Quotes of the Day:
"Psychological Warfare has always rested as an uneasy activity in democracies, even in wartime. It is partly to do with the suspicion that using the mind to influence the mind is somehow unacceptable. But is it more unacceptable to shoot someone's brains out rather than to persuade that brain to drop down their weapon and live?"
- Dr. Phillip M. Taylor, Author of "Munitions of the Mind", Manchester University Press, 1995
"I do believe that political arrangements which are based upon violence, intimidation and theft will eventually break down - and will deserve to do so."
- Margaret Thatcher
"Where there is power, there is resistance."
- Michel Foucault
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: Early July - Korea
2. Cheong Wa Dae reports 1st coronavirus infection among its staffers
3. N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018
4. N.K. propaganda outlets decry calls to abolish gender ministry, keeps mum on scrapping unification ministry
5. Labor union of unification ministry voices 'strong regret' over calls to scrap ministry
6. Moon still hoping for summit with Suga: Blue House
7. Gov't leaflet defense is pooh-poohed abroad
8. Monument in Benin has North Korean fingerprints
9. Reserve training canceled on COVID-19 surges
10. No signs that North Korea plans to demolish South Korean structures at the Mt. Kumgang tourism zone
11. Kim Jong Un grapples with the worst crisis in his reign so far: A crippled economy, no COVID-19 vaccines and food shortages
12. Coronavirus Has Arrived in North Korea: Pray You Never See That Headline
13. North Korea Is a Chemical Weapons Superpower Thanks to VX
14. China’s Overrated Role in Korean Peninsula Problems
15. In Seoul center, N Korean defectors find solace with locals
16. North Korea is making married women build cement blocks so it can complete a border wall with China in the next 3 months, report says
17. Is South Korea Going Global? New Possibilities Together With the Biden Administration
18. Lessons from South Korea’s approach to tackling disinformation
19. An Uprising of Despair in Cuba
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: Early July - Korea
Korea
By David Maxwell
Previous Trend: Positive
Pyongyang responded to U.S. diplomatic overtures with a statement from Kim Yo Jong (North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s sister) saying the United States “had wrong expectations for talks.” Pyongyang is likely consumed with internal problems resulting from COVID-19 mitigation measures, its failed economy, humanitarian disasters, and international sanctions. Kim Jong Un has made leadership changes, resuming his reign of terror. There have been reports of a major food crisis, and when Kim returned to public view, it was apparent he had lost a significant amount of weight. The dictator likely will not negotiate without first receiving sanctions relief, which, if provided, would only embolden his blackmail diplomacy. The administration continues its “principled and practical diplomacy” with engagement with regional powers, and Ambassador Sung Kim, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, reached out to his Chinese counterpart following the former’s trip to South Korea. The White House’s pursuit of “stern deterrence” will also continue. The alliance announced that ROK-U.S. combined command post training in August will proceed as scheduled, though there are outspoken officials, including 76 ROK assemblymen, who continue to argue for canceling ROK-U.S. exercises to spur Kim Jong Un to negotiate. However, changes to the exercise program for the past three years have failed to convince him to conduct substantive negotiations, and failing to maintain readiness puts the ROK-U.S. alliance at risk.
2. Cheong Wa Dae reports 1st coronavirus infection among its staffers
(LEAD) Cheong Wa Dae reports 1st coronavirus infection among its staffers | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with additional info in last para)
SEOUL, July 14 (Yonhap) -- Cheong Wa Dae said Wednesday that one of its officials has been diagnosed with COVID-19.
The official tested positive for the virus earlier in the day while working from home due to their spouse's fever symptom, according to Cheong Wa Dae spokesperson Park Kyung-mee.
It is the first known coronavirus infection directly linked with the office of President Moon Jae-in.
Park said the official holds the rank of assistant secretary to the president but stopped short of revealing personal information, including their name and gender.
Cheong Wa Dae immediately took the measure of restricting access to the space where the official had worked and disinfecting it.
Coronavirus testing is under way for all other Cheong Wa Dae staffers who worked there with the official, Park added.
The official earlier got vaccinated against the coronavirus and had "no contact" recently with the president, Cheong Wa Dae said in an additional press briefing.
lcd@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018
The regime continues to shape the information environment to try to set the conditions to successfully demand sanctions relief. I cannot emphasize this enough: The Korean people in the north are suffering due to Kim Jong-un's deliberate policy decision to priority nuclear and missile and military development over the welfare of the Korean people. Sanctions do not prevent the provision of humanitarian aid, food, and medical supplies. Those are not going to the north because Kim Jong-un has rejected the offers of the international community for the most part. Kim is using the suffering of the people as another line of effort to support blackmail diplomacy (increased tension, threats, and provocations combined with trying to gain sympathy for the people) to gain political and economic concessions. Kim could allocate resources to feed the people but instead wants to blame sanctions, COVID, and natural disasters for his failures.
N. Korea says its food production down to 10-year low in 2018 | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has reported to the United Nations that its food production dropped to the lowest level in 10 years in 2018 due to natural disasters, lack of farming materials and low levels of mechanization.
According to its Voluntary National Review (VNR) report submitted to the U.N., the North also admitted that it failed to achieve its national target of producing 7 million tons of food.
VNR is a process through which to assess progress among member countries in their efforts to achieve the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set in 2015. It is the first time that North Korea has made public a VNR report.
"The production in 2018 was about 4.95 million tons, the lowest during the last 10 years. The main reasons of reduced production are the natural disasters and weak resilience, insufficient farming materials and low level of mechanization," the report said.
"Despite of several positive measures to increase the cereal production, the national MDG target of cereal production of 7 million tons was not achieved," it added.
MDGs refer to the Millennium Development Goals set by the U.N. in 2000, which include the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.
North Korea is known for chronic food shortages, which appear to have been aggravated by last summer's back-to-back typhoons and flooding that wrought havoc on key farming areas.
In June, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un acknowledged that the country is facing a "tense" food shortage.
Experts say that North Korea needs to produce around 5.5 million tons of food every year to feed its population. A think tank in Seoul earlier said the North could be faced with a food shortage of around 1.3 million tons this year.
kokobj@yna.co.kr
(END)
4. N.K. propaganda outlets decry calls to abolish gender ministry, keeps mum on scrapping unification ministry
It is interesting to try to understand what north Korea deems important from its propaganda focus.
We must always keep in mind how poorly women are treated in the north. I have heard from escapees that one of the things they link about South Korean dramas is the portrayal of women with power and respect in the South (of course there are problems in the South as well but they do not caompar to how much women suffer in the north).
N.K. propaganda outlets decry calls to abolish gender ministry, keeps mum on scrapping unification ministry | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korean propaganda outlets slammed the head of South Korea's main opposition party Wednesday for calling for the abolition of the gender equality ministry but stayed mum on a more relevant issue of his call for scrapping the unification ministry.
Earlier, Lee Jun-seok, chairman of the People Power Party, called for the abolishment of the gender equality and unification ministries, claiming they have outlived their lifespans or had no role to play from the beginning.
Meari, a North Korean propaganda website, carried an article under the name of an individual, saying that Lee's claims on scrapping the gender equality ministry show that the mindsets of South Korean politicians "still belong to the pre-modern times."
"The so-called 'Lee Jun-seok phenomenon' shows the shameful aspect of the South Korean society and is a deformed and dangerous phenomenon that has its roots in the reactionary view and backward social system running counter to the advancement of history of mankind," it said.
Uriminzokkiri, another propaganda website, quoted South Korean media reports on the issue and slammed Lee for "showing outright discrimination against women."
Tongil Voice, a North Korean propaganda radio broadcast, also cited media reports in the South and said Lee's leadership is faced with a crisis.
The North, however, remained mum on Lee's calls to scrap the unification ministry.
Last week, Lee called into question the existence of the unification ministry in a radio interview, saying it is inefficient to separate the duties of the unification ministry from the foreign ministry.
Unification Minister Lee In-young immediately rebuffed his arguments and voiced strong regret. Later, he also criticized the PPP chairman for lacking "historical awareness" with regard to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.
The unification ministry has handled all issues related to inter-Korean relations and unification since it was first launched in 1969 as the Board of National Unification and later upgraded into a full ministry.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
5. Labor union of unification ministry voices 'strong regret' over calls to scrap ministry
No surprise here.
Labor union of unification ministry voices 'strong regret' over calls to scrap ministry | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, July 13 (Yonhap) -- The labor union of unification ministry employees expressed "strong regret" Tuesday over the main opposition People Power Party leader's call for scrapping the agency handling reconciliation efforts with North Korea.
PPP Chairman Lee Jun-seok called into question the existence of the unification ministry in a radio interview last week, saying it is inefficient to separate the duties of the unification ministry from the foreign ministry.
Unification Minister Lee In-young immediately rebuffed his arguments and voiced strong regret. Later, he also criticized the PPP chairman for lacking "historical awareness" with regard to unification of the Korean Peninsula.
"The labor union of the unification ministry expresses strong regret and worries over the arguments recently being raised by some that the ministry has to be dismantled," the union said in a statement.
"The peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula is what the Korean people ask us to achieve and the duty presented to our time," it added. "Whether to dismantle the unification ministry is not a matter of debate predicated on impromptu remarks emanating from the perspectives of political interests and narrow-minded performance-based ways of thinking."
