Quotes of the Day:
“You do not become a ‘dissident’ just because you decide one day to take up this most unusual career. You are thrown into it by your personal sense of responsibility, combined with a complex set of external circumstances. You are cast out of
the existing structures and placed in a position of conflict with them. It begins as an attempt to do your work well, and ends with being branded an enemy of society.”
- Václav Havel
“Some people can read War and Peace and come away thinking it’s a simple adventure story. Others can read the ingredients on the back of a chewing gum wrapper and unlock the secrets to the universe.”
- Gene Hackman as Lex Luthor in Superman (1978)
"To succeed, we must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same. . ..However, work remains to foster coordination across departments and agencies. Key steps include more effectively ensuring alignment of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the training and education of national security professionals to equip them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies and programs that strengthen coordination."
- U.S. National Security Strategy, May 2010
1. Moon decides not to visit Japan: Cheong Wa Dae
2. S.Korea military suffers worst COVID-19 outbreak aboard anti-piracy ship off Africa
3. Dereliction of duty (Korean Navy and COVID)
4. Chinese refined oil imports lead to fall in North Korean gasoline and diesel prices
5. North Korea warns youth against using South Korean slang, says Pyongyang dialect is superior
6. S.Korea's Moon scraps Tokyo trip over 'unacceptable' diplomat remarks
7. Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Expresses Regret over Official's 'Sexual Remarks'
8. For North Korean workers, Russia’s Far East remains a windfall for them and for Kim’s regime
9. ‘Historical Distortions’ Test South Korea’s Commitment to Free Speech
10. Could North Korea See a Shift in Its Balance of Power?
11. Beijing sent over 50 defectors in detention back to N. Korea
12. Korea secures 94% of global LNG tanker orders in 1st half
13. China's peninsula engagement
1. Moon decides not to visit Japan: Cheong Wa Dae
That settles that. I did not think it was practical to try to have a summitt during the Olympics.
(4th LD) Moon decides not to visit Japan: Cheong Wa Dae | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with details of additional briefing)
By Lee Chi-dong
SEOUL/TOKYO, July 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Moon Jae-in has decided not to visit Japan this week, as no satisfactory accomplishment is expected in proposed summit talks, Cheong Wa Dae announced Monday.
Moon plans to send Hwang Hee, minister of culture, sports and tourism, there to attend the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, slated for Friday, as head of his government's delegation.
The president had considered a trip to Tokyo for the event. South Korea and Japan had consultations on the possibility of holding the first face-to-face summit between Moon and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga on the occasion.
The two sides "had meaningful discussions on progress regarding historical issues and future-oriented cooperation," according to Park Soo-hyun, senior Cheong Wa Dae secretary for public communication.
Although the consultations produced a "significant level" of mutual understanding, the extent of the progress was deemed "still insufficient" to indicate an accomplishment at the summit talks, he said in a statement
In addition, various other situations were comprehensively considered for the decision, Park added.
Cheong Wa Dae expressed hope that Japan will host the Olympics, a festival of peace for people around the world, safely and successfully.
A Cheong Wa Dae official said later that inappropriate comments made recently by a high-level Japanese diplomat here against Moon affected his decision not to visit Tokyo.
Hirohisa Soma, deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy, reportedly told a South Korean reporter that Moon's diplomatic efforts with Japan are tantamount to "masturbating." He was quoted as saying that Japan "does not have the time to care so much about the relationship between the two countries as South Korea thinks."
It is hard to tolerate Soma's reported comments, the Cheong Wa Dae official told reporters on background.
"We had to consider that public sentiment and the internal mood of Cheong Wa Dae (regarding the issue of Moon's Japan visit) turned skeptical (following the related report)," he said on the condition of anonymity.
He said Cheong Wa Dae is taking note of the Japanese government's expression of regret over the diplomat's wrongdoing. He urged it to take appropriate follow-up measures and prevent the recurrence of a similar problem.
Opinion polls have shown that many South Koreans are opposed to Moon making a trip to Tokyo.
Cheong Wa Dae has openly set a guarantee of making meaningful accomplishments in summit talks as a precondition for Moon's possible visit there. Seoul is seeking a resolution to longstanding disputes over shared history and Tokyo's unilateral export curbs launched in 2019.
"Our ultimate goal was to restore the (bilateral) relations. But we thought that more discussions are necessary," the Cheong Wa Dae official said.
Relations between the neighboring countries have remained at a low point due primarily to the thorny issue of compensating Korean victims of forced labor and sexual enslavement by Japan during its colonial rule from 1910-45.
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. S.Korea military suffers worst COVID-19 outbreak aboard anti-piracy ship off Africa
247 out of 301 sailors are positive for COVID. What if this were a biological attack? Adversaries are studying the effects of COVID and how militaries act and react.
S.Korea military suffers worst COVID-19 outbreak aboard anti-piracy ship off Africa
SEOUL, July 19 (Reuters) - South Korea's military has recorded its biggest cluster of COVID-19 infections to date, with more than 80% of personnel aboard a destroyer on anti-piracy patrol in the Gulf of Aden testing positive.
While the 247 cases are not directly linked to new domestic infections, with the destroyer having left South Korea to start its mission in February, the surge comes as the country battles its worst-ever outbreak of COVID-19 cases at home, with another 1,252 new infections reported for Sunday.
The country's Joint Chiefs of Staff said on Monday that just 50 of the ship's complement of 301 personnel have tested negative in an outbreak first reported on July 15. Authorities have begun an operation to airlift them home, while a replacement team will steer the vessel back home. read more
Sunday's number meant new cases in South Korea, which has so far fared better than many industrialised nations in case numbers and deaths, have topped 1,100 a day for nearly two weeks in an outbreak stoked by a surge in highly transmissible Delta variant cases.
So far, South Korea has recorded 179,203 cases and 2,058 deaths. Some 31.4% of its 52 million population has received at least one dose of vaccine, while 12.7% have been fully vaccinated.
Helped largely by vaccinations of the elderly and the vulnerable, the latest surge in case numbers has yet to be accompanied by a significant increase in hospitalisations or deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.15% and the number of severe cases at 185 as of Sunday.
Citing military sources, Yonhap news agency reported none of the affected personnel aboard the destroyer were classified as severe cases, though one person has developed conditions that require close observation.
The defence ministry had said noone aboard the destroyer had been vaccinated as the unit had left the country in February, before a vaccination campaign began for military personnel. read more
Authorities had decided vaccination at sea was not a viable option as it would limit monitoring for any allergic reaction such as anaphylaxis due to the nature of the operational mission.
