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Quotes of the Day:
"We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of the human freedoms – to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way."
- Victor Frankel
You said, “They’re harmless dreamers and they’re loved by the people.” – “What,” I asked you, is harmless about a dreamer?” and “What,” I asked you, “Is harmless about the love of the people? – Revolution only needs good dreamers who remember their dreams.”
- Tennessee Williams, Camino Real 1953
“The greater part of the population is not very intelligent, dreads responsibility, and desires nothing better than to be told what to do. Provided the rulers do not interfere with its material comforts and its cherished beliefs, it is perfectly happy to let itself be ruled.”
- Aldous Huxley
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 28, 2023
2. Open-source intelligence is piercing the fog of war in Ukraine
3. U.S. general predicts war with China in 2025, tells officers to get ready
4. A Chinese naval blockade could isolate Taiwan and shock the world
5. Putin Has a Problem: His So-Called Allies Won't Help Fight in Ukraine
6. Women Lead: Ukrainian Women’s Fight for the Future of Ukraine
7. Ukraine says Russia's putting inflatable tanks on the battlefield — but the decoys deflated
8. World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
9. Burning of Qur’an in Stockholm funded by journalist with Kremlin ties
10. Some Western Backers of Ukraine Worry That Time Might Be on Russia’s Side
11. What If The US Army Never Built The M1 Abrams Tank Or M2 Bradley?
12. Russian TV discusses if economy now "equal" to Iran, North Korea or Cuba
13. Germany was a soft target for Russian spies. That's changing fast.
14. Overmatch secrecy needed as China, Russia surveil US Navy, experts say
15. The World Is Tired Of United States’ Wars – OpEd
16. Women at war: Ukraine's female soldiers dream of freedom, fight for survival
17. West to deliver 321 tanks to Ukraine, says diplomat, as North Korea accuses US of 'crossing the red line'
18. China’s Top Nuclear-Weapons Lab Used American Computer Chips Decades After Ban
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 28, 2023
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-28-2023
Key Takeaways
- Conventional Russian forces are likely replacing exhausted Wagner Group forces to maintain the offensive in Bakhmut after the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut culminated with the capture of Soledar around January 12.
- Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukraine from regaining the initiative possibly ahead of a planned decisive Russian offensive in Donbas.
- Russian forces likely lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation while fixing Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
- The Russian military leadership may once again be planning an offensive operation based on erroneous assumptions about the Russian military’s capabilities
- The Russian military’s decreasing reliance on Wagner forces around Bakhmut is likely reducing Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s influence.
- Russian forces reportedly continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas. Russian forces continued a localized offensive near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the second consecutive day on January 28.
- Some Russian citizens continue limited efforts to sabotage Russian force generation efforts.
- Russian occupation officials continue to set conditions for the long-term forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 28, 2023
understandingwar.org
George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 28, 6 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Conventional Russian forces are likely replacing exhausted Wagner Group forces to maintain the offensive in Bakhmut after the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut culminated with the capture of Soledar around January 12. The Wagner Group’s assault on Bakhmut has likely culminated with its surge on Soledar. Wagner Group forces in Bakhmut have not made significant gains since capturing Soledar around January 12. Conventional Russian units are now participating in fighting in Bakhmut to reinvigorate the Russian offensive there. Combat footage posted on January 20 indicates Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) are operating around Bakhmut as the footage shows a Russian BMD-4M – niche mechanized equipment exclusively used by the VDV.[1] A Russian source reported that Wagner and VDV elements conducted joint operations in Bakhmut on December 27.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense has been increasingly reporting that Russian VDV are operating in the Bakhmut area since early January 2023, indicating conventional Russian forces are augmenting if not replacing likely culminated Wagner forces in the area.[3] Wagner Group forces - particularly convicts - have taken heavy causalities in Bakhmut since the fall of 2022. One anonymous US official reportedly stated on January 5 that the Wagner Group’s forces have sustained more than 4,100 deaths and 10,000 wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut.[4]
Ukrainian officials have maintained that the Russian offensive on Bakhmut has not culminated.[5] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian offensive on Bakhmut was culminating.[6] We continue to assess that the Wagner offensive has culminated, but now assess that the Russians are committing conventional units to continue the fight. The larger Russian effort against Bakhmut has likely thus not culminated.
Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukraine from regaining the initiative possibly ahead of a planned decisive Russian offensive in Donbas. Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated on December 22 that Russian forces are focusing most of their efforts on seizing Donetsk Oblast, which likely entails Russian forces capturing key positions in western Luhansk Oblast and northeastern Donetsk Oblast to reach the oblasts’ administrative borders.[7] Russian forces have resumed ground attacks in the Vuhledar area (which they unsuccessfully attempted to reach in late October 2022) and are conducting small-scale assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast and around Donetsk City. Russian forces are conducting a large-scale offensive operation on the Bakhmut frontline as their current main effort and a defensive operation, for now, on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[8]
The localized attacks on Vuhledar and settlements in Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts are likely intended to disperse Ukrainian troops and set conditions for a decisive Russian offensive in western Luhansk Oblast, as ISW had previously assessed.[9] Russian forces may be attempting to disperse the Ukrainian grouping of forces on the Svatove-Kreminna line to enable a Russian recapture of Lyman, Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces could seek to use Lyman as a launching point for a decisive offensive to secure Donbas by conducting an offensive from Lyman in tandem with a drive on Bakhmut or from Bakhmut toward Slovyansk if the Russians succeed in capturing Bakhmut. The Russians may imagine that they can drive from their current positions directly to the Donetsk Oblast border along several independent lines of advance, although it is unlikely that they would not recognize the extreme improbability of success in such an attempt. The Russians more likely intend to pursue several phases of offensive operations culminating with securing the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. These phases would likely require anywhere from six to 12 months of Russian campaigning, if they are possible at all, extrapolating from past Russian operational patterns and assuming higher levels of Russian combat power and capability than ISW has observed since the start of the war.
Russian forces likely lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation while fixing Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. There is no open-source evidence to suggest that Russian forces have regenerated sufficient combat power from their losses in the early phases of the war to enable Russian forces to conduct simultaneous large-scale mechanized offensives in the next several months. The Russian military has not demonstrated the capability to conduct simultaneous combined arms offensive operations since early 2022. Russia’s most recent gains around Bakhmut relied on months of human wave attacks to secure territorial gains around Bakhmut by brute force at tremendous human costs. Russia’s earlier capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 also did not utilize combined arms but instead relied on large-scale rolling artillery barrages to methodically destroy Ukrainian positions. Russian forces are experiencing growing artillery ammunition shortages that would prevent them from repeating these tactics.[10] It is unlikely, moreover, that the conventional Russian military will be willing to take the kinds of horrific losses the human wave tactic has inflicted on Wagner’s convicts. The Russians’ ability to execute large-scale rapid offensives on multiple axes this winter and spring is thus very questionable.
The conventional Russian military still must undergo significant reconstitution before regaining the ability to conduct effective maneuver warfare. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) plans to significantly increase the size of Russia’s military with 12 new maneuver divisions will take at least until 2026, if this effort succeeds at all.[11] Western intelligence and defense officials have not issued any indications that Russia’s effective mechanized warfare combat power has recently increased, and ISW has not observed any indicators along those lines.
The Russian military leadership may once again be planning an offensive operation based on erroneous assumptions about the Russian military’s capabilities, however. Russia's military failures in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts have demonstrated time and again that Russian military leadership overestimates the Russian military‘s own capabilities. The degraded Eastern Military District naval infantry elements that are currently attacking Vuhledar will likely culminate even if they succeed in capturing the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian loss of Vuhledar, if it occurs, would not likely portend an immediate Russian breakthrough on multiple lines of advance in Donetsk or in the theater in general, therefore. Ukraine‘s spring rain season (which normally occurs around April) will degrade the terrain’s suitability for maneuver warfare. If Russian forces attempt simultaneous mechanized offensives in the next two months they would likely disrupt Ukrainian efforts to conduct a counteroffensive in the short term, but such a Russian offensive would likely prematurely culminate during the spring rain season (if not before) before achieving operationally significant effects. Russian forces’ culmination would then generate favorable conditions for Ukrainian forces to exploit in their own late spring or summer 2023 counteroffensive. Ukraine would additionally be seeing growing benefits from the incorporation of Western tank deliveries that have only just been pledged.
The Russians are thus very unlikely to achieve operationally decisive successes in their current and likely upcoming offensive operations, although they are likely to make tactically and possibly even operationally significant gains. Ukraine will very likely find itself in a good position from which to conduct successful counteroffensive operations following the culmination of Russian offensives before or during the spring rainy season—always assuming that the Ukrainians do not preempt or disrupt the Russian offensives with a counter-offensive of their own.
The Russian military’s decreasing reliance on Wagner forces around Bakhmut is likely reducing Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s influence. ISW assessed on January 22 that the Kremlin likely turned to Prigozhin’s irregular forces to get through a rough period following the culmination of Russian conventional forces’ offensive in Luhansk Oblast over the summer of 2022, which misled Prigozhin into overestimating his importance in the Russian military and political spheres.[13] The Kremlin, however, will not need to appease Prigozhin if Russian conventional forces continue to take responsibility for the Bakhmut frontline. ISW has reported that the Kremlin likely has already been slowly terminating his privileges.[14] Gerasimov and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) have also embarked upon new efforts to professionalize the army, an effort that, if successful, would marginalize parallel military formations such as the Wagner Group.
Prigozhin is likely sensing and is overcompensating for his declining influence and has therefore begun to attack the nationalist veteran faction. The veteran faction has been demanding that the Russian military command fix flaws within its conventional campaign instead of focusing on ineffective and unconventional solutions since at least May 2022.[15] Prigozhin continued on January 28 to berate Igor Girkin – a prominent Russian nationalist voice and a former Russian officer who has connections with the Russian veteran community – with vulgar insults and accusations that he is responsible for Russian forces’ loss of Slovyansk in 2014.[16] Prigozhin accused Girkin, Russian State Duma Parliamentarian and Committee on Defense member Lieutenant General (Ret.) Viktor Sobolev, and Leader of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party Leonid Slutsky of living in a past in which Russia relied on conventional forces.[17] Sobolev previously supported the Russian MoD effort to professionalize the military by enforcing grooming standards, and Slutsky avidly advocated for the Kremlin to declare mobilization to rectify the dire situation on the frontlines in early fall 2022.[18] Prigozhin went after these three individuals likely in an effort to undermine their credibility and advocacy for reforms and improvements within the military that further marginalize his undisciplined and brutal parallel military forces.
Prigozhin is also facing bribery accusations, which may further diminish his reputation regardless of their validity. Prigozhin responded to a media inquiry on January 27 regarding speculations that he receives bribes from convicts who do not then serve on the front lines but still receive a pardon for their “service.”[19] The allegations claimed that Prigozhin had recruited and soon released convicted Lipetsk Oblast Parliamentarian Andrey Yaitskiy (who some commentators speculated was physically unfit for military service), which granted him a pardon in exchange for a bribe.[20] Prigozhin attempted to deflect the accusations by claiming that Wagner discharged Yaitskiy with honors following his heavy injuries sustained on the frontlines and included purported testimony from Yaitskiy’s alleged commanders who portrayed him as a hero.[21] ISW cannot independently verify these bribery accusations against Prigozhin, however, their emergence is notable given that corruption and bribery is endemic in Russia and a hated cultural vice among Russians.
Key Takeaways
- Conventional Russian forces are likely replacing exhausted Wagner Group forces to maintain the offensive in Bakhmut after the Wagner Group’s offensive in Bakhmut culminated with the capture of Soledar around January 12.
- Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukraine from regaining the initiative possibly ahead of a planned decisive Russian offensive in Donbas.
- Russian forces likely lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation while fixing Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
- The Russian military leadership may once again be planning an offensive operation based on erroneous assumptions about the Russian military’s capabilities
- The Russian military’s decreasing reliance on Wagner forces around Bakhmut is likely reducing Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s influence.
- Russian forces reportedly continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas. Russian forces continued a localized offensive near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast.
- Russian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the second consecutive day on January 28.
- Some Russian citizens continue limited efforts to sabotage Russian force generation efforts.
- Russian occupation officials continue to set conditions for the long-term forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces reportedly continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 28. Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances near Hryanykivka, Kharkiv Oblast (53km northwest of Svatove) and likely hold positions near Novovodyane, Luhansk Oblast (24km northwest of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) in the direction of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations along the Nevske-Terny line on January 26 and 27.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[25]
Russian milbloggers continue to provide forecasts of possible Ukrainian actions. One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces expect Russian forces to conduct an offensive along the Synkivka-Vilshana line in eastern Kharkiv Oblast (10-15km northeast of Kupyansk) and are simultaneously withdrawing some forces in Kupyansk to unspecified areas along the front line.[26] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are planning their own counteroffensive near Kuzymivka, Luhansk Oblast (18km northwest of Svatove), and used sabotage and reconnaissance groups to assess Russian forces’ capabilities in the area. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces reduced the intensity of ground attacks but increased artillery fire along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[27] These forecasts suggest that these Russian milbloggers may be increasingly worried about a renewed Ukrainian effort somewhere on the front line to which Ukrainians may dedicate resources currently operating in the Kupyansk, Svatove, or Lyman areas.
Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian rear areas in Luhansk Oblast on January 28. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a hospital in Novoaidar (km east of Kreminna) with HIMARS rockets, killing 14 unspecified patients.[28] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai implied that Ukrainian forces may have struck the hospital, killing several dozen Russian military personnel.[29] Ukrainian forces are likely increasing strikes on Russian positions in deep rear areas of Luhansk Oblast to disrupt Russian logistics and ground lines of communication (GLOCs), an effort that Ukrainian forces could use to set conditions for future counteroffensive operations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration on December 2 in the vicinity of Starobilsk - also a rear area in Luhansk Oblast - killing 14 Russian personnel and wounding 30.[30]
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself, within 18km north of east of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka and Krasna Hora, 6km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, and within 20km south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Druzhba.[31] Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced to the northwestern outskirts of Sil (14km north of Bakhmut).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters pushed Ukrainian forces back from positions north of Sil and that Russian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Paraskoviivka (9km north of Bakhmut) and Verkhnokamianske (32km northeast of Bakhmut).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured a stronghold west of the Bakhmutka River near Paraskoviivka and Krasna Hora (7km north of Bakhmut).[34] Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances in the northeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters continued assaults in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault squads pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) back to Ivanivske and advanced to Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut) from the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal.[37] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that the 132nd Brigade of the 1st Army Corps continued successful offensive operations in the direction of Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut) and recaptured lost positions from Ukrainian forces.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area on January 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] Geolocated footage posted on January 27 indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced near Vodyane.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Sieverne (7km west of Avdiivka) and are attempting to advance towards elevated positions near Sieverne and Tonenke (7km west of Avdiivka).[41] The Russian milblogger claimed that these positions would allow Russian forces to advance further towards Orlivka (9km northwest of Avdiivka) and Lastochkyne (6km northwest of Avdiivka) and cut off the Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) between Avdiivka and Orlivka.[42]
Russian forces continued a localized offensive in western Donetsk Oblast on January 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Prechystivka (43km southwest of Donetsk City) and Vuhledar (32km southwest of Donetsk City).[43] Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces have likely made marginal advances west of Mykilske (27km southwest of Avdiivka) and south of Vuhledar.[44] A Ukrainian military official reported that the situation in the Vuhledar area is stable and that Russian forces conducted failed attempts to outflank Ukrainian forces in the area and take control over the surrounding roads.[45] DNR Head Advisor Yan Gagin claimed that the DNR “Kaskad” Battalion and other Russian formations still hold positions on the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Vuhledar.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are focusing their main effort on the southeastern outskirts of the settlement and that Ukrainian forces have constructed a serious line of defense in the Vuhledar area.[47] Russian sources amplified footage published on January 28 purporting to show the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet conducting a ground assault near Vuhledar and supposedly capturing a group of Ukrainian servicemembers.[48]
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the second consecutive day on January 28. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov, who began the Russian information operation of a Russian offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast, has not commented on Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast since January 26.[49] Russian sources reported only routine artillery fire without mentioning any ground assaults on January 28.[50] One Russian milblogger claimed on January 27 that poor weather during the day prevents Russian forces from firing artillery and that Russian forces are unable to advance at night due to a complicated network of fortifications on the front lines.[51] The current lack of reporting and evidence of Russian advances continues to support ISW’s assessment that Russian forces only conducted limited offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[52]
Russian forces continued to strike routine areas in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts on January 28.[53] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Zaporizhstal plant in Zaporizhzhia City with an Iskander missile overnight on January 27-28.[54]
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Some Russians continue limited efforts to sabotage Russian force generation efforts. Independent Russian media outlets OVD-Info and Mediazona reported on January 27 that the Bryansk district court sent Dmitry Prokhorenko, a resident of Surazh, Bryansk Oblast, to a pre-trial detention center for two months.[55] The man’s case file states that he set fire to a Russian railroad relay box in order to “undermine the economic security and defense capability” of Russia.[56] Another Russian news source claimed that Russian authorities further suspect that Prokhorenko attacked an oil depot in Surazh using drones in December 2022.[57] Russian opposition news source Ostorozhno Novosti reported on January 7 that Russian authorities also sent four Russian teenagers from Krasnoyarsk to a pre-trial detention center for setting fire to a railway transformer box in Ovinny, Krasnoyarsk Krai.[58] Sabotage acts targeting Russian infrastructure committed by Russian residents are particularly notable as Russian authorities normally depict sabotage acts as the work of foreign agents and terrorists, as ISW has previously reported.[59]
Russian soldiers and their relatives continue to express frustration over poor conditions, commander callousness, and information blocks. An open-source intelligence aggregator on January 28 posted a screenshot of a conversation in which a Russian soldier fighting in the Svatove direction accused his commanders of devaluing his life and sending his company on a mission that caused the death of 70 percent of the company.[60] The soldier credited Wagner Group mercenaries with providing the unit with equipment and helping to evacuate the wounded.[61] A Russian news source released an expose on January 27 including interviews with family members of a unit of mobilized soldiers from Volgograd in which the family members accused Russian authorities of withholding information about their relatives.[62] The source implied that dozens of the mobilized soldiers died on October 24 due to Russian commanders’ mistakes and neglect.[63]
Russian officers continue to pressure mobilized soldiers into signing contracts as volunteer soldiers. Independent Russian media outlet ASTRA on January 27 amplified reports from the relatives of Russia’s 346th Regiment that Russian commanders used exposure to the elements, intimidation, threats of violence, and rounds fired at soldiers’ feet to coerce the mobilized soldiers into agreeing to “volunteer” for combat service.[64]
Abysmal Russian discipline and observance of basic rules continue to diminish Russian forces’ effectiveness and create challenges for Russian authorities. Russian Telegram channel “Mozhem Obyasnit” posted a recorded complaint from a Russian mobilized soldier on January 27 in which he claimed that his unit faces rampant drunkenness leading to fighting and even an unreported murder.[65] The soldier claims his commander is constantly drunk, has beaten soldiers more than once, and threatens to shoot soldiers, so the soldier surrounds himself with guards because he is afraid of his fellow servicemen.[66] Russian opposition news outlet Verstka reported on January 27 that Russian authorities have tried at least 42 Russian soldiers for illegal appropriation, possession, transportation, and carrying of weapons, ammunition, and explosive devices.[67] The majority of these cases appear to occur among soldiers returning from the front lines.[68]
Russian authorities reportedly have not paid workers digging trenches in Belgorod Oblast to defend against the nonexistent threat of a Ukrainian ground attack against Russia.[69] A Russian opposition news source on January 27 amplified a comment on Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov’s VK page that accused officials of allocating money for trench construction from the budget but not using that money to pay workers.[70] A Belgorod resident reportedly spoke to Gladkov about the issue via phone on a prior date, and Gladkov referred the resident to the prosecutor’s office.[71] The construction of such fortifications continues to waste Russia’s limited resources as well as mobilized soldiers and civilian labor on a nonexistent threat.
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation officials continue to set conditions for the long-term forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. Russian occupation Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on January 28 that the Russian government allocated a 70-million-ruble ($989,800) subsidy for Sevastopol to create three non-profit facilities for children’s health and recreation in the Gorny children’s camp. Razvozhaev claimed that these new buildings will allow the camp to house over 400 children at once and will complete construction by May 25. Russian occupation officials have forcibly deported Ukrainian children to Crimea, including temporary housing for civilians forcibly evacuated from Kherson Oblast, as ISW has previously reported.[72] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (parliament) Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets stated on January 26 that Ukrainian officials have confirmed information that Russian occupation authorities have forcibly deported over 14,000 children to Russia and may have forcibly deported over 150,000 Ukrainian children in total.[73]
Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities continued to integrate occupied Ukraine into Russian administrative and economic structures. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities began forced passportization measures among employees of state and communal enterprises in occupied Donetsk Oblast and that the enterprises will fire employees who do not have Russian passports by March 1.[74] The Resistance Center stated that the workers must also renounce their Ukrainian citizenship even though Russian law allows for dual citizenship and assessed that Russian authorities intend to change the demographic composition of occupied Ukraine to support propaganda efforts.[75] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian occupation authorities have raised the retirement age for women from 55 to 60, delayed payment of pensions and salaries, created blanket pension amounts regardless of the length of service or previous salary, and established a living wage of 11,000 rubles, one half the living wage in Moscow and one third the living wage in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug in the Russian Far East.[76]
Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses it very unlikely that Russian or Belarusian forces will attack northern Ukraine in early 2023 and has thus restructured this section of the update to orient away from the previous most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a Russian offensive against northern Ukraine to report on significant activity in Belarus. ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.)
There is still no indication that Russian forces are forming a strike group in Belarus as of January 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 27.[77] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 3rd Army Corps (a force of about 10,000 - 15,000 poorly trained mobilized personnel that Ukrainian forces defeated in the fall 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive) are training in Belarus.[78] This is one of the first prominent mentions of the 3rd Army Corps since its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast in 2022. It is unclear if the 3rd Army Corps still exists as a coherent formation or if the Ukrainian General Staff simply observed elements formally of the 3rd Army Corps regrouping in Belarus.
The Russian military continues expanding its air force presence in Belarus under the rubric of joint tactical flight exercises. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on January 28 that unspecified flight crews (likely Russian and Belarusian) performed a combat exercise at the Ruzhansky Training Ground as part of ongoing joint Russian-Belarus tactical flight exercises.[79] Independent Belarusian monitoring organization The Hajun Project reported that a Russian Aerospace Forces An-26 transport arrived at the Machulishchy Airfield in Minsk, Belarus on January 27.[80] The Hajun Project also reported that unspecified Belarusian aircraft conducted flights near the Machulishchy, Baranavichy, and Luninets airfields and that a Russian Su-34 flew to Russia from the Baranavichy Airfield on January 27.[81]
Belarusian mechanized elements continue to deploy across Belarus for exercises. The Hajun Project reported that a column of at least 30 unspecified vehicles of the Belarusian 11th Mechanized Brigade deployed through Slonim in Grodno Oblast on January 27.[82]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[5] https://www.newsweek.com/possible-russian-victory-vuhledar-ukraine-could... gov.ua/ru/news/nam-potribna-micna-derzhava-i-ukrayina-bude-same-takoyu-zver-80597
[20] https://gorod48 dot ru/news/1939136/; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/358
[55] https://ovd dot news/express-news/2023/01/27/zhitelya-bryanskoy-oblasti-arestovali-po-delu-o-diversii-na-zheleznoy-doroge; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27; https://zona dot media/news/2023/01/27/shkaf
[56] https://ovd dot news/express-news/2023/01/27/zhitelya-bryanskoy-oblasti-arestovali-po-delu-o-diversii-na-zheleznoy-doroge; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27; https://zona dot media/news/2023/01/27/shkaf
[62] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq_0eTWHnNY&list=PLbG2mQ1U5ZZ1nEAwMJsJJz... com/video-13717157
[63] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq_0eTWHnNY&list=PLbG2mQ1U5ZZ1nEAwMJsJJz... dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27
[64] https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27; https://t.me/astrapress/20048
[65] https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/13970; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27
[67] https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-jan-26-27; https://t.me/svobodnieslova/1295
[73] https://suspilne dot media/366772-rosijska-storona-ne-pogodzuetsa-na-obmin-vsih-na-vsih-ombudsman-ukraini/
[74] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/28/rosiyany-provodyat-prymusovu-pasportyzacziyu-na-donechchyni/
[75] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/28/rosiyany-provodyat-prymusovu-pasportyzacziyu-na-donechchyni/
[80] https://motolko dot help/en-news/belarusian-hajun-military-activity-on-the-territory-of-belarus-on-january-27/
[81] https://motolko dot help/en-news/belarusian-hajun-military-activity-on-the-territory-of-belarus-on-january-27/
[82] https://motolko dot help/en-news/belarusian-hajun-military-activity-on-the-territory-of-belarus-on-january-27/
understandingwar.org
2. Open-source intelligence is piercing the fog of war in Ukraine
I missed this a couple of weeks ago and a friend flagged it for me today. I think we are all well aware of this but it is worth highlighting the importance of OSINT.
The previous daily report from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is just one credible example of OSINT or a report that is built on OSINT (and it is referenced as a source in this article).
I imagine reports from ISW are very useful to journalists and others who do not have access to classified sources.
What I hope someone is doing is comparing the information reporting and intelligence analysis that is being done solely with OSINT such as ISW is doing, with the intelligence and analysis that is being conducted by the intelligence community. Of course it would not be a fair fight if the intelligence community is integrating OSINT from sources like ISW because all source intelligence is the best of all. But the question is whether the intelligence community is exploiting OSINT most effectively and efficiently?
Open-source intelligence is piercing the fog of war in Ukraine
The Economist
International | An open book
Social-media posts and satellite imagery provide a torrent of data, but can overwhelm and confuse
Jan 13th 2023
On May 29th 1982 Robert Fox had just witnessed 36 hours of intense warfare over Goose Green, a remote spot on the Falkland Islands, an archipelago in the South Atlantic then being fought over by Britain and Argentina. It was the decisive battle of the war and it had gone Britain’s way. Mr Fox, then a BBC radio correspondent, was keen to tell listeners. It took him ten hours to get to a satellite phone aboard a warship, he recalls. It took another eight hours to decrypt his text in London. The story was not broadcast for 24 hours. Television journalists had it worse, says Mr Fox. Their shots took ten days to reach home.
When the southern Ukrainian city of Kherson was liberated in November, it took just hours, if not minutes, for the news to flood out. Images circulating on Telegram, a messaging service popular in Russia and Ukraine, showed Ukrainian soldiers strolling into the centre of the city and Ukrainian flags lofted over buildings (see clips above). A network of amateur analysts on Twitter tracked the Ukrainian advance, almost in real time, by “geo-locating” the images—comparing trees, buildings and other features to satellite imagery on Google Maps and similar services.
