Quotes of the Day:
“Most of my important lessons about life have come from recognizing how others from a different culture view things”
- Edgar H. Schein
“Two monologues do not make a dialogue”
- Jeff Daly
“I speak to everyone in the same way, whether he is the garbage man or the president of the university”
- Albert Einstein
1. Kim Jong Un might be playing good cop to his sister's bad cop, but it's how they are seen by North Koreans that matters most
2. U.S. stands ready to respond to any N. Korean missile launch: U.S. commander
3. North Korea has entered the chat
4. Domestic Politics Could be Behind North Korea’s Rejection of Sinovac Jabs, Experts say
5. North Korea declines 3 million COVID vaccines, says they should go to other nations
6. North Korea is forcing youth into 'backbreaking' hard labor at mines and farms to control them, human rights group says
7. Scrutinizing North Korea’s Record on Civil and Political Rights: The New ICCPR Reporting Cycle
8. ‘Artery of friendship’: Seoul proposes extending legendary Trans-Siberian railway from Vladivostok through to North & South Korea
9. Tech-intensive defense blueprint (South Korea)
10. Strengthening Of US-South Korea Ties Has Consequences For Region – Analysis
11. Extending the North Korea travel ban is a missed opportunity – Responsible Statecraft
1. Kim Jong Un might be playing good cop to his sister's bad cop, but it's how they are seen by North Koreans that matters most
A lot of interesting speculation in this article. But it is all speculation.
Excerpts:
Dr Davis said Ms Kim's sabre-rattling is an effort to place pressure on the South Korean leader to scale back these exercises and an effort to exploit his belief that somehow North Korea wants peace as much as he does.
"I think the interesting question to consider is whether North Korea would follow through on Kim Yo Jong's threats, in a manner timed to exploit US distraction with the situation in Afghanistan, " Dr Davis said.
"So how might Biden respond to a North Korean long-range missile test now?
"Yo Jong's threats might be a signal that there is debate in Pyongyang about when to conduct such a test."
In the end, Mr King says it's clear the North Korean elite ultimately don't care what the world think of them.
As an aside I am unsure of the custom of just using a Korean's given name versus using their given and family name. But at least the commenter did not make the biggest faux pas and call her "Jong." I usually use the complete "Kim Yo-jong" as I am not on a first name basis with "Yo-jong."
On a serious note , the regime has followed through on KimYo-jong's threats in the past (the liaison building in Kaesong):
It came just days after the two Koreas restored hotlines as the two nations work to repair strained ties and amid a renewed push by South Korean President Moon Jae-in to reopen a joint liaison office that Pyongyang blew up last year on Ms Kim's orders.
Kim Jong Un might be playing good cop to his sister's bad cop, but it's how they are seen by North Koreans that matters most
By Debra Killalea
Posted 19h ago
One sibling is the leader of the most reclusive nation in the world, the other is an ambitious woman determined to make her mark.
But while North Korea's ruler Kim Jong Un likes to flex his nuclear might every now and then, he hasn't been afraid of showing a softer side to his people.
Just days ago, Mr Kim reportedly met with young people who had "volunteered" to work in "difficult and challenging" sectors and made a public show of praising them. At other events he's even shed a tear.
While Mr Kim acts as the humble leader to his people, his younger sister is portraying a tougher side of the family.
Kim Yo Jong, one of her brother's most trusted allies, is no stranger to issuing threats on his behalf, especially when it comes to her southern rival.
And recently it appears that she's stepped up her attacks. Just last month, Ms Kim criticised South Korea and Washington over scheduled joint military drills, a move Pyongyang regards as a provocation.
Ms Kim warned they would face even greater security threats for going ahead with the exercises, which she said would set back progress in improving inter-Korean relations.
But are the siblings engaging in a strategy of good cop, bad cop? Or is Kim Yo Jong trying to position herself should there be a sudden power vacuum in North Korea?
Kim Yo Jong's push for power
Dr Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said Ms Kim could be trying to prove herself to her country's military and the regime's elite — a hurdle to any future leader.
Kim Yo Jong may be Kim Jong Un's only viable successor until his small children become old enough to rule. (AP: Jorge Silva
)
"[Ms] Kim still considers herself a potential future North Korean leader," Dr Davis said.
"Kim Jong Un has lost a bit of weight recently — but whether that implies he's healthier, or its a result of a serious medical problem is uncertain.
"So his sister may be trying to push her hardliner credentials with the DPRK military by making these threats."
New York-based Asia specialist Sean King agreed, saying there was one task that had clearly fallen to Ms Kim – and there could be a good reason behind it.
"Kim Jong Un, for his part, appears to be trying to come off as sympathetic to his subjects' plight, losing weight when they're hungry and crying at a parade over their hardships," the vice-president of Park Strategies said.
"But central to ultra-[Korean] nationalist DPRK ideology is the need to demonise the South as somehow less Korean than the North and as not in control of its own destiny.
"This rhetorical task's now fallen to Kim Yo Jong, which only enhances her own prospects and bona fides."
Mr King said this could indicate Ms Kim was being groomed for potential further leadership opportunities, as a direct blood relative of the current leader.
The family maintains their dynastic rule over North Korea by claiming that the nation's founder Kim Il Sung defended a sacred volcano called Mount Paektu.
"I believe Kim Yo Jong's being prepared [or] brought along for something, as she's part of the mythical Mount Paektu bloodline," he said.
A case of good cop, bad cop?
Ms Kim has been speaking out more frequently on behalf of her brother, sometimes using threatening language towards another nation.
In March, Ms Kim had strong words for the freshly sworn-in Biden administration, warning the US not to "cause a stink".
"A word of advice to the new administration of the United States that is struggling to spread the smell of gunpowder on our land from across the ocean," she was quoted as saying in state newspaper Rodong Sinmun.
"If it wants to sleep in peace for [the] coming four years, it had better refrain from causing a stink at its first step."
Stimson Centre fellow and deputy director at respected Washington-based North Korea monitoring service 38 North, Jenny Town, stopped short of saying it was a good cop, bad cop routine by the powerful siblings.
North Korea appears to have restarted a nuclear reactor that is widely believed to have produced plutonium for nuclear weapons. (Korean Central News Agency via Reuters
)
"I think it's more strategic than that," Ms Town said.
"Having a statement come from Kim Yo Jong carries a high level of authority but still allows Kim Jong Un political space to manoeuvre, to change course if and when needed as political circumstances evolve."
Ms Town said it made a lot of sense for Pyongyang to restore hotline communications ahead of the US and South Korean military exercises as it gave the Kims leverage.