The ship would not meet the cold-storage requirements for some vaccines, including Pfizer/BioNTech (PFE.N), vaccines for soldiers aged under 30, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said in a statement.
South Korea has excluded people below 30 from receiving AstraZeneca (AZN.L) or Johnson & Johnson (JNJ.N) vaccines over risk of rare but serious blood clots linked to the shots.
Reporting by Sangmi Cha; Editing by Kenneth Maxwell
3. Dereliction of duty (Korean Navy and COVID)
Excerpts:
First of all, the Defense Ministry did not draw up any vaccination plan even after the Cheonghae unit arrived at its destination. The military started inoculating soldiers in barracks from April, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not send vaccines to the naval unit. Even after 38 sailors aboard a landing ship tested positive before, the Navy did not prepare safety measures for sailors serving in tight space.
...
Such a weird stance of the Moon Jae-in administration can be affirmed by the double standards it applied to the illegal rally by the KCTU. Over 8,000 unionists of the group pushed ahead with it in downtown Seoul and participants tested positive for Covid-19. On Sunday, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) hurriedly ordered all of them to get tested, but a public transportation union under the umbrella union threatened to hold a 1,200-member rally in front of the National Health Insurance Service Thursday.
Sunday
July 18, 2021
Dereliction of duty
A cluster of Covid-19 infections is growing among sailors of the Cheonghae unit on a Navy destroyer dispatched to the waters off eastern Africa. In Korea, a growing number of members of the militant Korean Confederation of Trade Union (KCTU) tested positive after participating in an illegal rally in Seoul on July 3. The first cluster resulted from the government’s negligence of sailors’ safety while the latter originated with the government’s lax reaction. Basically, both outbreaks can be attributed to the government’s failure to buy vaccines early enough and its incompetent and irresponsible quarantine campaigns.
On the 4,400-ton-class destroyer deployed to the Gulp of Aden in February, 68 sailors tested positive after more than 100 sailors were tested for Covid-19. As over 300 sailors are aboard the ship, the number of cases can still increase. The Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Navy Headquarters are all responsible for the cluster infection on the vessel.
First of all, the Defense Ministry did not draw up any vaccination plan even after the Cheonghae unit arrived at its destination. The military started inoculating soldiers in barracks from April, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not send vaccines to the naval unit. Even after 38 sailors aboard a landing ship tested positive before, the Navy did not prepare safety measures for sailors serving in tight space.
The destroyer is required to call at ports in Africa or the Middle East for refueling and getting other supplies during its six-month mission. But the Navy was not prepared for possible infections from sailors’ contacts with locals. A senior officer who showed symptoms of pneumonia reportedly carried supplies from a local port last month. The opposition People Power Party criticized the government for not vaccinating the sailors — while trying to give vaccines to North Korea.
Such a weird stance of the Moon Jae-in administration can be affirmed by the double standards it applied to the illegal rally by the KCTU. Over 8,000 unionists of the group pushed ahead with it in downtown Seoul and participants tested positive for Covid-19. On Sunday, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) hurriedly ordered all of them to get tested, but a public transportation union under the umbrella union threatened to hold a 1,200-member rally in front of the National Health Insurance Service Thursday.
Appearing at a Covid-19 test center in Gangnam Sunday, Moon expressed some regret for repeated breakouts of the coronavirus. We hope the government brings the Chenghae unit sailors back home safely and sternly deals with illegal rallies of the KCTU.
4. Chinese refined oil imports lead to fall in North Korean gasoline and diesel prices
Are there still some kind of "market forces" at work or is this still work of a centrally controlled economy in the north?
Chinese refined oil imports lead to fall in North Korean gasoline and diesel prices - Daily NK
North Korea reportedly agreed to provide mineral resources to China at low cost in return for the oil
The price of refined oil — which had been skyrocketing due to shortages — has recently fallen by more than 50% after the country received supplies of the commodity from China.
According to a Daily NK source in North Korea recently, speaking on condition of anonymity, the price of gasoline and diesel in Pyongyang, as of July 15, was KPW 7,000 and KPW 4,000 a kilogram, respectively.
In the case of gasoline, the price had fallen by 36% compared to July 12, when it was at KPW 11,000 a kilogram. The price of diesel, meanwhile, had fallen 53% (KPW 4,000) from KPW 8,500.
The prices of gasoline and diesel fell in February and early March when the country received imports from China, but they had been climbing until recently.
Early last month, the price of gasoline and diesel climbed to nearly KPW 13,000 and KPW 10,000, respectively.
Multiple sources have reported that North Korea imported refined oil from China immediately after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Chinese leader Xi Jinping exchanged letters on July 11 to mark the 60th anniversary of the two countries’ treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.
In his congratulatory message to Xi, Kim said the conclusion of the treaty demonstrated the “firm will of the two parties and the governments and peoples of the two countries to ensure the long-term development of the DPRK-China friendship, which was forged at the cost of blood on the road of independence against imperialism and of socialism on the basis of the solid legal foundations.” He also said it was “the fixed stand of the WPK and the DPRK government to ceaselessly develop the friendly and cooperative relations between the DPRK and China.”
A gas station on the outskirts of Pyongyang. / Image: Daily NK
In his letter, Xi said China and North Korea share a firm relationship and that he is “willing to provide greater happiness to the two countries and the two peoples by strengthening the strategic communication with General Secretary Kim Jong Un to properly control the direction of the advance of the China-DPRK relations and by steadily leading the relations of friendship and cooperation between the two countries to a new stage.”
North Koreans aware of the oil imports are reportedly claiming that the shipments represent “China’s response to Kim’s letter.”
North Korea received much of the oil by sea through the port of Nampo, though some of the oil was reportedly imported through the Sino-North Korean pipeline as well.
According to Daily NK’s source, dozens of trucks have been detected coming and going from the Paengma-ri Petroleum Production Storage Facility, the terminus of the PRC-DPRK Friendship Oil Pipeline.
State-allotted shares of oil to the Central Committee, military, state enterprises, and other official bodies were likely imported by sea, while the pipeline was likely used to import oil for civilian use.
The source claimed the most recent shipment of oil far exceeded typical imports of the past.
The source explained that in North Korea, the authorities issue “gasoline tickets” that are used instead of cash to purchase gas at gasoline stations. Considering the number of tickets already issued, it appears the most recent oil import will last more than just a week or two, he said.
