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Quotes of the Day:
"He knows nothing; and he thinks he knows everything,
That points clearly to a political career."
- George Bernard Shaw
"If you are ever tempted to look for outside approval,
realize that you have compromised your integrity. If you need a witness,
be your own.
- Epictetus
"There is a principle which is a bar against all information,
which cannot fail to keep a man in everlasting ignorance
– that principle is contempt prior to investigation."
- British philosopher Herbert Spencer [1820-1903]
1. N. Korea labeled 'enemy' again in S. Korea's defense white paper
2. South Korea defence paper calls North 'enemy', estimates plutonium stockpile at 70 kg
3. Shuttered US Army base in South Korea to become a 24-acre park
4. North Korea's missile launch over Japan shows increased payload, distance: exclusive analysis
5. North Korea: towards a solid-fuel ICBM?
6. ‘The Hard Road Out’ Review: A Prison Break Across Borders
7. U.S. takes N. Korea as serious as all other challenges: State Dept.
8. South Korea Should be Taking Notes on Ukraine
9. Report says Yoon could make state visit to U.S. in spring
10. [INTERVIEW] Seoul's integration into Quad will benefit all parties: Center for a New American Security
11. The Impossible State Live Podcast: National Strategy for Countering North Korea
12. South Korean gov't ordered to compensate man kidnapped from North Korea 67 years ago
13. NK leader attends groundbreaking ceremony for housing project in Pyongyang
14. What perceptions do many N. Koreans have about Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae?
15. Opinion: What Stalin's daughter taught me (and link to north Korea)
1. N. Korea labeled 'enemy' again in S. Korea's defense white paper
No surprise since the President forecasted this with his comments about north Korea being the "main enemy" when he assumed office last May.
I checked the MND web page (HERE) and the new white paper is only in Korean and has not yet been translated into English. As soon as it is posted I will forward it.
Here are the contents of the report (Thanks to Google Translate):
2022 Defense White Paper
Publication date:
February 2023 (biennial publication)
views :
1868
The 2022 Defense White Paper is the 25th white paper published since 1967 and consists of a total of 7 main texts. The results of defense policy promotion until the end of December 2022 and future directions are detailed.
look
Defense White Paper 2022 (all) PDF
2022 Defense White Paper (main text) PDF
2022 Defense White Paper (Appendix) PDF
index
main text
Chapter 1 Security environment
Chapter 2 National security strategy and defense strategy
Chapter 3 Establishment of all-round defense posture, expansion of response capability
Chapter 4 Fostering advanced science and technology strong military through defense innovation 4.0
Chapter 5 Rapid development of the ROK-US alliance and defense cooperation Intensification and Expansion
Chapter 6 Safe, transparent, civil-military mutually beneficial defense operation
Chapter 7 Creating a defense culture suitable for future generations
Special Appendix
1. Past, Present, and Future of the ROK-US Alliance
2. History and Future of Korean Military Peacekeeping Activities
3. Performance of USFK Base Relocation Project
4. Defense Industry Export Performance and Military Science Weapons and Technology Development
General Annex
Publication department
Defense Strategy Division, Policy Planning Office, Ministry of National Defense 02)748-6237
(2nd LD) N. Korea labeled 'enemy' again in S. Korea's defense white paper | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 16, 2023
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details in 8th para)
By Song Sang-ho and Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Feb. 16 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense ministry has referred to the North Korean regime and military as an "enemy" in its new white paper, for the first time in six years, according to officials Thursday, apparently in consideration of the North's evolving nuclear and missile threats.
In the 2022 Defense White Paper, the ministry also described Japan as a "close neighbor" in line with Seoul's move to improve bilateral security ties and offered a new assessment on Pyongyang's growing stockpile of plutonium, a fissile material used to build nuclear bombs.
It marks the first biennial defense policy document published under the conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration launched in May last year. Yoon took office with a pledge to get tough on North Korean provocations and achieve "peace through strength."
"As the North defined us as an 'undoubted enemy' at the plenary meeting of the ruling party's Central Committee in December 2022, and continues to pose a military threat without renouncing its nuclear program, the North Korean regime and military -- the executor of that (threat) -- are our enemy," it reads.
This photo, released Feb. 9, 2023, by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency, shows weapons being showcased at a major military parade in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
The South called the North's military an "enemy" in the white paper in 1995 after a Pyongyang official threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of flames." In the 2004 version, the expression was replaced by a "direct military threat" amid a conciliatory mood.
The labeling was reinstated in 2010 as the North torpedoed a South Korean corvette in March of that year, killing 46 sailors, and launched an artillery attack on a border island in November, killing two soldiers and two civilians. The expression stayed until the 2016 edition.
But the description disappeared in the 2018 and 2020 editions issued under the then liberal Moon Jae-in administration that tried notably to promote inter-Korean reconciliation.
In an apparent reflection of the strained cross-border ties, the latest document called the North Korean leader just by his name, Kim Jong-un. The previous edition referred to him as the State Affairs Commission chairman.
In its reference to Japan, the 2022 document used the expression "close neighbor" for the first time since the 2018 edition.
"ROK and Japan share values, and Japan is a close neighboring country that (ROK should cooperate with to) build future cooperative relations that serve common interests," it reads. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
This photo, taken on Nov. 13, 2022, shows President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) shaking hands with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida prior to their talks on the margins of regional gatherings in Cambodia. (Yonhap)
In the previous version, Japan was described as a "neighboring country that the ROK should cooperate not only for bilateral relations but also for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world."
The 2018 edition referred to the two countries as "geographically and culturally close neighbors as well as partners cooperating for global peace and prosperity."
Touching on the North's nuclear activities, the 2022 document assessed the North possesses some 70 kilograms of plutonium, up from 50 kg estimated in the previous document. Around 6 kg of plutonium is required to build a single nuclear bomb.
The increase appears to be attributable to the operation of a key plutonium-producing nuclear reactor and other activities at the North's mainstay nuclear complex in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang, according to observers.
A 2021 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated the 5-megawatt reactor at the complex showed signs of being in operation since July 2021. It also said a steam plant, used to provide heat to a reprocessing facility, had been operated for around five months since February of the same year.
The white paper also described the amount of the North's highly enriched uranium (HEU) as "considerable." The production of one nuclear bomb requires 15 kg to 20 kg of HEU.
The white paper included a series of new North Korean missiles, including the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and tactical short-range missiles, in an analysis of the country's growing arms list.
In particular, it highlighted the North's consistent push to develop solid-propellant ballistic missiles with greater accuracy and improved capabilities to avoid interception.
"North Korea has continued the test-firing of solid-propellant ballistic missiles, which are more advantageous than liquid-fuel ballistic missiles in terms of their operational employment," the document said.
On the North's ICBM atmospheric reentry technology, the white paper stressed the need for further analysis, noting the country's past ICBM launches were conducted on a lofted trajectory rather than on a standard one.
Highlighting the South's deterrence efforts in multiple pages, the white paper detailed its push to secure capabilities for the "three-axis" military system.
The three-pronged system consists of the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership in a major conflict; the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system.
The new document also compared the troop strengths of the two Koreas.
It put the number of South Korean active-duty personnel at around 500,000, down from 555,000 tallied two years ago. The figure for the North stood at 1.28 million, the same figure recorded in the 2018 and 2020 white papers.
The South has been pushing for a nimbler and smarter military based on cutting-edge technologies amid prospects of personnel shortages caused by the country's falling birthrate.
The document also said the South has about 2,200 tanks, 90 surface combatant ships and 10 submarines, while the corresponding figures for the North were around 4,300, 420 and 70, respectively.
The document stressed the numerical data was based only on "quantitative" comparisons, and that a more detailed analysis of assets' capabilities, their deterioration, the level of training and operational concepts would make a "difference" in the military strength assessment.
In an appendix, the ministry spelled out key North Korean violations of a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement aimed at reducing border tensions and preventing accidental clashes, while it stated in the 2020 edition that Pyongyang was "generally" complying with the agreement.
