Quotes of the Day:
“I will accept any rules that you feel necessary to your freedom. I am free, no matter what rules surround me. If I find them tolerable I will tolerate; if I find them too obnoxious I will break them, I am free because I know that I alone am morally responsible for everything I do.”
-Robert Heinlein, The Moon is a harsh Mistress
“Paradoxically, to alter our culture, we must address everything other than culture. As John Kotter describes in Leading Change, culture is not amenable to direct attack. No amount of blue ribbon panels, chain teaching or “innovative activity reports” will change culture. Behavior drives culture. To change the culture, we must change behavior.”
- Fastabend and Simpson, Adapt or Die, Army Magazine, Feb 2004.
"A great many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices."
- William James
1. Spineless leadership making Seoul subject of mockery
2. DP reps want drill with U.S. postponed
3. Women’s Rights in North Korea
4. DOD and ROK Conduct First Bilateral Communication Technology Cooperation Committee Forum
5. U.S., S. Korea hold first director-level talks on N. Korea: State Dept.
6. Biden gov't likely to seek incremental sanctions relief for North Korea: CRS report
7. Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung
8. North Korea’s Vaccination Capabilities: Implications for a COVID-19 Campaign
9. Two North Korean soldiers die after suffering from COVID-19 symptoms
10. North Korea COVID-19 vaccines face obstacles to delivery, UNICEF says
11. Opinion | South Korea wants Biden to get serious about North Korea
12. North Korea floods damage more than 1,000 homes, state media reports
13. Report: North Korean teens caught listening to BTS song
14. North Korea Orders Military Officials to Host ‘Soldiers’ Day’ Dog Meat Feast
15. North Korea Forces Factory Workers to Donate Grain for Army Pig Farms
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Domestic Currency Appreciates by 22% as Chinese Yuan and U.S. Dollar Mysteriously Plunge Again
1. Spineless leadership making Seoul subject of mockery
I am optimistic that President Moon is not going to succumb to the progressive faction of the ruling party ( 74 lawmakers and his Minister of Unification and Director of the NIS). I think he is going to take the wise counsel of the national security, diplomatic, and military professionals in MND and MOFA.
He cannot afford to appease the regime or he will be faced with Kim doubling down on blackmail diplomacy and the alliance will be weakened which of course is one of the objectives of the regime.
Spineless leadership making Seoul subject of mockery
Posted August. 06, 2021 07:25,
Updated August. 06, 2021 07:25
Spineless leadership making Seoul subject of mockery. August. 06, 2021 07:25. .
A total 74 South Korean lawmakers from the Democratic Party of Korea, Justice Party, and Open Democratic Party issued a statement on Thursday, calling for suspension of the joint military exercise between South Korea and the United States. They claimed that suspending the joint drills can serve as a negotiation card for ameliorating the soured bilateral relations with the North. However, ruling party leader Song Yong-gil said the drills are unavoidable as they have already been agreed upon. On Wednesday, President Moon Jae-in called for a “careful consultation” with the U.S. while being debriefed by the military command.
With the annual ROK-US joint military drills only 10 days ahead, the South Korean government and the ruling party appear to be completely split over. While both keep the official stance that the drills must be proceeded as scheduled, in reality, the imminent event seems to be an inevitability rather than a matter of rescheduling. In fact, most of American soldiers to participate in the drills have already arrived in South Korea, which means the joint exercise has already begun in effect.
President Moon’s ambiguous, lukewarm stance is also fueling chaos. He called for a “careful consultation” without giving specific instructions. This might well be interpreted as an indirect call to test the waters with Washington to postpone or minimize the joint drills. With the South Korean Unification Ministry and the National Intelligence Service proposing to put off the military event, the nation’s politics is jolted by lawmakers gathering signers to demand a halt to the drills.
This all began with Pyongyang’s double-faced tactics of restoring the inter-Korean hotline and pressuring to suspend the drills. After reconnecting the hotline that it cut off unilaterally, the communist regime warned that a joint military exercise would be “an unpleasant prelude.” This gained credence with the NIS proposing the possibility of retaliatory provocations from the North. Even the members of the ruling party are trying to ingratiate themselves with Pyongyang. Under these topsy-turvy circumstances, the long list of vicious acts from the North is conveniently redacted, and there is only a brimful sense of ungrounded hopes and expectations.
Even the drills do get postponed, it will look like the South has succumbed to the threats from Pyongyang, giving upon the regular defense drills and the minimum scope of military training and putting national security on the line to curry favor with the North. Unsurprisingly, this will make the South a subject of mockery and ridicule. With President Moon passing the buck to his ally as “an agenda to be discussed with the U.S.,” Seoul’s diplomatic moves must be far from desirable in the eyes of Washington.
2. DP reps want drill with U.S. postponed
The 74 lawmakers of the ruling party are puting appeasing Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong ahead of the security of the ROK and the ROK/US alliance.
This is really troubling.
Thursday
August 5, 2021
DP reps want drill with U.S. postponed
A group of 74 liberal lawmakers issued a joint statement Thursday calling for South Korea and the United States to postpone an annual summertime military exercise scheduled for later this month, announced in a press briefing by Democratic Party Rep. Sul Hoon, second from left, and other lawmakers at the National Assembly in western Seoul. [NEWS1]
A group of 74 liberal lawmakers issued a joint statement Thursday calling for South Korea and the United States to postpone their annual summertime military exercise scheduled for later this month.
The lawmakers led by the ruling Democratic Party (DP) said in the statement, “We can’t help but acknowledge that the South Korea-U.S. combined exercises is an obstacle in bringing North Korea to the negotiation table, regardless of its scale.”
They proposed Seoul and Washington “actively consider making a decision to postpone the joint exercise scheduled to be held in August.”
Signers of the petition included 61 DP lawmakers as well as Justice Party, Open Democratic Party, Basic Income Party and independent representatives. The ruling party started the petition the previous day, immediately gathering dozens of signatures.
Last Sunday, Kim Yo-jung, the North Korean leader’s sister, issued a statement calling for a halt to the annual joint military exercise, warning it could undermine inter-Korean relations.
She said North Korea would be closely watching to see if South Korea chooses to follow through with “hostile war exercises in August" or makes another "bold decision."
Kim's remarks followed the restoration of inter-Korean communication lines on July 27, which had been severed by Pyongyang on June 9, 2020 in protest of what it claimed were Seoul's failures to prevent activists from sending propaganda leaflets across the border.
A group of lawmakers including DP Reps. Sul Hoon and Jin Sung-joon and independent Rep. Yoon Mee-hyang held a joint press conference at the National Assembly Thursday afternoon announcing the statement calling to delay the drill for the sake of resuming dialogue and improving inter-Korean relations.
They said that Pyongyang’s mention of the Seoul-Washington joint exercise after the restoration of communication lines “seems to indicate that they also want to resume dialogue, and that they needed an internal and external justification for this.”
The lawmakers’ statement, which follows recent remarks by Seoul’s Ministry of Unification and Park Jie-won, director of the National Intelligence Service, supporting the postponement of the joint drill, puts the summertime exercise with Washington in political and diplomatic crosshairs.
President Moon Jae-in told Defense Minister Suh Wook in a meeting with military commanders Wednesday to “carefully consider various factors” in regard to the joint exercise, said the Blue House. Suh said that Seoul's Defense Ministry is in consultation with quarantine authorities and the United States on the current Covid-19 situation and other “realistic conditions.”