"Given the fact that the North Koreans had been largely unresponsive to the South Koreans over the past year, there was no real political reason not to move forward with exercises," Ms Town said.
"The exercises serve a specific military purpose, just as North Korea's military exercises do as well.
"Moreover, there was no active dialogue to consider and since the hotlines were cut, North Korea has revealed new strategic weapons [in military parades] and upgraded conventional military hardware and weapons."
Ms Town said the North probably assumed restoring the hotlines would be enough of a political gesture to warrant a reciprocal response from South Korea on the exercises.
"When that decision was not volunteered by [South Korean President] Moon as a reciprocal goodwill gesture, then the North Koreans demanded it," she said.
"The bigger question is, why the Moon administration didn't anticipate such moves, and come to [a] clear understanding with the North Koreans before announcing the hotline restoration, especially with the exercises just weeks away."
Kims seeking to place 'pressure' on the South
Mr Moon may have just months left in office with an election taking place next year in South Korea, but he remains determined to play nice with his northern neighbour in the meantime.
Kim Jong Un recently made a public appearance meeting with young people who had "volunteered" to work, the North Korean news agency said.(AP: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service
)
Mr Moon came to office determined to restore friendly relations under Seoul's longstanding stance towards North Korea known as the Sunshine Policy.
Dr Davis said Pyongyang recognised Mr Moon is still pushing a "Sunshine Policy 2.0" effort even though North Korea continues to build up military capability, including more advanced nuclear weapons capabilities.
"The north's development of more advanced battlefield rockets and short-range delivery systems which are nuclear-capable, and their modernisation of their longer-range nuclear systems are increasing the threat to the South," he said.
"And yet Moon seems comfortable to put this to one side and pursue his 'blind faith' in diplomacy with Pyongyang. Hence the hotline.
"… At the same time, the US [and South Korean] exercises have gone ahead as planned, and I think this is a case of backing up well-intentioned diplomacy with solid deterrence based around credible military force and resolve."
Dr Davis said Ms Kim's sabre-rattling is an effort to place pressure on the South Korean leader to scale back these exercises and an effort to exploit his belief that somehow North Korea wants peace as much as he does.
"I think the interesting question to consider is whether North Korea would follow through on Kim Yo Jong's threats, in a manner timed to exploit US distraction with the situation in Afghanistan, " Dr Davis said.
"So how might Biden respond to a North Korean long-range missile test now?
"Yo Jong's threats might be a signal that there is debate in Pyongyang about when to conduct such a test."
In the end, Mr King says it's clear the North Korean elite ultimately don't care what the world think of them.
"How the leaders are perceived within [North Korea] and on the peninsula at large, is more important to Pyongyang than how the rest of the world sees them," he said.
U.S. stands ready to respond to any N. Korean missile launch: U.S. commander
U.S. stands ready to respond to any N. Korean missile launch: U.S. commander | Yonhap News Agency
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Sept. 3 (Yonhap) -- The United States stands ready to respond to any missile launch by North Korea should the North decide to stage such a provocation, the commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) said Friday.
"I'm ready 24/7, 365 (days). If North Korea decides to launch a ballistic missile, I'm confident in our capabilities," Gen. Glen VanHerck said in a Department of Defense press briefing.
The Air Force general reiterated that both NORTHCOM and NORAD stand ready to provide "mission capabilities."
"For NORAD that's threat warning and attack assessment. For NORTHCOM, ballistic missile defense capability," he said. "We continue to be ready to respond should North Korea elect to launch a missile."
His remark comes as the North is set to observe important anniversaries that it had in the past often marked by launching or unveiling new weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles.
Earlier reports said the North is preparing for a massive military parade as the country marks the establishment of its government on Sept. 9 and founding anniversary of its ruling Workers' Party on Oct. 10.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. North Korea has entered the chat
The chat? IS Kim Jong-un on Signal or What App? or some other messenger/chat app? Perhaps we could orchestrate a Kim-BIden chat over some app. (note sarcasm).
Seriously this conclusion is probably most accurate:
But the question still remains: Is North Korea serious about ending its nuclear program? The answer from most experts: Not likely. North Korea’s buildup, then, is yet another middle finger to the U.S. and its regional partners who aim to defuse Pyongyang’s bombs.
North Korea has entered the chat
Politico · by Jonathan Custodio · September 3, 2021
With help from Nahal Toosi, Daniel Lippman and Quint Forgey
Welcome to National Security Daily, your guide to the global events roiling Washington and keeping the administration up at night.
PROGRAMMING NOTE: NatSec Daily will be off Monday for Labor Day, but we’ll be back in your inbox on Tuesday afternoon.
While President JOE BIDEN is trying to pivot back to domestic initiatives after the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, the world has a funny way of messing with plans. This week brings news that North Korea has quietly boosted its nuclear program.
A report last week from the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed renewed activity at the nuclear reactor site Yongbyon, where there had been no signs of reactor operations since December 2018.
Why is Pyongyang doing this? The obvious answer is that North Korea is continuing to build out its arsenal, which is currently estimated as high as 60 nuclear warheads. But North Korea experts also tell NatSec Daily that it might be a signal KIM JONG UN’s regime wants to chat.
The activity at Yongbyon “could very well indicate that North Korea is preparing itself to accept the Biden administration’s offer to resume nuclear talks, because the North Koreans want to go into those talks with some additional leverage,” said GARY SAMORE, director of the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University and a former top NSC official.
“We are aware of this report and we are closely coordinating with our allies and partners on developments regarding the DPRK,” a NSC spokesperson told NatSec Daily, using the acronym for the country’s official name. “This report underscores the urgent need for dialogue and diplomacy so we can achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue to seek dialogue with the DPRK so we can address this reported activity and the full range of issues related to denuclearization.”
Negotiations won’t be easy. Former President DONALD TRUMP found that out the hard way after three face-to-face meetings with Kim. In Hanoi in 2019 during their second encounter, the North Korean leader put Yongbyon’s closure on the table, but the American president wanted the “big deal” — and both sides walked away empty handed. Now the problem is Biden’s to solve.
“In the short term, there are meaningful gains to be had by sort of slowing down the growth of the program. And Yongbyon gives you an opportunity to do that,” said VIPIN NARANG, a nuclear expert at MIT, noting the nuclear reactor site is North Korea’s only known plutonium and tritium production path. “I think the question for the Biden administration or any administration going forward … is whether we can get Yongbyon, the whole complex, back on the table.”