Meanwhile, in return for receiving oil from China, North Korea reportedly agreed to provide mineral resources to China at low cost.
“The Chinese side has been asking for mineral resources,” said the source. “It appears exports of magnesia clinker and metals to China will increase going forward.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
5. North Korea warns youth against using South Korean slang, says Pyongyang dialect is superior
So the Pyongyang dialect is superior? My language is better than yours. Such is the nature of the Kim family regime.
North Korea warns youth against using South Korean slang, says Pyongyang dialect is superior
Matthias Ang
North Korea has been cracking down on South Korea's influence.
July 19, 2021, 01:44 PM
North Korea's official newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, has warned the country's youth against adopting slang from the South, stressing that the Pyongyang dialect is superior, The Korea Times reported.
In an article put out on July 18, the Rodong Sinmun said, "The ideological and cultural penetration under the colourful coloured signboard of the bourgeoisie is even more dangerous than enemies who are taking guns."
The media outlet, which is part of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party, also re-issued warnings against adopting the fashion, lifestyle and music of South Korea, according to the BBC.
It added, "When the new generations have a sound sense of ideology and revolutionary spirits, the future of a country is bright. If not, decades-long social systems and revolution will be perished. That is the lesson of blood in the history of the world's socialist movement."
North Korea is cracking down on the spread of South Korea's culture
The warning is part of North Korea's crackdown on the spread of South Korea's culture within the country, amidst growing external pressure from global sanctions and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The country criminalised the consumption and distribution of outside information, including foreign news, radio broadcasts and South Korean music and entertainment under a new anti-reactionary thought law implemented late in 2020.
Those caught with large amounts of media from South Korea, the U.S., or Japan, can be sentenced to death, while those caught watching it can face 15 years in a prison camp, the BBC highlighted.
The Korea Times further reported that the crackdown also extends to banning North Koreans from using the word "oppa" to address their husbands, like South Koreans.
It is believed that such media is deemed forbidden by Pyongyang as they can be subversive, and lead to people changing their thinking or questioning the regime.
South Korean dramas are being illegally watched and sold in North Korea
Previously in June, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un lashed out at K-pop, calling it a "vicious cancer", while state media warned that K-pop would make the country "crumble like a damp wall", as it is corrupting young North Koreans' "attire, hairstyles, speeches, behaviours".
May also saw around 10,000 students giving themselves up to the authorities for secretly watching South Korean dramas and movies, in the hopes of receiving a lighter punishment.
And in April, North Korean authorities reportedly publicly executed a citizen by firing squad, in front of 500 people, for the crime of illegally selling USBs and CDs that contained South Korean movies, dramas, and music videos, under the new law.
Related stories:
Top screenshot from Arirang YouTube
Copyright © 2020 Mothership. All rights reserved.
6.S.Korea's Moon scraps Tokyo trip over 'unacceptable' diplomat remarks
Ah so it is all the diplomat's fault. A convenient excuse.
S.Korea's Moon scraps Tokyo trip over 'unacceptable' diplomat remarks
1/2
South Korea's President Moon Jae-in arrives at Cornwall Airport Newquay for the G7 summit in Carbis Bay, Cornwall, Britain, June 11, 2021. REUTERS/Peter Nicholls/Pool
SEOUL/TOKYO, July 19 (Reuters) - South Korean President Moon Jae-in will not visit Tokyo for the upcoming Olympics, his office said on Monday, scrapping plans for what would have been his first summit with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga.
The announcement came after Seoul lodged a protest over a news report on Friday that a senior diplomat at Japan's embassy in Seoul had said Moon was "masturbating" when describing his efforts to improve relations between the two countries.
"President Moon has decided not to visit Japan," Moon's press secretary Park Soo-hyun told a briefing, adding both sides had explored ways to tackle rows over history and boost cooperation but failed to reach agreement.
"The discussions were held amicably and made considerable progress, but it still fell short of being considered as a summit result, and we took other circumstances into account," Park said, without elaborating.
Suga declined to comment on Moon's decision, but described the Japanese diplomat's remarks as "inappropriate." read more
Moon's office said it turned "sceptical" about his potential trip after the Japanese diplomat's "unacceptable" comment.
Moon will instead send the culture minister to Friday's opening ceremony as head of the Korean delegation, his office said, wishing Japan safe and successful Olympics.
The latest uproar further inflamed relations between the two nations feuding over territorial claims and their wartime history, dashing any remaining hopes that the Tokyo Games might offer a fresh start for bilateral and regional cooperation.
The neighbours have long been at odds over compensation for Koreans forced to work in Japanese firms and military brothels during Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.
Last month, another spat erupted over a map on the Tokyo Olympics website showing a set of Korea-controlled islands as Japanese territory. read more
Japan's Yomiuri newspaper earlier on Monday reported Moon would meet Suga in Tokyo on Friday, but both governments quickly denied a meeting had been finalised, with Moon's office citing an "last minute obstacle."
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato said Tokyo's ambassador in Seoul Koichi Aiboshi cautioned his deputy over his "regrettable" remarks, but did not elaborate when asked whether he would be sacked as reported by Yomiuri.
South Korea's vice foreign minister, Choi Jong-kun, summoned Aiboshi on Saturday to protest. Moon's office said it took note of Kato's comment, but called for Tokyo to take steps to prevent such a situation from recurring.
Suga this month called relations between Japan and South Korea "very difficult", adding that it was up to Seoul to address history disputesand other problems.
Moon had earlier hoped the Olympics may offer an opportunity for North and South Korea to improve relations and revive peace talks, before Pyongyang announced it would not take part because of coronavirus concerns. read more
Reporting by Chang-Ran Kim, Ju-min Park in Tokyo, Hyonhee Shin, Sangmi Cha and Jack Kim in Seoul; Editing by William Mallard, Gerry Doyle, Lincoln Feast and Tomasz Janowski
7. Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Expresses Regret over Official's 'Sexual Remarks'
All I can ask is what was he thinking when he made these remarks? Or was it deliberate? Meant to scuttle the summit? Was this diplomat somehow taking one for the team?
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Expresses Regret over Official's 'Sexual Remarks'
Write: 2021-07-19 13:48:56 / Update: 2021-07-19 14:27:38
Photo : YONHAP News
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato has expressed strong regret over a sexual comment a senior official at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul recently made regarding President Moon Jae-in's efforts to improve bilateral ties.
At a press conference on Monday, Kato said the remarks by Hirohisa Soma, the deputy chief of mission, were "very inappropriate" for a diplomat under any circumstance or context.