The lawmakers’ statement ran counter to the view of the DP leadership.
Song Young-gil, chairman of the DP, told a YTN radio program Thursday morning that conducting the joint exercise is “inevitable,” repeating a message he has consistently conveyed in the past week.
Likewise, Kim Byung-joo, a DP deputy floor leader and a former deputy commander of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command, said at a party policy coordination meeting Thursday, “It is now too late to argue for the postponement or cancelation of the joint exercise.”
He added, “It is not appropriate for political circles to call for a postponement or suspension of the exercise when most of the U.S. troops who will attend the drills are already in South Korea.”
However, Rep. Sul, a five-term lawmaker, said he hasn’t heard directly from DP chairman Song that the drill was inevitable, adding, “Even if it means negotiating with the United States again, delaying the exercise is a wiser way to deal with it.”
On the exercise already being in progress, he said, “It is in the preparation stage, so even if it is postponed now, it wouldn’t be a big problem.”
Joint military drills usually take between three months and a year to prepare for.
Later Thursday, in response to reporters' questions on the lawmakers' statement, Song said the DP leadership adheres to the view that the exercise needs to be carried out as scheduled.
Song referred to Kim Yo-jong’s statement and said, “It is not right to postpone for that kind of reason in a situation where training is already in progress.”
He said that the DP lawmakers’ statement “is as an expression of intention of members of the National Assembly, an independent constitutional institution."
The main opposition People Power Party (PPP) immediately criticized the DP joint statement and PPP spokesman Kang Min-guk said it panders to North Korea's Kim Yo-jong.
The Ministry of National Defense repeated its stance Thursday that the “timing, scale and method" of the joint exercise has not yet been decided.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
3. Women’s Rights in North Korea
A nice essay from one of our HRNK interns.
This must be part of a human rights upfront approach to north Korea.
Conclusion:
The status of women’s rights in North Korea is of growing concern and it is evident that stepped-up international intervention and cooperation is required in order to eradicate these violations. These violations are being perpetrated through acts of the Party. A restructuring of Party policies, legislation, and imposition of Constitutional principles by the Party is urgently needed. Considering the lack of will from the Party, this can be achieved through pressure applied by the international community, and this is only possible through multilateralism.
Women’s Rights in North Korea
8/5/2021
By Seshni Moodley, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Carter Thompson, HRNK Research Intern, and Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor
August 5, 2021
Introduction
Women’s rights violations are a global issue. Women are continuously disadvantaged in many spheres of everyday life. There are various social, political and cultural constraints that hamper the promotion of women’s rights in North Korea.
Amongst the various barriers that are hampering the promotion of gender equality in North Korea, the most prominent are the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as these laws enforce the idea that women play an inferior role in society.
Women’s Rights Laws in North Korea [1]
The DPRK enacted the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women (LPPRW) in 2010. The law specifically states that an international treaty, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), to which the DPRK is a party, “shall have the same effect” as a domestic law. This law encompasses the fundamental rights of women, including social and political, educational, cultural, health, and labor rights. CEDAW is an international convention that calls for Party States to protect women from discrimination and provide for the adoption of various measures to prevent discrimination from occurring.
The Criminal Code (2012) punishes some acts of sexual violence. However, other forms of violence, such as attempted rape and sexual violence or marital rape, are not incorporated in these laws.
The Law on Socialist Labour Rights (2010) extended the duration of maternity leave in 2015 from 150 to 240 days. The DPRK further states that this extension has improved maternal health for women.
Although the above laws are supposedly written to protect the rights of women, testimonies from refugees indicate that these rights are not being enforced by the DPRK as these rights were written because of international press. [2]
Women’s Rights in North Korea
These women’s rights violations have been occurring since 1945, when women were assigned primary roles as child bearers and placed in a subordinate position in society. This is partly attributable to Korea’s dominant culture of Confucianism which is focused on men and preserves the idea of women being subordinate to men. Further, Korean Confucianism has been regarded as “the enemy of feminism.” [3] Nevertheless, the official governmental position is that women in North Korea have the same rights to the men in North Korea.
CEDAW is currently involved in the process of eradicating these violations. The North Korean authorities are unwilling to cooperate with CEDAW’s efforts. A possible reason for this is rooted in the DPRK’s conception of human rights in North Korea. This conception involves the understanding that human rights play an inferior role. North Korea does not perceive human rights as inherent to an individual but understands them in the context of a state and collectivism, and a trinity made up of the Supreme Leader, the Korean Workers’ Party and the public.
In order for the international community’s efforts to improve North Korean human rights to be effective, understanding how the North Korean authorities and their residents, the parties directly involved, perceive human rights as a priority.
Abuse of Women in North Korea
The abuse, including sexual violence against women is rife in North Korea and in areas where these women escape, such as China. Various accounts of abuse towards women have reportedly occurred not only in their homes, but also in public as assaults are rife throughout the country.
The North Korean law on sexual equality came into force in 1946, but since then, the situation for women has worsened especially in matters of sexual violence. The Kim government is trying to create a façade for the rest of the world. This façade aims at fooling the world into thinking that the North Korean government is protecting women’s rights.
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea illustrated that the women in North Korea are still being treated terribly. [4] Some human rights violations affecting women constitute crimes against humanity. The report mentioned that:
- Discrimination against women remains pervasive in all aspects of society.
- Although there have been advances in social and political spheres, the advancement of women has lagged behind. Women represent 5 percent of the top political cadre and 10 percent of central government employees.
- The rights of women are violated. In particular, violations of the right to food and the right to freedom of movement make women vulnerable.
It has been stated that although statutory requirements were put into place for gender equality in the North Korean 1946 Law on Sexual Equality, the reality is contrary to these provisions.
A legal analysis of the 2010 North Korean Women’s Rights Act demonstrates the stated lack of true determination to enforce gender equality. The language is vague and there are no clear statements on the prohibition of sexual harassment. Without a clear policy in place, an additional barrier is placed on the promotion of women’s rights. This demonstrates how the actions of the Party are hampering the promotion of women’s rights in North Korea. [5]
Sexual Exploitation and the Abuse of Women
The institution of Kim Jong-un’s “pleasure squad” can be seen as a method used by the Party to encourage the sexual exploitation and abuse of women in North Korea. This follows in the notorious footsteps of Kim Jong-un’s father and grandfather. This indicates a long history of the Party encouraging such abuses.
Girls as young as 13 to 15 years old are recruited as members of the “pleasure squad.” This has a damaging and devastating effect on the youth in North Korea as many of these girls are abused and left without a proper education after the recruitment.
The girls are put through a rigorous training process, where they are taught to sing, dance, and ultimately “please” Kim Jong-un and his guests. Consent is rarely, if ever given by the parents or guardians of the girls since they are not of the appropriate age to give consent. There is no evidence that North Korean legislation specifies the legal age of consent, so one is required to assess the validity of the consent by the appropriateness of the age of the girl in question. This reinforces the idea that women play such an inferior role in society that their consent is disregarded.
Possible Solutions
CEDAW Committee Members have repeatedly inquired and requested detailed information from the North Korean delegation. Their requests for details on incidences of sexual assault and rape were met with indignant refusals. Once again, this demonstrated the utter lack of transparency and secretive nature of the North Korean regime.