The union also called for the ministry to use the controversy as a chance to renew itself and strengthen its functions in order to better serve the Constitution that supports a "peaceful unification" and heal the wounds from the decadeslong division of the Korean Peninsula.
The ministry was first launched in 1969 as the Board of National Unification. It was later upgraded into a full ministry responsible for all issues related to inter-Korean relations and unification.
Inter-Korean relations remain chilled since the Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea in early 2019. The ties got strained further after North Korea blew up a joint liaison office in its border town of Kaesong last summer in protest of anti-Pyongyang leaflets sent into the country by defector groups.
The two Koreas technically remain in a state of war as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.
kokobj@yna.co.kr
(END)
6. Moon still hoping for summit with Suga: Blue House
Hope is not a course of action as General Sullivan used to say,,
Wednesday
July 14, 2021
Moon still hoping for summit with Suga: Blue House
Korean lawmakers from the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Association led by Democratic Party Rep. Kim Jin-pyo arrive at Narita Airport in Tokyo Wednesday afternoon for a two-day trip to meet with their Japanese counterparts. [YONHAP]
Korea is holding out to the last-minute for a leaders summit with Japan ahead of the Summer Olympics despite Tokyo remaining unresponsive.
Addressing speculation that President Moon Jae-in will visit Japan to attend the opening ceremony of the Tokyo Olympics on July 23 and hold a bilateral meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, the Blue House said Wednesday that while "nothing has been decided," it hopes a summit will come through for the sake of bilateral relations.
Park Soo-hyun, the Blue House senior secretary for public communication, said in a CBS radio interview Wednesday, "We continue to stand by our position that we hope that a Korea-Japan summit will be held, and that there will be practical results that bring hope to the people of both countries."
He said Korea stands by its two-track approach to relations with Japan, separating historical disputes from areas the two neighbors can work together on.
Addressing the Korean public's lack of enthusiasm for a visit by Moon to Tokyo, he said, "From the perspective of the president who is in charge of state affairs, it is not possible to act only on emotions regarding Japan, our closest neighbor."
With just nine days left until the Olympic opening ceremony, not much time remains to arrange what would be the first formal meeting between Moon and Suga.
When asked in the radio interview if Moon would take part in the Olympic opening ceremony if there is no summit guaranteed to yield sufficient results, Park replied that "nothing is definitive," while calling on Japan for a "change in attitude."
Park was critical of the Japanese government recently leaking to the media comments about a possible summit, saying it has "caused confusion for our people."
Japanese media in recent weeks has been reporting that the Japanese government wanted a short 15-minute meeting between Moon and Suga, generally citing government sources.
The Korean Foreign Ministry Sunday expressed "strong regret" over such leaks about a possible summit, noting the consultation process could be hindered unless Tokyo "responds prudently." It added that Japanese media speculation was "not true."
Japan so far hasn't been responsive to Korea's desire for substantive talks that could tackle some pending issues between the countries.
They include the issue of wartime sexual slavery and forced labor victims, Japan's export restrictions on Korea and Tokyo's planned discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima power plant into the Pacific Ocean.
The two sides have also clashed over territorial claims over Korea's Dokdo islets in the East Sea.
Park did not elaborate on what could constitute a significant achievement from a Moon-Suga summit, saying, "I can't comment in further detail."
Japan's conservative Sankei Shimbun reported in an editorial Wednesday that a bilateral summit would be "meaningless" unless Moon addresses his "anti-Japanese attitude," adding that there is "no need for a full-fledged meeting" unless Korea provides a "concrete plan" to resolve differences.
Korean lawmakers from the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Association kicked off a two-day trip to Tokyo Wednesday. The delegation, led by ruling Democratic Party Rep. Kim Jin-pyo, will meet with their Japanese counterparts to discuss ways to improve Korea-Japan relations. The group last visited Japan in November and met with Suga.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
7. Gov't leaflet defense is pooh-poohed abroad
As it should and must be. It is wrong. And the national assembly and Moon administration should be embarrassed. They need to take action to correct this and then to participate in a combined, integrated, and holistic information and influence activities campaign to support ROK and US interests.
Wednesday
July 14, 2021
Gov't leaflet defense is pooh-poohed abroad
The South Korean government's response to concerns from United Nations special rapporteurs on the country's ban on launches of anti-Pyongyang propaganda materials over the inter-Korean border, which was delivered on Friday. [OHCR]
The government's response to a group of United Nations special rapporteurs criticizing its outlawing of sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border was met with an icy reception.
“The South Korean government has not made a convincing argument that public safety is threatened by leaflets being sent via balloon,” said Robert King, the U.S. State Department’s former special envoy on North Korean human rights, in an interview with Voice of America.
“Incidents along the inter-Korean border are frequent," King continued. "South Korean military officers and United Nations officers are constantly dealing with border incidents, and most of them have nothing to do with balloons and leaflets.”
Phil Robertson, director of Human Rights Watch, issued a short statement on Twitter on the leaflet ban, saying, “It is both ironic and sad that a South Korean [government] headed by a former human rights lawyer is violating human rights of its own people in order to defend the government of North Korea, which is one of the worst human rights abusing regimes in the world.”
The government’s explanation for the leaflet ban came several months after Tomas Ojea Quintana, special rapporteur on North Korea's human rights situation, and three other rapporteurs voiced concerns in a letter that the ban could infringe on "the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression" and "legitimate activities" conducted by nongovernmental organizations in South Korea.
In response to the special rapporteurs' concerns, the South Korean government sent a letter to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) last Friday, according to the office.
In the letter, Seoul argued that the ban only restrains freedom of expression to "the minimum level to protect public safety" and is within the extent of restrictions on speech permitted by international human rights agreements.
The government also claimed that the law was not concerned with restricting speech or ideas, but focused on limiting the use of a specific method – sending leaflets across the border – to express an opinion.
However, at the time of the law’s enactment in late December, the Unification Ministry pointed out problems with the content of the leaflets, calling it “obscene propaganda” and “fake news.”
During the debate over the law in the National Assembly, the bill’s sponsor, ruling Democratic Party lawmaker Song Young-gil, also took issue with illustrations and words in the leaflets, describing them as “insulting to Chairman Kim Jong-un, who is North Korea’s most respected figure.”
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
8. Monument in Benin has North Korean fingerprints
Yes, we often forget that north Korea has an "export industry"of building monuments in other countries.
Wednesday
July 14, 2021
=
Monument in Benin has North Korean fingerprints
The African Renaissance Monument near Dakar, Senegal, was one of the sculptures built by Mansudae Overseas Projects before such commissions were forbidden by the United Nations Security Council in 2017. [JOONGANG PHOTO]
North Korea's Mansudae Art Studio is probably behind the construction of a monumental statue in the West African country of Benin, in violation of United Nations sanctions, according to a Voice of America (VOA) report Wednesday.
Previous reporting by the French-language arm of the Chinese state news agency Xinhua and Beninese media portal Beninplus.com said the 30-meter bronze statue under construction in Cotonou, Benin – entitled “Amazone” after an all-female military regiment of the kingdom of Dahomey, which existed within the modern territory of Benin – was designed by a Chinese sculptor.
However, documents obtained by VOA show that Korean-language design blueprints and contracts for the statue were drafted by a company called Chongryong International Development. Furthermore, the initials of designers, architects, and sculptors listed in the documents include “K.C.J.” and “R.Y.C.,” which are more likely to be Korean names than Chinese ones.
Chongryong is believed to be a front for the state-owned Mansudae Art Studio. Under United Nations sanctions passed in 2016 and 2017, Mansudae Art Studio and its affiliate companies are forbidden from exporting artwork or undertaking projects overseas.
The studio is controlled by the propaganda department of the Workers’ Party and is responsible for churning out artwork inside North Korea that maintains the cult of personality surrounding its leaders, including current leader Kim Jong-un, his father and grandfather.
North Korean artwork in Africa is not a new phenomenon. The regime conducted extensive diplomatic outreach to African countries in the Non-Aligned Movement during the 1970’s and 1980’s, efforts bolstered by ideological sympathy between the North and authoritarian states in Africa.
Impressed by North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung’s ideology of self-reliance – known in Korean as "juche" – Zimbabwean dictator and President Robert Mugabe commissioned the Mansudae Art Studio to construct the National Heroes’ Acre in Harare that extols the anti-colonial ideology of Zimbabwe’s ruling party, ZANU-PF.
Mansudae also constructed a giant statue of Laurent Kabila, former president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Kinshasa and a memorial to Angolan independence fighter Agostinho Neto in Luanda.
Although the North initially built statues in Africa for free, the regime increasingly turned to earning money from African commissions as it faced a shortfall of foreign currency following the break-up of the Eastern Bloc in the early 1990’s.
The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Mansudae Art Studio in 2016 and the studio’s foreign branch Mansudae Overseas Projects in 2017 after investigations revealed that the studio was selling artwork to raise money for the North Korean government.
However, inconsistent enforcement of the sanctions by African countries and close ties with the North have allowed projects such as the Amazone in Benin to proceed.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
9. Reserve training canceled on COVID-19 surges
This is not good. There is so little reserve training that any cancellation is damaging.
I think we provided sufficient vaccines for the active duty ROK force.