But the question still remains: Is North Korea serious about ending its nuclear program? The answer from most experts: Not likely. North Korea’s buildup, then, is yet another middle finger to the U.S. and its regional partners who aim to defuse Pyongyang’s bombs.
4. Domestic Politics Could be Behind North Korea’s Rejection of Sinovac Jabs, Experts say
All politics is local (and in the north - domestic)
But a ticking time bomb is an ominous warning.
Domestic Politics Could be Behind North Korea’s Rejection of Sinovac Jabs, Experts say
Experts say the country is a ticking time bomb without mass inoculation.
North Korea’s rejection of nearly three million doses of a Chinese-made coronavirus vaccine this week might be an attempt by leader Kim Jong Un to use the pandemic to consolidate power, experts told RFA.
UNICEF on Wednesday said that Pyongyang conveyed that the doses of China’s Sinovac vaccine offered under the COVAX program should be given to countries more in need, maintaining the widely doubted claim that North Korea is virus-free.
“With North Korea needing something like 60 million or more doses of a two-shot regiment to inoculate its population, the DPRK should take any shots it can get,” Harry Kazianis, senior director of the Washington-based Center for National Interest think tank told RFA’s Korean Service.
“So, this move, to be very frank, makes zero sense. The only logical explanation is that the Kim regime truly does have doubts about the current vaccines, or he likes the amount of control locking the country down gives him and, for the time being, is leveraging the crisis to gain even more power over the population and the [ruling] Korean Workers Party,” he said.
North Korea has not reported a single confirmed case of coronavirus among its population of 25.6 million, but according to previous RFA reports, it keeps unofficial records of “suspected cases,” and if these patients die, they are quickly cremated before COVID-19 can be confirmed as the cause of death.
Pyongyang outwardly maintains it is untouched by the virus due to its extensive measures against COVID-19’s spread, including the closure of the Sino-Korean border and suspension of all trade with China since Jan. 2020.
However, it has admitted to citizens in public lectures that the virus was spreading in geographically distant areas of the country as early as mid-2020.
Reuters news agency reported that the Seoul-based Institute for National Security Strategy attributed the refusal of the three million Sinovac doses, to Pyongyang’s concern over their efficacy, saying that it is more interested in vaccines made in Russia.
Impending health crisis
Kazianis said North Korea would become a ticking timebomb if it did not vaccinate its population as soon as possible.
“Unless they have a cure for COVID they are hiding, they need vaccines. Otherwise, they are only welcoming disaster sometime in the future,” he said.
The reallocation of the vaccines might be a foreign policy gesture by North Korea, Gilbert Burnham, founder of the Center for Refugee and Disaster Response at Johns Hopkins University told RFA.
“Sealing the borders has been stated as a measure to prevent entry of the COVID-19 virus, but it is unlikely that this will be successful in the long term. The DPRK health system is unlikely to be strong enough to handle a large number of people with COVID-19 if an epidemic breaks out,” said Gilbert.
Gilbert said the reallocation could have been done “with the intention of showing the world that DPRK COVID-19 containment strategies were successful in containing the virus, so the people of the DPRK do not need immunization.”
Gilbert acknowledged that there were concerns about the Sinovac vaccines but said that North Korea definitely needs to immunize its population.
“Eventually the virus will make it to the DPRK and with a poorly nourished population having many other health problems—the outlook for the people of the DPRK could be catastrophic. It is in everyone’s interest to see and help the DPRK population get immunized with whatever effective vaccine is on hand, and not argue which vaccine has a bit more efficacy than another,” he said.
Dr. Edwin Salvador of the World Health Organization (WHO) country office for North Korea told RFA that North Korea was “looking at future opportunities through COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX,” but did not discuss the reallocation.
A UNICEF spokesperson acknowledged the reallocation to RFA, saying that partner agencies were continuing to work with North Korean health authorities “to ensure that the necessary support is provided to the Government to prepare for such an opportunity,” to receive vaccines later.
The spokesperson added that although essential health supplies have been shipped to North Korea in recent weeks, but the international community should “accelerate access for supplies and for international personnel to return to the country at the earliest opportunity,” because much more is needed there.
RFA has reported that citizens in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar were also reluctant to use Chinese-made vaccines for reasons ranging from high levels of anti-Chinese sentiment to distrust of their own government.
Reported by Jeongeun Ji for RFA’s Korean Service.
5. North Korea declines 3 million COVID vaccines, says they should go to other nations
A very magnanimous gesture by Kim Jong-un. Maybe there is hope for him that the will become a responsible member of the international community (note sarcasm)
On a sadder or perhaps more realistic note, maybe Kim does not want to get a large part of the Korean population vaccinated as then he might be forced to lift his draconian population and resources control measures that he really is using to exert even great control over the population that he has been able to do in the past 10 years. The widespread information penetration is certainly threatening him and he has been implementing countermeasures to stop its influence (which he most likely will not be able to do as information is too powerful).
North Korea declines 3 million COVID vaccines, says they should go to other nations
Newsweek · by Zoe Strozewski · September 3, 2021
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has declined 3 million Sinovac COVID-19 vaccine shots offered to the country by UNICEF through the COVAX distribution program, the Associated Press reported. North Korea proposed that the vaccines should be distributed to countries more severely affected by the virus.
North Korea was also supposed to receive a now delayed delivery of 1.9 million AstraZeneca vaccine shots through the COVAX program, the AP reported. The AstraZeneca shots would have been able to vaccinate only 7.3 percent of North Korea's population of 26 million, or 950,000.
Some experts speculate that North Korea may want to bypass certain vaccines in favor of others, as the effectiveness of the Sinovac shot has been questioned and there have been rare occurrences of blood clots in people who received AstraZeneca's vaccine, the AP said. However, the country's Health Ministry said it would still correspond with COVAX in the future regarding vaccines, according to UNICEF.
For more reporting from the Associated Press, see below.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has declined 3 million vaccine shots offered to his country by UNICEF, saying they should go to other countries. Above, Kim delivers a speech during a Politburo meeting in Pyongyang on Thursday. Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
Kim previously called for North Koreans to brace for prolonged COVID-19 restrictions, indicating the nation's borders would stay closed despite worsening economic and food conditions. Since the start of the pandemic, North Korea has used tough quarantines and border closures to prevent outbreaks, though its claim to be entirely virus-free is widely doubted.
Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Seoul's Ewha Womans University, said North Korea is likely angling to receive more effective jabs from COVAX and then strategically allocate them domestically.
"Pyongyang appears to have issues with COVAX involving legal responsibility and distribution reporting requirements. So it might procure vaccines from China to deliver to border regions and soldiers while allocating COVAX shots to less sensitive populations," Easley said.