Although it is prudent to note that North Korea has engaged with CEDAW, this is insufficient as North Korea is notorious for its closed society and borders. This prevents awareness of mass discriminatory practices that are occurring in North Korea from spreading to the international community.[6]
In order to remedy these discriminatory practices, intervention from the international community is needed. To achieve the eradication of discriminatory practices, measures must be implemented to break down the barriers that enclose North Korean society and its borders.
There are various rights contained in the Constitution of North Korea. However, no one in North Korea has access to these rights because they are not given access to the document. It seems that these rights are only for show.
An important solution to the human rights violations would be for the international community to apply pressure on North Korea to comply with CEDAW. A multilateral rather than unilateral approach will be more effective in applying such pressure. Multilateralism involves like-minded UN member states working together as a unified body towards the eradication of human rights violations.
Conclusion
The status of women’s rights in North Korea is of growing concern and it is evident that stepped-up international intervention and cooperation is required in order to eradicate these violations. These violations are being perpetrated through acts of the Party. A restructuring of Party policies, legislation, and imposition of Constitutional principles by the Party is urgently needed. Considering the lack of will from the Party, this can be achieved through pressure applied by the international community, and this is only possible through multilateralism.
[1] Jina Yang, “Women’s Rights in the DPRK: Discrepancies Between International and Domestic Legal Instruments in Promoting Women’s Rights and the Reality Reflected by North Korean Defectors,” Cornell Law Journal 51 no. 1 (2018): 221-226.
[3] Eunkang Koh, "Gender Issues and Confucian Scriptures: Is Confucianism Incompatible with Gender Equality in South Korea?" Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 71, no. 2 (2008): 345-62, accessed July 29, 2021, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40378774.
[5] Ida Samier, “The reality of women’s rights in North Korea,” The Borgen Project, 23 October 2020, https://borgenproject.org/tag/womens-rights-in-north-korea/.
HRNK staff members and interns wish to dedicate this program to our colleague Katty Chi. A native of Chile and graduate of the London School of Economics, Katty became a North Korean human rights defender in her early 20s. Katty was chief of international affairs with the North Korea Strategy Center (NKSC) in Seoul from 2010 to 2014 and worked with the Seoul Office of Liberty in North Korea (LinK) from 2019 to 2020. A remarkable member of our small North Korean human rights community, Katty brought inspiration and good humor to all. Katty passed away in Seoul this past May, at the young age of 32. She is survived by her parents and brother living in Chile. With the YPWP series, we endeavor to honor Katty’s life and work.
Greg Scarlatoiu
If you have any questions or would like to write for us, contact us at outreach@hrnk.org.
4.DOD and ROK Conduct First Bilateral Communication Technology Cooperation Committee Forum
It is apparent the ROK and US are implementing agreements and actions from the Biden-Moon summit.
DOD and ROK Conduct First Bilateral Communication Technology Cooperation Committee Forum
Immediate Release
Aug. 5, 2021
Leaders from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Chief Information Office (CIO) and the Office of Planning and Coordination Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Defense (MOD) met August 4 for the first time for a bilateral Information and Communication Technology Cooperation Committee (ICTCC) Forum.
John Sherman, acting DOD CIO, virtually joined his counterpart Deputy Minister of the Office of Planning and Coordination Hyun Su Han of the ROK MOD for the forum. Building on the success of prior ICT Forum series, this was the first ICTCC meeting between the two countries.
The forum was conducted virtually, and represents the two nations’ commitment to maintain the strongest dialogue and cooperation. The leaders discussed areas of mutual interest including cybersecurity; defense information technology; command, control and communications and data. The forum is a part of the ROK-U.S. security partnership in this critical region of the world.
At the start of the meeting, Sherman and Han signed a governing ICTCC Terms of Reference (TOR). The TOR emphasizes the importance of the relationship to the Department in support of the alliance as well as the U.S. commitment to broaden our ability to coordinate military technology development with Allies to enable more effective combined operations. The ICTCC provides both nations with a key mechanism for senior consultations and a forum to exchange information and share best practices to facilitate interoperability.
The forum is expected to become an annual event with the next meeting in 2022.
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5. U.S., S. Korea hold first director-level talks on N. Korea: State Dept.
Wwe are sustaining alliance engagement.
U.S., S. Korea hold first director-level talks on N. Korea: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Aug. 5 (Yonhap) -- United States and South Korea officials met this week to coordinate efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the State Department said Thursday.
The first director-general or deputy-level consultation (DLC) meeting was held in Seoul on Wednesday (Seoul time) between the U.S. deputy special representative for North Korea, Jung Pak, and officials from South Korea's foreign and unification ministries, the presidential office and the National Security Council, according to the department.
"The two sides discussed the current situation on the Korean Peninsula; prospects for humanitarian cooperation; and coordination on DPRK issues with stakeholders in other multilateral fora, including trilateral cooperation with Japan," it said in a press release, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
It was not immediately clear wether the prospects for humanitarian cooperation referred to possible assistance for North Korea.
Pyongyang has kept its borders shut since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic early last year, despite claiming to have confirmed no single infection case up to date.
Recently, however, the impoverished country has cited difficulties it faces in securing enough food and COVID-19 vaccines for its population, causing many to wonder if Pyongyang is willing to accept international assistance that it had often criticized for coming with too much monitoring.
"This DLC meeting illustrated the U.S. and ROK commitment to ongoing cooperation on DPRK issues and emphasized the importance of such coordination as we seek to advance complete denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula," the State Department said. ROK stands for the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name.
Seoul earlier said Pak and her South Korean counterparts discussed ways to resume dialogue between the United States and North Korea at an early date.
North Korea reopened its direct communication channels with South Korea last week after more than a 13-month hiatus in inter-Korean dialogue.
Pak's visit to South Korea also follows an earlier trip by her boss, Sung Kim, during which the U.S. special representative for the DPRK said his country is ready to meet with the North "anytime, anywhere" and without preconditions.
U.S.-North Korea dialogue have stalled since early 2019.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Biden gov't likely to seek incremental sanctions relief for North Korea: CRS report
There may be some wishful thinking here and an attempt to shape the narrative. Certain progressives in the South (and in the Moon administration - e.g., Minister of Unification) will welcome this as it supports their appeasement strategy. The headline editor correctly notes the administration will have to seek sanctions relief, it cannot unilaterally decide to lift sanctions. . The CRS report referenced is HERE.
Here are the two important paragraphs from the report. Note "apparent aim." I have seen no official reporting that the administration seeks incremental sanctions relief. Yes there are references to flexibility and discussion about actions for action. But the key paragraph is the second. It will be difficult to lift sanctions based on a unilateral decision by the administration and CRS is pointing out the role Congress will play in the process. And the key point is in the penultimate sentence of the second paragraph. Sanctions cover nearly the entire range of north Korean malign activities.
The Biden Administration has indicated that the United States could build on 2018 agreements the United States and South Korea separately reached with North Korea, along with prior agreements negotiated with Pyongyang. In a 2018 joint declaration issued in Singapore, Trump and Kim agreed to “commit to establish” new bilateral relations, build “a lasting and stable peace regime,” and cooperate to recover the remains of thousands of U.S. troops unaccounted for from the Korean War. Kim said he “commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Subsequent negotiations in Hanoi in 2019 collapsed, however, due to differences over the scope and sequencing of DPRK denuclearization measures required in exchange for sanctions relief.