Excerpt:
The US provided Johnson & Johnson’s coronavirus vaccine for South Korean troops and military workers, but the supply fell short of covering key demographic groups -- those aged between 20 and 30, who account for the majority of the reserve forces.
Reserve training canceled on COVID-19 surges
Published : Jul 14, 2021 - 15:12 Updated : Jul 14, 2021 - 17:24
Members of South Korea’s reserve forces take part in drills at one of the Army units in Seoul, on March 5, 2018. (Yonhap)
South Korea is suspending training for its reserve forces for a second consecutive year, as the fourth wave of COVID-19 threatens to spiral out of control.
The US provided Johnson & Johnson’s coronavirus vaccine for South Korean troops and military workers, but the supply fell short of covering key demographic groups -- those aged between 20 and 30, who account for the majority of the reserve forces.
“Those aged 30 and below will receive their shots in August at the earliest, which means they will develop resistance to the virus in mid-October. Training this year is out the window,” the Ministry of National Defense said Wednesday.
But the ministry said it will instead offer online courses for reservists seeking to brush up on their knowledge of combat skills, adding that commanders at key front-line units will take part in the training without the reservists.
“Hopefully it will be back to business as usual next year. Vaccinated and ready to go again,” a senior military official said.
South Korea maintains a 3.1 million-strong reserve forces. That is the world’s largest, according to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.
A vital part of the country’s defenses along with its 555,000-strong standing army, they were established in April 1968, three months after a 31-member team of North Korean commandos was sent here to assassinate South Korea’s then-President Park Chung-hee.
And soon enough, the reserve forces demonstrated their capabilities by defeating almost all of the North Korean commandos deployed again later that year -- from late October to early November 1968 -- to topple the South Korean government.
At the time, North Korea bypassed the increased border security prompted by the Blue House raid by sending its team to coastal locations in Gangwon Province. The team established guerilla camps and tried reaching out to villagers in the hope that they would sympathize with their cause.
South Korea and the US successfully thwarted the advances of the 120 North Koreans, with the South’s reserve forces helping to kill 107 people and capture seven alive.
10. No signs that North Korea plans to demolish South Korean structures at the Mt. Kumgang tourism zone
I wonder if there are behind the scenes talks about the possibility of reopening tourism which is of course a major money maker for the regime. And I am sure any new tourism initiative will include a demand that South korea repair and refurbish the existing facilities.
No signs that North Korea plans to demolish South Korean structures at the Mt. Kumgang tourism zone - Daily NK
Construction work remains incomplete at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone in Kangwon Province as well
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered the demolition of South Korean facilities in the Mt. Kumgang tourist zone two years ago, but it appears the country has yet to implement that order.
A Daily NK source in North Korea reported on Monday that North Korean authorities believe building new structures after demolishing the old ones would prove pointless given the decreased amount of tourism due to COVID-19. The country’s leadership also believes that it needs to place a priority on disease control efforts.
The source emphasized that the reason behind North Korea’s failure to demolish the existing buildings is because the “Supreme Leader [Kim Jong Un] and the ruling party are placing a priority on preparing for a protracted coronavirus pandemic.”
The source pointed out that the authorities would have to erect new buildings immediately after demolishing the old South Korean ones. “Even if the [structures] were built immediately, it would likely be a tough time domestically and internationally to promote tourism,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
“[The leadership] doesn’t feel the need to invest party funds, labor, or supplies into such a project, so they won’t be demolishing the facilities right away,” he continued, adding, “[North Korean leaders] have also postponed orders to start construction [of new buildings].”
Since 2019, North Korea has made moves ostensibly aimed at developing the Mt. Kumgang tourist zone on its own. When he last visited the area, Kim ordered the demolition of “shabby” South Korean facilities and their replacement with new facilities “built in our [North Korean] style.”
North Korean leader visited Mt. Kumgang on Oct. 23, 2019. / Image: Rodong Sinmun
During a review of past activities at the Eighth Party Congress earlier this year, Kim called for “gradual and annual” progress in the comprehensive plan to develop the Mt. Kumgang tourist zone “over the course of the new five-year plan.” He called for the removal of all the old facilities, including “the Hotel Haegumgang near Kosong Port.”
With COVID-19 continuing to spread, however, the authorities appear to have put efforts to develop the country’s various tourist sites on the back burner. This seems to have included postponing the demolishing of South Korean facilities in the Mt. Kumgang tourist zone for the time being.
North Korean authorities have also provisionally shelved plans to develop the region into distinctive zones such as the Kosong Port Coastal Tourism Zone, the Piro Peak Hiking Tourism Zone, and the Haegumgang Coastal Park Zone, according to the source.
“Work on the area around the Kosong Port Coastal Tourism Zone was suspended, with just the port area fixed up,” he explained. “In the Piro Peak, Haegumgang, and Sports and Culture zones, all the soldiers were withdrawn right after the start of construction work.”
North Korea continues to make it clear it intends to demolish the South Korean facilities and erect new buildings once the worst of the COVID-19 pandemic is over. Daily NK’s source said that the authorities have announced that they will “never cooperate with South Korea” during the process of demolishing the buildings and putting up new ones.
“It’s clear they will demolish Hotel Haegumgang and replace it with a new building,” the source said, “They will build a completely different building, newly remodeling everything in our [North Korean] style.
“Absolutely no attempt will be made to liaison with South Korea regarding the development of tourist sites in Mt. Kumgang,” he claimed, adding, “It’s likely the designs and construction will be done in our [North Korean] style after receiving supplies, equipment, and money from China.”
Meanwhile, the authorities have reportedly been unable to complete construction work at the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone in Kangwon Province.
Work on the tourist zone was slated to be completed by April of last year.
“The Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone remains uncompleted,” the source said. “The interiors [of structures at the site] in particular remain incomplete.”
According to the source, only the exteriors of the structures have been completed, and that construction managers “have not even reported [to the leadership] that the structures are finished being built.”
The source went on to explain that North Korean building laws forbid structures to be used before a “construction completion report” has been filed. “That’s why no one is using these buildings,” he added.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
11. Kim Jong Un grapples with the worst crisis in his reign so far: A crippled economy, no COVID-19 vaccines and food shortages
How bad will it get and will there be some kind of catastrophic event?
I wonder what Kim is thinking about Cuba right now?
Kim Jong Un grapples with the worst crisis in his reign so far: A crippled economy, no COVID-19 vaccines and food shortages
As the rest of the world grapples with dangerous new variants, North Korea continues to proudly proclaim it remains COVID-19 free.
Its virus control strategy to date has been simple and effective: strict quarantine measures have kept the virus from coming in by keeping everything else out.
But while North Korea may not have the virus within its borders, its pandemic defence has come at a cost.
Along with crippling its economy, the closure has also meant there is no clear strategy on how the regime will vaccinate its population to protect it against a wave of the coronavirus.
In fact, the best intelligence is that North Korea has so far not managed to acquire any vaccines against COVID-19, not even for leader Kim Jong Un himself.
Without access to vaccines and no real plan on how to get them, the population and regime remain vulnerable to any breach of the fortress.
And now the country appears in turmoil as its 37-year-old leader faces the worst crisis in his nearly decade-long reign.
North Korea may pay huge toll for pandemic restrictions
As reports first swirled at the beginning of last year that the coronavirus was spreading, North Korea pulled up its drawbridge.
With a malnourished population and a decrepit health system, the regime knew a virus outbreak would be devastating, said Professor Jung Dae-jin from the Aju Institute of Unification.
"North Korea itself knows it lacks the health infrastructure to cope with the COVID-19," he said.
Staff of the Pyongyang Primary School No. 4 clean stairwells in Pyongyang to prevent the spread of COVID-19 among children. (AP: Cha Song Ho
)
The already isolated nation cut itself off almost completely from the outside world and has held the position for over 18 months.
The strategy appears to have worked.
Kang Mi-jin, a North Korean defector who is now chief executive of NK Investment and Development, is in regular contact with North Korean residents who relay messages using smuggled mobile phones.
She says the best evidence is that North Korea has managed to keep the virus out.
"North Korea is holding several massive meetings while South Korea restricts gathering to no more than five," she said.
"The fact that North Korea holds big gatherings of thousands proves there is no COVID-19 in the North."
Kang Mi-jin is in regular contact with North Koreans and said there are signs the country has managed to avoid a COVID-19 outbreak.(ABC News: Mitch Woolnough
)
But she warned it would not take much for the virus to get out of control.
"To cope with COVID-19, you need diagnostic and treatment facilities which North Korea doesn't have," she said.
While the strict border controls have kept the virus out, they have extracted a high toll.
Could the North be facing another 'Arduous March'?
Despite years of sanctions, the North Korean economy still relies on trade, particularly with its key ally China. And it needs key inputs like fertiliser and fuel.
Without them, it cannot produce the food needed to feed its population. As a result, the food supply, "will be in crisis in [the] near short term," Professor Dae-jin said.
A high and horrific bar was set for North Korea during the "Arduous March" period in the 1990s, when possibly millions of people starved to death during extreme famines.
The cause of Kim Jong Un's recent weight loss is unclear. (KCNA via Reuters
)
"Our people's hearts ached most when we saw [his] emaciated looks," a North Korean man said on state television.