"The Kim regime likely wants the most safe and effective vaccine for the elite, but administering Pfizer would require upgraded cold chain capability in Pyongyang and at least discreet discussions with the United States. The Johnson & Johnson option could also be useful to North Korea given that vaccine's portability and one-shot regimen," he said.
In a recent U.N. report on the North's human rights situation, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres asked North Korea to "take all necessary measures, including through international cooperation and assistance, to provide access to COVID-19 vaccines for all persons, without discrimination."
He also asked North Korea to form a plan to enable diplomats and aid workers to return to the North and revive humanitarian aid distribution systems as soon as possible in conjunction with its COVID-19 vaccine rollout.
After their meeting in Seoul last month, Sung Kim, the top U.S. diplomat on North Korea affairs, and his South Korean counterpart, Noh Kyu-duk, told reporters that they discussed humanitarian cooperation with North Korea in providing anti-virus resources, sanitation and safe water.
Vials of China's Sinovac vaccine, produced by the Egyptian company VACSERA, in Cairo on Wednesday. Khaled Desouki/AFP via Getty Images
Newsweek · by Zoe Strozewski · September 3, 2021
6. North Korea is forcing youth into 'backbreaking' hard labor at mines and farms to control them, human rights group says
Another regime information and influence countermeasure. Youth have to "volunteer" after being caught being exposed to information from South Korea.
North Korea is forcing youth into 'backbreaking' hard labor at mines and farms to control them, human rights group says
North Korea's youth and students wearing protective face masks hold an outdoor rally in protest of the leaflets launched by defectors in South Korea that condemned the Kim Jong Un's regime in Pyongyang, North Korea, in this photo taken June 6, 2020 and released by Kyodo on June 7, 2020.
Kyodo/via REUTERS
- North Korea is forcing its youth into "backbreaking" hard labor, Human Rights Watch said.
- Conditions are harsh and dangerous, and people work for long periods of time with little or no pay.
- The rights group said North Korea's practices violate international labor law and human rights law.
10 Things in Politics: The latest in politics & the economy
North Korea is forcing its youth into "backbreaking" labor at mines, farms, and construction sites, Human Rights Watch said in a report on Thursday.
The rights group said conditions are often harsh and dangerous, and people work for long periods of time with little or no pay. North Korea's economy was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the government believes the labor will increase domestic production, the report said.
The rights group alleged North Korea's brutal practices violate international labor law and human rights law.
The government, meanwhile, framed the labor as "volunteer" work. But refusing to participate can end in punishments like torture and prison, the rights group said.
North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un visited with some of the young people this week and praised them for "volunteering to work at the most difficult and challenging posts," KCNA Watch reported.
His words follow an order from April 2021 aimed to crack down on "words, acts, hairstyles, and attires of young people" that the government opposes, according to KCNA Watch. Human Rights Watch said young people were also told to stop watching, reading, and listening to unapproved videos and to not show any admiration for a South Korean lifestyle.
Young people were also told to embrace North Korean leadership, the rights group said, and follow along with government propaganda.
7. Scrutinizing North Korea’s Record on Civil and Political Rights: The New ICCPR Reporting Cycle
This is a very useful overview of north Korean engagement and non-engagement in human rights processes and organizations.
Kim Jong-un must be held accountable for his human rights abuses and crimes against humanity and all forms of them.
We must take a human right upfront approach.
Conclusion:
North Korea’s track record with the ICCPR is not promising. At this point, its repeated failure to acknowledge the existence, let alone uphold the substance, of its treaty obligations suggests that North Korea effectively no longer considers itself to be a state party to the ICCPR. The current review cycle is therefore not just an opportunity to elicit further concessions or promote much-needed legal, institutional and policy reforms, but also something of a litmus test for engagement advocates. If cooperation is not forthcoming, the Human Rights Committee can—and should—nonetheless proceed to review North Korea’s record in its absence over the next two years. And regardless of whether the government engages, the work of the Committee and the wider questions that it throws up would benefit from much greater attention.
Scrutinizing North Korea’s Record on Civil and Political Rights: The New ICCPR Reporting Cycle
Since the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry report in 2014, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has selectively engaged with various elements of the UN human rights system in an effort to ward off further criticism. Pyongyang has shown a willingness to participate in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process, engage in sporadic discussions on technical cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and cooperate with the work of various human rights treaty monitoring bodies. But the regime has consistently failed over the last two decades to engage with the treaty bodies for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Earlier this year, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the ICCPR adopted an official “list of issues” that the government is expected to address by April 2022 under a new simplified reporting procedure.[1] How likely is it that North Korea will now engage with the work of the Committee, and what should be the focus of scrutiny for its members and the international community at large?
Limited Engagement With the Treaty Monitoring Bodies
North Korea is currently a state party to five of the nine “core” international human rights treaties, having acceded to the ICCPR and ICESCR in September 1981; subsequently, it ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in September 1990, acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in February 2001, and ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in December 2016.
Its overall pattern of engagement with the treaty body committees that monitor state party implementation has been marked by two distinct trends. One is a general lateness in reporting, which is poor but not entirely remarkable. The other is an increasing divergence between renewed engagement with the CRC, CEDAW and CRPD Committees, and persistent nonengagement with the ICESCR and ICCPR Committees—part of a broader policy of making deliberate tactical concessions on a limited set of issues that are considered relatively less threatening to Pyongyang.