If U.S.-DPRK talks restart, Members of Congress could debate the merits of the Biden Administration’s apparent aim to push in the near term for incremental dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program in step with gradual sanctions relief, rather than trying for earlier and/or more extensive DPRK denuclearization concessions. The possibility of sanctions relief is complicated by, among other factors, U.S. legal requirements to address a range of security, regional stability, human rights, and governance issues before sanctions can be suspended or altogether terminated. U.S. sanctions on North Korea target not just weapons development but also human rights abuses, money laundering, weapons trade, international terrorism, and cyber operations.Members may also debate whether and how to push the Administration to more effectively shield humanitarian aid from the impact of sanctions.
Biden gov't likely to seek incremental sanctions relief for North Korea: CRS report
U.S. President Joe Biden / AP-Yonhap
The U.S. government appears to envision offering partial sanctions relief in exchange for North Korea taking denuclearization steps but such "incremental" sanctions relief would be difficult to move forward without congressional support, a congressional report showed Friday.
That is because the sanctions on the North are targeting not just the country's weapons development but also a host of other issues, such as human rights abuses, money laundering, international terrorism and cyber operations, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report said.
"The (Joe) Biden approach... appears to envision offering partial sanctions relief in exchange for partial steps toward denuclearization," the report said. "Incremental sanctions relief could be difficult to accomplish without congressional support."
"The possibility of sanctions relief is complicated by, among other factors, U.S. legal requirements ... U.S. sanctions on North Korea target not just weapons development but also human rights abuses, money laundering, weapons trade, international terrorism and cyber operations," it added.
The report said should talks between the North and the U.S. restart, members of congress could debate "the merits of the Biden administration's apparent aim to push in the near term for incremental dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program in step with gradual sanctions relief."
The report also noted they will look into whether and how to push the administration "to more effectively shield humanitarian aid from the impact of sanctions."
Denuclearization talks have been stalled since a summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and then U.S. President Donald Trump in early 2019 broke down as they failed to match Pyongyang's denuclearization steps with Washington's concessions, including sanctions relief.
In April, the Biden administration completed its monthslong policy review and said it would pursue a "calibrated, practical" approach toward the goal of the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. (Yonhap)
7. Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung
Good. High level engagement continues. Alliances are the administration's priority.
I just hope they discuss the importance of executing the combined training and not to play into Kim Jong-un's political airfare strategy. I am sure Minister Chung gets it. But his fellow cabinet members in the MOU and NIS as well as the 74 ruling party lawmakers do not seem to.
Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
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Secretary Blinken’s Call with Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Chung
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August 5, 2021
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The below is attributable to Spokesperson Ned Price:
Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Republic of Korea (ROK) Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong the evening of August 5. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Chung emphasized the importance of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to promoting security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world.
The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reaffirmed their commitment to complete denuclearization and establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the Secretary confirmed U.S. support for inter-Korean dialogue and engagement. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister also discussed recent developments in the DPRK and agreed to explore humanitarian initiatives on the Korean Peninsula.
state.gov · by Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
8. North Korea’s Vaccination Capabilities: Implications for a COVID-19 Campaign
This is probably a more comprehensive assessment than anything the regime has developed. The problem is would Kim Jong-un accept the vaccines? (he is demanding only the best - he does not seem to want Chinese or Russian vaccines).
North Korea’s Vaccination Capabilities: Implications for a COVID-19 Campaign
Although the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) appears to have succeeded in preventing the coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2 virus) from entering its borders, the drastic isolation measures have hurt its economy and taken a toll on the vulnerable population. As the pandemic shows no sign of abating, the country will need to explore a path to reopening while minimizing the risk to its people. Vaccines, while not a panacea, are indispensable to any strategy for reopening. However, questions have been raised about the country’s ability to maintain the cold temperatures required for storage and transport and implement a national vaccination program. We analyze the DPRK’s history with vaccines which shows that, with the proper preparations, it could carry out swift, nationwide campaigns. We also describe a theoretical vaccination road map using a combination of the AstraZeneca/Oxford and the mRNA (Moderna or the Pfizer-BioNTech) vaccines.
History of Vaccinations in the DPRK
Vaccinations in North Korea started in 1946. According to the DPRK Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the first vaccine manufacturing plant was founded in February 1946; subsequently, another two plants were also established. Ten different kinds of vaccines were produced, including Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG), diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP), oral polio vaccine (OPV), and Japanese encephalitis (JE). Due to the economic crisis and natural disasters of the mid-1990s, vaccine production capacity deteriorated.
The National Immunization Program (EPI) was launched in 1980, supported by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), and is managed by the Central Hygiene and Anti-Epidemic Institute and the Hygiene and Anti-Epidemic Station (AEHS) at the provincial and the county levels. Most vaccines are now procured through UNICEF. Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, began to support EPI vaccination distributions in 2002. In accordance with the UNICEF/WHO 2019 Joint Reporting Format (JRF), the DPRK government is paying for 15 percent of the vaccines’ cost and 30 percent of the routine immunization program cost.
How Effective Is the DPRK’s Immunization Program?
The long-term partnership between the DPRK MoPH, UNICEF and the WHO, with support from Gavi, has delivered remarkable results. Figure 1 below shows the percentage coverage rates for DPT3 (a childhood vaccine) from 1980 onwards. Prior to the mid-1990s, the country reported high but unverified coverage rates; the entire health system suffered during the mid-1990s due to the famine and the collapse of Soviet assistance, resulting in a decrease in vaccine coverage. The coverage rates soon recovered, however, and North Korea has maintained >90 percent coverage rates for over the past decade.
Figure 1. WHO/UNICEF estimates of DTP3 coverage in North Korea from 1980-2013.
How Accurate Is the Reported Data on Immunization Rates?
In December 2004, a joint mission by the Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health and the Euro Health Group conducted a Data Quality Audit (DQA) on behalf of Gavi. One objective of the audit was to measure the “accuracy of reporting,” using its standard methods, including random visits to four counties and 24 health facilities. The Provisional Verification Factor was reported as 0.93—well exceeding the threshold for acceptable accuracy of 0.80.
The report stated,
The immunisation reporting system in DPRK is well designed, was functional and information was easily retrievable at all levels. There was a high degree of completeness of reporting, documents were stored properly and staff were in general aware of the reporting procedures for immunisations, vaccines, syringes and AEFI.
At least for the immunization reports, the data appear accurate.
Cold Chain Capabilities in the DPRK
Vaccines are distributed from the national cold room in Pyongyang (Figures 2 and 3) to the provincial cold rooms by cold trucks (Figure 4). Smaller pick-up-based cold trucks deliver the vaccines from the provincial cold rooms to the refrigerators and freezers in the counties. Village doctors then transport the vaccines inside ice boxes to the villages on the immunization days. Prior to that day, section doctors remind households to bring infants to the village clinic. Syringes and safety boxes are distributed through the Central Medical Stores to the provincial and county medical warehouses and then to the villages.
UNICEF and WHO have been supporting the EPI program, including the cold chain equipment and supplies, by providing transportation, refrigerators, freezers, cold boxes, iceboxes and thermometers to the provincial and county levels.
Figure 2. National cold room in Pyongyang.
(Image source: Nagi M. Shafik)
Figure 3. National cold room in Pyongyang.
