Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The supreme quality of leadership is unquestionably integrity; without it, no real success as possible, no matter whether it is on a section, gang, a football field, in an army, or in an office."

- Dwight D Eisenhower.

"How I long to accomplish a great and noble task, but it is my chief duty to accomplish small tasks, as if they were great and noble."

- Helen Keller.

“I would rather have questions that can't be answered than answers that can't be questioned."

- This quote is attributed to George Carlin and Richard Feynman. So take your pick, Carlin or Feynman. Both are worthy people to quote, and both quotes are relevant in any discussion about children, questions, and thinking.”

1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2023

3. Task Force Viking Hammer (Iraq 2003) | SOF News

4. Philippines names 4 new camps for US forces amid China fury

5. China seethes as US chip controls threaten tech ambitions

6. US military says senior IS commander killed in Syria

7. Elite Ukrainian snipers describe their war from the shadows

8. Congressman: US support for aid to Ukraine is 'overwhelming'

9. Finland to join NATO on Tuesday, Sweden still waiting

10. Ukraine battles on in Bakhmut as Finland joins NATO

11. The Intensifying Trend Of Global De-Dollarization – Analysis

12. Chinese balloon got intel from U.S. military sites, despite efforts to block it

13. US says it cannot confirm China collected real-time data from spy balloon

14. China warns US House Speaker not to meet Taiwan president

15. War in Taiwan will dwarf Ukraine unless the US shows China its teeth

16. Why Some in the Military Might Not Celebrate a TikTok Ban

17. Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

18. Kevin McCarthy Prepares to Meet Taiwan’s President as Tensions With China Swirl

19. Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel

20. Mind the Middle Powers

21. America Can Win the AI Race

22. The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation

23. Retired U.S. colonel compares Ukraine counterattack to pivotal WWII battle

24. Drone-on-Drone Combat in Ukraine Marks a New Era of Aerial Warfare

25. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN April 3, 7.00 pm EST - Glory to Ukraine! The four hundred and fourthday of large-scale armed aggression of the russian federation against our state continues.

1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

Access the Foreign Policy Tracker HERE.

April 4, 2023 | FDD Tracker: March 1-April 4, 2023

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

Trend Overview

By John Hardie and David Adesnik

Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.

Last month saw President Joe Biden host his Australian and British counterparts to announce next steps in their trilateral defense pact, known as AUKUS, which seeks to strengthen deterrence of Beijing. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea are working to mend ties, a boon for U.S. efforts to combat threats from China and North Korea. The White House also released a long-awaited national strategy that delineates U.S. cybersecurity priorities.

The good news ends there, however. Although it is working with allies to help Ukraine prepare for a spring counteroffensive, the administration continues to withhold key weapons from Kyiv. The administration also refuses to lower the G7-imposed price cap on Russian oil exports, neutering its ability to cut Kremlin revenue. Additionally, the president’s proposed defense budget, once adjusted for inflation, would leave the U.S. military with flat or even declining resources while failing to fund top priorities identified by Indo-Pacific Command.

Meanwhile, Biden continues to struggle to assert leadership in the Middle East. Beijing brokered a deal to normalize relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Middle Kingdom’s first major foray into Middle East politics. Tehran inches ever closer to a nuclear weapons capability, but the White House seemingly lacks a strategy to stop it. The administration also continues to green-light Arab normalization with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.

Check back with us next month to see whether Biden manages to right the ship.

Trending Positive

Trending Neutral

Trending Negative

Trending Very Negative

International Organizations

Nonproliferation and Biodefense

Syria

2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-3-2023

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group fighters made further advances in central Bakhmut and seized the Bakhmut City Administration Building on the night of April 2.
Russian authorities are blaming Ukrainian government entities and Russian opposition figure Alexey Navalny for the assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin (also known as Vladlen Tartarsky).
Official Russian responses to Fomin’s death failed to generate a single narrative in the information space and led to disjointed responses from prominent pro-war voices.
Russian security services reportedly continue to confiscate passports of senior officials and state company executives in an effort to limit flight from Russia.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian sources reported on April 3 that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) units received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems for the first time.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian officials likely remain concerned about a potential Ukrainian threat to Crimea amid continued fortification and logistical efforts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing a state fund to support military personnel who participate in the war in Ukraine and their families.
Likely Ukrainian partisans used an improvised explosive device (IED) to target a former Russian occupation official in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 3, 2023

Apr 3, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark

April 3, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Wagner Group fighters made further advances in central Bakhmut and seized the Bakhmut City Administration Building on the night of April 2. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin raised a Russian flag with an inscription in memory of assassinated milblogger Maksim Fomin across from the Bakhmut City Administration building the night of April 2 and claimed that Wagner “legally controls” Bakhmut, though Ukrainian troops remain in the western part of the city.[1] Russian forces made further advances on April 3, with drone footage posted on April 3 depicting Wagner Group and Russian flags planted over the rubble of the destroyed administration building.[2] Several Russian milbloggers additionally circulated an image of a Wagner fighter standing in front of the Bakhmut City Administration building before its destruction.[3] The Wagner Group likely will continue attempts to consolidate control of central Bakhmut and attempt to push westward through dense urban areas toward Khromove.

Russian authorities are blaming Ukrainian government entities and Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny for the April 2 assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin, also known as Vladlen Tartarsky. The Russian National Anti-Terrorism Committee claimed that Ukrainian special services collaborated with the Anti-Corruption Fund, which Navalny founded in 2011, to plan the attack against Fomin.[4] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that the Ukrainian government may be behind Fomin’s death and claimed that Ukraine has killed others since 2014, such as Daria Dugina, which Peskov spuriously used as justification for the “special military operation.”[5] The Russian Investigative Committee reclassified the case as a terrorist attack and claimed that it was planned in Ukrainian territory.[6] The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) confirmed that the sculpture handed to Fomin prior to his death contained hidden explosives.[7] The Russian Investigative Committee confirmed on April 3 that Russian authorities detained Daria Trepova in a St. Petersburg apartment on suspicion of the attack.[8] Authorities released an excerpt of their interrogation of Trepova, in which Trepova stated that authorities questioned her about giving a sculpture to Fomin, but she did not answer on camera whether she knew the sculpture contained explosives.[9] The range of various official responses is notably disjointed, with a lack of consensus among official Russian sources regarding Trepova’s involvement or association with either Ukrainian special services or Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Fund.

Official Russian responses to Fomin’s death failed to generate a single narrative in the information space and led to disjointed responses from prominent pro-war voices. Several prominent milbloggers and news aggregators fixated on the reported investigation into Daria Trepova and analyzing footage of the lead-up to and aftermath of the explosion.[10] Other milbloggers claimed that the attack was carried out by Ukrainian special services and amplified news of the investigation without offering additional commentary into the situation.[11] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted a simple message mourning Fomin without engaging with the Kremlin's informational response.[12] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed that unspecified attackers targeted Fomin because he listened to both the Russian and Ukrainian perspectives, had over 500,000 Telegram subscribers, and effectively organized donation drives for Russian forces.[13] Russian Orthodox Church head Patriarch Kirill connected Fomin’s murder to the ongoing conflict over the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, despite no obvious connection between the two incidents.[14]

As Russian officials try to galvanize an official narrative around the National Anti-Terrorism Committee’s investigation, Russian milbloggers will likely increasingly criticize the results and conclusions of the investigation, and Fomin’s death is likely to become a major point of information space neuralgia. One Russian milblogger and political analyst overtly criticized the official Russian response to Fomin’s death and noted that Russian officials have likely predetermined the final findings of the investigation.[15] The absence of a coherent narrative in the pro-Russian information space is reminiscent of responses to Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive in fall 2022, when the Kremlin’s propaganda machine initially failed to define a rhetorical line to respond to massive Ukrainian gains and caused an information space breakdown that manifested in disjointed responses across the entire pro-war community.[16]

Russian security services reportedly continue to confiscate the passports of senior officials and state company executives to limit flight from Russia. Financial Times reported on April 2 that the Russian security services seek to prevent senior officials, ex-officials, and state company executives from traveling abroad, indicating that the Kremlin continues to fear elites will flee Russia.[17] Current Time TV and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty-associated investigative project “Sistema” reported on March 10 that Russian security officials told government officials and employees of state-owned companies to hand over their passports on threat of forcibly revoking an individual’s passports or forced resignation.[18]

Key Takeaways

Wagner Group fighters made further advances in central Bakhmut and seized the Bakhmut City Administration Building on the night of April 2.
Russian authorities are blaming Ukrainian government entities and Russian opposition figure Alexey Navalny for the assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin (also known as Vladlen Tartarsky).
Official Russian responses to Fomin’s death failed to generate a single narrative in the information space and led to disjointed responses from prominent pro-war voices.
Russian security services reportedly continue to confiscate passports of senior officials and state company executives in an effort to limit flight from Russia.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian sources reported on April 3 that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) units received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems for the first time.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
Russian officials likely remain concerned about a potential Ukrainian threat to Crimea amid continued fortification and logistical efforts.
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing a state fund to support military personnel who participate in the war in Ukraine and their families.
Likely Ukrainian partisans used an improvised explosive device (IED) to target a former Russian occupation official in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 2 and 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Nevske (20km northwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Verkhnokamianske (18km south of Kreminna).[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) elements are operating near Kreminna and that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks with artillery support near Torske, Nevske, Terny, and Makiivka (all within 14 to 21km west or northwest of Kreminna) on April 2 and 3.[20] Geolocated footage published on April 1 shows that Ukrainian forces made a limited advance southwest of Chervonopopivka (5km northwest of Kreminna) on an unspecified date.[21] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev posted footage allegedly showing elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd LNR Army Corps) operating in the Kreminna direction.[22] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Oleksii Smirnov reported on April 3 that Ukrainian forces continue to repel constant attacks on Bilohorivka even though Russian forces have more troops near the settlement.[23] Another milblogger published footage on April 3 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division operating near Kreminna.[24]

Russian sources reported on April 3 that units of the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces received TOS-1A thermobaric MLRS for the first time. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that VDV units were issued TOS-1A “Solntsepek” thermobaric artillery systems for the first time in the VDV’s history before deploying to an unspecified section of the frontline in Ukraine.[25] ISW has observed the commitment of elements of at least two VDV divisions (the 76thand 98thdivisions) to the Kreminna area and the deployment of a TOS-1 system near Kreminna as recently as April 1.[26] TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems are military district level assets and are not tied to specific divisions, and the assignment of rare TOS-1 systems to VDV elements suggests Russian military command is likely prioritizing VDV units in pursing offensive operations, potentially in Luhansk Oblast.[27] The commitment of VDV units with TOS-1 support to this, or any axis, is unlikely to lend Russian troops a decisive offensive advantage, however.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Wagner Group forces continued advancing in central Bakhmut on April 2 and 3. Geolocated footage posted on April 1 shows a Ukrainian missile strike on Russian positions in the AZOM complex in northern Bakhmut, confirming that the Wagner Group likely seized the complex around March 28, as ISW previously reported.[28] Geolocated footage taken on the night of April 2 shows Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin raising a Russian flag in front of the Bakhmut City Administration Building.[29] Several milbloggers additionally circulated an image of a Wagner fighter standing in front of an office door in the Bakhmut City Administration building itself.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 2 and 3 that Wagner forces continued to consolidate control of streets and urban areas near central Bakhmut, and that heavy fighting continued southwest of Bakhmut near the Ivanivske sector of the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[31] Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing to the western part of the city.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself, northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest), and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km southwest) and Predtechyne (15km southwest).[33] Ukrainian military officials supported ISW’s assessment that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are increasingly supporting Wagner operations in Bakhmut.[34]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline on April 2 and 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued unsuccessful offensive actions near Avdiivka itself; in the Avdiivka area near Severne (5km west of Avdiivka) and Novokalynove (12km north of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Pervomaiske and Vodyane; and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[35] Ukrainian Tavriisk Direction Forces Joint Press Center Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 2 that Russian forces in the Donetsk City direction retreated from unspecified positions and that Ukrainian forces are reoccupying those newly captured positions.[36] Dmytrashkivskyi also reported on April 3 that unspecified Russian special forces elements have recently deployed in the Donetsk City area and that the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) recently withdrew from the Avdiivka area for recovery.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued attacking Avdiivka from the south and northeast on April 2 and 3.[38] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage on April 2 and 3 reportedly depicting elements of the 87th and 9th regiments of the 1st DNR Army Corps operating in the Avdiivka area.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that unspecified motorized rifle formations of the Southern Grouping of Forces (Southern Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks near Marinka on April 2 and 3.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on April 2. Dmytrashkivskyi stated on April 3 that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults towards Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) on April 2, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Vuhledar area on April 3.[41] Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Spokesperson Aleksandr Gordeev stated that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in unspecified locations southwest of Donetsk City on April 2 and 3.[42] Geolocated footage posted on April 2 shows that Russian forces likely hold positions in Dorozhnianka, eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, about 100km southwest of Donetsk City.[43]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian officials likely remain concerned about a potential Ukrainian threat to occupied Crimea amid continued defensive and logistical preparations on the peninsula. Satellite imagery posted on April 1 shows that Russian forces have erected defensive lines along key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and logistics nodes in Crimea, including near Armyansk, along the E105 south of Chonhar (34km northeast of Dzhankoy), along the E97 highway near Filativka (8km southeast of Armyansk), near Vorontsivka (20km south of Armyansk), and along the beaches of Yevpatoria in western Crimea.[44] The Washington Post reported that Russian authorities have focused on erecting new defenses in Crimea in the past few weeks amid rumors of a Ukrainian counteroffensive, including near Vitino on Crimea’s western coast (15km west of Yevpatoria), Medvedivka (22km northeast of Dzhankoy), Armyansk, Maslove (9km north of Dzhankoy), and Novoivanivka (32km northwest of Dzhankoy).[45] The Washington Post also reported that Russian forces have established extensive fortifications along the approach to Crimea from occupied Kherson Oblast.

Russian authorities also continue to struggle with the reconstruction of the Kerch Strait Bridge. Satellite imagery posted on April 3 shows that Russian authorities continue efforts to restore the Kerch Strait Bridge rail track.[46] Krasnodar Krai local news outlet Krasnodarskye Izvestia reported on April 1 that the Kerch Strait road bridge has faced traffic jams of 1.7 to 2km long on both sides of the bridge due to security checkpoints, and that 128 heavy trucks waited in line to ferry across the Kerch Strait that morning.[47]

Ukrainian sources conducted a HIMARS strike against a Russian railway depot in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast for the third time in the past seven days on April 2.[48] Russian sources noted that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against rear logistics elements during the Kherson Oblast counteroffensive in fall 2022 and expressed concern about Ukrainian forces conducting these strikes against Melitopol to prepare for an upcoming counteroffensive.[49]

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson Oblast on April 2 and 3. Ukrainian Head of the Southern Operational Command Press Center Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the pace of Russian shelling in Kherson Oblast has decreased from 90 to 100 rounds per day the prior week to 50 to 60 in the current week.[50] Humenyuk also stated that Russian forces may have limited their usage of guided aerial bombs in Kherson Oblast on April 1 due to poor weather conditions. A Russian source claimed on April 3 that Russian forces conducted an airstrike against a Ukrainian force concentration near Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast (35km northeast of Tokmak).[51]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 3 establishing a state fund to support military personnel serving in Ukraine and their families.[52] The decree includes all personnel who served in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts since February 24, 2022, and in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts since September 20, 2022. Russian sources reported that the fund’s leadership will include Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko as Chairperson of the Supervisory Board and wife of the head of Kemerovo Oblast Anna Tsivileva as Chairperson of the Fund.[53] A Russian milblogger criticized this leadership composition, claiming that Putin appointed Tsivileva to head the fund because she is also Putin’s cousin and the head of the Kolmar Group, a large coalmining company.[54]

Russian authorities continue to struggle with internal resistance to the war in Ukraine. Russian sources reported at least four cases of alleged sabotage against Russian railways and arson attempts against military registration and enlistment offices in Russia on April 1 and 2.[55]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Likely Ukrainian partisans targeted a former Russian occupation official with an improved explosive device (IED) in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on April 3. Official Ukrainian sources reported that a car carrying Maksim Zubarev, former occupation head of Yakymivka (15km southwest of Melitopol), exploded in the center of Melitopol on April 3.[56] Russian occupation authorities claimed that unspecified terrorists conducted the attack and that Zubarev is in severe condition.[57] Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Council Member Vladimir Rogov claimed that Melitopol has become the center for terrorist activity in “Novorossiya,” and advocated for the reestablishment of the death penalty to particularly target “terrorist” activities in occupied territories.[58]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a package of eight laws on April 3 on establishing courts in occupied territories. The laws create regional and arbitration courts in occupied territories and define the procedure for selecting the courts’ initial judicial composition.[59] The laws dictate that existing courts in occupied territories may continue operations in accordance with Russian legal standards until the new laws come into force on April 20.[60]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.)

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ordered a combat readiness check for Belarusian forces on April 3. The Belarusian MoD stated that one unspecified formation will conduct the combat readiness check, which will focus on the ability of commanders to manage subordinate units and subunits.[61] Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin announced the appointment of Colonel Vladimir Bely as Commander of Belarus’ Western Operational Command.[62]

Belarusian authorities continue to advance Russia’s false narrative of nuclear escalation, likely to intimidate NATO states from providing military aid to Ukraine. The Belarusian Ambassador to Russia claimed on April 2 that Russian tactical nuclear weapons will be deployed on Belarus’ western border with NATO countries and that the weapons would expand Belarusian defensive capabilities.[63] ISW previously assessed that Putin attempts to exploit Western fears of nuclear escalation while the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons remains extremely low.[64] Russia has long fielded nuclear-capable weapons with the ability to strike any targets that tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus could hit.

Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Hajun Project reported on March 30 that four Russian An-124 military transport aircraft arrived at the Gomel airport purportedly carrying a large payload, possibly S-300 or S-400 missiles, since March 25.[65] Belarusian human rights organization Charter 97 amplified reports that seven Russian military transport aircraft allegedly carrying large payloads landed at the Gomel airport since March 25.[66]

The Belarusian State Security Committee announced on April 3 that detainees suspected of the Machulishchy Airfield sabotage attack could face the death penalty.[67]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1642668716591570944?s=20 ; https:...

[2] https://t.me/brussinf/5821

[3] https://t.me/grey_zone/18008

[4] https://t.me/readovkanews/56071; https://crimea.ria dot ru/20230403/ubiystvo-vladlena-tatarskogo-splanirovali-ukrainskie-spetssluzhby-1127943590.html; https://t.me/readovkanews/56072; https://t.me/bazabazon/16722; https://t.me/basurin_e/518; https://t.me/Agdchan/9716; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/03/nak-ubiystvo-tatarskogo-splanirovali-ukrainskie-spetssluzhby-s-privlecheniem-agentury-iz-chisla-lits-sotrudnichayuschih-s-fbk; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/03/terrorizm-na-nas-davno-pytayutsya-navesit-fbk-otritsaet-obvineniya-v-prichastnosti-k-ubiystvu-voenkora-tatarskogo; https://t.me/bbcrussian/44185

[5] https://russian.rt dot com/russia/news/1131381-peskov-kievskii-rezhim-podderzhivaet-terror-i-vozmozhno; https://t.me/readovkanews/56075; https://news dot ru/vlast/peskov-obvinil-kiev-v-ubijstve-voenkora-tatarskogo/; https://t.me/readovkanews/56074; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/03/imenno-poetomu-provoditsya-spetsialnaya-voennaya-operatsiya-peskov-ob-ubiystve-voenkora-tatarskogo

[6] https://t.me/rlz_the_kraken/57457; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17437831

[7] https://t.me/readovkanews/56016

[8] https://t.me/readovkanews/56066

[9] https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1642831350351683586; https://t.me/readovkanews/56076; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/10935; https://t.me/bazabazon/16723

[10] https://t.me/readovkanews/56068; https://t.me/readovkanews/56057; http...

[11] https://t.me/JokerDPR/408; https://t.me/readovkanews/56020; https://t....

[12] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10126

[13] https://t.me/vrogov/8516

[14] https://t.me/romagolovanov/10974

[15] https://t.me/anatoly_nesmiyan/8813; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22341

[16] https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept2; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept9; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept10

[17] https://www.ft.com/content/c41be6b0-f625-46f2-91e4-d03eb4b6372b

[18] https://www.currenttime.tv/a/rf-zagranpasporta/32311413.html

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fJnei1XUxCBb5aBXoR...

[20] https://t.me/wargonzo/11747; https://t.me/wargonzo/11739; https://t.me...

[21] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1642866101309566982; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1642259202751037441

[22] https://t.me/kommunist/16730

[23] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/9612

[24] https://t.me/sashakots/39168

[25] https://t.me/mod_russia/25340; https://t.me/rian_ru/198717; ttps://t.m...

[26] https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1642866101309566982; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1642259202751037441; https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1642866101309566982; https://twitter.com/200_zoka/status/1642259202751037441; https://www.un...

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[29] https://twitter.com/War_cube_/status/1642668716591570944?s=20 ; https:...

[30] https://t.me/grey_zone/18008; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82074

[31] https://t.me/readovkanews/55951; https://t.me/wargonzo/11721; https://...

[32] https://t.me/basurin_e/510; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/82071; https://t...

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gCzRisYpJfpPj5WWCbF...

[34] https://t.me/annamaliar/610; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/04/03/vorog-slabshaye-i-namagayetsya-prykryty-svoyi-provaly-fejkamy-pro-vzyattya-bahmutu/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012823; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030623; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021923

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0gCzRisYpJfpPj5WWCbF...

[36] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/02/na-doneczkomu-napryamku-vorog-vidstupyv-iz-deyakyh-pozyczij/

[37] https://suspilne dot media/433569-na-doneckomu-napramku-zavilisa-specpriznacenci-dmitraskivskij/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/04/03/na-donechchyni-nam-vdalosya-pokrashhyty-svoye-taktychne-polozhennya-oleksij-dmytrashkivskyj/

[38] https://t.me/wargonzo/11721; https://t.me/wargonzo/11739

[39] https://t.me/nm_dnr/10122; https://t.me/voenacher/42221; https://t.me/...

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/25314 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/25336

[41] https://suspilne dot media/433569-na-doneckomu-napramku-zavilisa-specpriznacenci-dmitraskivskij/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fJnei1XUxCBb5aBXoR...

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/25320; https://t.me/mod_russia/25339

[43] https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1642648227752058880; https://twitte...

[44] https://t.me/hueviy_kherson/204

[45] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2023/ukraine-russia-cri...