The rise of open-source intelligence, OSINT to insiders, has transformed the way that people receive news. In the run-up to war, commercial satellite imagery and video footage of Russian convoys on TikTok, a social-media site, allowed journalists and researchers to corroborate Western claims that Russia was preparing an invasion. OSINT even predicted its onset. Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute in California used Google Maps’ road-traffic reports to identify a tell-tale jam on the Russian side of the border at 3:15am on February 24th. “Someone’s on the move”, he tweeted. Less than three hours later Vladimir Putin launched his war.
Satellite imagery still plays a role in tracking the war. During the Kherson offensive, synthetic-aperture radar (SAR) satellites, which can see at night and through clouds, showed Russia building pontoon bridges over the Dnieper river before its retreat from Kherson, boats appearing and disappearing as troops escaped east and, later, Russia’s army building new defensive positions along the M14 highway on the river’s left bank. And when Ukrainian drones struck two air bases deep inside Russia on December 5th, high-resolution satellite images showed the extent of the damage.
Il-76 transport plane
Tu-22M
Tu-95
Il-76
Il-76
Scorch marks
Fire suppressant
The Dyagilevo air base, in Ryazan, south-east of Moscow, houses some of Russia’s long-range bombers including Soviet-era Tu-95 and Tu-22M planes. This image was taken on December 7th, two days after the attack.
Scorch marks and fire suppressant can be seen on the ground where a Tu-22M bomber had been days before. Around ten Tu-22Ms appear to have been moved out of harm’s way, compared with photos taken before the attack.
Image: Planet Labs PBC
But whereas satellites were well-suited to cataloguing Russian battalions laid out neatly in open fields in January, it is harder to capture compelling images of small companies of men dispersed over a wide area and often ensconced in trenches or bunkers. The single most important repository of data during the war has been Telegram.
OSINT analysts scour Telegram channels such as Rybar, an account with over 1m followers, to harvest images of battle, testimony from the front line and the mood among troops. Rybar is not neutral—its founder once worked for the press service of Russia’s defence ministry, and reportedly once had links to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the mercenary Wagner group—but it offers relatively accurate and timely accounts of battlefield movements, including Ukraine’s blitz through Kharkiv in September, and is often critical of Russian policy.
Telegram has become a platform for Russian ultra-nationalists, supportive of the war but dissatisfied with its conduct, to air their grievances against Russia’s military leadership. Popular accounts have circulated images of troops without basic equipment. During the Kherson offensive in early October, one panicked Russian account even used Telegram to make a desperate plea for air support. The first ten years of the Syrian civil war produced video footage running to 40 years, notes Matthew Ford of the Swedish Defence University. In the first 80 days of the Ukraine war, there was ten years of footage—an order of magnitude more.
For armies seeking to maintain operational security, this profusion of data is a nightmare. In 2019, after a series of blunders, Russia passed a law banning soldiers from uploading sensitive photos or videos. It began shutting down railway-tracking websites shortly before the war began, removing a valuable source of data. It has also attempted to obscure patches on soldiers’ uniforms and vehicle markings, to avoid giving away the position of whole units. In October the Kremlin began cracking down on prominent critics on Telegram, such as Igor Girkin, a hardline ex-spook who led Russia’s proxy war in Donbas in 2014. But they remain as garrulous as ever. After at least 89 Russian servicemen—possibly hundreds—were killed by a Ukrainian attack on New Year’s Day in Makiivka, a Russian-occupied town in the Donbas region, Mr Girkin lambasted the incompetence of Russian generals, describing them as “untrainable”.
Nor has Russia staunched the flow of information. “There’s a lot of lessons being learnt very slowly,” says Tom Bullock, an OSINT analyst at Atreides, an intelligence company, “but I think that’s on Telegram, where they know people are looking”. On VKontakte (VK), the Russian equivalent of Facebook, says Mr Bullock, “it’s basically just as bad as it always has been. There’s so many geo-tagged pictures of their bases just floating around at all times.”
This sloppiness can have lethal consequences. In December a Russian volunteer posted photos on VK of forces encamped in a country club in Sahy, an occupied part of Kherson province. His post included a geo-tag of the exact location. Ukrainian missiles later struck it, after which the volunteer posted yet again. This time he uploaded a video showing the extent of the destruction, in effect giving Ukraine a damage assessment from on the ground, noted Rob Lee of King’s College London.
December 8th
December 11th
December 20th
Images and video posted on VK showing Russian forces at the Grand Prix country club in Kherson province, and later the aftermath of a Ukrainian attack.
As Russia mobilises hundreds of thousands of recruits, most with little experience of a warzone and minimal security training, this vulnerability is likely to grow. “A lot of them see posting on social media as part of their tour of duty,” says Mr Bullock. He recalls tracking a Russian volunteer who was sent to Kherson province in June. The soldier obligingly posted a photograph of every village he drove through on his way from Rostov, in southern Russia, to Kherson, revealing the precise route of Russian supply lines.
“There have been efforts to close or limit OSINT collection,” says HI Sutton, a naval analyst who uses SAR imagery to track ship movements. “But OSINT evolves and people, if they are keen enough, find new ways to figure stuff out.” He gives the example of NASA's Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS), which uses infra-red sensors on satellites to detect active fires. It was originally developed to track things like forest fires. Now it is used to identify missile launches, shellfire and explosions, allowing researchers to discern the latest front line.
2021
2022
Active fires detected by NASA satellites on June 1st-7th 2021, before the war, and June 1st-7th 2022.
Open sources undoubtedly have their limitations. The torrent of images that emerged from Kherson did so with unusual speed, in part because euphoric residents were keen to take and upload the footage. On one occasion, Ukrainian forces managed to target a Chechen unit near Kyiv within 40 minutes of videos being uploaded to TikTok, according to the New York Times. But on average it takes one to three days for an image to circulate widely and be geo-located, says Andro Mathewson, an OSINT analyst for the HALO Trust, a landmine clearance charity. Images often arrive in bursts when a unit is rotated off the front lines and has time and connectivity to upload footage.
Open sources also entail a form of survivorship bias, akin to the problem, in the second world war, of drawing the wrong lessons by analysing only those planes which returned from missions rather than also those which were shot down. “The footage we see of this war is not necessarily representative of how it is being fought,” says Mr Lee. Tanks hit by anti-tank missiles are more likely to be caught on video than those struck by mines, he notes. Yet a big chunk of Ukrainian tank losses are from mines, according to informed sources.
In a recent talk, General Sir Jim Hockenhull, who ran British defence intelligence until 2022, compared old-fashioned intelligence to assembling a jigsaw puzzle without the lid, showing the complete picture, or all the pieces. “What’s happening with open source is that we still don’t have the lid…but what we have is an almost infinite number of jigsaw pieces.” The result, he said, was that one could assemble “an almost infinite number of pictures”.
That creates “splintered realities”, says Mr Ford. He is working on an open-source narrative history of the war, and reckons it can be done “at what might be considered US intelligence standards”—a remarkable acceleration of military history. But he acknowledges that the infinite jigsaw poses serious challenges. One is the problem of self-deception: seeing the war “as we want to see it, rather than as it is”. Images of cold and hungry Russian recruits huddled in trenches paint a picture of shambolic mobilisation. In practice, Western and Ukrainian officials say they are worried about the units being formed out of sight.
The other problem is seeing what belligerents want you to see. In the early months of the war, videos showed strike after strike by Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2 drones, many set to catchy music. It was a piece of theatre. “Ukraine recognised very quickly as part of an extremely effective information operations strategy that this was some of the best footage they had,” noted Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank, speaking on a recent podcast. “And so the Ukrainains stored up a lot of that footage and kept drip-feeding it, having got rid of date, time and location stamps to give the impression this was still a major thing a couple of months in.”
Despite those limitations, Western intelligence agencies are taking a keen interest in OSINT. Satellite imagery is old hat. America has had it for more than 60 years, though never quite so much. But a world in which Telegram channels convey a steady stream of battlefield imagery is new and unsettling. “Open source contributes somewhere in the region of 20% of our current processes,” says General Hockenhull, “but the availability and opportunity means that we’ve got to invert this metric.” Rather than sprinkling OSINT over a bedrock of secret intelligence, the secrets should be the icing on an open-source cake. “It’s crucial that we are able to merge those together.” ■
Sources: AEI’s Critical Threats Project; Institute for the Study of War; NASA Earthdata; Planet; Telegram; VKontakte; The Economist
3. U.S. general predicts war with China in 2025, tells officers to get ready
In a tweet Rep Gallagher has this to say about General Minihin's comments that are receiving criticism in some quarters.
“If we've learned anything from Ukraine it's that we need to take our adversaries at their word when they threaten their neighbors and put hard power in their way before it's too late. General Minihan should be commended for directing his airmen to take the threat seriously and preparing with the urgency that the situation demands.” – Mike Gallagher, Member of Congress, WI-08 https://twitter.com/RepGallagher/status/1619395814115409920
U.S. general predicts war with China in 2025, tells officers to get ready
“I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me will fight in 2025," said Gen. Mike Minihan in a memo sent to the officers he commands and obtained by NBC News.
NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Mosheh Gains · January 27, 2023
A four-star Air Force general sent a memo on Friday to the officers he commands that predicts the U.S. will be at war with China in two years and tells them to get ready to prep by firing "a clip" at a target, and "aim for the head."
In the memo sent Friday and obtained by NBC News, Gen. Mike Minihan, head of Air Mobility Command, said, “I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me will fight in 2025.”
Air Mobility Command has nearly 50,000 service members and nearly 500 planes and is responsible for transport and refueling.
Minihan said in the memo that because both Taiwan and the U.S. will have presidential elections in 2024, the U.S. will be “distracted,” and Chinese President Xi Jinping will have an opportunity to move on Taiwan.
Dec. 26, 202200:25
He lays out his goals for preparing, including building “a fortified, ready, integrated, and agile Joint Force Maneuver Team ready to fight and win inside the first island chain.”
The signed memo is addressed to all air wing commanders in Air Mobility Command and other Air Force operational commanders, and orders them to report all major efforts to prepare for the China fight to Minihan by Feb. 28.
During the month of February, he directs all AMC personnel to “fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head.” He also orders all personnel to update their records and emergency contacts.
In March he directs all AMC personnel to “consider their personal affairs and whether a visit should be scheduled with their servicing base legal office to ensure they are legally ready and prepared.”
Footage captured on Dec. 21, 2022 shows a Chinese fighter jet flying close to a U.S. surveillance plane in international airspace over the South China Sea. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Minihan urges them to accept some risk in training. “Run deliberately, not recklessly,” he writes, but later adds, “If you are comfortable in your approach to training, then you are not taking enough risk.”
He also provides a window into one capability the U.S. is considering for possible conflict with China — commercial drone swarms. He directs the KC-135 units to prepare for “delivering 100 off-the-shelf size and type UAVs from a single aircraft.”
An AMC spokesperson confirmed in a statement Friday that the memo is real: “This is an authentic internal memo from General Minihan addressed to his subordinate command teams. His order builds on last year’s foundational efforts by Air Mobility Command to ready the Mobility Air Forces for future conflict, should deterrence fail.”
In March 2021, Adm. Philip Davidson, then commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that “Taiwan is clearly one of [China’s] ambitions.
“I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” said Davidson.
When asked earlier this month whether a Chinese invasion of Taiwan was imminent, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, said, “What we’re seeing recently, is some very provocative behavior on the part of China’s forces and their attempt to re-establish a new normal.”
“But whether or not that means that an invasion is imminent,” said Austin, “I seriously doubt that."
"So we will continue to watch and we will continue to work with our allies and partners to do everything that we can to ensure that we promote peace and stability ... in the region overall."
NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Mosheh Gains · January 27, 2023
4. A Chinese naval blockade could isolate Taiwan and shock the world
In regards to the question in this excerpt, I am sure that is its primary objective:
Can China win in Taiwan without war?
While China clearly has a range of options short of invasion to pressure Taiwan, it’s less clear that any of them will accomplish Beijing’s goal of forcing Taiwan to abandon its autonomy and submit to full political control from Beijing. Decades of political and economic pressure have only turned public opinion in Taiwan more staunchly against Beijing. More concerted pressure, or even a full blockade, could produce a rally-round-the-flag effect that only stiffens Taiwan’s resolve.
Still, the pressure is likely to continue. It is likely to be dialed up ahead of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential elections and to spike in response to future American actions, along the lines of Pelosi’s visit, that are deemed provocative. (New House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., is reportedly planning a visit of his own.)
The Chinese government is caught between an unacceptable status quo — Taiwan’s de facto independence — and a course of action, war, that would be unspeakably costly and might well be disastrous. For these reasons alone, there’s a good chance China will try every other conceivable option.
A Chinese naval blockade could isolate Taiwan and shock the world
A blockade could accomplish what Beijing wants — minus the horrific casualties.
Joshua Keating
Global Security Reporter
January 27, 2023
grid.news · by Joshua Keating
When most people imagine war in the Taiwan Strait, they tend to conjure up images inspired by Normandy, France, in 1944; Incheon, South Korea, in 1950; Baghdad in 2003; or even Kyiv in 2022: Troops streaming out of transport ships onto beaches, missiles slamming into air defense systems, and heavy casualties all around. In short, a bloody conflict with the potential to draw in the United States and its allies.
But what if a Taiwan D-Day never comes? What if instead of all-out invasion, Beijing instead opts for an escalating pressure campaign aimed at bringing Taiwan to its knees without actually starting a war?
“What I fear is that China will not do a frontal assault on Taiwan, but they will begin to do one thing after another that never quite gives the United States or Japan or the Quad Alliance any casus belli,” or justification for war, Orville Schell, director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society, told Grid last August.
In this scenario, Beijing’s campaign to snuff out Taiwan’s political autonomy would involve not hundreds of thousands of troops crossing the Taiwan Strait, but a more subtle approach: ships interdicted at sea and undersea cables snipped in mysterious circumstances. Many experts believe these tactics are more likely than all-out war.
