In a new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, Tetyana Malyarenko and Borys Kormych analyze the increased intensity of Russian cyberattacks against Ukraine compared to 2014-2021, finding limited damage so far thanks to Russian technical limitations and Western counter-measures. Susanne Wengle and Vitalii Dankevych, in another new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, identify the types of critical damage to Ukrainian agriculture caused by Russia, such as deliberate thefts, disruptions, diversions, destructions, and blockades.

Konstantin Sonin says Russia has de facto launched a full-scale mobilization, as “volunteering for the special operation in Ukraine” is advertised on national TV in some Russian regions. However, Pavel Baev writes that Russia’s attack on Ukraine has lost momentum—citing an operational pause—but the intensity of its multi-prong confrontation with the West keeps rising.

On the economic side, Ekaterina Shengeliya offers a PONARS Eurasia Commentary on the reactions of businesses operating in Russia to the War in Ukraine, finding them engaged in heavy debates about their departure’s effect on civilians versus their complicity in the war. Kathryn Stoner adds that the war undid thirty years of economic gains and made Russia an international pariah state. However, the “bottom line,” according to Peter Rutland is that Russia’s oil and gas revenues haven’t been dented at all, allowing the government to keep funding the war and providing financial support for citizens.

Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, in another new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, add the near-term prospect for climate action to the often forgotten list of war casualties, a particularly depressing turn due to the potential for improved Russian policy just prior to the war.

In discussing the war’s effect on academic freedom and the persecution of scientists, Brian Taylor writes that the Kremlin security services are driven by performance quotas but are also populated by officials trying to build their careers or make money through the cases they pursue. Marlene Laruelle argues it is still incorrect to apply the “fascism” label to the entirety of the Russian state or society, claiming it reinforces confirmation bias and is monocausal whereby everything bad happening in Russia is read through the sole analytical lens of “fascism.”

As rumors about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s health spark succession questions and multiple rival clans vie for power in Moscow, Yuri Zhukov writes that if Putin resigns, dies, or is removed from office, the Russian Constitution states that the prime minister becomes acting president. Taylor hedges that while the current Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin would be the “path of least resistance” to assume the presidency in an emergency, he may not last long-term without the support of elites. Volodymyr Ishchenko, notes that only “some dramatic changes,” such as a major retreat or defeat, would trigger anti-Putin protests and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova attributes much of the Russian citizens’ indifference to the Putin regime’s social contract in which people focus on bettering their own lives while leaving politics to the state.

In the latest issue of the Journal of Democracy, Ivan Gomza further writes that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “personalist dictatorship” has a distinct life cycle: economic performance gives way to stagnation and stagnation prompts diversionary wars. In contrast, Jessica Pisano finds that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s implementation of decentralizing reforms as president follows his advocacy for local identity as a comedian, and has been critical to Ukrainian resilience in the war. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili cites this success as an example to argue that democracy building must aim to transform governance by supporting human dignity where it is born—at the local level.

Nargis Kassenova writes that as the geopolitical division between Moscow and the West widens, Kazakhstan will have a hard time being a good neighbor both to isolated Russia and to the rest of the world.

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NEW BOOK: Vladimir Gel’man considers bad governance as a distinctive and, at times, deliberate politico-economic order based on a set of formal and informal practices in his new book, The Politics of Bad Governance in Contemporary Russia.

An article on Antiwar.com about what happens next in the Russia-Ukraine conflict includes a summary of the recent PONARS Eurasia Policy Exchange event with Petro Burkovskyi, Olexiy Haran, Maria Popova, Oxana Shevel, Paul D’Anieri, and Mariya Omelicheva.