[46] https://twitter.com/bradyafr/status/1642889692931604491?s=20

[47] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1642191550892367877

[48] https://t.me/rian_ru/198650; https://t.me/rian_ru/198655; https://t.me/vrogov/8503; https://t.me/ry... https://t.me/riamelitopol/87187 ; https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1642451664211771397?s=20; https://t.me/readovkanews/55970; https://t.me/readovkanews/55968; https://t.me/readovkanews/55966

[49] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22249

[50] https://suspilne dot media/433320-sili-oboroni-znisili-tri-artilerijski-ustanovki-vijsk-rf-na-livoberezzi-hersonsini/

[51] https://t.me/milinfolive/98830

[52] https://t.me/mod_russia/25337; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202304030001; https://t.me/readovkanews/56064; https://interfax dot ru/russia/894103

[53] https://t.me/sashakots/39153; https://t.me/president_sovet/2656; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/04/03/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-sozdanii-fonda-podderzhki-uchastnikov-spetsialnoy-voennoy-operatsii-ego-vozglavila-zhena-glavy-kemerovskoy-oblasti

[54] https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/22325

[55] .https://t.me/sotaproject/56378; https://t.me/astrapress/24248; https://t.me/sotaproject/56394; https://t.me/astrapress/24183

[56] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/04/03/v-melitopoli-pidirvaly-avtomobil-z-kolaborantom/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1639; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_mel... https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1638;%20https://suspilne%20dot%20med...

[57] https://t.me/vrogov/8518; https://t.me/vrogov/8519; https://t.me/Balit...

[58] https://t.me/vrogov/8518; https://t.me/vrogov/8519

[59] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8292; https://t.me/vrogov/8528; https://t.me/...

[60] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/8292; https://t.me/vrogov/8528; https://t.me/...

[61] https://t.me/modmilby/25107

[62] https://t.me/modmilby/25103; https://t.me/modmilby/25106

[63] https://apnews.com/article/russia-belarus-ukraine-war-nuclear-weapons-41...

[64] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[65] https://twitter.com/Hajun_BY/status/1641376646321020928?s=20; https://t...

[66] https://charter97.org/ru/news/2023/4/1/542437/; https://t.me/flagshtok/10502; https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1642...

[67] https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1642918830216298497?s=20; https://w... by/society/view/kgb-figurantam-ugolovnogo-dela-po-faktu-terakta-na-aerodrome-machulischi-mozhet-grozit-smertnaja-kazn-559043-2023

Task Force Viking Hammer (Iraq 2003) | SOF News

sof.news · by DVIDS · April 4, 2023

Story by Isaih Vega, 10th SFG(A).

“In the Spring of 2002, as the concept started to take shape, all I could think was, this sounded like an exciting but unrealistic script for a TV show or movie about Special Forces,” said retired Lt. Col. Mark Grdovic. “Our concept was to open a second front against Saddam’s forces that would force him to divide his limited forces to defend the north and ease the pressure on the invading U.S. and coalition forces in the south.”

In 2003, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), along with approximately 55,000 Kurdish Fighters (aka Peshmerga) from the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), rallied together for what would be known as Task Force Viking. The objective of TF Viking was to disrupt the enemy forces in the Joint Special Operations Area North, specifically the 13 Iraqi Divisions that included: two Republican Guard Divisions and an Armor Division. In addition to the Iraqi forces, an Islamic extremist group, Ansar al-Islam, with ties to Al Qaeda, was also situated along the Iranian border. However, to effectively enable the PUK to threaten the Iraqi positions, it first required Ansar al-Islam to be neutralized as a threat to their rear area.

“As I understood the situation, all we must do is successfully conduct a division-size, daylight, uphill, frontal attack in mountainous terrain, with a partner whom I have not yet met, against a fanatical entrenched enemy with minimal resources. Amidst this task is a facility that the USG is interested in and would like us to conduct a raid and subsequent sensitive site exploitation to determine the extent of the suspected chemical/biological experiments.”

Col. (Ret) Mark Grdovic, former 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG(A) Operations Officer

He continued to state, “To be crystal clear, this effort, as complex as it is, is not my actual mission but merely a precursor that must be accomplished to conduct my actual mission (to open a second front against Saddam). This task comes with an unknown expiration date for its value to the U.S. CENTCOM plan based on the undeclared (secret) D-Day for the invasion”.

Map: Map of Northern Iraq March 2003, courtesy of Mark Grdovic. Ansar-al-Islam’s area of operations was in the vicinity of the red blob on the above map along the Iraqi-Iranian border – in the vicinity of Sargat, Iraq (Google Maps).

The operation would require attacking along a 25-mile front uphill in incredibly rugged mountainous terrain connected with the Iranian border. On the 21st of March, the U.S. forces launched 64 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), minimally impacting the terrorist’s defenses. Several of the TLAMs hit around the Sargat chemical weapons facility.

“I don’t think anyone slept that night. It was quiet; everyone was sitting around, checking equipment, reviewing their portion of the plan, loading vehicles, and trying to rest or eat,” said Grdovic.

Over the next four days, their defenses were softened with intermittent airstrikes.

On the 25th of March, Operation Viking Hammer was underway. The plan called for 5 ODAs, each with an accompanying PUK unit with 1000 peshmerga fighters, attacking along a five separate axis of advance or “prongs,” with 4000 Peshmerga in reserve. The attack ended up as six different routes, each named with a different color. As the PUK forces advanced, they encountered minefields and prepared enemy positions. The ODAs, operating at the front of the PUK columns, called in close air support. In addition, they provided fire support from mortars, crew-served weapons, sniper systems, or small arms. Over the first day of the battle, the PUK columns, with their ODAs, successfully overcame the Ansar al-Islam defenses and pushed the enemy almost to the Iranian border.

During the advance, the Yellow and Green prongs reached and secured the suspected chemical weapons facility in Sargat. The Red and Blue prongs seized a compound near a village called Darga Chakan that was known to house foreign fighters and advisors. One of those foreign fighters was rumored to have been a Jordanian named Zarqawi, who got away and later started the group AQ in Iraq. The ODA accompanying the Black prong was almost overrun during a counterattack when engaged in an intense close-quarter attack with an attempted suicide bomber. The northernmost prong (added the day before and not assigned a color) was also at risk of being overrun until the ODA called in a close airstrike (danger close) to break the enemy’s advance.

The remainder of the day was spent eliminating any final pockets of resistance and consolidating their hold over the terrain. The sensitive site exploitation of the Sargat site yielded positive tests for hydrogen cyanide, the collection of dozens of forged passports, and written documents outlining the process form making VX nerve agent.

The PUK lost approximately 40 fighters during the attack, and at least 2-3 times as many were wounded. The enemy suffered approximately 150-200 hundred killed in action. The following day, 9,000 of the Peshmerga, armed with weapons and ammunition from the battlefield, moved west toward the Green Line like a tidal wave, eager to press the fight to the Iraqi forces and toward Kirkuk. The PUK left 1,000 peshmerga to secure the territory in and around the Halabja and Sargat regions. Over the next two weeks, isolated pockets of Ansar al-Islam fighters would be captured or surrendered.

**********

This story by Sgt. Isaih Vega of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service on March 29, 2023. DVIDS content is in the public domain.

Top Map: The six axis “prong” that advanced across northern Iraq during Operation Viking Hammer. (Courtesy photo by Mark Grdovic)

Operation Viking Hammer, Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Viking_Hammer

“Operation VIKING HAMMER”, by Kenneth Finlayson, Veritas, Vol. 1. No. 1, 2005.

“Operation Ugly Baby and 10th Special Forces Group (Iraq 2003)”, SOF News, March 31, 2023.

“Video – History of Task Force Viking (2003)”, SOF News, October 29, 2022.

“Book Review – The CIA War in Kurdistan”, SOF News, January 26, 2021.

“173rd and Operation Northern Delay – March 26, 2003”, SOF News, March 26, 2023.

sof.news · by DVIDS · April 4, 2023

4. Philippines names 4 new camps for US forces amid China fury

Philippines names 4 new camps for US forces amid China fury

militarytimes.com · by Jim Gomez, The Associated Press · April 3, 2023

MANILA, Philippines (AP) — The Philippine government on Monday identified four new local military camps, including some across a sea border from Taiwan, where rotational batches of American forces with their weapons would be allowed to stay indefinitely despite strong objections from China.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration announced in February his approval of an expanded U.S. military presence in the country by allowing American forces to station in the four additional Philippine military bases under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the longtime treaty allies.

The move would boost his country’s coastal defense, Marcos said. It dovetails with the Biden administration’s effort to strengthen an arc of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific to better counter China, including in any future confrontation over Taiwan.

The new sites identified by Marcos’ office include a Philippine navy base in Santa Ana town and an international airport in Lal-lo town, both in northern Cagayan province. Those two locations have infuriated Chinese officials because they would provide U.S. forces with a staging ground close to southern China and Taiwan, the self-ruled island Beijing claims as its own.

The two other military areas are in northern Isabela province and on a local navy camp on Balabac island in the western province of Palawan.

Palawan faces the South China Sea, a key passage for global trade that Beijing claims virtually in its entirety and where it has taken increasingly aggressive actions that have threatened smaller claimant states, including the Philippines.

China and the Philippines, along with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan, have been locked in increasingly tense territorial disputes over the busy and resource-rich South China Sea. Washington lays no claims to the strategic waters but has deployed warships and fighter and surveillance aircraft for patrols that it says promote freedom of navigation and the rule of law, angering Beijing.

“That’s a trade route, that’s where more or less $3 trillion worth of trade passes. Our responsibility in collectively securing that is huge,” Carlito Galvez, who heads the Philippine Defense Department, said.

The four new military sites where American would gain access were “suitable and mutually beneficial” and would “boost the disaster response of the country” as springboard for humanitarian and relief work during emergencies, Marcos’s office said.

In a closed doors meeting in Manila with their Philippine counterparts last month, however, a Chinese Foreign Ministry delegation expressed its strong opposition to an expanded U.S. military presence in the Philippines and warned of its repercussions to regional peace and stability, Philippine officials said.

The Chinese Embassy separately warned in a recent statement that the Philippine government’s security cooperation with Washington “will drag the Philippines into the abyss of geopolitical strife and damage its economic development at the end of the day.”

The long-seething territorial conflicts have persisted as a major irritant in Philippine-China relations early in Marcos’ six-year term. His administration has filed at least 77 of more than 200 diplomatic protests against China’s increasingly assertive actions in the disputed waters since Marcos took office last year.

The Philippines used to host two of the largest U.S. Navy and Air Force bases outside the American mainland. The bases were shut down in the early 1990s after the Philippine Senate rejected an extension, but American forces later returned for large-scale combat exercises with Filipino troops under a Visiting Forces Agreement.

The Philippine Constitution prohibits the permanent basing of foreign troops and their involvement in local combat. The 2014 agreement allows visiting American forces to stay indefinitely in rotating batches in barracks and other buildings they construct within designated Philippine camps with their defense equipment, except nuclear weapons.

The Department of National Defense in Manila said the American military presence was not a re-establishment of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, as opponents have asserted.

5. China seethes as US chip controls threaten tech ambitions

China seethes as US chip controls threaten tech ambitions

AP · by JOE McDONALD · April 4, 2023

BEIJING (AP) — Furious at U.S. efforts that cut off access to technology to make advanced computer chips, China’s leaders appear to be struggling to figure out how to retaliate without hurting their own ambitions in telecoms, artificial intelligence and other industries.

President Xi Jinping’s government sees the chips that are used in everything from phones to kitchen appliances to fighter jets as crucial assets in its strategic rivalry with Washington and efforts to gain wealth and global influence. Chips are the center of a “technology war,” a Chinese scientist wrote in an official journal in February.

China has its own chip foundries, but they supply only low-end processors used in autos and appliances. The U.S. government, starting under then-President Donald Trump, is cutting off access to a growing array of tools to make chips for computer servers, AI and other advanced applications. Japan and the Netherlands have joined in limiting access to technology they say might be used to make weapons.

Xi, in unusually pointed language, accused Washington in March of trying to block China’s development with a campaign of “containment and suppression.” He called on the public to “dare to fight.”

Technology

Biden to meet with experts on AI 'risks and opportunities'

US infrastructure splurge extends to remote New Mexico farms

Biden pushes econ policy as Trump indictment gets attention

What's happening with Twitter blue check marks?

Despite that, Beijing has been slow to retaliate against U.S. companies, possibly to avoid disrupting Chinese industries that assemble most of the world’s smartphones, tablet computers and other consumer electronics. They import more than $300 billion worth of foreign chips every year.

The ruling Communist Party is throwing billions of dollars at trying to accelerate chip development and reduce the need for foreign technology.

China’s loudest complaint: It is blocked from buying a machine available only from a Dutch company, ASML, that uses ultraviolet light to etch circuits into silicon chips on a scale measured in nanometers, or billionths of a meter. Without that, Chinese efforts to make transistors faster and more efficient by packing them more closely together on fingernail-size slivers of silicon are stalled.

Making processor chips requires some 1,500 steps and technologies owned by U.S., European, Japanese and other suppliers.

“China won’t swallow everything. If damage occurs, we must take action to protect ourselves,” the Chinese ambassador to the Netherlands, Tan Jian, told the Dutch newspaper Financieele Dagblad.

“I’m not going to speculate on what that might be,” Tan said. “It won’t just be harsh words.”

The conflict has prompted warnings the world might decouple, or split into separate spheres with incompatible technology standards that mean computers, smartphones and other products from one region wouldn’t work in others. That would raise costs and might slow innovation.

“The bifurcation in technological and economic systems is deepening,” Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore said at an economic forum in China last month. “This will impose a huge economic cost.”

U.S.-Chinese relations are at their lowest level in decades due to disputes over security, Beijing’s treatment of Hong Kong and Muslim ethnic minorities, territorial disputes and China’s multibillion-dollar trade surpluses.

Chinese industries will “hit a wall” in 2025 or 2026 if they can’t get next generation chips or the tools to make their own, said Handel Jones, a tech industry consultant.

China “will start falling behind significantly,” said Jones, CEO of International Business Strategies.

Beijing might have leverage, though, as the biggest source of batteries for electric vehicles, Jones said.

Chinese battery giant CATL supplies U.S. and Europe automakers. Ford Motor Co. plans to use CATL technology in a $3.5 billion battery factory in Michigan.

“China will strike back,” Jones said. “What the public might see is China not giving the U.S. batteries for EVs.”

On Friday, Japan increased pressure on Beijing by joining Washington in imposing controls on exports of chipmaking equipment. The announcement didn’t mention China, but the trade minister said Tokyo doesn’t want its technology used for military purposes.

A Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, warned Japan that “weaponizing sci-tech and trade issues” would “hurt others as well as oneself.”

Hours later, the Chinese government announced an investigation of the biggest U.S. memory chip maker, Micron Technology Inc., a key supplier to Chinese factories. The Cyberspace Administration of China said it would look for national security threats in Micron’s technology and manufacturing but gave no details.

The Chinese military also needs semiconductors for its development of stealth fighter jets, cruise missiles and other weapons.

Chinese alarm grew after President Joe Biden in October expanded controls imposed by Trump on chip manufacturing technology. Biden also barred Americans from helping Chinese manufacturers with some processes.

To nurture Chinese suppliers, Xi’s government is stepping up support that industry experts say already amounts to as much as $30 billion a year in research grants and other subsidies.

China’s biggest maker of memory chips, Yangtze Memory Technologies Corp., or YMTC, received a 49 billion yuan ($7 billion) infusion this year from two official funds, according to Tianyancha, a financial information provider.

One was the government’s main investment vehicle, the China National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund, known as the Big Fund. It was founded in 2014 with 139 billion yuan ($21 billion) and has invested in hundreds of companies.

The Big Fund launched a second entity, known as the Big Fund II, in 2019 with 200 billion yuan ($30 billion).

In January, chip manufacturer Hua Hong Semiconductor said Big Fund II would contribute 1.2 billion yuan ($175 million) for a planned 6.7 billion yuan ($975 million) wafer fabrication facility in eastern China’s Wuxi.

In March, the Cabinet promised tax breaks and other support for the industry. It gave no price tag. The government also has set up “integrated circuit talent training bases” at 23 universities and six at other schools.

“Semiconductors are the ‘main battlefield’ of the current China-U.S. technology war,” Junwei Luo, a scientist at the official Institute of Semiconductors, wrote in the February issue of the journal of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Luo called for “self-reliance and self-improvement in semiconductors.”

The scale of spending required is huge. The global industry leader, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp., or TSMC, is in the third year of a three-year, $100 billion plan to expand research and production.

Developers including Huawei Technologies Ltd. and VeriSilicon Holdings Co. can design logic chips for smartphones as powerful as those from Intel Corp., Apple Inc., South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Co. or Britain’s Arm Ltd., according to industry researchers. But they cannot be manufactured without the precision technology of TSMC and other foreign foundries.

Trump in 2019 crippled Huawei’s smartphone brand by blocking it from buying U.S. chips or other technology. American officials say Huawei, China’s first global tech brand, might facilitate Chinese spying, an accusation the company denies. In 2020, the White House tightened controls, blocking TSMC and others from using U.S. technology to produce chips for Huawei.

Washington threw up new hurdles for Chinese chip designers in August by imposing restrictions on software known as EDA, or electronic design automation, along with European, Asian and other governments to limit the spread of “dual use” technologies that might be used to make weapons.

In December, Biden added YMTC, the memory chip maker, and some other Chinese companies to a blacklist that limits access to chips made anywhere using U.S. tools or processes.

China’s foundries can etch circuits as small as 28 nanometers apart. By contrast, TSMC and other global competitors can etch circuits just three nanometers apart, ten times the Chinese industry’s precision. They are moving toward two nanometers.

To make the latest chips, “you need EUV (extreme ultraviolet lithography) tools, a very complicated process recipe and not just a couple of billion dollars but tens and tens of billions of dollars,” said Peter Hanbury, who follows the industry for Bain & Co.

“They’re not going to be able to produce competitive server, PC and smartphone chips,” Hanbury said. “You have to go to TSMC to do that.”

China’s ruling party is trying to develop its own tool vendors, but researchers say it is far behind a global network spread across dozens of countries.

Huawei said in a video on its website in December it was working on EUV technology. But creating a machine comparable to ASML’s might cost $5 billion and require a decade of research, according to industry experts. Huawei didn’t respond to a request for comment.

The day when China can supply its own EUV machine is “very far away,” said Hanbury.

___

AP researcher Yu Bing in Beijing and AP Writer Mike Corder in Amsterdam contributed.

AP · by JOE McDONALD · April 4, 2023

6. US military says senior IS commander killed in Syria

US military says senior IS commander killed in Syria

AP · by BASSEM MROUE · April 4, 2023

BEIRUT (AP) — A drone strike carried out by the American-led coalition in northwestern Syria has killed a senior member of the Islamic State group who was in charge of planning attacks in Europe, the United States military said Tuesday.

The man killed Monday in the strike was identified by a U.S. military statement as Khalid Aydd Ahmad al-Jabouri. The military statement added that his death “will temporarily disrupt the organization’s ability to plot external attacks.”

Monday’s strike was the latest by the U.S. military to kill a top official with the extremist group that once controlled large parts of Iraq and Syria, where it declared a “caliphate.” From the areas they once controlled, the extremists planned deadly attacks in Europe that killed scores of people. In recent years, such attacks have decreased because the Islamic State group lost the last sliver of land it controlled in March 2019.

The extremist sleeper cells are still launching deadly attacks in Syria and Iraq.

Opposition activists in northwest Syria said the man killed showed up in the area about 10 days ago claiming to be a displaced person from the eastern province of Deir el-Zour, bordering Iraq. Al-Jabouri is one of Iraq’s biggest tribes that also has presence in east and north Syria and the man might have said that he is from Deir el-Zour to hide his Iraqi identity as residents of east Syria speak Arabic dialect similar to the one spoken in Iraq.

Islamic State group

U.S. citizen gets 20 years for joining Islamic State group

Bomb kills 1, wounds 8 at press award event in Afghanistan

Bomb kills 3, including provincial governor, in Afghanistan

US defense secretary makes unannounced visit to Baghdad

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor, said on Monday that one person was killed in a drone strike near the rebel-held village of Kefteen. The Observatory’s chief Rami Abdurrahman identified the dead man as an Iraqi citizen who was struck with a missile as he spoke on his cellular phone outside the home he rented.

The opposition’s Syrian Civil Defense, also known as the White Helmets, said it evacuated the man from the scene of the attack and he later succumbed to his wounds.

The strike was the latest in a series of attacks over the past years targeting al-Qaida-linked militants and senior members of the Islamic State group in northwestern Syria.

Most of those killed by U.S. strikes in the rebel-held Idlib province over the past years were members of al-Qaida offshoot Horas al-Din, which is Arabic for “Guardians of Religion.” The group includes hardcore al-Qaida members who broke away from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the strongest insurgent group in Idlib province.

In February, a drone strike killed two men, whom local activists initially identified as Horas al-Din members. The Observatory later said that one of the two killed was a senior member of the Islamic State group that was defeated in Syria in March 2019.

The founder of the Islamic State group, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was hunted down by the Americans in a raid in Idlib in October 2019. His successor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, was also killed in a U.S. raid in February 2022 in northwest Syria.

In October, Syrian rebels killed the group’s leader, Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, and he has since been repalced by Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurayshi.

None of the al-Qurayshis are believed to be related. Al-Qurayshi is not their real name but comes from Quraish, the name of the tribe to which Islam’s Prophet Muhammad belonged. IS claims its leaders hail from this tribe and “al-Qurayshi” serves as part of an IS leader’s nom de guerre.

AP · by BASSEM MROUE · April 4, 2023

7. Elite Ukrainian snipers describe their war from the shadows

Excerpts:

Despite his specialized equipment, the expert sniper says his weapon of choice these days in the fighting around Bakhmut is not his cutting-edge Western rifle, but rather, a simple Kalashnikov automatic, equipped with a thermal scope.

“Believe it or not, this, with the proper optics is the most effective weapon I’ve used in this war,” Artyom says, holding up his go-to machine gun. “A sniper rifle costs $20,000 or $30,000 dollars and can kill only one Russian quickly. An AK can defend against an entire assault.” His record in a single engagement? 15 enemies eliminated in about three hours. “We didn’t expect them to react so calmly once we started shooting, but they just kept milling around in the same area,” Artyom says.

Elite Ukrainian snipers describe their war from the shadows

militarytimes.com · by Neil Hauer · April 3, 2023

DONBAS, UKRAINE — “Sector clear,” calls out the instructor, Artyom, to his student Yevhen. The latter man shifts his rifle slightly, its long British-made barrel resting just above the ground as Yevhen lays prone.

“Target in sights,” he says in Ukrainian as he rests his crosshairs on a man-shaped metal panel in the quarry below a half-kilometer away. He pulls the trigger: a sharp crack, and the smell of gunpowder in the air. Artyom continues to peer through his binoculars into the quarry.

“Target hit,” he says, with a note of approval.

Artyom and Yevhen are training here at a makeshift firing range in eastern Ukraine, just a few dozen miles from the fierce battle for the city of Bakhmut, keeping sharp for when their deadly skills will be called on again. It’s early March, and around Bakhmut, both sides are dug in behind armor or mud, sheltering from 24/7 artillery fire, and occasionally darting from cover to open fire on an enemy trench position. The two snipers’ go-to guns in that type of fight are Kalashnikovs — a weapon well-suited to unleashing a wall of ammunition at close range.

