Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


​Quotes of the Day:


"All the war-propaganda, all the screaming and lies and hatred, comes invariably from people who are not fighting."
- George Orwell

"The smallest act of kindness is worth more than the grandest intention." 
- Oscar Wilde

“Divided leadership is dangerous because people in groups often think and act in ways that are illogical and ineffective—call it Groupthink. People in groups are political: 
they say and do things that they think will help their image within the group. They aim to please others, to promote themselves, rather than to see things dispassionately. 
Where an individual can be bold and creative, a group is often afraid of risk. The need to find a compromise among all the different egos kills creativity. 
The group has a mind of its own, and that mind is cautious, slow to decide, unimaginative, and sometimes downright irrational.”
- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14, 2023

2. New Jersey requiring students to learn 'media literacy' to fight 'disinformation'

3. The sun is crackling with ‘solar flares’. Here’s what that means.

4. Rare earths find in Sweden: A gamechanger?

5. Former Russian president says Japanese leader should disembowel himself

6. Hate speech rises on Twitter in its largest markets after Musk takeover

7. UK to send Apache helicopters and modern tanks to Ukraine

8. The Taiwanese Expedition – Xi Jinping has read Thucydides. Have the China hawks?

9. US should help arm Taiwan with missiles to destroy Shanghai, says ex-general

10. Call for PLA to use AI for ‘smart deterrence’ against US over Taiwan

11. Logistical challenge looms for Ukraine over promised tanks

12. Pentagon Balks at Sending Ukraine Long-Range Bombs

13. To Make Japan Stronger, America Must Pull It Closer

14. Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

15. Japan Coast Guard’s rising role in a rules-based Indo-Pacific

16. Will the Ukraine war slow Russia’s Arctic push?

17. Japan sells Tokyo as US linchpin of security against China, Russia

18. GOP officially launches probe into chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal

19. MLK Jr.’s dream not yet achieved, but still attainable, advocates say

20. From phishing scams to propaganda: How Russia, rogue nations utilize cyber capabilities against the US



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14, 2023


Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2023


Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces launched two waves of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on January 14.
  • The Kremlin continues to falsely claim Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia to reject Ukrainian offers of a peace summit and retain Putin’s original maximalist goals.
  • The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as moral justification for its refusal to negotiate with Ukraine and likely in the hopes of turning international public opinion against Ukraine.
  • Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to leverage the Wagner Group’s role in capturing Soledar to elevate his political stature and indirectly criticize the conventional Russian military.
  • Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar as well as in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas. Ukrainian forces are highly unlikely to still hold positions within the settlement of Soledar itself.
  • Russian forces continued defensive operations and reinforced frontlines positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Western officials are increasingly joining Ukrainian authorities in warning that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization.
  • Russian occupation officials in Kherson continued measures to forcibly relocate residents to Russia.
  • Ukrainian partisan attacks continue to disrupt Russian rear security efforts.




RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 14, 2023

Jan 14, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF



understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, and Mason Clark

January 14, 7:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces launched two waves of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on January 14. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted 50 missile and three airstrikes against Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipro, Vinnytsya, and unspecified settlements in western Ukraine.[1] Russian missile strikes on Dnipro City damaged an apartment building, killing at least 5 people and wounding over 60.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian cities and settlements in two waves: first employing S-300 and S-400 systems in Belarus against ground targets in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast in the morning and later launching 28 cruise missile strikes using Kh-101/Kh-555, Kh-22, sea-based Kalibr, and Kh-59 guided air missiles.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian forces shot down 18 cruise missiles and three guided air missiles.

Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian forces used missiles fired with a sharp ballistic trajectory, possibly modified S-300 and S-400 missiles or Iskander-M systems, to strike Kyiv, noting that Ukrainian forces cannot currently shoot these missiles down when fired from short-range.[4] Ignat explained that S-300 and S-400 missiles launched from Belarus can hit Kyiv in less than two minutes. Ignat stated that Ukraine can only effectively prevent these strikes by destroying Russian S-300 complexes with Ukrainian long-range systems. Ignat added that Russian forces have previously used these modified systems to target Ukrainian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.

The Kremlin continues to falsely claim that Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia to reject Ukrainian offers of a peace summit and retain Putin’s original maximalist goals. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Security Council Vassily Nebenzya responded to Ukrainian proposals for a peace summit on January 13 with a series of false claims framing Ukraine as an aggressor that was, ludicrously, “about to attack Moscow.”[5] Nebenzya stated that Russia’s war in Ukraine will only end “when the threat to Russia no longer comes from the territory of Ukraine” and when “the discrimination [against] the Russian-speaking population” in Ukraine ends.[6] Kremlin claims of discrimination against Russian speakers in Ukraine are a longstanding information operation seeking to justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[7] Nebenzya reiterated the Kremlin’s narrative that Ukraine’s refusal to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territories and relationships with the West threaten Russia and claimed that Ukrainian ties with the West (rather than Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine) undermined Ukraine’s sovereignty and cultural identity.[8] Nebenzya claimed Ukraine is not interested in negotiations and is no more than a NATO paramilitary company—both longstanding claims that the Kremlin intends to delegitimize Ukraine as an independent actor and shift the responsibility for negotiations onto Western officials, who the Kremlin likely believes Russia can pressure into preemptive concessions.[9] Nebenzya asserted that if the Kremlin cannot achieve its maximalist goals through negotiations, it will achieve them through military means.[10] Nebenzya’s speech again demonstrates that the Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist goals in Ukraine, false justifications for its unprovoked war of aggression, and will seek to coerce the West to negotiate over Ukraine’s head.[11]

The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as moral justification for its refusal to negotiate with Ukraine, likely in the hopes of turning international public opinion against Ukraine. Nebenzya claimed in his address that the “Zelensky regime” is an “authoritarian dictatorship” that desires “to destroy the canonical church in Ukraine—the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”[12] Nebenzya likely deliberately misrepresented the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP)—a Kremlin-affiliated institution—as the official Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is a separate entity from the UOC MP. Nebenzya argued that such an “authoritarian dictatorship” represents a major obstacle to peace talks and requested a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council to discuss alleged state persecution of the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”[13] Ukrainian officials are not persecuting religious liberty or the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, however. Russian officials are intentionally misrepresenting Ukrainian efforts to prosecute Kremlin-linked elements of the UOC MP as persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is an independent entity that continues to operate in Ukraine, while the UOC MP is a non-independent subordinate branch of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, which has fiscally and rhetorically supported Russia’s war in Ukraine.[14]

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to leverage the Wagner Group’s role in capturing Soledar to elevate his political stature and indirectly criticize the conventional Russian military. Prigozhin published footage on January 14, which he claimed was filmed in Soledar, promoting Wagner’s claimed role in capturing the town.[15] Prigozhin introduced the Wagner Group commander who oversaw the capture of the settlement and extolled Wagner’s capabilities compared to the conventional Russian military.[16] Prigozhin stated the Wagner Group succeeded due to its wealth of experience, its independence, its effective military equipment, and its superior management system.[17] Prigozhin claimed the Wagner Group’s management system incentivizes commanders and subordinates to work closely together on the ground and allows the complaints of regular fighters to be heard.[18] Prigozhin likely highlighted these elements, true or not, to distinguish the Wagner Group from the conventional Russian military and likely advertise for further recruitment and denigrate conventional Russian forces, lobbying for an increased role for Wagner Group—and himself—in the war in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces launched two waves of missile strikes targeting Ukrainian critical infrastructure on January 14.
  • The Kremlin continues to falsely claim Ukraine poses an existential threat to Russia to reject Ukrainian offers of a peace summit and retain Putin’s original maximalist goals.
  • The Kremlin continues to use long-standing false narratives that the Ukrainian government is oppressing religious liberties as moral justification for its refusal to negotiate with Ukraine and likely in the hopes of turning international public opinion against Ukraine.
  • Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to leverage the Wagner Group’s role in capturing Soledar to elevate his political stature and indirectly criticize the conventional Russian military.
  • Russian forces continued limited counterattacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar as well as in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas. Ukrainian forces are highly unlikely to still hold positions within the settlement of Soledar itself.
  • Russian forces continued defensive operations and reinforced frontlines positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
  • Western officials are increasingly joining Ukrainian authorities in warning that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization.
  • Russian occupation officials in Kherson continued measures to forcibly relocate residents to Russia.
  • Ukrainian partisan attacks continue to disrupt Russian rear security efforts.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 14. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of Stelmakhivka (16km west of Svatove) and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna).[19] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District continued unspecified offensive operations along the Ploshchanka-Makiivka line.[20] Geolocated footage published on January 13 also showed Ukrainian artillery shelling several groups of Russian servicemen in Dzherelne, approximately 12km west of Svatove.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and near Kreminna itself.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff’s subsequent reporting that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Kreminna suggests that Ukrainian forces may have advanced closer to the city.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[24]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to strike Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast on January 14. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in Rubizhne (8km west of Kreminna) and Russian rear areas in Tarasivka (30km northeast of Svatove).[25]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Rozdolivka (7km north of Soledar), Sil (5km northwest of Soledar), and Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters continued offensive operations near Krasna Hora and that they almost completely control the settlement.[27] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Wagner Group fighters conducted an assault near Pidhorodne (6km southwest of Soledar).[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian assault squads in cooperation with units of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) conducted unspecified successful operations in the direction of Sil.[29] A Russian milblogger posted footage purporting to show Ukrainian forces removing wounded personnel from the railway station in Sil and claimed that Russian forces are currently fighting for control of the station.[30] Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces captured the railway station in Sil on January 13, although ISW still cannot independently verify these claims.[31]

Ukrainian forces likely do not hold positions in the settlement of Soledar itself despite continued Ukrainian claims as of January 14. Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces control positions in the western outskirts of Soledar and are continuing to fight for control of the settlement.[32] The Ukrainian commander of a separate tactical group under the alias Magayar published footage of a Ukrainian flag hanging outside a mine in the westernmost outskirts of Soledar and claimed the video proves that Ukrainian forces are still operating in the area.[33] The video did not show Ukrainian nor Russian forces in the vicinity of the flag. Geolocation of the footage shows that while the claimed Ukrainian position may be within Soledar’s administrative boundaries, the position is not within the settlement itself.[34] Other geolocated footage published on January 14 may indicate that Ukrainian forces are likely holding some positions immediately outside of Soledar.[35] A social media source claimed on January 13 that Ukrainian forces have established fortified positions on the west side of the T0513 highway near Soledar.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself and near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Mayorsk (22km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] A Russian source posted footage on January 12 showing the commander of the Akhmat Kadyrov Special Purpose Police Regiment, Zamid Chalaev, denying rumors that he surrendered near Bakhmut.[38] The State Border Service of Ukraine reported on January 14 that Ukrainian forces eliminated Wagner Group assault personnel in Bakhmut and repelled continued Wagner Group attempts to reach the outskirts of the settlement.[39] One Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters are abandoning head-on attacks against Bakhmut and instead are trying to encircle the settlement.[40] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault in the direction of Dyliivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut) and that Wagner Group fighters conducted assaults near Klishchivka as well as in the direction of Predtechyne (15km southwest of Bakhmut), attempting to cut off a section of the H-32 highway between Bakhmut and Kostiantynivka.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Pobieda, and Marinka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions in the western part of Marinka and that Russian forces are trying to advance in the settlement, despite previous milblogger claims that Russian forces control Marinka.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nevelske (14km southwest of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (12km southwest of Avdiivka).[44]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Velyka Novosilka (55km southwest of Donetsk City) in western Donetsk Oblast.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[46]


Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued defensive operations and reinforcement efforts on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on January 14. The Ukrainian General Staff and several Ukrainian officials reported the movement of Russian personnel, weapons, military, equipment, and ammunition as Russian forces redeploy units and concentrate forces to strengthen defensive capabilities along the southern axis.[47] Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo claimed on January 14 that Russian forces have almost completed the construction of a system of modern fortifications along the east bank of the Dnipro River. Saldo claimed the fortifications are an emergency backup and that he is certain Russian forces will return to Kherson City in 2023.[48] A popular Russian news source reported on January 14 that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated that Russia will complete the reconstruction of all four spans of the damaged section of the Kerch Strait bridge by the end of February.[49] Russian forces continued routine strikes along the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River on January 14.[50]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas. Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol Ivan Fedorov stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian deployment point in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast, during the night of January 13 and January 14.[51] Fedorov also reported that two loud explosions of unspecified origin occurred in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on January 14.[52] Fedorov stated that preliminary information indicates that the explosions damaged a Russian military base situated on the premises of a factory.[53] No actors have claimed responsibility for the attack at this time. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration deputy Vladimir Rogov claimed on January 14 that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian missile in the vicinity of Melitopol.[54]


Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Western officials are increasingly joining Ukrainian authorities in warning that Russia is preparing for an imminent second wave of mobilization. UK news outlet The Times reported on January 13 that Western intelligence indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin could send a fresh wave of mobilized soldiers to the front lines in Ukraine by April if Russian officials decide to launch a fresh wave of mobilization within weeks.[55] An unnamed western official stated that Russian regional recruitment offices are engaged in ”serious preparations.”[56] The official added that a Kremlin-sponsored poll also showed that Russians are anxious about the war but support its continuation in fear of a defeat.

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov attempted to limit growing confusion and alarm among Russian audiences regarding the expansion of mobilization eligibility. Peskov commented on contradictory official reports that Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov terminated mobilization exemptions for fathers of three or more children, stating that “the Kremlin knows nothing about such termination.”[57] Peskov’s response neither confirmed nor denied that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has terminated or plans to terminate deferrals for fathers with more than three children, however. Controversy continues among Russian domestic audiences regarding the likelihood and implications of a coming second wave of mobilization.[58]

Kremlin officials continue to propose expansions of the categories of Russians eligible for mobilization. Russian Investigative Committee Head Aleksandr Bastrykin stated on January 13 that foreigners are receiving Russian citizenship in droves and are bypassing military service, including more than a million migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus over the past five years.[59] Bastrykin argued that Russia should consider participation in the ”special military operation” a priority for naturalized Russian citizens.[60]

Russian authorities continue efforts to use religion to justify their force generation campaigns and recruit forces to partake in the war in Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on January 13 that the Chechen Republic Spiritual Administration of Muslims Chairman, Mufti Salah Mezhiyev, will deploy to Ukraine to fight and perform religious activities.[61] The milblogger also claimed that Russian officials are forming a battalion of imams and training theologians, including Mezhiyev, at the Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya.[62]

Russian officers continue attempts to eliminate publicized dissent among Russian servicemembers. A wife of a mobilized soldier in Russia’s 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment told a Russian news outlet that Russian military command sent mobilized soldiers serving in the regiment to frontline trenches as punishment for recording a video appeal about their lack of equipment.[63]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce residents of occupied Kherson Oblast to evacuate. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan reported on January 14 that Russian authorities are attempting to lure Kherson Oblast residents to move to Russia using “mythical” promises of money and housing certificates.[64] Khlan claimed that Russian forces announced that they will forcibly evacuate hospital patients and leave patients who choose not to evacuate on the street on an unspecified future date.[65] Khlan claimed that occupation authorities are also dismissing hospital staff despite reported medical personnel shortages and the ongoing import of Russian medical professionals.[66] Kherson occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo stated on January 12 that his administration "evacuated” 160,000 residents of Kherson Oblast to unspecified “safe” locations.[67] Khlan dismissed the claim that thousands of Kherson Oblast residents have chosen to evacuate without evidence.[68]

Ukrainian partisan attacks and resulting Russian security crackdowns continue to disrupt Russian rear security efforts and occupation authorities’ efforts to establish stable control. The Ukrainian Resistance Center identified the car that exploded on January 13 on the outskirts of Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast, as the vehicle of Berdyansk Raion occupation administration head Oleksiy Kychyhin.[69] Russian sources claimed that the explosion did not injure Kychyhin.[70] Russian occupation authorities continue to surveil, monitor the phone communications of, and raid the homes of residents in the occupied territories due to their growing concern of partisan activity or collaboration with Ukrainian forces.[71]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Serhiy Nayev stated on January 14 that the current ratio of Ukrainian forces operating on Ukraine’s northern border to Russian forces in Belarus is sufficient to stabilize the border.[72] Nayev added that Ukrainian reserves could redeploy in response to an increased threat from Belarus.
  • Russian forces continue to deploy to Belarus. Social media footage shows that additional trainload of Russian military equipment arrived in Gomel Oblast on January 13.[73]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 24 hours:

  • The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 14.[74]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/14/mayemo-zrobyty-vse-shhob-zupynyty-rashyzm-tak-samo-yak-vilnyj-svit-svogo-chasu-zupynyv-naczyzm-prezydent-ukrayiny/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02kXFoFrQ4rqhyTWJpzD...