(Image source: Nagi M. Shafik)
Figure 4. Cold truck.
(Image source: Nagi M. Shafik)
A continuous supply of electricity is required to ensure an uninterrupted cold chain. Solar refrigerators were proposed in 2003, with funding support from European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), to overcome the intermittent availability of electricity in certain areas in the DPRK. A pilot project to provide 50 solar refrigerators to 50 county hygiene and anti-epidemic stations was completed in 2004 (Figures 5 and 6).
Figure 5. Solar refrigerator.
(Image source: Nagi M. Shafik)
Figure 6. Solar panels installed.
(Image source: Nagi M. Shafik)
The UNICEF Supply Division of Copenhagen sent international technicians to plan the installation. A team of North Korean technicians was sent to Copenhagen for training on installation, maintenance and repair. The staff receiving the refrigerators were also trained on the use and maintenance of the refrigerators.
UNICEF Copenhagen conducts regular reviews to assess the condition of the cold chain. The review in 2008 included inspections of refrigerators, freezers and transportation assets and inventorying of cold chain equipment and accessories. Usually, such reviews and accounting of inventories are used to identify the gaps and replenish and maintain the integrity of the cold chain.
The DPRK’s Cold Chain and the COVID-19 Vaccines
The DPRK’s national cold chain infrastructure is capable of supporting the country-wide deployment of vaccines that require standard refrigeration between 2-8 degrees Celsius (C, e.g., the AstraZeneca/Oxford vaccine). Some equipment may need repair or replacing, but the enhancements are expected to be minor.
The DPRK can also deploy mRNA vaccines, which require ultra-cold temperatures (minus 70 C for Pfizer and minus 20 C for the Moderna vaccines), if the initial deployment is limited geographically, for example, to Pyongyang. If deep freezers are not available, UNICEF, given its familiarity with North Korea’s cold chain infrastructure, could quickly procure and install enough ultra-cold temperature freezers to store a limited quantity of vaccines. Another option for both the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines is storing them in refrigerators (2-8 degrees Celsius) for up to 30 days; if the deployment can be completed within that time period, the ultra-cold freezers may not even be needed.
Figure 7. Estimated vaccine deployment capability with mRNA and other vaccine options.
(Infographic by C. Yoonhee Ryder)
How Fast Can the DPRK Deploy Vaccines?
During the winter of 2006-2007, four people died due to a measles outbreak in the DPRK, the first in over a decade. Over 3,600 people and one out of every seven counties were affected by February of 2007, when the North Korean government asked for help from UNICEF and the WHO.
The campaign was carried out in two phases. In phase 1, from March 14-18, 2007, six million people were vaccinated for a daily average of 1.2 million vaccinations; in phase 2, from April 9-11 of that year, 10 million people were vaccinated, or a daily average of 3.3 million. The cost of the nationwide campaign was estimated at $8.5 million; the government of North Korea covered $2.5 million (30 percent) of the total cost. As of 2018, measles is considered eradicated in the DPRK.
The DPRK is highly capable of implementing national vaccination programs. Their measles vaccine campaign in 2007 showed how quickly and efficiently they can get the job done. Provided they had time to prepare, i.e., ensure the integrity of the cold chain and have sufficient stock of consumables, the North Koreans could, in theory, vaccinate the entire population of 25 million people in less than 10 days for single injection vaccines, and in under two months for two-shot vaccines. These projections are based on ideal conditions, and the real-world experience would likely be much different.
Conclusion
The DPRK has a well-organized national immunization program and has collaborated with UNICEF, WHO and Gavi to achieve remarkable coverage rates. The government co-finances up to 30 percent of the total costs of the program. When needed, the MoPH can administer up to 3.3 million vaccine injections per day. The country should be able to deploy the AstraZeneca vaccine nationwide with the existing infrastructure and minimal cold chain enhancements; it could also deploy the Pfizer or Moderna vaccines if the coverage area is limited.
9. Two North Korean soldiers die after suffering from COVID-19 symptoms
Obviously an unvetted report so we have to take this with a grain of salt. But this is one of my worst fears. If there is a widespread outbreak in the military it could lead Kim Jong-un down a very dark path of crisis action decision making. The loss of coherency (and support) of the military could be catastrophic for the regime.
Are we reviewing contingency plans (without overreacting)?
Two North Korean soldiers die after suffering from COVID-19 symptoms - Daily NK
The two died from fever and hunger after they not only failed to receive treatment during the workshop, but even had their meals stolen
Two soldiers from the Eighth Corps of the North Korean army who were quarantined together in a military medical ward with symptoms of COVID-19 have reportedly died. The two soldiers perished when they failed to receive treatment during a recently-held workshop (July 24-27) for military commanders and political cadres.
A military source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Tuesday that the two soldiers died after they were confined to the medical ward during the period of the workshop, the first of its kind. “They were found dead in their room in the isolation ward after the lectures,” he said.
According to the source, the soldiers were quarantined in an Eighth Corps facility for suspected COVID-19 cases — as per orders from North Korea’s military medical authorities — before the start of the workshop, and after being classified as suspected cases.
Rumor has it, however, that the two were essentially abandoned during the workshop, when major cadres left their posts to attend lectures and the entire military was put on special guard duty for a week.
Though the soldiers required medical and pathological treatment as they were suffering breathing problems and fevers, they received only temperature checks during the workshop period. Not even once did they receive medication.
“During the lecture period for the entire military, military doctors and nurses neglected even the most rudimentary treatments,” explained the source. “In fact, the soldiers were isolated out of fear they would spread the disease to the unit, but nobody gave a fig about them.”
North Korean soldiers walking near Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province. / Image: Daily NK
This is to say, the two young soldiers died even as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was lecturing military commanders on “the need to seriously consider and review military activities in their entirety.” From the position of the authorities, commanders and political cadres essentially shirked their duty to look after soldiers “as an elder brother would look after his younger brothers.”
Moreover, unit commanders discovered that a higher-ranking soldier quarantined in the same ward as the two was stealing their food, but apparently did nothing about it.
Ultimately, the two soldiers in the isolation ward died from fever and hunger after they not only failed to receive treatment during the workshop, but even had their meals stolen, according to the source.
Following the discovery of the death of the two men during room-to-room doctor visits after the workshop, the Eighth Corps moved quickly to manage the situation. However, the unit’s commanders have focused only on cremating the two bodies and silencing rumors. They have not even properly informed the parents of the two soldiers about what happened, according to the source.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense has responded to the Eighth Corps’ report on the incident by ordering the entire military to carry out sweeping examinations of soldiers in isolation wards as an “urgent matter.” It also ordered unit commanders and political cadres to “put their heads together and formulate responses” to improve the health and diet of soldiers. As in the past, the authorities have responded to the incident by telling lower-level units “to take responsibility” rather than resolving issues with management at the top echelons of the military.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
10. North Korea COVID-19 vaccines face obstacles to delivery, UNICEF says
Of course the biggest obstacle is KimJong-un (though perhaps he is not as big as he has always been given his recent diet). But in all seriousness if he would be willing to allow the international community to do their jobs and implement their programs using best practices without being under the party control a lot of humanitarian aid could be provided and the Korean people in the north could be helped. But it is Kim that stands in the way of effective help because he fears the loss of control.