The ministry plans to publish the white paper in English, Japanese, Chinese and Russian in the first half of this year. The Korean-language version will be downloadable from the ministry's homepage, starting this afternoon.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · February 16, 2023
2. South Korea defence paper calls North 'enemy', estimates plutonium stockpile at 70 kg
South Korea defence paper calls North 'enemy', estimates plutonium stockpile at 70 kg
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin
SEOUL, Feb 16 (Reuters) - South Korea released its latest defence white paper on Thursday, describing North Korea as its "enemy" for the first time in six years and reporting an increase in Pyongyang's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.
The biennial white paper offers a glimpse into the reclusive North's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as its conventional military capabilities.
The 2022 paper revived the description of the North Korean regime and military as "our enemy," last used in its 2016 edition, citing Pyongyang's ongoing weapons development, cyber and military provocations and its recent portrayal of the South as an "enemy."
"As North Korea continues to pose military threats without giving up nuclear weapons, its regime and military, which are the main agents of the execution, are our enemies," the document said.
To beef up its nuclear stockpile, North Korea has continued reprocessing spent fuel from its reactor and possesses about 70kg (154lb) of weapons-grade plutonium, up from 50kg estimated in the previous report, it said.
The North has also secured "substantial" amounts of highly enriched uranium" and "significant level of capability" to miniaturise atomic bombs though six nuclear tests, a description that remains unchanged since 2018.
"Our military is strengthening surveillance as the possibility of an additional nuclear test is rising," the paper said, citing the restoration last year of previously destroyed tunnels at the North's testing site.
The paper said the North violated a 2018 inter-Korean military pact banning hostilities 15 times last year alone, including its drone intrusion in December, artillery fire inside a military buffer zone and missiles launched across the de facto maritime border into the South in November.
Its 2020 edition said the North was "generally" complying with the agreement, which was sealed on the margins of a 2018 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
The latest document noted Pyongyang's 2022 launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the new Hwasong-17 tested, but said further analysis was needed to verify whether it has acquired improved missile re-entry technology.
On Japan, the paper called it a "close neighbour that shares values" for the first time since 2016, amid efforts to mend ties strained by history and trade spats.
Reporting by Hyonhee Shin. Editing by Gerry Doyle
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin
3. Shuttered US Army base in South Korea to become a 24-acre park
And also Kunsan and Osan air bases. Why do they always neglect the air bases?
The majority of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea are stationed at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek and U.S. Army Garrison Daegu.
Shuttered US Army base in South Korea to become a 24-acre park
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · February 15, 2023
The site of Camp Essayons, a former U.S. Army outpost in Uijeongbu, South Korea, is set to become a 24-acre public park by December 2025. (Christopher Green/Stars and Stripes)
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UIJEONGBU, South Korea — A section of a former U.S. Army outpost north of Seoul is destined to become a neighborhood park now that Uijeongbu city has secured project money, local officials announced recently.
The commissioned park will be completed by December 2025 and span 24 acres in Uijeongbu, which is surrounded by mountain hiking trails and wildlife, according to a news release from the city on Feb. 9.
“We will do our best to come up with a plan to create a neighborhood park with a natural setting where 470,000 people in the city can love and relax,” deputy mayor An Dong-gwang said in the release.
The city purchased the site from the South Korean government for roughly $4.5 million and later received $9.4 million in funding from the Korea Land and Housing Corp. for restoration projects, according to the release.
Camp Essayons occupied the site until 2007 as the Army shuttered or partially returned around 40 outposts throughout the country and turned the land over to the South Korean government.
The site of Camp Essayons, a former U.S. Army outpost in Uijeongbu, South Korea, is set to become a 24-acre public park by December 2025. (Christopher Green/Stars and Stripes)
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The site of Camp Essayons, a former U.S. Army outpost in Uijeongbu, South Korea, is set to become a 24-acre public park by December 2025. (Christopher Green/Stars and Stripes)
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The site of Camp Essayons, a former U.S. Army outpost in Uijeongbu, South Korea, is set to become a 24-acre public park by December 2025. (Christopher Green/Stars and Stripes)
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The closures were part of an agreement by the United States military “to create a more suitable environment for the stationing of U.S. Forces Korea and to enhance force protection …,” according to the Land Partnership Plan signed in 2002 by the former USFK and South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense.
Camp Essayons is named after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ French motto, which translates to “let us strive” or “let us try,” according to a handbook from the U.S. Army Engineer School History Office.
The nearly 76-acre outpost once housed about 600 soldiers from the since deactivated 102nd Military Intelligence Battalion. It included a gymnasium, movie theater and library, but lacked a commissary.
The site now houses the Eulji Medical Center, a hospital connected to the Eulji University school system and the Northern Gyeonggi Provincial Office of Education, a project official said by phone Monday. South Korean government officials customarily speak to the media on the condition of anonymity.
“Building a park will probably be a good thing,” Shim Joon Ho, a 30-year Uijeongbu resident and a taxi driver, told Stars and Stripes on Tuesday. Shim recalled driving a lot of U.S. troops during his work shift and said that business has struggled since they left the city.
The majority of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea are stationed at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek and U.S. Army Garrison Daegu.
Stars and Stripes reporter Yoo Kyong Chang contributed to this report.
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · February 15, 2023
4. North Korea's missile launch over Japan shows increased payload, distance: exclusive analysis
North Korea's missile launch over Japan shows increased payload, distance: exclusive analysis - Breaking Defense
In a new analysis, Ralph Savelsberg of the Netherlands Defence Academy warns that North Korea's October launch demonstrated the ability to deliver an almost 20 percent greater payload into Guam.
By RALPH SAVELSBERG
breakingdefense.com · by Ralph Savelsberg · February 15, 2023
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un observes missile tracking data from the October launch. (DPRK State Media.)
In October, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that tracked over Japanese territory. That alone was eye-catching and cause for alarm. Now, expert Ralph Savelsberg of the Netherlands Defence Academy has provided an exclusive analysis to Breaking Defense of his conclusions regarding the capabilities of the weapon — and why the alarm should probably keep ringing.
The large ICBMs displayed by North Korea during military parades, such as the one in Pyongyang last week, always catch a lot of attention. But while there are some hints to capabilities from observing the missiles, the truest test of the DPRK’s missile designs come from live launches. And there is an unfortunate amount of cases to draw from.
Most dramatically, in a test on Oct. 4, an intermediate range ballistic missile overflew Japan, the first time a DPRK launch took such a trajectory since 2017. The missile reportedly flew more than 4,500 km and reached an altitude of 965 km, passing well over Japan before landing in the Pacific Ocean. And as with all North Korean launches, the effort was on to try and identify whether this is a known weapon or a new design.
After carefully studying the data, our conclusion is clear: North Korea has now demonstrated a design that can carry significantly greater payload, at similar or better distances, than its previously demonstrated Hwasong-12.
Initial DPRK silence as to specific claims fueled speculation that the missile used was a Hwasong-12, which was twice launched over Japan in 2017. A few days’ later DPRK state media reported it as a “new-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile” and released images. One showed Kim Jong-Un in front of a bank of monitors, two of which display trajectories.
The Hwasong-12 first flew in May 2017, on a highly lofted trajectory, covering a 787 km range and reaching an altitude of 2,111 km. Based on that trajectory, its estimated maximum range was 4,500 km with an unknown payload. Therefore, it seemed an obvious candidate for the October flight. However, the pictures released a few days later show a significantly different missile.
The images of the missile itself indicate that, while it is similar to the older Hwasong-12 IRBM, it has several new features. Based on the imagery and computer modeling, analysis shows that the missile’s likely performance exceeds that of the Hwasong-12, either increasing the range or payload capacity.
A Hwasong-12 shortly after launch (left) and the new missile launched over Japan on October 4 (right). (DPRK State Media photos)
The Hwasong-12 is powered by the Paektusan engine cluster, with a single main engine surrounded by four Vernier engines used for steering. A single turbopump supplies propellant to the engine and the Verniers. In contrast, the new missile has a single main engine without Vernier motors. There are other differences: the Hwasong-12 has a flared base and a very distinctively shaped “baby-bottle” re-entry vehicle, neither of which are present on the new missile.