[4] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/14/rechnyk-povitryanyh-syl-rozpoviv-z-chogo-ta-zvidky-rosiyany-jmovirno-zavdaly-udariv-po-stolyczi/

[5] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[6] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[8] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[10] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[12] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[13] https://russiaun dot ru/ru/news/130123_n

[32] https://suspilne dot media/358704-bitva-za-donbas-trivae-rosia-moze-rozpocati-nastup-z-okupovanih-teritorij-pivdna-ta-shodu-325-den-vijni-onlajn/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NiBfb425kIk ; https://youtu.be/Zx-yO73bXMk; https://t.me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/6281 ...

[52] ttps://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1189

[53] ttps://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/1189

[57] https://t.me/bloodysx/25161; https://www.starhit dot ru/life/dmitrii-peskov-kremlyu-nichego-ne-izvestno-ob-otmene-otsrochki-dlya-otcov-s-tremya-detmi-860807/; https://t.me/CITeam/3035

[63] https://vnnews dot ru/uchastnikov-video-iz-ledyanykh-okopov-v-n-2/; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-jan-12-13

[69] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/14/v-berdyansku-pidirvaly-mashynu-misczevogo-gaulyajtera/; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/44412; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/statu... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/75267

[70] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/14/v-berdyansku-pidirvaly-mashynu-misczevogo-gaulyajtera/; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/44412; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/statu... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/75267

understandingwar.org



2. New Jersey requiring students to learn 'media literacy' to fight 'disinformation'




​Perhaps we are taking a lesson from Finland: "How Finland Is Teaching a Generation to Spot Misinformation: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/10/world/europe/finland-misinformation-classes.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare​


New Jersey requiring students to learn 'media literacy' to fight 'disinformation'

foxnews.com · by David Rutz | Fox News

Video

Governor Murphy is the ‘master of misinformation’ and 'hypocrisy': Joe Concha

Fox News contributor Joe Concha discusses New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy’s decision to require media literacy for grades K-12 on ‘Fox & Friends Weekend.’

New Jersey is now requiring all students in grades K-12 to be taught "media literacy" as a means of fighting so-called misinformation.

"Our democracy remains under sustained attack through the proliferation of disinformation that is eroding the role of truth in our political and civic discourse," Gov. Phil Murphy, D., said in a statement. "It is our responsibility to ensure our nation’s future leaders are equipped with the tools necessary to identify fact from fiction."

"K-12 media literacy education will empower future leaders to accurately assess information — essential in preserving our democracy in a time of disinformation," he added in a tweet.


New Jersey Gov. Phil Murphy is touting a new media literacy law for students K-12 as a means of fighting "disinformation." (Eduardo Munoz Alvarez/Getty Images)

GAVIN NEWSOM TAKES HITS FROM TWITTER AFTER HERALDING CALIFORNIA AS THE ‘TRUE FREEDOM STATE’

Murphy signed the bill after it passed on a bipartisan basis last month in the state legislature. The law is aimed at helping students better determine credible sources by learning the difference between news and opinion, as well as primary and secondary sources, and improving their research methods and literacy skills.

"School librarians and media specialists and teachers would be enlisted to help develop standards for information learning, including digital, visual, media, textual, and technological literacy. The law requires that public hearings be held on the standards before adoption by the state Board of Education," The Philadelphia Inquirer reported about the law.

The bill's defenders frame it as a means of combating the spread of falsehoods online on topics like the 2020 election and coronavirus pandemic, but some critics are uncomfortable with the idea of the government declaring what is and isn't absolute truth, as things once dismissed as crackpot theories like the Wuhan lab-leak hypothesis have become more mainstream as time passed.

"Isn't that amazing? The government's now involved in what's misinformation and what isn't," Fox News contributor Joe Concha said Saturday on "Fox & Friends Weekend."


Empty classroom in an elementary school. (FNC)

BIDEN'S WAR ON ‘DISINFORMATION’ RAMPS UP AS GOP ACCUSES OFFICIALS OF PLAYING POLITICS WITH THE TRUTH

A New Jersey parent himself, Concha assailed Murphy as a "master of disinformation and hypocrisy," pointing to his administration's stringent COVID-19 policies and accusations of hypocrisy when it came to masking.

"Disinformation" has become a ubiquitous term in modern political combat, with Democrats and liberal media members often baldly using the word to label certain opinions and viewpoints.

Concha noted that he would have been accused of spreading disinformation at one point for saying that Hunter Biden's laptop was not a product of Russian intelligence, a talking point that was pushed heavily from liberal media outlets in the run-up to 2020.

"Who decides what's truth and what isn't? It certainly shouldn't be the teachers unions and the government… It's going to be weaponized," Concha said. "It's so subjective."

CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP

A federal Disinformation Governance Board under the Department of Homeland Security came under severe criticism last year and was hastily disbanded.

David Rutz is a senior editor at Fox News. Follow him on Twitter at @davidrutz.

foxnews.com · by David Rutz | Fox News




3. The sun is crackling with ‘solar flares’. Here’s what that means.


I would hate to be an 18E, Special Forces Communications Sergeant, trying to make HF comms these days! (though I would keep this article at hand to explain why we would not make comms)


Excerpt:

On Tuesday, at least one X flare caused a strong radio blackout. Amateur radio operators and those using sensitive navigation equipment near the poles might may have noticed. Minor shortwave radio blackouts are unlikely to be disruptive to the average person.



The sun is crackling with ‘solar flares’. Here’s what that means.

The sudden flare-up of activity bodes well for a potentially active solar cycle and colorful aurora displays

By Matthew Cappucci and Joe Kunches 

January 12, 2023 at 2:28 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Matthew Cappucci · January 12, 2023

After a long period of relative slumber, the sun is waking up and sputtering with unrest. Experts say the start of the new “solar cycle” could be roaring like a lion — with impacts possible here on Earth.

In just the past week, three X-class solar flares — the strongest bracket on the scale — have erupted on the sun’s surface. Solar flares are bursts of energy that travel at the speed of light, composed of electromagnetic radiation that can affect radio communications. None has been aiming toward Earth, but that could change in the weeks ahead.

The sudden flare-up of activity may also be a sign that experts grossly underestimated how busy Solar Cycle 25 — current iteration of the sun’s magnetic rhythm — will be. A few bold solar physicists have deviated from the consensus expectations, calling instead for a spike of robust storminess on the sun in the years ahead. This new flurry shows those outliers may wind up being right.

What is a solar flare?

Solar flares come from sunspots, or bruiselike discolorations on the surface of the sun that pulsate with energy. They’re also regions from which magnetic flux pours out; those magnetic field lines loop back and reconnect elsewhere on the sun’s surface.

Like stretched rubber bands, sometimes magnetic fields get contorted, causing pent-up energy that must be released. When that happens, a burst of electromagnetism known as a flare is ejected from the parent “sunspot.”

Flares can cause radio blackouts and sometimes interfere with or even damage satellites. They can also deliver harmful radiation to passengers on aircraft passing near the poles.

Sometimes a CME, or coronal mass ejection, can occur as well. CMEs are accompanied by magnetic disturbances that can rattle Earth’s geomagnetic field, triggering vibrant displays of the Northern and Southern lights (aurora borealis and australis). CMEs only affect us if they are Earth-directed.

How often do they occur?

Unbelievable, the Sun just produced its third X-class #SolarFlare in almost as many days! However, this time from a different active region than the first two. The Sun has two X-class-producing active regions on disk, making it difficult for observers choosing where to point  pic.twitter.com/396qOjNPnQ
— Dr. Ryan French (@RyanJFrench) January 11, 2023

The number of flares and CMEs that occur is proportional to the number of sunspots on the solar disk. Those sunspots are most common at the peak of each 11-year “solar cycle,” which solar physicists have confirmed is actually a subset of several overlapping cycles on both shorter and longer time frames.

At “solar maximum,” which is estimated to occur in July 2025 (give or take), NASA and NOAA forecasters are anticipating about 115 sunspots per month. But a pair of researchers — Scott McIntosh, deputy director of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, and Bob Leamon, a researcher at the University of Maryland Baltimore and NASA Goddard — predict twice as many. So far, current trends are on pace for their prediction.

In either case, the number of sunspots, and subsequently flares and CMEs, will increase over the coming two-plus years. It’s a stark change from 2019, during which 77 percent of the year — 281 days total — showed not a single blemish anywhere on the sun.

What’s going on right now?

Over the past week, three X-class flares have spurted off from two eruptive sunspot groups. The sunspot clusters have been named “active region 3186” and “active region 3184,” according to NOAA. Both are located in the eastern hemisphere of the sun; the former is north of the equator, and the latter to the south. Both will rotate more directly toward the center of the solar disk (what’s facing us head-on), and could find themselves in position to affect Earth’s “space weather” in the weeks ahead.

On Tuesday, at least one X flare caused a strong radio blackout. Amateur radio operators and those using sensitive navigation equipment near the poles might may have noticed. Minor shortwave radio blackouts are unlikely to be disruptive to the average person.

In the event of an Earth-directed flare and CME, there’s a chance for more serious geomagnetic storming, which could force power companies and satellite operators to take precautions to protect valuable, sensitive electronics. More pronounced displays of the Northern and Southern lights, possibly down to the mid-latitudes (including the northern United States), may also be in the offing.

The Washington Post · by Matthew Cappucci · January 12, 2023





4. Rare earths find in Sweden: A gamechanger?



I certainly hope so. And if this comes to fruition it is another reason why we need to be concerned with the northern sea lanes of communication.



Rare earths find in Sweden: A gamechanger? – DW – 01/13/2023


Arthur Sullivan

01/13/2023January 13, 2023

A big find of raw materials critical for green technology has been announced in Sweden. Since Europe does not produce its own so-called 'rare earths' so far could this news be a gamechanger?

DW

The Swedish state-owned mining company LKAB announced on Thursday that it had found more than a million tons of rare earth oxides in Kiruna, northern Sweden.

Rare earth elements, also known as rare earth metals or rare earth oxides, are a set of 17 heavy metals which have a wide range of commercial and industrial uses. They are of particular importance for the green transition, as they are needed for the production of wind turbines and electric vehicles.

However, the EU is heavily dependent on importing them or the compounds they are needed for.

Jan Moström, CEO of LKAB, said in a statement that the find was good news for "Europe and the climate", adding "it could become a significant building block for producing the critical raw materials that are absolutely crucial to enable the green transition."

Experts say the size of the find still needs to be verified but the estimate from the company of 1 million tons would make it the largest of its kind in Europe.

Is this a big surprise?

Not really. The deposit, dubbed Per Geijer, is located in the Swedish portion of the Arctic Circle, which has been known to be rich in rare earth minerals for several decades. LKAB already runs the largest iron ore mine in Europe and their exploration for rare earths in Kiruna has been widely publicized.

LKAB already controls Europe's largest iron ore mineImage: Jonas Ekstremer/TT/picture alliance

How rare are rare earths and who has them all?

Despite the name, rare earths are plentiful in many parts of the world but mining and extracting them is extremely complex and costly. It can also be very damaging to the environment.

China has by far the largest amount of rare earth reserves of any country in the world, followed by Vietnam, Brazil and Russia. However, in terms of refining and processing rare earths, China is further ahead: according to data from the US Geological Survey, it accounted for more than 60% of all rare earths production as of January 2022, followed by the US (16%), Myanmar (9%) and Australia (8%).

In Europe, there are heavy regulatory barriers to the mining and production of critical raw materials and it does not currently mine raw earths. As a result, the EU is heavily dependent on China and other countries for them.

That has become a major political issue given how the EU wants to both end trade dependencies on China and Russia and boost its own green technologies to achieve its climate goals. The $369-billion (€340-billion) Inflation Reduction Act in the US, which gives massive subsidies to green technologies, has also ramped up the pressure on the EU.

So how significant could this find be for Europe?

"Superlative claims abound whenever a new rare earth deposit is announced, so it is important to look at the data," Julie Klinger, a professor of geography at the University of Delaware, told DW.

"If you take a look back at the headlines concerning rare earth deposits in Greenland, North Korea, Afghanistan, Turkey, the ocean floor, the Moon: all are claimed to be the largest or one of the largest," she added, stressing the need for the find to be verified.

Nabeel Mancheri, secretary-general of the Global Rare Earth Industry Association, says a lot more work is needed to determine the quality of the deposit.

"Economically speaking, these are not 'reserves' yet. You still need a lot of drilling, a lot of testing, and you don't have the full information about what quality the ore grade is yet," he told DW.

Klinger says the find could potentially end up being an alternative source for Europe's rare earth needs, but said it would take between 10 and 15 years to develop a mine, which is in line with the company's own estimates.

Made in Germany - The race for critical raw materials

"This is not just because of the permitting, although that is often blamed. It is a monumental construction and engineering feat to open a new mine," she said.

What needs to happen now?

In order for LKAB to exploit the discovery, they would need to drive a change in how the EU approaches the issue of mining for such raw materials.

"The EU has long since discarded mining as something that 'we don't want to be in our backyard,'" said Mancheri.

LKAB CEO Moström says he hopes the stringent permitting processes for mining within the EU can be sped up in order for the company to bring finished materials more quickly to market. "If we really want to pursue the green transition we must find ways to speed up this process quite substantially," he said at a press conference.

The European Commission is currently working on lowering the barriers to the mining and production of critical raw materials for the green transition.


However, Mancheri says establishing a mining industry is still only half the job. "Once you have the mining, you also need to establish the processing industry," he said, referring to the complex and hugely energy intensive processes of isolating and refining rare earths.

Will the rare earths only be used for the green transition?

Experts say this is a critical question, as rare earths are also used in many polluting industries.

"Although most of the press releases emphasize the importance of rare earth elements for renewable energy technologies, rare earth elements are also important for petroleum refining and are important for military-industrial applications," said Klinger.

"There is currently no policy in place, in the EU or elsewhere, that protects materials mined in the name of climate change from capture by other, less climate-friendly sectors. Even the Swedish state-owned LKAB, or any other mining company for that matter, is not required to sell its output to firms in the renewable energy technologies sector."

She says that if mining firms such as LKAB are to demand that the permit process is sped up for them in the name of fighting climate change, there must be EU rules which prevent the output going to non-green sectors.

Edited by: Uwe Hessler

DW


5. Former Russian president says Japanese leader should disembowel himself


Wow. I have no words.



Former Russian president says Japanese leader should disembowel himself

The Washington Post · by Bryan Pietsch · January 15, 2023

Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president and a senior security official in President Vladimir Putin’s administration, said Saturday that Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida should perform a ritualistic suicide by disembowelment to repent for what Medvedev called servitude to the United States.

Medvedev’s remarks were in response to a joint statement Friday by President Biden and Kishida, in which the leaders said that “any use of a nuclear weapon by Russia in Ukraine would be an act of hostility against humanity and unjustifiable in any way.”

Russian military leaders have discussed the potential use of a tactical nuclear weapon should their invasion of Ukraine face more setbacks.

Medvedev, who was president from 2008 to 2012 and is deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, said in a Telegram post that the statement by Kishida and Biden amounted to “paranoia.” He added that Kishida was a “servant” to the United States.

The only way for Kishida to atone for “such a shame” would be to perform a “hara-kiri” in front of a meeting of his cabinet, Medvedev said, using a Japanese term for an ancient ritualistic disembowelment.

Tass, Russia’s state news agency, avoided repeating Medvedev’s comments, writing only that he “described a method” for Kishida to repent.

As president, Medvedev was viewed optimistically in the West as a potential partner in forging improved relations. But in 2011, he went along with a switch that returned Putin to the presidency, and in early 2020, Medvedev resigned as prime minister to make way for constitutional changes that allowed Putin to serve further terms and tighten his grip on power.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, Medvedev has sought relevance as an attack dog, using his Telegram account to issue bombastic and hyperbolic threats against the West, including that Russia would potentially use nuclear weapons, as well as insults against public figures he perceives as enemies. He has also called for Ukraine’s “total capitulation.”

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not immediately respond to a request for comment about Medvedev’s remarks.