North Korea COVID-19 vaccines face obstacles to delivery, UNICEF says
By Elizabeth Shim
Aug. 5 (UPI) -- COVID-19 vaccines for North Korea are being delayed because the Kim Jong Un regime has not completed requirements for their deployment, according to a new press report.
A spokesperson for the United Nations Children's Fund said that Pyongyang has not been making the required arrangements after agreeing to import about 1.7 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines, Voice of America's Korean service reported Thursday.
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"The government has not yet fully completed the necessary preparatory steps required to receive COVAX-supported vaccines but UNICEF is providing technical assistance in this area," UNICEF said.
The World Health Organization and "UNICEF continue to work with the [North Korean] Ministry of Public Health to ensure access to COVID-19 vaccines through the COVAX Facility.
"However, the country has not received any vaccine yet through this mechanism."
UNICEF also confirmed that "restrictions on movement" in North Korea has prevented the U.N. staff from undertaking field-based assessments.
"This has inevitably created a gap in available data," the agency said.
COVAX was expected to donate vaccines to fully inoculate 852,000 people in North Korea earlier this year, but lack of cooperation from Pyongyang has impeded delivery, according to reports.
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North Korea in July also took issue with foreign aid. Pyongyang's foreign ministry said last month that outside assistance is a form of "economic infiltration" that should "never be tolerated."
UNICEF also said that the agency delivered other vaccines since the start of pandemic, including a shipment in the second quarter of 2020.
"Currently, there are only stocks of Hepatitis B vaccine in-country," the agency said.
South Korea also has disclosed plans to "share" COVID-19 vaccines with the North. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, co-leader of COVAX, has said that South Korea pledged to donate $200 million to the Facility.
11. Opinion | South Korea wants Biden to get serious about North Korea
Actually more accurately is some in the South Korean government, to include the Minister of Unification, the Director of the National INtelligence Service and t74 ruling party lawmakers want the Biden Administration to support an appeasement strategy with north Korea.
But for all the critics who put the blame on Trump and Biden for not effectively engaging with North Korea they must come to understand that it is Kim Jong-un that is blocking all engagement.
And for those who think it is simply a matter of providing sanctions relief to bring Kim to the negotiating table to restart north-South engagement, I would say to you bluntly that you do not understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. You do not understand Kim's political warfare strategy and long con and how it uses blackmail diplomacy to try to achieve its objectives. And of course it continues development of military capabilities (at the expense of th welfare of the Korean people) because it will seek to dominate the Korean peninsula by force when it has achieved the right conditions to do so (e.g., an end to the ROK./US alliance and the withdrawal of all US troops).
I am all for engagement and negotiation whenever Kim is ready to act as a responsible member of the international community. And I think the Biden administration's policy is about providing Kim the opportunity to do so. The responsibility is on him. The ball is in his court.
Conclusion:
Meanwhile, North Korea’s pause in testing has provided a false sense of security, while Kim Jong Un continues to roll out new, more dangerous weapons that threaten the entire world. Ignoring the fact that the North Korean threat is growing is not pragmatic — it’s dangerous. Engaging North Korea may be politically perilous, but it’s a national security imperative.
Opinion | South Korea wants Biden to get serious about North Korea
The Washington Post · by Opinion by Josh RoginColumnist Today at 5:24 p.m. EDT · August 5, 2021
The Biden administration hasn’t been devoting much effort to the North Korea issue, perhaps calculating that entering new negotiations with Kim Jong Un is a high-risk, low-reward gambit. But South Korea, America’s ally, can’t afford to overlook any opening for peace talks, no matter how dim the prospects for success. Right now, Seoul is trying to tell Washington there’s an opportunity that both governments should seize. But the Biden team doesn’t seem to be listening.
President Moon Jae-in’s government, facing its last year in office, is sending public and private signals that the United States should do more to encourage Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table. Pointing to small but symbolic signs from North Korea, including a recent flurry of letters between Moon and Kim and the restoration of communication lines, leaders in Seoul are trying to convince President Biden and his aides that now is the time to make moves to coax Kim into a new round of diplomacy.
North Korea is in bad shape. A drought, food shortages, the pandemic and economic sanctions are all taking a toll on the already impoverished country. To test Washington’s appetite for joining a new diplomatic initiative, Moon’s political allies are floating a trial balloon. They want the Biden administration to drop its current stance of simply waiting for Kim to respond to its initial outreach, which is essentially an alibi for inaction.
Song Young-gil, the leader of the ruling Democratic Party, laid out Seoul’s argument during his appearance Tuesday at the Aspen Security Forum with this columnist. President Donald Trump, he said, achieved something through his audacious and ultimately failed diplomacy with Kim — a halt in North Korean nuclear and long-range missile tests. But this pause will not last.
“North Korea is preparing for a further provocation,” he said. “This is a big problem for the United States’ security.”
Rather than wait for the provocation, which would force the United States to react in crisis mode, South Korea and Washington should do more to engage North Korea now, he said.
Song wants the United States to endorse the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a manufacturing center inside North Korea where South Korean companies once employed North Korea workers. The complex was opened in 2004, but South Korea ended its involvement in 2016. Reopening it could help wean North Korea off its total economic dependence on China, he said.
“Reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex is a critical point for building trust between the United States, South Korea and North Korea,” said Song.
The United States and South Korea should also offer humanitarian, food and medical aid to North Korea, Song said. Somewhat contrary to expectations, however, he did not say the United States and South Korea should cancel or curtail their upcoming joint military exercises — even though Kim’s sister and propaganda chief Kim Yo Jong has demanded that they be scuttled.
While Song pitched in public, another close associate of Moon came to Washington last week to make the same push in private. Kim Ki-jung, a former Moon adviser who is now president of the Institute for National Security Strategy, a government-funded think tank, told me in an interview that Biden must recognize there is an opening and act boldly.
“When we consider what’s happening on the Korean Peninsula, now is the right time to take actions toward engaging North Korea,” he said. “They are reaching out to Washington through Seoul.”
The U.S. government should communicate more clearly to Pyongyang its vision for how diplomacy can result in North Korea getting some relief from its many woes, he said.
A senior Biden administration official told me that while the U.S. government is encouraged by the recent thaw between South and North Korea, there are no plans to offer any specific incentives for a resumption of talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
“Of course we are supportive of dialogue with DPRK, which is why we’ve reached out and have offered to meet anywhere, anytime without preconditions,” the official said. “But at the end of the day, Pyongyang must choose to engage.”
There’s a sense in Washington that the Moon and Biden camps are talking past each other. The Moon team may not realize that opening the Kaesong complex is seen in Washington as too drastic and too controversial for the Biden team to support as a first step. And the Biden team may not realize how its self-described “pragmatic” approach to North Korea is leaving Moon in a terrible position and undermining Biden’s own goal of repairing U.S.-South Korea ties.
“For Moon, there’s a sense of urgency. He is trying to salvage his political legacy,” said Jenny Town, senior fellow at the Stimson Center. “With Biden, North Korea is not a high-priority issue, so he’s not going to put his political capital there.”
Meanwhile, North Korea’s pause in testing has provided a false sense of security, while Kim Jong Un continues to roll out new, more dangerous weapons that threaten the entire world. Ignoring the fact that the North Korean threat is growing is not pragmatic — it’s dangerous. Engaging North Korea may be politically perilous, but it’s a national security imperative.