North Korea was positively disposed toward early cooperation with the CRC and CEDAW Committees until halting its engagement between 2009 and 2016. It eventually submitted overdue state party reports for both in early 2016—although the subsequent constructive dialogues with each Committee in late 2017 were still marked by a number of rote denials and ill-tempered remarks by the North Korean delegation. Ratification of the CRPD in December 2016 has meanwhile been followed by the submission of an initial state party report within the required two-year deadline.[2]
In contrast, nonengagement with the ICCPR’s Human Rights Committee dates back to 2002. North Korea’s reply to the Committee’s concluding observations brought a close to its second reporting cycle some thirteen years behind schedule; its third periodic report has now been overdue since January 2004. North Korea has similarly failed to engage with the ICESCR Committee since the adoption of concluding observations in December 2003, and its third periodic report has been overdue since June 2008.[3]
It is particularly notable that North Korea also remains the only country ever to attempt to withdraw from the ICCPR, having done so in response to a UN Sub-Commission resolution in August 1997 that heavily criticized its late ICCPR reporting and general human rights record. North Korea claimed that its objections were with the Sub-Commission resolution rather than the ICCPR. After it became clear that neither treaty withdrawal nor resolution annulment would be possible, however, it reengaged with the reporting cycle in late 1999, although the notice of treaty withdrawal was never officially reversed.[4]
The New ICCPR Reporting Cycle and Priority Issues of Concern
Renewed scrutiny of North Korea’s treaty obligations is the result of the Human Rights Committee’s decision in July 2019 to move to a regular eight-year review cycle and a simplified reporting procedure for all ICCPR state parties (part of a broader treaty body reform process). Under this simplified procedure, the first stage of a reporting cycle now begins with the adoption by the Committee of a “list of issues prior to reporting” (LOIPR). The focused reply by the state under review then constitutes its state party report—which means that reporting cycles are now initiated by the Committee rather than the state party. [5]
The Human Rights Committee required states to provide notification of any decision to opt-out of the simplified procedure by December 31, 2019. North Korea failed to do this and was automatically transferred over after the deadline elapsed. As a result, the Committee began work on its overdue third reporting cycle last year. Based on previous concluding observations from 2001 and information submitted by nongovernmental organizations, the Committee adopted its LOIPR for North Korea in March of this year. An advance version was transmitted to the North Korean Mission to the UN in Geneva immediately afterward.
The LOIPR indicates the substantive issues that will be the focus of the Committee’s attention through the review cycle and is worth examining both for what it does and does not include. The brief opening section requests general information on “any significant developments” in the domestic legal and institutional framework since 2001; in addition, it asks for—somewhat naively—details of “any progress” made in granting access to outside observers and increasing the “limited number” of domestic human rights organizations.[6]
The bulk of the LOIPR addresses specific priority issues. This includes the status of human rights treaties in North Korea’s “hierarchy of norms” and the question of how the ICCPR “takes precedence over domestic law in practice.”[7] North Korea previously replied to the CEDAW Committee in 2017 that where any discrepancies arise between domestic and international legal protections, “the one that is more favourable for the realization of women’s rights takes precedence”—a deliberately vague and selective approach which it claimed is “the general principle that the DPRK maintains in invoking international human rights treaties.” [8] The Committee will no doubt want to push on this further, but in doing so, will need to be more explicit about the fundamental subservience of law to politics in North Korea and its markedly relativist approach to human rights.
The use of widespread arbitrary detention within both the ordinary and political prison camp systems is also addressed within the subsection on the liberty and security of persons.[11] However, the general lack of consideration of the political prison camp system throughout the LOIPR is surprising, given that it comprises such a wide range of grave violations and arguably constitutes the defining feature of the North Korean apparatus of repression.[12]
The National Committee for the Implementation of the Human Rights Treaties
Due to its narrow focus on the substantive articles of the ICCPR, the new LOIPR also fails to address the broader process by which North Korea claims to engage with its reporting commitments and uphold its international legal obligations. Central to this is the so-called National Committee for the Implementation of the Human Rights Treaties, apparently established in April 2015 through merging previous treaty-specific national coordinating committees in order to provide “unified coordination for the implementation of all the treaties that the DPRK is a State party.”[13] The functions, composition and status of this body should be a focus of additional scrutiny by the Human Rights Committee, building on the work of the CRC and CEDAW Committees over previous review cycles.[14]
The National Committee appears to be an ersatz National Mechanism for Implementation, Reporting and Follow-up, and typifies how North Korea mimics the language of the international human rights system to avoid more substantive scrutiny. The establishment of the National Committee was a subject of repeated praise by various member state delegates during North Korea’s 2019 UPR review session. It supposedly exercises two functions—a year-round implementation monitoring role that entails regular meetings, site visits and recommendations to relevant government institutions,[15] and a periodic coordinating role for treaty body reporting, organizing task forces to collect information, consult with domestic stakeholders and prepare draft state party reports.[16]
The National Committee is described as a 108-member body comprising officials from the Presidium, Cabinet, and various ministries, departments, people’s committees and civil society organizations.[17] Its chair is the director-general of the Legislation Department of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, with a secretariat provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Human Rights Division[18], and the secretary-general being the North Korean Ambassador for Human Rights (briefly identified as Ri Hung Sik in mid-2017).[19]
Past evidence suggests that National Committee members would also form part of any delegation to the constructive dialogue with the Human Rights Committee in March 2023—although this would likely consist primarily of seasoned diplomats skilled in delivering the official government line, rather than subject matter experts from relevant institutions. The recent delegations to the CRC and CEDAW dialogues,[20] for example, included not only the presumed National Committee chair, Ri Kyong Hun, and other members, but also UN Ambassador Han Tae Song, Deputy Ambassador Choe Myong Nam and high-ranking career diplomats Jang Il Hun and Jong Song Il.[21]
It is, of course, doubtful that the National Committee exists as anything more than a paper exercise. And despite earlier coordinating committees apparently being established for the CRC and CEDAW in 1999 and 2001, there is a conspicuous lack of mention of such mechanisms for the ICCPR or ICESCR across any of the treaty body or UPR material submitted by North Korea over the last two decades.[22] Most striking of all is the much–vaunted September 2014 report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies, which also relitigated the 1997 withdrawal attempt and pointedly failed to include the ICCPR alongside the ICESCR, CEDAW, CRC and UPR as human rights instruments for which it submits periodic reports and engages in constructive dialogues.[23]
Conclusion
North Korea’s track record with the ICCPR is not promising. At this point, its repeated failure to acknowledge the existence, let alone uphold the substance, of its treaty obligations suggests that North Korea effectively no longer considers itself to be a state party to the ICCPR. The current review cycle is therefore not just an opportunity to elicit further concessions or promote much-needed legal, institutional and policy reforms, but also something of a litmus test for engagement advocates. If cooperation is not forthcoming, the Human Rights Committee can—and should—nonetheless proceed to review North Korea’s record in its absence over the next two years. And regardless of whether the government engages, the work of the Committee and the wider questions that it throws up would benefit from much greater attention.
- [1]
UN Human Rights Committee, List of issues prior to the submission of the third periodic report of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CCPR/C/PRK/QPR/3, June 22, 2021, https://undocs.org/en/CCPR/C/PRK/QPR/3.
- [2]
The CRPD Committee has not yet presented North Korea with a list of issues as per the next phase of the reporting cycle.
- [3]
It should be noted that, in isolation, this is hardly unique—almost forty countries are currently more than ten years behind in their reporting for the ICESCR, and until recently, there were a dozen countries with a worse record of ICCPR nonreporting.