The joint statement, issued while Kishida visited Washington last week to meet with Biden, addressed countering Russia and China, as Kishida repeated his concerns over the weekend that East Asia could face a fate similar to that of Ukraine amid Beijing’s simmering ambitions in the region.

They said in their statement that China’s recent actions have been “inconsistent with the rules-based international order.”

In response to the statement, Wang Wenbin, a spokesman for China’s Foreign Ministry, said the phrasing “smacks heavily of a zero-sum Cold War mentality and contains groundless smears and attacks on China.” He alleged that the United States and Japan were “finding pretexts for military buildup and willful use of force.”

Kishida, speaking through an interpreter at a news conference before the meeting with Biden, said the two countries are “currently facing the most challenging and complex security environment in recent history.”

Japan unveiled a revamped national security strategy last month as it grapples with increasing concerns posed by China and North Korea.

The Washington Post · by Bryan Pietsch · January 15, 2023



6. Hate speech rises on Twitter in its largest markets after Musk takeover


No surprise. It seems Twitter brings out the worst in some (many?) people.



Hate speech rises on Twitter in its largest markets after Musk takeover

With 75 percent of its audience outside the U.S. and Canada, the impact of Elon Musk’s moderation cuts has been great elsewhere

By Gerry ShihMichael Miller and Joseph Menn 

January 14, 2023 at 7:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Gerry Shih · January 14, 2023

SAN FRANCISCO — Elon Musk’s overhaul of Twitter has been accompanied by an increase in digital harassment of religious and ethnic minorities in some of its largest markets outside the United States — and it’s beginning to wreak havoc in the physical world as well, according to current and former employees and experts studying the issue.

Musk has fired or accepted resignations from about three-fourths of Twitter’s employees since his $44 billion takeover at the end of October. He has also terminated thousands of contractors who were monitoring the site for slurs and threats.

Those cuts went deepest outside North America, where more than 75 percent of the company’s 280 million daily users live and where Twitter already had fewer moderators who understood local languages and cultural references and where the political landscape could be chaotic and prone to violence.

Musk also welcomed back thousands of banned accounts, including many suspended for promoting hate or violence, even as he has personally has tweeted misinformation and interacted with far-right accounts. Sensing an opportunity, if not a welcome, political operatives and attention-seeking profiteers have rushed to fill the vacuum that the drop in moderation efforts has left, employees said.

That has changed the tenor of the site in its No. 2 market, Japan, where nearly 59 million are estimated to use the site, and made it more fraught in India (nearly 24 million users) and Brazil (nearly 20 million), the third and fourth largest markets, according to current and former staff and researchers. Musk cut virtually all staff in Brazil, allowing an unmoderated surge in misinformation that helped fuel this month’s attacks on the country’s government center.

Even in the better-moderated English-speaking world, the tone of Twitter has become rougher, say those tasked with monitoring the site. Australia’s eSafety commissioner, Julie Inman Grant, who worked at Twitter from 2014 to 2016, told The Washington Post that the platform had already been like a “sewer” in her country before Musk let some of the worst users back on.

“You can’t expect them not to behave like sewer rats, and you probably should expect that further pestilence is going to expand to the user base,” said Inman Grant, who has written the company twice and reminded it that she can order abusive material to be taken down. “It’s becoming a cesspool.”

Australian Electoral Commissioner Tom Rogers said he has been taken aback by vitriolic attacks on a campaign to persuade more indigenous people to register to vote ahead of a referendum expected next year on whether the legislature should have an advisory council of native people. “We’re watching it very closely. This has been a dry run for what we might see when that referendum occurs,” he said.

Tweets from Sydney-area accounts using two of the most common gay slurs doubled in volume over the last three weeks of November, according to Timothy Graham, a digital media expert at the Queensland University of Technology.

“It is reasonable to argue that Elon Musk’s disintegration of the Twitter safety team and major cuts to moderation is influencing these trends,” Graham said. “At the least, it strongly suggests that Elon’s claims about hate speech reduction are overblown. If anything, the trend is increasing.”

In Australia, Twitter is in the process of laying off even more of its staff.

Entire teams monitoring Asian countries, including Japan, are now gone or nearly so, including those responsible for local curation, trust and safety, and legal issues.

Twitter employees in Singapore and elsewhere in Asia worked on misinformation beyond the immediate region, monitoring content on everything including the war in Ukraine, protests in Iran and major elections in markets where Twitter has less presence. The teams were expanding efforts to identify and remove Russian misinformation around the Ukraine war when their computers were turned off Nov. 4.

“The people who were in the U.S., because of their location, were primarily dealing with the U.S. Outside, we were taking on everything else. There was already that neglect underlying in the company, and now it has been exacerbated,” a former employee who worked on misinformation in the Asia-Pacific region said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters.

India was a particular focus for Twitter moderation before the layoffs because it was a priority market and because political misinformation there was rife, along with legitimate protest. Moderation for that country has fallen precipitously with staff cuts.

In the past, employees could report any misinformation or hate speech, while curation teams would de-emphasize hashtags that were especially partisan or invited hatred of minority groups.

One former Twitter employee said a Nov. 18 post written by provocateur Suresh Chavhanke would have “definitely” been taken down previously for violating platform’s policy.

The media entrepreneur and militant Hindu nationalist shared a wedding invitation for an interfaith couple that was to take place two days later at an event hall in the Mumbai suburbs — just weeks after the murder of a Hindu woman from the same neighborhood, allegedly by her Muslim boyfriend, made national news.

“How is this still happening even after the heart-rending crime?” Chavhanke demanded to know. He added the hashtag #lovejihad_ActOfTerrorism — a reference to a popular but false claim in India that Muslim men were broadly waging religious war by seducing Hindu women.

The post from Chavhanke racked up more than 5,700 retweets and 10,000 likes, with some of his followers urging local residents to stop the wedding. Activists tried to report his post by tagging and emailing Twitter employees, to no avail. The couple’s relatives were inundated with phone calls, the event hall proprietor told the media outlet Newslaundry. By evening, the families had called off the wedding.

Chavhanke has gone further since then, posting on Twitter a new email address and phone number for tipsters across India to report interfaith relationships.

Alt News and SM Hoax Slayer, two Indian fact-checking and social media advocacy groups, said they tried to alert Twitter through emails about Chavhanke’s post trolling the interfaith wedding. Nothing happened.

“There has to be somebody there to make a determination about takedowns. I’m not sure if they have the bandwidth,” said Pratik Sinha, the co-founder of Alt News.

Current and former employees in India said they worried about both moderation team cuts and the departure of lesser-known teams that improved the platform, including by debunking disinformation.

In the past, said Sinha of Alt News: “They elevated our fact checks multiple times, when the curation team was around.”

During a fraught 2021 election in India’s biggest state, Uttar Pradesh, one employee said Twitter’s content curation team promoted Indian fact-checkers who debunked fake posts alleging ballot box tampering.

That team hasn’t posted anything related to India recently, though forged photos again became an issue in the closely watched Gujarat state elections.

In Japan, Twitter’s largest market outside the United States, staff cuts and other changes have produced a different feel to the service without inflaming passions.

In the past, a small team curated topics of interest and promoted them, which made Twitter an important resource for people to discuss serious issues anonymously. That produced more varied takes on political and cultural issues than did the relatively uniform news media.

But with the news curation team gone, trending topics that are surfaced automatically are less about political events and more about entertainment topics, a review of posts found.

Users said topics that disappeared from their timelines in recent weeks included the divisive issue of the U.S. military’s presence in Okinawa and socially sensitive topics like infertility and feminism.

Users reported that they no longer see tweets about issues such as human rights or criticism of the administration of Shinzo Abe, a polarizing political leader who was assassinated in July.

While that disappointed some earnest Twitter users, others were relieved.

“No more political topics trending on Twitter. How peaceful,” one posted.

Shih reported from Delhi, Miller from Sydney and Menn from San Francisco. Shibani Mahtani in Singapore and Julia Mio Inuma in Tokyo contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Gerry Shih · January 14, 2023


7. UK to send Apache helicopters and modern tanks to Ukraine


As others have mentioned, American approval for the Apaches must be necessary. I wonder if the Biden administration is anticipating the soon to come push back from the radical hard right Republicans and the radical hard left progressive Democrats who want to end or at least scale back support to Ukraine. The Administration may be blocked from providing advanced weaponry to Ukraine by these factions so it is acting now and through allies to get such equipment to Ukraine.




UK to send Apache helicopters and modern tanks to Ukraine

english.nv.ua

15 January, 12:09 PM

Share:



Apache AH64 E Helikopter (Photo:en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_AH-64_Apache)

The UK will supply Ukraine with Apache attack helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles, UK tabloid Mirror reported on Jan. 14.

A senior defense source told the publication that the helicopters would follow the delivery of Challenger 2 main battle tanks.

"The Apache will be a major game-changer,” the source told the Mirror.

“The tanks will arrive first and it will take a while before helicopters can be deployed. Other NATO members will now follow suit.”

Video of day

The Apache can be armed with up to 16 anti-tank Hellfire missiles, 76 Hydra 70mm rockets, and a 30mm chain gun.

"This means four Apaches could wipe out an entire regiment of 70 tanks within moments," the Mirror wrote.

Ukrainian pilots are to be trained in the UK, while a maintenance base for the helicopters will be established in a neighboring country, such as Poland.

Earlier, it was reported that the UK would accelerate Ukraine support and would send a squadron of Challenger 2 tanks and around 30 self-propelled AS90 guns.

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8. The Taiwanese Expedition – Xi Jinping has read Thucydides. Have the China hawks?


Basically an argument for why we should not support Taiwan because the PRC know it would be too costly to invade.Excerpts:


Yet the story of the Sicilian Expedition shares enough fundamentals with the current Taiwan situation to provide useful points of caution both to China and to the U.S. It is simply difficult to project force onto a rugged island inhabited by the rich, the well-armed, and the hostile. Efforts to do so will certainly meet with difficulty, sometimes with catastrophe.
...
An obvious truth bears repeating: For historical and geographic reasons, China has a much greater interest in the resolution of the Taiwan question than the U.S. does. At the same time, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, even if successful, would weaken China. Would those agitating for direct American military involvement to prevent such a war have argued for American military involvement in the Afghan-Soviet wars? Would it have been to America’s advantage to have become so involved?


Why should Sparta discourage Athenian excursions in Sicily?


I still return to Sun Tzu: "never assume your enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible "which is why the first paragraph of the excerpt above is so important.



The Taiwanese Expedition - The American Conservative

Xi Jinping has read Thucydides. Have the China hawks?

The American Conservative · by Jude Russo · January 12, 2023

Posit two national powers. One is based on a continental mainland; it enjoys a relative preeminence in wealth and manpower and has historically appeared successful in its efforts to project force on nearby neighbors and even overseas. This mainland power has been formally at peace with its main rival for several years under a treaty still considered binding despite continued tensions and infringements of treaty terms.

The second power is a large island. Its inhabitants are historically friendly with the first power’s current enemies but have not taken much of a role in existing conflicts because of internal concerns. The island, which is resource-rich and agriculturally self-sufficient, is mountainous and largely forested in its interior. The inhabitants’ political orientation varies, but generally rejects the first power’s putative egalitarianism; some elements agitate for a complete separation from mainland interests. The islanders are wealthy and technically advanced.


In a bid for wealth and national glory, and to prevent the islanders from materially aiding the mainlanders’ enemies, the mainlanders decide to invade the island. The mainland power’s deliberative body decides to commit an exceptionally large force to subduing the island. They expect politically friendly elements among the islanders to come to their aid after the initial shock of the invasion.

Despite initial success for the mainland forces, a three-year campaign ensues. The islanders’ infrastructure allows them to hold out against the initial assault, and their physical and agricultural wealth allow them to stay fed and armed indefinitely. Logistical advantages carry the day; the islanders use the rough (and, for the mainlanders, unfamiliar) terrain to harry the invading force and press advantages as they come. The unsuccessful campaign is expensive, wastes an enormous amount of manpower, and leaves the mainland power prone to attack from its other enemies.

This is not a prediction of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan that some in the military establishment have claimed could come as soon as this year — it is a summary of the Athenian invasion of Sicily in 416 B.C. as described by Thucydides in The Peloponnesian War. The Sicilian Expedition was catastrophic for Athens; it began a period of decline that concluded with the 404 capture of Athens and the destruction of its alliance-as-empire, the Delian League, at the hands of the Persian-backed and Spartan-led Peloponnesian League.

History rhymes rather than repeats: Modern technology annihilates distance, and the breadth of the Taiwan Strait is only a third of the distance between Syracuse and Corfu, the Athenian base of operations. While the Sicilian Greeks were slow to prepare for war even in the face of the Athenian expeditionary force—ultimately organizing under the influence of Spartan general Gylippus—every week brings news of Taiwanese drills and war games. The deterioration of the Peace of Nicias invited direct interference from Sparta in a way that is not reflected in current U.S.–China relations.

Yet the story of the Sicilian Expedition shares enough fundamentals with the current Taiwan situation to provide useful points of caution both to China and to the U.S. It is simply difficult to project force onto a rugged island inhabited by the rich, the well-armed, and the hostile. Efforts to do so will certainly meet with difficulty, sometimes with catastrophe.


Xi Jinping has evinced familiarity with Thucydides in public statements. “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves,” he said during a 2015 speech in Seattle, referring to the historian’s argument that the challenge to Athenian hegemony caused the Peloponnesian War. Do we think he failed to notice in his reading the campaign that dominates Thucydides’ history for two full books?


Think-tank war gamers insisted last month that a Chinese invasion of the island could be repelled only with the aid of American force, an argument taken up by legislators calling for “deterrence” by deploying American personnel directly to Taiwan. Maybe, but a war game assumes the premise that war will break out. Why do we think that China has not considered the inherent difficulty of the task at hand, or its own continued industrial reliance on Taiwanese products? And, if China wishes to weaken itself with a war that, even if successful, will be costly and bloody, why should America stop it at such great cost?

An obvious truth bears repeating: For historical and geographic reasons, China has a much greater interest in the resolution of the Taiwan question than the U.S. does. At the same time, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, even if successful, would weaken China. Would those agitating for direct American military involvement to prevent such a war have argued for American military involvement in the Afghan-Soviet wars? Would it have been to America’s advantage to have become so involved?

Why should Sparta discourage Athenian excursions in Sicily?

The American Conservative · by Jude Russo · January 12, 2023



9. US should help arm Taiwan with missiles to destroy Shanghai, says ex-general





US should help arm Taiwan with missiles to destroy Shanghai, says ex-general

the-sun.com · by Tariq Tahir · January 14, 2023

TAIWAN should be armed with missiles able destroy Shanghai to deter China from invading, a former US general has said.

David Deptula also believes the United States should make it clear it's prepared to hit mainland China with stealth bombers to make it think twice about trying to seize the island.


David Deptula is a former US Air Force General and fighter pilotCredit: United States Air Force


Soldiers pose for group photos with a Taiwan flag in war games to simulate a Chinese invasionCredit: AP

The retired US Air Force General was speaking at the unveiling of a wargame that showed what would happen if the US and China went to war over Taiwan.

It was carried out by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and in one scenario, the US would lost least US two aircraft carriers and hundreds of warplanes.

China regards the self-governing island as part of its territory and has vowed to reunite it with the mainland by force if necessary.

But Deptula, a former fighter pilot, said the US needs to "get creative in deterring China from invading Taiwan" adding "I’ll offer an example".

“Assisting Taiwan in acquiring an abundance of surface to surface missiles with the range to reach Shanghai and threaten its destruction," he said.

“The risk of losing their cultural and financial capital would weigh heavily on Xi Jinping and crew.

“As everyone understands, deterrence involves inducing sufficient uncertainty regarding success and or consequences in the PRC’s mind so that they elect not to invade."

He also said it was "extraordinarily unwise from a deterrent perspective" to declare "that US attacks against China’s mainland would be off the table".

“That option should remain in play," he said.

“Stealth bombers provide and enormous advantage in this arena.

“They can be launched from well beyond the area of operations, they carry large payloads and are the only reusable assets capable of significantly penetrating mainland China.”

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has refused to rule out force and after becoming leader for life, some are predicting Beijing is "all but guaranteed" to attack Taiwan.

The short but brutally intense conflict would see around a fifth of US carriers and combat planes destroyed, as well as least 20 other warships, according to the chilling scenario.

