In two new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memos, Lance Davies reveals how the Kremlin has weaponized the “humanitarian space” to complement its military effort, while Sasha de Vogel analyzes data on citizens’ appeals to Putin’s office and finds evidence of increasing Russian anxiety.

As Ukraine marked the anniversary of Russia’s all-out invasion, Brian Taylor writes that the war has revealed the determination of Ukrainians, the value of NATO, and the shortcomings of the UN. Susanne Wengle points out that Ukraine’s ability to export grain depends on the “quite uncertain” Black Sea Grain Initiative. Commenting on Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Jessica Pisano writes he has long “fostered a generous, inclusive idea of what it meant to be Ukrainian.”

With Putin addressing a large Moscow rally last week, Kirill Rogov writes his main goal was to normalize the war. For Nikolay Petrov, Putin has shifted his claim to legitimacy from elections to being an almighty leader, and “if you’re a Leader, you need a crowd to gather around you.” Ivan Kurilla finds that when Putin tries to explain the war to Russians, the “language of history has replaced the language of politics.”

Maria Snegovaya finds Russia’s public mood “not too bad” since people think higher costs of living are fleeting and “recoverable.” Petrov, though, thinks “the government is cheating” with its economic numbers, and Pavel Baev finds “every modern sector of the Russian economy, from the IT sector to the aircraft building, is severely affected, and the degradation is set to accelerate.” At the same time, Adam Stulberg finds sanctions are blurring lines between peace and conflict in Moscow’s eyes. Kurilla believes there would be no crackdowns if the Russian public truly supported the war, while for Konstantin Sonin, huge emigration numbers indicate many are “extremely unhappy” with the war. Margarita Zavadskaya and co-authors conclude this emigration reflects highly educated people leaving under great duress.

Why did Putin do it? For Simon Saradzhyan, he blundered in seeing growing threats to Russia’s interests and thinking he would win. Putin also underestimated both the West (Elise Giuliano) and Ukraine’s will to resist (Mikhail Alexseev), both symbolized in U.S. President Biden’s visit to Kyiv (Alexseev). For Henry Hale, key to the timing was Russian disappointment that Zelenskyy turned out to be both pro-European and competent. Maria Snegovaya finds the war a “saving-face issue” for Putin, meaning he will double down as long as resources allow. Peter Rutland notes reports of Putin suffering from serious illness are rarely credible.

As Russia suspends New START, Pavel Podvig concludes “it could be worse,” and Samuel Charap sees a “successful boiling of the frog” in the West’s gradual growth in military assistance, though worries the conflict could drag on for years. Baev also finds Putin’s mobilization falling short. Maria Popova says the war has diminished Russia’s standing as even its allies don’t find it just, and Erica Marat describes Central Asian countries’ response as “cautious.” Farid Guliyev writes the US and Russia are also competing in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, while Kornely Kakachia links Georgia’s omission in Biden’s Warsaw speech to democratic backsliding.

In academia, Maria Popova argues for a focus on “Russia as an imperial actor in the neighborhood,” while Eugene Finkel fears the colonization narrative oversimplifies. Joshua Tucker argues social scientists could better serve policymakers if major social media platforms gave them more data.

Event

Join us! PONARS Eurasia Spring Policy Conference, Friday, March 3, 2023, 9 AM–5 PM EST, in-person and online.