The October 4 missile with size measurements (main image) and the Hwasong-12 in flight (inset), to scale. (DPRK State Media photos; mark-ups by Ralph Salvesberg.)
And yet, there also are similarities. The plume shows the presence of a turbopump exhaust, and an orange oxidizer cloud visible in a launch photograph confirms that it uses liquid propellant, like the Hwasong-12. MAZ-547 Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) vehicles, used to cart the Hwasong-12 through Pyongyang, enabled measuring the size of the Hwasong-12 and a photograph of the missile in flight provided the diameter of its main engine nozzle. The new missile uses a similar TEL.
The DPRK released just one, low-quality image that shows the complete missile together with its TEL. However, it was still good enough to measure the size of the new missile, with an error margin of less than ten percent. Its diameter and its overall length match the Hwasong-12, but due to its shorter front end, the new missile likely has longer propellant tanks. The error margin in the nozzle diameter is larger, but it too is consistent with the core of the Paektusan engine cluster.
Different configurations of the Paektusan engine cluster: without Vernier engines but with a clearly visible turbopump in September 2016 (a), with four Vernier engines during a static test in September 2017 (b) and in flight on the Hwasong-12. (Original images via DPRK State Media)
All of this suggests that the new missile uses the same engine core as the Hwasong-12 but instead of Vernier engines steering the missile, it may have a gimballed engine. Interestingly, when footage of the Hwasong-12 engine first emerged, back in 2016, it did not have Vernier engines either. A single gimballed nozzle does not provide roll control — a rotation of the missile about the longitudinal axis — so this requires a separate system. (One option could be to vector the small thrust generated by the turbopump exhaust.)
These changes obviously affect performance. Removing the Verniers decreases the thrust; however, this may be compensated by increasing the thrust of the main engine via increased propellant flow. The impact of gravity losses (the effect of having to accelerate the mass of propellant remaining in the tanks for longer) may change depending on whether total thrust is changed. However, since the Vernier engines are less efficient than the main engine, either way, overall efficiency goes up. Furthermore, removing the Vernier engines reduces the empty mass of the missile, although the mass of whatever system that takes over their role partially offsets this.
So those are the physical parameters of the missile itself. What about performance? To assess the missile’s potential, medium-fidelity computer simulations were done of its trajectory.
Using existing models that replicate the 2017 Hwasong-12 flights, parameters were varied to address the observed changes in the missile configuration. It should be noted that the 3,700 km range on the Hwasong-12’s longest-range flight to date appeared to represent realistic payload capabilities. That range would be sufficient to reach Guam, which is the expected intended target for this type. The take-off accelerations in the simulations closely match accelerations measured in launch videos.
Visualization of the lofted trajectory flown by the Hwasong-12 in May 2017 (yellow), the Japan overflight in September 2017 (red) and the approximate trajectory of the new IRBM flown on October 4, 2022 (green). (Graphic courtesy Ralph Savelsberg)
The Oct. 4 missile likely carries more propellant than the Hwasong-12, has a longer burn time, a slightly higher specific impulse and lower drag, due to the deletion of the flared base. It likely also has a slightly lower deadweight mass fraction, i.e., its booster mass at burnout is a smaller fraction of the booster take-off mass.
The resulting missile model can recreate the trajectory flown on Oct. 4. Incidentally, there is some uncertainty in the exact trajectory. The trajectory to the impact point on Kim Jong-Un’s screen would have taken the missile over Oshima peninsula, north of Tsugaru Strait, which separates Honshu and Hokkaido, whereas Japanese media report that it flew over Aomori Prefecture, south of the Strait. This is a small difference in azimuth from the launch site, which may indicate that the missile’s roll control did not work entirely as intended.
Range as a function of the payload, for both missiles, without Earth rotation (dashed lines) and on a heading from the DPRK towards Guam (solid lines). (Courtesy Ralph Savelsberg)
The simulations show that the new missile can plausibly deliver a significantly heavier warhead over similar distances than the Hwasong-12. Specifically, the range from the DPRK to Guam is about 3,500 km. The Hwasong-12 can deliver a payload (including its heat shield) of 950 kg to that distance, while the equivalent for the new missile is about 1,200 kg. In fact, the simulations suggest that the missile is optimized for that performance, since for a lighter warhead and a longer range, a missile with less propellant would be optimal.
Put another way: if our simulations are correct, North Korea’s October launch demonstrated the ability to deliver an almost 20 percent greater payload into the heart of America’s key military base in the Pacific.
Ralph Savelsberg, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is associate professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy in Den Helder, the Netherlands, specializing in missile defense. This article does not reflect any official position or policy of the Government of the Netherlands. The author would like to thank James Kiessling and Tomohiko Kawaguchi for their valuable comments on the manuscript.
breakingdefense.com · by Ralph Savelsberg · February 15, 2023
5. North Korea: towards a solid-fuel ICBM?
While the press and pundits focus on KJU's daughter Kim Ju Ae, we overlook the potential game changer a solid fuel ICBM could be.
North Korea: towards a solid-fuel ICBM?
Joseph Dempsey
@JosephHDempsey
Research Associate for Defence and Military Analysis
ABOUT JOSEPH
North Korea’s latest military parade re-emphasised the fact that the country has long sought to add a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile to its emergent strategic forces, a goal that may soon be realised.
https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2023/02/north-korea-towards-a-solidfuel-icbm
Source: KCNA
North Korea observed the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army on 8 February 2023 and used the customary parade marking the occasion as an opportunity to reveal to the world what may be a new missile system. The grand finale included at least five heavy transporter-erector-launcher vehicles that appear to be based on a known chassis adapted for several liquid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the past. Each of the launcher vehicles, however, mounted large canisters commonly associated with housing and launching solid-fuel missiles. Any correspondingly sized solid-fuel missiles that might exist remained out of view. It is possible that the Korean People’s Army has already integrated these missiles onto the launcher vehicles and removed them from the canisters for the parade. This is not the first time similarly sized canisters have been displayed, with two other road-mobile launcher designs paraded in April 2017. Those cases, in retrospect, may have been indicators of intent rather than actual development. North Korea’s subsequent advances in designing ICBMs and solid-fuel motors suggest that the appearance of these new launchers is more meaningful.
Solidifying ambitions
Pyongyang has conducted successful flight tests of three different ICBM types since 2017, although the operational status of these systems is unclear. Each relies on corrosive and toxic mixtures of liquid propellants, meaning the missiles cannot remain fuelled for prolonged periods. Consequently, they are fuelled before launch in a process that can take hours and requires specialist equipment. This process may also provide opponents with a visual indicator of launch preparations and time to identify, react to and neutralise a missile before it is launched. In the case of North Korea’s ICBMs – especially the massive Hwasong-17 – many analysts are uncertain that they can be safely erected from a stowed horizontal position when fully fuelled; if they cannot, the missiles would have to remain in the vertical firing position for additional time at the launch site, offering an even clearer warning to observers.
Solid-fuel missiles have a key advantage over liquid-fuel missiles in being fuelled from the point of manufacture. They therefore allow operators to maintain a high state of readiness and the potential to launch within minutes, depending on basing. As launch crews do not need to fuel the missiles and do not require direct access to them, they can be contained within sealed canisters that increase missile security, which is particularly important on protracted forward deployments. The fuelling infrastructure is also less observable, which reduces an opponent’s detection opportunities.
North Korea’s desire to develop solid-fuel systems became clear in 2019, when it demonstrated designs for a new generation of solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles and larger-diameter solid motors for medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
At an earlier stage of North Korea’s missile programme, liquid-fuel ICBMs represented the quickest and easiest path to achieving the country’s historic goal of being able to threaten the continental United States. The addition of solid-fuel ICBMs to the missile force would make it a more credible strategic deterrent by providing a more capable, less vulnerable pre-emptive and retaliatory capability. Pyongyang’s ambition to field such a system has therefore been long suspected, and was expressed publicly by Kim Jong-un in January 2021.