The CSIS wargame envisages a number scenarios for a Chinese attempt to take the island in 2026 and the damage inflicted on US forces coming to its aid.

In their basic scenario, the US Navy’s losses “included two US aircraft carriers as well as between 7 and 20 other major surface warships”.

The losses of combat aircraft range from a low of 90 to a high of 774.

Currently the US has 11 aircraft carriers and is estimated to have around 3800 combat aircraft.

The attacks would include strikes by China's DF-17 hypersonic missile dubbed the "carrier killer" for the it's ability to be guided onto powerful US ships at terrifying speed.

The losses translates into at least 3200 US dead at a rate 140 a day, which dwarfs those suffered during America’s recent conflicts and approaches the 300 killed per day in World War 2.

By comparison, the US sustained about three killed per day in Afghanistan and Iraq, while at at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968, it lost 30 killed per day.

The wargame sees the Chinese hitting US bases at Kadena in Japan and on the island of Guam with a barrage of missiles and strikes by planes.


Why is Taiwan a flashpoint between the US and China?

The dispute over Taiwan stems back to the Chinese civil war, which ended in 1949 with the victory of the Communist Party Mao Zedong.

Taiwan - with a population of just 22 million - was recognised by the as the government of China until 1971 when the mainland took its seat at the United Nations.

China’s deposed leader Chiang Kaishek, who was backed by US, fled with his defeat forces the island of Taiwan, about 100 miles off the coast of the mainland.

Taiwan has since developed an identity of its own and become a thriving democratic country with close ties to the West, in particular the US.

The party led by its current president Tsai Ingwen has independence as its ultimate goal.

But China continues to regard the island has being part of its territory and vowed to reunify it by force if necessary.

Even holding a vote on independence is widely seen as the trigger for war.

To that end China has been pouring billions into modernising its military, including now building a fleet of aircraft carriers to match the US Navy.

That has put the country on a collision course with the United States, its main arms supplier.

President Joe Biden has recently said America will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.

In recent years tensions have been rising as US air and naval forces patrol the sea around Taiwan, to China's intense annoyance.

Chinese warplanes regularly buzz the island while it has stepped up rehearsals for invasion.

Such an attack has been compared to that carried out by the Japanese on us forces at Pearl Harbor.

The wargame paints a grim picture off what reinforcements arriving at Kadena would encounter.

There would be “entire squadrons" of wrecked US aircraft "bulldozed to the side of the runway”.

In addition to the material damage there is the shocking sight of “hundreds of wounded in the base hospital, and temporary cemeteries to handle the many dead”.

“Missile attacks and air combat will have wiped out squadrons that arrived only a few days earlier.

“Newly arriving personnel will be required to immediately conduct operations against the powerful Chinese forces that have caused so many casualties.”

According to the CSIS the devastation would come as a blow to the US.

“In addition to shocking the US public, the scale of casualties and equipment loss would stagger a US military that has dominated battlefields for a generation,” says the CSIS.

“These losses would be particularly difficult for the Air Force and Navy, which have essentially operated in sanctuary since the end of World War II.

“Such losses would damage the US global position for many years.”

Ultimately, China can only take Taiwan if the US doesn’t come to its aid “suffers heavily” if it fights America, the wargame predicts.

“Its navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers are prisoners of war."

While the US would win and Taiwan survive as a self-governing island, the losses on all sides would be staggering, says the CSIS.

“The United States might win a pyrrhic victory, suffering more in the long run than the ‘defeated’ Chinese. Victory is not everything.”

While Beijing may be preparing for a lightning war to storm across the Taiwan Strait and capture the island, experts have said the war could be anything but quick.

With tough beaches, rocky terrain, well-drilled defenders, and unforgiving seas, China could face the same brutal grinding warfare that Russia is facing in Ukraine.

Taking Taiwan could even require Beijing to muster a force of two million troops, it's been claimed.


US planes at Kadena - the wargame predicts large numbers of them will be destroyed thereCredit: SWNS

6

The Chinese DF-17 missile is dubbed the 'carrier killer'


America would lose two of the giant ships in a war with ChinaCredit: AP

the-sun.com · by Tariq Tahir · January 14, 2023



10. Call for PLA to use AI for ‘smart deterrence’ against US over Taiwan



Key points:


He said the concept of “smart deterrence” was being studied within the PLA.
Ni made the remarks in an article in the journal Cross-Strait Taiwan Studies, which was posted on its social media account earlier this week.
He suggested the PLA could become a leader in future intelligent warfare, drawing on capabilities in AI, cloud computing, big data, cyber offence and defence, and unmanned equipment.
Ni also called for the PLA to normalise military drills that cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait – the de facto sea border separating mainland China from Taiwan – and that approach the baseline of the island’s territorial waters and cut off transport.





Call for PLA to use AI for ‘smart deterrence’ against US over Taiwan

By Amber Wang South China Morning Post3 min

January 14, 2023

View Original



The People’s Liberation Army has ramped up drills around Taiwan in recent months. Photo: Xinhua

The People’s Liberation Army should make more use of artificial intelligence to strengthen its deterrence strategy against the United States over Taiwan, according to a Chinese expert on Taiwanese affairs.

Ni Yongjie, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of Taiwan Studies, said the PLA should conduct blockade exercises around the island and use AI technology to deter US interference and Taiwanese independence forces.

He said the concept of “smart deterrence” was being studied within the PLA.

Ni made the remarks in an article in the journal Cross-Strait Taiwan Studies, which was posted on its social media account earlier this week.

He suggested the PLA could become a leader in future intelligent warfare, drawing on capabilities in AI, cloud computing, big data, cyber offence and defence, and unmanned equipment.

Ni also called for the PLA to normalise military drills that cross the median line of the Taiwan Strait – the de facto sea border separating mainland China from Taiwan – and that approach the baseline of the island’s territorial waters and cut off transport.

It comes after the PLA staged unprecedented live-fire exercises that encircled the self-ruled island amid heightened tensions after then-US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August. The trip angered Beijing, which saw it as a violation of its sovereignty.

The PLA also ramped up drills around the island after US President Joe Biden last month signed the latest National Defence Authorisation Act, which includes financing arms for Taiwan.

Ni said future PLA exercises could go beyond traditional amphibious landings and use intelligent warfare tactics for blockades and network disconnection.

According to Ni, both war games and virtual confrontation using unmanned systems could be used to achieve the goal of zero casualties and a “lightning-fast” seizure of an island.

He said simulation exercises could be conducted on the Taiwanese-controlled island of Taiping – located in the contested Spratlys in the South China Sea – as well as Dongsha and Penghu in the future.

The exercises could constitute a powerful deterrent against “Taiwan independence” separatists and foreign interference, in addition to conventional and nuclear deterrence, Ni wrote.

He also called for the use of economic, legal, psychological and cyber tools to contain Taiwan independence forces, giving the example of regulating cross-strait trade, stopping imports of agricultural products from areas where those forces are governed, and halting the free-trade framework between the two sides of the strait.

02:04

PLA scrambles record 71 warplanes near Taiwan in response to increased US military aid

According to a report released last year by the Centre for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, the PLA has been using AI to simulate war games for invasion operations against Taiwan, as well as to identify undersea vehicles, track US Navy ships and deploy electronic countermeasures, among other tasks.

Meanwhile, American think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies warned in a recent report that while Beijing would be unlikely to succeed in seizing Taiwan in a hypothetical invasion of the island in 2026, such a conflict would wreak havoc on both sides of the strait, as well as the US and Japan, with total casualties running into the tens of thousands.

The National Defence Authorisation Act signed by Biden established the US military budget for the next financial year and includes US$10 billion worth of security assistance to Taiwan over the next five years, prompting protests from Beijing.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to take control of it. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state. Washington, however, opposes any attempt to take the island by force.

Amber Wang

Amber Wang is a reporter for the China desk, and focuses on Chinese politics and diplomacy. She joined the Post in 2021, and previously worked for The New York Times and Southern Metropolis Daily.



11. Logistical challenge looms for Ukraine over promised tanks



Logistical challenge looms for Ukraine over promised tanks

France 24 · January 13, 2023

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Ukraine's European allies have sent Kyiv more than 300 modernised Soviet tanks since Russia invaded more than 10 months ago.

But they have so far held off on dispatching the Western-made heavy tanks that Ukraine has repeatedly requested to push forward against Russian invaders.

Near the battleground city of Bakhmut in eastern Ukraine, Ukrainian captain Volodymyr Tchaikovsky said NATO tanks had "a huge advantage" for any soldier inside.

"If he has the coordinates of his target, he can destroy the target with one shot," the 54-year-old said.

Initial reluctance to provide Ukraine with advanced weaponry seems, however, to be lifting.

Poland on Wednesday said it was willing to send Kyiv 14 advanced Leopard 2 battle tanks as part of an international coalition.

The German-made model is largely seen as one of the best-performing worldwide and is widely used across Europe, meaning spare parts and munition are readily available.

Germany has so far refused to give its necessary green light to the delivery, fearing an escalation that would more directly pit the West against Russia.

But Britain has not ruled out providing the war-torn country with Challenger 2 battle tanks.

And a meeting of Ukraine's allies in Germany on January 20 could see Western nations make new pledges of military aid.

'Logistical headache'

Last week, France, Germany and the United States opened the way with promises of French AMX-10 RC light tanks, 40 German Marders infantry vehicles, and 50 Bradley fighting vehicles.

A French source said Paris could dispatch around 40 of the highly mobile AMX-10 RCs, which are wheeled rather than tracked but have a much heavier cannon typical of a tank.

The French defence ministry said late on Thursday that a first batch would be delivered "within two months".

Once all the foreign gear arrives, Kyiv will have to bring its military personnel rapidly up to speed with how to handle and fix it.

France may send around 40 highly mobile AMX-10 RCs, which are wheeled rather than tracked © FRANCOIS NASCIMBENI / AFP/File

"That equipment is one thing. Using the equipment is another," a US military official said.

Analysts agree that the Ukrainians have so far shown a remarkable ability to adapt to the various military instruments that have flooded in since the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.

Before that date, Ukraine had around 900 Soviet-era tanks.

"Soviet tanks are very crude. There are fewer electronics on board," said a French officer, who asked not to be named.

"In view of the diversity of the pledged Western tanks and armoured vehicles, it's bound to be a logistical headache for them," he added.

"The range is extremely broad. Each has its own weapons system, its engines."

The tanks also require highly specific munitions.

The German Leopard 2 -- like the US Abrams tank -- fires 120-mm artillery shells.

The British Challenger 2 comes with a 120-mm rifled gun that require specific munition.

The French AMX 10 RC is less complex to manoeuvre than a heavy tank but uses 105 mm ammunition.

'Poisoned chalice'?

With fighting at some of its most intense between Ukrainian and Russian troops, all military gear needs to be in the best possible shape.

Leo Peria-Peigne, a weaponry expert at French think tank IFRI, said Ukraine had "a considerable pool of labour" and the structures in place to "assimilate all this diverse equipment".

Army personnel deployed near the front line can usually fix the lighter damage but heavier repairs are usually carried out further away from the fighting.

Ukraine's allies have already started organising maintenance so all newly delivered gear remains operational.

French-German defence industry firm KNDS, for example, in November opened a maintenance hub in Slovakia to repair military gear such as the Caesar howitzer artillery, Gepard anti-aircraft and Mars II multiple launch rocket systems sent to the battlefront.

But Peria-Peigne warned it would be crucial for the West to send enough tanks and armoured vehicles to Kyiv for all the training and maintenance efforts to be worth it.

Germany has not approved the Leopard 2 delivery, fearing an escalation with Russia © Ronny HARTMANN / AFP

"A battle tank is the most complex of military vehicles in terms of maintenance on land," he said.

Usually a third of all tanks in a battle situation are in maintenance at any one time.

"The United Kingdom sending just 10 Challenger 2 tanks would be a poisoned chalice," Peria-Peigne said.

"It would require drawing up a whole training and maintenance scheme for a very limited availability (of tanks) and therefore minimal effect on the ground."

© 2023 AFP


France 24 · January 13, 2023



12. Pentagon Balks at Sending Ukraine Long-Range Bombs


Fear of being too late????


Excerpts:


“There’s like a chicken and egg problem,” said one congressional aide familiar with the debate. “It’s bureaucratic fucktardery that’s messing with it now, not political dynamics.”
Estimates vary on how long the integration could take: John Hardie and Bradley Bowman, both analysts at the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, estimated that Ukraine could get two launchers and 24 weapons within nine months after the Pentagon approves the plan, and 12 launchers and 750 bombs by the end of 2024, without having to build new weapons but simply by integrating old ones already in U.S. stocks. But despite the long lead time, advocates argue that Russia’s invasion is likely to stretch on for months, meaning the system will still be useful when it arrives.
“Every day the Pentagon delays a decision is a day we push back when Kyiv would actually have this capability in their hands,” Bowman told Foreign Policy. The GLSDB is paired with its own launcher that resembles a cargo container but is distinct from the HIMARS or European-provided multiple launch rocket systems.
Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesperson, declined to provide details on internal talks about military aid to Ukraine but said the agency was in “regular contact” with Kyiv to assess the Ukrainians’ weapons requirements. “As evidenced by their determination on the battlefield, they continue to employ the capabilities provided to them by the U.S. and international community to great effect in defense of their sovereign country,” he said.
Boeing declined to comment on the plan. But Ukrainian officials remain hopeful that any internal impediments to the deal can be solved quickly.





Pentagon Balks at Sending Ukraine Long-Range Bombs

It’s not fear of escalation. It’s fear of being too late.

By Jack Detsch, a Pentagon and national security reporter at Foreign Policy. You have opted out of receiving all news alerts. To begin receiving alerts and manage your settings, click here.

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · January 12, 2023

U.S. Defense Department officials are raising concerns about a proposal to send Ukraine small precision-guided bombs that would allow Kyiv to strike Russian targets nearly 100 miles away, according to sources familiar with the debate, fearing that the timeline for deploying the weapons could take far too long.

Under a plan proposed by the U.S. weapons manufacturer Boeing and first reported by Reuters in November, the United States could provide the so-called Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) to Ukraine. The transfer, if completed, would give Ukraine weapons with twice the range of the precision munitions the United States has already supplied for HIMARS batteries and would enable Ukraine to hit targets that have been out of reach for the duration of the war.

Ukraine has repeatedly pledged not to fire U.S.- and NATO-provided weapons onto Russian soil in a move that American officials worry could escalate the war, a designation that does not apply to Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, such as Crimea. But the Biden administration has balked at sending the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, known as ATACMS—precision rounds that would give Ukraine the capability to hit Russian targets nearly 200 miles from the front lines—despite lobbying from some NATO allies.

U.S. Defense Department officials are raising concerns about a proposal to send Ukraine small precision-guided bombs that would allow Kyiv to strike Russian targets nearly 100 miles away, according to sources familiar with the debate, fearing that the timeline for deploying the weapons could take far too long.

Under a plan proposed by the U.S. weapons manufacturer Boeing and first reported by Reuters in November, the United States could provide the so-called Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) to Ukraine. The transfer, if completed, would give Ukraine weapons with twice the range of the precision munitions the United States has already supplied for HIMARS batteries and would enable Ukraine to hit targets that have been out of reach for the duration of the war.

Ukraine has repeatedly pledged not to fire U.S.- and NATO-provided weapons onto Russian soil in a move that American officials worry could escalate the war, a designation that does not apply to Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia, such as Crimea. But the Biden administration has balked at sending the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System, known as ATACMS—precision rounds that would give Ukraine the capability to hit Russian targets nearly 200 miles from the front lines—despite lobbying from some NATO allies.

But the small diameter bomb, known as the SDB in Pentagon parlance, has not been subjected to the administration-wide debate over U.S. weapons provisions to Ukraine potentially provoking Russian escalation, a fear that previously snagged U.S.-made arms including the Javelin anti-tank system, 155 mm howitzer guns, and HIMARS batteries before they were subsequently approved for transfer to Ukraine. The Wall Street Journal previously reported that the United States had even modified HIMARS batteries sent to Ukraine to prevent them from firing the long-range ATACMS missiles.

Instead, officials inside the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the U.S. Air Force are concerned that the long lead time to deploy the SDB could render the weapons redundant given the fast pace of fighting in Ukraine, which has not let up in the Donbas region in towns such as Bakhmut and Soledar despite the onset of a punishing winter.