Analysts say it is still unclear why Mr Kim's waistline is shrinking, but it is clearly being used to paint him as a stressed leader, toiling away during tough times.
Professor Jung Dae-jin said North Korea wants to restore trade to save itself but does not feel it can safely do so.
"They are eager to reopen the cooperation with China but they are not comfortable to reopen because of the pandemic," he said.
Professor Jung Dae-jin says North Korea are not comfortable reopening because of the pandemic.(ABC News: Mitch Woolnough
)
North Korea will need to restart trade once again and the only way to do that without risking a major outbreak of COVID-19 is to vaccinate its people.
The predicament for the North Koreans is that with no hope of creating its own vaccine, it will need to open its borders to access the doses.
For a government as paranoid as the Kim regime, it is a giant leap of faith.
Kim appears to be stalling on COVID-19 vaccinations
North Korea was supposed to receive 2 million doses of Astra Zeneca vaccines from COVAX, a United Nations-backed vaccine-sharing initiative designed to help low- and middle-income countries.
North Korea has also had vaccine offers from other countries.
South Korea is presenting itself as a global vaccine hub.(ABC News: Mitch Woolnough
)
The Russian foreign minister said his country has offered Pyongyang vaccines on a number of occasions. But so far, they don't appear to have taken up the offer.
In many ways, China is the obvious pathway for North Korea to access vaccines. Just this week, the two countries celebrated the 60th anniversary of their "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" and promised to strengthen cooperation.
But it was notable that there was no announcement of a vaccine delivery.
Instead, South Korean intelligence suggests North Korea is barring Chinese diplomats from entering and reinforcing its border with new guard posts to ensure there are no illegal crossings.
Could South Korea help?
South Korea is currently dealing with its own fourth wave of the virus and its capital Seoul has just tightened restrictions to their highest level.
But it has made clear it is open to providing North Korea with vaccines.
North Korea has claimed it did not found a single coronavirus infection after testing more than 30,000 people.(AP: Jon Chol Jin
)
Professor Jung Dae-jin said the South Korean government understands the strategic value in supplying vaccines to the North.
"The South Korean government would like to give vaccines as a diplomatic card or chip to deal with North Korea," he said.
President Moon Jae-in is in his last year of office and is desperate to resume stalled peace talks.
"If North Korea agrees to it, we will actively pursue cooperation toward supplying vaccines to North Korea," he said.
South Korea is promoting itself to be a global vaccination hub. It has signed agreements to produce vaccines on behalf of AstraZeneca, Novavax and Sputnik and is in talks to produce the Pfizer and Moderna mRNA vaccines.
It also has five local vaccines currently being tested.
One of those in development is from eubiologics, which has just moved to stage 2 testing. The results are expected in October.
"Hopefully, we're going to get the vaccines ready by the end of this year or early next year," Kim Seok-gyu from eubiologics said.
Kim Seok-gyu says that eubiologics stands ready to supply COVID-19 vaccines to North Korea if required.(ABC News: Mitch Woolnough
)
He said the company stands ready to supply to North Korea if the South Korean government asks them to.
"It is not easy to tell you right now because it is somewhat a political issue. It is subject to the [South] Korean government," he said.
"But as long as there is a demand, then we are ready to supply."
Ms Mi-jin said regular North Koreans would welcome access to South Korean vaccines.
"Ordinary people's perception is, product made in South Korea is the best quality, while any product or food from China is the worst," she said.
Although Mr Moon would love to be able to provide vaccines as a peace offering to kickstart negotiations with the North, Professor Jung Dae-jin thinks it's still a long way off from realisation.
"North Korea is not willing to open its doors to South Korea or to [the] United States or to any other states at this point,” he said.
"President Moon's plan will not be achieved in the short term."
The North Korean people hope that when the door finally opens, vaccines make it through before the virus.
South Korea is currently testing five local COVID-19 vaccines, including one from eubiologics.(ABC News: Mitch Woolnough
)
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12. Coronavirus Has Arrived in North Korea: Pray You Never See That Headline
It will be bad, very bad.
Conclusion: While North Korea continues to maintain that it has not yet detected a signal positive case of COVID-19, it is likely that the virus has made its way into the DPRK in some capacity. Should North Korea experience a major outbreak of the virus, it will likely prove to be devastating because of the poor state of North Korea’s healthcare system.
Coronavirus Has Arrived in North Korea: Pray You Never See That Headline
Shortly after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea quickly closed off its borders to both trade and international travel while also implementing strict domestic quarantine measures. These COVID-19 prevention measures remain in place today, and are having a significant impact on the North Korean economy, and are contributing to the DPRK’s current food challenges. Indeed, some experts have argued that North Korea’s efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 within its borders have done more to isolate and squeeze the country than the extensive international sanctions regime that has been levied against the country.
That North Korea is willing to endure this self-inflicted damage is reflective of the combination of a lack of reliable access to healthcare for many people in North Korea and the poor quality of the healthcare that is available. Were North Korea to experience a major COVID-19 outbreak, it would likely prove to be uncontrollable and would result in a substantial number of fatalities.
Starvation or Pandemic: A Crisis In the Making?
North Korea was one of the first countries to take significant action in response to the emergence of the COVID-19 virus in China, and by January the DPRK had entered into what remains the world’s most stringent set of COVID-19 prevention measures. North Korea shut its borders to international trade – even with China, the country’s most important trading partner and its economic lifeline – while also halting travel to the country by canceling flights and closely monitoring the movements of international diplomats and aid workers operating in the country. In addition, the North Korean regime put into practice its decades of experience in monitoring, directing, and restricting the internal movement of the North Korean people by instigating a strict quarantine for as many as 8,000 people.
These COVID-19 prevention efforts have had significant detrimental effects on the DPRK. As a result of the border closures, North Korean trade with China has plummeted, hitting record lows on several occasions. The absence of trade has resulted in a lack of commodities and consumer goods in the country – including in Pyongyang – while prices of goods that are available have skyrocketed.
More worrying has been the impact of the COVID-19 prevention efforts on North Korea’s food situation. North Korea is currently experiencing what appears to be a significant food shortage as a result of problems with the country’s agricultural sector in the aftermath of deadly weather events last summer, and the price of staple foods including both rice and corn has risen dramatically. These challenges have been compounded by the border closures, which have prevented imports of food and important agricultural supplies such as fertilizer and farming equipment. A recent leadership shakeup in response to a “grave incident” involving COVID-19 was reportedly the result of the North Korean military’s decision to import rice from overseas without authorization, which was considered to be a major breach of the country’s COVID-19 prevention efforts.
For North Korea to remain so committed to its COVID-19 prevention measures, despite their major negative effects on the country, likely reflects a realization on the part of the regime that a major COVID-19 outbreak in North Korea would be devastating.
The lack of reliable access to healthcare for many North Koreans is a major contributing factor to this reality. North Korea officially maintains that it offers free universal healthcare for the North Korean public, but according to surveys of North Korean defectors this is unlikely to true in practice. Research suggests that in reality, both costs associated with healthcare and a general lack of available medicine and medical supplies mean that reliable access to healthcare is likely limited to only wealthier North Koreans.
In addition, the quality of healthcare services on offer in North Korea – particularly in health facilities outside of Pyongyang – is likely poor. Hospitals and other healthcare facilities reportedly often lack both heat and electricity, and defectors have reported that surgeries often take place by the light of battery-operated flashlights, while many of the doctors and healthcare professionals are not particularly well trained. According to UNICEF, up to 50 percent of North Korean schools and healthcare facilities lack proper sanitation and clean water facilities. This is problematic in a healthcare setting in general, but would likely prove calamitous for North Korea’s ability to slow the rate of infections following a mass influx of COVID-19 patients into healthcare facilities.
While North Korea continues to maintain that it has not yet detected a signal positive case of COVID-19, it is likely that the virus has made its way into the DPRK in some capacity. Should North Korea experience a major outbreak of the virus, it will likely prove to be devastating because of the poor state of North Korea’s healthcare system.
13. North Korea Is a Chemical Weapons Superpower Thanks to VX
We must not overlook the regime's chemical and bio programs.
North Korea Is a Chemical Weapons Superpower Thanks to VX
Any examination of the threat posed by North Korea should no doubt begin with the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. North Korea’s nuclear weapons arsenal may grow substantially in the coming years to as many as 151 to 242 weapons by 2027. North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities are also continuing to improve, with the country now reportedly in possession of as many as eight intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of striking the continental United States and a growing arsenal of other ballistic missile systems that increasingly appear capable of challenging ballistic missile defenses in South Korea.
But North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs do not represent the totality of the threat posed by the country, or even the full extent of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat posed by the DPRK. North Korea’s large arsenal of chemical weapons, and its significant stockpile of VX nerve agent,s in particular, are also a significant security concern.
Chemical weapons have for decades fit into North Korean military policy. In the early 1960s, North Korea promulgated a new defense policy referred to as the Four Point Military Guidelines, a central tenet of which was an emphasis on the selective development of military capabilities that offered the country the greatest strategic benefit at the lowest possible cost, in keeping with North Korea’s financial resource and financial constraints.
Chemical weapons no doubt fit into that general military logic, and North Korea’s pursuit of a chemical weapons capability even predates the introduction of the Four Point Military Guidelines. North Korea began its development of chemical weapons in the 1950s when it reportedly first received a sarin nerve agent from the Soviet Union. North Korea shortly thereafter established its first facility for the production of chemical agents and stood up its first regular military chemical units.