Vectoring closer
While the paraded transporter-erector-launchers may indicate progress towards the goal of acquiring solid-fuel ICBMs, a more substantive milestone reportedly occurred in December 2022 with a static ground test of a new large-diameter solid-fuel motor, supervised by Kim at the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground. Although not specifically described as an ICBM motor test, North Korean state media proclaimed the trial to be one of ‘strategic significance’. The claimed 140-tonne force generated by the motor would indicate its suitability for the first stage of an ICBM, potentially with a mass of approximately 100–115 tns.
Source: KCNA
State media also claimed the test verified ‘thrust vector controlling technology’, and released accompanying imagery showing that the motor may have featured a gimbaled exhaust nozzle. Smaller existing North Korean solid-fuel missiles use jet vanes for directional control; these are ill suited for larger and more powerful motors due to greater thermal degradation of the vanes, which are placed directly in the exhaust flow. As such, North Korea has begun adopting gimbaled nozzles for its liquid-fuel ICBMs, a design characteristic that could open the path to developing longer-range solid-fuel missiles.
Next steps
In 2017, North Korea conducted its first successful ICBM test launch less than four months after demonstrating a static ground test of the associated liquid-fuel engine. It is unclear when a solid-fuel ICBM test launch might occur, but the provocative nature and propaganda value of missile tests mean the development timeline for the technology is not the only consideration that will guide the decision.
Despite Kim’s desire to possess a solid-fuel ICBM, North Korean developers may face some technological challenges. Solid propellants provide less thrust-to-weight efficiency than liquid-fuelled systems, which means developers will probably try to minimise the missile’s weight in order to extend its range, attempting to approach the 15,000-kilometre mark that Kim has publicly touted. And while North Korea has seemingly acquired the technology to produce advanced lightweight filament-wound casing for some existing solid-fuel missiles, it is unclear if it has machinery capable of producing a casing large enough for an ICBM.
The canister paraded on 8 February indicated that North Korea intends to use a ‘cold launch’ method in which the missile is forced out of the canister with compressed gas before ignition. While North Korea has demonstrated some proficiency in this area, doing so with heavy missiles may present new challenges. A series of ejection tests would therefore be expected ahead of any flight test.
Should a solid-fuel ICBM launch occur, it is likely to be conducted on a lofted trajectory in order to avoid provocative overflights (as with all previous ICBM tests). This would enable a full-burn test of the engines and staging, and provide an indication of the missile’s range, but it would leave some questions unanswered – namely survivability, and the accuracy of a re-entry vehicle at operationally realistic ranges.
This article is part of a series from the Missile Dialogue Initiative (MDI) focusing on selected missile and arms-control developments. The MDI aims to strengthen international discussion and promote a high-level exchange of views on missile technologies and related international-security dynamics.
Author
6. ‘The Hard Road Out’ Review: A Prison Break Across Borders
Every time I read a review of this book I will say this is a must read. And we must understand China's complicity in north Korean human rights abuses.
‘The Hard Road Out’ Review: A Prison Break Across Borders
Beijing’s cruel policy was—and is—to hunt down and repatriate fleeing North Koreans. Meanwhile, they are threatened and exploited.
By Melanie Kirkpatrick
Feb. 14, 2023 6:18 pm ET
Thanks to the testimonies of North Koreans who have escaped their prison of a homeland in the past 25 years, the world is aware of the Kim-family regime’s atrocities against its own people. A chilling United Nations report a few years ago observed that North Korea’s crimes against humanity “do not have any parallel in the contemporary world.”
It is one thing to hear pronouncements from investigating organizations about the everyday horrors of life in North Korea. It is quite another to read personal accounts. “The Hard Road Out” by Jihyun Park and Seh-lynn Chai is the latest in a series of searing memoirs by North Koreans who beat the odds and reached safety in free countries. Ms. Park and her South Korean co-author relate Ms. Park’s awful story in clear-eyed, unsentimental prose. It is a gripping read.
A less resolute woman would have been felled by the tragedies Ms. Park endured. Her childhood in the 1970s and 1980s was happy—even blissful—even as she remembers her near-constant hunger and her parents’ scramble to feed the family. She was in her 20s when famine hit in the late 1990s. As many as three million North Koreans died of starvation, and she watched friends and family succumb around her. In the authors’ matter-of-fact description: “The stench of dead bodies, people being publicly executed in the market for stealing food, soldiers who used their weapons to threaten the citizens in order to ensure their own existence—all this was now part of daily life.”
At school, the young Jihyun took pride in her ability to memorize speeches by Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, whose portrait is a mandatory feature of every home. She brushed off the biweekly self-criticism sessions, which were designed to encourage spying on parents and fellow students. She disliked having to confess to so-called crimes—was doodling during history class really disrespectful to the regime?—and she hated being required to condemn her friends. She and her buddies would strike deals about who would denounce whom for what crimes. Call it a small flash of rebellion.
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The Hard Road Out: One Woman’s Escape From North Korea
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Despite being her high school’s top math student, Jihyun was denied admission to a first-rate university. Entrance slots were reserved for students with higher songbun, that is, for families who ranked higher in North Korea’s apartheid-like system of social classification. Since Jihyun’s maternal grandfather had deserted to the South at the end of the Korean War, Jihyun was deemed to be of impure blood, unfit to study at an elite college.
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When, in 1998, Ms. Park’s brother-in-law hired a guide to lead the family illegally across the frozen Tumen River to China, Ms. Park was astonished at what she found there. Her first meal—soup, eggs, rice—was to her a sumptuous feast. “In Korea, we had lived with death for years,” she writes, “yet just across the border another world existed. A world barely 100 meters away, where you could bask in abundance.”
She soon discovered that China was not a safe haven. Beijing’s cruel policy was—and is—to hunt down, arrest and repatriate North Koreans, whom it considers illegal refugees. Since repatriation means prison, or even death, North Koreans in China have no choice but to live underground, where they are exploited by Chinese who threaten to expose them to the authorities. Women are especially vulnerable.
Ms. Park writes dispassionately of the Chinese slave market—the phrase is precise and not mere hyperbole—where she and other North Koreans were auctioned off to the highest bidders. “There were all types of merchandise,” she writes, “old women, ugly women, handicapped women, young girls.” Ms. Park was sold as a bride for 5,000 yuan, roughly $750 at today’s exchange rate. Her despair was intensified when she learned that her mother and sister, desperate for money, were in on the plot to sell her.
Ms. Park has an estimable co-author in Ms. Chai, the pseudonym of a highly educated, cosmopolitan South Korean woman whom she met much later, in her expatriate life. After a period of mutual wariness, the two became fast friends, sharing stories of their experiences in the two Koreas. When she was a little girl, Ms. Park’s playground game was “Kill the Americans.” Ms. Chai won a prize in her South Korean primary school for a poster urging “Down With Communists.”
While “The Hard Road Out” is mostly a first-person narrative written in Ms. Park’s voice, Ms. Chai’s reflections on the women’s divided country are scattered throughout. “I write of my need to connect two lives, to create a link, to repair,” she says of her bond with Ms. Park, asking: “Who would she and I have become, had our country not been divided?” For Ms. Chai, the friendship becomes a metaphor for the reunification of their country. Her yearning for peace is sincere, if idealistic.
Ms. Park’s story has a happy ending. After years in China, a failed attempt at escape through Mongolia, and repatriation and punishment in North Korea, she eventually makes it out of China with the help of an American missionary and the U.N. With her were the son she had borne to the Chinese man who purchased her, as well as the North Korean husband she met in China and their son.
While the vast majority of escapees settle in South Korea, where language and culture are familiar, Ms. Park and her family ended up in Britain, which has given asylum to several hundred North Koreans. She now works as a human-rights activist.
Most North Koreans who flee to China never get any farther. Tens of thousands remain in hiding there. Ms. Park’s escape story mirrors that of the roughly 30,000 North Koreans who have reached sanctuary in South Korea. That journey is hard to replicate today. In recent years, China and North Korea have reinforced border controls, and Pyongyang has cracked down on escape routes. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification reports that last year, of North Korea’s population of 26 million, a mere 67 managed to make their way to the free half of their long-divided country.