Ukrainian forces running out of shells, equipment in fight for Bakhmut

To keep holding Bakhmut, Ukrainian troops need to be resupplied, fast.

“Over the last six months, there hasn’t been much use for snipers — the frontline has been changing quite a bit,” Artyom says. “Instead, we have largely been working as saboteurs: planting mines, destroying train tracks” before the enemy can capture and use them, and carrying out reconnaissance for raids.

But when the Russians have spent their energy on the latest offensive, make camp and take a knee before the next one, the snipers will take to the shadows again, to take them out.

The men have repurposed a deserted stone quarry for their target practice — a wide, rock-strewn depression gouged out of miles of farmer’s fields clogged with mud from the springtime thaw. Yevhen is younger, having joined Ukraine’s armed forces as Russia invaded last year; he is now honing his skills in long-range firearms. Artyom is a professional sniper, having worked in this role since he joined Ukraine’s army in 2016.

Top-of-the-line rifles

For today’s session, each man has a personalized, top-of-the-line sniper rifle to work with. Yevhen to a .308 calibre Accuracy International model; Artyom prefers his Italian-made .338 Victrix Scorpio V. The Western, NATO-style loadout of each marksman is an evolutionary shift from the Soviet approach that characterized Ukraine’s armed forces in years past.

“The U.S., UK, Canada — these countries are the pinnacle of modern equipment,” Artyom says, his outfit bristling with optics and auxiliary gear. “What they use, we try to emulate.” The two men spoke anonymously because they were talking without Ukrainian army permission, in order to speak freely about the course of the war.

While most of their countrymen are fighting in large, coordinated maneuver formations of tanks, artillery and infantry, the two snipers are part of the elite light-infantry force striking from the shadows, using some of the most advanced equipment in Ukraine’s arsenal. Their operations helped drive Russian forces out of western Ukraine in the opening weeks of the 2021 invasion, picking off senior enemy officers at long range, inspiring fear, and confusion among the ill-prepared and disorganized Russian ranks. It’s their tactics that NATO chiefs are studying, as a playbook to what U.S. and other troops might face, should Moscow attack NATO territory.

Yevhen fires his rifle, a .308 Accuracy International, at a training range in eastern Ukraine. The Western, NATO-style loadout of each marksman is an evolutionary shift from the Soviet approach that characterized Ukraine’s armed forces in years past. (Thomas Mutch/Special to Military Times)

That kind of warfare was particularly vital in the first six weeks of the Russian invasion as well.

As Russian armored units lumbered through the Ukrainian countryside in late February and early March 2022, the conditions for the sniper warfare that had dominated the not-so-frozen conflict along the frontlines in Donbas since 2015 evaporated.

Instead, mobile strike teams capable of taking on isolated Russian columns, often operating without the requisite infantry cover, became the priority. Composed of both veteran and irregular partisan fighters, small teams of Ukrainian infantry inflicted outsized losses on Russian units.

While neither Yevhen nor Artyom ever worked behind Russian lines, they admit that there was “hardly such a thing” as proper frontlines in those hectic first weeks, before Moscow abandoned the fight for northern Ukraine to focus on Donbas.

In the months that followed, Arytom redeployed to Donbas as well. He describes several close brushes with death since then.

“Sniper duels are just a silly thing from the movies,” Artyom says. “When [the Russians] really want to get us, they use mortars — or if we’re really unlucky, white phosphorus.” The latter substance – an incendiary agent whose use as a weapon is banned in most cases by international law – was deployed against Artyom and his comrades in the village of Bilohorivka just last month. “Everything was on fire. We were lucky to escape that time,” Artyom says.

For Artyom, the war didn’t start with Russia’s full-scale invasion last February. A native of Kramatorsk, he was living in that city when Russian-backed separatists occupied it for several months in 2014 — an experience he credits for his desire to join the armed forces.

“Back in 2014, I was a normal guy, just working in a heavy machinery factory,” he says. “What happened was almost surreal. I couldn’t believe that just 20 guys can capture a whole city – that 500 policemen can just defect or flee,” Artyom says of the Russian separatists’ brief capture of Kramatorsk during Russia’s seizure of Crimea.

He aided Ukraine’s armed forces during the 2014 occupation, providing them with coordinates of separatist troops and bases. “It was pure chaos in those days – gangs looting stores, kidnapping people. I couldn’t imagine that happening to the rest [of Ukraine]. Those days affected me a lot,” Artyom says. He joined the army two years later.

Artyom has served in Ukraine's armed forces since 2016, fighting in battlefields across the country in the past year. Photo by Thomas Mutch.

Battle for Bakhmut

Despite his specialized equipment, the expert sniper says his weapon of choice these days in the fighting around Bakhmut is not his cutting-edge Western rifle, but rather, a simple Kalashnikov automatic, equipped with a thermal scope.

“Believe it or not, this, with the proper optics is the most effective weapon I’ve used in this war,” Artyom says, holding up his go-to machine gun. “A sniper rifle costs $20,000 or $30,000 dollars and can kill only one Russian quickly. An AK can defend against an entire assault.” His record in a single engagement? 15 enemies eliminated in about three hours. “We didn’t expect them to react so calmly once we started shooting, but they just kept milling around in the same area,” Artyom says.

Neither Artyom nor Yevhen knows where their next deployment will be. All they are certain is that it won’t be in Bakhmut, the city where six months of brutal fighting has brought Russian troops to within a few kilometers of encircling the Ukrainian defenders.

“There’s not much need for snipers in Bakhmut,” Yevhen says. “It’s the kind of battle that is decided by artillery and regular infantry. There’s no sense to risk highly specialized troops when shelling will kill you just as easily,” he says.

But Artyom has a few interesting ideas for assignments further down the road.

“Since we’re specialists, we get to choose a lot of our own missions,” he says. “I’d like to go next to either the forests of Belarus or the mountains of the North Caucasus. Ukraine isn’t the only country that needs to be liberated from the Russians.”

About Neil Hauer

Neil Hauer is a freelance reporter covering the war in Ukraine and the Caucasus at large. You can follow him on Twitter at @NeilPHauer.

8. Congressman: US support for aid to Ukraine is 'overwhelming'

Excerpts:

Rep. Michael Turner of Ohio, the Republican chairman of the committee, which serves as the House’s main body for overseeing American intelligence organizations, spoke alongside three other GOP congressmen during a brief visit to Kyiv.

“There are those on the left and on the right who question continued support or the amount of support. That will certainly be part of the debate,” Turner said. “But overwhelmingly, there is support for continuing aid to Ukraine, so that they can continue to fight against this aggression of Russia.”

The trip to the Ukrainian capital was the latest effort from top-ranking Republicans in the House, who are laying the groundwork for continued U.S. assistance but facing opposition in their own ranks. Emboldened by former President Donald Trump’s “America First” approach, many on the right are clamoring for the Ukraine aid to come to an end, creating the potential for a politically bruising fight when the current American assistance runs out.

Congressman: US support for aid to Ukraine is 'overwhelming'

AP · by ELENA BECATOROS · April 3, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The head of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee said Monday that there is “overwhelming” support in the United States to continue supplying aid to Ukraine in its fight against Russia, despite vocal opposition from a hard-right faction of his own Republican Party.

Rep. Michael Turner of Ohio, the Republican chairman of the committee, which serves as the House’s main body for overseeing American intelligence organizations, spoke alongside three other GOP congressmen during a brief visit to Kyiv.

“There are those on the left and on the right who question continued support or the amount of support. That will certainly be part of the debate,” Turner said. “But overwhelmingly, there is support for continuing aid to Ukraine, so that they can continue to fight against this aggression of Russia.”

The trip to the Ukrainian capital was the latest effort from top-ranking Republicans in the House, who are laying the groundwork for continued U.S. assistance but facing opposition in their own ranks. Emboldened by former President Donald Trump’s “America First” approach, many on the right are clamoring for the Ukraine aid to come to an end, creating the potential for a politically bruising fight when the current American assistance runs out.

Russia-Ukraine war

Russia rejects US claims its UN council presidency is a joke

Finland set to join NATO, dealing major blow to Russia

Suspect in attack that killed military blogger to face court

With no peace in sight, NATO countries eye more Ukraine help

For instance, Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, a likely Trump rival for the 2024 GOP presidential nomination, recently suggested that defending Ukraine in a “territorial dispute” with Russia was not a significant U.S. national security priority. He later walked that statement back following criticism from other members of the party.

With the war in Ukraine now entering its second year, Rep. Chris Stewart of Utah said the American people would continue supporting aid as long as U.S. resources were being used judiciously.

“This is going to take some time,” he said of the war. “That’s not surprising. Most conflicts such as this between nation-states take time to resolve themselves. I think the American people understand that, as long as they feel like progress is being made over being careful with the money and being thoughtful of how we involve U.S. resources.”

Stewart, who is also on the intelligence committee, said NATO members should also fulfill their commitment to spend 2% of their gross domestic product on defense.

“Most of them have not done that except for a few of the smaller countries,” Stewart said. “The American people also look at this and go, ‘This is in Europe’s backyard. They should be at least as invested in this as we are.’ And I don’t know that we can assure them right now that that’s the case.”

Rep. Rich McCormick of Georgia noted that nations have rallied to Ukraine’s support.

“For the first time, maybe ever, countries were talking about putting pressure on each other and holding each other accountable inside of NATO,” said the congressman, who is a member of the House Armed Services Committee. “There is a new sort of urgency that never existed before, that I think you’re seeing Europe actually step up to the plate like they’ve never done before.”

The fourth member of the delegation to Kyiv, Rep. Darin LaHood of Illinois, another member of the intelligence committee, said the visit to Ukraine was aimed at observing the situation on the ground from “the illegal, unprovoked war that Putin engaged in here.”

That, he said, “will help us as we go back and have to make decisions on further funding and further support for this conflict.”

Also in Kyiv to underline the importance of support for Ukraine was former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who joins a long list of potential Republican candidates for the presidential nomination.

“Why is it that the United States should expand its resources and its people’s resources to support the effort here that you all are engaged in? I think it is pretty straightforward,” Pompeo said Monday during an event organized by prominent Ukrainian businessman Victor Pinchuk. “If we have learned one singular thing” that is that “when bad guys begin to march, they do not stop marching.”

Asked about the dissenting voices in the United States, Pompeo said that “your president has asked for equipment. He hasn’t asked for our young men and women. So long as we stay in that place, I’m convinced that most American leaders will see it that way and will support the continued efforts.”

AP · by ELENA BECATOROS · April 3, 2023

9. Finland to join NATO on Tuesday, Sweden still waiting

Finland to join NATO on Tuesday, Sweden still waiting

Reuters · by Andrew Gray

BRUSSELS/HELSINKI, April 3 (Reuters) - Finland will join NATO on Tuesday, marking the completion of a swift journey into the military alliance for the Nordic nation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, officials said.

Finland has a 1,300-km (810-mile) border with Russia, meaning NATO's frontier with Russia will roughly double in length, and the move drew a pledge from Moscow that it will beef up its forces in border regions.

"Tomorrow we will welcome Finland as the 31st member of NATO making Finland safer and our alliance stronger," NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told reporters in Brussels, hailing the move as "historic".

"We will raise the Finnish flag for the first time here at NATO headquarters. It will be a good day for Finland's security, for Nordic security and for NATO as a whole," Stoltenberg said.

Finnish President Sauli Niinisto will travel to Brussels to take part in the ceremony, his office said.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February last year pushed Finland and its neighbour Sweden to apply for NATO membership, abandoning decades of military non-alignment.

The last hurdle to Finland's membership was removed last week when Turkey's parliament voted to ratify Helsinki's application even as it kept Sweden's bid on hold.

[1/2] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg attends a news conference before a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, Belgium April 3, 2023. REUTERS/Johanna Geron

"President Putin went to war against Ukraine with the clear aim to get less NATO," Stoltenberg said. "He's getting the exact opposite."

Turkey continues to hold up Sweden's application. It says that Stockholm harbours members of what Ankara considers terrorist groups - a charge Sweden denies - and has demanded their extradition as a step toward ratifying Swedish membership.

Hungary is also holding up Sweden's admission, citing grievances over criticism of Prime Minister Viktor Orban's policies. But NATO diplomats say they expect Budapest will approve Sweden's bid if it sees Turkey moving to do so.

Stoltenberg pledged to work hard to get Sweden into NATO as soon as possible. He also stressed that NATO and Swedish officials were already working to bring Sweden closer to the alliance even as they wait for membership to be finalised.

In Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko said Russia will boost its forces in its west and northwest.

Grushko told state-owned news agency RIA reported: "In the event that the forces and resources of other NATO members are deployed in Finland, we will take additional steps to reliably ensure Russia's military security."

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said last year that Russia was taking "adequate countermeasures" and would form 12 units and divisions in its western military district.

Reporting by Terje Solsvik, editing by Essi Lehto and Angus MacSwan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Andrew Gray

10. Ukraine battles on in Bakhmut as Finland joins NATO

Ukraine battles on in Bakhmut as Finland joins NATO

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

Summary
Companies
Ukrainian officials say Bakhmut defenders still fighting
Finland to join NATO on Tuesday
Ukraine soldiers readying for counteroffensive
West tries to hurt Russia's ties with China, Africa - Lavrov

KYIV, April 4 (Reuters) - Fighting raged in and around Bakhmut as Ukraine mocked Russian claims to have captured the administrative centre of the eastern Ukrainian city, saying Russian forces had raised a victory flag over "some kind of toilet".

Finland, which shares a 1,300-km (810-mile) border with Russia, will later on Tuesday join NATO, just over a year after Russia invaded Ukraine, partly in response to what Russia said the alliance's aggressive expansion eastward.

The battle for the mining city and logistics hub of Bakhmut has been one of the bloodiest of the conflict with heavy casualties on both sides and the city largely destroyed.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force spearheading the siege, said on Sunday his troops had raised a Russian flag on the city-centre administrative building even though Ukrainian soldiers still held some western positions.

But Ukraine's military poured scorn on that claim and said fighting was raging around the city council building, as well as in other nearby towns.

"Bakhmut is Ukrainian and they have not captured anything and are very far from doing that," Serhiy Cherevatyi, spokesperson for the eastern military command, told Reuters.

"They raised the flag over some kind of toilet. They attached it to the side of who knows what, hung their rag and said they had captured the city. Well good, let them think they've taken it," Cherevatyi added by telephone.

The Ukrainian armed forces General Staff said in an evening statement 45 enemy attacks had been repelled in total in the last 24 hours, with Bakhmut at the "epicentre of operations" along with the cities of Avdiivka and Maryinka further south.

Reuters could not verify the battlefield reports.

'WAITING FOR ORDERS'

On the edge of a part of Donetsk province under Russian control, Bakhmut had a population of 70,000 before Russia invaded Ukraine in February last year.

Russian forces, bogged down in a war of attrition after a series of setbacks, are seeking a victory from their winter offensive but have suffered huge casualties around Bakhmut.

Ukrainian military commanders have said their own counteroffensive - backed by newly delivered Western tanks and other hardware - is not far off but have stressed the importance of holding Bakhmut and inflicting losses in the meantime.

"People are ready for the counteroffensive, all we are waiting for is marching orders and details on which direction we should go forward on - Bakhmut, Soledar or anywhere else," said a 35-year-old soldier of a tank brigade near Bakhmut, who used the nom-de-guerre Polyot.

Russia launched up to 17 Iranian-made Shahed drones overnight, Ukraine's air force command said early on Tuesday, with its air-defence systems destroying 14 of them.

Yuriy Kruk, head of the regional military administration in the Black Sea port city of Odesa, said the region was struck by several drones and there was damage but he did not specify the extent.

Four civilians were killed and three wounded in Ukraine-controlled Donetsk, its governor, Pavlo Kyrylenko, said in a statement.

'DRIVING A WEDGE'

Russia calls its invasion of Ukraine a "special military operation" to rid it of Nazis.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers on both sides have been killed. Russia has destroyed Ukrainian cities and forced millions of people to flee their homes, and it claims to have annexed nearly a fifth of Ukraine.

The West calls the war an unprovoked assault to subdue an independent country and has provided Kyiv with weapons while seeking to punish Russia with sanctions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the West of trying to drive a wedge between Russia and China, and attempting to wreck Russia's planned summit with African countries. He also said the European Union's hostile stance towards Moscow meant it had "lost" Russia.

Echoing that anger, Russia's parliament speaker said Western leaders have blood on their hands for supporting Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and the support had led to the creation of a "terrorist state" at Europe's centre.

Vyacheslav Volodin, an ally of President Vladimir Putin, said the killing of prominent war blogger Vladlen Tatarsky in a bomb attack in St Petersburg over the weekend was a "terrorist act" committed by Kyiv.

Ukraine blamed "domestic terrorism" for the blast.

NATO will welcome Finland as its 31st member in a flag-raising ceremony at its headquarters on the outskirts of Brussels.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine prompted Finns to seek security under the umbrella of NATO's collective defence pact, which states that an attack on one member is an attack on all.

Russia has also said it would strengthen its military capacity in its western and northwestern regions in response to Finland's accession.

Additional reporting by Nick Starkov, Ron Popeski, Lidia Kelly, Mark Trevelyan and Felix Light; Writing by Lincoln Feast; Editing by Stephen Coates, Robert Birsel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Pavel Polityuk

11. The Intensifying Trend Of Global De-Dollarization – Analysis

We must protect the dollar as the reserve currency.

We cannot remain a superpower with it. We will not be able to fund our military without it.

Excerpt:

In recent times, there has been a growing trend among countries and regions like India, Brazil, and ASEAN to “de-dollarize”. This trend is likely to become more pronounced as the problems with the U.S. dollar continue to mount. While it may not be possible to replace the dollar in the short term, the effect of countries reducing their reliance on it will become increasingly significant, eventually leading to a new global monetary geopolitical pattern.

The Intensifying Trend Of Global De-Dollarization – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Anbound · April 3, 2023

By Wei Hongxu

There has been a recent accelerating trend towards “de-dollarization” in emerging markets. According to media reports, on April 1, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that India and Malaysia had agreed to settle trade in Indian rupees.

Earlier, India and Russia were also pushing for a local currency settlement mechanism to move beyond the U.S. dollar. On March 29, Brazil announced that it had reached an agreement with China to no longer use the dollar as an intermediate currency, but to settle trade in local currencies. This signifies that, except for South Africa, all of the BRICS countries have substantially begun to use local currency settlement as an alternative to dollar settlement in trade. Earlier on January 18, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Naledi Pandor publicly stated that the country was studying how the BRICS countries could help to establish a fairer currency trading system to challenge the dollar’s dominance. It is apparent that the “de-dollarization” of trade settlement promoted by the BRICS countries, which are the main force in emerging markets, has become a trend.

On March 28, the Meeting of ASEAN Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in Indonesia discussed reducing dependence on the U.S. dollar, euro, yen, and pound in financial transactions and shifting toward local currency settlement. ASEAN will further extend and expand the local currency trading (LCT) plan, which was previously attempted as a digital currency, to allow its member countries to use local currencies for trade. A day before, the Indonesian banking regulator stated that Indonesian banks are preparing to gradually phase out VISA and Mastercard and launch their own domestic payment system. Countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are also trying to diversify the settlement currency in the oil trade. These can all be seen as new trends in currency localization promoted by emerging markets over a period of time.

According to researchers at ANBOUND, the international monetary system is evolving from a singular currency system dominated by the U.S. dollar to a more geographically diversified and multi-currency system. While a singular currency is more favorable for foreign trade, changes in the geopolitical landscape and increased geopolitical risks have made the issues of efficiency and cost negligible. As a result, the drive for independent and diversified trade settlement systems in various countries is becoming more prominent.

On the U.S. side, some individuals have been reflecting on “de-dollarization”. On March 30th, Elon Musk tweeted that, this is a “serious issue”, and that “US policy has been too heavy-handed, making countries want to ditch the dollar”. He further stated, “combined with excess government spending, which forces other countries to absorb a significant part of our inflation”. Jim O’Neill, formerly the Chief Economist at Goldman Sachs and the inventor of the term “BRICS”, has recently called for the BRICS group to expand its scale and challenge the dominance of the dollar, as he believes that the dominance of the dollar will destabilize the monetary policies of other countries.

Indeed, the drastic changes in U.S. monetary policy in recent years, spearheaded by the Federal Reserve, have been a significant factor in many countries diversifying away from the dollar. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Fed embarked on a program of quantitative easing and caused the value of the currency earned from trade surpluses in many emerging countries to shrink. The COVID-19 pandemic-induced changes in Fed policy have only added to this instability, causing the dollar exchange rate to fluctuate widely and posing a major policy risk to trade and investment stability across many countries. The repercussions of this policy risk are far-reaching, not only causing market volatility in developed countries but also exerting a greater impact on emerging markets. While the U.S. economy is grappling with stagflation, characterized by high inflation and high-interest rates, emerging market countries are facing the dual pressures of inflation and high borrowing costs denominated in U.S. dollars. To mitigate the risks of dollar fluctuations, the global economy has increasingly turned to safe-haven assets like gold and digital assets. For BRICS countries, the first step towards reducing their reliance on the dollar involves bearing the costs of currency volatility. Meanwhile, the ongoing banking crisis in the U.S. has only compounded concerns over the value of U.S. assets and the dollar, creating opportunities for other countries to reduce their dependence on the currency.

The imposition of financial sanctions by Europe and the US after the Russia-Ukraine conflict is another crucial factor that has contributed to the global shift away from the dollar. These sanctions have not only frozen Russia’s financial assets but have also caused many countries outside the conflict zone to realize the dangers of an international monetary system dominated by the U.S. The U.S.’s increasing reliance on sanctions as a tool to control the dollar settlement system has resulted in growing uncertainty in international trade. Consequently, many countries that are not closely linked to Europe and the U.S. have become reluctant to continue trading through the dollar. According to researchers at ANBOUND, these sanctions, while causing significant damage to Russia’s economy and finance, will eventually impact the independence of the current dollar-dominated international financial, trade settlement, and clearing systems. In an increasingly politicized environment, the value-oriented international financial system will inevitably become more dependent on changes in geopolitical patterns. This trend is reflected in the various attempts at currency settlement, which are a signal that the currency system is accelerating its geopoliticalization. In the long run, the use of financial sanctions and other tools by the U.S. to exert its influence may ultimately erode the international status of the dollar as a dominant currency.

Despite countries’ efforts to “de-dollarize”, replacing the U.S. dollar with geo-currencies is a lengthy process. The construction and operation of a trade settlement system, along with key indicators such as exchange rates and prices, require further exploration by the market. Regional currencies, such as the renminbi, have less stability and market acceptance than the U.S. dollar, where trading costs and settlement risks are higher. Therefore, no geo-currency can challenge the U.S. dollar’s position in the short term. The attempt of emerging market countries, mainly the BRICS, to establish an independent trading system, will pose a long-term threat to the dollar’s status. This erosion may be gradual, but with many participants, it may snowball. As more countries reduce their dependence on the dollar, the U.S. economy will gradually weaken with the dollar’s declining position.