The ground-launched variant of the SDB, which is jointly produced by Boeing and the Swedish manufacturer Saab, uses a rocket motor to help launch it to altitude before gliding to its target, giving it the ability to fly around terrain or circle back to a target. GBU-39 SDBs would need to be paired with M26 rocket motors—the two main components of the GLSDB—before being used in combat, a process that would take months. But proponents of the move are worried that the dithering could slow down that process even more, pushing the timeline back for when Ukraine fields the weapon as industry waits for the Pentagon’s signoff.

“There’s like a chicken and egg problem,” said one congressional aide familiar with the debate. “It’s bureaucratic fucktardery that’s messing with it now, not political dynamics.”

Estimates vary on how long the integration could take: John Hardie and Bradley Bowman, both analysts at the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, estimated that Ukraine could get two launchers and 24 weapons within nine months after the Pentagon approves the plan, and 12 launchers and 750 bombs by the end of 2024, without having to build new weapons but simply by integrating old ones already in U.S. stocks. But despite the long lead time, advocates argue that Russia’s invasion is likely to stretch on for months, meaning the system will still be useful when it arrives.

“Every day the Pentagon delays a decision is a day we push back when Kyiv would actually have this capability in their hands,” Bowman told Foreign Policy. The GLSDB is paired with its own launcher that resembles a cargo container but is distinct from the HIMARS or European-provided multiple launch rocket systems.

Lt. Col. Garron Garn, a Pentagon spokesperson, declined to provide details on internal talks about military aid to Ukraine but said the agency was in “regular contact” with Kyiv to assess the Ukrainians’ weapons requirements. “As evidenced by their determination on the battlefield, they continue to employ the capabilities provided to them by the U.S. and international community to great effect in defense of their sovereign country,” he said.

Boeing declined to comment on the plan. But Ukrainian officials remain hopeful that any internal impediments to the deal can be solved quickly.

“We’re just trying to understand how to provide the necessary improvement of these bombs,” one Ukrainian military official told Foreign Policy, speaking on condition of anonymity to speak about the planned transfer. “Hopefully in the next package we will receive it.”

The 250-pound precision bomb—about 50 pounds heavier than the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions that the United States has already provided—could prove effective in rooting out reinforced Russian positions, such as trenches, and can be launched from hidden positions to avoid being spotted. But it is still smaller than the ATACMS munition, which is about two times heavier.

“If you get something that is precision-guided and brings a heavier munition, it’s going to be useful,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. “And bombs, if you’re dealing with defensive positions and trenches, GMLRS and other munitions are not as effective because they’re not as large a warhead.” The weapon was successfully tested by Boeing and Saab in 2019, but it hasn’t been purchased by any foreign military as of 2023.

The debate comes as Ukraine is beginning to show improved range on the battlefield even without receiving the highest-grade NATO-standard long-range weapons. Ukraine’s top arms conglomerate, Ukroboronprom, recently tested kamikaze drones that have a range of more than 600 miles, and the Russian defense ministry has claimed that Ukraine is already using long-range unmanned aerial vehicles to launch attacks on air bases, though the cause of recent strikes remains unclear. That has sparked debate over whether Western countries should be sending longer-range weapons of their own, such as ATACMS, which may be more accurate.

“Putin is betting on more delays. He must lose that bet,” Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis tweeted on Wednesday. “Ukraine has more than earned our support and respect. It’s time to send ATACMS and unleash the Leopards,” he added, referring to the long-sought-after German tanks that have not yet been sent to Ukraine (though Poland has indicated it plans to donate Leopard tanks to Ukraine). A deadly HIMARS strike against a Russian barracks in the occupied city of Makiivka at the start of the new year was the latest sign of Ukraine’s effectiveness using long-range weapons.

Even as the United States has redoubled efforts to provide aid to Ukraine, including $3 billion in military aid this month that will include 50 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Ukrainian officials are concerned that they don’t have enough long-range firepower to go on the offensive and continue liberating Russian-occupied territories. And Russia may be readying an effort to fight back beyond the current toe-to-toe fighting in the Donbas region: Iran is said to be preparing to send Russia new short-range ballistic missiles to relieve the Kremlin’s depleted arsenal.

“There are Russian targets in Ukraine that are difficult to reach with what we’ve provided to this point,” said Bowman, the FDD analyst. “Foremost among them is Crimea. We need to make sure that Ukraine has the means to effectively target Russian occupying forces in Crimea.”

But even as Ukraine lobbies for more state-of-the-art long-range bombs and munitions, after constant Russian targeting of the Donbas cities of Bakhmut and Soledar, the Ukrainians will also need to focus on the rate of newly trained troops arriving for battle and artillery ammo coming from the West, experts said.

“A lot of it comes back to, do they have enough artillery ammunition, and also, do they have enough well-trained units that can do offensive operations?” Lee said. “And those are still open questions.”

Foreign Policy · by Jack Detsch · January 12, 2023



13. To Make Japan Stronger, America Must Pull It Closer




Excerpts:

Japan’s commitment to increase defense spending and to invest in new capabilities is among the most significant strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific in decades. It is in the national interest of the United States to see that it is sustained and that the U.S.-Japanese relationship is strengthened as a result. Continuing the existing framework for cost-sharing would undermine the vision of a more equal alliance and partnership.
The current cost-sharing arrangement will expire in 2027, and assuming that Japan follows through on its defense buildup, it should be the last such agreement in its existing form. The United States and Japan should develop a plan that redirects some of the resources Tokyo has long put into basic support for the United States presence—like covering heating bills—toward mutually agreed priorities that support a more operational alliance. These may include shared training facilities, munitions stocks and depots, and fixed infrastructure. Attempting to sustain the current arrangement even as Japan transforms its defense strategy will precipitate contentious negotiations that are in neither country’s interest. Japan’s new national security strategy signals that the country is emerging from the legacy of World War II. The alliance should, too.



To Make Japan Stronger, America Must Pull It Closer

What Biden and Kishida Should Do to Strengthen the Alliance

By Christopher Johnstone

January 12, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Christopher Johnstone · January 12, 2023

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden on January 13 will provide a crucial opportunity to turn the page on decades of history in Japan’s security relationship with the United States. In mid-December, Kishida announced a new national security and defense strategy that departs from the path Japan has followed since World War II. The plan calls for Japan to increase defense spending by nearly 60 percent over five years, shattering the informal cap of one percent of GDP that has been in place since the 1970s. Japan will also acquire military capabilities it has long foresworn—in particular “counterstrike” missiles, or long-range precision weapons that will be mounted on vehicles, aircraft, ships, and eventually submarines. These will likely include U.S. Tomahawk land attack missiles, which Washington is preparing to sell to Tokyo. Japan will also heavily invest in cyber-capabilities, unmanned systems, and satellites that can support counterstrike operations. Tokyo has signaled that it intends to move quickly: Just a week later, the Kishida government unveiled a 6.8 trillion yen (about $51 billion) defense budget request for the next fiscal year, a 25 percent increase over the current year.

Once implemented, Japan’s strategy will transform the country’s place in the international security order. The prospect of a better-armed and equipped Japan will complicate North Korea and China’s calculations. But to maximize the effectiveness of Japan’s new posture, the country’s alliance with the United States must evolve. Today it is strong, but it falls short of a true military partnership capable of mounting integrated operations at short notice. As Japan pursues its new vision, the two close allies need a new command and control architecture, far deeper levels of information-sharing, and expanded cooperation between their defense industries. It is also time to revisit the cost-sharing arrangement that has long supported the U.S. military presence in Japan.

From Self-Defense to Active Defense

To create a stronger alliance, Washington and Tokyo must rethink alliance command and control. Japan’s new defense strategy calls for a significant expansion in bilateral military operations, including larger and more complex joint exercises with U.S. forces, enhanced joint patrols and reconnaissance operations, and deeper cooperation in the space and cyber-domains.

Japan’s development of a counterstrike capability in particular will require the two countries to work much more closely together. At least at first, and perhaps over the long term, Japan will need to rely on U.S. intelligence, targeting, and damage assessment capabilities to respond to an attack with strikes of its own. Japan does not possess those capabilities today. Any scenario in which it is launching long-range strikes against targets in North Korea or China—or even “active defense” cyber-operations, which penetrate and disrupt an adversary’s computer networks—would almost certainly coincide with military actions taken by the United States, underscoring the need for tight coordination based on a common understanding of the threat. Washington and Tokyo will need a dynamic ability to identify priority targets, determine who will mount the attacks and how, and assess the damage inflicted and whether further action is required. For the first time, the United States and Japan will need to be able to coordinate the use of force against targets outside Japan.

But unlike the U.S. alliance with South Korea, the U.S.-Japanese alliance was never designed to enable integrated military operations. When the alliance was created, Japan was essentially a platform for projecting U.S. power, a staging area for U.S. operations elsewhere in the region. This arrangement derived from Japan’s postwar constitution and the attendant policy restrictions on Japanese military activity. In the early days of the Cold War, Japan was never intended to become an important military partner for the United States. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and U.S. forces in Japan therefore built parallel and separate command structures, an arrangement that remains in place today—even as Japan has gradually expanded and strengthened the SDF’s roles, missions, and capabilities over the last two decades.


The policies and legal reforms of Shinzo Abe, the late former prime minister, led to much deeper cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese militaries and expanded the support Japan can provide to the United States in a contingency. The U.S. Navy and the Maritime SDF in particular have long maintained a close relationship that includes deep cooperation in antisubmarine warfare and ballistic missile defense. But the alliance’s command structure is still that of a bygone era and is insufficient to support the far more active defense role that Tokyo is now embracing.

As Japan follows through on its new defense strategy, these existing arrangements must change. Among other structural reforms of the SDF, Japan intends to establish a permanent joint operational headquarters modeled on a U.S. combatant command to exercise unified command of SDF operations. This new headquarters, long discussed and long overdue, will need a U.S. counterpart in Japan and a standing mechanism for planning and executing integrated military operations. No such U.S. counterpart exists in Japan today. Although the United States has a joint operational commander for its forces in South Korea, there is no equivalent in Japan; each U.S. service there reports separately to its respective component under the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii.


A more integrated structure will be essential to employing Japan’s new capabilities effectively.

The need for a joint U.S. operational command in Japan has been clear for some time. Indeed, such a command would have facilitated a smoother U.S. response and better coordination with Japan in the early days following the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck in 2011. But with Japan now prepared to take on new military responsibilities and become a much more capable ally, the need for change is urgent. Establishing a joint U.S. operational command in Japan and a new bilateral architecture to coordinate integrated military operations is the critical next step in strengthening the alliance. This new architecture will ultimately need a planning cell directly connected to the Combined Forces Command in South Korea. This would allow coordination with American and South Korean forces in a crisis to ensure that Japanese military operations are synchronized with operations on the Korean Peninsula.

There are numerous models that Washington and Tokyo could adapt for enhancing joint command and control in Japan. The South Korean model—a combined structure in which the U.S. commander has authority over U.S. and Korean forces in wartime—is probably not politically tenable in Japan today, since there is no legal basis for SDF personnel to serve under a U.S. command. But a more integrated structure will be essential to employing Japan’s new capabilities effectively and in close coordination with the United States.

Two Eyes in Tokyo

Washington will also need to share more information with Tokyo to fully leverage Japan’s planned investments in defense, intelligence, and cyber-capabilities. Tactically, a credible Japanese counterstrike or cyberdefense capability will depend on a common real-time operational picture that integrates information collected by both countries. Strategically, a shared understanding of threats assembled from the full range of intelligence, including information gathered by spies on the ground, will also ensure that Washington and Tokyo’s approaches to the major challenges of the day are consistent. Information cannot be shared in one direction only; the United States must also benefit from Japan’s plans to strengthen its collection of intelligence gleaned from humans, signals, imagery and open sources.

Deepening the sharing of information and intelligence will require trust. Japan has historically been plagued by lax information-security practices. Despite significant progress over the last decade, including passage of the Secrets Protection Act under Abe in 2013, the Japanese government still lacks common information classification standards, a robust system for vetting personnel, and rigorous cybersecurity protocols that apply to all sensitive government networks. These problems reinforce the widespread view in the U.S. government, frequently more perceived than real, that “Japan leaks.”


Japan’s new national security and defense strategies acknowledge these vulnerabilities and prescribe ways to address them. The national security strategy calls for the establishment of a revamped national cyber-incident response center that has the resources to monitor threats and the authority to set cyber-related policy across the government share more information with the private sector.


As Japan brings enhanced capabilities online, it should share information at a comparable level with the United States.

The United States should recognize the stake it has in Japan’s success. For 15 years, the two allies have maintained a dialogue on information security aimed at strengthening Japan’s defensive practices. This dialogue has yielded some progress, and in a few discrete areas such as space and cyber-operations, the United States and Japan have established clear goals and the protocols needed to achieve them. But Washington has yet to comprehensively explain the benefits that Japan and the alliance would accrue from steady improvements in Japanese practices.

The United States should therefore develop a clear roadmap for elevating Japan to the status of a “Five Eyes” partner, the highest level at which Washington shares information with key allies. Such an effort would not be the same as inviting Japan to join the Five Eyes partnership, as that is probably neither realistic—given the range of policy and intelligence areas in which the five countries cooperate—nor perhaps desirable from Japan’s point of view. But the roadmap should lead to Japan attaining an equivalent stature in information sharing—and trust. This roadmap should lay out clear and measurable standards in the physical, personnel, communications, and cyber-security areas. If Japan is able to meet these standards, the United States should commit to share information on threats in the Indo-Pacific that is equivalent to what it shares with its closest intelligence partners. Built into this roadmap should be reciprocity: the idea that as Japan brings enhanced capabilities online, it will share information at a comparable level with the United States.

A commitment to accord Japan “Five Eyes”-like status if it meets measurable standards will require leadership from the highest levels of the U.S. defense and intelligence communities. Left to its own devices, the U.S. bureaucracy will continue to move the goalposts on what is required for a deeper information-sharing relationship and Japan will see little incentive to take difficult steps.

More Industry, More Security

Tokyo’s new national security and defense strategies recognize the need to strengthen the Japanese defense industry. Historically, Japan has had a comparatively weak and uncompetitive defense industry, focused only on the small domestic market, that produced capabilities sufficient to support a tightly constrained concept of defense. Because Japan effectively banned arms exports after World War II, the industry limited itself to building high-cost boutique equipment for the SDF that was supplemented primarily by purchases from the United States. This situation finally began to change with a partial loosening of arms exports under Abe in 2014. Still, U.S.-Japanese collaboration on advanced capabilities has so far been limited to the development of a ballistic missile defense interceptor in the early 2000s. Japan’s new strategy calls for more subsidies and spending on R & D to support the defense industry, among other steps. The risk of wasteful spending is high if Japan fails to develop a competitive presence in the international defense marketplace that leverages economies of scale and the best technology available.

Deeper defense industrial cooperation is in the interest of both the United States and Japan. Japan’s technology base holds significant potential for collaboration in areas such as aerospace, autonomous systems, and artificial intelligence. More robust Japanese production capacity would also help diversify the supply chain of the United States and its allies for key defense items including munitions, a critical need that the war in Ukraine has served to highlight. Ultimately, Japan’s military buildup is unlikely to be sustainable without an equivalent strengthening of the country’s defense industry.

Getting there will not be easy. The Japanese government must adopt more flexible and transparent export rules, promote equity-sharing partnerships with foreign defense firms, and send a clear signal that international partnerships are a top priority in increasing competitiveness. A restructuring of the defense industry is likely to be necessary. There are no dedicated defense firms in Japan, and defense represents a small percentage of overall business for even the largest industrial players, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. For its part, the United States should commit to loosening restrictions on sharing technology with Japan, in line with the Five Eyes roadmap. The U.S. government should actively encourage defense industry collaboration and re-energize existing forums for discussion of joint development opportunities. As a near-term step, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom should invite Japan to participate in discrete (non-submarine) elements of the 2021 AUKUS security pact, which will support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines and promote cooperation on other advanced capabilities. Japan could participate in that forum’s advanced capabilities agenda, such as hypersonics and counterhypersonic capabilities—fields in which Japan is already undertaking its own development effort.