Today, chemical weapons remain in keeping with North Korean military thinking. The DPRK’s Korean Peoples’ Army (KPA) remains large, but is also qualitatively inferior when compared to the armed forces of both the United States and South Korea. North Korea has attempted to overcome these qualitative deficiencies through a focus on the pursuit of asymmetric military capabilities, including such things as the development of ballistic missiles, a large Special Operations Force, cyber tools, and chemical weapons.
As a result of its qualitative disadvantage, in the event of a major armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula North Korea may look to quickly escalate the conflict by making use of the full range of its asymmetric military capabilities – potentially including its arsenal of chemical weapons. A strategy of rapid escalation would support a North Korean effort to bring about early termination of the conflict on terms favorable to North Korea, either in the form of North Korea’s early securing of its military objectives or the infliction of material, personnel, and psychological damage on its adversaries that is sufficient enough to lead them to pursue an end to the hostilities.
North Korea’s current arsenal of chemical weapons is estimated to be as large as between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons, and at maximum capacity North Korea is thought to be capable of producing up to 12,000 tons of chemical weapons. North Korea’s chemical weapons arsenal is believed to include a wide range of different chemical agents including blister agents, blood agents, choking agents, and riot-control agents. The bulk of North Korea’s chemical weapons stockpile, however, is likely made up of nerve agents such as Sarin, and in particular VX.
VX is a man-made chemical agent with no known uses outside of chemical warfare. VX appears as an oily liquid that is amber in color and which is very slow to evaporate, and is both odorless and tasteless. Under normal weather conditions, VX can last for days on objects that it has come into contact with and for much longer in very cold conditions. VX is primarily a liquid-threat, but it can be heated with very high temperatures to be turned into a gas. People can be exposed to VX in a number of ways, including both skin and eye contact as well as inhalation of VX that has been turned into a gas, while VX can also be used to contaminate food and can be released by an individual’s clothing should it come in contact with VX. While VX does not mix as well with water as some other chemical agents do, it can be used to contaminate water. VX is, generally speaking, the most potent of all nerve agents.
While much of North Korea’s chemical weapons arsenal is comprised of nerve agents such as VX, the country may have to import some precursors in order to produce them. North Korea operates a number of potential delivery mechanisms for its stockpile of VX, with its large Special Operations Force emerging as a particularly likely means for deploying the nerve agent.
In the event of a conflict, VX could be used to lock down a large civilian area or to suppress activity at a military facility. VX is also a prime candidate for use in more targeted operations, such as the assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong Nam at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in 2017.
14. China’s Overrated Role in Korean Peninsula Problems
And we must also consider north Korea as a "spoiler" in great power competition as well.
China’s Overrated Role in Korean Peninsula Problems
Prospects for productive U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear threat seem faint at best.
Beijing’s goals for the North Korean nuclear issue are at odds with Washington’s ultimate objective for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). More broadly, their goals for the desired end-state for the Korean Peninsula conflict. Whereas the United States remains committed to the goal of denuclearization of North Korea, China is more interested in maintaining a delicate geopolitical balance to counter U.S. influence in the region and expanding its own reach. Thus, prospects for productive U.S.-China cooperation on the North Korean nuclear threat seem faint at best.
For China, Pyongyang’s nuclear threats serve as a chip that either underscores Beijing’s relevance to the nuclear dilemma or justifies its calls for Washington to reduce its troop presence and military activity on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China may be content with living with a nuclear North Korea so long as the threat remains a nuisance to Washington’s strategic goals, helps preserve Beijing’s influence over the region, and hamstrings the international community’s efforts to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat.
Against the current backdrop of U.S.-China competition for influence, Beijing may perceive its North Korea card to be even more useful in undercutting Washington’s efforts to address perennial security challenges and contend for clout in the region. Therefore, the Biden administration may be met with Beijing’s intransigence in the follow-through on sanctions implementation and utilizing its diplomatic leverage over Pyongyang to persuade Kim to adhere to international norms and laws.
For the United States, this might simply underscore an imperative to revive alliances and like-minded partners to constrain China’s strategic mobility, exclude Beijing’s participation, and reduce its place and importance in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. This may not only undercut Beijing’s role in U.S. multilateral North Korea policy efforts; China’s diminished place in the Korean Peninsula may also dilute the utility of Pyongyang’s ties with Beijing, a critical fallback for the Kim regime in its long-term strategy towards the United States.
Can China be a real partner in bringing North Korea to the nuclear negotiating table? Perhaps a better question is whether the United States and like-minded countries should continue to tolerate what may be Beijing’s whims as a key component in dealing with the DPRK nuclear challenge.
Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor at American University. Twitter: @mllesookim
Image: Reuters
15. In Seoul center, N Korean defectors find solace with locals
Escapees from the north had a tough life there and they have a different kind of tough life wherever they go.
In Seoul center, N Korean defectors find solace with locals
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · July 14, 2021
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A small group of North Korean defectors gather at a sleek seven-story building in Seoul. Together with South Korean residents, they play the accordion, make ornaments and learn how to grow plants. Later, some go out for coffee.
“South and North Koreans gather here, smile and talk to each other. They ask each other about their pasts. Some (South Koreans) say their parents also originally came from North Korea,” said Ko Jeong Hee, 60, a defector who teaches accordion at the Inter-Korean Cultural Integration Center. “The atmosphere is really good here.”
The center, which opened last year, is South Korea’s first government-run facility to bring together North Korean defectors and local residents to get to know each other through cultural activities and fun. It’s meant to support defectors’ often difficult resettlement in the South, but also aims at studying the possible blending of the rivals’ cultures should they unify.
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Unification is a cherished part of the political rhetoric of both Koreas, but the difficulties of creating a single Korea comprised of the fantastically rich and successful South and the poor, authoritarian North make the reality of such a plan deeply complicated.
A Korean unification in the near future seems highly unlikely. The North, despite decades of poverty and mistrust of the outside world, is not politically unstable, and there have been no meaningful recent talks on unification between the Koreas.
Exchange programs between the Koreas — singers, art troupes and basketball matches — are frozen in the midst of a dispute over North Korea’s continued accumulation of nuclear weapons. There are also questions over just how useful the center will be, and whether many defectors, suffering economic hardship, will join in events that offer no chance of profit.
About 34,000 North Koreans have resettled in South Korea after fleeing poverty and political oppression at home, mostly in the last 20 years or so. That’s about 0.06% of South Korea’s 52 million people. Upon their arrival in South Korea, defectors are given citizenship, apartments, resettlement money, three months of social orientation courses and other benefits.
But they come from an extremely repressive, nominally socialist country whose estimated nominal gross domestic product was only one-54th of South Korea’s in 2019. Many are often discriminated against in the South and struggle to adjust to their new brutally competitive, capitalistic lives.
Last year, official data showed defectors’ monthly average wage was about 80% of South Koreans’. They stuck with a job for 31.6 months on average, less than half the time spent by South Koreans; and their school dropout rate was nearly three times higher. A 2019 survey showed only 9.4% of South Korean respondents would accept defectors marrying into their families.
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The plight of defectors in the South raises questions about what would happen if South Korea had to handle a sudden influx of North Korea’s 26 million people in the event of a unification on South Korean terms.
“This country has been unable to embrace those who voluntarily flee North Korea, but many are shouting for an integration of South and North Koreans and a unification,” said defector Son Jung Hoon, who worked as a human rights activist in South Korea for years. “That’s hypocrisy.”
Even the center’s establishment has been contentious. Its opening was delayed for several years because of protests by local residents, who worried it would tarnish their neighborhood’s image and lower housing prices. Center officials say there are no such complaints any longer.
Churches and civic groups have previously offered activities involving defectors, often enticing them with cash. They included a chorus, camping trips and soccer games with South Korea-born residents. But Kang Woo-jun, a university professor who is in charge some programs at the government center, said that facility doesn’t offer money but is pushing to give defectors high-quality classes.
“Cultural integration is much more difficult and requires a longer time than a political and institutional unification,” Unification Minister Lee In-young said recently. “Even though South and North Korea, living separated for about 70 years, becoming one is a long, treacherous journey, we must not stop it. It’s a journey that we have to go on together. That’s the reason why the Inter-Korean Cultural Integration Center exists.”
Built in a quiet residential neighborhood in western Seoul, the center isn’t well-known to the general public. COVID 19-related restrictions have largely forced it to offer more than half of its programs online and limit the number of in-person participants to less than 10. On Monday, its in-person programs were suspended or switched online amid a viral resurgence in Seoul.
During a recent visit to the center by Associated Press journalists, four female defectors and a South Korean man, all wearing masks, played the accordion, with Ko, the instructor, helping them.
Yu Hwa-suk, 57, fled to the South in 2015, and said she wants to achieve her childhood dream of becoming an accordionist.
“(South Korean) participants have a huge interest in North Koreans so we felt an intimacy with them,” Yu said, adding that she and others often dine out after their class.
In a craft class, four defectors and three South Koreans, all women, appeared a bit uncomfortable with each other, saying they haven’t had any meaningful conversations.