Ms. Kirkpatrick, a former deputy editorial-page editor of the Journal, is the author of “Escape From North Korea: The Untold Story of Asia’s Underground Railroad.”
Appeared in the February 15, 2023, print edition as 'A Prison Break Across Borders'.
7. U.S. takes N. Korea as serious as all other challenges: State Dept.
This criticism overlooks the amount of ROK and US military activity that is taking place on the peninsula and in the region to enhance readiness.
Our efforts to sustain a high level of readiness are nearly unprecedented. We are not neglecting readiness on the peninsula despite what some pundits and politicos say.
U.S. takes N. Korea as serious as all other challenges: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 16, 2023
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- The United States considers and is dealing with North Korea issues with the same level of urgency as all other challenges facing the country and its allies, a state department spokesperson said Wednesday.
The spokesperson, Ned Price, insisted the U.S. simply did not have the "luxury of being able to prioritize" the challenges.
"All of these issues are important," Price told a daily press briefing.
"All of these same issues are made of the same plot. All of these challenges that we face, very different challenges that we face from the PRC (People's Republic of China), from Iran, from Russia, from the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), in some ways, this all boils down to the rules-based order," added Price, referring to China and North Korea by their official names.
State Department Press Secretary Ned Price is seen speaking during a daily press briefing at the state department in Washington on Feb. 15, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)
The department spokesperson was reacting to a question whether the U.S. takes the threat posed by North Korea as serious as other challenges, given that President Joe Biden had failed to mention the North Korea issue in his State of the Union Address delivered last week.
"Whether it's Russia's unprovoked, brutal aggression against Ukraine, whether it is the PRC's attempts to change or undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, whether it is Iran's provision of support to malign actors that in turn destabilize the Middle East or whether it's the DPRK's nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs, all of these, in different ways, pose a challenge to the rules-based order," said Price.
"The United States and countries around the world are standing up for that rules-based order. It's what we are doing in Ukraine. It's what we are doing in the context of the DPRK," he added.
When asked about Japan's proposed release of potentially radiation-contaminated water from its Fukushima nuclear power plant, the department spokesperson said Tokyo has been transparent in its decision-making process.
"We strongly support the nuclear safety and security standards championed by the International Atomic Energy Agency or the IAEA, and we welcome Japan's continued openness and close coordination with the international community as Japan prepares to disperse the treated water in a manner that appears to be in line with the internationally accepted nuclear safety standards," he said.
Youtube
https://youtu.be/gz_wJQeN-Zc
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · February 16, 2023
8. South Korea Should be Taking Notes on Ukraine
I am glad to see people being thoughtful about the potential for instability and regime collapse n north Korea. And there are a lot of lessons to be learned from Ukraine (and Poland and it addresses contingencies and more)
Excerpts:
Like Korea, Poland is an economically developed country with different resources and infrastructure for refugees than traditional “tent city” refugee camp models. While the United Nations has great instructions for accommodating large numbers of refugees in sparse conditions, it has little guidance for the challenges faced by developed nations like Poland. The Polish had a crash course in humanitarian response logistics for the developed world, and it’s an ideal case study from which South Korea can learn.
As Szczęsny said, “We needed to know how to convert an expo hall or stadium for refugees, not something in the middle of the desert. We’ve made every mistake, and now we can sum up this knowledge and keep it as a manual for future crises.”
South Korea will be in a similar position if – or when – the North Korean regime collapses. If it pays attention now, it won’t have to reinvent the wheel.
It is not like the ROK/US alliance has not thought about these issues. Of course the priority on this kind of planning has ebbed and flowed but we have done all the planning going back to the 1990s and CONPLAN 5029. Of course as Ike said:
1) Plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.
2) Plans are worthless, but planning is essential.
We may have written plans in the past but we need to conduct continuous planning (and we need to exercise the plans because plans are no good just sitting on shelves).
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5029.htm
CONPLAN 5029 is the US-ROK Combined Forces Command to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. The plan is reported to feature preparations by the South Korean and US forces to manage an inflow of North Korean refugees and other unusual situations if the North Korean regime collapses.
In August 1999 Gen. John H. Tilelli, commander-in-chief of U.S. Forces Korea, acknowledged that the CFC has mapped out a scenario to prepare for the collapse of North Korea. "It would be unusual if we didn't have one, and we are preparing for any course of action," he said. But he refused to disclose details.
In January 2005 the ROK National Security Council rejected an American proposal transform Concept Plan CONPLAN 5029 into an Operational Plan, OPLAN 5029. The OPLAN would provide much more specific military course of action to repsond to various types of internal instability in North Korea, such as regime collapse, mass defection and revolt. In June 2005 ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung and US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld agreed to "improve and develop" the Concept Plan, stopping short of turning it into an Operation Plan. The improved Concept Plan will include measures for "various types of contingencies" other than military operations.
South Korea Should be Taking Notes on Ukraine
A potential humanitarian crisis looms across the country’s northern border. It needs to be prepared.
thediplomat.com · by Emily Schroen · February 15, 2023
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A little over a year ago, Poland went from hosting hardly any refugees to being the world’s 2nd biggest refugee host — and all in just a matter of weeks. In years prior, the country accepted a few more refugees than South Korea, another ethnically homogeneous country that also faces a potential humanitarian crisis along its northern border. South Korea should pay attention to Poland now in preparation for the inevitable.
Although the Kim Jong Un regime doesn’t show signs of immediate collapse, the country is in a critical position. North Korea is currently supported by China and the Russian Federation. An economically and militarily weak Russia is thus a threat to North Korea’s stability – that’s according to former South Korean ambassador Lee Yang-goo, who spoke with me in a phone call. He said leaving China as the only big player in North Korea’s corner puts the Kim regime in an “uncomfortable position against a Western alliance,” as they would become even more reliant on and subject to the demands of an already frustrated China.
On top of this, North Korea is facing one of the most severe food shortages since the famine of the 1990s. The country is poised for an international humanitarian emergency.
And according to Lee, who spent the last seven years of his career as the South Korean ambassador to Ukraine, it’s only a matter of time before South Korea faces a flood of North Korean refugees similar to the one he’s seen in Ukraine. “Nobody imagined the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union,” Lee told me in an interview. “A small trigger can make North Korea collapse in a sudden way. If North Korea were to collapse tomorrow, there would be no big surprise.”
The nation needs to be ready for this inevitability, and currently, it isn’t. South Korea isn’t known for welcoming refugees, and isn’t ready for a flood of evacuees like we’ve seen from Ukraine into Poland. Among developed countries, South Korea has one of the world’s lowest rates of refugee acceptance. Many North Korean defectors, who can receive automatic citizenship under Korean law, travel on to Europe and the United States rather than try to integrate into South Korean society. If South Korea receives thousands of refugees across its border tomorrow, it won’t be culturally or structurally prepared to accommodate them.
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Thankfully, the urgency of this situation is not lost on some South Korean leaders, who have already started researching the Polish refugee response. Krzysztof Szczęsny, the strategic director of a humanitarian aid center in Warsaw, was surprised by the detailed questioning from South Korean diplomats visiting the center. “They mentioned the similarities which we are having with the Ukrainians – same culture zone, similar language, formerly occupied territories,” he said. “They are contingency planning, and they can learn quite a lot from us.”
Youngchan Daniel, a representative of the Joint Action Committee for supporting Ukraine, agrees with Krzysztof. Youngchan was living and volunteering with Ukrainian refugees in Poland at the beginning of Russia’s invasion. After working with Krzysztof in the shelter in Warsaw, Youngchan invited him to visit South Korea to share his experience and garner support there.
Youngchan has met with Korean government officials and NGOs about responding to North Korean refugees, and says he can “feel” that his government is working on a program, although it is largely unofficial. South Korea could take practical lessons from how Poland managed such a large number of refugees at once. “Poland is one of the best countries for supporting the Ukrainian refugees.” Youngchan said. “They just opened their country. It’s a very good example for South Korea. It is not easy to open our country to North Korean people due to political issues.”
