In a new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, Nurlan Aliyev describes how Russia’s energy, trade, and scientific ventures in the Arctic have slowed as foreign money and supply chains evaporate, and domestic resources are rerouted to the invasion of Ukraine. Pistan Carna, in a new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, says President Vladimir Putin’s 2020 constitutional changes based on memory politics enable Russia’s neo-imperialism and conflicts.

J. Paul Goode characterizes Putin’s partial mobilization as a misguided and politically risky attempt “to have it both ways:” placating regime nationalists without mobilizing the public. Marlene Laruelle argues that the success of Ukraine’s counteroffensives has revealed long-present “cracks” in consensus about Putin’s handling of the war and agrees that mobilization, among other measures, is an effort to placate hawkish critics.

Russia’s escalating gamble is unlikely to pay off, says Samuel Charap, because it will not scare Ukraine or the West into capitulating, and Putin will end up with worse choices. Elsewhere, he mentions the Biden administration can further isolate Russia if more developing countries can be convinced to stand against Moscow. Margarita Zavadskaya describes the mobilization as an apocalyptic event with tangible effects on ordinary Russians, especially given that the 300,000 may not be enough and that mobilization may stretch on. Kirill Rogov calls it an “explosive mixture of madness, incompetence and despair” that could lead to the loss of public support for Putin.

Samuel Greene predicts that Putin is taking a big risk by drafting young Russian men, particularly married men, as formerly ambivalent citizens may start sincerely opposing his policies. He adds that mobilization can be understood as a “trial balloon,” with Putin watching the domestic consequences closely. Graeme Robertson suggests that mobilization marks a positive development for Ukraine, signaling Russia’s change from an “expansive war of conquest” to one of defending territories they have appropriated.

Elise Giuliano finds that the “referendums” in Russia-occupied Ukraine are part of a scenario strategy in which Russia can claim that Ukraine and the West attacked Russian territory, possibly to justify the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pavel Podvig notes, however, that nuclear weapons rarely serve tactical purposes, with their main mission being to demonstrate the “willingness and readiness to attack and kill a lot of civilians.”

Henry Hale and co-authors study how autocrats shape public opinion outside their borders, finding that local sympathies do not necessarily translate into new public positions, and can backfire if nationalist priorities are strong. Margaret Hanson and Sarah Wilson Sohkey outline how higher education can keep dictators in power by rewarding regime supporters and co-opting employees into large public sectors, even if it also empowers a young middle-class.

EVENTS

Join us! PONARS Eurasia Annual Fall Policy Conference, Friday, September 30, at the GW Elliott School or online.

Stay tuned for our New Voices on Eurasia event series with Maria Sidorkina on October 6 and Anton Shirikov on October 12.

BOOKS

See Enemies Within (Oxford, 2022) by Harris Mylonas and Scott Radnitz (eds.), the first work to systematically investigate the roots and implications of the politics of fifth columns.