Song Hyo Eun, a 39-year-old South Korean, said she wouldn’t ask defectors about their lives in North Korea because it might involve a sore subject like their relatives left behind. Two defectors in their 70s said they worry South Koreans might have negative views about defectors.
Authorities should use various local facilities to integrate defectors living around South Korea, rather than establishing one big center in a certain area, said Kim Whasoon, an expert at a research institute at Seoul’s Sungkonghoe University.
Many defectors eke out a living and have been paid for attending cultural events in the past, said Kim Jong Kun, a professor at Seoul’s Kunkuk University. Because of this, Kim said, “I don’t think they want to gather with South Koreans just to learn calligraphy and musical instruments or sing a song.”
Some defectors and South Koreans also view unification differently.
Park Seong Hee, 50, a South Korean instructor in the craft class, said she hopes for a gradual process. “If we are unified, I think North Koreans would all come down to South Korea and disrupt the order that we’ve established,” she said.
Yu, the defector, wept as she spoke of unification as a way to rejoin her relatives and teach them what she’s learned in South Korea.
“Frankly speaking, I sometimes want to go back home,” Yu said. “When I lived in North Korea, I thought I would be happy if I was well-off. But after coming here, I’ve realized that being happy means being with the people I miss.”
AP · by HYUNG-JIN KIM · July 14, 2021
16. North Korea is making married women build cement blocks so it can complete a border wall with China in the next 3 months, report says
An example of how women are treated in the north.
North Korea is making married women build cement blocks so it can complete a border wall with China in the next 3 months, report says
- North Korea has been building a wall on its border with Communist cousin China.
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When it realized it was behind schedule, it started conscripting married women as laborers, per Radio Free Asia.
- North Koreans were upset with the forced labor, saying the border wall will be "useless," sources told Radio Free Asia.
North Korea, unable to meet a deadline for building a wall along its border with China, has turned to forcing married women to make cement blocks for construction, Radio Free Asia reported on Monday.
The regime wants to finish a two-meter high wall with voltage wiring in the province of Ryanggang by October 10, its Party Founding Day, per Radio Free Asia, a US-backed nonprofit news site.
North Korea initially planned to use military and youth personnel as laborers, but anonymous sources in the province told Radio Free Asia that authorities realized they needed more manpower to complete the wall on time. As a result, it ordered married women in the area, as young as those in their 20s and as old as those in their 60s, to start producing 10 blocks of cement a day for the wall until Party Founding Day, per the report.
"People complain that the authorities are making frail old women in their 60s to do hard labor," a source told Radio Free Asia.
"The people are critical of the authorities, saying: 'Even in this severe coronavirus emergency, people still cross the river, risking their lives to smuggle. Even if they build the wall, could that possibly stop people from finding a way to cross the river?'" the source added.
Another source told Radio Free Asia that some of the women roped in for the effort are upset about being forced to work, complaining that the wall would be "useless" because smugglers always find ways to get across the border.
North Korea's hardline border control
North Korea shares an 880-mile border with China. The neighbors are separated by two rivers — the Tumen and the Yalu.
The Yalu river crossing is narrowest at Ryanggang province's largest city of Hyesan, where the wall is being built. It's a common area for smuggling anything from food to television sets to recording devices, reported Seoul-based news site Daily NK.
The wall in Ryanggang is just another of the country's hardline measures to protect its boundaries.
Now, North Korean authorities want the Ryanggang wall to be completed before Party Founding Day so they can revamp their border patrols and recall their special forces for winter training, reported Daily NK.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the river, China has also been reinforcing its border with North Korea over the last few years, establishing a military base southwest of Ryanggang, reported Forbes.
17. Is South Korea Going Global? New Possibilities Together With the Biden Administration
Is South Korea Going Global? New Possibilities Together With the Biden Administration
Summary
Since South Korean President Moon Jae-in entered office in May 2017, he spent the first three years of his presidency focusing on summitry with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, convincing former U.S. president Donald Trump to engage directly with Kim, stressing his own version of “draining the swamp” or rooting out corruption, and promoting wage-led economic growth. However, less than a year before Moon leaves office, his domestic and inter-Korean policies remain mired in setbacks. Surprisingly, Moon’s most enduring foreign policy legacy could lie in resetting and strengthening the U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance after his critical meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden in May 2021.
The global outbreak of the coronavirus and the disease it causes, COVID-19, in early 2020 caught the world off guard. Yet South Korea’s successful handling of the pandemic provided key political dividends to Moon including his party’s resounding victory in the April 2020 National Assembly election. But just a year later, Moon’s Democratic Party faced crushing defeats in mayoral by-elections in Seoul and Busan. With skyrocketing housing prices, continuing economic fallout from the pandemic, and stalled South-North relations, Moon hit the reset button in May 2021 by pivoting toward the United States and embracing Biden’s foreign policy and economic recovery priorities.
While Biden has stressed the importance of denuclearization diplomacy with North Korea, he has also made clear that he will not meet with Kim Jong Un unless there is firm assurance of denuclearization prospects. During the U.S.-ROK summit in Washington, DC, the joint statement stressed America’s unflinching commitment to South Korean defense while recognizing the progress made through inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea summits. More importantly, however, the joint statement emphasized, for the first time, the importance of maintaining an open and secure Indo-Pacific and security in the Taiwan Strait. Moon and Biden also joined hands in fighting climate change, building a more resilient high-tech supply chain, providing economic assistance to Central American states, and fighting cyber attacks. Leading South Korean companies including Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and SK agreed to invest some $40 billion in manufacturing facilities in the United States.
Chung Min Lee is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program. He is an expert on Korean and Northeast Asian security, defense, intelligence, and crisis management.
What Biden and Moon did during their meeting was to put into place a new technology cooperation platform for the alliance on top of existing military, foreign policy, and economic partnerships. As the U.S.-China competition heats up, Biden wanted to secure critical support from key allies, including South Korea with its advanced manufacturing base. Moon understood that South Korea’s leverage vis-à-vis North Korea but especially China could only be really strengthened through a new technology alliance. Despite Moon’s overarching emphasis on engaging with Kim, the South Korean public has become more wary of Kim’s intentions. In a May 2021 poll published by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, only 28.8 percent of respondents said that the U.S.-ROK alliance should focus on North Korea–related issues while 66.3 percent replied that shared universal values as joint democracies should garner greater attention.
When South Koreans choose their next president in March 2022, it will be up to Moon’s successor to put into motion the initiatives that were agreed to in the May summit. As South Koreans become increasingly aware of China’s overt pressures, they see the benefits of a more globalized South Korea anchored firmly in an expanding U.S.-ROK alliance. While unplanned from the onset, if a strengthened, modernized, and increasingly globalized alliance is realized over time, this will remain as Moon’s most important foreign policy legacy notwithstanding his instincts to accommodate North Korea and an increasingly powerful China.
Even as he prepares to leave office, Moon can put into place initiatives that will begin to institutionalize U.S.–South Korea technology cooperation. Seoul and Washington should create a science and technology commission, launch a bilateral science and technology ministers’ meeting, and focus sharply on emerging defense technology and space cooperation. South Korea and the United States should take the lead in energy transitions and fighting climate change. These steps will ensure that the alliance will emerge more relevant and stronger after the pandemic and reaffirm South Korea’s growing role as an indispensable American ally with expanding global footprints.
Introduction
Although foreign policy issues including inter-Korean relations will not be at the epicenter of South Korea’s upcoming presidential campaign, the country stands at a critical crossroads. Not only is North Korea accelerating development of its nuclear weapons arsenal, but it is also at a stage where it would be virtually impossible to roll back North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Diplomacy remains as the only viable option, but as noted below, prospects remain limited. For South Korea, the other major foreign policy and economic issue is the growing competition between the United States and China. South Korea also faces extremely daunting demographic challenges. Among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries, South Korea has the lowest fertility rate and the fastest growing elderly population.1 How South Korea manages its population decline, much lower GDP growth, and multi-pronged economic and technological competition from China will determine its global competitiveness well into mid-century.
Unique among U.S. allies, South Korea is the only country that has maintained historical ties with China for more than a thousand years. Since the Korean War, South Korea’s alliance with the United States has become a cornerstone of South Korea’s national security posture. And as evinced by South Korea’s growing global footprint and an increasingly comprehensive alliance with the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) can provide key dividends to the United States. How Seoul traverses what many have called a new cold war between the United States and China—while coping with an accelerating North Korean nuclear threat and maintaining its economic and technological competitiveness as the Fourth Industrial Revolution begins in earnest—will not be decided in the March 2022 presidential election. Nevertheless, the next South Korean president and the extent to which Moon Jae-in can begin to institutionalize what seems to be a major foreign policy course correction is going to significantly influence the shape of South Korea’s globalization grid.
The Tail End of South Korean Presidencies
As South Korea heads into a year-long presidential campaign after a year and a half of grappling with a global pandemic, foreign policy and national security issues seem to be on the sidelines. Political stakes for both President Moon Jae-in and his Democratic Party (DP), however, have never been higher since the ruling party lost critical by-elections in the nation’s capital, Seoul, and its second-largest city, Busan, on April 8, 2021. Former Seoul mayor Oh Se-hoon of the opposition People Power Party (PPP) returned to the role with a resounding 57.5 percent of the vote against the ruling party’s Park Young-sun, who received 38.18 percent of the votes. In Busan, PPP candidate Park Hyung-joon trounced the DP’s Kim Young-choon with 62.27 percent.