Final analysis conclusion:

Wei Hongxu is a researcher at ANBOUND

eurasiareview.com · by Anbound · April 3, 2023

12. Chinese balloon got intel from U.S. military sites, despite efforts to block it

Again, a friend who flagged an article reporting on this report yesterday provided this comment:

Shocking. It has been reported that China had a quantum camera onboard that was able to map a kilometer underneath the ground -- thus allowing them to schematically photograph our underground nuclear minuteman missile facilities

Chinese balloon got intel from U.S. military sites, despite efforts to block it

The intelligence China collected was mostly from electronic signals, which can be picked up from weapons systems or include communications from base personnel.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee

The Chinese spy balloon that flew across the U.S. was able to gather intelligence from several sensitive American military sites, despite the Biden administration’s efforts to block it from doing so, according to two current senior U.S. officials and one former senior administration official.

China was able to control the balloon so it could make multiple passes over some of the sites (at times flying figure-eight formations) and transmit the information it collected back to Beijing in real time, the three officials said. The intelligence China collected was mostly from electronic signals, which can be picked up from weapons systems or include communications from base personnel, rather than images, the officials said.

The three officials said China could have gathered much more intelligence from sensitive sites if not for the administration’s efforts to move around potential targets and obscure the balloon’s ability to pick up their electronic signals by stopping them from broadcasting or emitting signals.

The Defense Department directed NBC News to comments senior officials made in February that the balloon had “limited additive value” for intelligence collection by the Chinese government “over and above what [China] is likely able to collect through things like satellites in low earth orbit.”

On Monday, a Defense Department spokesperson reiterated that any intelligence collected had "limited additive value" for China and said she could not confirm that the balloon had transmitted any information back to China in "real time."

National Security Council spokesperson Kirby John declined to answer questions Monday afternoon about what kind of electronic signals or communications the balloon could have accessed.

“Knowing it was going to enter U.S. airspace we took action to limit the ability of this balloon to garner anything of additive or especially useful content,” said Kirby. “So again, I won’t get ahead of what we’re learning off this thing.”

Montana Sen. Steve Daines, a Republican, said, “The administration’s explanation that the balloon had ‘limited additive value’ is little comfort to Montanans and the American people and weak spin on an issue the administration mishandled from start to finish.”

Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee said, "We have consistently learned more from press reports about the Chinese surveillance balloon than we have from administration officials. ... I intend to hold this administration accountable."

China has said repeatedly that the balloon was an unmanned civilian airship that accidentally strayed off course, and that the U.S. overreacted by shooting it down. Officials have not said which company, department or organization the balloon belonged to, despite several requests for comment by NBC News.

After the balloon was shot down in February, Biden administration officials said it was capable of collecting signals intelligence.

The balloon had a self-destruct mechanism that could have been activated remotely by China, but the officials said it’s not clear if that didn’t happen because the mechanism malfunctioned or because China decided not to trigger it.

The balloon entered U.S. airspace over Alaska on Jan. 28, according to the Biden administration, which said it was tracking it as it moved. Within the next four days, the balloon was flying over Montana — specifically Malmstrom Air Force Base, where the U.S. stores some of its nuclear assets.

On Feb. 2, NBC News was first to report that the Chinese spy balloon was flying over the U.S. and that President Joe Biden had considered shooting it down, prompting the administration to publicly confirm that and disclose it had been monitoring the balloon for days. Once the balloon’s existence became public, China increased its speed, officials said, in attempt to get it out of U.S. airspace as quickly as possible.

The U.S. shot down the balloon on Feb. 4 off the coast of South Carolina, and officials are still analyzing the debris that was retrieved.

At the time, the U.S. government said it waited to shoot the balloon down until it was over the ocean to avoid any damage or casualties on the ground. The balloon, which was nearly as large as three school buses, would have had a large debris field that U.S. officials could not control as it fell to the earth.

“U.S. military commanders had determined downing the balloon while over land posed an undue risk to people across a wide area due to the size and altitude of the balloon and its surveillance payload,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement after the balloon was downed.

Officials have tried to reconstruct the balloon from the recovered debris.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee

13. US says it cannot confirm China collected real-time data from spy balloon

USG pushes back slightly on the NBC report.

US says it cannot confirm China collected real-time data from spy balloon

Reuters · by Reuters

April 3 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden's administration said on Monday it could not confirm reports that China was able to collect real-time data from a spy balloon as it flew over sensitive military sites earlier this year, saying analysis was still ongoing.

NBC News on Monday reported that the Chinese balloon was able to transmit data back to Beijing in real time despite the U.S. government's efforts to prevent it from doing so - a disclosure that could deepen Republican criticism of Biden for waiting for the balloon to reach a safe location before shooting it down.

NBC cited two current senior U.S. officials and one former senior administration official.

The White House and the Pentagon told reporters that they could not confirm that account. The Pentagon said experts were still analyzing debris collected from the balloon after it was shot down on Feb. 4.

"I could not confirm that there was real-time transmission from the balloon back to (China) at this time," said Pentagon spokesperson Sabrina Singh, adding, "that's something we're analyzing right now."

The Chinese Foreign Ministry said on Tuesday that China has made it clear that the unmanned civilian airship that flew over U.S. territory was "an unexpected and isolated event".

"China rejects distortion and hyping up of this incident," spokesperson Mao Ning said at a regular briefing in response to a question about the U.S. remarks.

The balloon, which Beijing denies was a government spy vessel, spent a week flying over the United States and Canada before the U.S. military shot it down off the Atlantic Coast on Biden's orders.

Reuters has reported that the U.S. officials believe the high-altitude balloon was controlled by Beijing and was able to maneuver as it flew over the United States, at times steering left or right.

Still, at the time, U.S. officials played down the balloon's impact on national security, saying it took measures to limit its ability to collect information on sensitive U.S. sites. It also played down the idea that the balloon was much more capable of collecting information than Chinese spy satellites, while acknowledging the balloon's ability to loiter longer over U.S. locations than a satellite.

The Chinese balloon incident prompted U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to postpone a planned visit to Beijing and further strained relations between Washington and Beijing.

The episode caused an uproar in Washington and led the U.S. military to search the skies for other objects that were not being captured on radar.

The FBI has taken the lead in the analysis since the United States said on Feb. 17 it had successfully concluded recovery efforts off South Carolina to collect sensors and other debris from the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon.

Reporting by Idrees Ali, Phil Stewart and Doina Chiacu in Washington and Juby Babu in Bengaluru; Additional reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing; Editing by Louise Heavens, Bernadette Baum and Muralikumar Anantharaman

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

14. China warns US House Speaker not to meet Taiwan president

There is no way the Speaker cannot meet with the President with this "warning.". Perhaps some reverse psychology would have worked, e.g., if the Chinese said they did not care about a meeting then the Speaker might assess he does not need to meet her. (note sarcasm).

China warns US House Speaker not to meet Taiwan president

Reuters · by Laurie Chen

Summary
McCarthy, Tsai to meet in Los Angeles on Wednesday
China again warns McCarthy against meeting
Taiwan says China's criticism "increasingly absurd"

BEIJING/TAIPEI, April 4 (Reuters) - China warned U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy on Tuesday not to "repeat disastrous past mistakes" by meeting Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, saying it would not help regional peace and stability, only unite the Chinese people against a common enemy.

The Republican McCarthy, the third-most-senior U.S. leader after the president and vice president, will host a meeting in California on Wednesday with Tsai, during a sensitive stopover in the United States that has prompted Chinese threats of retaliation.

China, which claims Taiwan as its own territory, staged war games around the island last August after then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi, a Democrat, visited the capital, Taipei.

Tsai will make what is formally called a "transit" in Los Angeles on her way back to Taipei after a trip to Central America. The United States says such stopovers are common practice and there is no need for China to overreact.

But China's consulate in Los Angeles said it was "false" to claim it as a transit, adding that Tsai was engaging in official exchanges to "put on a political show".

No matter in what capacity McCarthy meets Tsai, the gesture would greatly harm the feelings of the Chinese people, send a serious wrong signal to Taiwan separatist forces, and affect the political foundation of Sino-U.S. ties, it said in a statement.

"It is not conducive to regional peace, security nor stability, and is not in the common interests of the people of China and the United States," the consulate added.

McCarthy is ignoring the lessons from the mistakes of his predecessor, it said, in a veiled reference to Pelosi's Taipei visit, and is insisting on playing the "Taiwan card".

"He will undoubtedly repeat disastrous past mistakes and further damage Sino-U.S. relations. It will only strengthen the Chinese people's strong will and determination to share a common enemy and support national unity."

Speaking to reporters in Beijing on Tuesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said China will closely follow developments and resolutely and vigorously defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, without giving details.

CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

Although Taiwan has not reported unusual Chinese movements in the run-up to the meeting, China's military has continued activities around the island.

Taiwan's defence ministry on Tuesday morning reported that in the previous 24 hours it had spotted nine Chinese military aircraft in its air defence identification zone, in an area between Taiwan's southwest coast and the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands at the top of the South China Sea.

In a statement on Tuesday, Taiwan's foreign ministry said China had no right to complain, as the People's Republic of China has never ruled the island.

China's recent criticism of Tsai's trip "has become increasingly absurd", it added.

"Even if the authoritarian government continues with its expansion and intensifies coercion, Taiwan will not back down," the statement said.

In China, prominent commentator Hu Xijin wrote on his widely followed Twitter account "the Chinese mainland will definitely react, and make the Tsai Ing-wen regime lose much more than what they can gain from this meeting."

Hu, who had voiced his concerns over House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last year, also wrote "The U.S. side is definitely not getting any real advantage either," on his Weibo account, a Twitter-like social media platform in China.

Hu is former editor-in-chief of Chinese state-backed tabloid the Global Times, known for its strident nationalistic stance.

Taiwan has lived with the threat of a Chinese attack since the defeated Republic of China government fled to the island in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists.

Life in Taiwan has continued as normal, with shops, restaurants and tourist spots in Taipei packed during a long holiday weekend that ends on Wednesday.

"They will certainly get angry and there will be some actions, but we are actually used to this," said social worker Sunny Lai, 42.

Reporting by Laurie Chen in Beijing and Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Additional reporting by Beijing newsroom and Fabian Hamacher in Taipei; Editing by Himani Sarkar, Clarence Fernandez and Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Laurie Chen

Thomson Reuters

Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

Reuters · by Laurie Chen

15. War in Taiwan will dwarf Ukraine unless the US shows China its teeth

But does Taiwan equal Ukraine? Does Xi equal Putin?

I do agree what we must show strength though I would like actions to speak louder than words.

War in Taiwan will dwarf Ukraine unless the US shows China its teeth | Simon Tisdall

Putin thought he could get away with his invasion. Xi Jinping must be deterred from making a similarly fatal miscalculation

The Guardian · by Simon Tisdall · April 2, 2023

It is generally acknowledged that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, drawing in the US and possibly Japan, Australia and Britain, could dwarf the Ukraine crisis both in scale and danger. Top US generals and officials have repeatedly warned an attack is becoming more probable and more feasible. And yet it remains spectacularly unclear what the Biden administration would actually do in response.

The longstanding US policy of “strategic ambiguity”, designed to leave Beijing guessing about Washington’s intentions, has helped keep a lid on cross-strait tensions. But the dynamic has changed radically with the rise of China’s president, Xi Jinping, to a position of supreme power and the advent of his aggressive approach to Taiwan and international relations as a whole.

Xi vowed again last month to annex the self-ruled island, which he regards as China’s property. “We should actively oppose the external forces and secessionist activities of Taiwan independence. We should unswervingly advance the cause of national rejuvenation and reunification,” Xi told the National People’s Congress. Xi pointedly did not rule out the use of force.

American ambiguity becomes more problematic as time passes. US president Joe Biden has confused matters further with unscripted remarks. Asked in September whether, unlike in Ukraine, he would send US troops to defend Taiwan, Biden replied: “Yes, if in fact there was an unprecedented attack.”

This is not official US policy – although it probably should be. Biden’s words were swiftly disowned by his senior officials amid furious Chinese protests. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, the US is committed “to provide Taiwan with arms of defensive character”. The aim is deterrence, not war-fighting.

The marked deterioration in US-China relations consequent on Xi’s rise and Donald Trump’s presidency has led to much unhelpful posturing by US and Chinese politicians. They include Democrat Nancy Pelosi, whose needlessly provocative visit last year supercharged military tensions, and Beijing’s hawkish foreign minister, Qin Gang.

Another row, and more military threats, may be expected if Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, meets Kevin McCarthy, Pelosi’s Republican successor as House speaker, in California this week. Tsai will make an unofficial stopover after visiting two of Taiwan’s few remaining allies in Central America. Honduras recently defected to Beijing.

The planned McCarthy meeting will be symbolic, lacking practical import. What it will do is advertise the Republicans’ hardline anti-China stance before next year’s US elections. By demonstrating leverage with Washington, it may also boost Tsai’s ruling Democratic Progressive party (DPP) before national polls in January 2024.

Ambiguity, strategic or otherwise, extends to the Taiwanese side, too. Tsai cannot run again, and it is uncertain who will succeed her as president or whether the pro-independence DPP can retain power. Her party’s main opponent, the Kuomintang (KMT), claims the DPP has trashed relations with China, which it promises to repair.

The KMT has long maintained it is not “pro-China” but pro-peace and prosperity – an attractive message after years of cross-strait turmoil. Last November, the party swept to victory in local elections, capturing the capital, Taipei. Yet suspicions about its willingness to stand up to Beijing persist. When Biden talks about defending Taiwan, he should understand not everyone wants to be defended.

This ambivalence was on dramatic show again last week, when Ma Ying-jeou became the first former Taiwan president and most senior KMT-linked figure to visit China since 1949. Ma, in office from 2008 to 2016, claimed his trip was not political, but evidently it was. Such outreach has positive and negative implications for KMT’s electoral prospects.

Ma, who once said he would “never ask the Americans to fight for Taiwan”, explained his visit in remarks Xi could have written himself. “People on both sides of the Taiwan strait are Chinese people,” Ma said. “We sincerely hope the two sides will work together to pursue peace, avoid war, and strive to revitalise China.”

Few people want war. And Ma’s “we are all Chinese” comment ignored the fact that more than 60% of the island’s people now identify as Taiwanese only. While most favour the status quo over a formal declaration of independence, a huge majority opposes rule by Beijing. China’s ruthless Hong Kong takeover set a fearsome precedent. Some fear a KMT sell-out.

Free daily newsletter

Archie Bland and Nimo Omer take you through the top stories and what they mean, free every weekday morning

Privacy Notice: Newsletters may contain info about charities, online ads, and content funded by outside parties. For more information see our Privacy Policy. We use Google reCaptcha to protect our website and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

after newsletter promotion

A Taipei Times editorial called Ma’s trip a “backward step”. It could, the paper warned, “be interpreted as a former leader risking the nation’s legitimacy and being used as a propaganda tool by [China] in its desire to annihilate the Republic of China and Taiwan’s democracy.”

It’s plain that Taiwan’s situation is more complex and nuanced than American rightwingers (and former UK prime minister Liz Truss, who advocates supplying British arms and military support) maintain. The oft-conjured, black-and-white picture of a tiny democracy united in valiant defiance of towering tyranny is simplistic – and potentially dangerous.

Dangerous, too, is the continuing confusion about US guarantees, real or imagined. Richard Haass, president of the US Council on Foreign Relations, warned in an influential article published just before the Ukraine invasion that Biden’s lack of “strategic clarity” could lead Xi, like Vladimir Putin, into fatal miscalculation.

“The best way to reduce the risk of war would be to make explicit to China that the US would respond to an attack against Taiwan with all the tools at its disposal, including severe economic sanctions and military force. Washington needs to make it clear to Beijing that the cost of aggression would vastly outweigh any potential benefits,” Haass wrote.

An American shift towards deterrence with teeth could help head off an Asian Ukraine – and is necessary and urgent. But it won’t resolve the wider Taiwan conundrum. That requires the political vision, moderation and disinterestedness that is in global short supply these days.

The Guardian · by Simon Tisdall · April 2, 2023

16. Why Some in the Military Might Not Celebrate a TikTok Ban

I am seeing a couple of TikTok ads repeatedly streamed - one on teaching a child to read and another one about a woman and her soap making business. I wonder if we will soon see one that advertises its value to the military. (note sarcasm).

Why Some in the Military Might Not Celebrate a TikTok Ban

military.com · by 3 Apr 2023 Military.com | By Andy Oare · April 3, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Last week, Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., brought a bill to the Senate floor that would ban TikTok from the United States. The bill didn't get very far, but it was an important symbolic first step on the long road to booting the Chinese-owned app from American app stores. Such a ban would certainly win the praise of many military leaders -- and for good cause (just look at all the data that users relinquish to China) -- but some in recruitment circles may not be so thrilled.

With lagging recruitment numbers and an estimated 64 million monthly TikTok users between the ages of 16 and 34, how could such an opportunity be ignored?

As of this writing, the hashtag #militarylife has more than 6.7 billion views on TikTok. Some of the more popular military-focused accounts boast six- and seven-figure follower accounts, and their well-curated content capitalizes on all the latest memes and trends. Some recruiters have even publicly stated that half of their recruits come from TikTok alone.

But for years now, the use of TikTok in the military has been the subject of sharp criticism from Democrats, Republicans and scores of individual privacy experts. Just a couple weeks ago, Rep. Richard Hudson, R-N.C., who represents the district that houses Fort Bragg, told TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew that he had "serious concerns about the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist Party to access the non-public sensitive data of our men and women in uniform."

"This personal data and location information can be harvested and could be used for blackmail to conduct espionage and to possibly even reveal troop movements," he added.

Hudson's warnings are not hyperbole. Geolocation data and misuse of open-source cell signals have had dire effects on recent Russian military operations. It's been so bad that the Russian Ministry of Defense made an uncharacteristic honest admission in the wake of a strike that killed dozens of their troops in the occupied city of Makiivka: that mobile phone activity enabled Ukraine to "track and determine the coordinates of the soldiers' locations."

In December 2019, the U.S. Navy and Army banned TikTok from official devices, and in December last year, the Biden administration expanded the ban to apply to all government devices. But no such ban applies to TikTok on personal devices, even though the military does discourage it for recruiting.

"Recruiters are only allowed to conduct official business using government devices, so at this time, they should not be using TikTok for recruiting purposes either from their government or personal devices," Kelli Bland, the Army Recruiting Command's director of public affairs, said in a 2021 interview with Defense One.

Another aspect of TikTok that cannot be ignored is its powerful reach. In February 2021, a Marine Corps sergeant posted a video on her personal TikTok channel recounting the harrowing fallout that stemmed from her reporting a coworker for sexual misconduct. The video went viral, rising even to the attention of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who called it "deeply disturbing" and has used his tenure to take unprecedented levels of action to address sexual assault in the military.

If posted on another platform, does a video gain so much traction that it reaches the defense secretary within a matter of hours? I'm not sure that it does, and our leaders may never have heard that Marine's important story.

So what must be done to mitigate the risks?

In an ideal world, American social media companies -- particularly Meta, Snap and Google -- would rise to the opportunity being presented here. Platforms like Instagram Stories and YouTube Shorts offer a reasonable alternative from a user experience, but their parent companies should step up their work directly with commanders and recruiters to pull service members away from a Chinese-owned company that has every incentive imageable to keep harvesting the data of our troops.

Although I can't see it actually happening, maybe a total ban on TikTok in the United States is what it will take for these homegrown companies to finally win the game that they invented: mastering the algorithm. It'd be a shame if it had to come to that, though -- not because extracting a company like TikTok would be bad (it would be great) -- but because you'd like to think U.S. companies would be able to figure out how to simply be better than TikTok.

-- Andy Oare is the former director of digital media for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, and currently the head of federal marketing and public affairs for Shift5, a technology company that unlocks the fleet data of weapons systems and military vehicles.

military.com · by 3 Apr 2023 Military.com | By Andy Oare · April 3, 2023

17. Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

Can this be exploited? How are we using this in an information and influence activities campaign?

Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

Far from being astride the globe, the “China Dream” globally—China’s economic power, political attraction, and standing—are all eroding.

The National Interest · by Ronald H. Linden · April 3, 2023

The question “are the United States and China in a new cold war?” is not particularly challenging. The answer is yes. A more intriguing question might be, “can the United States and China avoid the mistakes of the previous Cold War?”

One of these mistakes was a fear-driven credulousness; a tendency to take all boasts and claims of the rival power (think Nikita Khrushchev’s pronouncement of “We will bury you!”) as accurate, and in doing so, miss a chance to craft sensible, non-escalatory responses. Currently, after Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow and boasts about China being ready to “stand guard over the world order,” it might be worth taking a closer look at China’s foreign policy environment. Do its boasts match reality, or is China’s global position weakening like a seaside home at high tide?

Far from being astride the globe, the “China Dream” globally—China’s economic power, political attraction, and standing—are all eroding. Several key indicators reveal that, in the epic clash with the United States and the “collective West,” China is weaker than at any time in the last ten years.

Consider the economic dimensions for starters. A key instrument of great power influence has long been foreign direct investment (FDI), something that is also crucial for China’s own economic health. Spurred by its 2001 “Go Out” policy and supercharged with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese outward FDI grew steadily, from $10 billion in 2005 to more than $170 billion by 2017. Since then, four of the last five years have seen drops in outward FDI—including a 15 percent fall in 2022, according to the American Enterprise Institute. Chinese investment into Europe, previously a choice location because of its high value-added manufacturing capacity and weak regulation, fell sharply as well. Once eager partners like Germany, Italy, and the EU itself have adopted or strengthened investment screening mechanisms and blocked key Chinese acquisitions. A mutual investment treaty that is supposed to address chronic business complaints about Chinese practices and restrictions has stalled in the European Parliament due to widespread Chinese human rights violations and tit-for-tat individual sanctions. Viewed in the other direction, European investment into China dropped steadily after 2018 until rebounding last year. But as Rhodium Group figures show, FDI inflow to China has become concentrated to the point where almost 90 percent of European FDI in China comes from only four countries. During the coronavirus pandemic, the Rhodium report notes, “virtually no European investors that were not already present in the country have made direct investments.” The impact of European investment, which had in 2018 accounted for 7.5 percent of Chinese GDP, fell to 2.8 percent three years later.

The most serious challenge to Chinese economic clout has come from the United States. Heightened tariffs and restrictions put in place during the Trump administration have continued under Joe Biden. Reviews of foreign (read: Chinese) investments have broadened, as have policies blocking the sale of high-tech goods to China—not only from the United States, but also from companies in other countries whose goods have U.S. components. Washington redoubled its efforts to block Huawei and TikTok, along with passing legislation to subsidize U.S. production of high-tech goods at home and direct “friendshoring” investments to reliable allies and partners.