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“A full military attack is uncertain,” Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, told Grid. “To fight a war, you need at least some level of confidence that you’ll win, and the Chinese don’t have that at this point.” Sun said China’s concerns about a war in Taiwan have likely increased since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — an operation many seasoned military analysts assumed would be a weeklong cakewalk but which shows no signs of ending after nearly a year of war.
Tactics meant to isolate and strangle Taiwan’s economy are generally described as a “blockade,” but that’s a term that can encompass many different actions. Ian Easton, a defense analyst who studies Chinese military planning documents and doctrine, suggested that China could pursue a “protracted blockade that varies in intensity. The point would be to try to coerce the Taiwanese government to come to the negotiating table on conditions set by Beijing.”
More concerning, Easton told Grid he believes this campaign is “already starting at a very low level, and it’s gradually becoming more intensive over time.”
All-out blockade
The world got a preview of what a blockade of Taiwan might look like last August, in the days following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Calif.) controversial visit to the island. As part of Beijing’s response, the Chinese military conducted live-fire exercises in six areas surrounding the island, effectively blocking international shipping lanes and forcing cargo ships to redirect traffic in the area.
For many, the operation was a wake-up call. In an emailed statement to Grid, Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister, Tsai Ming-yen, wrote, “Last year, the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in February and China’s live-fire military drills around Taiwan in August alerted democracies around the world to the dangers of totalitarian expansionism. There is general recognition that solidarity is necessary to counter this trend.”
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A naval blockade of Taiwan, enforced by mines, submarines or surface ships, could serve different purposes for China. In one scenario, a blockade could be used as a prelude to invasion. One major disadvantage for Taiwan’s allies in the event of war is that, unlike Ukraine, it does not have friendly neighboring countries that could be used for ongoing military resupply. A blockade would thus render resupply for the island all but impossible. But it is also possible that China would use the blockade as an alternative to invasion; in this scenario, it would attempt to strangle Taiwan’s economy and force it to negotiate away its sovereignty without sending a single soldier to the island.
One prominent Chinese military textbook describes a “strategic blockade” as a tactic to “destroy the enemy’s external economic and military connections, degrade its operational capacity and war-fighting potential, and leave it isolated and unaided.”
Taiwan is uniquely vulnerable to such a tactic. Three ports — all located on the island’s west coast, facing China — handle around 90 percent of the island’s shipping, including most of its food and oil imports. Those imports amounted to a little under $20 billion last year alone.
When it comes to food, Taiwanese consumers are increasingly reliant on imports — namely wheat and corn products — although Taiwan is likely self-sufficient enough in rice, fruit, vegetables and wheat to get by in a worst-case scenario. The Taiwanese government has also begun stockpiling food and other critical supplies in preparation for a possible blockade.
Energy is another story. In 2021, Taiwan relied on imported fossil fuels — mainly liquefied natural gas and coal — for 97.7 percent of its energy supply. The island has only about 39 days’ worth of coal and an 11-day stockpile of gas. Taiwan is pouring billions of dollars into solar and wind energy — this is a country that has more reason than most to abandon fossil fuels — but is currently not on track to meet its 2025 targets for renewable energy production. The economic consequences of even a short or partial blockade could be disastrous.
Global spillover: a chip crisis
The economic effects of a blockade wouldn’t be limited to Taiwan or China. And nowhere would the global pain be felt more profoundly than when it comes to the world’s “smart” technologies. Put simply, a huge number of products that use microchips would face an immediate problem.
Taiwan produces the microchips used in nearly all the world’s smartphones, about a third of its PCs and countless other devices from cars to dishwashers. Chris Miller, a Tufts University professor and author of the recent book “Chip War” about the global semiconductor industry, painted the picture for Grid: If the world lost access to Taiwanese chips, in “week one, you would begin to see disruptions, and by week four to week eight, you would see really substantial disruptions not only to consumer electronics and tech goods, but also to all types of manufactured products.”
The United States’ 2022 Chips and Science Act, which encourages U.S. domestic semiconductor production, was in large part motivated by the desire to address this vulnerability — as was Beijing’s own Made in China 2025 Initiative. Even after this investment, the tech industries in both countries are still likely to be heavily dependent on Taiwanese chips, expertise and manufacturing equipment.
Experts sometimes refer to Taiwan’s vital role in the semiconductor industry as the “silicon shield”: the idea being that the economic costs, including to China, of cutting Taiwan off from the world are simply too high. But Miller pointed out that there are many examples of countries being willing to incur major economic costs to accomplish core political goals — and “reunification” with Taiwan is certainly a core political goal for the Chinese Communist Party. “I do worry that some people in Taiwan are overconfident about this,” he said.
Rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, along with the ongoing disruptions to Black Sea trade caused by the Ukraine War, have also raised concerns that the era of relatively free and open global shipping that the world has enjoyed since World War II — and even more so since the end of the Cold War — is now coming to an end.
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“If we start getting back into nationalistic shipping and interdicting other nations’ ability to trade, you know, that almost brings us back to the 17th-18th century, and it’s really risky,” Sal Mercogliano, a former merchant mariner and shipping historian, told Grid.
Blockade-lite?
While less risky for China than an invasion, a blockade still isn’t exactly a safe option. For one thing, a blockade is still an act of war under international law. Taiwan could try to use its own navy to break the blockade. And U.S. Navy commanders have talked openly about the possibility of the United States and its allies helping Taiwan to do so. In other words, a blockade could escalate quickly into exactly the scenario China is trying to avoid: a shooting war with the Americans.
Meanwhile, given how intertwined the two countries are, and how many Chinese citizens are employed by Taiwanese firms such as tech manufacturer Foxconn or shipping company Evergreen, the impact of a blockade on the Chinese economy would reach well beyond semiconductors.
“Without Taiwanese suppliers, China’s economy will grind to a halt quite quickly,” said Easton. “There would be massive unemployment in China. It’d be very, very difficult for them to pull off a protracted blockade of Taiwan without destroying themselves.”
For that reason, China could attempt to carry out a less intense, less blatant blockade. It could do this by having its coast guard (rather than navy) interdict and inspect ships traveling into Taiwanese waters — which according to Beijing are Chinese waters — in the name of drug enforcement, anti-piracy or some other pretext. Or China could start demanding that ships traveling to Taiwan first go through Chinese customs. This would have the effect of slowing rather than shutting down Taiwan trade entirely, making global shipping companies think twice about using these trade routes. The tactic might disrupt arms shipments to Taiwan as well. Of course, the risk is that Taiwan and the United States could apply the same approach to ships bound for China.
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Information blockade
In the 21st century, we may need to expand our definition of “blockade.” Some experts who spoke with Grid suggested that China is more likely to cut off Taiwan’s information than its shipping. Taiwan’s internet access is dependent on 15 undersea cables, and there’s growing concern China could try to cut them. As an example of what this could look like — the nation of Mauritania was knocked off the internet for two days when an undersea cable was cut for unknown reasons in 2018.
While technologies such as Elon Musk’s Starlink have proved enormously effective at maintaining connectivity in Ukraine, it’s likely not sufficient to keep one of the most high-tech economies running.
Another advantage of an information blockade is that an act of sabotage that occurs deep under the ocean is much easier for a nation to deny — as opposed to, say, an interception of ship traffic in open waters. Four months after the destruction of an undersea oil pipeline in the Baltic Sea that Western leaders were quick to blame on Russia, investigators say they still can’t say for sure who was responsible.
Into the gray zone
China’s approach to Taiwan in the coming years is likely to involve escalating military activities short of all-out war. The 71 Chinese planes and seven ships that were sent into the Taiwan Strait in the last week of 2022 were a sign of this new normal.
These military displays could be combined with so-called gray zone tactics: provocative actions meant to undermine Taiwan’s political system and unnerve its population but which can’t be directly linked back to China. These could range in intensity from online information campaigns to targeted assassinations. Becca Wasser, a senior fellow and war gaming specialist at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), told Grid that the advantage of gray zone tactics is their “low cost” relative to options like an invasion or full blockade.
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“It’s very difficult to foresee a scenario where the Pentagon is going to suggest entering into a broader war with China” unless China has itself committed a clear act of war, Wasser said.
None of these options is mutually exclusive. Wasser said it’s likely that gray zone tactics could be used in conjunction with economic pressure or military force. And even “military,” in this case, includes a spectrum of options. CNAS has also gamed out scenarios where rather than attacking Taiwan itself, China seizes one or more of the islands between the two countries. Such an attack, if successful, would be a major political and strategic blow to Taiwan, but if carried out quickly and successfully, it would be far less likely to result in an all-out war or international intervention.
Can China win in Taiwan without war?
While China clearly has a range of options short of invasion to pressure Taiwan, it’s less clear that any of them will accomplish Beijing’s goal of forcing Taiwan to abandon its autonomy and submit to full political control from Beijing. Decades of political and economic pressure have only turned public opinion in Taiwan more staunchly against Beijing. More concerted pressure, or even a full blockade, could produce a rally-round-the-flag effect that only stiffens Taiwan’s resolve.
Still, the pressure is likely to continue. It is likely to be dialed up ahead of Taiwan’s 2024 presidential elections and to spike in response to future American actions, along the lines of Pelosi’s visit, that are deemed provocative. (New House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif., is reportedly planning a visit of his own.)
The Chinese government is caught between an unacceptable status quo — Taiwan’s de facto independence — and a course of action, war, that would be unspeakably costly and might well be disastrous. For these reasons alone, there’s a good chance China will try every other conceivable option.
Thanks to Lillian Barkley for copy editing this article.
grid.news · by Joshua Keating
5. Putin Has a Problem: His So-Called Allies Won't Help Fight in Ukraine
Sun Tzu admonishes us to attack alliances.
Putin Has a Problem: His So-Called Allies Won't Help Fight in Ukraine
19fortyfive.com · by Julian McBride · January 27, 2023
With Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has attempted to paint himself in a God complex. Comparing himself to Peter the Great, a well-known imperialist, he has tried to convince the non-western world that he will bring “multipolarity” back. Despite using faux pretenses to invade Ukraine, the Russian autocrat has directed much of his warring rhetoric toward Western governments the most.
To bring the multipolar world in order to upend long-standing American hegemony, the Russian President has attempted to form a coalition of countries that are willing to combat the West. These ambitions have been minuscule to say the least, as the people he thought were allies have not supported his war the way he thought it would go.
During the early stages of the war, Putin attempted to convince CTSO member states such as Kazakhstan and Belarus to formally send troops and join in on the invasion. As Russian media paints the war as Moscow’s coalition versus NATO, this was a call to action towards their allies to intervene.
Central Asia
President Tokayev of Kazakhstan, who was backed by Moscow to crush internal dissidence has become one of the Kremlin’s biggest critics thus far. Refusing to send troops to help Russia and humiliating him in front of the Saint Petersburg economic forum, Tokayev is starting to look to China and Turkey as its future economic and security partners, putting Almaty and Moscow in foreseeable odds. Likewise, other Central Asian nations under Russia’s sphere have not lifted a finger to help during the war.
Syria
Despite recognizing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the faux referendums, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has not militarily supported Russia. Quite the opposite has taken place, as Russia has become extremely weakened to where they’ve gradually withdrawn its top officers from Syria to Ukraine and air defense systems Assad needs against his rivals of Turkey and Israel.
Original reports of Syrian volunteers being sent to Ukraine last spring fell flat, as Damascus would need the manpower even more than ever as the Turkish military has threatened a renewed military operation if peace talks fall through. If Putin’s regime falls, Assad would be one of the first to feel the effects of it.
Armenia
Once dependent on Russia for its security due to being geographically sandwiched in between hostile nations and isolated from the west, Yerevan’s relations with Moscow hit an all-time low. Ever since the Velvet Revolution that replaced the pro-Russian ruling parties with a more western friendly one, the Kremlin has barely lifted a finger when Armenia needed it the most.
The past three years have seen a heavily Turkish-backed Azerbaijan in a near everlasting conflict with Armenia. Even when the country activated CTSO articles, Russia has not responded. This has caused the country to gradually look elsewhere with calls and protests to expel Russian forces from the nation for an EU-led multinational peacekeeping one.
India
India and Russia have had a close knit relation for hundreds of years, but New Delhi has not provided military support for Ukraine, but rather has taken advantage of discounted oil. Usually siding with Russia as they’ve been a historical counterbalance to China’s incursions on India’s borders, Putin’s military endeavor has weakened his state to where it is now a client of Russia.
With Beijing gaining influence in Moscow, this puts New Delhi in a precarious situation. India’s PM Modi stated “now is not an era for war” signaling their displeasure in conflict despite abstaining on multiple UN Resolutions.
China
Usurping Russia in economic progression and growing its military past Moscow’s might, Putin has relied on monetary assistance from the CCP to keep his economy afloat in the war. China has not supported Moscow militarily in the war thus far.
Signaling the disappointment of potential use of nuclear weapons by Russia, China has quietly backed away from support. Currently having a demographic crisis, economic decline and future standoff over Taiwan, China has refused to recognize any annexations and will focus on quelling their own internal problems.
Serbia
Serbia and Russia have had a close relationship, as the Russian Empire helped Serbia gain its independence from the Ottomans, but in the 21st century, these relations are at a crossroads. Though many Serbian citizens support Russia, especially the far right and more religiously orthodox, the Serbian government has recently been at odds with the Kremlin.
The Wagner Group has heavily recruited in Serbia, giving a negative perception of the country the government has been fed up with. PM Vucic recently demanded the Wagner mercenaries leave Serbia and the government has sent generators to Ukraine. They have refused to recognize Russia’s annexations as it affects the fate of Kosovo, which Belgrade is still interested in governing again one day.