Amid speculation over Soma's dismissal, the chief cabinet secretary said Amb. Koichi Aiboshi has reprimanded the official and that Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi is expected to make a decision on replacing Soma in consideration of his term of duty.
Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun earlier reported that Tokyo will likely dismiss Soma in line with President Moon's possible visit to Japan around the opening of the Tokyo Olympics on Friday.
Asked about the controversial remarks impacting the bilateral summit, Kato said if Moon does visit Japan, Tokyo plans to diplomatically respond in a serious manner, but that no decision has been made.
8. For North Korean workers, Russia’s Far East remains a windfall for them and for Kim’s regime
Excerpts:
The North Koreans are in-demand laborers, the construction managers said, because they are cheap but with a reputation for quality work. Though they tend to be private and limit their interactions with people outside of the job, they also don’t fear operating in the open by posting ads for renovation gigs on a Russian version of Craigslist.
The influx of foreign cash from North Koreans working abroad is vital as North Korea last year faced its worst economic slump in more than two decades, analysts said. There were reports of acute power cuts and factory closures, and Kim called the country’s food situation “tense” last month, amid mounting reports of shortages.
The United States has said it believed the North Korean government was earning more than $500 million a year before the U.N. sanctions from nearly 100,000 workers abroad, of which some 50,000 were in China and 30,000 in Russia.
Zakharova told reporters in January 2020 that around 1,000 North Korean workers remained in Russia but they “are in reality no longer workers since their work permits have expired and they don’t receive income in Russia.”
For North Korean workers, Russia’s Far East remains a windfall for them and for Kim’s regime
By Isabelle Khurshudyan and Min Joo Kim
July 18, 2021|Updated yesterday at 10:06 a.m. EDT
70
VLADIVOSTOK, Russia — On a popular advertising site in Russia's Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, there's a separate page with listings devoted to North Korean workers available for home construction jobs.
The contact information on one post led to a North Korean man who told The Washington Post he has worked in Russia for “many years.” He said he can earn significantly more money here than in North Korea, even as about half of his earnings are earmarked for Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang.
“The amount you pay is set” by the North Korean government, he said. “If you earn a lot, you can keep a lot yourself. If you earn little, you can keep only a little yourself.”
More than a year after U.N. Security Council sanctions banned countries from hosting North Korea’s regime-directed workforce, North Korean workers remain in Vladivostok, a port city of about 600,000 near the Russia-North Korea border. It’s one of the main footholds in the world for North Koreans to work outside the country and provide Pyongyang with a stream of foreign currency that helps back Kim and his rule.
Several Russian construction managers in Vladivostok said that they continue to work with North Koreans, though there are fewer of them in the city since the U.N. sanctions took effect in December 2019. The coronavirus pandemic shuttered the border between the countries a month later.
Russia has been critical of the sanctions, but said it would adhere to them. Moscow acknowledged last year that it missed the U.N. deadline to repatriate North Korean workers due to what Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said were “objective difficulties” from limited transportation options.
The North Koreans are in-demand laborers, the construction managers said, because they are cheap but with a reputation for quality work. Though they tend to be private and limit their interactions with people outside of the job, they also don’t fear operating in the open by posting ads for renovation gigs on a Russian version of Craigslist.
The influx of foreign cash from North Koreans working abroad is vital as North Korea last year faced its worst economic slump in more than two decades, analysts said. There were reports of acute power cuts and factory closures, and Kim called the country’s food situation “tense” last month, amid mounting reports of shortages.
The United States has said it believed the North Korean government was earning more than $500 million a year before the U.N. sanctions from nearly 100,000 workers abroad, of which some 50,000 were in China and 30,000 in Russia.
Zakharova told reporters in January 2020 that around 1,000 North Korean workers remained in Russia but they “are in reality no longer workers since their work permits have expired and they don’t receive income in Russia.”
In a March 2020 report submitted by the Russian mission to the United Nations, the country said 511 North Korean nationals who previously held work permits remained because “in view of the novel coronavirus disease pandemic, Pyongyang has unilaterally halted transport links” with other countries.
The Russian Foreign Ministry did not respond to a request for comment on the current status of the more-than 500 North Koreans who remained in Russia after the border closure.
Russia issued more than 16,000 tourist visas and more than 10,000 student visas to North Koreans in 2019. Fewer than 5,000 North Koreans were granted a tourist or student visa in 2018, according to Russian Interior Ministry statistics. Analysts said the surge suggested North Koreans were continuing to work in Russia but illegally.
Artyom Lukin, an international relations scholar at Vladivostok’s Far Eastern Federal University, said Russia has a stake in propping up Kim’s rule. If the Koreas were ever reunified, it would mean a key U.S. ally on Russia’s border, Lukin said.
Turning something of a blind eye to the North Korean workers still in the country, he added, is a way for Moscow to maintain its outreach to Pyongyang.
“It’s an open secret that many North Koreans continue to work,” Lukin said. “But a few years ago, if you walked the streets of Vladivostok, you would see quite a lot of North Koreans. Now, I do see them from time to time, but not as many as before.”
When contacted by The Post, one North Korean man who posted an online ad to work construction, said he was in Russia on a student visa. The number of North Korean migrants to Russia dropped to fewer than 4,000 last year amid coronavirus travel restrictions, according to Interior Ministry statistics. About 2,600 came on a student visa.
Being selected to work abroad is a prestigious and rare opportunity for North Koreans to boost the lives of their families back home. But working conditions are notoriously poor, experts said, with potentially long hours, low pay and poor safety. Now that they are working undocumented, it’s even harder for external labor watchers to reach them.
The coronavirus risks make their situation even more precarious because they are unlikely to have access to personal protective equipment, let alone vaccines.
Svetlana, a Russian hostess at a Korean restaurant in Vladivostok, said the North Korean servers there work long hours seven days a week. But she assumed the young women pocket a decent portion of their pay because she’s observed them shopping for expensive cosmetics and clothing.
Svetlana declined to provide her surname because she feared retribution from her employer. Approached by The Post, the North Korean servers said they couldn’t comment without the permission of their North Korean manager, who refused. Svetlana said the servers are typically not permitted to communicate with anyone outside of the restaurant staff.
Svetlana said the women often ask her about the differences between their cultures. For example, she said they were “shocked” that she lives with her boyfriend.