As an economic colossus, China has alternatives, especially in Asia, Africa, and other places where it claims to offer an alternative development model. But here, too, China’s presence has run out of steam. Annual investments in the countries of the BRI, once the flagship vehicle for the extension of Chinese influence, are today less than half of what they were only five years ago. And most of that is in countries with serious debt issues. As a report in Foreign Policy put it, “China can make friends or break legs. It can’t do both.”

In some places, the Chinese “model” proved more destructive than instructive. Beijing’s bullying of Sri Lanka into handing over the Hambantota port that it built with borrowed Chinese money has not exactly burnished Beijing’s reputation as a guardian of a new world order. In fact, according to Pew Research, favorable views of China have dropped sharply around the world—a fall reinforced by China’s “digital authoritarianism” during coronavirus, its draconian and unsuccessful lockdown policy, and its support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

In Europe, which is generally less strident than the United States, China is on the verge of trading its once flourishing ties with the world’s most advanced economies for the cheap oil and the desperate embrace of what Alexander Gabuev calls its “new vassal,” Russia. At the EU-China summit in April 2022, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was blunt: “China, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has a special responsibility. No European citizen would understand any support to Russia's ability to wage war.” She is right. In February 2023, a report by the Munich Security Conference showed that across the globe—including in India and Brazi—two-thirds of those surveyed felt that China’s support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine made them wary of Chinese ambitions.

Among the EU’s new East European members, Beijing’s much-touted “CEE+” framework has foundered on China’s willingness to see Ukraine’s sovereignty ravished and its bullying of states that veer even a little on Taiwan, like Lithuania. China has also forfeited one of its more important European trade and investment partners in Ukraine itself. At one point. Volodymyr Zelensky offered Ukraine as “China’s bridge to Europe,” and Chinese companies began the construction of the largest wind farm in Europe near Donetsk and the refitting of the port of Mariupol, now in ruins.

If weakening the Western alliance structure is one of Beijing’s aims, it is now more distant than ever. Ukraine and Moldova have been advanced to candidate status for the EU, and NATO, the very embodiment of Western global domination in Beijing’s view, has been given new life, strength, and members by the actions of Xi’s “best friend” in Moscow. Worse than that from China’s point of view, the alliance has now incorporated China’s own neighborhood into its security stance. In 2022, NATO formally declared the Indo-Pacific to be part of its “shared security interests.” Under President Joe Biden, the United States has significantly increased the prominence of policy initiatives in this region, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad (composed of India, Australia, Japan, and the United States), and taken actions—like selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia and adding U.S. bases in the Philippines—that support a more muscular U.S. presence in the region.

Even the EU—which is certainly not a military alliance—has adopted the strategic aim of insuring an “open and rule-based” South China Sea—a direct rejection of China's unilateral claims to virtually all of it—and backed up this rhetoric with action. This month, Italy—the only G-7 country to sign on to the BRI and once the most open to Chinese investment—announced the deployment of one of its two aircraft carriers to the region and confirmed a tripartite deal with Japan and the UK to develop and produce a new generation fighter plane.

Nowhere has the rise of China been greeted with more alarm than in Japan. It was then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who first put forth the notion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” now widely adopted, as a notion to counter China’s influence. More recently, Japan has doubled its defense budget, reconceptualized the notion of what “defense” means, and opted for new, higher-quality weapons. While some of this comes as a response to North Korea’s menacing actions, Japan’s new national security strategy, adopted in December 2022, makes clear that China represents “the unprecedented and greatest strategic challenge.”

A broader unwelcome development for China is the comparison offered in the United States and elsewhere between Russian actions in Ukraine and possible Chinese actions against Taiwan—a comparison rejected by Beijing. As an alarm bell, the sound could not be clearer. “Ukraine today could be East Asia tomorrow,” said Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida, who just concluded a high-profile visit to Ukraine.

The news is not all bad for China. Foreign trade is up—including with its number one partner, the United States. Beijing scored a significant coup by facilitating the recent deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Honduras has changed sides, and European leaders still head off to Beijing, with groups of businessmen in tow. But the overall worsening international setting cannot be encouraging for Xi and the Chinese Communist Party, which must at the same time reckon with a dramatically slower growth rate at home, the consequences of a disastrous coronavirus policy, and a population that is both declining and aging.

Brave words and boasts are required when authoritarian leaders need to use nationalism to stay in power at home. But they need not be swallowed whole by outside observers in the face of contrary evidence, nor by policymakers trying to ensure that the new Cold War stays cold.

Far from being astride the globe, the “China Dream” globally—China’s economic power, political attraction, and standing—are all eroding.

Ronald H. Linden is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. During the spring of 2023, he has been Visiting Professor in the Department of Political Science of Sapienza University, Rome. Recent publications include, “Is Moldova Next? Brigadoon in a Tough Neighborhood,” The National Interest, May 22, 2022, and “No Limits? China, Russia and Ukraine” (with Emilia Zankina) Eurozine, May 4, 2022.

Image: Shutterstock.

The National Interest · by Ronald H. Linden · April 3, 2023

18. Kevin McCarthy Prepares to Meet Taiwan’s President as Tensions With China Swirl

Kevin McCarthy Prepares to Meet Taiwan’s President as Tensions With China Swirl

Beijing has threatened retaliation if House speaker meets with Tsai Ing-wen

https://www.wsj.com/articles/kevin-mccarthy-prepares-to-meet-taiwans-president-as-tensions-with-china-swirl-a63f76d3?mod=hp_lista_pos1

By Joyu WangFollow

April 4, 2023 6:54 am ET

TAIPEI—Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and the Biden administration are heading into the most pivotal event in her closely watched travels through the U.S.—a meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy that will test Beijing’s and Washington’s ability to manage tensions.

Ms. Tsai is set to land in Los Angeles on Tuesday evening for the second of two multiday stopovers in the U.S. on her way to and from visiting Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in Central America. At the top of her agenda in California is a long-anticipated meeting with Mr. McCarthy in the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on Wednesday that Beijing has warned would lead to unspecified retaliation.

Visits to the U.S. by Taiwanese leaders are labeled as “transits” and considered unofficial, part of Washington’s delicate diplomatic dance with Beijing, which considers Taiwan a part of Chinese territory. As a result, Taiwanese leaders avoid stops in Washington and typically don’t meet with senior U.S. officials.

If the meeting goes ahead as planned, the House speaker would become the highest-level U.S. official to meet a Taiwanese leader on American soil since the practice of transit visits began.

Such a meeting would “be an assault on the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations,” a spokesperson for the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles said Monday. “This is the first red line that must not be crossed.”

Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that the Chinese criticisms “have become increasingly absurd” and that it wouldn’t back down in the face of authoritarian pressure.

Kevin McCarthy would become the highest-level U.S. official to meet a Taiwanese leader on American soil since the practice of transit visits began.

PHOTO: AL DRAGO/BLOOMBERG NEWS

Taipei’s increasingly close relationship with Washington has been a growing source of anxiety in Beijing, turning the self-ruled island into the most volatile flashpoint in relations between the world’s two largest economies. China’s Communist Party, which has never ruled Taiwan, nevertheless vows it will one day take control there, by force if necessary. Beijing is expanding and upgrading its military with that possibility in mind, spurring similar moves in Taiwan and the U.S.

With tensions running high, Ms. Tsai’s office and the Biden administration have taken pains to keep the Taiwanese leader largely out of the public eye during her U.S. stopovers.

During an earlier stop in New York, Ms. Tsai made a brief appearance at an out-of-the-way cafe in Brooklyn, where she declined to be interviewed, before accepting an award from the conservative think tank Hudson Institute in a closed-door event.

The White House has repeatedly characterized Ms. Tsai’s U.S. transits, sandwiched around visits to Guatemala and Belize, as being no different than previous transits and urged Beijing not to overreact. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby repeated that message on Monday when asked about Mr. McCarthy’s plans to meet the Taiwanese leader.

“I’m not going to get ahead of where we are right now and speculate about what the Chinese might or might not do. We strongly urge them to not overreact to this, again, because there’s just simply no reason to,” he said.

After Mr. McCarthy’s predecessor as House speaker, Nancy Pelosi, traveled to Taiwan last summer—the highest-ranking U.S. official to do so in a quarter-century—Beijing encircled the island with rocket and ballistic-missile fire and tested its defenses with navy ships and war planes. It was an unusual show of force that sparked new concerns inside the U.S. military about China’s ability to blockade Taiwan.

That episode sent relations between Washington and Beijing into a downward spiral that both capitals have attempted to reverse, with limited success.

Mr. McCarthy expressed interest in visiting Taiwan himself after being named speaker, but the prospect of a repeat of Ms. Pelosi’s trip, and of Beijing’s wargames, unnerved some in Taipei. After considering the risks, members of Ms. Tsai’s decision-making circle worked to persuade Mr. McCarthy to meet with Ms. Tsai in the U.S. instead, according to people familiar with the discussions.

The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, in Simi Valley, Calif., where the U.S. House speaker plans to meet with Taiwan’s president.

PHOTO: DAVID CRANE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

A government official familiar with the discussions attributed the outcome to a high degree of trust between Taipei and Washington.

“It’s an amazing diplomatic move by whoever in the U.S. and Taiwan was able to make that happen,” Lev Nachman, a political scientist who teaches at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, said of Taipei’s persuading Mr. McCarthy to meet in the U.S.

Giving Beijing an excuse to repeat its live-fire drills would have been politically damaging to Ms. Tsai’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, which was battered in local elections late last year and is trying to shore up support ahead of presidential elections in January, Mr. Nachman said.

China’s government slapped sanctions on Ms. Pelosi and members of her family, barring any Chinese entity from doing business with them, after her visit to Taiwan. Beijing could do the same to Mr. McCarthy, in addition to intensifying military patrols around Taiwan.

Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao told China’s nationalistic tabloid Global Times over the weekend that he expected the Chinese military’s response to a McCarthy meeting to be similar to the one it unleashed following Ms. Pelosi’s Taiwan visit.

Asked at a regular press briefing on Tuesday whether China planned to hold military drills in response to the meeting, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Beijing would closely monitor the situation and “firmly defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Taiwanese military and defense officials have said that they don’t expect China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, to react forcefully but that the island is prepared for that possibility.

Taiwan’s defense ministry said 20 PLA aircraft flew sorties near Taiwanese airspace on Monday, with nine of them crossing the median line of the 100-mile Taiwan Strait separating the island from China. Neither number is remarkable compared with previous Chinese military operations around the island.

Charles Hutzler contributed to this article.

19. Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel

Excerpt:

The declining security situation in northwest Africa renders US and NATO involvement less and less attractive to policymakers. Concerns are not unfounded. However, the United States regularly outlines obligations to regional stability and conflict prevention. Inaction in the Sahel invites questions about NATO’s espoused commitment to international order and its ability to achieve security objectives. Policymakers must reconcile the complexities of the region and the risks of doing nothing. Though enacting a larger-scale, long-term regional approach to FID comes with inherent risks, it would restore Western credibility in the region and offer an alternative to governments seeking to avoid the destructive effects of outsourcing to PMCs. Ceding regional security dominance to Wagner and other mercenary groups may condemn northwest Africa to greater violence and instability, and may require a more robust and even less attractive Western intervention in the future.

Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Anthony Marco · April 4, 2023

This piece was selected as a finalist in the undergraduate category of an essay contest co-sponsored by IWI and the Joint Staff J7 Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition (OIWC). Due to the nature of the contest, this piece is published with only minimal inputs from our editorial team. The views expressed do not represent the position of IWI or the the US Government, including the Joint Staff J7 OIWC.

On 15 August, the last French army unit crossed Mali’s border into Niger, ending a nine year expeditionary counterinsurgency effort. Hours later, al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed it had killed four Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group in the Bandiagara area of central Mali. The day’s events bode poorly for the struggling Northwest African state, whose campaign against the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) and JNIM has already seen numerous atrocities. With the Malian junta turning from France to the Russian private military company (PMC) for support, and jihadist militants pivoting to take on this previously secondary adversary, the security situation in Mali may be on the cusp of significant deterioration. Western governments with interests in the region’s security need to formulate an appropriate response.

A History of Violence: Wagner Group and PMCs as Security Partners

Wagner Group is a PMC that provides site security, military training, protective services, intelligence, information operations, and a direct action capability to both state and non-state actors. The organization, comprised primarily of former Russian soldiers, serves as an unofficial tool of the Russian Defense Ministry, Federal Security Service (FSB), Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), and Spetsnaz. These ties are discrete, affording the Russian government some element of deniability while its private proxy pursues the Kremlin’s strategic interests.

Wagner Group first arrived in Mali in December 2021. In the ensuing months, human rights violations increased tenfold. By mid 2022, joint operations between the Russian mercenaries and the Malian military had killed 500 civilians. The massacre of 300 civilians in Moura was the most gruesome incident. Despite Wagner’s relatively recent arrival in the African security environment, the organization’s record of human rights abuses already extends across the continent. With several African governments and increasing swaths of terrain under Wagner’s influence, the Russian PMC’s presence portends exacerbation of the country’s refugee crises and jihadist insurgencies in a region already plagued by instability.

Within fragile states, Wagner regularly fosters instability by committing acts of indiscriminate violence and human rights abuses. In the Central African Republic (CAR), President Faustin-Archange Touadéera’s government hired Wagner in 2017 to assist with the country’s ongoing civil war. The group committed egregious human rights violations, including indiscriminate killings and sexual violence. In February 2021, Wagner contractors gunned down fleeing civilians from a combat helicopter while hunting rebels in the town of Bambari. Wagner also targeted ethnic minorities like the Fulani in CAR, intensifying ethnic strife and driving recruits to Fulani-based rebel groups.

Wagner has an affinity for large-scale direct-action missions, which, when used by PMCs, have historically not brought positive or lasting change. In 2015, the Nigerian government hired contractors from Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment, and Protection International (STTEP), a South African PMC, to combat Boko Haram. STTEP consists of personnel highly trained and experienced in counterinsurgency missions. The contractors used a strategy of annihilation to recapture 10 out of 14 local governments. Following STTEP’s departure, terrorism in Nigeria returned to pre-existing levels. The intervention temporarily suppressed Boko Haram but failed to achieve any political resolution to the insurgency.

Wagner’s direct-action campaigns are equally ineffective to those of STTEP. In 2020, Mozambique hired Wagner to conduct direct-action strikes against ISIS-linked insurgents. Wagner’s intervention suffered a series of setbacks and the PMC was ultimately replaced due to a lack of local expertise and an inability to coordinate with the Mozambican military. In Syria, according to news reports, 500 pro-Syrian government soldiers, augmented by Wagner contractors, failed in an assault on a US-supported Kurdish opposition outpost. Following the four-hour attack, 200 to 300 of Wagner’s Syrian partners lay dead.

Countering Wagner in Africa: A Possible Western Response

Preventing adversaries from dominating key regions and sustaining a stable and open international system are key objectives of US security policy. Wagner’s violence in northwest Africa threatens both goals, while reliance on PMCs further weakens the legitimacy and military capacity of already fragile African governments. As USAFRICOM commander, General Stephen J. Townsend, asserted in his March 2022 posture statement, “[w]here Wagner goes instability follows.” Wagner and other PMCs amplify regional instability, creating fertile, permissive environments for transnational threats while driving refugee flows. In Mali, the fight against ISWAP and JNIM has already displaced 400,000 people. Russian mercenarism there, like that in CAR, drives a segment of this displaced population toward violent extremist groups. According to a civilian in Mali, “We fear Wagner much more than the terrorists, really. The terrorists, they have never come to destroy a market.”

Stemming these problems early is critical. In East Africa, decades of instability enabled the morphing of al-Shabaab into an organization seeking to attack US citizens and interests. In 2019, an al-Shabaab operative was arrested by Philippine authorities for conspiring to hijack an aircraft and conduct a terrorist attack within the United States. West Africa could present similar radicalization risks. Burkina Faso experienced an increase from 80 to 1,800 local terrorism-related casualties from 2016 to 2019. In Mali, with Wagner on the ground, more violent civilian deaths occurred during this year’s first quarter than all of last year. A month ago, JNIM conducted a car bomb attack on a Mali military camp within 15 kilometers of the capital city Bamako. Following the attack, JNIM issued a statement: “We say to the Bamako government: if you have the right to hire mercenaries to kill defenseless innocent people, then we have right to destroy you and target you.”

The US and its NATO partners can counteract the impact of Wagner by increasing foreign internal defense (FID) efforts with stable regional partners. FID leverages civilian and military agencies to enhance a host nation’s ability to fight off insurgencies, violent extremism, and terrorism with indirect support, direct support, or combat operations. FID is not a panacea and US efforts in Africa have had problems. In Burkina Faso, American military aid empowered a military system that recently overthrew the democratic government. The new government, led by pro-Wagner Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damibia, already maintains an ongoing security dialogue with Wagner.

Niger is a more stable, promising partner than its neighbors and one of the last countries independent of Wagner in the Sahel. Though US effort there has suffered setbacks, this is the time to apply a whole-of-government approach to strengthening Niger’s security independence and building its capacity to stave off expansionary jihadist movements. Successful cooperation in Niger would re-assert the primacy of American partnership in the region and provide a contrast to Wagner’s deleterious tendencies. American forces certified 124 Nigerien NCOs in an enhanced training program in March. They have also engaged with local officials over security matters around the city of Agadez. Although minor strides, these efforts demonstrate the US tendency for cooperation and treating local governments as equitable partners. Niger could well be the cornerstone for reversing the deterioration of security in the Sahel.

The declining security situation in northwest Africa renders US and NATO involvement less and less attractive to policymakers. Concerns are not unfounded. However, the United States regularly outlines obligations to regional stability and conflict prevention. Inaction in the Sahel invites questions about NATO’s espoused commitment to international order and its ability to achieve security objectives. Policymakers must reconcile the complexities of the region and the risks of doing nothing. Though enacting a larger-scale, long-term regional approach to FID comes with inherent risks, it would restore Western credibility in the region and offer an alternative to governments seeking to avoid the destructive effects of outsourcing to PMCs. Ceding regional security dominance to Wagner and other mercenary groups may condemn northwest Africa to greater violence and instability, and may require a more robust and even less attractive Western intervention in the future.

Anthony Marco is a cadet at the United States Military Academy in the Class of 2023. He is a military history major and a research assistant for the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

20. Mind the Middle Powers

Conclusion:

The United States may be rushing into an overly narrow conception of geopolitics, obsessed with China and (to a lesser degree) Russia, treating a vital set of middle powers as necessary adjuncts to those rivalries rather than as strategic actors in their own right. The emerging system is likely to end up not so much as two great magnets pulling the world into a binary system, but rather as one with multiple great-power gravitational centers operating amid an increasingly influential, self-confident, and independent set of middle powers. Such a world will be governed by a different dominant-system dynamic than that of the Cold War. Both in terms of the risks of conflict and instability, and the global alignment of influence, middle powers could well prove to be the center of gravity for world politics and critical force multipliers from a U.S. perspective. The U.S. approach to the challenges of the coming decades should reflect this complex reality.

Mind the Middle Powers - War on the Rocks

TIM SWEIJS AND MICHAEL J. MAZARR

warontherocks.com · by Tim Sweijs · April 4, 2023

Asked to provide a recipe for World War III, many historically minded analysts might mention growing belligerence by dissatisfied great powers; inconsistent system responses; and a succession of economic downturns and domestic political upheavals, followed by a short-term crisis that pushes the system to the brink. Yet a new set of risks is emerging. Today, the ambitions and risk-taking of a jostling, often increasingly assertive crowd of middle powers seeking a larger voice in world politics is causing widespread turbulence in the global system as well as new challenges for U.S. statecraft.

In such a context, international stability and the outcome of great-power rivalries will be a product of many factors beyond Russian and Chinese agitation. One of the most important will be the behavior of middle powers — the growing number of developed and developing countries uninterested in a new bipolar stand-off and determined to chart an independent course. They, as much as the United States or its great-power rivals, will play pivotal roles in determining the future of the international system. The United States has yet to demonstrate that it can operate effectively in this new context. To adapt, Washington should directly address the ambitions and disputes of middle powers — especially those that are not close U.S. allies — and to revise its strategy for competition with Russia and China in ways that take seriously the autonomous position of these other states.

In its relations with middle powers, Washington should not hesitate to insist upon a very short list of norms of acceptable behavior. But while doing so, it should move decisively toward a more inclusive and less coercive approach that prioritizes relations with middle powers as a critical component of U.S. statecraft. This means leading with a broader global agenda that addresses the concerns of middle powers, rather than seeking to exclude states from global networks through overly simplistic frames such as democracy versus autocracy. And while the Indo-Pacific is certainly a principal concern, the United States should not overshoot in regional prioritization. This will generate power vacuums that other powers rush to fill. Finally, Washington should do more to address the systemic risks of conflict escalation between small and middle powers.

Why Middle Powers Matter

In international relations literature, the concept of middle powers is fairly vague. It generally refers to nations that are not strong enough to count as “great” powers but still have significant influence and strategic importance. Typically, middle powers are characterized by a certain degree of heft — in economic, geographic, demographic, or military terms — but some relatively small states can vault into the category as a function of their international activism and influence.

Become a Member

As a result, the set of countries typically identified as middle powers varies. Some are fully developed, former colonial powers like Germany and Japan. Some are smaller developed nations that punch above their weight in global role and influence, including Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, and South Korea. Some are petro-powers — Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, as well as smaller Gulf states like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Others are large developing states such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Vietnam.

One of the leading trends in world politics — in the long run, just as important as intensifying great-power rivalries — is the growing desire of these countries for more control over the shape of the global order and greater influence over specific outcomes. This trend emerges in Turkey’s ambitions for a regional voice and influence, its attempt to position itself between the United States and Europe on the one hand and their main rivals on the other, and its growing military presence abroad. It is evident in Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s vision of a more multipolar world with a greater voice for the Global South. It shows up in European goals for greater strategic autonomy, South Korea’s renewed emphasis on a bigger regional role (with President Yoon Suk-yeol’s stated desire to become a “global pivotal state”), and Poland’s military ambitions. Some middle powers have a sense of exceptionalism that parallels those of great powers: Karen Elliott House has compared Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman to Chinese leader Xi Jinping — technocrats with grand ambitions for their countries who “see themselves as symbols of proud and ancient civilizations that are superior to the West.”

Recent months have shown the challenge to the United States of a world in which middle-power activism is a feature rather than a bug in the international system. Saudi Arabia’s defiance of the Biden administration’s efforts to lower oil prices, Turkey’s extended blockade of Sweden’s NATO membership bid, Indonesia’s refusal to bar Russia’s entry to the G20 summit in Bali, and India’s continued cultivation of economic and military equipment ties with Russia all reflect the same trend. This emerging reality is amplifying the uncertainty and the clashes of regional ambitions in world politics, and molding a significant geopolitical space between the great powers.

The rising activism of middle powers can theoretically contribute to stability by providing additional sources of balancing and diplomacy. But an equally likely outcome is that the ambitions of these countries will exacerbate other rising instabilities of the international system.