Iran
One of the biggest rogue regimes today, Iran has been one of the biggest supporters of military technology to Russia today, sending the Shahed drones and potentially ballistic missiles. Though this seems like support, Iran has refused to recognize Russia’s annexations and stated they will not anytime in the future.
Dealing with various separatist movements, Iran is in no position to recognize illegal land grabs. Their military support is primarily to combat test their weaponry towards a conventional army as a potential war with Israel and the U.S looms.
North Korea
The hermit kingdom of North Korea has backed the faux proxy states of Donbas and has quietly sent shells to help Russia’s stagnant war effort. As the country remains isolated from the international community with one of the worst economies on earth, their support means little in the conflict.
Belarus
Alexander Lukashenko, the dictator of Belarus has been privy to Russian military operations throughout its invasion. Allowing the Kremlin to use his country as a launching pad, tens of thousands of RF poured into Ukraine through Belarusian borders. Despite the logistical support, Lukashenko has been wary of formally intervening.
Knowing the possibility of a civilian uprising or military mutiny if Belarus formally joins the war, as Lukashenko is highly unpopular among his own people, the autocrat has attempted to buy himself time with the Kremlin. Under pressure of intervening, he has instead placated his bases for the Russian military to launch missile attacks in Ukraine. If Putin’s regime falls, Lukashenko knows he would be the next domino in the house of cards to fall.
What Happens Next for Putin In Ukraine?
Putin’s grandeur of personal ego and the support he envisioned has gone the complete opposite of what he expected. Now afraid to stop the war, due to circling himself with hardliners that could move in on him, the multipolar world order the faux Tsar wanted has become nothing more than a coalition of the unwilling.
Author Expertise and Experience
Julian McBride is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist born in New York. He reports and documents the plight of people around the world who are affected by conflicts, rogue geopolitics, and war, and also tells the stories of war victims whose voices are never heard. Julian is the founder and director of the Reflections of War Initiative (ROW), an anthropological NGO which aims to tell the stories of the victims of war through art therapy. As a former Marine, he uses this technique not only to help heal PTSD but also to share people’s stories through art, which conveys “the message of the brutality of war better than most news organizations.”
19fortyfive.com · by Julian McBride · January 27, 2023
6. Women Lead: Ukrainian Women’s Fight for the Future of Ukraine
January 30 at 9am (EST).
Women Lead: Ukrainian Women’s Fight for the Future of Ukraine
https://interactive.state.gov/women-leaders-ukraine/
PROGRAM OVERVIEW
After almost one year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the global community has seen countless Ukrainian women stand up for themselves, their communities, and their country. Despite the disproportionate increase in protection threats against women and children, Ukrainian women have not been deterred. Ukrainian women leaders have risen and continue to rise to the occasion.
The United States remains deeply committed to amplifying Ukrainian women’s voices and protecting their rights. This virtual panel focuses on the leadership of Ukrainian women, the uniquely gendered impacts of the war, and the courageous work of Ukrainian women leaders from government, civil society, journalism, pop culture, and other sectors.
Join us live on Monday, January 30th at 9:00 AM EST (4:00 PM Kyiv).
FEATURED REMARKS
Oksana Markarova, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States
Oksana Markarova was appointed the Ukraine’s Ambassador to the USA and arrived in DC on Apr 20, 2021. She served in Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance in 2015-2020 as First deputy Minister and Government commissioner on investments and then since 2018 as a Minister of Finance. During her time at the Ministry she was a co-author of Ukraine’s macroeconomic revival program, has conducted unprecedented fiscal consolidation leading to deficit to GDP of 2% and debt to GDP reduction to below 50%, introduced midterm budgeting, gender oriented budgeting as well as negotiated, structured and coordinated successfully two IMF programs and other IFI cooperation programs. During her tenure she and her team has also created UkraineInvest government promotion agency, Ukrainian Startup fund and an eData ecosystem of government public finance portals including spending.gov.ua, openbudget.gov.ua and analytical instrument BOOST, which opened the majority of the public finance data to the public and increased Ukraine in all major international data transparency ratings. Prior to career in public service Mrs. Markarova spent 17 years working in private equity and financial advisory having leadership roles in ITT investment group, Western NIS Enterprise Fund, Chemonics and World Bank, as well as founded Archidata startup electronic archive company in between service positions in 2020.
Bridget A. Brink, U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine
Ambassador Brink was nominated by President Biden to be U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine on April 25, 2022, confirmed unanimously by the U.S. Senate on May 18, 2022, and arrived in Kyiv on May 29, 2022. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Ambassador Brink served as U.S. Ambassador to the Slovak Republic from August 15, 2019, until her confirmation as Ambassador to Ukraine. She previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, with responsibility for issues related to Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and the protracted conflicts in Europe. She also served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and in Tbilisi, Georgia. During her twenty-five years in the Foreign Service, Ambassador Brink has spent most of her career advancing U.S. policy in Europe and Eurasia. She was the Director for the Aegean and the South Caucasus at the National Security Council and also served in the State Department as the Deputy Director for Southern European Affairs, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Cyprus Desk Officer. She began her career in Belgrade, Serbia.
SPEAKERS
Moderator: Katrina Fotovat, Senior Official, Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues, U.S. Department Of State
Katrina “Kat” Fotovat is currently the Senior Official to the Secretary of State in the Office of Global Women’s Issues (S/GWI), where she leads a team of gender experts promoting gender equality efforts including support of women, peace, and security, countering violent extremism, promoting women’s economic empowerment, and combatting gender-based violence. Ms. Fotovat has over 20 years of experience advocating gender and human rights globally, specifically in conflict and post-conflict settings. Previously, Ms. Fotovat was Director for the Office of Communications, Policy, and Partnerships, in the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
Nataliya Gumenyuk, Journalist and Founder of the Public Interest Journalism Lab
Nataliya Gumenyuk is a well-known Ukrainian journalist, and author specializing in conflict reporting. She is the founder and CEO of the Public Interest Journalism Lab which promotes constructive discussion around complex social. Since the Russian invasion, PIJL pivoted to frontline media reporting, and launched “The Reckoning Project: Ukraine Testifies” which documents war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Russia. Nataliya regularly writes for The Guardian, The Washington Post, The Rolling Stone, Die Zeit, and The Atlantic, and provides commentaries for CNN, MSNBC, Sky News, etc. Gumenyuk was the co-founder and for 5 years head of independent Hromadske TV and Hromadske International, and is currently is a Board member.
Yevheniia Kravchuk, Member of Parliament and Deputy Head of the Servant of the People Party
Yevheniia Kravchuk is a Ukrainian politician, journalist and communication expert. Deputy Chair of the Servant of the People faction. Deputy Head of the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy. Head of the Subcommittee on Information Policy. Expert in communications and media consulting. In 2019-2021 Kravchuk was the Chairperson of the press office of the political party “Servant of the People” Co-author of more than 100 current laws of Ukraine. Worked in management positions in analytical centers, in journalism, and in documentaries.
Ruslana Lyzhychko, Award-Winning Recording Artist and 2014 International Women of Courage Award recipient
Ruslana Lyzhychko is a civil society activist, human rights advocate and a leader of Ukraine‘s Maidan movement for democratic reform. Her steadfast commitment to non-violent resistance and national unity helped channel a series of popular demonstrations into a national movement against government corruption and human rights abuses. Ms. Lyzhychko started her career as a pop music star, earning international fame for winning the 2004 Eurovision song contest. In November 2013, Ms. Lyzhychko became one of the most powerful voices and leaders of Ukraine’s EuroMaidan movement using her celebrity status and social media connections to encourage citizens to demonstrate peacefully for a change of political course. Her performance of the Ukrainian national anthem every night, even in the face of impending police attacks and death threats, fortified the movement and became a symbol of its commitment to a diverse and unified Ukraine.
7. Ukraine says Russia's putting inflatable tanks on the battlefield — but the decoys deflated
Deflating decoys. Some things just make you chuckle. Is this Karma? Is Russia so inept that they cannot even keep their balloons inflated?
But on a serious note "all warfare is based on deception" (Sun Tzu) and despite this report it is something we must both plan to do and plan to defeat our enemies' deception.
Ukraine says Russia's putting inflatable tanks on the battlefield — but the decoys deflated
Business Insider · by Erin Snodgrass
A Russian T-90M Proryv main battle tank destroyed by Ukrainian forces near the village of Staryi Saltiv in Ukraine's Kharkiv region, May 9, 2022.
REUTERS/Vitalii Hnidyi
-
Ukraine accused Russia of staging inflatable tanks near Zaporizhzhia in a Thursday Facebook post.
- But the Russian decoys unintentionally deflated, according to Ukrainian officials.
- Russia has employed deceptive warfare for decades, but its recent efforts apparently fizzled.
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Ukrainian military forces accused the Russian army of deploying inflatable tanks in the south of Ukraine in an effort to deceive the opposing side, saying the country's "rubber" decoys had deflated in an anticlimactic display.
The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a Thursday Facebook post said Russia's army had run out of steam in the Zaporizhzhia region, where Russian troops have been incessantly firing on Ukrainian defenses in recent days, according to the Zaporizhzhia Regional Military Administration.
"At the time when our partners are coordinating the supply of tanks to Ukraine, the invading army is also increasing the presence of 'tank units' in the Zaporizhzhia area," the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine wrote.
But Russia's multiplying tanks are, according to Ukrainian officials, not what they seem.
"Apparently, the free air of the Cossack region is not suitable for the 'rubber' products of the occupiers, so they deflate without fulfilling their main mission. Just like the inflated bravado of the Russian army," the agency said.
Inflatable tanks are a staple of Russia's deception doctrine known as maskirovka, or masking. The country's approach to psychological warfare relies on an arsenal of inflatable tanks and launchers, decoy vehicles and soldiers, and other operations of deceit to boost stealth tactics and sow confusion.
Russia has utilized elements of maskirovka in conflicts going back decades, but their most recent efforts in Ukraine apparently fizzled, Ukraine claims.
It was not clear for what purpose Russia allegedly staged the inflatable tanks near Zaporizhzhia.
Earlier in the war, Ukraine also produced false weaponry, using fake rocket launchers made of wood to entice Russia to waste missiles on useless targets. The wooden decoys were meant to look like US rocket launchers when spotted by Russian drones, prompting Russian cruise missile carriers in the Black Sea to fire on the false targets, according to August reports.
Deception as warfare has a long history. The US also utilized inflatable tanks in World War II as part of its Ghost Army operation in an effort to trick the Third Reich into overestimating the Allied forces' military strength. The unit created illusions and sought to spread disinformation by using inflatable mock-ups of military vehicles, tanks, and artillery, as well as audio recordings of sounds that mimicked the movement of large armies.
Business Insider · by Erin Snodgrass
8. World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
I am reminded of this quote:
“I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."
― Albert Einstein
World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 26, 2023
A war between China and the United States is horrible to contemplate, but we might hope that such a war would bring a degree of closure to US-China competition, and peace to the region. “The object in war is a better state of peace,“ or so said British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart.
But what if a better peace does not result?
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Competition between the United States and China might look less like a single sharp, decisive conflict between Washington and Beijing, and more like a series of militarized conflicts in a broader context of trade and cooperation. This would represent more of an 18th-century appreciation of international conflict, seeing no wars as particularly decisive in themselves, but rather each as a step to improving a state’s position for the next conflict. As Paul von Hindenburg said of annexing the Baltic States into the German Empire during World War I, “I need them for the manoeuvring of my left wing in the next war.”
The idea that long-term great power competition must end in a single decisive conflict is recent, and wrong. World War I seemed to end decisively in that it eliminated two of the Central Powers, led to regime change in another, and produced a new international settlement, but of course, Germany’s ambitions were not quenched. World War II decisively ended the expansionist aspirations of Germany, Japan, and Italy, replacing the existing authoritarian governments with democratic systems (in Japan, Italy, and ¾ of Germany, at least), and made a replay of the war exceedingly difficult.
However, both World War I and World War II were followed by long periods of disorder, civil war, and proxy conflict even after the guns of the primary combatants fell silent.
During the Cold War, not much thought was given to the prospect of multiple, iterated wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, largely because of the belief that nuclear weapons would come into play and possibly destroy both combatants, if not the entire world. At the same time, the sharply clashing ideological nature of the combatants led many to imagine that a US-Soviet fight would be resolved quickly and decisively, with the victorious ideology reigning supreme.
But the situation with China and the United States is different. Although Washington and Beijing have sharp ideological differences, neither puts much weight in the idea that it can topple the other. Each can inflict severe damage on the fielded military forces of the enemy, but is unlikely to cause much destruction to the industrial and economic foundations of the other’s military power. Weapons that a destroyed or expended can be rebuilt, quickly in the case of cruise missiles and slowly in the case of aircraft carriers.
The disputes that might spur conflict have similarly indecisive potential. A US defeat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan obviously won’t settle the question of Taiwan in the Chinese mind, and quite possibly won’t even unsettle the hold of the Chinese Communist Party over mainland China.
It is entirely conceivable that the United States and China could fight a short, sharp war over Taiwan, resume relatively normal political and commercial relations, then fight another short, sharp war over Taiwan.
Even if China won such a conflict, the fundamental issues that divide Washington and Beijing would not disappear.
While the regional reaction to a successful Chinese conquest of Taiwan context dependent and difficult to predict, countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea might well try to bind themselves more tightly to the US military, immediately creating the conditions for future conflict.