“I’m interested in how they lived there and what the rules were or weren’t,” Svetlana said. “But when I ask them, they just say, ‘Everything is good.’ So despite the fact that we’re in Russia and they should feel really safe here, there’s still no conversation. They’re really private.”
Kang Dong-wan, a North Korea expert at Dong-A University in Busan, South Korea, traveled to Vladivostok in late December 2019 to check what happened to North Korean workers after the repatriation deadline.
“There were North Koreans newly flying into Russia from North Korea,” Kang said. “I saw them myself.”
“North Korea and Russia have built a strong relationship over many years,” he added. “It is hard for Russia to say no when North Korea wants to send workers there.”
Kim reported from Seoul.
9. ‘Historical Distortions’ Test South Korea’s Commitment to Free Speech
As Americans we just do not know enough about this part of Korean history and how it has shaped everything up and especially including the Moon administration's "world view."
‘Historical Distortions’ Test South Korea’s Commitment to Free Speech
Conspiracy theories about the country’s turbulent past have spread online. Now the government is pushing criminal penalties to crack down on misinformation.
A memorial at the May 18th National Cemetery in Gwangju, South Korea, where people killed in the city’s 1980 uprising against military dictatorship are buried.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
Conspiracy theories about the country’s turbulent past have spread online. Now the government is pushing criminal penalties to crack down on misinformation.
A memorial at the May 18th National Cemetery in Gwangju, South Korea, where people killed in the city’s 1980 uprising against military dictatorship are buried.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
By
- July 18, 2021Updated 6:41 p.m. ET
SEOUL — In the history of South Korea’s fight for democracy, the 1980 uprising in Gwangju stands out as one of the proudest moments. Thousands of ordinary citizens took to the streets to protest a military dictatorship, and hundreds were shot down by security forces. The bloody incident has been sanctified in textbooks as the “Gwangju Democratization Movement.”
Right-wing extremists, however, have offered an alternative, highly inflammatory view of what happened: Gwangju, they say, was not a heroic sacrifice for democracy, but a “riot” instigated by North Korean communists who had infiltrated the protest movement.
Such conspiracy theories, which few historians take seriously, have been spreading quickly in South Korea, where a political divide — rooted in the country’s torturous and often violent modern history — is being amplified online.
President Moon Jae-in’s governing party has rolled out a slate of legislation, some of which has already become law, aimed at stamping out false narratives about certain sensitive historical topics, including Gwangju. His supporters say he is protecting the truth. Free speech advocates, and Mr. Moon’s conservative enemies, have accused the president of using censorship and history as political weapons.
But few democratic countries have sought to police speech to the extent that South Korea is considering, and a debate is underway about whether the efforts to squelch misinformation will lead to broader censorship or encourage authoritarian ambitions.
“Whether I am right or wrong should be decided through free public debate, the engine of democracy,” said Jee Man-won, a leading proponent of the theory of North Korean involvement in Gwangju. “Instead, the government is using its power to dictate history.”
The national cemetery in Gwangju. The 1980 uprising was a milestone in South Koreans’ fight for democracy.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
Arguments over which messages to allow and which to suppress are often about national history and identity. In the United States, debates rage about the influence of racism and slavery in the nation’s past and present, and about how to teach those topics in school. Supporters of the new laws say they do what Germany has done in attacking the lie of Holocaust denial.
South Korea has long prided itself on its commitment to free speech, but it is also a country where going against the mainstream can have steep consequences.
Historical issues, like collaboration with Japanese colonialists or wartime civilian massacres, have divided the country for decades. Defamation is a criminal offense. Under the bills pushed by Mr. Moon’s party, promoting revisionist narratives about sensitive subjects like Gwangju or the “comfort women” — Korean sex slaves for Japan’s World War II army — could also be a crime.
With the crackdown on misinformation, Mr. Moon is living up to a campaign promise to give Gwangju its rightful place in history. But by criminalizing so-called “historical distortions,” he is also stepping into a political minefield.
The Korea History Society and 20 other historical research institutes issued a joint statement last month warning that Mr. Moon’s progressive government, which presents itself as a champion of the democratic values secured through sacrifices like Gwangju, was actually undermining them by using the threat of criminal penalties to dictate history.
Paratroopers beating protesters in Gwangju in May 1980. Hundreds were killed by the security forces.Credit...Associated Press
A law sponsored by Mr. Moon’s party, which took effect in January, mandates up to five years in prison for people who spread “falsehoods” about Gwangju. The party’s lawmakers also submitted a bill in May that calls for up to 10 years in prison for those who praise Japan’s colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945.
The bill would set up a panel of experts on “truthful history” to detect distortions — and order corrections — in interpretations of sensitive historical topics, including killings of civilians during the Korean War and human rights violations under past military dictators.
Yet another bill from the party would criminalize “denying” or “distorting or falsifying facts” about a much more recent event, the sinking of the ferry Sewol in 2014, a disaster that killed hundreds of students and humiliated the conservative government then in power. Conservative lawmakers, for their part, submitted a bill last month that would punish those who deny that North Korea sank a South Korean naval ship in 2010.
Jee Man-won with copies of some of his books. He calls the Gwangju uprising a “riot” and says it was instigated by North Koreans.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
“It’s a populist approach to history, appealing to widespread anti-Japanese sentiment to consolidate their political power,” said Kim Jeong-in, head of the Korea History Society, referring to the bill on Japanese colonial rule. “Who’s going to study colonial-era history if their research results are judged at a court of law?”
Family members of the Gwangju protesters welcomed Mr. Moon’s attempts to punish purveyors of disinformation who disparage them.
“As if our loss of siblings and parents was not painful enough, they have been vilifying us as stooges of North Korean agents,” said Cho Young-dae, a nephew of the late Cho Pius, a Catholic priest in Gwangju who participated in the uprising and testified years later about the killings. “They have abused the freedom of expression to add insult to our injury.”
Mr. Cho, who is also a priest, said Gwangju survivors had suffered too long while people like Mr. Jee spread false information about the massacre. “We need a South Korean version of the Holocaust law to punish those who beautify the Gwangju atrocity, as European countries have laws against Holocaust denial,” he said.
Chun Doo-hwan, the general who was in power during the Gwangju massacre, was convicted of sedition and mutiny but was later pardoned.
Recent surveys have found that the biggest conflict dividing Korean society is between progressives and conservatives, both of whom are eager to shape and censor history and textbooks to their advantage.
Conservative dictators once arrested, tortured and executed dissidents in the name of a National Security Act that criminalized “praising, inciting or propagating” any behavior deemed pro-North Korean or sympathetic to communism.