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Like Korea, Poland is an economically developed country with different resources and infrastructure for refugees than traditional “tent city” refugee camp models. While the United Nations has great instructions for accommodating large numbers of refugees in sparse conditions, it has little guidance for the challenges faced by developed nations like Poland. The Polish had a crash course in humanitarian response logistics for the developed world, and it’s an ideal case study from which South Korea can learn.
As Szczęsny said, “We needed to know how to convert an expo hall or stadium for refugees, not something in the middle of the desert. We’ve made every mistake, and now we can sum up this knowledge and keep it as a manual for future crises.”
South Korea will be in a similar position if – or when – the North Korean regime collapses. If it pays attention now, it won’t have to reinvent the wheel.
GUEST AUTHOR
Emily Schroen
Emily Schroen is a global nonprofit development specialist with a focus on humanitarian aid, education, and international relations. She has worked with refugees and displaced people in the U.S., Spain, Poland, and recently returned from a humanitarian aid mission in Ukraine with Americans for Ukraine, a U.S.-based nonprofit supporting refugees in Poland.
thediplomat.com · by Emily Schroen · February 15, 2023
9. Report says Yoon could make state visit to U.S. in spring
I do hope this can happen soon. We have done so much to really make our alliance strong, this will be a symbolic way to really show that.
Excerpts:
A state visit will have symbolic meaning as this year commemorates the 70th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance.
The last state visit to the United States of a Korean leader was some 12 years ago by former President Lee Myung-bak in October 2011 upon the invitation of U.S. President Barack Obama.
There is also interest in whether Yoon will address the U.S. Congress, as Lee did.
Thursday
February 16, 2023
dictionary + A - A
Report says Yoon could make state visit to U.S. in spring
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/16/national/diplomacy/Korea-US-President-Joe-Biden-Yoon-Suk-Yeol/20230216185945313.html
President Yoon Suk Yeol, left, and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands after bilateral talks in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on Nov. 13, 2022, on the sidelines of Asean meetings. [PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE]
U.S. President Joe Biden is reportedly planning to host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a state dinner amid anticipation that the Korean leader could make a visit to Washington as early as this spring.
Bloomberg News reported Thursday that preparations for a state visit by Yoon are underway and that Biden is planning to hold a state dinner at the White House, citing sources familiar with the matter, possibly for late April.
It added that preparations for the visit and state dinner were underway, but the timing remained fluid.
If Yoon makes a state visit to the United States in April, he could become Biden's second state guest.
Last December, French President Emmanuel Macron became Biden's first state guest since the U.S. president took office in January 2021, recognizing France as the United States' oldest ally. Biden also hosted his first state dinner for the French presidential couple, and Macron and his first lady stayed at the historic Blair House, across the street from the White House, during their visit.
A state visit is the highest-level visit by a foreign leader, typically involving more pomp and ceremony, including an official welcoming event with an honor guard and a state dinner.
Yoon's presidential office said in a statement Thursday responding to the report on a state visit, "It is not the official position of the U.S. government."
However, Seoul officials have said diplomatic discussions have been underway since last month to discuss such a visit to take place within the first half of this year.
Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Washington on Feb. 3, and other high-level Foreign Ministry officials have had consecutive meetings with their State Department counterparts this month, where discussions of a summit would have taken place.
Presidential officials say “nothing has been decided” yet as the two sides are still discussing the details.
A state visit will have symbolic meaning as this year commemorates the 70th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance.
The last state visit to the United States of a Korean leader was some 12 years ago by former President Lee Myung-bak in October 2011 upon the invitation of U.S. President Barack Obama.
There is also interest in whether Yoon will address the U.S. Congress, as Lee did.
Yoon's visit to Washington could be an opportunity to discuss a slew of issues of mutual interest, including North Korean denuclearization, strengthening the alliance, coordinating Indo-Pacific strategies and discussing supply chain stability and economic security. Seoul could also reiterate its concerns over the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).
Biden visited Seoul for a first summit with Yoon on May 21, and the two countries agreed to upgrade ties to a global comprehensive strategic alliance. The summit came 11 days after Yoon took office, unusually fast for a first meeting between the U.S. president and a new Korean leader.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
10. [INTERVIEW] Seoul's integration into Quad will benefit all parties: Center for a New American Security
But would Japan "allow" South KOrea into the Quad. If it did, it would go a long way to improving Japan-ROK relations. And it would also upset Chian very much.
[INTERVIEW] Seoul's integration into Quad will benefit all parties: Center for a New American Security
The Korea Times · February 15, 2023
Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, center, talks during a press conference with Japanese Vice Minister Mori Takeo, left, and South Korea's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyundong, right, at the State Department in Washington, D.C., on February 13, 2023. AFP-Yonhap
This is the last in a series of interviews with security experts at leading think tanks in Washington and former U.S. officials on the implications of the escalating arms race in Northeast Asia and South Korea's growing nuclear ambitions. ― ED.
Speculation of NK's 7th nuclear test seems to be based on circumstantial evidence
By Kim Yoo-chul
A few months after U.S. President Joe Biden outlined the specifics of his signature U.S.-Indo Pacific strategy, South Korea also released its own version of an Indo Pacific-focused regional strategy late last year.
Such policy initiatives illustrate the fact that South Korea has greatly shifted its political intent on the country's regional strategy to favoring "strategic clarity" from "strategic ambiguity," which had been sought by former President Moon Jae-in. As China is South Korea's top trading partner, incumbent President Yoon Suk Yeol's vision for Seoul promoting strategic clarity has become a matter of discussion and debate.
The question is will the departure from "strategic ambiguity" to clarity yield benefits and how can South Korea strengthen today's growing rules-based international order?
Citing growing security challenges by North Korea and the need to upgrade the Seoul-Washington alliance beyond Korean Peninsula issues, the Yoon administration is still interested in being included in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad).
But as the prime focus of the Quad is China, despite South Korea's shift to clarity favoring to the U.S., the prevailing view is that Washington officials do not want Seoul to join the security framework. Such thoughts are based on the views of the group's existing members to avoid the pitfalls that come with overextending by including new members too soon. South Korea's diplomatic feud with Japan, one of the key group members, is another reason.
A recently-released report by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee highlighted the possibility of South Korea being involved in the Quad, because the security dialogue recently transitioned from simply holding working-group meetings to demonstrating its value in the Indo-Pacific region.
Joshua Fitt, CNAS fellow
Speaking to The Korea Times, Joshua Fitt, an associate fellow at the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), said the Quad is not likely to "formally expand" in the near term. However, he highlighted that a new phase of the Quad will also mean potential opportunities for informal partnerships and consultations on certain Quad initiatives with countries such as South Korea.
"South Korea already consults bilaterally with Quad countries on several of the grouping's priorities, and President Yoon himself mentioned his interest in the climate change and critical and emerging technology working groups on the campaign trail. When the time is right, South Korea's closer integration with some of the Quad's working groups will yield immense benefits to all parties," Fitt said in a recent interview.
CNAS, co-founded by the top White House Indo-Pacific official, Kurt M. Campbell, is one of the most influential public policy think tanks based in Washington.
The Quad has remained more as a forum for strategic talks that have looked at health challenges and maritime, technological and infrastructure issues through the lens of security.
South Korea is home to the world's two largest chip manufacturers ― Samsung and SK ― and LG Energy Solution (LGES), Samsung SDI and SK On are world-class electric vehicle (EV) battery manufacturers supplying products to Tesla, Ford, General Motors and others. These South Korean companies are affected by the passage of the U.S.' CHIPS Act and Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), both of which are aimed at providing tax credits to foreign manufacturers operating on U.S. soil.
Fitt said that the U.S. should facilitate good relations between South Korea and Japan to the greatest extent possible, because Washington's alliances with Tokyo and Seoul are two of the most important relationships in the world.
"The United States cannot―and should not―dictate the terms of rapprochement between South Korea and Japan. Recent trends in the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship have been promising, including renewed high-level summits and strong joint statements. While it is important to recognize the significance of these milestones after four bleak years, one must also remain realistic about how fragile the relationship is in the absence of stronger institutional ties that can weather the next inevitable bout of turbulence," he said.