BLACK SEA (Nov 4, 2021) The Blue Ridge-class command and control ship USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), the Arliegh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG-78), and the Bulgarian navy frigate Gordi (BGS 43) perform ship maneuvering exercises in the Black Sea, Nov 4, 2021. Mount Whitney, forward deployed to Gaeta, Italy operates with a combined crew of Sailors and Military Sealift Command civil service mariners in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andrew Eder) 211104-N-NO067-2261
MEDITERRANEAN SEA (Aug. 24, 2022) An F/A-18E Super Hornet attached to the “Fighting Checkmates” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 211 prepares to launch from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), Aug. 24, 2022. The Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group is on a scheduled deployment in the U.S. Naval Forces Europe area of operations, employed by U.S. 6th Fleet to defend U.S., allied and partner interests. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jack Hoppe).
221013-N-LK647-1031 ATLANTIC OCEAN—A view of the first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) from aboard the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60) as Normandy participates in a Tactical Force Exercise as part of the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group, Oct. 13, 2022. Ford is on its inaugural deployment conducting training and operations alongside NATO Allies and partners to enhance integration for future operations and demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s commitment to a peaceful, stable and conflict-free Atlantic region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Malachi Lakey)
SOUTH CHINA SEA (March 20, 2020) The Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Gabrielle Giffords (LCS 10) patrols the South China Sea, March 20, 2020. Gabrielle Giffords, part of Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 7, is on a rotational deployment, operating in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations to enhance interoperability with partners and serve as a ready-response force.(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Brenton Poyser/Released)
Any imaginable military conflict in the Western Pacific would be catastrophically destructive, not simply to the theaters of conflict but also to the financial and trade networks that have developed between Asia and North America. But we should take care with the notion that China and the United States will fight just one war.
Hopefully, they will fight none. If they fight one, they are likely to fight more.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020).
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 26, 2023
9. Burning of Qur’an in Stockholm funded by journalist with Kremlin ties
Active measures?
Burning of Qur’an in Stockholm funded by journalist with Kremlin ties
Permit for demonstration at which anti-Islam provocateur burned Muslim holy book was paid for by far-right journalist linked to Moscow-backed media
The Guardian · by Jennifer Rankin · January 27, 2023
The Qur’an-burning incident in Stockholm that threatens Sweden’s bid to join Nato was funded by a far-right journalist with links to Kremlin-backed media, it has emerged.
The holy book was set alight last Saturday near Turkey’s embassy in Stockholm by a far-right politician and anti-Islam provocateur, Rasmus Paludan, a dual Danish-Swedish national, with a reputation for carrying out similar acts.
Swedish media have reported that Paludan’s demonstration permit of 320 Swedish krona (£25, $31) was paid for by a former contributor to the Kremlin-backed channel RT, Chang Frick, who now does regular media spots for the far-right Sweden Democrats. Frick has confirmed he paid for the permit to hold the protest, but denied he had asked anyone to burn the Muslim holy book.
Sweden cannot expect Turkey’s support for Nato membership, Erdoğan warns
Read more
The exploit has sparked criticism across the Islamic world and deepened a stand off with Turkey over Sweden’s bid to join Nato, which requires the approval of all 30 member countries. “Those who allow such blasphemy in front of our embassy can no longer expect our support for their Nato membership,” Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said in response to the book burning.
Despite calls by Sweden to restart trilateral talks with Turkey and fellow applicant, Finland, on their Nato bids, Turkey’s foreign ministry said on Thursday it would be “meaningless” to hold further discussions. On Friday, Turkey also summoned the Danish ambassador, and accused Denmark of endorsing a “hate crime”.
Paludan told local media that he carried out the action because “some Swedes would like me to burn a Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy”. In an interview with The Insider website, Frick confirmed he paid for the permit to hold the protest, but claimed “it wasn’t my idea” to burn the Muslim holy book.
He also told the website that he had not worked for Russia Today, later rebranded as RT, since 2014, and had not supported Russia since the annexation of Crimea.
Frick, a former Sweden Democrats official, is the founder of a far-right website which focuses on immigration in Sweden. Speaking to the New York Times in 2019 he joked about his ties to the Russian president Vladimir Putin. As he pulled out a wad of rouble notes from a recent trip to Russia, he told the reporter: “Here is my real boss! It’s Putin!”
Frick also has a regular show on a media channel affiliated to the far-right Sweden Democrats, which has an agreement to support Sweden’s three-party coalition, although it is not part of the government.
Sweden’s foreign minister, Tobias Billström, has said Islamophobic provocations were appalling. “Sweden has a far-reaching freedom of expression, but it does not imply that the Swedish government, or myself, support the opinions expressed.”
Finland and Sweden last year began trilateral talks with Turkey aimed at overcoming Ankara’s doubts about their Nato membership. Sweden’s government has said it has been doing exactly what was promised to strengthen its counter-terrorism legislation, but Turkey is demanding more, including the extradition of 130 people it deems terrorists.
The Guardian · by Jennifer Rankin · January 27, 2023
10. Some Western Backers of Ukraine Worry That Time Might Be on Russia’s Side
Some Western Backers of Ukraine Worry That Time Might Be on Russia’s Side
Kyiv seen needing powerful new weapons urgently as Moscow sets in for the long haul
By Laurence NormanFollow
in Berlin and Stephen FidlerFollow
in London
Jan. 29, 2023 5:30 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-western-backers-of-ukraine-worry-that-time-might-be-on-russias-side-11674969063?mod=hp_lead_pos7
Behind the decision to sharply step up Western military aid to Ukraine lies a worry in some Western capitals that time might be on Russia’s side.
That concern suggests the window for Ukraine isn’t indefinite and it needs powerful Western weapons—main battle tanks, other armored vehicles and more air-defense systems—soon to reinforce the momentum it achieved in offensive successes around Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson last year.
That is a contrast with the sentiment widespread last spring when Russian troops were on the retreat from Kyiv. With Russian President Vladimir Putin‘s initial war plan in disarray, Western governments at the time were hopeful that the longer the fighting went on, the more likely Ukraine would prevail.
Western officials said that if Europe and Washington kept their nerve and emerged united after a difficult winter, Russia’s economic problems and military failures, deepened by sanctions, could force Moscow to seek an off-ramp in the conflict or sue for peace.
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As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine approaches its first anniversary, that confidence has faded. Instead, officials in some capitals now fear the Kremlin, which is willing to keep throwing men and materiel into the war, could gain the upper hand in any lengthy war of attrition.
Better, then, to give Ukraine more advanced weapons that could help it change the war’s dynamic and overwhelm Russia’s ability to fight.
Russia’s military has taken heavy losses of some of its best men and equipment and there are signs that it is running short of important military capabilities, including some precision missiles.
Destroyed Russian artillery stood in a field earlier this month in the Kharkiv region, where Ukraine regained territory last fall.
PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Ukrainian soldiers in the western city of Lviv attend a funeral for comrades killed fighting Russian troops.
PHOTO: YURIY DYACHYSHYN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Some of the toughest Western sanctions—such as the oil embargo and price cap on Russian crude-oil exports—are also only now starting to take effect. Russia’s economy is predicted to suffer a significant recession this year, and its potential is likely to remain diminished for years to come.
However, there is little sign of the sanctions grinding Russia’s military to a halt or putting so much economic pressure on the Kremlin, always adept at crushing dissent and protest, that it saps domestic support for the war.
Instead, Russia is looking to launch a new offensive in coming months, with better-trained conscripts filling out the ranks, ready for the kind of grinding battles that appear to have yielded gains for Moscow recently in the fighting around the eastern city of Bakhmut.
The shift in Western thinking over the need to accelerate supplies to Ukraine has played out publicly in recent days in the decisions by the U.S., the U.K. and Germany to send Western-designed main battle tanks to Ukraine.
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With other armored vehicles and air-defense systems, the weapons are designed to help Ukraine not only repel any Russian offensive but to provide the wherewithal for Kyiv to make further inroads into Russian-held territory, putting it in a better position from which to negotiate.
British officials have been the clearest in publicly arguing that the threat posed by Russia could increase as time goes by and that there is urgency to supply Ukraine with the kind of equipment that can help it advance.
“We have a window to accelerate efforts to secure a lasting peace for Ukrainians,” U.K. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said on Twitter on Wednesday in welcoming the German and U.S. announcement they would supply Ukraine with heavy tanks. “Let’s keep it up.”
There is another factor in moving soon. For now, officials say public opinion in Europe and the U.S. remains steadfast in supporting military and financial aid. But Mr. Putin may hope such support wouldn’t be sustained over years of war and changes of administration in the U.S. and elsewhere.
The turnaround in thinking about the need to accelerate deliveries of heavy weapons and high-caliber arms to Ukraine has been a sharp one. A few months ago, as Ukraine launched a successful counteroffensive that won back swaths of Russian-occupied territory, there was confidence among Western officials that Kyiv was getting what it needed to make further progress and ward off Russian advances. Multiple Russian military missteps played into that.
Ukrainian soldiers last month sheltered from Russian artillery in a basement full of mortar shell casings in Bakhmut.
PHOTO: MANU BRABO FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Residents still living in Bakhmut have endured months of fighting over the city.
PHOTO: EMANUELE SATOLLI FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Even then, some governments were urging Western allies to scale up support for Ukraine to prevent the conflict from dragging on for years.
“Our calculations were based on the fact that Russia still is an enormous country and with much bigger resources when it comes to soldiers and ability to produce weaponry which does not require Western components,” said Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, one of the earliest proponents of stepping up Western deliveries. “The longer we give them, the more people…they can throw at the Ukrainians.”
Some Western allies remain cautious about an acceleration of Western support.
Even as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said Wednesday that Germany would send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, he pointed to the biggest concern among Kyiv’s allies about sending more advanced deliveries.
“We must always make very clear that we will do what is necessary and possible to support Ukraine, but at the same time prevent an escalation of the war to a war between Russia and NATO,” the chancellor told lawmakers.
Sending Ukraine Tanks Exposed a Rift in NATO. Here’s Why.
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The intense political negotiations over sending U.S.-made Abrams and German-made Leopards to Ukraine briefly threatened the unity of the NATO alliance. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday looks at what went down and the challenges ahead for the U.S. and its allies. Illustration: David Fang
There are also concerns among some officials about whether the central goal articulated by proponents of stepped-up military support—achieving a quicker end to the conflict—is realistic.
While Ukraine’s military has far exceeded expectations of how quickly it can learn to operate and integrate complex Western military equipment, there is no certainty that Ukraine can again launch the kind of successful offensives it achieved last fall.
Nor is there much trust in any Western capital that Mr. Putin would ever entertain the prospect of an end to the conflict without the subjugation of Ukraine.
Anna Wieslander, director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council, a Washington think tank, said she is skeptical that Western allies have settled on a clear strategy of scaling up weapons deliveries to help Ukraine achieve a clear set of war aims. “This is a very transformative period in the conflict. But to me, the reactions from Western capitals have been merely tactical so far,” she said. “We lack a common vision about how the war should end and how these deliveries fit into that vision.”
Michael R. Gordon in Washington contributed to this article.
Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com and Stephen Fidler at stephen.fidler@wsj.com
11. What If The US Army Never Built The M1 Abrams Tank Or M2 Bradley?
The 1980s was a heady time with the "Big 5." From 1983 through 1985 in Germany I was fortunate to go through Bradley transition as an infantry company XO and then later as a brigade plans officer to serve as the OIC for tank gunnery (both Tank Table VIII and Tank Table XII) for the entire 3d Infantry dDvision so I was able to observe the capabilities and effects of the Abrams as well. And there have been tremendous improvements since then.
Excerpts:
The “Big Five” remain the core of U.S. ground forces today. Indeed, they have all served in capacities that go well beyond the intentions of their designers. None, at this point, have definite schedules for retirement. Taken together, they represent a remarkable, if complicated, story of success. Failure of any of the Big Five would have affected U.S. land operations in both Gulf Wars in unpredictable ways, and potentially to the effect of significantly higher casualties. The drawing out of the procurement process into the post-Cold War period, where cash for major ground combat systems had grown more scarce, would also potentially have had ripple effects across the entire force.
What If The US Army Never Built The M1 Abrams Tank Or M2 Bradley?
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 29, 2023
In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. Army embarked on a series of procurement programs designed to revitalize the force, and to counter the overwhelming numerical advantage of the Warsaw Pact. The “Big Five” represented a collection of procurement programs designed to re-establish the technological supremacy of U.S. land forces, and reinvigorate conventional capabilities in the wake of the Vietnam War. These systems, including the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Patriot air-defense system, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, and UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, continue to provide the foundation of U.S. military landpower.
Yet all of these systems came under criticism at the time, and each program needed to surmount obstacles on its way to serviceability. What if some or all of these programs had failed?
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Systems:
Most of the concepts behind the Big Five systems were born in the 1960s, under the understanding that the Army would need to replace the second generation of post–World War II equipment. However, the Vietnam War distracted the attention of the Army and diverted funding from procurement into operations, slowing the pace of modernization. In many cases this was fortunate, as some of the early ancestors of the Big Five were rejected and restructured due to the lack of mature technologies.
Still, as the Vietnam War wore to a close in the early 1970s, the need for a new generation of equipment became more pressing. The Army wanted a new main battle tank (MBT) to replace the M-60; a new armored personnel carrier (APC) to complement and replace the M113; a new air defense missile system; a new attack helicopter to replace the Cobra; and a new utility helicopter to replace the UH-1 Huey. In all area technology had moved substantially forward from the late-1950s status quo, but especially with regard to the last three. With respect to the new MBT and APC, doctrinal turmoil in the Army had begun to point to the need for greater mobility, both on the offense and the defense.
