"In everyday life the exchange of opinion with others checks our partiality and widens our perspective; we are made to see things from their standpoint and the limits of our vision are brought home to us.... The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the others know, or can make all tie same inferences that they can draw in concert. Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of arguments”

- John Rawls, A Theory of Justice

“I do not say that democracy has been more pernicious on the whole, and in the long run, than monarchy or aristocracy. Democracy has never been and never can be so durable as aristocracy or monarchy; but while it lasts, it is more bloody than either. … Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts, and murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide. It is in vain to say that democracy is less vain, less proud, less selfish, less ambitious, or less avaricious than aristocracy or monarchy. It is not true, in fact, and nowhere appears in history. Those passions are the same in all men, under all forms of simple government, and when unchecked, produce the same effects of fraud, violence, and cruelty. When clear prospects are opened before vanity, pride, avarice, or ambition, for their easy gratification, it is hard for the most considerate philosophers and the most conscientious moralists to resist the temptation. Individuals have conquered themselves. Nations and large bodies of men, never.”

- John Adams, The Letters of John and Abigail Adams

“If you are a leader or someone who works for the interest of a community, first make sure that you understand the interest of the people who make up that community. In this way, you will have a good chance of minimizing, perhaps, avoiding the us versus them mentality.”

- Duop Chak Wuol

Seems like mixed messages from the Foreign Minister. There is a small attack on the regime's strategy. Unfortunately, the words of the alliance and statements that we do not have a hostile policy mean nothing to the regime. The regime demands action to prove that we have no hostile policy. And unfortunately, in the regime's view the hostile policy is exemplified by the alliance and presence of US troops. 

And it is unfortunate that the Foreign Minister has said it is time for sanctions relief. He just provided an indicator to Kim Jong-un that his blackmail diplomacy is working. We cannot expect Kim to back down or come to the table without the precondition that he demands, e.g., sanctions relief. Lifting sanctions will not achieve the desired or intended effect for the ROK/US alliance. It will not bring Kim to the negotiating table. He will double down on his political warfare strategy and continue blackmail diplomacy because he assesses they work.

The Kim family regime is conducting “political warfare** with Juche characteristics” or a long con to ensure he keeps his nuclear weapons to support his long-term strategy. Kim will exploit an end of war declaration, peace regime, humanitarian assistance, and sanctions relief to support his strategy.

I am really disappointed to read this statement: "I think that now, time is ripe for the consideration of sanctions relief." These are dangerous words.

I would ask the ROK and US to consider the north Korea strategy and not fall into its trap that is designed to drive a wedge in the alliance. The call by the FM for "incentives" and sanctions relief likely has Kim smiling because he thinks it will either result in concessions for him and if it does not it will generate significant friction in the alliance as the US resists the ROK push for sanctions relief.

Fundamentally we must ask:

Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?

In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?

We need to view north Korean actions and rhetoric through the lens of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and understand the situation as it really is and not as we would wish it to be.

Incentives are not going to bring Kim to the negotiating table. He is unlikely to negotiate until the internal pressure, yes internal, not external, gives him no other alternative. But if he can extract concessions from the ROK and US, e.g., incentives, he will continue to conduct political warfare with Juche characteristics and double down on his blackmail diplomacy because it will have shown him that his strategy works.

I believe the United States is unlikely to give Kim what he really demands — sanctions relief — because the Biden administration’s policy remains committed to the full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. (Read it HERE)

**Political Warfare: defined: "Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent.  The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations." Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989), p. 3. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf

• The United Front Department (UFD) overtly attempts to establish pro-North Korean groups in the ROK, such as the Korean Asia-Pacific Committee and the Ethnic Reconciliation Council. The UFD is also the primary department involved in managing inter-Korean dialogue and North Korea's policy toward the ROK.
• The 225th Bureau is responsible for training agents to infiltrate the ROK and establish underground political parties focused on fomenting unrest and revolution.

This latest incident occurs as the Biden administration reevaluates Korea policies. A natural assumption is that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is returning to rigid hostility after some flexibility, including high-profile meetings with President Donald Trump.

In moving forward, U.S. government officials should keep in mind three basic realities about dealing with North Korea. First, North Korea has been inconsistent for many years. In 2013, Pyongyang declared a "state of war" with South Korea and abruptly abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War.

Yet, accommodating moves followed. In short, unpredictability is normal. This implies considerable factional infighting.

Second, we must demonstrate commitment to the defense of South Korea and our own readiness, and willingness, to use a range of forces. The Obama administration rightly deployed the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defense) anti-missile system for this purpose.

...

Third, we should emphasize coordination with other nations. This ideally should include China and Russia, but always our durable friend and close ally South Korea.

South Korea’s equivocation on joining a Quad Plus security architecture illustrates the difficulties inherent in reaching consensus over policies among a growing number of diverse countries. If the Quad is committed to expansion, it must look beyond “like-minded-ness” as the connective tissue for a broader framework and consider each partner’s strategic interests. In the South Korean case, there is much to consider—and much to overcome.