- [4]
The UN Secretariat replied in an aide-mémoire that the absence of any such unilateral provision within the substantive articles of the ICCPR meant that withdrawal was only possible if all state parties were to agree to it. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 26 adopted in October 1997 was entirely more restrictive and claimed that international law does not permit a state that has ratified or acceded to the ICCPR to denounce it or withdraw from it.
- [5]
Under the traditional standard reporting procedure, states are typically required to undergo an initial reporting cycle within one to two years of ratification, followed by a periodic reporting cycle every four to five years. Each cycle involves three stages: an exchange of “principal documents,” comprising a state party report, a list of issues drafted by the Committee, and a further state party reply; a “constructive dialogue” session between the state party and the Committee, leading to the adoption of “concluding observations” by the latter; and a “follow-up” procedure on implementation efforts.
- [6]
UN HRC, List of issues, para. 1.
- [7]
Ibid., para. 2. This is also a restatement of the concerns variously expressed in the list of issues, questions to the North Korean delegation, and concluding observations from the previous reporting cycle in 2001.
- [8]
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, List of issues and questions in relation to the combined second to fourth periodic reports of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Addendum: Replies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/Q/2-4/Add.1, June 16, 2017, para. 15, https://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/PRK/Q/2-4/Add.1.
- [9]
UN HRC, List of issues, passim. The songbun system divides the North Korean population into three broad categories— the “core,” “wavering,” and “hostile” classes—as based on perceived allegiance to the Kim family regime and determined by reference to birth and family background.
- [10]
Ibid., paragraphs 9-13.
- [11]
Ibid., paragraphs 15-17.
- [12]
The Committee’s request for data on the number of individuals held in “all types of detention facilities” does not explicitly include political prison camps. It is hard to tell whether this is an oversight or a deliberate omission. A later subsection on the rights of children does include a similar request for data on “the number of children who are held in detention facilities within the State party, including political prison camps.” (Emphasis added.)
- [13]
UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Fifth Periodic Report: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CRC/C/PRK/5, May 3, 2016, para. 22.
- [14]
The National Committee is discussed in the state party reports submitted by North Korea for the CRC and CEDAW in 2016 and the CRPD in 2018. It was also the subject of further questioning by the CEDAW Committee in its resulting list of issues. The name of the body is sometimes rendered as the National Committee for the Implementation of the International Human Rights Instruments (NCIRHI). It was also responsible for overseeing North Korea’s UPR state party report in 2019.
- [15]
See UN CRC Fifth Periodic Report, paras. 22-25; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/PRK/2-4, April 11, 2016, paragraphs 20-22; UN Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, National Report: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/WG.6/33/PRK/1, February 20, 2019, para. 13.
- [16]
See UN CRC Fifth Periodic Report, paragraphs 4-5; UN CEDAW Second, Third and Fourth Periodic Reports, paras. 4-6; UN CEDAW, List of questions and issues, para. 32. The general composition of the taskforces appears to be similar to that of the National Committee as a whole.
- [17]
UN CEDAW, Replies of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, para. 29.
- [18]
According to former North Korean diplomat Han Jin Myung, the Human Rights Division was established within the International Organisations Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2003 in response to the first resolution on North Korea adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Pak Dok Hun subsequently attended the November 2003 dialogue with the ICESCR Committee in his capacity as Director of the Human Rights Division.
- [19]
Ri Hung Sik has generally been identified as an Ambassador-at-Large since at least 2014. He previously served as Director-General of the International Organisations Department, which would have meant that he was also the Secretary-General of the National Coordinating Committees for the CRC and the CEDAW.
- [20]
The North Korean delegation to the May 2019 UPR review session was almost identical.
- [21]
Jong Song Il was the ambassador to Singapore from 2008 to 2015 and a division director within the International Organizations Department from 1991 to 2008 (during which time he was part of the delegation to the 2001 ICCPR dialogue). Jang Il Hun was the deputy UN ambassador in New York from 2013 to 2016, with responsibility for the so-called “New York channel,” and also previously served as a division director within the International Organizations Department. Both officials were referred to simply as Ministry of Foreign Affairs “researchers” in the CRC and CEDAW delegation lists.
- [22]
The National Coordination Committees for the CRC and the CEDAW were a feature of the respective state party reports and constructive dialogues between 2002 and 2009. Both Committees were also mentioned in the state party and working group reports for the UPR in both 2009 and 2019.
- [23]
United Nations General Assembly, Annex to the letter dated September 15, 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General: Report of the DPRK Association for Human Rights Studies, A/69/383, September 15, 2014, 92-93.
8. ‘Artery of friendship’: Seoul proposes extending legendary Trans-Siberian railway from Vladivostok through to North & South Korea
From the Russian propaganda mouthpiece, RT.
‘Artery of friendship’: Seoul proposes extending legendary Trans-Siberian railway from Vladivostok through to North & South Korea
2 Sep, 2021 14:41
Repair of the railway track with the help of specialized machines of the track repair complex on the Domna - Lesnaya stage of the Trans-Baikal railway near the village of Zhipkovshchyna. © Sputnik / Evgeny Epanchintsev
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By Jonny Tickle
The Trans-Siberian railway could be an artery of friendship and economic partnership for North and South Korea, Seoul's Unification Minister said on Thursday during the Eastern Economic Forum in the Russian city of Vladivostok.
Speaking remotely to Forum guests, Lee In-young called for improvement in transport connections between the two Koreas, expressing hope that a train from the South Korean port city of Busan could "pass through North Korean territory, get to Vladivostok and move on to various routes that may have tourist value."
If this comes to pass, the Trans-Siberian Railway will turn into an "artery of friendship" to enable the development of "peace and cooperation on the Korean Peninsula," he said.
"It is our dream that, together with North Korea and Russia, we can cooperate for peace and progress," the minister concluded.
Due to their close proximity, Moscow has healthy relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang. Russia has repeatedly expressed its wish to see North and South Korea improve their relationship. Last month, Georgiy Zinoviev, the department director for Asia at the Russian Foreign Ministry, noted that Moscow was happy with how relations between the two Koreas were progressing.
"Russia has always been working on improvement of the situation on the Korean Peninsula," he said. "We keep working constantly, and we are glad that now, thanks to the initiatives of both halves of the Korean Peninsula, a positive dynamic in relations between them is appearing."
At the Eastern Economic Forum, Lee In-young also noted that 300,000 South Koreans visited Russia in 2019. Young Koreans are becoming increasingly interested in tourism to the world's largest country, he said.
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9. Tech-intensive defense blueprint (South Korea)
But I am glad to see the commentary about trust in the military. That is more important than any technology.