Previous power transitions show that major powers are by no means doomed to trip into the Thucydides Trap during an era of fluidity. But periods of transition do inflame a whole basket of risks. The uncertainty associated with crumbling hierarchies and the militarization of foreign policies to compensate for perceived weaknesses can heighten the dangers of advertent and inadvertent escalation associated with closing windows of opportunity. These periods are also associated with the tightening of alliances and the accumulation of crises, as well as the spillover of conflicts between political, economic, and ideological domains amid declining ideological agreement between major powers.

All these systemic instabilities increase the probability of war — and they do so in large part through the dynamics unfolding among middle and smaller powers. Worrying about how power shifts drive direct conflict between great powers is not wrong but incomplete. System-shaping wars often grow out of ambitions, aggressions, and miscalculations involving other states, which eventually pull opposing great powers into major wars, crises, and proxy wars. This pattern crops up again and again: Serbia and Austria-Hungary before World War I, the division of the Korean peninsula and the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, the Kosovo War (with the infamous Pristina Airport Incident), the Syrian and Libyan civil wars (with foreign powers vying for influence), and on to the current Russia-Ukraine war (with Western support for Ukraine via money and military equipment). The assortment of “dangerous dyads” scattered over the globe — including in the Caucasus, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia — does not bode well for regional stability.

Focusing on great-power relationships alone therefore risks ignoring the ultimate catalysts of system-changing wars. It is also a recipe for forfeiting a significant competitive advantage in great-power competition.

Happy to Hedge

Perhaps the single geopolitical stance most characteristic of middle powers is an allergy to being recruited into a new bipolar stand-off between great powers. Middle powers display many variants of this. Some are pursuing rigid non-alignment, some want to affiliate more with the United States while still pursuing “soft balancing” vis-à-vis China, and some maintain formal alliances with the United States but take a starkly different view of key rivalries. As political scientist Hunter Marston has recently argued, all these strategies make hedging not merely a matter of wanting to “balance” or “bandwagon” but instead a comprehensive and essential foreign policy vision.

This is not a 21st century Non-Aligned Movement, where a handful of activist developing nations try to build a coherent, anti-colonial third bloc in word politics. It is a more disaggregated mosaic motivated primarily by nationalism — a collection of self-interested, independent-minded nations, with far more power than their Cold War forebears, who accelerate the arrival of a complex and fluid global pattern of alignments, coalitions, and issue-specific accords.

Examples are legion. India and Indonesia both adhere to formal, longstanding grand strategies of non-alignment. Vietnam also has a formalized policy of non-alignment and a foreign policy that seeks “loose, non-binding and multidimensional” relations with great powers and others. One analyst notes that “[Turkey’s] new foreign policy is best understood not as a drift toward Russia or China” but as a “desire to keep a foot in each camp and to manage great-power rivalry.” Even Israel may become more determinedly independent of U.S. policy under its new hard-right government.

France and Germany, while turning strongly against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, are carving out less confrontational positions on China. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has offered a foreign policy vision that rejects the idea of a “new Cold War” with China, suggesting that “China’s rise does not warrant isolating Beijing or curbing cooperation.” France’s 2022 National Strategic Review states that “France, a balanced power, refuses to be locked into bloc geopolitics.”

Michael Singh of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that Middle Eastern states increasingly reflect the same mindset: “A growing number of U.S. partners are seeking to avoid choosing sides altogether and to maintain relations with all the great powers at once.” Saudi Arabia may be the leading example of this increasingly multi-dimensional, multi-partner approach to balancing. Aaron David Miller contends that “[in] today’s Cold War 2.0,” Saudi Arabia will not simply “refuse to choose sides,” but most likely “move closer to Beijing and Moscow as its own interests warrant.” Karen Young adds that bin Salman “believes Riyadh has the right to work with a shifting constellation of partners” in an increasingly “malleable” world order.

These geopolitical strategies are reflected in public attitudes. A recent meta-review of public opinion data in dozens of developing countries concluded that many “have moved closer to China and Russia over the course of the last decade. As a result, China and Russia are now narrowly ahead of the United States in their popularity among developing countries.”

Taking Middle Powers Seriously

The most recent U.S. National Security Strategy envisions a world divided between two camps — the United States and most liberal democracies on one side, Russia and China and their handful of misfit devotees, such as Iran and North Korea, on the other. There is of course an important truth in that dichotomy. But the increasing self-confidence and assertiveness of middle powers suggests a more complex geopolitical map, one with a kaleidoscope of overlapping and conflicting nodes of influence, interests, and goals on dozens of issues rather than a pair of dominant blocs. This pattern is likely to be shifting rather than static, and spectral rather than binary. It will confront the United States with a dilemma-strewn basket of issue-specific shared interests, desires to collaborate, historical baggage, disagreements, and disputes with just about any middle power.

This budding reality poses two challenges to U.S. and allied statecraft. The first is managing the risks to stability from multiple sources. The second is promoting U.S. influence in a world resistant to being recruited into Team America. Some of the implications are reasonably well-appreciated: Such a context will defeat extreme strategies of either primacy or retrenchment, to avoid overextension and power vacuums that rivals could fill. The United States should not count on strong-willed middle powers for more than they are willing to provide, especially in military terms. Washington should focus on establishing a few clear norms of shared behavior and enforcing them credibly. And it should remember that most middle powers consider themselves neither allies nor “faithful” friends: Most will expect U.S. administrations to push them on selected issues, and Washington will have to engage in a competition of coercion from time to time with Russia and/or China. With this in mind, the following four principles can help Washington to engage with middle powers more effectively.

Lead with an Agenda Partly Focused on the Concerns of Middle Powers

As Foreign Policy editor Ravi Agrawal put it: “The West seemingly expects countries to join the initiatives it wants to invest in, but it rarely shows up for everyone else’s problems.” If the United States hammers away at self-interested goals while ignoring the needs of others — for example, using security ties primarily to bolster U.S. warfighting prowess rather than address partner security concerns — it will undermine the long-term basis for teamwork. Recruiting middle powers to a vision of zero-sum competition is not likely to gain support from such countries: They are generally uninterested in a U.S. agenda focused primarily on sabotaging Chinese influence and reaffirming U.S. primacy.

What would this approach look like in practice? The United States badly needs a fresh, serious, and well-funded initiative in sustainable development, perhaps built around the U.N. 2030 agenda. It could lead in designing — with China — a relief program for developing world debt and the promotion of equitable growth. It could significantly increase its stake in the Green Climate Fund for developing nations particularly vulnerable to climate change, and boost U.S. leadership on and support for global pandemic preparedness and health security. It could back reform of international institutions such as the World Bank and take quick action on U.S. regulations and policies especially irksome to middle powers and their populations, such as the massive wait times for U.S. visas. In security terms, U.S. efforts to provide middle powers with active, defensively oriented denial capabilities can help to insulate them against revisionist aggressors (including other middle powers) without triggering regional arms races and while relieving the direct defense burden on the United States.

Favor Inclusion over Exclusion

With a deepening reliance on direct and indirect sanctions, the default U.S. foreign policy approach has become punitive and exclusionary: Play by our rules or suffer the consequences. But this is a hangover from the post-Cold War era of U.S. primacy. Middle powers in the 21st century middle are of a different demographic, economic, and military size than their 20th-century forebears. Forcing these middle powers to accept policies antithetical to their own interests will antagonize both their domestic audiences and their foreign policy elites. This also prompts adversaries and partners alike to create mechanisms in important areas such as finance and trade to circumvent U.S. sanctions. This directly undermines U.S. leadership and power. The global consensus on norm enforcement is not as ironclad as some might hope or believe — and the United States cannot change this reality by fiat.

Favoring inclusion calls for careful treatment of issues such as export controls, sanctions, and trade policy, which risk pushing unilateralist positions on others. A frame of autocracy versus democracy is too simple for the emerging era. Among other things, it precludes working with partially free countries like Poland, Hungary, and Nigeria to promote human rights through positive encouragement, private pressure, and investments in civil society rather than through sanctions. Favoring inclusion would also call for a rethinking of generalized U.S. isolation of countries that violate liberal norms but pose no aggressive threat such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

Don’t Overdo Regional Prioritization

Three U.S. administrations have now advertised a “pivot to Asia,” reflecting an assessment that the threat from China is the dominant U.S. national security challenge. The problem with this understandable impulse is that most middle powers lie outside Asia and are unwilling to be drafted into an anti-China coalition. The risk is that, in the regions that become de-prioritized (notably the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa), the United States neglects relationships with critical middle powers, leaving ample room for China to fill the void. The rhetoric of regional prioritization alone has powerful consequences — it creates the impression that the United States has abandoned these countries, strengthening the hands of U.S. opponents. This maxim would suggest shifting more diplomatic and security cooperation resources back to Latin America, Africa, and selected areas of the Middle East. It means recruiting hundreds more foreign service and aid professionals focused on those regions. It also requires tailoring regional approaches within webs of multilateral, minilateral, and bilateral cooperation across issue areas such as trade, climate, and security.

Address the Escalation Risks Posed by Middle Powers

Wars are as likely to emerge from rivalries and ambitions among the middle powers as from direct Russian or Chinese actions. Systemic wars, or those wars that lead to the breakdown of international systems, result from conflicts that start small but spread geographically, drawing in other states. This is not necessarily due to often-overstated risk of entrapment, whereby great powers get dragged into wars by the adventurism of smaller allies and proxies. When this has happened in the modern era — for example in Korea and Vietnam — the great powers involved have managed to keep the conflict localized. Instead, the bigger risk today is from conflicts that begin with middle powers fighting either each other or great powers. This is particularly pertinent at a time when middle powers are increasingly becoming important military-strategic actors.

This means that rather than focus on great power rivalry alone, Washington should keep channels of communication open with middle powers and rivals alike, building crisis management tools and investing military and diplomatic expertise on relations with dozens of middle powers. This in turn requires more attention to crisis escalation in international military education and security sector assistance efforts. It will also require coordinating with Russia and China where necessary — and when interests align — to head off instability when middle-power disputes or ambitions threaten war.

Conclusion

The United States may be rushing into an overly narrow conception of geopolitics, obsessed with China and (to a lesser degree) Russia, treating a vital set of middle powers as necessary adjuncts to those rivalries rather than as strategic actors in their own right. The emerging system is likely to end up not so much as two great magnets pulling the world into a binary system, but rather as one with multiple great-power gravitational centers operating amid an increasingly influential, self-confident, and independent set of middle powers. Such a world will be governed by a different dominant-system dynamic than that of the Cold War. Both in terms of the risks of conflict and instability, and the global alignment of influence, middle powers could well prove to be the center of gravity for world politics and critical force multipliers from a U.S. perspective. The U.S. approach to the challenges of the coming decades should reflect this complex reality.

Become a Member

Tim Sweijs is the director of research at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and a senior research fellow at the Netherlands’ War Studies Research Centre.

Michael J. Mazarr is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Tim Sweijs · April 4, 2023

21. America Can Win the AI Race

Excerpts:

And ultimately, to truly integrate and capitalize on AI, U.S. defense leaders will need to shift how they measure military capability. The Pentagon will never give artificial intelligence its due when it does not consider AI to be a key component of military strength. When military leaders appear before Congress to advocate for their budgets, they make their case in terms of industrial-age metrics. The navy, for example, lays out how many ships it requires, while the air force spells out how many aircraft it has to purchase. These measurements still matter, but what matters more today is the digital capabilities of these systems, such as whether the ships and planes have sensors to detect enemy forces, algorithms that can process information and enable better decision-making, and intelligent munitions to precisely strike targets. All these capabilities can be improved with artificial intelligence, and U.S. leaders must begin taking them into account.

It will not be easy for the armed forces to make these changes: the American military is a vast and unwieldy bureaucracy. It will also be hard for the U.S. government as a whole to adjust to the rise of AI, given how polarized Washington is. Reforms to high-skilled immigration, in particular, have run into repeat resistance from conservatives on Capitol Hill. And the fact that today’s AI systems possess major limitations—and therefore require great caution and care during implementation—further complicates the process. Military service members will not use systems they do not trust, and so military officials must make sure that when AI is deployed it works as intended.

But the pieces of a better AI strategy are falling into place. The Pentagon may not yet properly measure the power of artificial intelligence, but it is paying much more attention to the technology. The federal government has increased spending and is exploring data and computing resources for academics. The White House is trying to make it easier for foreign STEM workers to come to the country. The United States, in other words, is working to ensure that China cannot fully catch up. If Washington ultimately maintains control over the semiconductor supply chain, maximizes the inflow of talent, and fields trustworthy systems, it will succeed in staying ahead. As the AI revolution reshapes global power, the United States can come out on top.

America Can Win the AI Race

It Has the Resources—Now It Needs a Plan

By Paul Scharre

April 4, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Paul Scharre · April 4, 2023

Throughout history, technology has been critical to determining which countries dominate global politics. By rapidly industrializing in the 1800s, Germany and the United Kingdom overtook Russia in economic strength. Europe’s broader industrialization had an even more profound effect. In 1790, Europe, China, and India held roughly the same shares of global manufacturing output, but by 1900, Europe—then home to a quarter of the world’s people—controlled 62 percent of the world’s manufacturing. By contrast, China had six percent and India had less than two.

European powers translated their economic might into military power, launching a wave of colonial expansion. By 1914, Europeans occupied or controlled over 80 percent of the planet’s land surfaces. The states were able to make this translation because the Industrial Revolution altered the key metrics of power, transforming coal, steel, and oil production into critical components of military success. In World War II, the United States turned its mighty manufacturing capacity to the business of war, retooling factories to build tanks and airplanes and making its military into the world’s most powerful. At the height of the war, Allied factories were producing over 3.5 times as many aircraft and tanks as the Axis powers, burying Germany, Japan, and Italy beneath an onslaught of iron.

Washington has maintained its leading position in the intervening century in large part due to technology. After the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik, the United States surged its investments in science and technology, building the world’s leading universities and technology companies. But technology is never static, and today the world is reckoning with an innovation that could prove just as transformative as nineteenth-century industrialization: artificial intelligence. Its powers, once largely confined to science fiction, are becoming common and ubiquitous. Just as the Industrial Revolution created machines that were physically stronger than humans, the AI revolution is creating machines that are cognitively smarter than humans. GPT-4, the successor to ChatGPT, recently achieved human-level performance on the SAT, the GRE, and the bar exam. And AI is rapidly improving. It is already transforming jobs from computer programming to fighter jet piloting, and it will continue to alter professions in the future.

Evaluating which state is leading in AI is tricky, especially because knowledge of the algorithms behind the technology can easily spread across borders. But researchers do know what drives AI advancements: massive amounts of data and computing hardware, talented AI scientists and engineers, and resources for AI initiatives. Countries can accrue clear advantages in each of these domains, and scholars can assess these as metrics of national AI power.

Right now, it is clear that the United States leads in AI, with advantages in computing hardware and human talent that other countries cannot match. But China is rapidly catching up. The AI ecosystem is highly open and breakthroughs rapidly proliferate, and Beijing has a better government strategy for advancing AI than Washington. China is ahead of the United States in AI adoption, and it has a large and growing community of high-quality AI experts. Beijing could also inadvertently benefit from U.S. immigration restrictions, which might help China keep more talent. Washington’s effort to cut off China from U.S. technology, meanwhile, could hasten the day when Beijing no longer needs U.S. computing hardware.

If the United States wants to win the AI competition, it must approach Beijing carefully and construct its own initiatives thoughtfully. It needs a strategy that will keep China dependent on foreign-made chips, and it needs to continue attracting and retaining the world’s top AI talent. It must make sure that its institutions, especially the military, fully adopt new innovations. And it must harness its existing advantages, working hard to mobilize academic, corporate, and government resources to improve its mastery of the technology that will govern the future.

ADVANTAGE, AMERICA

In the race for AI dominance, Washington has the upper hand. U.S. companies dominate the key chokepoints in the equipment needed to produce advanced semiconductors, giving the United States unparalleled leverage over the AI supply chain. This advantage is compounded by trends in AI, where the amount of computing hardware used to train cutting-edge machine learning models is doubling every six months. The most sophisticated AI models use thousands of highly specialized advanced chips, and these chips can only be built using U.S. technology.

To capitalize on this advantage, in October 2022 the Biden administration banned companies from selling to China advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and AI chips made with U.S. technology. For Beijing, these restrictions could prove devastating. China is highly dependent on foreign chips, importing over $400 billion worth of them per year. The bans have the dual effect of denying China both the ability to buy high-end AI hardware and the tools it needs to build its own. In early 2023, Japan and the Netherlands—the other two primary makers of semiconductor manufacturing gear—reportedly joined U.S. controls, although the public details of the deal are murky. But provided the two states did properly join with Washington, the bans will prove highly successful. Collectively, the three nations control 90 percent of the global market for semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and so the restrictions could ensure that China’s domestic chip production falls behind as the global industry advances.

Control over chips gives the United States an advantage over China. But as AI research becomes more computing intensive, the United States will also need to invest in more computing resources at home to capitalize on its upper hand. To train the largest machine-learning models, researchers need thousands of advanced, specialized chips, at the cost of millions of dollars per project—expenses that most organizations struggle to afford. Many leading AI labs are backed by major tech corporations with deep pockets. DeepMind and Google Brain, for example, are owned by Google’s parent company. OpenAI secured a $10 billion investment from Microsoft in the wake of ChatGPT. Academic AI researchers, meanwhile, find themselves priced out of training large models. The U.S. government has proposed a National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource to provide academics with additional data and computing hardware. But Congress must fund these federal resources to help U.S. academics remain competitive in cutting-edge AI research.

China is bleeding AI talent.

The United States also has an advantage over China in the competition for talent. Of the top 15 institutions publishing deep learning research, 13 are American universities or corporate labs. Only one, Tsinghua University, is Chinese. U.S. universities and firms recruit the best researchers from around the world, so much so that two-thirds of the top AI scientists in the United States did their undergraduate studies overseas before coming to the country, including many who came from China.

That’s not to say that China lacks AI talent. The country is home to the world’s fastest-growing AI research community—and one that is quickly improving in quality. China puts out more AI research papers than does the United States, and the number of Chinese authors contributing to top AI journals increased by a factor of 12 from 2009 to 2019 and is now roughly 2.5 times higher than the number of U.S. contributors.

But the United States still leads in quality, with papers that are cited 70 percent more often than Chinese ones. And China is bleeding talent. A 2020 study by MacroPolo, a U.S. think tank, tracked the flow of international AI talent based on a sample of papers accepted to one of the world’s top artificial intelligence conferences. They found that although more leading AI researchers did their undergraduate studies in China than in any other country, the vast majority of these experts left to pursue their graduate work abroad. More than half of them came to the United States, and over 90 percent of those who came to the United States ultimately stayed after graduation. China may be the biggest source of AI talent, but the United States is the biggest beneficiary of the talents of Chinese researchers.

The exodus is not the only way that China’s larger population has failed to give the country a leg up in the AI race. The country has 1.4 billion people, and so Chinese researchers should have access to more data than their U.S. counterparts. But technology is not always constrained by borders, and major U.S. tech firms—the ones that are funding some of the biggest AI breakthroughs—have a global reach that exceeds that of Chinese companies. Facebook, for example, has 2.7 billion users, and YouTube has over 2 billion. WeChat, China’s biggest app, has 1.2 billion users. U.S. tech firms also have a more diverse database. With the exception of ByteDance’s TikTok, Chinese social media platforms have struggled to gain a foothold outside China, putting them at a disadvantage in gaining access to diverse data. These apps may be well suited to predict the behavior of Chinese netizens, but their AI models may not hold for outside markets.

GAINING GROUND

Washington, however, does not dominate every part of the AI race. When it comes to some sectors of data collection, for example, China may be ahead. U.S. businesses have a wider reach, but the Chinese Communist Party has built a massive domestic surveillance apparatus that will give it larger data sets and faster AI development for some applications than the United States can muster. China is home to half of the world’s roughly one billion surveillance cameras, which are spread across airports, hotels, banks, train stations, subways, factories, apartment complexes, and even public toilets. This system will give Chinese companies an edge over their U.S. competitors in facial recognition, where a grassroots backlash has slowed U.S. efforts to deploy public cameras on a mass scale. Two of the United States’ largest tech companies—Amazon and Microsoft—have a moratorium on selling facial recognition to law enforcement. IBM cancelled its work on facial recognition altogether. Several cities and states have even banned law enforcement from using facial recognition software.

Beijing’s advantages in facial recognition may not confer a wide advantage. Better data on Chinese faces won’t necessarily translate to non-Chinese faces, and it certainly won’t help train better AI fighter pilots. And U.S. companies have ample data not only because of their international reach but also because Americans have willingly given their personal data over to them. Beijing, meanwhile, has cracked down on the power of tech firms, including by increasing consumer data privacy protections after a series of scandals. Yet Washington’s failure to regulate tech firms is unlikely to give it much of an advantage in data. In emerging AI fields, rule-making uncertainty may hold back innovation, as companies struggle to figure out what they can or cannot do. By clarifying copyright laws on training AI models and AI model outputs, the United States could help its businesses unlock new opportunities.

It is not just in the data realm where Washington could struggle. In other parts of the AI contest, China is working hard to close the gap with the United States. China is improving its domestic talent base, growing its number of scientists and engineers. It also has more than 200 talent recruitment programs focused on getting the estimated 400,000 Chinese scientists abroad to bring scientific knowledge back to China. The U.S. government has long been concerned about Chinese efforts to acquire technology adopted in the United States, and so it has responded to Beijing’s initiatives with a crackdown on espionage. But if increased investigations of Chinese researchers prompt some of them to feel unwelcome in the United States, Washington could cut off the flow of Chinese talent. Such moves would be a gift to Beijing.

Washington is also at risk of losing high-skilled immigrants from all over the world thanks to its immigration policies. A numerical cap on H-1B work visas—the visas typically awarded to college-educated immigrants—arbitrarily constrains U.S. companies from hiring foreign talent. Per-country caps on green cards mean that Indian immigrant scientists, especially, have to wait absurdly long periods of time before they can become permanent U.S. residents, and Indian scientists make up a quarter of Silicon Valley’s workforce. (One study estimated that Indian nationals who already have visas and are applying for employment-based green cards have to wait 8–9 years before they can receive one.) It is not surprising, then, that nearly 70 percent of top machine learning researchers residing in the United States said that visa and other immigration problems were an obstacle to recruiting foreign scientists. It is one of the starkest policy areas where government regulation is harming American competitiveness.

The Biden administration has taken some steps to make it easier for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics students to come to the United States. The White House has, for example, increased the number of foreign exchange programs, expanded the number of fields qualifying for the STEM Optional Practical Training visa for recent college graduates, and made it easier for STEM Ph.D.s to apply for the O-1A “extraordinary ability” visa. These are valuable steps, but they will have a minor impact relative to the problem. The United States needs comprehensive reform of its immigration policies for high-skilled workers to make it easier for U.S. universities and companies to recruit international scientists and engineers. Washington especially has to exempt STEM Ph.D. graduates from the H-1B cap and ease their pathway to permanent residency. And it must do so soon: as a country of 330 million people, the United States will always be at a disadvantage competing against a country of 1.4 billion if it restricts itself to homegrown talent. The United States’ unique advantage is its ability to draw on the best and brightest from around the world, and it cannot afford to lose it.