The Washington Post · by Opinion by Josh RoginColumnist Today at 5:24 p.m. EDT · August 5, 2021
12. North Korea floods damage more than 1,000 homes, state media reports
The Korean people in the north cannot get a break. They suffer at the hands of Kim Jong-un and mother nature.
But all of these events and conditions are adding up and will take a toll on the regie. Are we ready?
North Korea floods damage more than 1,000 homes, state media reports
Fears of crop damage and impact on food supplies rise as forecaster reports more than 500mm of rain has fallen in three days
More than 1,100 homes in North Korea were damaged, thousands of people evacuated and farms and roads washed away after days of heavy rains brought flooding, state media reported.
The reports come as concern grows about damage to crops and the possible impact on food supplies in North Korea, which is cut off from most foreign imports and aid by self-imposed border restrictions aimed at preventing a coronavirus outbreak, as well as by international sanctions.
Heavy rain struck several areas on the east coast, including North and South Hamgyong provinces, state broadcaster KRT reported on Thursday.
Television footage showed homes flooded to their roofs, and bridges and dikes washed away.
The deputy head of the State Hydro-Meteorological Administration, Ri Yong Nam, told the broadcaster that parts of North Hamgyong recorded more than 500mm of rain from Sunday to Tuesday, while areas of South Hamgyong exceeded the average monthly precipitation in those days.
“We expect more rain in August in various regions, including the east coast area, which may cause further damage,” he said.
In June, leader Kim Jong-un said the nation faced a “tense” food situation and much would depend on this year’s harvests.
For months, state media have shown work to shore up dikes and improve ditches, bridges and other infrastructure to try to prevent damage from floods.
During a phone call on Friday, US secretary of state Antony Blinken and South Korean foreign minister Chung Eui-yong discussed the prospect of humanitarian aid to North Korea, their offices said in statements, without elaborating.
13. Report: North Korean teens caught listening to BTS song
I wonder if Kim has lost the Korean youth in the north? He cannot put the information genie back in the bottle.
Report: North Korean teens caught listening to BTS song
By Elizabeth Shim
Aug. 5 (UPI) -- North Korean high school students who were caught singing and dancing to a song by South Korean boy band BTS are under investigation, according to a South Korean press report Thursday.
A source in North Korea's South Pyongan Province said that the students were trainees with North Korea's Red Youth Guard who were taking a break from training, Seoul Pyongyang News reported. The Red Youth Guard is a North Korean militia organization of teenage cadets.
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The students of Anju Middle School were listening to BTS' hit song, "Blood, Sweat & Tears" on an MP3 player and belting out the lyrics, the source said.
A local chapter of North Korea's Workers' Party and state security were notified of the activities. The group is being investigated for engaging in "reactionary ideology and culture," in violation of North Korean law, the report said.
In December North Korea passed laws against reactionary ideology and culture, a reference to flows of information from the outside world, including South Korean entertainment media and broadcasts.
SP News' source said that BTS songs are enjoying "explosive popularity" among North Korean youth.
"They also know that BTS are young South Korean singers, that they have topped the [U.S.] Billboard charts many times, something not many artists have done," the North Korean source said.
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The source also said young North Koreans like the songs of BTS because of their meaningful lyrics that tell listeners to "love themselves."
North Koreans indoctrinated to be loyal to the state are "shocked" to hear the message of self-care for the individual, the source said, according to SP News.
The BTS song "Blood, Sweat & Tears" also was mentioned in a 2020 report from South Korean news service Daily NK.
A North Korean military source told the news service last year that three soldiers in their 20s "partied" to the song and were arrested.
South Korea's White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea published last month said the regime has been strengthening punishment of citizens caught viewing outside media.
14. North Korea Orders Military Officials to Host ‘Soldiers’ Day’ Dog Meat Feast
With apologies to those who will be offended by this action. But this is north Korea and we must understand it. And this is another indication of the dire situation in the north. We must watch sign of disintegration within the military the ability of its three chains of control to maintain order. Once we start seeing major breakdowns in military discipline and control we need to be ready for possible contingencies.
North Korea Orders Military Officials to Host ‘Soldiers’ Day’ Dog Meat Feast
At a time when food is scarce, officials must provide expensive canine flesh to soldiers.
North Korea has ordered its armed forces to hold a day of appreciation for the country’s soldiers, complete with a feast of dog meat believed to boost their stamina, with military officials made to foot the bill, sources in the military told RFA.
With the country’s economy faltering under the combined weight of years of international nuclear sanctions and a near-complete suspension of imports due to the coronavirus pandemic, military units in North Korea are underequipped and poorly fed.
Even before the pandemic it was not uncommon for soldiers in rural areas to spend much of the year working on farms to grow corn, rice, and other staples to feed their units.
Soldiers’ Day is an annual event created by the country’s leader Kim Jong Un so that the country’s fighting men can enjoy a decent meal for a change. In some years, the military units can choose to hold it in the dead of winter and in other years in the hottest days of the summer.
But this year, Soldiers' Day will literally be among the so-called dog days of summer.
“The General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army has issued an order to organize Soldiers’ Day during the hottest period of this summer,” a military source in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA’s Korean Service.
“According to the order, all military officials have to provide one dog per two officials to feed the soldiers on Soldiers’ Day, and the officials are strongly opposing the order,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
Meat of any kind in North Korea is hard to come by, and dog meat, considered a summer delicacy with purported virility-enhancing properties, is expensive.
Though many officials in North Korea can use their authority to collect bribes from people, the many military officials with no interaction with the public cannot supplement their income with bribery, so buying dog meat is a major expense, according to the source.
“They have to use their own money to pay for dog meat at the market unless they have a dog at home,” the source said.
“If they don’t comply with the order, with the excuse that they have no money, the officials and even their families will face the humiliation of having to be publicly criticized for negligence in executing the Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un’s orders, so there are many military officials who are borrowing money to buy the dog meat,” the source said.
The source said that in past years, Soldiers’ Day had been a burden for military officials and their families because they had to prepare a feast for the soldiers, but this year the added requirement of providing dog meat is putting an even bigger strain on them and their families.
“The officials are resisting the authorities’ coercive order because these days, even military officials don’t get sufficient supply, and their families are suffering from hunger.”
Another military source, from the northwestern province of North Pyongan, told RFA that dog meat sellers there increased their prices after learning about the order.
“It was 15,000 won (U.S. $2.50) per kilogram (2.2 pounds), but now it is 20,000 won, and the price of a whole dog has risen to more than 200,000 won, so military officials are getting worried,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
The price of a kilogram of rice on the same day was about 6,200 won ($ 0.99), according to figures from Japan-based AsiaPress. The Korea Joongang Daily reported in 2018 that the average monthly salary provided by the government was 4,000 won at the time worth about $0.50.
The cost of complying with the dog meat order is so high that some officials are even risking their lives to comply with it.
“A few days ago, an accident happened to a non-commissioned officer of a unit under the 8th Corps while he was trying to climb aboard a train with beans in his backpack he got from his wife’s family, which he intended to use to buy a dog for Solders' Day.” the second source said.
“He could not bear the weight of the backpack and fell off the train and died,” said the second source.
The order has military officials questioning why they are made to sacrifice everything for dog meat, when they are already struggling to eat, according to the source.
“The General Political Bureau did not consider the actual situation of the military units and are only using them to look good to the commander-in-chief” the second source said.
“The military officials are saying that they do not understand who the People’s Army is really for.”