Shared Resources and Stronger Readiness

As Japan increases defense spending to new levels, it will be necessary to revisit the cost-sharing arrangements that have underpinned its alliance with the United States since the 1970s. Japan currently spends about $2 billion annually on supporting the U.S. military presence in Japan, footing a large portion of the utilities costs on U.S. bases, the salaries of Japanese nationals employed on them, and the construction of new facilities for the approximately 55,000 U.S. troops currently stationed in the country. This arrangement, like other aspects of the alliance, is rooted in another era, when Japan was not a significant military partner and the alliance was effectively a one-way arrangement.


Japan’s commitment to increase defense spending and to invest in new capabilities is among the most significant strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific in decades. It is in the national interest of the United States to see that it is sustained and that the U.S.-Japanese relationship is strengthened as a result. Continuing the existing framework for cost-sharing would undermine the vision of a more equal alliance and partnership.

The current cost-sharing arrangement will expire in 2027, and assuming that Japan follows through on its defense buildup, it should be the last such agreement in its existing form. The United States and Japan should develop a plan that redirects some of the resources Tokyo has long put into basic support for the United States presence—like covering heating bills—toward mutually agreed priorities that support a more operational alliance. These may include shared training facilities, munitions stocks and depots, and fixed infrastructure. Attempting to sustain the current arrangement even as Japan transforms its defense strategy will precipitate contentious negotiations that are in neither country’s interest. Japan’s new national security strategy signals that the country is emerging from the legacy of World War II. The alliance should, too.

  • CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTONE is Japan Chair and a Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served on the National Security Council as Director for East Asia in the Biden administration and Director for Japan and Oceanian Affairs in the Obama administration.
  • MORE BY CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTONE

Foreign Affairs · by Christopher Johnstone · January 12, 2023




14. Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")






Joint Statement of the 2023 U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee ("2+2")

defense.gov

Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hayashi, and Minister of Defense Hamada (referred to collectively as "the Ministers") convened the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, D.C., on January 11, 2023.

Recognizing the convergence of their nations' new national security and defense strategies toward bolstering deterrence in an integrated manner, the Ministers provided a vision of a modernized Alliance postured to prevail in a new era of strategic competition.

The Ministers firmly reiterated their commitment to champion a free and open Indo-Pacific region, heralding the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the cornerstone of regional peace, security, and prosperity. They resolved to advance bilateral modernization initiatives to build a more capable, integrated, and agile Alliance that bolsters deterrence and addresses evolving regional and global security challenges. The Ministers affirmed that the Alliance is stalwart in the face of these challenges and steadfast in support of shared values and norms that underpin the international rules-based order. They renewed their commitment to oppose any unilateral change to the status quo by force regardless of the location in the world.

The Ministers welcomed the release of their respective National Security Strategies and National Defense Strategies, and confirmed unprecedented alignment of their vision, priorities, and goals. This forms a solid foundation for their efforts to constantly modernize the Alliance in order to address the increasingly severe security environment.

Japan reiterated its resolve, under its new strategies, to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike, through a substantial increase of its defense budget. Japan also reaffirmed its determination to lead in its own defense and to expand its roles, in cooperation with the United States and other partners, to actively engage in maintaining regional peace and stability. The United States expressed its strong support for Japan's updated national security policies as a significant evolution that bolsters Alliance deterrence.

The United States expressed its determination to optimize its force posture in the Indo-Pacific, including in Japan, by forward-deploying more versatile, resilient, and mobile capabilities. Japan supported the U.S. plan to optimize its force posture and welcomed its strong commitment to maintain a robust presence in the region.

The United States restated its unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan under Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, using its full range of capabilities, including nuclear. The Ministers held an in-depth discussion on U.S. extended deterrence for Japan, as well as on the recently released U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, and reaffirmed the critical importance of ensuring U.S. extended deterrence remains credible and resilient, bolstered by Japan's capabilities. They reiterated both countries intend to deepen the substantive discussions at the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as well as through various senior-level meetings.

In accordance with their new strategies, the Ministers decided to accelerate work on evolving Alliance roles and missions and to employ interoperable and advanced capabilities, to address current and future security challenges. The Ministers also resolved to jointly strengthen Alliance activities with allies and partners within and beyond the region.

A New Era of Strategic Competition

The Ministers concurred that China's foreign policy seeks to reshape the international order to its benefit and to employ China's growing political, economic, military, and technological power to that end. This behavior is of serious concern to the Alliance and the entire international community, and represents the greatest strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to China's intensified attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, including through actions that seek to undermine Japan's longstanding administration of the Senkaku Islands. The United States reaffirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. The Ministers condemned China's dangerous and provocative military activities around Japan, including China's ballistic missile launches in August 2022, during which some missiles landed in waters near Japan's Sakishima Islands. They shared their continuing concerns regarding China's ongoing and accelerating expansion of its nuclear arsenal, which is also characterized by its lack of transparency.

They also reiterated their strong objections to China's unlawful maritime claims, militarization of reclaimed features, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea. The Ministers reaffirmed their support for unimpeded lawful commerce and full respect for international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. In this context, they recalled with emphasis that the July 12, 2016, Award in the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China), constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), is final and legally binding on the parties to that proceeding. They confirmed, also in this context, that they will work together closely to address non-market policies and practices as well as economic coercion. The Ministers stated that their basic positions on Taiwan remain unchanged, and reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community. They encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. They expressed serious concerns about the state of Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms as well as human rights issues, including in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Ministers strongly condemned North Korea's unprecedented number of unlawful and reckless ballistic missile launches over the past year, including of multiple intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class missiles, and of the ballistic missile that overflew Japan. They expressed strong concern over North Korea's stated policy to enhance its nuclear arsenal at maximum speed, both in quality and quantity, and reaffirmed their commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea. The Ministers urged North Korea to abide by its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions and confirmed the need for an immediate resolution of the abductions issue. The Ministers also committed to deepen cooperation between and among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, which is critical to addressing the grave threat North Korea presents and to promoting security, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The Ministers strongly condemned Russia's brutal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable war against Ukraine. They recognized that Russia's violation of the UN Charter and its attempts to unilaterally change borders by force, including through its ongoing aggression against Ukraine, present a serious security threat for the European region and shake the foundation of the international order. The Ministers condemned Russia's reckless nuclear rhetoric and its attacks against civilian infrastructure, and they reiterated the need for Russia to be held accountable for its atrocities in Ukraine. The Ministers also highlighted with concern Russia's growing and provocative strategic military cooperation with China, including through joint operations and drills in the vicinity of Japan.

Modernizing the Alliance

In light of evolving Alliance roles and missions, and enhancing interoperable capabilities to meet the aforementioned security challenges, the Ministers decided to accelerate their consultations, including on the following areas:

  1. Alliance Coordination
  2. The Ministers reemphasized the necessity to further enhance bilateral coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism in order to cope with the full spectrum of possible situations in a timely and integrated manner. In this context, the United States welcomed Japan's decision to establish a permanent joint headquarters. They committed to exploring more effective Alliance command and control relationships to enhance interoperability and responsiveness. The Ministers also shared the need to improve effective coordination with partner countries for more robust policy and operational cooperation.
  3. Allied Efforts in Peacetime
  4. The Ministers underscored the critical importance of joint efforts in peacetime to deter an armed attack against Japan and destabilizing activities in the region. They decided to deepen bilateral coordination, including on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and flexible deterrent options. They welcomed the U.S. deployment of MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles to Kanoya Air Base and the launch of the Bilateral Information Analysis Cell to increase intelligence sharing. In order to maximize the effects of these efforts, they decided to further expand their cooperation in the field of asset protection missions, broader engagement of partners, and strategic messaging. They welcomed the joint/shared use of additional facilities on Kadena Ammunition Storage Area by JSDF. They also committed to expand joint/shared use of U.S. and Japanese facilities and to increase bilateral exercises and training in areas including Japan's Southwest Islands.

  5. The Ministers stressed the importance of flexible use of air and seaports to ensure the resiliency of defense assets and their operational effectiveness in a contingency. Accordingly, they decided to work together through exercises and planning to enable such use.
  6. Allied Capability to Deter and Respond
  7. The Ministers concurred that Alliance efforts, consistent with new strategy documents, should focus on mission areas such as integrated air and missile defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, amphibious and airborne operations, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT), logistics, and mobility. They decided to deepen bilateral cooperation toward the effective employment of Japan's counterstrike capabilities in close coordination with the United States. The Ministers welcomed the steady progress on bilateral planning for contingencies as well as on realistic training and exercises such as Keen Sword 23, Resolute Dragon 22, Orient Shield 22, and MV-22 low altitude training.

  8. The Ministers underscored the critical importance of strengthened cross-domain capabilities, particularly integrating the land, maritime, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic spectrum, and other domains.
  9. Space, Cyber, and Information Security
  10. Recognizing the growing importance of outer space to the peace, security and prosperity of the Alliance, the Ministers renewed their commitment to deepening cooperation on space capabilities to strengthen mission assurance, interoperability, and operational cooperation, including through enhanced collaboration in space domain awareness after the operationalization of Japan's Space Situational Awareness system scheduled in 2023.

  11. The Ministers consider that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and affirmed such attacks, in certain circumstances, could lead to the invocation of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when such an attack would lead to an invocation of Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat.

  12. The Ministers emphasized the foundational importance of cybersecurity and information security for the Alliance. They welcomed the establishment of JSDF Cyber Defense Command in March 2022, and concurred to intensify collaboration to counter increasingly sophisticated and persistent cyber threats. The United States welcomed Japan's initiatives to bolster its national cybersecurity posture such as the creation of a new organization to coordinate whole-of-government cybersecurity policies, and the introduction of a risk management framework, which would provide a foundation for a wider range of U.S.-Japan cooperation. The Ministers welcomed progress in strengthening industrial cybersecurity, including Japan's efforts to establish the Standards on Cybersecurity Measures for Defense Industry. Lastly, the Ministers highlighted important progress made so far under the bilateral information security consultations.
  13. Maintaining the Technological Edge
  14. Emphasizing the importance of integrating technological developments into Alliance capabilities, the Ministers committed to bolster technology cooperation and joint investments in emerging technologies to further sharpen the competitive edge of the Alliance. The Ministers also emphasized that resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of defense equipment are essential to ensure national security.

  15. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Projects and the Security of Supply Arrangement as well as the substantial progress on the Reciprocal Government Quality Assurance.

  16. With these achievements as well as steady progress on defense science and technology cooperation, including discussions on joint research projects on high-power microwaves and autonomous systems, the Ministers concurred to further promote their efforts toward joint research and development of defense equipment. Based on the progress of joint analysis on counter-hypersonic technology, the Ministers concurred to begin joint research on important elements including advanced materials and hypersonic testbeds. The Ministers also concurred to begin discussion on potential joint development of a future interceptor. The Ministers also shared the importance of deepening technological cooperation with like-minded allies and partners, which complements bilateral efforts.

Expanding Alliance Partnerships

The Ministers renewed their commitment to further advance their partnership with Australia by building on outcomes from the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in August 2022 and Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting in June and October 2022 and by taking advantage of the expanding activities under the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed in October 2022. In this context, they highlighted the successful completion of the first coordinated asset protection mission among the three countries in November 2022. They also expressed their determination to increase trilateral training and exercises to enhance interoperability, including on ISR, as well as to explore opportunities for technological cooperation. In this context, they reaffirmed the importance of increasing trilateral training opportunities including in northern Australia, based on the Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations issued in December 2022. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to supporting quality, transparent infrastructure development that addresses the needs of Indo-Pacific partners and welcomed the renewal of the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership MOU with Australia.

The Ministers also emphasized the importance of further deepening their cooperation with the Republic of Korea and exploring opportunities for multilateral and trilateral exercises and other activities, including in areas such as ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, maritime security, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.

The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. They acknowledged the importance of further promoting economic and security cooperation with partners in Southeast Asia and Pacific Island countries through such activities as joint training, capacity building, and potential transfers of defense equipment. The Ministers welcomed further cooperation under the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which will support the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of the Quad, which has made positive contributions to the region through promoting practical cooperation in various fields.

Noting that likeminded nations are facing similar, and mutually-reinforcing threats to the global rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, the Ministers welcomed greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific by Euro-Atlantic partners—both bilaterally and through multilateral entities such as NATO and the EU. They expressed support for expanded exercises and deployments, facilitated by Japan's new bilateral agreements including forthcoming Reciprocal Access Agreements with Australia and the United Kingdom. The United States endorsed Japan's efforts to finalize its NATO Individually Tailored Partnership Program, and welcomed Japan's enhanced emphasis on European security through its provision of assistance to Ukraine. The United States likewise hailed Japan's increased cooperation with NATO, and Japan's leadership role in NATO's Asia Pacific partners' group. From this perspective, the United States welcomed Prime Minister Kishida's attendance at the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022—the first time a Japanese Prime Minister has participated in a NATO Summit.

Optimizing Alliance Posture

The Ministers affirmed the need to optimize Alliance force posture based on improved operational concepts and enhanced capabilities to address increasing security challenges in the region, including for the defense of the Southwestern Islands of Japan.

Facing a severely contested environment, they confirmed that the forward posture of U.S. forces in Japan should be upgraded to strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities.

In line with such policy, the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, as adjusted by the SCC on April 27, 2012, will be readjusted so that the 3rd Marine Division Headquarters and the 12th Marine Regiment will remain in Okinawa. The 12th Marine Regiment will be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to the basic tenets of the 2012 Realignment Plan, and confirmed that these readjustments do not affect the lands scheduled to be returned in the Okinawa Consolidation Plan, nor continued progress for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Camp Schwab.

The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to achieve an end-state for the U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa consistent with the levels envisioned in the Realignment Roadmap as revised in 2012.

The Ministers also confirmed that these readjustments do not require any changes to Japan's cash contribution and construction projects based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.

To further strengthen Alliance maritime mobility in Japan, the Ministers welcomed the establishment of the Composite Watercraft Company at Yokohama North Dock scheduled in 2023.

The Ministers affirmed that these initiatives demonstrate the steadfast commitment of the United States to the defense of Japan and share the same direction with Japan's fundamental reinforcement of its defense capabilities. They confirmed that the optimized posture of the U.S. forces in Japan, with enhanced JSDF capabilities and posture in areas including the Southwestern Islands, would substantially strengthen Alliance deterrence and response capabilities.

The Ministers decided to continue close consultation on these initiatives and ways to further optimize U.S. force posture in Japan.

The Ministers also reconfirmed the steady implementation of ongoing projects supporting realignment of facilities and areas of U.S. Forces in Japan and the importance of relationships with local communities. The Ministers underlined their commitment to continue construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henokosaki area and in adjacent waters as the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. The Ministers welcomed the progress and future prospects for the development of the SDF facility on Mageshima, which will be used for purposes including Field Carrier Landing Practice. They confirmed the importance of accelerating bilateral work on U.S. force realignment efforts, including construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa, and the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam beginning in 2024. The Ministers affirmed the importance of continued bilateral coordination for sharing timely information on incidents and accidents, enhancing environmental cooperation, as well as mitigating impacts on, and supporting strong relationships with, local communities while communicating with them about the importance of Alliance activities.

defense.gov



15. Japan Coast Guard’s rising role in a rules-based Indo-Pacific



Excerpts:


As Japan-US relations continue to strengthen, the more cooperative relationship between the two coast guards provides another layer to the security architecture, which leads to a more secure and stable sea. In addition, the JCG and USCG confirm and jointly disseminate those shared values, such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation, through joint operations and capacity building.
The JCG’s power goes far beyond the strength of its platforms and their capabilities. Its outreach and international engagements, combined with the provision of critical capacity building, reinforce the rules-based order of the Indo-Pacific.
Its normative strength is magnified by these activities, as well as by its deepening relationship with the USCG, which has created a strong bilateral tie that will multiply the efforts of both across the Indo-Pacific.
The Japan Coast Guard’s success in pushing forward the Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda is a model for use across the region, highlighting that cooperation and support make a powerful attractive force that draws in new partners and creates positive ties.



Japan Coast Guard’s rising role in a rules-based Indo-Pacific

Outfit that once dared not donate patrol ships with bulletproof windows now playing overtly muscular role in supporting US in the region


asiatimes.com · by Kentaro Furuya · January 13, 2023

Originally responsible primarily for maintaining good order and the safety of life at sea in domestic waters, the Japan Coast Guard has expanded its commitment to international duties to cultivate external relationships and much-needed capacity building in neighboring states.

While these international activities began in the 1970s, they have, in recent years, become essential functions in realizing Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy. The JCG’s broad spectrum of capabilities and engagements makes it indispensable across all elements of Tokyo’s broader regional strategy, and its deepening partnership with the US Coast Guard is amplifying its impact.