We should defer to (and support) the reunification plan of the Republic of Korea as President Park initially described it in her speech in Dresden on March 28, 2014.8 In addition to the points made in her speech, a reunification plan will likely include a few of these key elements: 

 Provision of full support to President Park’s policy of trustpolitik; 9 

 Development of a comprehensive information operations and influence campaign to inform the North Korean population about the outside world and educate them about the benefits or reunification; 

 Establishment of peninsula-wide land ownership policies, to include compensation vice recompense for those with pre1948 claims in the North; 

 Development of military integration plans, with specific focus on how the two militaries will be integrated and how senior military leaders will be treated if they support reunification; 

 Conducting detailed planning for infrastructure, and identification of required government and non-government investment; 

 Conducting detailed planning for economic transition and, ultimately, integration; 

 Conducting detailed planning for the integration of governmental/administration functions; and 

 Conducting comprehensive diplomatic coordination for international cooperation in support of reunification.

Again, these are just some of highlights of an ideal path to reunification. While we should strive to follow this path, the Kim regime has a vote and for various reasons may not agree. Unfortunately, there are three other paths that the North could pursue, any of which could be more likely than an embrace of the above principles likely to be announced by Park.

Bottom-up internal resistance to the regime appears to be growing among parts of North Korea’s population and even within the periphery of the political elite and military. This could be the second path to reunification. Such resistance should be monitored, assessed, understood, and possibly supported, to include assistance through an unconventional warfare campaign led by the Republic of Korea. Although this is unlikely, given the regime’s ability to suppress dissent, to lead to an Arab Spring-like phenomenon, such mass mobilization could occur and cannot be discounted. Such grassroots resistance could lead to a coup and the emergence of new leaders in the North that might then seek reunification with the South. The danger with internal resistance is that it can lead to conflict within the North, which could grow out of control and spill over into the Republic of Korea. However, if there were regime change, with or without conflict, there would eventually be opportunity to get back on the ideal path to reunification. All the planning and preparation that had previously been conducted would still have value after regime change via internal resistance.

The third path to reunification could be the collapse of the Kim dynasty. Regime collapse is defined as the loss of central governing effectiveness of the regime, combined with the loss of support and coherency of the military and security services. Although bottom-up internal resistance could lead to regime collapse, the regime’s demise is more likely to result from its inability to support the military and security services. Regime collapse is a result of friction within the regime elite and “deprioritization” of key military units. Regime collapse would likely lead to internal conflict, as actors fight to retain power and resources. In the worst case, when faced with significant internal or external pressure and the threat of regime collapse, Kim Jong-un might make the decision to execute his campaign plan to reunify the peninsula under his control, thus ensuring survival of his family’s regime (in his calculus). However, if collapse occurs without a direct attack on the ROK, the ROK–U.S. alliance, the UN Command, or both (and possibly also China) will likely have to conduct stabilization operations in the North to prevent spillover, establish security, restore stability, and relieve humanitarian suffering. Again, once the security situation is stabilized there could be a return to the ideal path to reunification. All of the planning and preparation that has taken place would still have value and could still be applied. Furthermore, many of the preparations could help mitigate the negative effects of regime collapse.

Finally, the fourth, worst case path to reunification is through war. First and foremost, the ROK–U.S. alliance must deter war, but if deterrence fails, then the alliance will win decisively and bring an end to the Kim regime. As in the case of regime collapse, post-conflict stabilization operations can and should be shifted toward the ideal path to reunification.

While the ideal path to reunification is the peaceful one, the other three paths of internal resistance, regime collapse, or war could all result in significant levels of conflict. However, all the planning and preparation for peaceful reunification that occurs prior to conflict will support post-conflict activities, and as soon as conditions warrant, the Republic of Korea can return to the peaceful path.

The four paths portrayed graphically might look like this:

​

​A shift in policy and strategy to a more realistic approach focused on reunification is going to be difficult for many to support, as the concept is difficult to grasp. There is great pressure to solve the Korean nuclear problem in the near-term, and taking a long-term view may be politically unacceptable to some, as that could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the North as a nuclear power. However, as stated already, as long as the​ Kim family remains in power, there is almost nothing that can be done diplomatically that will result in the regime deciding to give up its most important weapon and what Kim Jong-un believes is the key to survival as a deterrent as well as for support of its blackmail diplomacy. The North’s propaganda organs have criticized every country that has agreed to give up its nuclear weapons, and has used Iraq and Libya as examples, respectively, of what happens when one either fails to develop nuclear weapons or voluntarily relinquishes them. Iraq’s inability to develop a nuclear weapon left it vulnerable to U.S. attack, and the North believes that, had Saddam developed nuclear weapons, the U.S. would not have invaded. The North also believes that, had Qaddafi continued to develop nuclear weapons, he would have been able to sustain his dictatorship. It is likely that recent events in Ukraine have only reinforced the regime’s belief that giving up nuclear weapons makes a nation vulnerable to coercion and invasion. Security guarantees by the U.S. and the international community will never be trusted by the North because of the failure to uphold the Budapest Agreement.10 These are all reasons why the regime is unlikely to willingly give up its nuclear program.

The path to reunification is complex. It requires detailed planning by the South Korean government on how to integrate political and economic structures and education systems, and how to rebuild infrastructure, to name only a few challenges. There are numerous policy decisions that, if made before the reunification process begins, can have profound effects on the process and its outcome. Two examples are particularly instructive: the first has to do with property, and the second deals with the North Korean military and security services.​

• Katie Davis
• 9:46 ET, Oct 1 2021Updated: 9:50 ET, Oct 1 2021