The race to succeed Moon will take up most of South Korea’s political oxygen throughout 2021 and into early 2022. Moon will try to forestall a lame duck presidency by focusing on foreign policy issues and touting his achievements in South-North relations—areas where he can appear more successful. But as soon as the ruling party chooses its presidential candidate, power will inexorably shift to the next standard bearer. Moon’s approval ratings have continued to slip in his fourth year in office—a trend that has afflicted every South Korean president since the restoration of democracy in 1987 (see figure 1). Despite his slip in popularity, however, Moon remains more popular than any of his predecessors were at this point in their term.
Because South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term, they push through most of their major initiatives in the first two years. The concentration of power in the presidency is very high, but by the third or fourth year, approval ratings typically drop sharply. And without exception, every president since Roh Tae-woo, who was elected in 1987, left office with very low ratings. While each incoming president believes that he or she will be able to buck this trend, Moon is also unlikely to be an exception. In a Gallup Korea poll conducted from February to early June 2021, Moon’s approval ratings stayed relatively unchanged from 39 percent to 38 percent as did his disapproval ratings from 52 percent to 53 percent (see figure 2). Moon’s disapproval ratings reached their highest levels of 58 percent in April and May 2021.
In the same opinion poll, respondents indicated that their reasons for disapproval were largely related to domestic issues. For example, in a June 2021 Gallup Korea poll, 26 percent of those who disapproved of Moon cited his handling of the current real estate crisis in South Korea2—an issue that that has plagued his administration, but the crisis has been spurred by the government’s zig-zagging real estate policies. Apartment prices in Seoul have increased by 58 percent during Moon’s term, and none of the administration’s efforts to mitigate soaring housing costs have succeeded.3 Another 11 percent of respondents said they were unsatisfied with his handling of economic and socioeconomic issues more broadly.
Over the course of the pandemic, South Korea became a role model for its relatively successful management of COVID-19 due to rapid testing, expanded contact tracing, and systematic lockdowns. However, the government was criticized sharply for not procuring vaccines as soon as they became available compared to other developed economies. The Moon government has tried to maximize political windfalls from South Korea’s response to the pandemic. But many argue that it was the country’s universal healthcare system, public compliance, and critical reforms that were taken after previous epidemics such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome, 2002) and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome, 2015) that enabled South Korea’s rapid response to COVID-19. In the Gallup Korea poll, of the 38 percent of respondents who approved of Moon’s job performance, 31 percent said that it was because of his handling of the pandemic.4
After the summit between Moon and U.S. President Joe Biden, the largest share of Moon’s supporters—33 percent—cited his handling of foreign policy as the reason for their approval. In a poll conducted from May 11 to May 13 before the summit, just 3 percent of supporters named foreign policy as their reason for approval.5 However, support based on foreign policy wins is likely to be temporary, and the ruling party will need to persuade voters that it continues to deserve their support in the 2022 presidential election despite rising public discontent on Moon’s economic policies. According to a June 2021 Gallup Korea survey, for the first time since the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye in 2017, the opposition conservatives’ approval rating reached 30 percent.6 Whether the PPP can continue to gain support, however, will depend on numerous factors such as retaining unprecedented support from those in their twenties and thirties, selecting a formidable presidential candidate, offering credible policy options, and rebranding itself as a more dynamic party.
For the first time in South Korean political history, a thirty-six-year-old was chosen by PPP members as their leader. Lee Jun-sok, a Harvard-educated entrepreneur who has never been elected to the National Assembly, rose to the top as voters and party members clamored for a major generational shift. Right after Lee was chosen as head of the PPP in early June 2021, the party’s approval rating jumped to 40.1 percent versus the DP’s 28.6 percent, according to a Realmeter survey—although it will be much more difficult for the PPP to sustain such support.7
Moon’s Realignment With Washington
Although domestic issues will dominate the 2022 presidential election, South Koreans are increasingly aware of the growing pressures the ROK faces from China to distance South Korea from the United States while maximizing bilateral economic interests. They also understand why the United States wants South Korea to move closer to the United States as its rivalry and competition with China intensifies. For example, the Moon-Biden summit came as a welcome surprise to South Korea’s conservatives. When Moon agreed with Biden on maintaining a free and stable Indo-Pacific and the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait through their joint statement, Moon seemed to be on the same strategic page as Biden.
The two allies also agreed to build more resilient critical technologies supply chains. South Korea’s leading companies, such as Samsung, LG, SK, and Hyundai, announced that they were going to invest over $40 billion in new factories and projects in the United States.8
North Korea’s nuclear threat and denuclearization diplomacy were discussed in the May 2021 summit, but the meeting was not dominated by engagement toward North Korea—the central tenet of Moon’s foreign and national security policy over the past four years. Since he became president in May 2017, Moon was perceived as tilting toward China despite his public remarks supporting the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Moon entered office when South Korean–Chinese ties were engulfed in a mini-crisis triggered by North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016 and then president Park Geun-hye’s decision to deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea to protect U.S. forces. From the onset, China argued that the U.S. anti-missile system denigrated its deterrence posture since THAAD missiles could target Chinese missiles. The United States maintained that the THAAD batteries deployed in South Korea were focused on defending U.S. forces from North Korean missiles.
After protracted tensions, Seoul ultimately agreed to the so-called three noes that de-escalated tensions with China—no additional deployment of THAAD batteries, no ROK participation in a U.S.-led regional missile defense system, and no creation of a trilateral military alliance involving the United States, South Korea, and Japan.9 While this diplomatic accord may have de-escalated tensions with China over THAAD, it also contained the seeds for future Chinese interventions each time South Korea undertakes major military initiatives on its own or in partnership with the United States. Indeed, ensuing South Korean presidents cannot let China dictate South Korea’s critical defense choices, including the types of weapons systems it deploys or the depth of military ties with the United States.
The fact that a progressive president who was perceived as being pro-China agreed with Biden on Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific startled party stalwarts in both the DP and the PPP. The question remained, however, whether the summit signaled a marked shift in Moon’s foreign policy priorities a year before he leaves office or if he simply wanted to buy goodwill from Biden to jump-start U.S.–North Korea talks.
Moreover, while public sentiment against China continues to increase in South Korea, this does not mean that the Moon government is about to fundamentally reappraise its China policy. Despite the success of the summit, many questions remained unanswered, such as restarting U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Moon continued to pin hopes on restarting frozen inter-Korean and U.S.–North Korea talks. While prospects look highly unlikely, Moon is not going to completely discard the possibility of another South-North summit since such an event would help seal his legacy on inter-Korean détente and boost the standing of the ruling party’s presidential candidate. But playing political football with a South-North summit at the end of Moon’s term also entails significant risks, and it remains doubtful that Kim will provide Moon with a major gift as he leaves office.
18. Lessons from South Korea’s approach to tackling disinformation
Can we learn from our ally?
Excerpts:
Amid a deluge of disinformation around COVID-19, South Korea has mounted a mostly successful response to the pandemic. Openness and transparency lay at the heart of South Korea’s response, in which public-health officials took center stage. One crucial tool was effective health communications. To avoid an information vacuum and to maintain public awareness, South Korean authorities provided the public with updated information on a variety of platforms, including via twice-daily press briefings, text messages, and social media posts. The government also strengthened public-private partnerships to facilitate fact-checking, including by funding Fact Checker Net, an open platform for experts and ordinary citizens to confirm the veracity of COVID-19 reporting. Such tools and techniques offer a model to safeguard against politicized communications regarding future crises.
South Korea shows how even polarized democracies can respond effectively to complex challenges. In 2019, 91.8 percent of Koreans believed that there was a large divide between liberals and conservatives. Despite this, South Korea has taken steps to address online manipulation through prosecutions and investigations. And it has demonstrated how the state can communicate effectively during crises like COVID-19, even after presidential impeachments and political scandal. While disinformation remains a major challenge in South Korea, that did not prevent effective state communications during the COVID crisis.
Lessons from South Korea’s approach to tackling disinformation
Men wearing masks to avoid contracting COVID-19 cross a street in Seoul, South Korea onJuly 5, 2021. (REUTERS/Kim Hong-Ji)
Baseless rumors about new technologies spreading cancerous radiation. Politicians condemning negative stories as “false” or “defamatory.” Deepening polarization amid constant online manipulation. These might sound like recent episodes in U.S. public life. But they in fact come from South Korea, where rumormongering and manipulation of public opinion have become key features of its politics.
Although South Korea consistently tops indices measuring a country’s digital maturity, digital disinformation is changing its politics. Despite evidence to the contrary in the United States, South Korea’s experiences suggest that political polarization is not the death knell for the state’s ability to address domestic disinformation and provide clear guidance during crises like COVID-19.
The South Korean information environment
Disinformation has long spread through a South Korean media ecosystem that combines online platforms with more traditional newspaper and broadcast outlets. When protests broke out in 2008 following the decision to allow the import of American beef, the South Korean TV network Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation aired a report questioning whether American beef was safe from mad cow disease. This unsubstantiated report spread rapidly via the internet and SMS, helping catalyze mass protests against then-President Lee Myung-bak, who saw his approval rate drop to 20%. In a pattern that has since become common, the interaction of online and offline platforms amplified and accelerated the spread of disinformation.