The Big Five are now normally associated with the Second Offset, a body of thinking that emerged from the Office of Net Assessment (as well as other places) and that posited that the United States needed to leverage its technological advantages over the Soviet Union in order to have a plausible chance of defeating the Red Army in battle. Technological superiority, in this framework, could “offset” the Warsaw Pact’s superior numbers. Second Offset thinking really came of age in the period after the Yom Kippur War, which demonstrated the lethality of precision-guided munitions on the modern battlefield.
But the Second Offset was pursued with less coherence at the time than appears the case in hindsight. Many of the Army’s technological systems had begun to lag, in part because of the lack of capital investment during the Vietnam War. Consequently, the origins of each of these programs lay before the Yom Kippur War. It is only in retrospect that the Big Five look like a coherent effort at full-force modernization. Moreover, technology shifted considerably across the period of program development. In the case of some systems, such as the Apache, core technologies did not reach maturity until the 1970s.
Alternatives:
All of the Big Five faced rocky roads to serviceability. Three of the five programs (M1A1, Apache, and Bradley) were built upon massive program failures, and the fate of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle was in doubt until the mid-1980s. An alternative to the M1A1 was the MBT-70 project, a more linear development of the M-60 tank, and even after the construction of a prototype the Abrams was forced into competition with the German Leopard II. The AH-64 Apache emerged after the failure of the AH-56 Cheyenne, a failure caused both by technological over-reaching and inter-service conflict. The Bradley went through a bewildering array of evolutions, and still had to compete with the reliable, already-in-service M113 armored personnel carrier. The Patriot missile system ran afoul of inter-service prioritization, with some arguing that its long-range air defense mission properly belonged in the Air Force. Even the Black Hawk, which had the smoothest path to service, suffered from concerns about cost overruns.
While it is difficult to imagine the Army not acquiring the Black Hawk in large numbers, each of the other four programs could easily have resulted in a much different system. Had the MBT-70 program succeeded, the Army would have had a tank earlier, but substantially less capable, than the M1A1, which would have made later upgrades correspondingly more difficult. If the Bradley hadn’t survived doubts over its cost and mission in the 1980s, the Army would have had to press previous vehicles into longer service, as well as develop a new program in the cash-starved 1990s. The Cheyenne helicopter suffered from so many problems that, if purchased in numbers, it might well have turned the Army and the Department of Defense away from heavy investment in the close attack mission. Air Force or even Navy (some variant of Aegis) systems might have taken away the mission set of the Patriot missile.
Impact:
The Big Five became part of the Army’s long-range planning even before the advent of the doctrinal tumult of the late 1970s. While the Big Five platforms are often associated with the kind of maneuver warfare exemplified by AirLand Battle, in fact they were also compatible with Active Defense, the more positional doctrine adopted by the Army in 1976. These systems undoubtedly did enhance the mobility and lethality of the Army, but the manner in which the Army would utilize that combination remained up in the air until the systems became more mature. As it happened, the systems (especially the combination of the Bradley and the Abrams) provided a perfect fit for how the Army wanted to fight on the central front in the 1980s.
U.S. Army soldier from the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division pulls security next to a M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle during Decisive Action rotation 13-03, Jan. 19, 2013, at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. Decisive Action rotations are geared toward an adaptive enemy in a complex environment. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Eric M. Garland II/ Released)
M2 Bradley
Soldiers fire a 25mm tracer round from an M2A3 fighting vehicle during an integrated night live-fire exercise at Camp Adazi, Latvia, Nov. 25, 2021.
But of course, none of the “Big Five” saw combat against the Red Army or its Warsaw Pact allies. The collapse of the Soviet Union made the central front irrelevant. But they were certainly consequential in the Gulf War. The combination of mobility and power offered by the Bradley and the M1A1 may not have “won” the war, especially after airpower had badly attrited Iraqi forces. A previous generation of U.S. equipment, updated with modern sensor and communications equipment, would still have inflicted decisive defeat on the Iraqis. However, the Iraqis likely would have inflicted much higher casualties against advancing U.S. forces. It’s an open question how the United States would have thought about the legacy of the Gulf War if its casualty rates had been substantially higher during the conflict.
Parting Shots:
The “Big Five” remain the core of U.S. ground forces today. Indeed, they have all served in capacities that go well beyond the intentions of their designers. None, at this point, have definite schedules for retirement. Taken together, they represent a remarkable, if complicated, story of success. Failure of any of the Big Five would have affected U.S. land operations in both Gulf Wars in unpredictable ways, and potentially to the effect of significantly higher casualties. The drawing out of the procurement process into the post-Cold War period, where cash for major ground combat systems had grown more scarce, would also potentially have had ripple effects across the entire force.
Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky.
19fortyfive.com · by Robert Farley · January 29, 2023
12. Russian TV discusses if economy now "equal" to Iran, North Korea or Cuba
Certainly not the gold standard for economies, though all survive (on the shoulders and backs of their suffering citizens)
Russian TV discusses if economy now "equal" to Iran, North Korea or Cuba
Newsweek · by Fatma Khaled · January 28, 2023
Guest speakers on Russian state TV recently discussed how Iran, North Korea, and Cuba survived international sanctions, debating whether or not the Russian economy is now "equal" to that of any of those countries.
"There are three paths for countering Western sanctions: the Cuban path, the North Korean path, and the Iranian one," a Russian TV host said during a segment that was posted with English subtitles to Twitter on Friday by Francis Scarr, a journalist with the BBC Monitoring.
The clip then cuts to a visual report showing how Cuba, Iran, and North Korea prevented their economies from collapsing by finding solutions to counter sanctions.
After the recent Russian TV segment report ended, the host and guest speakers debated about which economic situation is similar to Russia's current sanctions, which have been imposed due to its war in Ukraine. Imports of Russian oil and products were banned after the war was launched last February.
An important discussion took place on state TV today:
Which country's economy is the best model for Russia to follow? Cuba, North Korea or Iran? pic.twitter.com/tShi724tGM
— Francis Scarr (@francis_scarr) January 27, 2023
"Which of those models suits us best?" the host asked, to which one of the guest speakers responded, "The Iranian one of course. It's difficult to say 'Iranian scenario' because until a while ago, as the Soviet Union, we sponsored all those countries, but now we're deciding which one we're equal to. So in terms of both the nature of its economic policy and its domestic resources, Iran is the closest to us."
Another guest speaker added that Iran is similar to Russia for being a "multi-ethnic" state, and that both countries have "very difficult neighbors."
The Russian state TV report mentioned the U.S. sanctions on Iran, which were imposed in 1979 after the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran following the Islamic Revolution. The report added that those sanctions were "similar to the current anti-Russia ones."
The U.S. sanctions on Iran included freezing Iranian government assets in the United States and U.S. banks overseas, and a full trade embargo was placed later on until an accord was signed with Iran in 1981.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen on January 18 in Saint Petersburg, Russia. Guest speakers on Russian state TV discussed how Iran, North Korea, and Cuba survived international sanctions, debating whether or not the Russian economy is now "equal" to that of any of those countries. Photo by Contributor/Getty Images
The embargo was later lifted and most assets were unblocked, but the U.S. imposed a new embargo in 1987 on Iranian goods and services for supporting "international terrorism," according to the U.S. Treasury.
Sanctions also expanded to include banning Iran's involvement with petroleum development. The U.S. continued to expand its sanctions on Iran to tighten restrictions on companies providing the country with equipment and expertise to run its oil and chemical sectors, and targeted groups in Iran such as the Basij Resistance Force, a paramilitary unit working under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
In efforts to survive the sanctions, Iran relied on manufacturing its own products. Iranian manufacturers were also able to use informal payment systems to get money in and out of the country without resorting to banks, according to NPR.
The Russian state TV report also mentioned the U.S. trade embargo imposed on Cuba in 1962, which still maintains in place due to former Cuban President Fidel Castro's decision to take control of privately owned properties and other productive assets. The sanctions were also announced as a response to his support for "violent communist" revolution through the Western Hemisphere, according to The Heritage Foundation, a U.S.-based think tank.
In the 1990s, the "Cubans were saved by Soviet aid" according to the Russian state TV report. However, Cuba had to resort to other economic solutions after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and therefore relied on rum and cigar exports, which Russian state TV described as "illegal."
Meanwhile, North Korea faced international sanctions in 2006 for developing nuclear weapons, but it was able to "bypass" them with China's help, according to the Russian state TV report. North Korea relied on cybertheft, transfer of crypto, and "dissemination" of ransomware for income, according to a report by the RAND Corporation, another U.S.-based think tank.
Following the Russian state TV report, one guest speaker said that "there's not a single country in the world with more experience existing under blockade and economic sanctions than us [Russia]."
Newsweek reached out to Russia's foreign affairs ministry for comment.
Newsweek · by Fatma Khaled · January 28, 2023
13. Germany was a soft target for Russian spies. That's changing fast.
Excerpts;
Western officials and former U.S. intelligence officers called the expulsions and the current investigation of the BND employee a positive sign that shows Berlin’s attitude has shifted.
“This government is serious about dealing with it,” a Western official familiar with the issue said.
Germany’s intelligence services failed to anticipate that Russia would invade Ukraine, a failure that has yet to be the subject of any publicly released “lessons learned” review. Such a review would show Germany is serious about altering its approach, the Western official said.
“There’s definitely a change. The question is, how far do they take it?”
Germany was a soft target for Russian spies. That's changing fast.
The case of an alleged Russian mole inside Germany’s intelligence service has raised alarms in Berlin, where Russia has long spied aggressively and may have assassinated a foe.
NBC News · by Marie Brockling and Dan De Luce · January 29, 2023
A widening investigation into alleged Russian spying inside Germany’s state intelligence service, the BND, has set off alarm bells in Western capitals and prompted calls for a major overhaul of the agency to shore up its defenses against Russian espionage.
Coming at a crucial moment in the war in Ukraine when the United States and its allies are sharing intelligence with Kyiv, the case has raised questions about how much potential damage may have been inflicted by a senior employee of the German spy service who allegedly passed secrets to Russia.
A vital partner in the Western effort to counter the Kremlin in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, Germany has long proven a soft target for Russian spies, who allegedly orchestrated the 2019 murder of one of Moscow's opponents in the heart of Berlin.
The revelations about a possible Russian mole inside the BND are just the latest in a string of worrisome reports of suspected Russian espionage in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Intelligence experts say there are likely more Russian agents yet to be uncovered, and German lawmakers say there is a growing consensus that Berlin needs to revamp its security services and take a harder line against Russian spying.
People walk past the center for advanced education at the Federal Intelligence Service in Berlin on Nov. 12, 2019.Michael Sohn / AP file
“The government is annoyed and frightened that Russia had a spy at such a high position,” said one member of the German parliament, who spoke on the ondition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the case.
The employee under investigation, identified only as “Carsten L.,” worked in the BND’s technical division, or Abteilung Technische Aufklärung, a crucial arm of the agency that oversees sensitive eavesdropping and other information gathered through technical means — not by human informants.
German authorities announced a second arrest in the case Thursday, saying a German citizen, who is not a BND employee, had been taken into custody on suspicion of helping the BND officer pass information to the Russians.
The second suspect, identified only as Arthur E. by German authorities, was arrested Sunday at Munich airport as he arrived on a flight from the U.S.
“Arthur E. took the information to Russia and handed it over to the intelligence service there,” prosecutors said in a statement.
German authorities said the FBI provided assistance in the investigation.
Revelations of a possible turncoat inside the country’s spy service have coincided with a major political shift in Germany since Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, with the German government dropping its long-standing conciliatory policy toward Moscow. The case is being cited by commentators and some parliament members as yet more proof that Berlin must take a tougher stance when it comes to countering Russia’s aggressive espionage and political warfare.
“If the allegations are substantiated, a clear signal is needed in the direction of Russia. Unfortunately, there has been a lack of such signals in the past,” said Greens lawmaker Konstantin von Notz, the chairman of the parliamentary committee that oversees the intelligence services. ”Other countries have reacted much more clearly to similar incidents.”
Bruno Kahl, president of the Federal Intelligence Service.Fabian Sommer / Fabian Sommer/picture-alliance/dpa/AP file
The BND employee under investigation, who had the military rank of a colonel, worked in the technical division, but his precise position and responsibilities remain unclear. Given his senior status, it’s likely he “had access not only to information collected by the BND, but also information from partner services,” said Wolfgang Krieger, a professor at the University of Marburg who has specialized in the intelligence services and has testified in previous espionage cases as an expert witness.
The case is potentially “harmful for relations between the BND and partner services” from allied countries, he said. “Less information could be given to the BND as a result and partner services could now be more cautious, because a spy is a risk for the services’ own people and for their methods.”
A spokesperson for the BND declined to comment on the case, saying it is an ongoing investigation. U.S. intelligence officials also declined to comment. German media first reported details of the case.
The courtroom during the "Tiergarten" murder trial of suspected Russian assassin Vadim K. at the Berlin Tribunal in 2021.Mika Savolainen / Pool/Getty Images file
In his statement on the case in December, the president of the BND, Bruno Kahl, said the success of the investigation would depend on ensuring as little information as possible became public.
“Restraint and discretion are very important in this particular case. With Russia, we are dealing with an actor on the other side whose unscrupulousness and willingness to use violence we have to reckon with,” he said. “Every detail of this operation that becomes public means an advantage for this adversary in his intention to harm Germany.”
A former senior BND officer, Gerhard Conrad, said until the precise nature of the suspect’s job at the intelligence service is revealed publicly, it was too soon to assess any potential fallout from the alleged spying. “To have a reliable picture here, we would have to know the specific function of the accused employee,” said Conrad, now a visiting professor in intelligence studies at King’s College London.
Jan. 25, 202302:23
Apart from the BND case, a German man was found guilty in November of passing information to Russia while working as a reserve officer in the German military.