"The 'best desired resolution' from Washington's perspective would be a South Korea-Japan relationship that is unfettered by historical tensions and able to advance mutual interests in maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific Region. Naturally, a future in which South Korea-Japan ties flourish is an appealing concept to Washington. But so far, this scenario has not come to fruition in a lasting way," he continued.
South Korean relatives of workers killed in a disaster at the Chosei coal mine, sort out ancestral tablets for the victims at a temple in Ube, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan, February 4, 2023. Reuters-Yonhap
Circumstantial evidence
The CNAS official said Yoon is correct to note that North Korea's provocations pose a serious threat. According to Fitt, there are two trends in the North Korean missile tests that are concerning: frequency and flight path.
"In 2022, there were more North Korean missile launches than ever before―including some that flew over Japan or landed in the waters of South Korea's exclusive economic zone. North Korean tests are not always successful, so with every launch, there is a chance that something will go wrong and inflict collateral damage. This is particularly concerning because of the awful state of North Korean channels of communication with the outside world," he responded.
Because unlike missile tests, nuclear tests are even more provocative and concerning, if North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is looking to up the ante, it may opt for a detonation.
"Experts have been bracing for a nuclear test for about a year now. To make matters worse, in 2022, Kim changed North Korea's nuclear use policy to allow for preemptive strikes. Still, all the speculation about a seventh nuclear test seems to be based on circumstantial evidence," Fitt said.
Opposing sides of a crisis or conflict should at least strive for better communication as open channels substantially reduce the risk of miscalculation or escalation and make situations with the potential for catastrophic global consequences less perilous. But the leaders of the United States and North Korea are not likely to hold a face-to-face meeting this year.
"In truth, the (previous U.S.-North Korea) summits were a waste of time for all parties. Until there is progress at the working level, more summits appear to be off the table. The prospect of working-level negotiations is complicated further by the unsustainable precedent set by the Trump-Kim summits that U.S-North Korea negotiations are to take place at the leader level. Any refusal from the North Korean side to negotiate can now easily fall back on this claim," he answered.
Regarding the possibility of initiating arms control talks as part of North Korea's denuclearization steps, the CNAS representative said it seems unlikely that such dialogue will resume soon as there is no public indication that North Korea is interested in accepting a U.S. offer to restart talks without preconditions.
A TV screen shows a file image of North Korean missiles in a military parade during a news program at Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Thursday, Feb. 2. 2023. North Korea said Thursday it is prepared to counter U.S. military moves with the "most overwhelming nuclear force" as it warned that the expansion of the U.S.' combined military exercises with rival South Korea is pushing tensions to an "extreme red line." AP-Yonhap
"Since 1991, when the United States decided to withdraw its nuclear assets from South Korea, Washington's policy has been that the entire Korean Peninsula ought to be completely denuclearized. In more than three decades, this policy has not changed despite North Korea's repeated steps in the opposite direction. If the goal of Pyongyang's pursuit of a nuclear weapon capable of imperiling the United States was to push Washington to view North Korea as a 'counterpart,' then the program has been a complete failure. Instead, the Kim dynasty's desire for weapons of mass destruction has solidified its role as a global pariah," he responded.
Discussions in Seoul about acquiring some type of nuclear capability are the result of South Korea not fully trusting the security guarantees offered by the United States. But the South Korea-U.S. alliance will be threatened if Seoul violates the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
"The ensuing turbulence would also divert scarce monetary and bandwidth resources away from more effective ways of countering and deterring Pyongyang. It is hard to imagine that Yoon's bullishness about a nuclear option for South Korea is in response to encouragement from Washington on the matter," he said. Fitt does not believe that nuclear sharing between Washington and Seoul is likely in the near future given the intentions of alliance stakeholders to seek less destabilizing ways to be comfortable with existing extended deterrence commitments.
"A nuclear-sharing arrangement under which South Korean military personnel would be trained to handle and use U.S. assets in the case of a nuclear contingency would not be a violation of the NPT (whereas South Korea developing its own nuclear weapon would). But just because an option falls within what is permitted under the NPT does not necessarily make it a good idea. China and North Korea paint nearly every level of alliance activity as 'destabilizing,' but bringing U.S. nuclear weapons back to the Korean Peninsula would indeed be a significant change to the regional status quo and should be avoided at all costs."
The Korea Times · February 15, 2023
11. The Impossible State Live Podcast: National Strategy for Countering North Korea
An excellent video/podcast on the report, National Strategy for Countering North Korea HERE
With Victor Cha (Host) and Robert Joseph and Greg Scarlatiou
Quotes:
"The regime's greatest threat comes from within." - Greg Scarlaloiu
"Never underestimate the power and persistence of bad ideas in the policy community." - Robert Joseph
The Impossible State Live Podcast: National Strategy for Countering North Korea
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6Bilh-pGw8
Center for Strategic & International Studies
234K subscribers
635 views Premiered 17 hours ago
Please join the Impossible State live podcast with Ambassador Robert Joseph and Greg Scarlatoiu discuss their recent report, National Strategy for Countering North Korea. In this report, 6 Strategic Propositions are presented for developing a new strategy for denuclearization of North Korea by promoting the rights and freedoms of the North Korean people in the context of unification with South Korea.
The conversation is moderated by Dr. Victor Cha about North Korea's human rights situation and the North Korean human rights movement ten years after the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK.
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12. South Korean gov't ordered to compensate man kidnapped from North Korea 67 years ago
A corrective.
The ROK stakes out the moral high ground.
It does the right thing now because it is the right thing to do.
Thursday
February 16, 2023
dictionary + A - A
South Korean gov't ordered to compensate man kidnapped from North Korea 67 years ago
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/16/national/northKorea/kidnap-abduction-north-korea/20230216103937980.html
Seoul Central District Court in Seocho-dong, southern Seoul [NEWS1]
A Seoul court has ordered the government to compensate an 86-year-old man from North Korea who was abducted by a South Korean spy right after the 1950-53 Korean War, legal sources said Wednesday.
In 1956, Kim Ju-sam was abducted by the South Korean agent at his home in the North's Hwanghae. Kim then was detained at an Air Force base and worked without pay for four years.
Since his release in 1961, he has lived in South Korea for 67 years.
In 2020 he filed a lawsuit seeking 1.5 billion won ($1.16 million).
The Seoul Central District Court on Tuesday ruled partially in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the state must pay 1 billion won in damages.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the state truth panel, last year issued a recommendation that Kim be given the opportunity to meet his family in the North.
Yonhap
13. NK leader attends groundbreaking ceremony for housing project in Pyongyang
Is Kim trying to show off his "new normal" as a benevolent dictator? I am surprised the Propaganda and Agitation Department did not continue the presence of KJU's daughter Kim Ju Ae to reinforce KJU's fatherly image.
Note the photos of military officers. Military Fists Politics continues.
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/02/103_345545.html
NK leader attends groundbreaking ceremony for housing project in Pyongyang
The Korea Times · February 16, 2023
This photo released by the North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attending a groundbreaking ceremony for a greenhouse farm in Pyongyang, Feb. 16. Yonhap North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has attended a groundbreaking ceremony to build 10,000 homes in Pyongyang, the country's state media reported Thursday, part of the nation's five-year project to supply more housing.
Kim attended the ceremony for the second stage of the housing project to build 10,000 homes in Pyongyang's Hwasong district Wednesday, according to the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The North plans to build 50,000 new homes in Pyongyang by 2025 under the project announced at the eighth congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in 2021.
Kim attended previous groundbreaking ceremonies for the project in the past two years.
"The project for construction of 50,000 flats in Pyongyang City is an important item decided by the 8th Congress of the WPK to build as soon as possible the socialist paradise," Premier Kim Tok-hun said in a speech at the event, according to an English-language report by the KCNA.
The North's leader also attended a separate groundbreaking ceremony for a large-scale greenhouse farm in the capital on the same day. The events marked Kim's first on-site field inspections this year.
The greenhouse appears to have been built on a former air force base in Kangdong County in Pyongyang, according to an official at Seoul's unification ministry.