KEEP YOUR ENEMIES CLOSER

Immigration is not the only domain where Washington’s policies could harm its AI drive. The Biden administration’s export restrictions may be hurting Beijing right now, but the bans risk hastening Beijing’s drive toward chip independence. U.S. restrictions, for instance, could turn China’s $400 billion of chip buying power inward, fueling its domestic semiconductor industry. This purchasing would add to the government’s already extensive efforts to grow domestic chip production. And once Beijing no longer needs foreign chips, the United States will have lost its leverage over its adversary.

Washington’s restrictions could also prompt companies to excise U.S. technology from their chip supply chains. Although U.S. chip restrictions cover only approximately one percent of China’s chip market today, the size of the banned market will grow over as technology advances, provided that the restrictions stay in place (as U.S. officials have promised). Even American companies have previously looked for ways to work around Washington’s prohibitions. After the U.S. government banned Huawei from receiving U.S.-made chips in 2019, Intel and Micron continued shipping chips to Huawei by cutting out components made in the United States.

Instead of implementing broad bans, U.S. policymakers should work closely with allies to maintain China’s dependence on foreign chips. The United States should prohibit sales of chips to China for military applications or that will facilitate China’s human rights abuses. But it should still permit sales to commercial data centers. Additionally, the United States should work with allies to create a broader, more multilateral system of semiconductor export controls to close off opportunities for China to circumvent U.S. controls. These steps will help keep China reliant on foreign chips built using U.S. technology, ensuring that Washington maintains the upper hand as the AI revolution progresses.

To stay ahead, the United States must also invest in new forms of microelectronics research that can ensure that U.S. companies lead in future semiconductor technology. Smaller transistor sizes have driven chip advances for decades, but as the most sophisticated chips become as tiny as is physically possible, future innovations will likely come from new areas, such as advanced packaging techniques that pack more functionality onto chips. The United States’ recent $52 billion CHIPS and Science Act is an opportunity to not only bring cutting-edge chip manufacturing back home but also to invest in new kinds of semiconductor innovations.

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

To be the world’s leading AI power, China and the United States will certainly need top-notch resources, researchers, and manufacturing. But to transform expertise and innovations into hard power, the countries need to find ways to integrate AI inventions into their militaries. It is not a simple task. Unlike stealth technology or hypersonic missiles, most AI advancements come from the civilian sector. They must then be reworked and scaled to have a battlefield impact.

Both states are aware of this challenge, and they are working hard to meet it. The U.S. Defense Department, for example, has gone on an organization building spree, creating dozens of new offices designed to bring private sector technology into the armed forces. The department has had some positive results. The Defense Innovation Unit, for example, established in 2015 as the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), has contracted with 120 companies that do not traditionally do defense work and 60 companies that are new to working with the Department of Defense entirely. It has helped foster new military innovations, including by helping launch the United States’ Project Maven—which uses AI technology to process drone video feeds.

The Chinese military has followed Washington’s lead. In 2018, the country’s Central Military Commission Science and Technology Commission created a self-described “rapid response small group” for adopting market AI inventions, apparently modeled on the Defense Innovation Unit. (Some Chinese reporting even referred to the group as “China’s DIUx.”) China has used competitions modeled off the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to draw in private sector innovators to take on tough problems. After the United States made advancements in swarming, in which robots autonomously cooperate to perform a task, and in AI dogfighting, China carried out public demonstrations of its own advances in both technologies.

Once Beijing no longer needs foreign chips, the United States will have lost its leverage.

Even though Beijing is copying Washington’s playbook, U.S. leaders have worried that their country might ultimately fall behind China—in large part because some American tech workers are reluctant to collaborate with the U.S. military. When protests by Google employees led the company to stop working on Project Maven in 2018, U.S. military leaders panicked that they would be shut out of future game-changing commercial technology. But these fears have not come to fruition. Tech companies have, in fact, proved eager to work with the Department of Defense on artificial intelligence. When the Pentagon asked for bids on a $10 billion AI-enabled cloud computing contract, Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle all fought to win it. There has been an explosion in defense-oriented AI startups, from now large firms such as Anduril to small ones such as Heron Systems, the latter of which beat out Lockheed Martin in a 2020 AI dogfighting competition. Even Google has returned to defense contracting.

If anything, the U.S. government appears to have the opposite problem: its commercial players are so determined to profit off the military’s needs that they are making it hard for the bureaucracy to properly adopt new tech. Tech companies launched lawsuits, filed protests, and called for investigations into the selection process for the DOD’s cloud computing contract in an attempt to take the contract for themselves. Their efforts paralyzed the program for three and a half years, before the DOD finally surrendered and canceled the contract. To proceed, it had to craft a multi-vendor solution, with Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and Oracle all on contract. To avoid being mired in more pointless delays, the United States must reform acquisition rules to cut back on objections.

The Department of Defense faces other bigger, structural obstacles. The DOD has succeeded in adopting commercial AI technology, but mostly for one-off solutions in small projects. It has not yet succeeded in integrating artificial intelligence into its core functions, and history shows that what matters most in periods of technological disruption is finding the best ways of using new inventions. The United Kingdom, for example, was the first country to develop aircraft carriers, but by the start of World War II it had fallen behind Japan and the United States, which embraced carrier aviation as central to the future of naval warfare. The two states’ advantages came thanks to bureaucratic foresight; war games at the Naval War College, for instance, showed U.S. Navy leaders the carriers’ potential. London, by contrast, made the mistake of consolidating airpower under the Royal Air Force instead of prioritizing naval aviation. Government decisions, not technology, were decisive in determining which states led in the carrier race.

The pieces of a better AI strategy are falling into place.

To properly integrate AI into the armed forces, the Department of Defense must build an iterative process of experimentation, prototyping, testing, and concept development—something it has struggled to do thus far. After Project Maven’s early success, the DOD established the Joint AI Center in 2018 to accelerate the use of AI technology, but the body had difficulty scaling applications across the rest of the department. In response, in 2022, Pentagon officials created a new chief digital and artificial intelligence office, consolidating AI and data-related functions across the DOD, including the Joint AI Center’s duties. This is a welcome shift, but it remains to be seen whether the new office will be successful in making sure AI is fully deployed across the Department of Defense. Building the right institutions will take continued attention and investment from senior defense leaders.

And ultimately, to truly integrate and capitalize on AI, U.S. defense leaders will need to shift how they measure military capability. The Pentagon will never give artificial intelligence its due when it does not consider AI to be a key component of military strength. When military leaders appear before Congress to advocate for their budgets, they make their case in terms of industrial-age metrics. The navy, for example, lays out how many ships it requires, while the air force spells out how many aircraft it has to purchase. These measurements still matter, but what matters more today is the digital capabilities of these systems, such as whether the ships and planes have sensors to detect enemy forces, algorithms that can process information and enable better decision-making, and intelligent munitions to precisely strike targets. All these capabilities can be improved with artificial intelligence, and U.S. leaders must begin taking them into account.

It will not be easy for the armed forces to make these changes: the American military is a vast and unwieldy bureaucracy. It will also be hard for the U.S. government as a whole to adjust to the rise of AI, given how polarized Washington is. Reforms to high-skilled immigration, in particular, have run into repeat resistance from conservatives on Capitol Hill. And the fact that today’s AI systems possess major limitations—and therefore require great caution and care during implementation—further complicates the process. Military service members will not use systems they do not trust, and so military officials must make sure that when AI is deployed it works as intended.

But the pieces of a better AI strategy are falling into place. The Pentagon may not yet properly measure the power of artificial intelligence, but it is paying much more attention to the technology. The federal government has increased spending and is exploring data and computing resources for academics. The White House is trying to make it easier for foreign STEM workers to come to the country. The United States, in other words, is working to ensure that China cannot fully catch up. If Washington ultimately maintains control over the semiconductor supply chain, maximizes the inflow of talent, and fields trustworthy systems, it will succeed in staying ahead. As the AI revolution reshapes global power, the United States can come out on top.

PAUL SCHARRE is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security and the author of Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence.

Foreign Affairs · by Paul Scharre · April 4, 2023

22. The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation

Excerpts:

To win support at home and abroad, American foreign policy needs to become less ideological. Common perceptions of common threats will do more to build the kind of international and domestic coalition that American foreign policy needs than democracy-vamping speeches from the bully pulpit.

Many countries share America’s concerns about Chinese, Russian and Iranian expansionism. China’s abuse of the World Trade Organization harms the whole world. The American-led global system that Russia and China want to break brought many countries unprecedented prosperity and security. These arguments carry more weight than abstract democracy talking points, even in Europe. Concerns about the Uyghurs did less to change German thinking about China than worries about China’s economic designs on the German automobile and capital-goods industries.

Mr. Biden should remember that his global coalition is held together more by common interests and common sense than by common values. And he should never underestimate the domestic and the international cost of overhyped, underthought democracy rhetoric.

The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation

It alienates allies his foreign policy needs both domestically and around the world.

By Walter Russell MeadFollow

April 3, 2023 6:25 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-cost-of-bidens-democracy-fixation-autocracy-summit-freedom-house-ideology-foreign-policy-middle-east-86638fc5?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1

From his 2021 address through the Munich Security Conference to last week’s Summit for Democracy, President Biden has been clear. He wants to frame world politics as a contest between liberal democracy and autocracy. That’s unfortunate. While not completely misguided, this approach hampers America’s diplomacy overseas and further erodes the weak consensus at home behind a strong American foreign policy around the world.

Mr. Biden is invoking an old American tradition here. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt framed the world wars as conflicts between democracy and dictatorship. And from Harry S. Truman to Ronald Reagan, America’s Cold War presidents used similar language.

Mr. Biden isn’t all wrong. If the U.S. and its allies lose the contest, and people like Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and their hangers-on in countries like North Korea and Nicaragua get to determine the world’s future, democracy isn’t going to flourish.

Nevertheless, the president and his team need to think again. Defining the current contest as one between democracies and autocracies is a flawed strategy. Abroad, this approach weakens America’s ties with key allies and exposes us to devastating charges of systemic hypocrisy. At home and abroad, the widespread unpopularity of the expanded version of democracy Mr. Biden expounds—including controversial stands on issues like trans rights—is too polarizing and divisive to support the long-term consensus American foreign policy needs for success.

If the U.S. is serious about an Indo-Pacific strategy, it is going to have to assemble and cultivate a coalition of countries that are anything but liberal and democratic. Finland, Sweden and Norway may score a perfect 100 on Freedom House’s widely used global freedom index, with Denmark hard on their heels at 97. But if we want any kind of Southeast Asian strategy at all, we will have to work with countries like Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, all of which count as “not free” on the Freedom House scale. And without as many “partly free” countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nepal, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka as we can bring into our network, we have zero chance of holding the balance against China.

It goes further. In Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan all rate as “not free.” Do we write off this part of the world? If we want to keep Middle East oil producers from aligning with our enemies, we need to work with some very undemocratic governments. And if we want to counter China in Africa, there are very imperfect governments in Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan that we can’t afford to ignore.

To alienate these countries through vacuous posturing about our sincerity as human-rights crusaders would be stupid. To spurn their aid because we dislike their human-rights and democracy policies would be suicidal.

At home, it is easier to show people that China under its current policies poses a direct threat to American security and prosperity than it is to energize people for a democracy crusade in East Asia. Worse, by conflating its international fight for liberal democracy with its internal struggle against the populist GOP, the Biden administration is undercutting the domestic foreign-policy consensus it seeks to build. When administration officials tell the public that the fight against Vladimir Putin is another front in the war against Donald Trump, they undermine the bipartisan support Ukraine desperately needs.

Beyond the Trump question, most Republicans don’t want to build a “democracy” at home that guarantees extreme versions of transgender ideology and abortion on demand through the ninth month of pregnancy. They certainly won’t want to help the Biden administration build such a democracy overseas. The more Mr. Biden beats this drum, the more isolationist Republican opinion is likely to become.

To win support at home and abroad, American foreign policy needs to become less ideological. Common perceptions of common threats will do more to build the kind of international and domestic coalition that American foreign policy needs than democracy-vamping speeches from the bully pulpit.

Many countries share America’s concerns about Chinese, Russian and Iranian expansionism. China’s abuse of the World Trade Organization harms the whole world. The American-led global system that Russia and China want to break brought many countries unprecedented prosperity and security. These arguments carry more weight than abstract democracy talking points, even in Europe. Concerns about the Uyghurs did less to change German thinking about China than worries about China’s economic designs on the German automobile and capital-goods industries.

Mr. Biden should remember that his global coalition is held together more by common interests and common sense than by common values. And he should never underestimate the domestic and the international cost of overhyped, underthought democracy rhetoric.

WSJ Opinion: Sen. Dan Sullivan on Taiwan and U.S. Defense Spending

Retired U.S. colonel compares Ukraine counterattack to pivotal WWII battle

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · April 3, 2023

Retired U.S. Army Colonel Jonathan Sweet compared a potential Ukrainian spring counteroffensive against Russia to a pivotal moment in World War II.

More than one year after Russian President Vladimir Putin launched the Ukraine "special military operation" on February 24, 2022, reports have emerged in recent weeks that Ukrainian forces could be preparing for a spring counteroffensive operation aimed at reclaiming more occupied territory.

The move would follow months of conflict largely surrounding the symbolically critical city of Bakhmut and other areas of eastern Ukraine, with Russian efforts stagnating amid allegedly high troop losses and other challenges plaguing Putin's ranks. While detailed information, including what areas would be targeted, remain unknown, any military action could potentially shape the outcome of the war.

Sweet, a retired military intelligence officer, wrote in an opinion piece with economist Mark Toth in Monday's Kyiv Post that he thinks Ukrainian military leaders are preparing for a military effort "of the importance" of the Battle of Normandy, which began with the D-Day invasion (code named Operation Overlord), on June 6, 1944.

A Ukrainian serviceman looks on with binoculars next to another sitting on an anti-air gun near Bakhmut, Ukraine, on March 24, 2023. Retired U.S. Army Colonel Jonathan Sweet explained that he thinks Ukrainian military leaders are preparing for a spring military effort "of the importance" of the Battle of Normandy, viewed by many historians as a turning point in World War II. Aris Messinis/AFP/Getty

"Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi and Commander of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, have shown high levels of strategic and tactical nous, directing an effort almost on the scale and of the importance of the Normandy and Inchon invasions of World War II and the Korean War," Sweet wrote.

The Battle of Normandy began when more than 150,000 Allied troops landed on the beaches of Normandy, France, as part of the largest amphibious assault in history. The battle led to the liberation of France and set the groundwork for Allied victory in Europe when Nazi Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945.

During the Korean War, U.S. Marines made an amphibious landing on September 15, 1950, at the Korean port of Inchon, about 25 miles from the South Korean capital, Seoul, which was eventually recaptured from North Korea. The landing at Inchon changed the course of the war, though it continued until an armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

In their opinion piece, Sweet and Toth praised Ukrainian military leaders for preparing for the next phases of the war.

"Rather than just sitting, waiting in their defensive positions in Bakhmut for the next Russian assault Zelensky's Generals are building combat power, stockpiling ammunition, and training Ukraine's army to launch its own counter offensive to drive Putin and his generals out of Ukraine," they wrote.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said in an interview last week that his country is planning operations "in several directions" for a counteroffensive, according to The Kyiv Post.

"You will see Leopards in a counterattack by the decision of our General Staff, Reznikov said. "It is already planned in several directions."

The war in recent months has been defined by efforts on both sides to take control of Bakhmut. Russia for months pointed to its troops' strength in the city as a sign of progress. But offenses have slowed in recent weeks, and experts now view the effort as nearing culmination.

Newsweek reached out to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense via email for comment.

Newsweek · by Andrew Stanton · April 3, 2023

24. Drone-on-Drone Combat in Ukraine Marks a New Era of Aerial Warfare

Drone-on-Drone Combat in Ukraine Marks a New Era of Aerial Warfare

Antidrone technology is combatting “flying IEDs” in the air over Ukraine—with implications beyond the war with Russia

By Jason Sherman on April 3, 2023

Scientific American · by Jason Sherman · April 3, 2023

The Fortem Technologies fully-autonomous, radar-guided DroneHunter captures a Group 1 level (aircraft that weigh up to 20 pounds) drone. It is also capable of capturing heavier aircraft, such as the Iranian-built Shahed 131 and 136 fixed-wing drones. Credit: Donte Hunter

In the skies over Ukraine, a new epoch in air warfare is emerging: drone-on-drone combat.

These aerial duels don’t involve bullets, missiles or bombs. In some, hobby-type camera quadcopters that are used to spy on enemy positions simply ram each other in a crude aerial demolition derby. In other encounters, highly sophisticated craft use advanced radar—backed by artificial intelligence and the latest aerospace engineering technology—to precision fire nets that snag other drones.

“This is something we haven’t seen before,” says Caitlin Lee, who leads the Center for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Autonomy Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies in Arlington, Va. “This is the first time we’re seeing drone-on-drone conflict.”

And the action in Ukraine suggests that even more novel kinds of aerial conflict—including combat drones armed to fight in tandem with piloted aircraft—are coming to the broader world of warfare. The U.S. Air Force, for example, now envisions a fleet of 1,000 high-performance uncrewed aircraft paired with its most advanced combat jets. This plan is in response to China’s growing challenge to the U.S. military’s 75-year air dominance. Beyond the battlefield, weaponized drones could, from the skies above any city, easily threaten things such as crowd safety at major sporting events, prison security and critical infrastructure. (Of course, much of the underlying technology is also expected to usher in changes for the good in the realm of peaceful applications. Drones have already been successfully used to rush extremely perishable donor organs to transplant patients.)

In Ukraine, the initial drone dogfights sprung from the proliferation of commercially available, low-cost, low-altitude aircraft, such as Chinese drone maker DJI’s quadcopter. People can creatively modify these hobbyist machines for combat to allow the drones to conduct overhead surveillance and drop grenades. Defending against such small drones, some weighing just a few ounces or pounds, is difficult. For starters, they are hard to detect.

“We can retrain air defenses to look for smaller radar cross sections, but then they’ll pick up every bird that flies by,” says Sarah Kreps, director of the Cornell Brooks School Tech Policy Institute. “So it’s a real sensor problem that countries like the U.S. have spent billions trying to solve—not unlike when the U.S. spent [heavily on] countering improvised explosive devices that were far less expensive or sophisticated than systems our militaries had been trained to destroy. These are essentially flying IEDs that have foiled militaries in similar ways, creating asymmetric advantages that have been difficult to counter.”

Another challenge these small drones present is that they are now widely available and cheap enough to be purchased in large numbers. Even though an individual machine modified for combat is not capable of causing massive destruction, the number of potentially vulnerable targets is nearly infinite, Kreps notes. This enables a group with fewer resources to attack a more powerful foe.

In 2016 French special operations forces deployed in Syria were among the first to see small commercial drones imaginatively converted into instruments of war when the forces were attacked by Islamic State fighters. “Less-funded countries now have access to airpower where they wouldn’t have in the past, so that’s changing who’s entering the fray,” says Nicole Thomas, division chief for strategy at the Pentagon’s Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, an organization created in 2020 to synchronize the U.S. military’s response to such threats.

The U.S. government divides small drones into three categories: Group 1 describes craft that have a gross takeoff weight of up to 20 pounds. Group 2 covers the next tier, between 21 and 55 pounds. And Group 3 encompasses uncrewed drones that can weigh as much as 1,320 pounds.

While the drone war era has clearly begun, it is not yet clear that these small aircraft are playing a decisive role in the larger Ukraine fight by creating an offensive breakthrough or an opportunity to seize the initiative for one side, Lee says. “I think the open question is: Do the drones have to get more sophisticated ... in order to hold the ground, let alone contribute to a combined arms campaign that actually takes back territory?” she adds.

Defense experts are not waiting for small drones to become more advanced before taking steps to defend against them. In the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. Congress directed the Pentagon to create a plan for developing and fielding defense systems to counter small drones. And this year the Pentagon plans to spend nearly $700 million for counterdrone research and development, plus $78 million for procurement. A private research firm estimates the market for systems to counter small drones will grow from about $2.3 billion in 2023 to $12.6 billion by 2030. This market includes not only the Pentagon but also state and municipal governments, as well as private entities.

That potential is inspiring more than a dozen companies around the world—including Blighter Surveillance Systems in England, and Dedrone and DeTect in the U.S.—to develop antidrone technology. Such systems may be ground-based, handheld or drone-based and can bring down other small aircraft using electromagnetic interference, lasers and other technology.

Fortem Technologies, a start-up based in Pleasant Grove, Utah, has vaulted into the drone wars by adapting its earlier work on miniature radars. The company says it has developed a complete system for detecting small drones—and capturing them midair with a net.

Fortem’s DroneHunter F700 has six rotors, a radar backed by autonomous technology and two “net heads” that can precisely fire webs at adversary drones. Once ensnared, smaller drones can be dragged away by the DroneHunter. Larger drones are also netted but then released; the net prevents them from flying, so they drop to the ground under their own weight. Then a parachute attached to the net deploys to soften the landing.

“We’re really the only one in the world at this point that can do that,” says the company’s chief executive officer Jon Gruen.

The U.S. government is using this technology to protect unnamed “strategic” sites. And Ukraine is flying Fortem’s new drone to patrol the skies and nab small Russian aircraft intact and on the fly.

Ukraine first deployed DroneHunter last May to chase down the Group 1 and 2 drones that Russia was using to spy on frontline Ukrainian troops. DroneHunter has dented Moscow’s ability to use drones for collecting artillery-targeting data on Ukrainian troop positions and has stymied larger kamikaze drones aimed at critical infrastructure.

When Russia began launching the Iranian-built uncrewed aerial vehicle Shahed, a Group 3 drone, as a kamikaze weapon, Fortem began modifying DroneHunter to intercept these armed drones. The system has ensnared more than 5,000 target drones during developmental flight tests, Gruen says. This has helped capture the attention of capital venture divisions at Lockheed Martin, Boeing and other giant corporations, which have invested $75 million in scaling up Fortem’s operations.

Significantly, DroneHunter operates autonomously: once deployed, it races to the action, makes independent decisions about all its moves, nets its prey and returns to be equipped with a fresh net.

“There have been debates about using autonomous drones in combat, and thus far, countries seem to have shied away from using them in a lethal capacity,” Kreps says. “At the same time, though, we’ve seen an increasingly porous line between the semiautonomous drones—which is how the U.S. used drones for counterterrorism—and fully autonomous drones.”

In a situation such as the one in Ukraine, where the West broadly supports giving the country the tools it needs to defend itself, “there could be a real first-mover advantage in using counterdrone systems in this type of autonomous capacity,” Kreps says, “which takes us further down the slippery slope of autonomy.”