South Korea’s intense political rivalries make false information an attractive weapon against political opponents. At the height of the Kim Hak-eui orgy scandal in 2019, the center-left Hankyoreh newspaper falsely claimed that the prosecution had buried evidence linking the conservative prosecutor general, Yoon Seok-youl, to the incident. Political rivalry seems to have driven the rumor: It emerged among civil society groups rallying behind a former justice minister, Cho Kuk, whom Yoon was investigating for corruption. After continual attacks and calls for his resignation, Yoon voluntarily left office in March 2021.
As false information has proliferated online, politicians in South Korea have used such material to amplify public dissent. Following the controversial 2017 deployment of a U.S. missile defense system (known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD) to the city of Seongju, rumors began to spread online that the system emitted cancer-causing electromagnetic waves. A handful of opposition politicians embraced this narrative and spurred Koreans to protest the deployment. In August of that year, six members of the Democratic Party attended a candlelight vigil against the THAAD deployment in Seongju and performed songs with lyrics such as “I hate that my body is about to rip due to the strong electromagnetic waves.” Some Seongju residents continue to question THAAD’s safety and to protest its existence. Just last November, approximately 70 activists tried to stop trucks entering the THAAD base and clashed with 600 riot police. While THAAD represented a real political controversy over the military relationship between the United States and South Korea, it’s telling that those anxieties were channeled into health disinformation and remain active years later.
Lessons from South Korea
South Korea’s experience with disinformation contains important lessons for other democracies on how to address this challenge. First, it is crucial to bar government intelligence and military officers from domestic influence operations. During the impeachment of ex-President Park Geun-hye in 2017, an internal investigation revealed that intelligence agents and military officials had engaged in political astroturfing to ensure Park’s election victory in 2012. Under the auspices of former director Won Sei-hoon, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) tasked 30 “extra-departmental teams,” including tech-savvy civilians, to spread pro-government opinions and slander anti-government views. “Our psychological operations against North Korea are important, but our psychological operations against the South Korean public are pretty important, too,” as Won put it. While the scope and influence of this campaign remains unclear, it is suspected that the NIS mobilized approximately 3,500 social media accounts and posted some 275,000 defamatory messages about Park’s opponents. Subsequently, Won was sentenced to four years in prison for orchestrating an online smear campaign.
These types of mobilization by intelligence and military personnel can undermine the fundamental tenets of democratic elections as free, open, and fair. Even more troublingly, the secrecy surrounding intelligence and military operations may prevent civilian oversight or discovery of such breaches. As militaries and intelligence agencies around the world embrace the use of information operations, regulatory oversight and internal investigations will be required to ensure that these tools are not turned against domestic populations. Even when forbidden from such activities, some North American militaries have used information operations against their own citizens. In June, multiple internal investigations concluded that the Canadian military had contravened federal rules by planning to use propaganda techniques on Canadians during the pandemic and gather information from social media accounts.
Additionally, South Korea offers a cautionary tale about invoking “disinformation” to justify anti-democratic actions. After the 2014 Sewol ferry accident, then-President Park was widely condemned for her mishandling of the incident. Protests broke out, and the victims’ families decried the disorderly rescue operation. As unflattering accounts of her handling of the crisis proliferated, Park announced a crackdown on alleged false rumors spreading on the country’s largest messaging app, Kakao Talk, that “divided the society.” Park established a prosecution team to actively monitor online information and vowed to punish anyone circulating online content deemed as inappropriate, rumor-mongering, and/or insulting. According to some reports, investigators targeted several users for spreading offensive content. Rattled users switched to Telegram, an app well known for its encryption features. The Kakao Talk crackdown was not an isolated incident but part of a larger strategy to silence legitimate opposition, including a 60-page blacklist of approximately 10,000 left-leaning cultural figures. If left unchecked, politicians’ cynical invocation of disinformation might justify surveillance or censorship, undermining basic democratic rights.
South Korea does, though, offer an example of how democracies can address disinformation and the domestic actors behind it. In a now infamous affair known as “Druking-gate,” an ally of President Moon Jae-in was found guilty in 2018 of conspiring with a so-called “power blogger” (who worked under the name “Druking”) to manipulate search results and shape online perceptions of Moon ahead of the 2017 election. Kim Kyoung-soo, the governor of South Gyeongsang province, was convicted for his role in the scheme, along with Druking. Although the case raises hard questions about judicial over-reach in prosecuting political speech, it also illustrates a way in which democracies can hold offenders accountable for manipulating online opinion during elections.
Amid a deluge of disinformation around COVID-19, South Korea has mounted a mostly successful response to the pandemic. Openness and transparency lay at the heart of South Korea’s response, in which public-health officials took center stage. One crucial tool was effective health communications. To avoid an information vacuum and to maintain public awareness, South Korean authorities provided the public with updated information on a variety of platforms, including via twice-daily press briefings, text messages, and social media posts. The government also strengthened public-private partnerships to facilitate fact-checking, including by funding Fact Checker Net, an open platform for experts and ordinary citizens to confirm the veracity of COVID-19 reporting. Such tools and techniques offer a model to safeguard against politicized communications regarding future crises.
South Korea shows how even polarized democracies can respond effectively to complex challenges. In 2019, 91.8 percent of Koreans believed that there was a large divide between liberals and conservatives. Despite this, South Korea has taken steps to address online manipulation through prosecutions and investigations. And it has demonstrated how the state can communicate effectively during crises like COVID-19, even after presidential impeachments and political scandal. While disinformation remains a major challenge in South Korea, that did not prevent effective state communications during the COVID crisis.
Heidi Tworek is an associate professor at the University of British Columbia and a non-resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Yoojung Lee graduated with a BA in international relations at the University of British Columbia and is an incoming masters student at Stanford University.
19. An Uprising of Despair in Cuba
I wonder how afraid Kim Jong-is observing this?
He may decide to double down on his draconian population and resources control measures to prevent any resistance.
If I were advising VOA and RFA I would include extensive Cubn reporting to the three target audiences in north Korea: the elite, the 2d tier leadership, and the population.
An Uprising of Despair in Cuba
Biden sounds the right notes but there’s more the U.S. can do.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
Anti-government protesters march in Havana, July 11.
Photo: Ismael Francisco/Associated Press
The remarkable protests in Cuba this weekend show that the Cuban people still yearn for a life free of tyranny despite decades of repression. President Biden hit the right note on Monday by expressing American support for the protesters, and let’s hope he follows through by increasing pressure on the regime.
Protests aren’t uncommon in Cuba, where most people live in desperate poverty while a narrow governing elite benefit from a state-owned economy that depends on dollars and euros from abroad. But Sunday’s uprising was unusual it that it developed almost spontaneously and expanded across the island as the message spread on social media and apps like Telegram.
The protests weren’t planned or organized. Cubans massed in the streets to register their opposition to the economic fallout from Covid-19, which has been mismanaged on the island; widespread shortages of food and medicine; and the numerous daily blackouts from failing electric power.
Protesters picked up the cry of freedom and sang the popular “Patria y Vida” (Homeland and Life) as a way of repudiating Che Guevara’s revolutionary slogan “Homeland or Death.” Social media is dangerous to the dictatorship because it allows people to share their dissatisfaction and feel they aren’t alone.
This time is also different because Fidel Castro is dead, his brother Raúl no longer holds an official position, and successor Miguel Díaz-Canel has no claim to legitimacy beyond the military and intelligence services that back him. The public’s willingness to risk arrest by heading into the streets is a signal that their suffering is so great that most Cubans have nothing left to lose.
It isn’t clear if this outburst has staying power or can be crushed like all the others. The regime is taking no chances. Mr. Díaz-Canel has unleashed his military and Ministry of Interior agents to stop the protests with arrests and beatings.
On Sunday he called for “revolutionaries”—plain-clothes thugs—to take to the streets to attack protesters and warned that his opponents “will have to go over our dead body if they want to overturn the revolution.” This state use of violence is standard operating procedure in Cuba, and there are reports that Mr. Díaz-Canel has cut off all internet service that the regime controls. He won’t give up easily because he has much to lose.
The U.S. can’t dictate events in Cuba, but we were heartened to hear President Biden issue a statement on Monday that Sunday’s protests are a “clarion call for freedom and relief from the tragic grip of the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering” dished out by Havana. He also called on “the Cuban regime to hear their people and serve their needs at this vital moment rather than enriching themselves.”
The Administration's challenge is to back up those words with real support for the liberation of this long-suffering nation. Step one is not to return to the failed appeasement of Barack Obama that expanded U.S. travel and commerce with the island but achieved nothing in political or economic reform. The regime is more vulnerable since Donald Trump restored some U.S. sanctions, and its allies in Venezuela can no longer provide much oil to keep the lights on and the military well-fed.
The U.S. can tighten the financial squeeze and impose Magnitsky sanctions on Cuba’s human-rights violators. Helping protesters foil Cuba’s internet shutdown would be invaluable, and a warning to Russia and China not to meddle by propping up the regime is warranted. The odds on a freedom revolution may be long, but the Cuban people need to hear loud and clear that America is on their side, and not on the Communist regime’s.
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WSJ · by The Editorial Board
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