Excerpts:
Besides the campaign to upgrade combat capabilities, the ministry should also exercise more efforts so that the military can obtain trust from the people. Public trust in the military has been nosediving, prompted by recent sexual harassment cases in all three military branches. Worse still, the coronavirus mass infection in the Cheonghae Unit has further aggravated the military's public credibility.
Such incidents only undermine the efforts to sharpen the competitive prowess of the military with advanced technologies. Along with endeavors to upgrade the structure of units and weapons systems, the ministry should also focus on upgrading the military culture and practices so that it can retain the public's trust.
Under the plan, the nation's defense budget next year will amount to 55 trillion won, accounting for 9 percent of the total state budget. This compares to Japan's plan to put some 58 trillion into its defense budget next year. This means the nation will spend more on defense than the neighboring nation in 2023 should the current trend continue. While strengthening efforts toward self-defense, we should also pay heed to the concerns over a possible military buildup competition in the region.
Tech-intensive defense blueprint
Vigorous efforts needed to retain trust in military
On Thursday, the Ministry of National Defense unveiled its 2022-2026 blueprint featuring a plan to invest 315.2 trillion won ($271.8 billion) to enhance the military's combat capabilities. According to the plan, the defense budget, which currently stands at 50 trillion won, will increase 6 percent annually to reach 70 trillion won in 2026. The ministry's plan seems inevitable in light of North Korea's growing nuclear threat and military buildups in regional countries.
The ministry is seeking to equip the Army, Navy and Air Force with state-of-the-art technologies by focusing on purchasing high-tech weapons like surveillance satellites, stealth jets and mid-sized submarines. The ministry is also seeking to continue to develop surface-to-surface and ship-to-ground missiles to cope with the possible threat of North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
South Korea has already begun developing ballistic missiles as destructive as tactical nuclear weapons, following the recent termination of missile guidelines, remarkably extending shooting ranges and increasing warheads. The move comes after the United States agreed to lift the restrictions on South Korea's missile technology in the summit between President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Joe Biden in May.
Given the steady decline in the population eligible for military services, the ministry has decided to seek realignment of the military structure with a focus on salaried soldiers and officers. The plan also includes measures designed to upgrade the welfare of soldiers.
For instance, the monthly wage for a sergeant will increase to 1 million won in 2026 from 670,000 won next year. This plan has aroused skepticism that it was designed to woo support from young people ahead of the presidential election slated for March next year. The spending on meal services for the troops will also increase 70 percent every year to boost their welfare.
Besides the campaign to upgrade combat capabilities, the ministry should also exercise more efforts so that the military can obtain trust from the people. Public trust in the military has been nosediving, prompted by recent sexual harassment cases in all three military branches. Worse still, the coronavirus mass infection in the Cheonghae Unit has further aggravated the military's public credibility.
Such incidents only undermine the efforts to sharpen the competitive prowess of the military with advanced technologies. Along with endeavors to upgrade the structure of units and weapons systems, the ministry should also focus on upgrading the military culture and practices so that it can retain the public's trust.
Under the plan, the nation's defense budget next year will amount to 55 trillion won, accounting for 9 percent of the total state budget. This compares to Japan's plan to put some 58 trillion into its defense budget next year. This means the nation will spend more on defense than the neighboring nation in 2023 should the current trend continue. While strengthening efforts toward self-defense, we should also pay heed to the concerns over a possible military buildup competition in the region.
10. Strengthening Of US-South Korea Ties Has Consequences For Region – Analysis
Hard to take analysis like this seriously when the author does not have even a basic knowledge of the South Korean political system. He should know that President Moon cannot run for re-election in march and that by the ROK Constitution presidents are limited to one term.
Excerpts:
Finally, part of South Korean society also rejects America’s request for the country to take a more active military role in the region. Some see this development as evidence of America attempting to militarize South Korea and use it as a proxy army. This sentiment is especially high during US-led multilateral military exercises that also involve Seoul.
For another segment of the South Korean political spectrum, China is the major security issue and working with the Americans is paramount for them. Moon’s support for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system deployed at Seongju since 2017, which is now within the context of the Special Measures Agreement, is a problem for South Korea’s relationship with China. Beijing objects to this missile defense deployment and threatens Seoul with economic penalties, in addition to Chinese aircraft penetrating the country’s boundaries.
...
Overall, South Korea’s approval of the new six-year Special Measures Agreement with the US is a positive step, but it continues to perplex part of the country’s vibrant society. A very common complaint among those who do not trust America is that Washington is only using Seoul to advance its selfish interests. Moon is up for re-election next year and the domestic scene is likely to get heated. It is possible that pushing Seoul too hard now may have consequences for various parties later
Strengthening Of US-South Korea Ties Has Consequences For Region – Analysis
The US and South Korea have settled the ongoing dispute about the scope of their bilateral security relationship. This news is good for both countries, with a strong bilateral agreement specifically designed for this Northeast Asian country approved by the South Korean parliament on Tuesday. Lawmakers passed the six-year Special Measures Agreement by 133 votes to 11 and it came into effect the following day. Seoul’s neighbors are watching with interest, as this is a key moment for security in this corner of the world.
Cost-sharing has been a major burden between the two countries over recent years. Under the Trump administration, no deal was forthcoming because of the transactional nature of the negotiations. South Korea was left feeling abused by the US and the country’s leaders resisted Washington’s pressure.
Under President Joe Biden, however, there was an immediate breakthrough and in March a deal was agreed in principle to end the logjam. South Korea’s National Assembly this week had the final say on the Special Measures Agreement, as required by law.
It is important to understand the domestic setting for South Korea’s decision-making on its relationship with the US. President Moon Jae-in is under intense pressure from many different groups regarding the American deal. The country’s diverse political scene features discussions on the history and relations of the country with its neighbors, especially North Korea, China and Russia. Japan is a separate case because of the uneven nature of Tokyo’s relationship with Seoul due to lingering tensions over their perceptions of each other.
Because of these domestic viewpoints, there are deep diplomatic differences between Biden and Moon. The local interpretation is that the Biden administration wants Moon to back away from Seoul’s “peace-oriented policy” toward North Korea. No doubt Kim Jong Un’s country is in trouble, but — with Pyongyang’s military capability — North Korea continues to present a perennial threat to the entire neighborhood.
Finally, part of South Korean society also rejects America’s request for the country to take a more active military role in the region. Some see this development as evidence of America attempting to militarize South Korea and use it as a proxy army. This sentiment is especially high during US-led multilateral military exercises that also involve Seoul.