Scientific American · by Jason Sherman · April 3, 2023

25. Ukraine: WAR BULLETIN April 3, 7.00 pm EST - Glory to Ukraine! The four hundred and fourthday of large-scale armed aggression of the russian federation against our state continues.

Also posted on the Small Wars Journal: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/ukraine-war-bulletin-april-3-700-pm-est-glory-ukraine-four-hundred-and-fourthday-large-scale

Embassy of Ukraine in the USA

WAR BULLETIN

April 3, 7.00 pm EST

During the day, the enemy carried out 3 missile and 17 air strikes, carried out more than 20 attacks from MLRS systems on the positions of our troops and the civilian infrastructure of populated areas.

During a working trip to the Chernihiv region, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a meeting with Secretary General of the Council of Europe Marija Pejčinović Burić who is visiting our country for the second time since the beginning of the full-scale aggression.

President of Ukraine held talks with Vice Chancellor, Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action of Germany Robert Habeck in the Chernihiv region.

The successes of our people in the battles for the Chernihiv, Sumy and Kyiv regions revealed to the world the truth that Ukraine is capable of emerging victorious from this war - President on the occasion of the anniversary of the de-occupation of the Chernihiv region.

Every day we are getting stronger, every day we are getting closer to the day when the terrorist state will be held to account - address by the President of Ukraine

Rashism must face a total defeat: military, economic, political, legal - address by the President of Ukraine on April 2.

Ukraine and Romania to hold First Black Sea Security Conference of International Crimea. Platform in Bucharest.

IMF Executive Board approved USD 15.6 billion for Ukraine under a New Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program.

Business activity expectations index almost reaches its neutral level – business outlook survey in March.

WAR ROOM

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

The total combat losses of the enemy from 24.02.2022 to 03.04.2023 were approximately:

personnel ‒ about 175160 (+610) persons,

tanks ‒ 3619 (+1),

APV ‒ 6993 (+7),

artillery systems – 2694 (+7),

MLRS – 527,

Anti-aircraft warfare systems ‒ 280 (+1),

aircraft – 306,

helicopters – 291,

UAV operational-tactical level – 2262 (+13),

cruise missiles ‒ 911,

warships / boats ‒ 18,

vehicles and fuel tanks – 5553 (+16),

special equipment ‒ 298 (+2).

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0wn3s1CjQg37QBB9JM6nnzeJqzasbKf5TpAhfkj2pXTe8QCjX1eC965dkwAvwyVmdl?locale=uk_UA

Operational information as of 18.00

Glory to Ukraine! The four hundred and fourth day of large-scale armed aggression of the russian federation against our state continues.

The probability of launching missile and air strikes on the entire territory of Ukraine remains high.

The enemy continues to focus its main efforts on conducting offensive actions in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Maryinka directions. Thanks to the coordinated actions of units of the Defense Forces of Ukraine and the heroism of each soldier, more than 45 enemy attacks were repelled during the day. Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Maryinka remain at the epicenter of hostilities.

In the Volyn, Polissiya, Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi directions, the operational situation has not changed significantly, and no signs of formations of enemy offensive groups have been detected. Certain units of the armed forces of the republic of belarus continue to perform tasks in the areas bordering Ukraine. The russian federation will continue to use the airspace and territory of the republic of belarus, its military infrastructure. The training of units of the armed forces of the russian federation is carried out on belarusian training grounds.

The presence of enemy units in the border areas of the Kursk and Belgorod regions is maintained.

During the day, the enemy shelled the settlements of Zapsilya and Myropyllya in the Sumy region, as well as the settlements of Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Zybine, Volokhivka, Rublene, and Vilkhuvatka in the Kharkiv region.

Kamianka, Petro-Ivanivka, Dvorichna, Kutkivka, Zapadne, Masyutivka of the Kharkiv region came under enemy fire in the Kupyansk direction; Krokhmalne in Luhansk region and Terna and Serebryanka in Donetsk region.

In the Lyman direction, during the day, the enemy conducted unsuccessful offensive actions in the areas of Nevsky and Serebryansk forestry. Makiivka, Nevske, Belogorivka of the Luhansk region and Vesele, Spirne and Rozdolivka of the Donetsk region were hit by artillery fire.

In the direction of Bakhmut, the enemy is trying to take full control of the city of Bakhmut, and continues to storm it. He led unsuccessful offensive actions near the settlements of Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Ivanivske. During the day, units of the defense forces repelled about 20 enemy attacks on the specified section of the battle line. Vasyukivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Novomarkove, Bohdanivka, Bakhmut, Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Ozaryanivka, Dachne, Oleksandro-Shultyne, Zalizne and New York of the Donetsk region suffered from enemy shelling.

On the Avdiivka and Maryinka directions, the enemy carried out unsuccessful offensive actions in the areas of Severnoy, Pervomaisky and Maryinka. At the same time, the enemy shelled Avdiivka, Vodyane, Severne, Netaylove, Pervomaiske, Georgiyivka, Maryinka, and Pobyeda of the Donetsk region.

During the day, the enemy did not conduct offensive operations in the Shakhtarsk direction. Unmanned aerial vehicles were actively used to adjust artillery fire. He shelled the settlements of Novomykhailivka, Vugledar, Prechistivka, Zolota Niva, Velika Novosilka, and Vremivka in the Donetsk region.

In the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson directions, the enemy did not conduct active operations, but increased its defense capabilities. He carried out shelling of populated areas, which are next to the line of military confrontation. Among them are Olhivske, Gulyaipole, Charivne, Biloghirya, Mala Tokmachka, Kamianske of the Zaporizhzhia region, as well as the city of Kherson.

In the Skadovsky district of the Kherson region, the so-called russian occupation authorities have started compiling lists of local residents who agree to "evacuate" to Crimea or the territory of the russian federation. It is known that the "evacuation" will be carried out on a voluntary basis for the time being, primarily women and children will be taken out.

The aviation of the defense forces struck 5 times during the day on the areas of concentration of personnel and military equipment of the occupiers. Our defenders also shot down an enemy reconnaissance UAV.

Units of missile forces and artillery, in turn, struck the area where the enemy's manpower was concentrated.

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02fJnei1XUxCBb5aBXoRwayujUzyHpDz9N4QYet1CStt7M52FGPkviBJBN8NodMCNLl?locale=uk_UA

POLICY

President of Ukraine

President held a meeting with the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in Chernihiv

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-proviv-u-chernigovi-zustrich-iz-generalnim-se-82065

President of Ukraine held talks with Vice Chancellor, Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action of Germany Robert Habeck in the Chernihiv region

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-chernigivshini-prezident-ukrayini-proviv-peregovori-z-vic-82061

Every day we are getting stronger, every day we are getting closer to the day when the terrorist state will be held to account - address by the President of Ukraine

Good health to you, fellow Ukrainians!

A report on this busy day.

Staff. Another away meeting of the Staff - the first was in Dnipro, now - in Chernihiv.

Key security issues at the front, in the northern regions and at the border.

The commanders of the directions delivered reports. This time, Generals Syrskyi and Tarnavskyi reported by secure communication line, and not in person, from the hottest areas of the front.

The situation in Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Maryinka and throughout the Donetsk region. Bilohorivka and the entire Luhansk region.

The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate, the Head of the State Border Guard Service, representatives of the Ministry of Defense.

Full-fledged meeting. Full-fledged coordination. Full-fledged preparation of our active actions for the liberation of Ukrainian lands.

There were many different events and negotiations in the Chernihiv region starting from this morning.

One of the most difficult trips in terms of emotions.

We visited Yahidne, an ordinary small village of our Chernihiv region, which Russian savages turned into one of the world's biggest examples of human abuse last year.

Russian soldiers made a command post at the school in Yahidne, and drove all the villagers into the basement of the school. Just like a human shield.

From March 3 to March 30 of last year, the occupiers kept more than three hundred people in the basement of this school... An ordinary village school, the basement, which is smaller than two hundred square meters.

Elderly people and little children, women and men... The oldest woman was 93 years old, the youngest child was less than six months old.

We will never forgive the evil state for this basement, this concentration camp in Yahidne, just as for all other crimes of Russia against people and humanity. And not only us.

The Kremlin will not be able to hide behind a chair in the UN Security Council, gas pipes or anything else. There will certainly be legal and fair responsibility for every Russian crime committed on Ukrainian soil. In the tribunal, in the International Criminal Court, in Ukrainian courts.

I am grateful to the guests of Ukraine who visited the Chernihiv region with me, who saw this concentration of Russian evil in our Yahidne. I thank German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Secretary General of the Council of Europe Marija Pejčinović Burić. I am also thankful for the negotiations - meaningful and correct.

I thank UNESCO Director General Audrey Azoulay for her attention to Ukraine, for today's meetings in Ukraine. We are preparing the UNESCO World Heritage status for the historical center of Chernihiv. The same status that was recently obtained for the historical center of our Odesa.

As always, it was a special honor to visit our warriors in the hospital, who are recovering from battle wounds. To thank them for everything they do for Ukraine, to thank them for their faith in Ukraine, which our people defend, risking the most valuable - their lives.

I presented Chernihiv with the award of a hero city, a city of heroes. Chernihiv saw different occupiers, different kinds of evil... Protecting ourselves from this Russian evil is perhaps the most important thing in our history.

I awarded our warriors who distinguished themselves in the defense of the state.

And what is very important - I thanked everyone who ensures the reconstruction of our Chernihiv region. We will restore everything that the enemy destroyed.

Ukraine will never be a country of ruins, no matter how much the Kremlin dreams of it. Their dreams do not come true.

Already here, in Kyiv, after my return, I met with a delegation of American congressmen.

I thanked America for its consistently powerful help, from President Biden and the White House team to both houses of Congress and the entire system of American power.

We talked, of course, about the active actions of Ukraine. Of course, about our joint victory.

I also met with Mike Pompeo, former United States Secretary of State

I am grateful to everyone who helps us defend freedom! I am especially thankful today to Denmark and Norway for the initiative of the governments to transfer an additional batch of artillery shells to our warriors. This is very timely and useful.

We are getting stronger every day. Every day we are getting closer to the day when the terrorist state will be held to account.

Glory to all who are now fighting for Ukraine! May the memory of all those who gave their lives for Ukraine be blessed and eternal!

Glory to Ukraine!

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/shodnya-stayemo-micnishimi-shodnya-nablizhayemo-den-koli-der-82073

Rashism must face a total defeat: military, economic, political, legal - address by the President of Ukraine

April 2

Today, Russian terrorists again struck at Kostiantynivka, Donetsk region. At ordinary residential blocks. Six people were killed by this Russian shelling. Three women, three men. Ordinary people of an ordinary town in Donbas. My condolences to the family and friends of the deceased...

Another 11 people were wounded. Russia used S-300 missiles and the Uragan MLRS against Kostiantynivka.

This morning, Russian terrorists also attacked the Konotop district of the Sumy region. Mortar fire. Two people were killed. My condolences to all relatives, friends, all families...

These are just a few examples of dozens of hits per day. There is only one way to stop Russian terror, to restore security to all our cities and communities - from Sumy region to Donbas, from Kharkiv region to Kherson region, from Kyiv region to Yalta. And this is Ukraine’s military victory. There is no other way and there will be no other way.

The evil state for which it has become the norm to hit residential buildings with "Uragan" like this, to launch S-300 missiles at cities, to shell ordinary villages, people... The evil state must be defeated. In every sense of the word. Rashism must face a total defeat: military, economic, political, legal. The first point is military. And it will face it.

I thank everyone who brings this time closer! I am grateful to our warriors who are fighting near Avdiivka, Maryinka, near Bakhmut... Especially Bakhmut! It's especially hot there today! Near Bilohorivka, near Kreminna and all our other cities, towns and villages of Donbas! The resilience of everyone is the resilience of the whole of Ukraine, helping everyone in a position nearby is helping the whole of Ukraine!

Thank you to everyone who protects Zaporizhzhia, Kherson region, the direction of the Dnipropetrovsk region and Kharkiv, Sumy region and Chernihiv region... To everyone who protects our border. Who saves our people from injuries, from pain.

Of course I would like to separately thank everyone who trains our warriors, as it is on powerful training that a successful combat result is based.

Today, April 2, we celebrate the anniversary of the liberation of our Kyiv region from the rashist army. On April 2, the last occupier fled from the territory of the Kyiv region.

There will be a day when we will say: the last occupier has fled or been killed in the Donetsk region, Luhansk region, Kherson region and in our entire south. Crimea will be free and safe again. Ukraine will return all its territories.

Next week will be especially important for our defense, for our advancement towards victory. We are already preparing for scheduled events and decisions.

The key thing now is to cherish our unity, take care of our defenders, help each other and the state.

Full address:

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/rashizm-povinen-projti-cherez-povnu-porazku-vijskovu-ekonomi-82037

Prime Minister of Ukraine

Platform in Bucharest

03 April 2023 14:39 CET

The unprovoked and unjustified military aggression of russia against Ukraine has challenged the security system in the Black Sea and Azov Sea regions. In order to find effective ways to respond to these challenges and provide opportunities for sustainable development to all peaceful countries of the region, Ukraine initiated the First Black Sea Security Conference, which will be held jointly with Romania on April 12-13 in Bucharest.

This event is a part of the International Crimea Platform, a mechanism aimed at the de-occupation of Crimea, restoration of the Black Sea, European, and global security.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukraina-ta-rumuniia-provedut-v-bukharesti-pershu-chornomorsku-bezpekovu-konferentsiiu-mizhnarodnoi-krymskoi-platformy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dmytro Kuleba to pay a visit to Brussels

On April 3-4, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba will pay a working visit to Brussels to participate in an official meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

This will be the first meeting of the Commission at the level of foreign ministers with the participation of Ukraine since 2017.

The Head of Ukrainian diplomacy will hold important talks in the context of preparations for the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July.

Dmytro Kuleba will also discuss in detail steps to strengthen Ukraine’s defence capabilities, including new arms supplies and ammunition production, increased sanctions pressure on russia, the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, and humanitarian aid.

During the visit, the Ukrainian Foreign Minister will also hold separate bilateral meetings with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Joseph Borrell, EU Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth Mariya Gabriel, and foreign ministers of partner countries.

https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/dmytro-kuleba-zdiisnyt-vizyt-do-briusselia

FINANCE

The Ministry of Finance

IMF Executive Board approved USD 15.6 billion for Ukraine under a New Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program

On 31 March the IMF Board approved a new four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program for Ukraine with financing in the amount of USD 15.6 billion (SDR 11.6 billion).

It is expected that Ukraine may receive the first tranche from the Fund in the near future. And its volume will be about USD 2.7 billion of direct budget funding.

The program includes two phases. The first phase, planned for 2023-24, will focus on implementing a robust budget for 2023 and increasing revenue mobilization, including by avoiding new measures that might erode tax revenues.

The first phase also provides inflation reduction and stability of exchange rate, including through maintaining adequate foreign exchange reserves. In addition, measures to promote long-term financial stability are expected, including by preparing a deeper assessment of the banking sector health and further promoting central bank independence.

At the same time, the Government of Ukraine undertakes to support and continue reforms to strengthen the system of governance and fight against corruption, including through amendments to legislation.

During the second phase of the program, the focus will be on reforms that will help to support post-war recovery and reconstruction as efficiently as possible, and will help Ukraine implement the necessary measures on the way to European integration. Long-term economic growth is also one of the priorities of the second phase of the EFF program.

It is planned that during the second phase, Ukraine will return to the pre-war policy framework, in particular, to a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting. At the same time, there will be a focus on implementing essential structural reforms in fiscal policies to stabilize medium-term revenues by introducing a national revenue strategy, and also launching public finance management and introducing public investment management reforms that will aid in the post-war reconstruction process. To help the post-war reform endeavors, it is necessary to improve competition in the crucial energy sector, while reducing quasi-fiscal liabilities.

In turn, the Government of Ukraine commits to:

● strengthen policies that sustain fiscal, external, price and financial stability;

● support economic recovery while enhancing governance and strengthening institutions to promote long-term growth in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction and European integration path.

Despite the conditions of extremely high uncertainty in Ukraine, the EFF program is a pillar of cooperation with various international partners and paves the way for large-scale funding from donors, including the G7 countries and the European Union.

Minister of Finance of Ukraine Sergii Marchenko stated:

“We are grateful to the Fund's Board for the decision regarding the Extended Fund Facility Program for Ukraine. Unprecedented work was done to achieve the result, because this is an exceptional case of providing an IMF program to a warring country. The EFF program will significantly strengthen the economy and financial system, while facilitating the mobilization of additional financial resources from donors. Currently, Ukraine is at the beginning of a new stage of cooperation both with the International Monetary Fund and with partner countries.”

https://www.mof.gov.ua/en/news/imf_executive_board_approved_usd_156_billion_for_ukraine_under_a_new_extended_fund_facility_eff_program-3911

Sergii Marchenko met with Minister of Finance of the Netherlands Sigrid Kaag

On 2 April Minister of Finance of Ukraine Sergii Marchenko met with First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Netherlands Sigrid Kaag.

The parties discussed the state of Ukraine's financial system, cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, post-war recovery and reconstruction, and the strengthening of sanctions against russia.

"I am grateful to the Government and people of the Netherlands for their significant financial, military and humanitarian support. It is very important for us in our struggle to defeat the aggressor," said Sergii Marchenko.

The Minister of Finance of Ukraine outlined the state of the economy after more than a year of full-scale war, emphasizing that the country has adapted to the new conditions and maintained stability despite all the challenges: "The Government of Ukraine continues to function fully, providing all basic and vital services to the population."

Sergii Marchenko noted that international partners have confirmed their intention to support the country in financing the current year's State Budget deficit in full. In particular, the recent decision of the IMF to launch a new four-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program for Ukraine in the amount of USD 15.6 billion was an important milestone.

Ukraine also needs significant resources to recover the country. According to the RDNA2 report by the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group, the European Commission, and the United Nations, Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated at approximately USD 411 billion.

At the same time, in 2023, Ukraine needs USD 14 billion to implement rapid recovery, including the restoration of energy, housing, critical and social infrastructure, basic services for the most vulnerable, humanitarian demining and private sector development.

The Minister of Finance of Ukraine noted that he counts on the support of international partners in the realization of a rapid and large-scale recovery. The new Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine involving the G7 countries and the European Commission should become a reliable tool for mobilizing and coordinating the necessary funding.

https://www.mof.gov.ua/en/news/sergii_marchenko_met_with_minister_of_finance_of_the_netherlands_sigrid_kaag-3912

The National Bank of Ukraine

Business activity expectations index almost reaches its neutral level – business outlook survey in March

A more benign external environment, reestablished supply chains, the improved functioning of the energy sector and rebounding consumer sentiment had a positive effect on business expectations in March. Companies across all of the surveyed sectors reported more optimistic expectations of their business performance and future economic outlook.

This is evidenced by the business activity expectations index (BAEI), which the NBU calculates on a monthly basis, apart from the forced break in March–May 2022. The BAEI, at 49.5, almost reached its neutral level in March 2023, compared to 45.0 in February. This is a high not seen since December 2021.

Trading companies reported the most optimistic expectations of their business performance and future economic outlook on the back of rebounding consumer sentiment, the improved supply of electric power and an increase in the supply of goods. In March, the sector’s index moved above its neutral level for the first time since November 2021, hitting 53.6 (compared to 47.0 in February). Companies markedly improved their views about their trade turnover and purchases of goods for sale. On the back of softer expectations for purchase prices, respondents declared intentions to cut their trade margins slightly.

The improved functioning of the energy sector, reestablished supply chains and a more benign external environment had a positive effect on industrial companies’ expectations. For the first time since February 2022, industrial companies expected more robust economic performance compared to the previous month, as the sector’s DI moved above its neutral level, to 51.2, up from 47.2 in February 2023. Respondents expected an increase in the amount of manufactured goods and the number of new orders for products, including export orders. Respondents markedly softened their negative expectations for the amount of unfinished products (unfulfilled orders), while also reporting weaker expectations for a rise in finished goods stocks.

On the back of seasonal factors, construction companies noticeably improved their negative performance expectations, the sector’s DI being 45.9 in March, up from 33.5 in February. Respondents reported intentions to purchase more raw materials and supplies and contractor services. At the same time, construction companies expected no changes in their construction volumes. They also significantly softened their negative expectations for the number of new orders.

Despite there being a seasonal revival, services companies reported the gloomiest economic outlook, the sector’s index being 45.7, up from 43.2 in February. Respondents somewhat improved their still pessimistic expectations for the amount of services provided, the number of new orders, and the amount of services that are being provided.

Most polled companies said they expected that purchase and contractor prices would grow at a slower pace. They also declared weaker intentions to raise their selling prices.

Employment expectations remained guarded. Companies across all polled sectors still report no intentions to expand their workforces. Trading companies reported the least pessimistic expectations.

https://bank.gov.ua/en/news/all/indeks-ochikuvan-dilovoyi-aktivnosti-mayje-dosyag-rivnovajnogo-rivnya--rezultati-opituvannya-pidpriyemstv-u-berezni

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: April

Trend Overview

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 3, 2023

Tags

Task Force Viking Hammer (Iraq 2003) | SOF News

**********

Philippines names 4 new camps for US forces amid China fury

China seethes as US chip controls threaten tech ambitions

US military says senior IS commander killed in Syria

Elite Ukrainian snipers describe their war from the shadows

Top-of-the-line rifles

Battle for Bakhmut

Congressman: US support for aid to Ukraine is 'overwhelming'

Finland to join NATO on Tuesday, Sweden still waiting

Ukraine battles on in Bakhmut as Finland joins NATO

'WAITING FOR ORDERS'

'DRIVING A WEDGE'

The Intensifying Trend Of Global De-Dollarization – Analysis

Final analysis conclusion:

Chinese balloon got intel from U.S. military sites, despite efforts to block it

US says it cannot confirm China collected real-time data from spy balloon

China warns US House Speaker not to meet Taiwan president

CHINESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

War in Taiwan will dwarf Ukraine unless the US shows China its teeth | Simon Tisdall

Why Some in the Military Might Not Celebrate a TikTok Ban

Is the Chinese Dream Turning into a Chinese Nightmare for Beijing?

Kevin McCarthy Prepares to Meet Taiwan’s President as Tensions With China Swirl

Beijing has threatened retaliation if House speaker meets with Tsai Ing-wen

Forces of Destabilization: Countering Wagner Group in the Sahel - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Mind the Middle Powers - War on the Rocks

America Can Win the AI Race

It Has the Resources—Now It Needs a Plan

By Paul Scharre

ADVANTAGE, AMERICA

GAINING GROUND

KEEP YOUR ENEMIES CLOSER

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

The Cost of Biden’s ‘Democracy’ Fixation

It alienates allies his foreign policy needs both domestically and around the world.

Retired U.S. colonel compares Ukraine counterattack to pivotal WWII battle

Drone-on-Drone Combat in Ukraine Marks a New Era of Aerial Warfare