Several states have adopted the Indo-Pacific as a geographic and policy concept in pursuing their national interests. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Shinzo first articulated Japan’s “free and open” concept in 2016 at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, held, despite its name, in Nairobi, Kenya.

The Abe administration considered it vital to connect Asia to Africa in order to link accelerating Asian economies with Africa’s rich resources. Washington published its own Indo-Pacific strategy in 2017.


ASEAN then followed with its “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in 2019, setting out its views on this concept, in line with the shared understanding among member states. In a similar vein, the EU created a “Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.”


The government of Japan views its Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept as the best way to reinforce the rules-based international order that it relies upon – and to connect itself to Africa, which it sees as an attractive prospect for ensuring Japan’s economic future.

Within this concept are three pillars:

  • promotion and establishment of the rule of law and freedom of navigation;
  • free trade and the pursuit of economic prosperity; and
  • commitment to peace and stability.

Under the first pillar of its FOIP vision, the Japanese government commits itself to enhancing and advancing cooperation with like-minded states that share the principles of the rule of law and freedom of navigation.

Tokyo’s work in providing quality infrastructure makes up its FOIP’s second pillar, including ports, railways, and roads physically creating the connection between Africa and Asia. Tokyo’s emphasis on building comprehensive trade agreements also falls under the strategy’s second pillar.

Within the third pillar, the government invests considerably in capacity building, with particular emphasis upon maritime law enforcement and maritime domain awareness.


Japan’s efforts also include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, counter-piracy and counter-terrorism operations, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Japan and US coast guards’ anti-narcotics exercise off Guam this year. Photo: US Coast Guard / Petty Officer 3d Class David Graham

The Japan Coast Guard expends considerable effort on strengthening the relationships among maritime law enforcement agencies in the Indo-Pacific and beyond to advance the rule of law and freedom of navigation.

For example, JCG launched the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum in 2000. Consisting of mature coast guard agencies in the north Pacific region, the forum aims to foster operational interactions and convenes exercises to deepen mutual understanding.

Then, subsequently, the JCG launched the Head of the Asian Coast Guard Agencies’ Meeting in 2004, creating a forum to discuss the construction and development of critical operational capabilities in agencies in Asia.

Lastly, the Coast Guard Global Summit was launched in 2017. This international framework for coast guard agencies exists to foster a global approach to shared challenges at sea as well as develop the members’ respective workforces.


These dialogues knit together coast guard agencies at the regional and global levels, building confidence and mutual understanding.


Capacity building is another way Tokyo seeks to implement its regional vision. To implement its commitment to peace and stability, enhancing the capability of regional states to maintain good order in their own waters is essential.

In this regard, the JCG has been active for nearly half a century, beginning with hydrographic surveys to support partners and expanding its works to include environmental protection and law enforcement efforts.

The JCG carefully structures its assistance in most cases to support the recipient states’ abilities to secure their own water space, rather than intervening directly or by deploying Japanese assets abroad.

This is not to say that the JCG is not active outside the Japanese exclusive economic zone. Operationally, the JCG dispatches its assets abroad annually for counter-piracy patrols and for combined exercises with regional counterparts.

In 2022, the JCG dispatched the 5,300-ton cutter Mizuho for counter-piracy patrolling and exercises, including an oil spill response exercise with Indonesia and the Philippines.


Using education to advance partnerships and improve policy formulation, the JCG and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) launched the Maritime Safety and Security Policy Program in 2015.


The significance of the program was highlighted when Abe noted in his speech at the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly that students in that field learn and share the principle that “the maritime order is a matter of the rule of law and one that is rule-based.”

Through the study of international law and international relations, students deepen their understanding of the legal framework and how international order and stability are maintained at sea.


Furthermore, the Japanese government enhances the capability of maritime law enforcement agencies in the Indo-Pacific region by donating patrol ships. This concept has evolved over the course of years.

At its outset, Tokyo hesitated to even equip patrol ships with bullet-proof windows to avoid the perception of providing military equipment. But by 2006, the government decided to change its policy and began providing more capable patrol ships, with the first going to Indonesia under a grant aid scheme. Tokyo subsequently donated patrol ships to Djibouti and Vietnam in 2015, the Philippines in 2016, Malaysia in 2017, and Sri Lanka in 2018.


The enhanced relationship between the Japanese and US coast guards further strengthens attempts to realize and advance Tokyo’s FOIP concept. The two coast guards, in 2010, signed a key memorandum of understanding that established an expectation of comprehensive cooperation between the two but was not overly detailed.

Both coast guards recognized that, to strengthen the cooperative relationship further, concrete shared objectives were necessary in areas such as operations and exercises, professional exchanges, academic instruction and capacity building. Thus, on May 18, 2022, JCG and the USCG signed SAPPHIRE (Solid Alliance for Peace and Prosperity with Humanity and Integrity on the Rule-of-law based Engagement), an annex to the 2010 memorandum.


The first combined exercise conducted under the terms of both documents took place just after the SAPPHIRE signature ceremony in San Francisco on May 20, 2022. The JCG’s training ship, PL21 Kojima, joined a combined exercise focused on maritime search and rescue and communication.

Following that event, PLH21 Mizuho was dispatched to participate in a counter-narcotics exercise off the coast of Guam. A real-world maritime emergency interrupted the exercise, and the participating American and Japanese assets conducted combined search and rescue operations. What began as an exercise quickly became a proof of concept, in which US and Japanese assets cooperated to save lives.

The US Air Force and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force conduct an airborne interoperability exercise at Camp Fuji, Japan, on January 26, 2022. Photo: US Air Force Senior Airman Brieana E Bolfing

Following this, in July of 2022, a combined Japan-US team conducted the first combined capacity-building program in Manila for the Philippines Coast Guard. JCG dispatched its Mobile Cooperation Team, and the combined JCG-USCG instructors led exercises such as towing, fire-fighting and high-speed boat operations.


As Japan-US relations continue to strengthen, the more cooperative relationship between the two coast guards provides another layer to the security architecture, which leads to a more secure and stable sea. In addition, the JCG and USCG confirm and jointly disseminate those shared values, such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation, through joint operations and capacity building.


The JCG’s power goes far beyond the strength of its platforms and their capabilities. Its outreach and international engagements, combined with the provision of critical capacity building, reinforce the rules-based order of the Indo-Pacific.

Its normative strength is magnified by these activities, as well as by its deepening relationship with the USCG, which has created a strong bilateral tie that will multiply the efforts of both across the Indo-Pacific.

The Japan Coast Guard’s success in pushing forward the Japanese Free and Open Indo-Pacific agenda is a model for use across the region, highlighting that cooperation and support make a powerful attractive force that draws in new partners and creates positive ties.

Japan Coast Guard Captain Kentaro Furuya (k-furuya@grips.ac.jp) is an adjunct professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and a professor at the Japan Coast Guard Academy.

This article, first published by Pacific Forum, is republished with permission. The article is the second in a series on the region’s coast guards. The first installment is here.

asiatimes.com · by Kentaro Furuya · January 13, 2023




16. Will the Ukraine war slow Russia’s Arctic push?



Or the converse: Will it provide the opportunity for the US to catch up?


Will the Ukraine war slow Russia’s Arctic push?

Defense News · by Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo · January 13, 2023

MILAN, Italy — Unmanned technologies could offer the West an opening to catch up with Russia, bogged down in Ukraine, in establishing a foothold in the warming Arctic, according to issue experts.

The sea ice covering the Arctic ocean is melting at an alarming rate of 13% per decade due to climate change, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This has created for Arctic states – the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden – as well as non-Arctic countries a renewed land of opportunity to assert military and commercial control over this recently accessible territory as greater natural resource extraction and new shipping lanes have emerged.

The only issue? The West is fairly late to the game against Russia’s long-standing presence in the region, where experts agree it has succeeded in maintaining military superiority over the last decade.

“Moscow considers the Arctic key to its national security and economic development – this was enshrined in its government statements, policies and especially in its Maritime Doctrines since the early 1990s,” said Samuel Bendett, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses’ Russian Studies Program. “Its overall approach to the development of the region today builds on its Cold War legacy, when the country inherited massive technical and knowledge base after 1992 and extended it.”

The Kremlin has secured its Arctic military capability primarily by banking on a “superior number of ice-breakers, its pioneering of Arctic-capable military drones, upgrading off-shore bases, missiles, runways and radar systems,” says James Rogers, associate professor in war studies at the Danish Institute for Advanced Study. It is important to note that the region is also an integral part of Russia’s Northern Fleet operational environment, which houses the country’s most powerful nuclear submarines.

According to data from the American Security Project, in 2020 the number of Russian military bases in use or being modernized in the Arctic was at least 16, of which 12 are air bases, three submarine bases and one drone-aerial reconnaissance base.

Jussi Kangasoja, unmanned aircraft specialist at the Arctic Drone Labs collective in Finland, explains that Moscow has been known to have several operational Arctic-capable drones for years.

“In 2018, Kalashnikov presented the dual-purpose Zala Arctic drone series [including the Zala 421-08M and Zala 421-16E] suited for the region’s conditions,” he said. “In 2019, state sources announced the existence of another UAV able to remain in-flight for four days in the Arctic without the need to rely on jammable satellite-based navigation. In 2021, Radar MMS introduced a heavy lift cargo drone capable of working at -70 degree celsius. It is also documented that Russia is using underwater unmanned drones (UUVs), with some, such as the nuclear-powered Poseidon, developed particularly for Arctic waters.”

To this list, Bendett adds that the following are reported to be in development for the region: tiltrotor and helicopter type drones (VRT-300), the Sarma deep-water autonomous UUV undergoing final tests, and the Shadow-2 UUV. Russia has also initiated its “Project Iceberg” consisting of deep-water drilling and maintenance stations that involve robotic and autonomous UUVs, which he says is “likely the country’s largest and most ambitious project of its kind.”

War in Ukraine

Experts have mixed reviews about whether Russia’s war on Ukraine is detracting attention from Arctic expansion. While Rogers and Kangasoja are of the similar view that Moscow’s offensive in Ukraine “has taken a toll on both Russian Arctic readiness and its deployable assets,” Bendett states that he has not necessarily seen it lessen the pace of its regional development.

On the contrary, he says, “the Russian government kept announcing more resources for the Arctic in 2022, such as the construction of more icebreakers and military submarines, as well as calling for greater attention there in 2023.”

Nonetheless, specialists warn that although the Kremlin appears to have highly advanced Arctic technology, the equipment has yet to see much real use. Kangasoja said that “Russia’s military capabilities, including the performance of its equipment, have been quite generally overestimated prior to the war.” In his opinion, it is clear that the conflict has pulled plenty, if not the majority, of Russian resources in terms of manpower and weapons from Arctic bases, leaving behind minimum crew. “It is also a fact that its production has slowed down because of international sanctions and that the war is consuming its supplies heavily,” he said.

Rogers concurs that in the past Moscow has been known to embellish and overstate the capacity and readiness of its military weapons. However, he emphasizes that he would not “conclude in any way that Russia is weak when it comes to Arctic defense.” In fact, Moscow could very well “be holding back some of its more high-tech systems or Arctic ready drones.”

Where the West stands

The U.S. and Western allies have a number of operational Arctic capabilities gaps to close if they want to catch up or outpace Russian development in the region. Washington currently struggles with many of its drones losing network and communication capabilities when operating above the 77th parallel north, which U.S. Northern Command chief Gen. Glen VanHerck has said hinders the military’s “day-to-day” competitiveness in the region. Additionally, the country lacks sufficient functional infrastructure to support the operation of such systems. Its primary Arctic territory is concentrated along Alaska’s 34,000 miles coastline, where it has five military bases with only one other, Thule Air Base, located in Greenland.

Kangasoja is optimistic that the current state of Russian forces in Ukraine is giving “an almost unprecedented opportunity for the West to not only catch up but also take a strong lead with unmanned technologies within the Arctic context.”

Several Western countries seem to be prioritizing the development of Arctic-capable drones. An example of this is the IDG consortium, a multinational cooperation project among six Arctic-Antarctic nations consisting of Andøya Space Center (Norway), Boeing’s drone company Insitu, C-Core (Canada), Karl Osen (Switzerland), MDSI (Denmark), Scott Polar Research Institute (UK), Viasat (US) and VTT (Finland). Together they have created the Integrated Remote Sensing for the Arctic (IRSA) architecture, a system for monitoring and reconnaissance with four different types of drones, satellites, aircraft and underwater vehicles. The system was first showcased in 2021 in Denmark.

The U.S. possesses the Arctic Shark, designed for beyond-line-of-sight operations in polar regions, which can carry a payload up to 70 pounds (32kg). The U.S. Navy has also been developing a wide-area underwater surveillance system including UUVs, while General Atomics successfully tested the MQ-9A Reaper in the Canadian Arctic in 2021.

“We demonstrated a new capability for effective ISR operations by performing a loiter at 78.31° North (using Inmarsat’s L-band Airborne ISR Service) during a 25.5 hours flight that covered 4,550 miles and reached temperatures at times below -50 degrees Celsius,” General Atomics spokesman Mark Brinkley wrote in an email to Defense News. He added that in recent months, the company has been operating the MQ-9B from snow-covered runways in northern Japan in significantly cold conditions as well.

Among the European countries leading the way is Denmark with its political prioritization of the region, realizing in 2021 an Arctic capability package. Within this, the country has pledged to spend $108 million on fielding several long-endurance surveillance drones, in line with a NATO request for the Faroe Islands, and $8.6 million on ship-based tactical drones.

Another state making strides is Finland, where Arctic Drone Labs is based.

Kangasoja, the UAS Specialist there, explains “we operate a fleet of 20-plus drones and various sensors in the North and are as we speak in the middle of planning new investments. As we are based just below the Arctic circle, our systems are tested in highly challenging conditions.” He says the fleet acts as a training platform for pilots and researchers and they help manufacturers to trial their vehicles in specific test areas throughout Finland.

For his part, Bendett is not as optimistic that the West can match Russian superiority in the region. He emphasizes that Russia has in its possession a dedicated number of financial, technical and human resources for the continuation of Arctic exploration, which include of developing more uncrewed technologies.

“Even if the West develops more uncrewed systems, that is not enough to have a significant presence in the Arctic, which requires [more] icebreakers and manned stations,” Bendett argues.

One thing is clear, says Rogers: Regardless of the conflict in Ukraine, Moscow’s robust rhetoric about the high-priority defense of the Russian Arctic remains unchanged.

Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. She covers a wide range of topics related to military procurement and international security, and specializes in reporting on the aviation sector. She is based in Milan, Italy.






​17. Japan sells Tokyo as US linchpin of security against China, Russia



Someone did not get the memo. Japan is the cornerstone. South Korea is the linchpin.





Japan sells Tokyo as US linchpin of security against China, Russia 

BY LAURA KELLY - 01/13/23 5:59 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3812858-japan-sells-tokyo-as-us-linchpin-of-security-against-china-russia/


Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit with President Biden is aimed at selling Tokyo as the linchpin of Eastern security and a bulwark against Chinese and North Korean aggression. 

It’s part of a historic shift for the island nation, which has committed to growing its military and shirking off its pacifist policy that was self-imposed in the aftermath of World War II. 

Japan has also joined sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine war, though it has not provided lethal aid to Kyiv. 

“Japan has really broken out of the kind of postwar mold, if you’d like, of hesitancy about its military,” said Sheila Smith, senior fellow for Asia-Pacific studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

“So we have a new Japan on the world stage, in some ways, that is less hesitant about the need for military power as one of the arrows in the quiver of its statecraft,” Smith added. 

Meeting in the Oval Office on Friday, Biden described Kishida’s Washington visit as a “remarkable moment” for the U.S. and Japan alliance.   

“I don’t think there’s ever been a time when we were closer,” the president said. 

“Let me be crystal clear: The United States is fully, thoroughly, completely committed to the alliance and, more importantly, to the defense of Japan.”  

Kishida on Friday said that the U.S. and Japan are “facing the most challenging and complex security environment in recent history.”  

Japan’s commitment to double its defense spending over the next five years was widely welcomed in Washington, and Tokyo is walking away with concrete gains from the Biden administration. 

They include upgrading U.S. troops stationed in Japan with increased capabilities such as advanced intelligence and surveillance, Biden officials said. The U.S. and Japan are also expanding their mutual defense commitments to cover space and cybersecurity. 