The North has previously transformed an airfield in Jungphyong in North Hamgyong Province and the Ryonpho air base into greenhouse farms in 2018 and 2022, respectively, amid apparent efforts to make productive use of underutilized facilities.
The latest conversion of the air base was undertaken in line with those made in Jungphyong and Ryonpho, an official at South Korea's unification ministry said. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · February 16, 2023
14. What perceptions do many N. Koreans have about Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae?
What perceptions do many N. Koreans have about Kim Jong Un’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae?
Many people cannot hide how perplexed they are that a 10-year-old girl was treated even better than the top generals in the North Korean army, a source told Daily NK
By Lee Chae Un - 2023.02.16 4:00pm
dailynk.com
Kim Jong Un was accompanied by his wife and daughter at a banquet celebrating the founding of the DPRK's military on Feb. 7, according to state-run media. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)
Many North Koreans are reacting coldly to the appearance of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s young daughter Kim Ju Ae during the Feb. 8 nighttime military parade, which was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army.
A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that people who saw Kim Ju Ae alongside her father at the parade “couldn’t hide their bitterness.”
The Rodong Sinmun and other North Korean state-run media ran a series of reports on Feb. 8 and 9 about how Kim Jong Un — accompanied by his wife Ri Sol Ju and his daughter Kim Ju Ae — attended a banquet to mark Army Day, as well as the military parade.
The source said people who actually saw the reports are taking great interest in the appearance of Kim’s daughter, but not necessarily in a good way.
He said many people cannot hide how perplexed they are that a 10-year-old girl was treated even better than the top generals in the North Korean army.
The source said other children her age would have a hard time even glimpsing the face of a high-ranking military cadre before they die, let alone attending a military parade.
“As a parent, I felt a sense of shame watching a young girl receive top treatment alongside her dad, outclipsing even the top military brass, just because of who her father is,” he said.
The source said it was a bit heartwarming to watch Kim and his daughter smiling and talking on the VIP platform, “but it’s an image the people cannot entirely embrace.”
“No one would be happy to see somebody treated like royalty because of who her father is while their own kids are trembling from hunger and cold,” he claimed.
Even young university students are expressing concern that with Kim Ju Ae already making her fifth official appearance in North Korean media, a fourth generation succession of the Kim family has become a fait accompli.
According to the source, a student at Chongjin University of Pedagogy said unease is spreading among the students with Kim Ju Ae appearing before her father’s time as leader is even up.
“That’s because the repeated appearances of the young daughter is clearly intended to show that [Kim family rule] will continue into the next generation,” the student said, according to the source.
Daily NK’s source further commented that young North Koreans who have grown up on South Korean films and TV are more aware of things than previous generations, “so they aren’t viewing the appearance of the young girl with just amusement or by being deeply moved emotionally.”
Translated by David Carruth. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
15. Opinion: What Stalin's daughter taught me (and link to north Korea)
Opinion: What Stalin's daughter taught me | CNN
CNN · by Rosemary Sullivan · February 15, 2023
Editor’s Note: Rosemary Sullivan is a Canadian author. She has published 16 books, most recently “Stalin’s Daughter: The Extraordinary ad Tumultuous Life of Svetlana Alliluyeva (2015)” and “The Betrayal of Anne Frank: A Cold Case Investigation (2022).” The views expressed in this commentary are her own. Read more opinion on CNN.
CNN —
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was back in the spotlight last week after appearing at two lavish military events in Pyongyang. In one photograph, he is seen with his generals reviewing a midnight parade of ballistic missiles. Beside him stands his roughly 9-year-old daughter.
Rosemary Sullivan
Michael Rafelson/Courtesy Rosemary Sullivan
Ironically, the photo exactly mirrors one taken almost 100 years ago of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin standing on a similar balcony in Moscow reviewing a military parade with a young girl standing beside him.
Both children look enraptured to have the dictator’s attention. And I think: The predicament of the dictator’s daughter! What will Kim Ju Ae’s future be?
In my biography of Svetlana Alliluyeva, “Stalin’s Daughter,” I quoted Svetlana’s comment on her fate in her own memoir, “Only One Year.” She writes: “You are Stalin’s daughter. Actually, you are already dead. Your life is already finished. You can’t live your own life. You can’t live any life. You exist only in reference to a name.”
On a lengthy visit to Moscow in 2013, I was able to interview Stalin’s grandson Alexander Burdonsky, who told me that life in the Soviet army felt like a liberation after life at home. Like his aunt Svetlana, he took his mother’s name to escape his lineage.
Of Svetlana, he said: “I admired her as a woman and as a human being. I cannot say that of all my relatives. I loved her very much.”
He explained that his father Vasily Stalin was “a product of the freeloaders and leaches who surrounded him.” But Svetlana was her father’s daughter. “She had his organized intelligence, his unbelievable will, but she did not have his evil.”
Kim Jong Un and his daughter attend a military parade on February 08, 2023.
Rodong Sinmun
During her childhood, Svetlana was the “beloved daughter.” Stalin called her his little hostess, little fly, little sparrow. She was the only one who could stop his rages against her mother by wrapping her arms around his Cossack boots.
After her mother’s suicide, her letters to her father are poignant. At age seven, she wrote: “Hello my dear Paposhka, How are you living and how is your health. … I wait for you in Sochi.” In a game he invented for her, Stalin advised his daughter that she should never ask for things; she should give orders. He was her Secretary No. 1.
All this changed when Svetlana was 16 and had her first chaste love affair with a famous filmmaker Aleksei Kapler, who was 39 (the same age as Stalin when he married Svetlana’s mother.) Stalin exiled Kapler to the Gulag for 10 years for having the audacity to romance his daughter. This was when Svetlana began to understand who her father was. Her status as beloved was conditional.
Stalin died in 1953. And Svetlana eventually defected to the US in 1967, but discovered that she still carried her father’s shadow; she was expected to cooperate with the CIA. When she was seduced back to Russia in 1984 to see her son who was supposedly ill, the government there offered her luxury dachas, apartments, cars. She refused them. She slipped back into the US and ended her life in virtual poverty.
She summed up her life in her memoir: “Wherever I go, whether to Australia or some island, I will always be the political prisoner of my father’s name.”
Soviet leader Josef Stalin with his son, Vasily, and daughter Svetlana, in 1935. Both children are by Stalin's second wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva.
Laski Diffusion/Getty Images
Burdonsky told me that the children of dictators have either to totally reject their heritage or to follow in their father’s footsteps. He said Svetlana was caught in between. She did not defend her father’s murderousness, but she thought he had been turned into a sinkhole for all the evil of his regime.
“He knew what he was doing,” she said of her father in her memoir. “He was neither insane nor misled. With cold calculation he cemented his power, afraid of losing it more than anything else in the world.” But a dictator needs accomplices. He was the head of a homicidal system she had the courage to reject.
This makes me think of Russian President Vladimir Putin today. We know virtually nothing about Kim Jung Un’s daughter, but we know a little about Putin’s two daughters, Mariya and Katerina. As children of the “first person,” people are careful not to speak about them; to do so would be dangerous.
Shrouded in secrecy, they attended university under assumed names (classmates had no idea who they were); they had guards to go to the movies and security details at home. Told that Putin loves his children and spoils them, a journalist once asked if the girls had Putin wrapped around their little fingers. Their mother Lyudmila replied: “Nobody can wrap Papa around their little finger.”
It appears that Putin’s daughters have chosen their father’s side. It is reported that Katerina is head of a new AI institute at Moscow State University and is said to be worth several billion. Mariya leads a state funded genetics program that has received billions from the Kremlin, according to US officials. Supposedly neither have political ambitions, which is reportedly the way Putin wants it.
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But it would seem that Kim Jong Un might indeed be grooming his daughter to carry on his dynasty. North Korea just released a new postage stamp carrying photos of the dictator and his “beloved daughter” standing together watching the test-firing of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile.
Will she, like Svetlana, inherit her father’s will but reject his murderous legacy? Or will she prove a well-trained apprentice and possibly become more dangerous than her father? Given the closed universe of North Korea and the seduction of wealth and power, the latter is more likely.
CNN · by Rosemary Sullivan · February 15, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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