"The end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the states of created beings capable of law, where there is no law, there is no freedom."

- John Locke

“Burke rejected the liberal idea of the social contract, as a deal agreed among living people. Society, he argued, does not contain the living only; it is an association between the dead, the living and the unborn. Its binding principle is not contract but something more akin to trusteeship. It is a shared inheritance for the sake of which we learn to circumscribe our demands, to see our own place in things as part of a continuous chain of giving and receiving, and to recognise that the good things we inherit are not ours to spoil but ours to safeguard for our dependents. There is a line of obligation that connects us to those who gave us what we have; and our concern for the future is an extension of that line. We take the future of our community into account not by fictitious cost-benefit calculations, but more concretely, by seeing ourselves as inheriting benefits and passing them on. Concern for future generations is a non-specific outgrowth of gratitude. It does not calculate, because it shouldn't and can't.”

- Roger Scruton, Conservatism: An Invitation to the Great Tradition

• Milley went a step further, suggesting the president shouldn't have put a date certain — Aug. 31 — on the U.S. withdrawal. "Make it conditions-based," the top U.S. general told senators during a newsy five-hour hearing alongside Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

• "No, they didn't; it was split. That wasn't true," Biden said when asked whether Pentagon leaders recommended he keep a residual force in Afghanistan.
• The advisers didn't argue against pulling out all troops under a specific time frame, Biden insisted. "No one said that to me, that I can recall."

• "Al Qaeda is still in Afghanistan. They were there in mid-August," Milley said when asked about Biden's claim on Aug. 20 that the U.S. has no interests in Afghanistan now that the terrorist group was "gone."
• The outcome of the war was "a strategic failure," Milley said bluntly. "The enemy is in charge of Kabul; there's no way else to describe that."
• As to whether America’s credibility has been damaged, Milley said: "I think that our credibility with allies and partners around the world, and with adversaries, is being intensely reviewed by them to see which way this is going to go. And I think that 'damage' is one word that could be used, yes.”
• "The war on terror is not over, and the war in Afghanistan is not over," McKenzie testified, undermining the central message in Biden's address last week to the UN General Assembly.

• She also correctly noted the two generals, as well as Secretary Austin, testified that remaining in Afghanistan past Aug. 31 would have required an additional troop surge to fight the Taliban.

• McKenzie told senators "the primary accelerant to lowering morale and general efficiency of the Afghan military" was the peace agreement the Trump administration negotiated with the Taliban.
• And Milley confirmed the Axios "Off the Rails" scoop that Trump ordered the full withdrawal of U.S. forces by Jan. 15 — undermining any suggestion that the ex-president favored a conditions-based exit from Afghanistan, unlike Biden.

• Sept. 28, 2021

• Nearly three times as many Americans – 58 percent vs. 21 percent – want to increase as decrease diplomatic engagement with the world;
• A plurality of Americans fit a “Global Ambassadors” type. They support active diplomacy but oppose increasing America’s troop presence worldwide;
• When asked to rank the forms of international assistance they think the United States should prioritize, the most popular types were non-military: (1) humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and (2) COVID-19 relief such as vaccine donations;
• Sixty-three percent support reviving nuclear negotiations with Iran and pursuing an agreement which prevents the development of nuclear weapons;

• Most (62 percent) think the biggest lesson from the war in Afghanistan was that the United States should not be in the business of nation-building or that it should only send troops into harm’s way if vital national interests are threatened;
• A plurality wants to decrease the number of US troops stationed overseas and reduce security commitments to countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East;
• Support for United States-led military intervention to stop human rights abuses decreased by 14 percent between 2020 and 2021; (and support for the United Nations taking the lead increased by 14 percent);
• In recent years, Congress has largely ceded its war-making prerogative to the executive branch. 76 percent believe the president should seek Congressional approval before ordering military action;
• Seventy percent believe “the US should negotiate directly with adversaries to try to avoid military confrontation, even if those adversaries are human rights abusers, dictators, or home to terrorist organizations;”
• Americans generally make a positive appraisal of drone strikes: nearly 70 percent believe they are less costly than sending US troops into combat, or are an effective tool in depriving terrorists of safe havens in remote parts of the world;

• Twice as many Americans want to decrease the defense budget as increase it. The most cited rationale for decreasing the defense budget is a desire to redirect resources domestically;
• Half of Americans have a “Jeffersonian” outlook: they are more eager to protect democracy at home than promote it abroad. This outlook increased by 35 percent since 2018;

• The number of respondents who think the United States should act militarily to prevent Russian troops from invading a NATO ally decreased by six percentage points between 2020 and 2021, and Americans are divided down the middle on this issue;
• For the second year in a row, Americans are evenly split on whether the United States should increase or decrease its troop presence in Asia;
• ​​While a slight plurality of respondents believe the United States should militarily defend Taiwan, Americans appear ambivalent on the issue: 40 percent are unsure about what the United States should do in the case of a Chinese invasion;

• Eighty percent believe that unless the United States is under attack, the president should be required to seek approval from Congress before ordering military action overseas;
• Nearly two-thirds believe the United States should respond to China’s rise by decreasing the US troop presence in Asia, a seven percent increase from last year;
• Of all age groups surveyed, young Americans are the most likely to believe the United States is “not an exceptional nation” (60 percent) and least likely to believe it is “exceptional because of what it has done for the world” (12 percent);
• Nearly 60 percent are critical of the use of drones, more than twice as many as the older age groups;
• Five times as many want to decrease as increase current levels of defense spending.

• Traditional Internationalists support both elements of the bipartisan US foreign policy consensus, believing the United States should work with other countries to address global issues and maintain its status as much of the world’s security guarantor.
• Global Ambassadors want the United States to increase diplomatic efforts to address global issues like climate change, migration, and human rights, and support participating in international institutions and trade. But they oppose military primacy and believe the United States should reduce its overseas troop levels.
• Hard Power Primacists think the United States should maintain its muscular global military presence and security commitments. However, they think the United States should reduce other aspects of its international role and are skeptical of America’s involvement in international institutions, trade, and treaties.
• Genuine Isolationists oppose both military and non-military means of international engagement. They think the United States should be less involved in international institutions, trade and treaties, and should draw down its military presence.

There’s nothing "strategic" about making yourself look bad — just ask John Cena. In place of "strategic ambiguity," America and other democracies should adopt “strategic integrity ," a policy of speaking and acting in a way that is consistent with shared moral principles.

The long Republican romance with the military appears to have finally come to an end.

The only thing worse than the nation venerating its military officers is the nation reviling them.

For its own sake, as well as the country’s, the U.S. military should make a greater commitment to democratic civil-military relations.

The ROC rightfully recognizes that the only viable defense option for small states is resistance, and US Army Special Forces will play a significant role supporting such activities. The ROC provides a strong foundation of principles, requirements, and potential challenges of such an approach, but it does not reach its full potential because it fails to properly address the realities of the twenty-first century. To avoid falling into the trap of preparing for the last war and ignoring the concepts and capabilities of our potential adversaries, the ROC must be revised and updated. We must make sure we do not look back at a romanticized past of mainly rural resistance but instead find relevant contemporary sources of lessons and develop bold and innovative concepts that are right for our time.