Conservatives today want history to highlight the positive aspects of their heroes — such as Syngman Rhee, South Korea’s authoritarian founding president, and Park Chung-hee, a military dictator — and their success in fighting communism and lifting the country out of poverty after the Korean War.
Progressives often emphasize the underbelly of the conservative dictatorship, like the killings in Gwangju. They also denounce those they call “chinil,” pro-Japanese Koreans who they say collaborated with colonial leaders and thrived during the Cold War by rebranding themselves as anti-communist crusaders.
Yet Mr. Jee says there are progressives who harbor communist views that threaten the country’s democratic values.
Cho Young-dae, whose uncle participated in the Gwangju uprising, said historical revisionists like Mr. Jee “have abused the freedom of expression to add insult to our injury.”Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times
Much of this debate is being carried out online, where some highly partisan podcasters and YouTubers have as many viewers as national television programs do.
“Ideally, conspiracy theories and irrational ideas should be dismissed or marginalized through the market of public opinion,” said Park Sang-hoon, chief political scientist at the Political Power Plant, a Seoul-based civic group. “But they have become part of the political agenda here.” Mainstream media is “helping them gain legitimacy,” he said.
During the Gwangju uprising, a handful of journalists were able to slip through the military cordon around the city. They found mothers wailing over the bodies of loved ones. A “citizens’ army” carried weapons commandeered from police stations, as people on the sidewalks chanted “Down with dictatorship!” The protesters dug into a government building for their last, doomed standoff against the army.
Family members with the coffins of slain protesters in Gwangju after the killings.Credit...Associated Press
To many South Koreans, the protesters in Gwangju won. Students across the country followed in their footsteps and rose up against the junta.
Chun Doo-hwan, the army general who had seized power in a military coup before the protests, blamed “vicious rioters” and “communist agitators” for the violence. In the late 1990s, he was convicted of sedition and mutiny in connection with the coup and the killings in Gwangju. (He was later pardoned.)
“Thanks to the sacrifice in Gwangju, our democracy could survive and stand again,” Mr. Moon said when he visited the city shortly after his election in 2017. He said the spirit of Gwangju had been “reincarnated” in the mass protests that ousted his predecessor, Park Geun-hye — the dictator Park Chung-hee’s daughter — and warned against “intolerable” attempts to “distort and disparage” the 1980 uprising.
President Moon Jae-in at the Gwangju national cemetery in 2019. He has called attempts to “disparage” the protesters “intolerable.”Credit...Yonhap/EPA, via Shutterstock
But Mr. Jee said his experience voicing nonconformist historical views should be a warning to South Koreans. In 2002, he placed a newspaper advertisement claiming that Gwangju was a secret North Korean operation.
He was subsequently hauled to Gwangju in handcuffs and jailed for 100 days on defamation charges, until his prison term was eventually suspended.
He has since published 10 books on Gwangju and fought more defamation prosecutions. Although critics accused him of peddling wild conspiracy theories, his view has drawn a following.
“If they didn’t treat me the way they did in 2002, I would not have come this far,” he said.
Photos from the uprising on display in Seoul.Credit...Jeon Heon-Kyun/EPA, via Shutterstock
10. Could North Korea See a Shift in Its Balance of Power?
Sigh... This misconstrues the nature of the Kim family regime and the role of the party (the regime's version of civilian control perhaps in the nK context). But we have to be careful about mirror imaging. The party controls the military and the military belongs to the party.
But I very much agree with the concluding phrase of the concluding sentence:
There seems to be political movement within the North, most likely spurred by a worsening economy. However, anything could happen. Even if the Biden administration is not talking to Pyongyang, it should be watching Pyongyang.
Could North Korea See a Shift in Its Balance of Power?
Pyongyang’s “great crisis” may have provided a good opportunity for Kim to do what he had previously intended to do: reinforce civilian control over the military.
North Korean governance is opaque in the best of times. Today is not the best of times. A recent leadership change suggests that the balance of power is moving from the military to civilians, though no one knows for sure.
Kim Jong-un has diverged from his father and grandfather in many ways. Perhaps most important is his very public commitment to improve his people’s living standards—and failure to sustain what economic growth had occurred.
Three years ago he declared that the North had acquired its deterrent and therefore he would be concentrating on economic policy. In dropping his Byungjin policy, meaning parallel military and economic development, Kim took a political risk.
“This makes him more vulnerable to economic crises than his predecessors,” German Economist Ruediger Frank said.
The fear that he is losing ground might have animated his latest political changes.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has become an unusual consumer society. In 2017, there was more color, style, and goods in Pyongyang. But times have changed. Frank, a professor who teaches about the East Asian economy at the University of Vienna, detailed the new North Korea.
“For two decades now, consumerism has taken a firm hold in the country,” Frank said. “Cars, smartphones, electric bicycles, flat-screen TVs, fashion and fancy food and cafes are all available. The over four hundred markets and even state-run shops and stores of North Korea are full of a great variety of top-quality products. A society that for a long time was economically largely homogeneous and where differences between individuals existed because of political merits such as party membership, or political shortcomings such as family ties to South Korea, is getting more diversified. The divide is running along new, monetary lines: some can afford the new luxuries, others cannot. The new middle class is concentrated in Pyongyang but also spreads to the provincial capitals.”
Those gains are now at great risk and have an uncertain impact on Kim’s hold on power.
Kim’s economic reforms never went far enough. Three years ago Frank insisted that if the supreme leader “wants to stay in power and achieve Korean unification under his leadership, he will have to succeed in making North Korea the next East Asian tiger. However, reaching such an ambitious goal will be impossible without decisive steps towards privatization.” Those conditions never occurred. There was real liberalization but it fell far short of the changes which transformed South Korea, Taiwan, and China.
Worse, Kim has since retreated. When the Workers’ Party of Korea gathered in January, NKNews found “no apparent interest in reform, sanctions relief, or an opening of the economy.” In fact, “entrepreneurial freedoms are being curtailed. State media and party economists have returned to the familiar old rhetoric of autarky and central control,” according to The Economist.
Equally serious is the role of the sanctions. Kim’s professed emphasis on the economy might have been a signal to the Trump administration as well as his own people: I feel secure and am willing to deal. His Hanoi proposal, even if unbalanced, showed the way forward, and should have been used as a basis for negotiation: reductions in North Korea nuclear activities in exchange for reductions in sanctions.