The administration has also endorsed Japan’s decision to develop counterstrike capabilities, which would allow Tokyo to defend itself from incoming missile attacks and launch strikes against aggressors — likely North Korea or China. 

Japan has identified China’s military buildup as a threat to Tokyo, and sees Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as having the potential to spill over in the Indo-Pacific region.  

“As Russia’s aggression against Ukraine attests, the international community, of which Japan is a member, is facing serious challenges, and has plunged into a new crisis,” the government wrote in its National Defense Strategy published in December.  

“In the future one cannot rule out the possibility of serious events taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, that might shake the foundation of the stable post-war international order,” it added. 

Japan joined U.S. and European sanctions on Russia and has sent Kyiv humanitarian and defensive assistance. 

In June, NATO members took an unprecedented step by inviting Japan to join the summit meeting that took place in Madrid.  

Jacob Stokes, senior fellow for the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, called it “an incredibly important time” in Japan’s defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

“You’re really seeing a very foundational change in Japan’s approach that is reflecting what they see, rightly, as a very severe security environment in Northeast Asia. Of course the challenge from China, but also threats from North Korea and Russia as well,” he said. 

“From a U.S. strategic perspective, Japan is really the cornerstone of our engagement with the region. Arguably, the most important country relationship the U.S. has in the Indo-Pacific,” he added. 

Kishida arrived in Washington for the final stop of a five-nation tour that took him to Group of Seven (G-7) nations France, Italy, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Canada. 

Japan holds the presidency of the G-7 for 2023 and will host the leaders summit in Hiroshima in May — the site of the first detonation of an atomic weapon by the U.S. Japan is also chairing the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council for the month of January, part of its two-year stint as a nonpermanent member of the U.N. Security Council. 

Tokyo is looking to use both venues to increase calls for the disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. This comes as Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, as China has increased its stockpile and as North Korea lays the groundwork for a possible nuclear weapons test.  

“Japan feels very strongly on issues of nuclear disarmament and the need to mitigate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons,” said Smith, of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Tokyo is balancing that advocacy with its pursuit of a military expansion. It signed a defense pact with the U.K. on Wednesday and has fully aligned itself with what U.S. and European allies define as the defense of the “rules-based” international and economic order. 

“It’s an interesting recognition, I think, that the Indo-Pacific allies — Japan, first and foremost — are aligned now with our European allies in a very different way than they have been in the past. And that is, again, thanks to Vladimir Putin,” Smith continued. 

“You now have a very similar language coming out of our European allies and our Indo-Pacific allies, led by Japan, that this is really a moment of challenge for the postwar order,” Smith said.

One area where the Biden administration and Japan are not fully aligned is Washington’s refusal to respond to Japan’s requests to join a regional trade agreement — formally called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 

“So on CPTPP, this is not an option we’re exploring,” White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said Friday. She said the U.S. is focused on an initiative launched in May, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. 


The CPTPP is a free trade agreement that was formed by the 11 members of the Obama-era Trans Pacific Partnership. Former President Trump withdrew the U.S. from that deal on his first day in office in 2017.  

The U.K. is on the brink of ascending to the CPTPP, and China and Taiwan have both applied to join the agreement. Smith said that Japan is keen on having the U.S. in the CPTPP as a bulwark against China’s pursuit of joining the agreement.  


“There’s a worry, I think, that China, its economic heft, will eventually begin to persuade other members of the CPTPP that maybe letting China in, it’s not a bad idea after all,” she said. “And the counterbalance, I think, is what the region is looking for. People may not say it out loud, but the U.S. counterbalance to China is really what this is all about.” 




18. GOP officially launches probe into chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal




This should not be a partisan issue. It should have been done a year and a half ago.


GOP officially launches probe into chaotic Afghanistan withdrawal

BY BRAD DRESS - 01/13/23 11:55 AM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/house/3812133-gop-officially-launches-probe-into-chaotic-afghanistan-withdrawal/



A top House Republican has officially launched a probe into the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, sending a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken requesting a wide array of information on the matter.

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee who served as its ranking member previously, said the Biden administration has so far refused to hand over documents but that he is now formally requesting compliance as chair of the panel.

“It is absurd and disgraceful that the Biden administration has repeatedly denied our longstanding oversight requests and continues to withhold information related to the withdrawal,” McCaul said in a statement. “In the event of continued noncompliance, the Committee will use the authorities available to it to enforce these requests as necessary, including through a compulsory process.”

McCaul is seeking intelligence assessments, internal agency documents and communications with the Taliban and Afghan government, among a long list of other inquiries in the letter Thursday.

He requested the information from the Biden administration by Jan. 26.

A spokesperson for the State Department said they were committed to working with the congressional committee and have already provided more than 150 briefings to bipartisan members of Congress since the withdrawal.

“Additionally, senior Department representatives have appeared in public hearings and answered questions on Afghanistan policy, and the Department has responded to thousands of requests for information and letters from members and their staffs related to Afghanistan policy,” the spokesperson said.

Republicans have long hinted at the Afghanistan investigation, one of a number of probes the party planned to launch after seizing the House in the November midterm elections.

In October, McCaul demanded the State Department preserve records related to the U.S. troop pullout from Afghanistan, promising he would investigate messy evacuations, the quick Taliban takeover of Kabul and the death of 13 American troops in a terrorist attack.

The chaos surrounding the Afghanistan withdrawal was the focus of bipartisan scrutiny in 2021 as the U.S. exit was highly publicized, with photos and videos showing refugees scrambling to leave the country.

Last year, Republicans on the Foreign Affairs Committee released a report as minority members of the panel slamming the White House for sloppy planning, understaffing at Afghanistan’s largest airport and failing to anticipate the wave of refugees.

The White House responded that the report was “riddled” with inaccuracies.

Republicans are also expected to issue subpoenas to compel U.S. officials to sit for depositions in the probe led by McCaul.

McCaul on Thursday said he takes the obligation of investigating the withdrawal “very seriously” and will “pursue this investigation until all our questions are answered and all parties responsible are held accountable.”

“We owe this to the American people, especially our service members and veterans,” the lawmaker said in his statement.


This story was updated at 3:37 p.m.




19. MLK Jr.’s dream not yet achieved, but still attainable, advocates say


MLK Jr.’s dream not yet achieved, but still attainable, advocates say

BY CHEYANNE M. DANIELS - 01/15/23 7:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/legislation/civil-rights/3812797-mlk-jr-s-dream-not-yet-achieved-but-still-attainable-advocates-say/


Sixty years after Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. gave his “I Have a Dream” speech, racial justice advocates say that dream has not been achieved. As Black Americans continue to face economic, social and systemic racism, those advocates point to social and policy changes that could push the country closer to King’s vision.

To start, political organizer DaMareo Cooper told The Hill it’s important to acknowledge that King’s dream has been misconstrued.

“It’s been perverted in our society to just talk about how [King] was the greatest peaceful demonstrator, and all that stuff is true, but we don’t want to talk about radical King,” said Cooper, co-executive director of the multiracial organizing network The Center for Popular Democracy. 

“We pretend that the dream was just that Black and white folks can hang out together or go to school together or that society allows interracial marriages and stuff like that,” he continued. “But what he was really talking about is how do we create a society where everyone has economic opportunity … about being able to not only sit at the counter but to be able to pay for the food.”

For King’s dream to come to life, Cooper said, certain issues need to be addressed — with injustices in the criminal justice system being among the most pressing.

Black Americans are incarcerated in state prisons at more than five times the rate of white Americans in the United States, according to the Sentencing Project. Additionally, Black men consistently receive harsher prison sentences than white men who commit the same crimes, according to a 2022 report by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

The result of the disparities directly affects families’ financial stability. Mass incarceration has increased the U.S. poverty rate by an estimated 20 percent. In addition, the probability of a family being poor is 40 percent greater if the father is incarcerated. For Black Americans, once they are released from incarceration, they are less likely than white Americans to see their earnings recover, according to the Brennan Center for Justice.

Supporting communities, whether it be financially investing in predominantly Black public schools or improving health outcomes and access to health care, is the first step toward change, agreed Rev. William Barber, co-chair of the Poor People’s Campaign. 

“Dr. King did not die because he was part of a movement that won the crucial victories of citywide desegregation, the desegregation of public schools, the Civil Rights Act, and the Voting Rights Act,” Barber said in a statement to The Hill. 

“No, he died because he insisted that those victories were not enough. Dr. King was murdered because he refused to accept a military industrial complex that destroyed lives half a world away, an economic system that was willing to throw away millions of poor and low wage people right here at home, and the continuing public policy racism that he called triune evils.”

Barber said in order for King’s vision to be reached, ideological differences must be put aside. 

“So much of the problem in our public life isn’t about which side is right in any given debate, but the fact that we’re not even talking about the things that matter to the people who are hurting the most,” said Barber. That includes topics like health care, voting rights and the continued effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, he said.

But another important part to achieving King’s dream is dismantling three big myths about race, said Ben Jealous, former national president and CEO of NAACP.

The first myth is that racism only hurts Black people and people of color.

“If you accept that racism is used to divide people, then it follows that it hurts everybody trapped in poverty because if they can’t unite, they can’t change their position,” said Jealous, author of “Never Forget Our People Were Always Free: A Parable of American Healing.”

“There’s almost twice as many whites trapped in poverty than Blacks,” he added. “Ergo, it hurts numerically even more whites than Blacks in the biggest way, which is to impoverish people for generations.” 

The second big lie, he said, is that only white people have paid for discrimination. In truth, Jealous said, Black Americans lost thousands of businesses and homes when segregation ended.

The last lie, Jealous said, is that division between races has always existed in America. 

“The notion of race that we grew up with, as a color caste and a vestige of an old colonial order, was created in the early 1700s,” Jealous explained. “The Virginia Colony was started in the early 1600s. The American Experiment had been going for 100 years before we switched from a very old definition of race, which basically meant tribe, and applied it to this color caste system.” 

As Jealous explores in his book, when European indentured servants and African slaves were rebelling together, race became a way to divide the servants and enslaved people.

Still, Jealous acknowledges these truths might be hard for some to accept, particularly as challenges are underway in state legislatures across the nation about what can be taught in schools.  

“This is American history and we all need to know our history,” said Jealous. “It is important to the sons and daughters of confederates to understand the full history of their ancestors. It’s important to the sons and daughters of slaves to know the full history of our ancestors. And it’s especially important that we understand that our ancestors understood they were part of the same family. It affirms Dr. King’s assertion that we are all one American family.”

Barber added that in order to truly honor the Kingian tradition this weekend, the goal should not be to find ways to pat oneself on the back. 


“Instead, as King said, we must [be] dissatisfied until justice rolls down like water and we are one nation under God indivisible with Liberty and justice for all.”






20. From phishing scams to propaganda: How Russia, rogue nations utilize cyber capabilities against the US






From phishing scams to propaganda: How Russia, rogue nations utilize cyber capabilities against the US

Russia utilizes a group called Cyber Front Z that it portrays as a 'people's army'

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

Video

CISA provides resources to hospital networks amid cybersecurity threats

Fox News national security correspondent Jennifer Griffin has the latest on cybersecurity threats on 'Special Report.'

Rogue nations including China, Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to close the cyber capabilities gap on the U.S., utilizing a range of operations that have created an increasingly complex and difficult security landscape to navigate.

"Cyber warfare isn't just about access to sensitive or classified information," Jamil Jaffer, founder and executive director at the National Security Institute at the George Mason University Law School, told Fox News Digital. "It can have real physical effects."

The cybersecurity landscape has shifted over the past 10 years, due in part to disclosures from various nations, including the U.S., into how their national cyber toolkits work, allowing other countries to quickly develop capabilities they had lacked.

Jaffer labeled China "the largest threat" in cyberspace due to the long-term hacking campaign the country has maintained with deep inroads to U.S. systems, along with the Russians. But he highlighted the significant threat of developing cyber nations like Iran and North Korea.

AMERICA'S NEW B-21 RAIDER HAS 4 BIG SECRETS CHINA WANTS TO STEAL


In this undated photo distributed Feb. 12, 2020, by the North Korean government, North Korean Premier Kim Jae-ryon, right top, has a meeting at the emergency anti-epidemic headquarters in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

Those nations have utilized their cyber capabilities in a range of ways, from suppression of the general population through limiting internet access to outright monetary theft and the attack of foreign assets and terrorism.

"The really scary thing about the Iranians, the North Koreans — in part because we so successfully cut them off from the world economic system — is that they have both now the growing capability, desire, and potentially the freedom to act," Jaffer, who previously served as associate counsel to President George W. Bush and senior counsel to the House Intelligence Committee, explained.

"The Russians and Chinese have better capabilities, they have more access, but they're going to step more carefully, whereas the North Koreans, the Iranians are really gaining ground and are maybe more willing to take actions that the Russians and Chinese wouldn't because they're willing to bear that price," he added. "And so they, to me, represent a significant threat."

North Korea has focused on its financial gain, using phishing scams and crypto theft as means of gaining money and bypassing international sanctions. Through their cyber capabilities, the hermit kingdom has "extracted a tremendous amount of money from the global economy," according to Jaffer.

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"They've engaged in significant theft of money, including from major payment systems and banking institutions, so they're very capable in that realm as well," he added. "That's a key element of their cyber efforts."


A police motorcycle burns in downtown Tehran, Iran, during a protest over the death of a young woman who had been detained for violating the country's conservative dress code. (AP Photo)

Iran has used cyberwarfare to achieve a variety of goals, including the suppression of access to the internet to prevent opponents of the regime from organizing, including periodic blackouts at the start of the months-long protests that started in September 2022, and attacks on foreign infrastructure.

"Iran’s regime has dedicated its resources to improving its cyber capabilities for years now, realizing that this is an area of vulnerability for the U.S. and Europe," Lisa Daftari, a Middle East expert and editor-in-chief of The Foreign Desk, told Fox News Digital. "Their capabilities are steadily improving as a significant arm of their military apparatus.

"This is Tehran’s way of saying, 'Look at us, we are here, and we see you," she added. "It’s a threat to silence its opponents and a flex of their own might. They use everything from malware to ransomware to get their point across."

CHINA THREAT: BRITAIN, JAPAN SIGN MAJOR DEFENSE DEAL TO ALLOW MUTUAL TROOP ACCESS

As dangerous as Iran and North Korea have grown with their capabilities, Russia remains at the forefront of cyberwarfare, which has played a significant role in its Ukraine invasion.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has made use of a group called Cyber Front Z to help spread his propaganda online, a more organized and public-facing "troll factory" than the kind Russia normally utilizes. "Troll farms," as they are more commonly called, aim to disrupt naturally trending topics and online discourse to spread misinformation.


Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, speaks as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, left, and Chief of the General Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov attend a meeting with senior military officers in Moscow, Russia, Dec. 21, 2022. (Sergey Fadeichev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

While Russia regularly uses such farms, it has gone to great lengths to make Cyber Front Z appear as a grassroots organization, reflecting the likes of cyber collective Anonymous, in an effort to hide its goals and create deniability, according to Ivana Stradner, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies focusing on Russia’s information warfare.

"Russia's never openly talking about its offensive information operations activities. They only talk about their defensive information operations activities," Stradner told Fox News Digital. "If you read the latest national security strategy for 2021, they for the first time devoted a special chapter on information security. They talked about information operations."

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Stradner said that Russia wants to void ties to the group because it creates "plausible deniability" and allows Russia to avoid "any responsibility" even though you have "all those hackers ... that clearly operation behalf of the Russian state."


Illustration of a hacker (iStock)

A Newsweek report on Cyber Front Z at the start of the Ukraine invasion referred to them as "pro-Russia activists" who organized on social media platform Telegram to recruit "cyber troops," citing Russian media outlets. Vice in April 2022 referred to the group as "the People’s Movement" that was "spreading Russian propaganda."

But Vice also pointed to a report from independent St. Petersburg-based media outlet Fontanka that revealed the group to be "just another Kremlin-linked troll farm, where people are paid to post disinformation in a targeted and coordinated manner."

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Moscow’s cybernetic reach extends even to countries like Serbia and areas in Africa, where it seeks to establish information superiority and control cyberspace, according to Stradner.

"They do not need to be rolling tanks in any of those countries as long as they can win the popularity and win what's been once called hearts and minds of those people," she explained, adding that this is "precisely also the role of Cyber Front Z."

Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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