Dog meat is available at marketplaces in both North and South Korea, but the dog meat trade has questionable legality in the South. In 2018 a South Korean court ruled that killing dogs for their meat was illegal, but the law did not specifically ban the sale or consumption of dog meat.
North Korea’s total military personnel of 1.47 million in 2018 ranked it third in the world that year, behind only China and India, and the country remains technically at war with South Korea and its ally the United States.
According to 2019 data from the CIA World Factbook, North Korea spent between 22 and 24 percent of its GDP on its military, or roughly U.S. $3.7 billion to $4.2 billion each year between 2007 and 2017.
Reported by Myung Chul Lee for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Jinha Shin. Edited by Eugene Whong.
15. North Korea Forces Factory Workers to Donate Grain for Army Pig Farms
For all those who claim military first politics has been abandoned, I offer this as anecdotal evidence. The military remains the number one priority of the party.
And this is how the socialist workers paradise really works. Instead of providing for the people the people are forced to support the military,
North Korea Forces Factory Workers to Donate Grain for Army Pig Farms
Workers struggle to meet corn and rice bran quotas at a time when food is scarce.
North Korea is forcing factories to raise pork for the country’s huge military, and imposing pig feed grain quotas on workers who are already struggling to stay fed after 18 months of coronavirus measures have frozen trade with China and choked the economy, sources in the country told RFA.
The cash-strapped Pyongyang government has long struggled to supply the military with food and basic necessities and has increasingly shifted the supply burden onto the people, while also forcing work units to raise livestock and families to grow their own food and donate labor.
“State run factories in the province are building new pig pens and raising piglets these days. It is because the authorities have imposed a pork quota to each factory to provide meat to the Korean People’s Army by the end of this year,” a resident of South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang told RFA’s Korean Service Aug. 2.
“The bigger the factory is, the more pork they must produce, so the officials of the larger factories are deeply concerned because they have to raise a lot of pigs to meet the quota, and there is a serious shortage of pig feed,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
Factory workers are complaining about the pork order, which requires each employee to provide five kg (11 lbs.) of rice bran for the pigs each month.
“The workers are complaining, saying, ‘When it is so hard even for people to find food to eat, where could we possibly get rice bran for pigs?’” the source said.
“As workers’ complaints mount, the factory officials pester them to donate 10 kilograms of mash, the sediment leftover from homemade alcohol brewing, if they don’t have rice bran,” said the source.
Though technically a waste product, mash is commonly sold as animal feed and is an integral part of many of the workers’ household incomes.
The factory workers’ official salary is nowhere near enough to support a family. That responsibility falls upon spouses who run small businesses to raise cash.
“The workers complain, ‘Wives make hooch at home to make money, but the profit mainly comes from selling the mash. If we have to give it to the factory to feed the pigs, what can we depend on for a living?” said the source.
“Mash is usually sold to pig farmers at a price usually 1/30 that of the price of corn,” said the source.
Another resident of South Pyongan told RFA that factory workers in Songchon county have had to donate to the pork plan since last month.
“Each factory needs to expand its pig farms and raise the fastest growing pigs to supply the planned amount of pork before December,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“The meat support plan for the army already mandates 10 to 15 kilograms of meat per year for cooperative farmers nationwide, but the authorities are now including workers in state-run factories to provide pork in the second half of the year, saying they need to improve the diet of soldiers,” the second source said.
The second source said that the factories are now going into the alcohol business to solve the feed problem, but that is putting even more burden on the workers.
“There are growing complaints among factory workers as they must provide five kilograms of corn as raw materials for alcohol production,” the second source said.
“Workers criticize the authorities’ policy that burdens them with providing corn for pigs, when there is not enough corn for people due to the coronavirus pandemic,” said the second source.
A quarter century after famine killed as many as a tenth of North Korea’s 23 million people, the food situation in North Korea is again dire, as cross-border trade with China has been suspended since January 2020.
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization estimated in a recent report that North Korea would be short about 860,000 tons of food this year, about two months of normal demand.
The forecast followed a warning from U.N Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights Tomás Ojea Quintana in March that the closure of the Sino-Korean border had led to reported “deaths by starvation” and growing ranks of children and elderly who have resorted to begging.
North Korea’s total military personnel of 1.47 million in 2018 ranked it third in the world that year, behind only China and India, and the country remains technically at war with South Korea and its ally, the United States.
According to 2019 data from the CIA World Factbook, North Korea spent between 22 and 24 percent of its GDP on its military, or roughly U.S. $3.7 billion to $4.2 billion each year between 2007 and 2017.
Reported by Hyemin Son for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Jinha Shin. Edited by Joongsok Oh. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
16. ＜Inside N. Korea＞Domestic Currency Appreciates by 22% as Chinese Yuan and U.S. Dollar Mysteriously Plunge Again
I do not profess to understand anything about the north Korean economy But perhaps someone like Bill Brown can provide an explanation and assessment.
＜Inside N. Korea＞Domestic Currency Appreciates by 22% as Chinese Yuan and U.S. Dollar Mysteriously Plunge Again
(Photo) A market manager verbally abuses a young woman doing business (left). Photographed in Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province in March 2013 by ASIAPRESS.
The actual exchange rate of the Chinese yuan and the U.S. dollar recently plummeted by about 22% in the illegal foreign currency exchange markets of North Korea. On August 4, a reporting partner from North Hamkyung Province and Ryanggang Province reported that "There are even rumours that both the yuan and the dollar will become worthless."
In North Korea, the Chinese Yuan suddenly fell by about 30% in early June, while grain and fuel prices soared, causing great turmoil in markets. The Chinese yuan continued to fall throughout June but eventually gradually regained its value in July.
The following are the recent changes in the Chinese yuan exchange rate as investigated by ASIAPRESS (1 Chinese yuan = 0.15 USD per won).
970（May 28）→ 670（June 4）→ 520 （June 29）→ 665（July 28）→520（August 4）
◆ What is the reason for the appreciation of the won amidst the economic slump?
The reporting partner explains that "The crackdown on the use of foreign currencies has become so severe that it is difficult to use them, and they are no longer available. Most people have run out of domestic currency, so they sell their foreign currency reserves at low prices. On the other hand, the Dongju (the newly wealthy) see this as an opportunity and are trying to collect foreign currency under the radar."
Then, why is the won continuing to appreciate? The North Korean economy has been in a slump for more than a year, and its exchange value of its domestic currency has not been recognized internationally. There is also a deep-rooted distrust among North Koreans toward their local currency. Although the reasons for the won’s upward trajectory are unclear, there is no doubt that the authorities are intervening to manipulate the market.
To combat the COVID-19 outbreak, the North Korean authorities closed the Chinese border and limited trade, placing markets almost entirely under state control since around August of last year. In the past, trading companies were allowed discretionary control over imports and exports. Now, however, the state has complete control and management over goods at ports such as Nampo. Given the circumstances, the state’s monopoly over the circulation of foreign currencies is probably the cause of the won's appreciation.
The exchange rate between the North Korean won and the Chinese yuan and U.S. dollar is determined independently by the so-called "tondeko," or underground money changers in various parts of the country, based on reference values unofficially announced by the Foreign Trade Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyang every morning (Kang Ji-won).
※ASIAPRESS contacts its reporting partners in North Korea through smuggled Chinese mobile phones.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