Alas, that approach broke down. Last year, Kim appeared to publicly abandon any effort to engage the Trump administration. He told Korean Workers’ Party leaders that “the DPRK-U.S. standoff, which has lasted for generations, has now been compressed into a clear standoff between self-reliance and sanctions.” In which case, his position should not surprise anyone. “We can never sell our dignity, which we have so far defended as something as valuable as our own lives, in the hope of a brilliant transformation,” Kim empathized.
This shift in attitude may explain Kim’s seeming reluctance to engage the Biden administration. He might have grown pessimistic about the likelihood of reaching an agreement with any U.S. administration. He might figure Biden will be a one-term president and therefore could not be counted on to enforce any deal made. Or he might believe it is necessary to improve his leverage by establishing that he is not anxious for a deal. In any case, sanctions are likely to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Completing the negative economic trifecta is North Korea’s response to the coronavirus. Last year the DPRK effectively sanctioned itself, resulting in greater isolation than caused by outside restrictions. For instance, “North Korea seems to be rolling down the path of new unprecedented levels of isolationism,” according to Daminov Ildar of Visionary Analytics.
That might seem like an extreme policy, but the North lacks a modern medical infrastructure. As a result, suggested Ildar, “hermetically sealing itself off from the outside world was the only rational choice the North Korean government had.” Even if so, it has had a devastating economic impact.
In April, Kim told yet another group of party leaders that “I made up my mind to ask the WPK organizations at all levels, including its Central Committee and the cell secretaries of the entire party, to wage another more difficult ‘arduous march’ in order to relieve our people of the difficulty, even a little.” His reference to an “arduous march” is ominous since that is most often used to describe the 1990s famine that is believed to have killed at least a half-million people. He called on the party to act.
On top of this was an unspecified “great crisis” involving the coronavirus pandemic, but apparently not an outbreak. Kim’s ire seemed concentrated on the military. Now comes confirmation that army marshal and Politburo member Ri Pyong-chol was dropped from the latter panel, though he retains some position or authority. A civilian member of the Politburo also was demoted. The interesting question is whether these moves were primarily personal or had a broader institutional purpose. Some experts, like CNA’s Ken Gause, believe that the military had been “pushed down the pecking order” and that “Kim has tightened his inner circle around a group of technocrats and internal security personnel.”
The North’s leadership seems to constantly churn—even Kim’s sister has been added to and dropped from the Politburo for reasons unknown. The “great crisis” also might have provided a good opportunity for Kim to do what he had previously intended to do, such as reinforce civilian control over the military. His father emphasized a policy of military first and enhanced the role of the National Defense Commission. Kim fils changed both.
None of this indicates that Kim has suddenly become a peacenik. In his June party address, he presented his Christmas wish list six months early. The New York Times reported that Kim was “offering an unusually detailed list of weapons that the North was developing. They included ‘ultramodern tactical nuclear weapons,’ ‘hypersonic gliding-flight warheads,’ ‘multi-warhead’ missiles, military reconnaissance satellites, a nuclear-powered submarine, and land- and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles that use solid fuel.” In January the Rodong Sinmun further explained this approach. “Reality shows that, in order to deter U.S. military threats and achieve peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, we should strengthen our national defense capabilities without stopping for even a moment,” according to the Rodong Sinmun.
However, Kim may believe his continued support for the military’s desired armaments and surveillance of top officials is sufficient to ensure the armed forces’ loyalty without top representation in government. Perhaps Kim curbed the military’s political influence to more easily trim military outlays to help cope with the emerging economic emergency. Or perhaps he simply believed that Ri Pyong-chol did a poor job and needed to be replaced. It is doubtful that anyone outside of a chosen few in Pyongyang know the answers.
Experience suggests that what we see is but a blip, that the North Korean state will survive even another “arduous march.” But maybe not. In February 1989 veteran West German politician Wolfgang Schaeuble proclaimed that belief in the potential for German reunification was “illusory.” Nine months later the Berlin Wall fell.
Winston Churchill once described Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key.” The same could be said of North Korea, except there still is no key, even though the system has become slightly less mysterious in recent years.
There seems to be political movement within the North, most likely spurred by a worsening economy. However, anything could happen. Even if the Biden administration is not talking to Pyongyang, it should be watching Pyongyang.
Image: Reuters
11. Beijing sent over 50 defectors in detention back to N. Korea
China is complicit in north Korean human rights abuses and crimes against humanity. Full Stop.
Beijing sent over 50 defectors in detention back to N. Korea
Posted July. 19, 2021 08:34,
Updated July. 19, 2021 08:34
Beijing sent over 50 defectors in detention back to N. Korea. July. 19, 2021 08:34. by Eun-Taek Lee nabi@donga.com.
The Chinese government sent more than 50 North Korean defectors who had been in detention in Shenyang, Liaoning Province back to North Korea, Radio Free Asia reported on Friday. China had sought to repatriate them to the North since April, but Pyongyang reportedly declined to receive them several times due to concern over possible inflow of Covid-19 patients, which resulted in delays. RFA said the ill-fated defectors will most likely face execution in the North.
The Chinese authority sent North Korean defectors, who had been detained at the Shenyang Detention Center for one or two years, via the customs office in Dandong, China on July 14. According to the RFA report, the defectors were carried in two buses, and dozens of Chinese police officers were watching them around the customs office from early in the morning, while blocking people from taking photos or video.
The 50-plus defectors, who were repatriated to the North, included a number of North Korean soldiers and Air Force pilots. A 30-something female defector who married to a Chinese man has a 12-year-old son. She reportedly earned a sizable amount of money in China. “The woman was repatriated to the North for a second time, and there is no way of knowing her fate. Her husband tried to bribe officials to save her, to no avail,” an informed source said. According to RFA, the Shenyang Detention Center still has a number of North Korean defectors in detention, apart from the 50-plus repatriated defectors.
As the customs office in Dandong reopened on the day after shutdown for Covid-19 quarantine on the day, 98 people including Chinese nationals who were staying in the North and representatives of the North’s trade office moved to China.
12. Korea secures 94% of global LNG tanker orders in 1st half
These are quite the statistics.
Orders for LNG tankers will likely increase further in the second half. While shipbuilding orders were lackluster last year due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the market is enjoying a boom this year due to the distribution of vaccines and rising demand for eco-friendly ships stemming from the global trend towards carbon neutrality. Korea’s share of the global LNG ship market amounted to 98 percent in 2018, 94 percent in 2019, and 72 percent in 2020.