For another segment of the South Korean political spectrum, China is the major security issue and working with the Americans is paramount for them. Moon’s support for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system deployed at Seongju since 2017, which is now within the context of the Special Measures Agreement, is a problem for South Korea’s relationship with China. Beijing objects to this missile defense deployment and threatens Seoul with economic penalties, in addition to Chinese aircraft penetrating the country’s boundaries.
At the June summit between Biden and Moon, it was decided that Seoul would become more active not in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue concept, but as part of the Indo-Pacific security architecture. Parts of the South Korean public are quite upset by this development. But the growing alliance specifically designed for South Korea is emerging. Seoul last month took responsibility for space, electronic, information and cyberwarfare at a meeting of the newly established South Korea-US Information and Communication Technology Cooperation Committee.
For Northeast Asia, all of this armament policy discussion and interaction is forcing China’s hand. Beijing is placing restrictions on transit in the South China Sea for Quad members and is threatening to expand such bans. South Korea sees Japan’s participation in the Quad as inviting more Chinese ire in the region and thereby seriously unbalancing South Korean foreign policy. In response, there is talk of possible hypersonic weapon deployment among a number of Indo-Pacific countries. The placement of these missiles is part of an emerging line or string of high-tech weaponry for great power competition in the Western Pacific.
Finally, Russia is playing an interesting role in Northeast Asia, focusing on its new industrial and commercial developments on the Kuril Islands, which are angering Tokyo, while also engaging South Korea on nuclear talks with Pyongyang. Moscow sees an opportunity in playing the diplomat, while also using its stick by raising historical grievances. This is not a new tactic, but the timing is key amid the new developments in the US-South Korea security relationship. Exploiting divisions in Korean society is a desired outcome for Russia. Moscow is biding its time.
Overall, South Korea’s approval of the new six-year Special Measures Agreement with the US is a positive step, but it continues to perplex part of the country’s vibrant society. A very common complaint among those who do not trust America is that Washington is only using Seoul to advance its selfish interests. Moon is up for re-election next year and the domestic scene is likely to get heated. It is possible that pushing Seoul too hard now may have consequences for various parties later.
11. Extending the North Korea travel ban is a missed opportunity – Responsible Statecraft
I am all for principled engagement and humanitarian exchange with north Korea. I am for people-to people engagement on a massive scale. Unfortunately Kim is not. If we allow travel to north Korea for tourism it becomes a money making opportunity for the regime which violate sanctions. The second reason is
This excerpt is this.Americans and other foreigners are vulnerable. but what is so troubling about this excerpt (beyond the fact that Kim Jong-un is responsible for harming Americans) is that it is making a subtle argument that we need to understand and respect north Korean laws. It is making a north Korean apology argument. It is the victims' fault for being arrested and tortured and killed. The UN has assessed that KimJong-un and his regime are one of the worst human rights violations in the modern era since WWII. Kim does not act as a responsible member of the international community. And because of the north Korean "system" our desired people to people engagement will not achieve the effects we desire.
One impetus for these restrictions was the tragic death of Otto Warmbier, an American student arrested for allegedly stealing a propaganda poster while visiting North Korea as a tourist. Warmbier was held from January 2016 to June 2017 and died in the United States days after being released from North Korea in a coma.
Warmbier was neither the first nor the last American detained in the country. At least one American was held in North Korea after the travel restrictions took effect, though he has since been released and deported after allegations that he entered North Korea illegally. Robert King, the former Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues notes that “[o]ver the last decade or so, some twenty Americans have been detained by the DPRK, in most cases for reasons that are consistent with North Korean laws, but not with those of democratic societies like the United States.”
Extending the North Korea travel ban is a missed opportunity – Responsible Statecraft
Extending the North Korea travel ban is a missed opportunity
President Biden let the Trump-era rule continue, which blocks people-to-people contact and humanitarian assistance.
September 2, 2021
Restrictions imposed on American passport holders over travel to North Korea were extended by the Biden administration after being set to expire on September 1. Extending these restrictions is a missed opportunity to remove an obstacle to principled engagement and humanitarian exchange with North Korea.
These restrictions, introduced by the Trump administration in 2017 and renewed annually, made U.S. passports no longer valid for travel to, in, or through North Korea. Since then, individuals seeking to legally travel to North Korea on a U.S. passport have been required to apply for a special validation passport through the U.S. State Department. These one-time-use passports are “issued on an extremely limited basis” when the State Department deems the “trip is in the national interest.”
As a presidential candidate, Joe Biden pledged to work “to reunite Korean Americans separated from loved ones in North Korea for decades.” Prior to the travel restrictions, some Korean Americans were able to travel to North Korea to visit their family members still living there. However, with the travel restrictions in place and lack of an agreement between the American and North Korean governments on family reunions, the options for Korean American divided families to reunite in person will be extremely limited.
One impetus for these restrictions was the tragic death of Otto Warmbier, an American student arrested for allegedly stealing a propaganda poster while visiting North Korea as a tourist. Warmbier was held from January 2016 to June 2017 and died in the United States days after being released from North Korea in a coma.
Warmbier was neither the first nor the last American detained in the country. At least one American was held in North Korea after the travel restrictions took effect, though he has since been released and deported after allegations that he entered North Korea illegally. Robert King, the former Special Envoy for North Korea Human Rights Issues notes that “[o]ver the last decade or so, some twenty Americans have been detained by the DPRK, in most cases for reasons that are consistent with North Korean laws, but not with those of democratic societies like the United States.”
The travel restrictions have also limited the ability of some non-governmental organizations to provide medical, developmental, and other humanitarian assistance. Advocates for removing the travel restrictions note that the process is too often arbitrary and lacks transparency detailing why applications are denied. Even those individuals who have their applications for special validation passports approved by the State Department may face bureaucratic and financial burdens.
Cultural exchanges, educational engagement, and other people-to-people exchanges are also valuable, especially given the general lack of direct contact between U.S. and North Korean citizens. This people-to-people engagement has been diverse, ranging from former American political leaders visiting North Korea to promote dialogue and understanding to the New York Philharmonic performing a concert in Pyongyang.
Had the Biden administration chosen not to renew these travel restrictions, the initial effect would have been largely be symbolic due to North Korea’s strict self-imposed border controls arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. But easing the restrictions would have enabled direct people-to-people contact or humanitarian assistance in significant areas in the future.
U.S. Special Representative for the DPRK Sung Kim recently wrote that “we are open to exploring meaningful confidence-building initiatives.” Unfortunately, this was a missed opportunity for the administration to demonstrate its commitment to that pledge by removing a significant barrier that could hinder the success of those very confidence-building initiatives.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