Korea secures 94% of global LNG tanker orders in 1st half
Posted July. 19, 2021 07:27,
Updated July. 19, 2021 07:27
Korea secures 94% of global LNG tanker orders in 1st half. July. 19, 2021 07:27. by Dong-Jin Shin shine@donga.com.
The Korean shipbuilding industry has secured 94 percent of the global orders for LNG tankers, a high value-added ship, in the first half of this year.
According to Clarkson Research, a shipbuilding and shipping market analysis company in the U.K. on Sunday, orders for a total of 1,529,421 CGT of LNG tankers were placed worldwide in the first half of this year. The figure represents a 320-percent increase from the same period of last year (363,629 CGT). Korea secured a total of 1,433,562 CGT, or 94 percent of the total order. The construction of an LNG tanker requires advanced technology that enables the tanker to maintain an ultralow temperature of minus 163 degrees Celsius, while minimizing losses due to gasification. Korean shipbuilders are said to have unrivaled technological edge in this field.
Orders for LNG tankers will likely increase further in the second half. While shipbuilding orders were lackluster last year due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the market is enjoying a boom this year due to the distribution of vaccines and rising demand for eco-friendly ships stemming from the global trend towards carbon neutrality. Korea’s share of the global LNG ship market amounted to 98 percent in 2018, 94 percent in 2019, and 72 percent in 2020.
13. China's peninsula engagement
Some useful food for thought.
Excerpts:
Now, China is engaged in a strategic competition with the U.S., while North Korea is waging psychological warfare with America over the nuclear negotiations. Due to the growing need for mutual cooperation between China and North Korea, their close relationship is likely to continue for a while.
...
North Korea may be very aware of the fact that it is not possible to ensure its survival by relying on China only. North Korea has painful memories of China failing to consider its point of view and establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea when the Cold War ended in the 1990s. North Korea may have the long-term goal of improving its relations with the U.S., along with establishing an independent foundation for survival and prosperity. As such, a foreign policy of relying solely on China could be dangerous for North Korea.
Furthermore, North Korea must deviate from its rigid stance of resuming talks only after the U.S. first abandons its hostile policy. Since the U.S. has declared its desire for a diplomatic solution through a practical and phased approach, North Korea should return to the negotiating table, listen to the Biden administration's policy and try to achieve what it wants by proceeding with negotiations over incentives that the U.S. may suggest.
China's peninsula engagement
By Yang Moo-jin
China and North Korea seem to be getting closer these days. The leaders of the two countries exchanged congratulatory messages on the 60th anniversary of the China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on July 11. In the message, they emphasized advancing the development of respective socialist causes and strengthening strategic communication, based on the friendship between the two sides that was forged in blood.
Intensifying U.S.-China competition is behind the close relationship between China and North Korea. China could be seen as using North Korea, which is a traditional ally and geopolitical buffer zone, to counter the U.S.'s pressure and containment strategies. The Biden administration has defined China as its sole competitor and made it clear that it will respond with the alliance network, while stressing value-oriented diplomacy that places democracy and human rights first.
North Korea is prepared to reinforce its relationship with China as leverage to deal with international sanctions, amid a protracted deadlock in relations with the U.S., while strengthening internal unity and striving for self-reliance, as it propagates a people-first policy internally.
Now, China is engaged in a strategic competition with the U.S., while North Korea is waging psychological warfare with America over the nuclear negotiations. Due to the growing need for mutual cooperation between China and North Korea, their close relationship is likely to continue for a while.
In terms of reliable control over the Korean Peninsula situation, China's growing influence in North Korea is of some use. China does not want military tensions and conflicts to erupt on the Korean Peninsula just in front of its doorstep. China will strongly oppose high-level North Korean provocations, such as nuclear tests and ICBM test launches, which provide a reason to strengthen the U.S. missile defense system and ROK-U.S.-Japan military cooperation. However, there is a limit to China's role of controlling military tensions, due to Beijing's passive stance and penchant for maintaining the status quo.
Although China is said to prefer dialogue to address problems involving the Korean Peninsula, Beijing appears to favor maintaining a balance of power by teaming up with North Korea and Russia rather than seeking active cooperation with the U.S. But due to this response, there is a great risk that a ROK-U.S.-Japan vs. DPRK-China-Russia rivalry will form.
The most desirable situation is for the North Korea issue to fall into the realm of U.S.-China cooperation and related nations to come together to pursue peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. The Biden administration has pointed out the possibility of working with China on the issues of Iran, North Korea and climate change. To make the North Korea issue fall into the realm of U.S.-China cooperation, it is necessary to see denuclearization as a long-term process, as suggested by the Biden administration, and gradually take steps to achieve peace, improve relations and build trust.
During their summit in late May, the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. set conditions for resuming talks with North Korea by reaffirming the importance of diplomacy and dialogue with the North based on the previous inter-Korea and U.S.-DPRK agreements, such as the Panmunjom Declaration and Singapore joint statement. The U.S. should not put the blame on North Korea by saying that the ball is in its court. If it is difficult to ease sanctions first, the U.S. needs to present a roadmap for tangible progress, including the establishment of a peace regime and the improvement of the U.S.-DPRK relationship, which North Korea could negotiate.
Also, the U.S. should not limit China's role when it comes to North Korea issues by demanding it to join in the international sanctions. Rather, the U.S. should work with China to make it play a constructive role as an "honest broker" in resuming talks and promoting negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea. The Beijing Winter Olympics next February could provide important momentum for China to seek an active role in addressing the North Korea issues.
North Korea may be very aware of the fact that it is not possible to ensure its survival by relying on China only. North Korea has painful memories of China failing to consider its point of view and establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea when the Cold War ended in the 1990s. North Korea may have the long-term goal of improving its relations with the U.S., along with establishing an independent foundation for survival and prosperity. As such, a foreign policy of relying solely on China could be dangerous for North Korea.
Furthermore, North Korea must deviate from its rigid stance of resuming talks only after the U.S. first abandons its hostile policy. Since the U.S. has declared its desire for a diplomatic solution through a practical and phased approach, North Korea should return to the negotiating table, listen to the Biden administration's policy and try to achieve what it wants by proceeding with negotiations over incentives that the U.S. may suggest.
Yang Moo-jin (yangmj@kyungnam.ac.kr) is a professor at the University of North Korean Studies and vice chairman of the Korean Association of North Korean Studies. He is also a standing committee member of the National Unification Advisory Council and a policy consultant at the Ministry of Unification.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