German authorities are also examining whether two officials in Germany’s federal ministry of economics were spying for Russia, according to the newspaper Die Zeit. The officials under investigation worked on energy supply issues, possibly placing them at the center of pivotal decisions on the now-suspended Russian Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline to Germany.
Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, BfV, which is the rough equivalent of the FBI, declined to comment on the case.
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action said it could not comment directly on any specific case but said it works in close coordination with federal law enforcement authorities. On energy, the ministry has “completely overhauled the previous government’s Russia-friendly policy” to reduce Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas, it said.
Angela Merkel, a Christian Democrat considered wary of friction with Russia, had served 16 years as chancellor before leaving office in 2021. Olaf Scholz of the left-leaning Social Democrats succeeded her as Germany’s leader, forming a coalition with the Greens and the Free Democrats.
'The Russian services are relentless'
For more than two decades, Russia has waged an incessant and often successful campaign of spying and political warfare against Germany, infiltrating the country’s political elites and security services, according to former U.S. intelligence officers, current Western officials and members of Germany’s parliament.
“The Russians have invested massive time and effort into penetrating German institutions at all levels. The Russian services are relentless and have benefited from a weak counterintelligence atmosphere in Germany,” said John Sipher, a former CIA intelligence officer who worked for the agency’s clandestine service for 28 years and had postings in Europe, Asia and elsewhere.
“So, when you have a weak defense combined with a focused and relentless offense, you can expect that there are numerous sources inside the German government and business elite that are doing Moscow’s bidding,” he said.
In 2019, a former Chechen separatist fighter was gunned down in Berlin’s Tiergarten park; a German court eventually convicted a Russian national who authorities said was an officer of the Russian FSB domestic intelligence service acting on orders from Moscow.
Forensic experts work at the crime scene after the assassination of Zelimkhan Khangoshvili in Berlin in 2019.Christoph Soeder / DPA/AFP via Getty Images
Russia denied the allegations. In his trial, the convicted assassin, Vadim Kraskikov, denied he was acting on Moscow’s orders.
“The murder in the Tiergarten shows that Russia has the impression that Germany is so weak that they can commit a contract killing in broad daylight in the government quarter in Berlin,“ said a member of the German parliament. “That tells you something.”
Germany consistently underestimated the Russian threat and gave counterintelligence work a low priority, but that is changing now in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, experts and Western officials said.
“It is clear that we must also take a completely different approach to counterintelligence than we have in the past,” von Notz said. “We have been drawing attention to this for a long time. In view of the sharp increase in security threats following Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which violated international law, we must act very decisively.”
Conrad, the former BND officer, said decision-makers in Germany failed to heed concerns repeatedly raised by the security services about Berlin’s approach to Russia in the past, including relying on Russian natural gas imports.
“The services have been the unheard admonishers here for years,” Conrad said.
The German government has proposed plans to overhaul the intelligence service to give it more funding and clearer legal authority to carry out its mission.
The BND has been hampered by a lack of resources, with its technology lagging behind many of its partners, and a cumbersome legal framework that makes countering adversaries inside Germany extremely difficult, according to Conrad and other experts.
“The BND law does not meet the current needs,” Krieger said.
German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock.Tobias Schwarz / AFP via Getty Images file
Given the country’s Nazi past and the totalitarian legacy of Soviet-controlled East Germany, politicians have been reluctant to empower German security services and have sought tough safeguards for privacy and civil liberties. German leaders, painfully aware that Germany invaded Russia in World War II, have also tried to avoid confrontation and hoped economic ties could reduce tensions. But the invasion of Ukraine has triggered a political sea change, with Berlin now providing artillery and tanks to Kyiv while backing sanctions on Russia’s economy.
Last April, Berlin expelled 40 Russian Embassy employees for allegedly working for Russian intelligence services. In announcing the move, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said the employees “have worked every day against our freedom and against the cohesion of our society here in Germany."
Western officials and former U.S. intelligence officers called the expulsions and the current investigation of the BND employee a positive sign that shows Berlin’s attitude has shifted.
“This government is serious about dealing with it,” a Western official familiar with the issue said.
Germany’s intelligence services failed to anticipate that Russia would invade Ukraine, a failure that has yet to be the subject of any publicly released “lessons learned” review. Such a review would show Germany is serious about altering its approach, the Western official said.
“There’s definitely a change. The question is, how far do they take it?”
Marie Brockling
Dan De Luce
Dan De Luce is a reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit.
NBC News · by Marie Brockling and Dan De Luce · January 29, 2023
14. Overmatch secrecy needed as China, Russia surveil US Navy, experts say
Excerpts;
Project Overmatch is the Navy’s contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, the Pentagon’s multibillion-dollar push to connect disparate databases and forces across land, air, sea, space and cyber. By doing so, defense officials say, the U.S. will be able to better address foreign aggression.
China is attempting to counteract JADC2 with what has been dubbed Multi-Domain Precision Warfare, or MDPW, an effort to interlink command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and more to quickly coordinate firepower and exploit weakness.
...
“When you think of this systems warfare approach, they see our command, control and communications architecture as being our linchpin and our greatest vulnerability,” Clark said. “Revealing too much about Project Overmatch might give clues that an adversary could use.”
The Navy sought $195 million for Project Overmatch in fiscal 2023, a 167% increase over the $73 million it received in 2022.
Overmatch secrecy needed as China, Russia surveil US Navy, experts say
Defense News · by Colin Demarest · January 26, 2023
WASHINGTON — The thick fog of secrecy encircling the U.S. Navy’s Project Overmatch is still needed to keep rival nations including China and Russia off-balance, unable to discern from afar how the service is readying for future large-scale conflicts, according to a pair of experts.
Speaking at a Defense News event Jan. 26, Bryan Clark, a senior fellow and director of the Center for Defense Concepts and Technology at the Hudson Institute, and Bill Drexel, an associate fellow of technology and national security at the Center for a New American Security, said the clandestine approach that has shrouded the project since its inception in late 2020 is purposeful, however frustrating it may be to outside observers.
“A large part of it is this idea that decision advantage does depend on what you think you’re going to be combining together, how you manage the communication network,” Clark said. “And getting too much into the details of that would provide information that China could use to try to take that network apart.”
Project Overmatch is the Navy’s contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, the Pentagon’s multibillion-dollar push to connect disparate databases and forces across land, air, sea, space and cyber. By doing so, defense officials say, the U.S. will be able to better address foreign aggression.
China is attempting to counteract JADC2 with what has been dubbed Multi-Domain Precision Warfare, or MDPW, an effort to interlink command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and more to quickly coordinate firepower and exploit weakness.
RELATED
US Navy sharing Project Overmatch insights with international allies
“We have to be inclusive,” Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said, “or we’re not going to be able to fight together.”
“It’s a stated high-priority target of both the Chinese and Russian military doctrine. So, I’m pretty glad that it’s secret,” Drexel said Thursday. “I suspect the kind of stitching everything together, particularly, is what the Chinese, the Russians, would love to know.”
The Navy plans to deploy a carrier strike group with products of Project Overmatch, namely advanced networking capabilities, later this year.
Rear Adm. Doug Small, who leads both Naval Information Warfare Systems Command and is spearheading Project Overmatch, in a November interview described the milestone as the “starting gun.” Additional deployments on additional strike groups are expected to follow.
“When you think of this systems warfare approach, they see our command, control and communications architecture as being our linchpin and our greatest vulnerability,” Clark said. “Revealing too much about Project Overmatch might give clues that an adversary could use.”
The Navy sought $195 million for Project Overmatch in fiscal 2023, a 167% increase over the $73 million it received in 2022.
About Colin Demarest
Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.
15. The World Is Tired Of United States’ Wars – OpEd
"Afghanistanizing" the world?
Excerpt:
But the current United States as the former world leader has lost its credibility among its allies. In other words, the strategy of Afghanistanizing the world and humiliating others have cost the US its allies. The first thing that the European allies lost in reaching a consensus with the US was the right to have sovereignty over their own destiny.
Other than the liberal world order?
Conclusion:
Every actor in every part of the world has now realized that to meet its needs they must get rid of Thucydides’ trap and establish a new system other than the liberal world order. That is why China, India, and Saudi Arabia are looking for regional security alliances instead of NATOism and the policy of peace first rather than war first. In other words, the measures that Beijing, Moscow, Delhi, and Riyadh are taking demonstrate that Washington is not an order-making and stability-creating actor anymore. This means that America basically no longer has the possibility and authority to determine examples of normal behavior, and if it tries to do so, it will face non-compliance.
The World Is Tired Of United States’ Wars – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Greg Pence · January 29, 2023
The fate of wars has shown that consensus-building lead to more power and consensus at the international level is only possible with the support of allies behind a great power as a leader. Of course, consensus building is impacted by factors such as ideological influence, the ability to ensure the security of the allies in order to maintain their international peace and stability, and finally the resolution of international crises based on the interests of the allies. In other words, what brings a great power the necessary capabilities for consensus building is nothing but international credit. This credit rests upon the rules of the international/liberal order.
Consensus building succeeds when it can manage the interests of allies to serve the interests of the great power by creating a collective will. In the past, with the help of Europe, the United States controlled and managed the consensus-building industry against Russia and China, and also controlled the world’s public opinion. In the consensus-building industry that was formed after the Second World War, the United States together with NATO became the world’s largest military power and was able to form the world’s largest economic power along with G7 countries. American consensus-building became a concept for political, economic, cultural, and military influence over other countries and societies. It transformed the international system into a global system based on American values and interests with greater mastery and dominance in diplomatic affairs.
Consensus in the economic sector also turned the United States into an international economic power that still has no serious competitors in the world. By creating a global value chain in the economic and financial sectors, the US was able to lay the foundation for monetary and economic dominance through the Bretton Woods organizations. The economic consensus gave the US effective access to international credits and the foreign exchange market. During the 1970s, the Bretton Woods system allowed the United States to cover approximately 70 percent of its balance-of-payments deficits through the dual processes of gold profitability and debt financing. Financing this debt enabled the United States to undertake heavy military spending abroad and “foreign commitments” and to maintain considerable flexibility in domestic economic policy.
But the current United States as the former world leader has lost its credibility among its allies. In other words, the strategy of Afghanistanizing the world and humiliating others have cost the US its allies. The first thing that the European allies lost in reaching a consensus with the US was the right to have sovereignty over their own destiny.
Saudi Arabia is one of the most important regional partners of the US in the Middle East which had been promised the leadership of Arab countries in return for supplying the energy resources of Washington. The unwritten strategic pact between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which survived 15 presidents and seven kings, the Arab oil embargo, two Persian Gulf wars, and the September 11 terrorist attacks, is now collapsing completely. Earlier in the 2020 US presidential election campaign, Biden called the Saudi government of low social value and refused to talk to Saudi Crown Prince Bin Salman. As usual, he remembered Saudi Arabia when the world was involved in the energy crisis and the dramatic increase in oil prices.
But by bypassing the United States and turning its back on the promises made to the White House during Biden’s visit to the country, Saudi Arabia chose OPEC+, Kremlin, and Beijing to Washington. During the OPEC+ meeting, despite the repeated requests of the United States to increase the production and supply ceiling in order to reduce the oil price, the Saudis decided to reduce their oil production. This is while the US can no longer punish Saudi Arabia by not selling weapons, nor can they impose an oil embargo on this country in the midst of the war in Ukraine.
With the departure of Trump and the arrival of Biden and the strategic confusion in American foreign policy, two big things have happened. First, the United States’ loss of control over its allies, and second, US partners’ attempt to establish relations with other powers. The Wall Street Journal, in an article on October 24, has described a lack of trust among the allies as the reason for these issues. Currently, the Ukraine war has kept the two sides of the transatlantic united. In fact, the world has become a venue for great powers to manipulate crises, but the United States is losing its power to intensify or resolve the crises.
That is why not only the United States cannot end the war in Yemen and disband al-Qaeda in the Middle East and North Africa, it cannot manage the energy crisis or the war in Ukraine. In the coming years, fewer and fewer countries would want to be recognized as a strategic ally of the US. Saudi Arabia is a case in point that simply rejected the US’s request to stabilize the energy markets. This is not only the result of the decline of the United States but also the effect of the ongoing change in the world order.
Every actor in every part of the world has now realized that to meet its needs they must get rid of Thucydides’ trap and establish a new system other than the liberal world order. That is why China, India, and Saudi Arabia are looking for regional security alliances instead of NATOism and the policy of peace first rather than war first. In other words, the measures that Beijing, Moscow, Delhi, and Riyadh are taking demonstrate that Washington is not an order-making and stability-creating actor anymore. This means that America basically no longer has the possibility and authority to determine examples of normal behavior, and if it tries to do so, it will face non-compliance.
eurasiareview.com · by Greg Pence · January 29, 2023
16. Women at war: Ukraine's female soldiers dream of freedom, fight for survival
Women at war: Ukraine's female soldiers dream of freedom, fight for survival
americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty · January 27, 2023
This article was originally published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and is reprinted with permission.
A pile of boxes filled with body bags welcomed visitors to the headquarters of the Ukrainian Women Veteran Movement, Ukraine’s biggest female soldiers’ organization, on a recent afternoon.
The empty bags were ready to be shipped to Bakhmut, a city in the Donetsk region where deadly fighting has raged for months, said Olena Kharchenko, an employee in charge of the dispatch. “It’s what we do almost every day,” she added.
“We set up our movement to defend the rights of female soldiers and veterans,” said Kateryna Priymak, the organization’s deputy head, “but Russia’s full-scale invasion forced us to focus on the maximally efficient support for the army.”
The long corridor running through the headquarters leads to several storage rooms with military and humanitarian supplies, a drone-production workshop, a room for weaving protective nets, and a large sewing room where volunteers design military uniforms for women.
Almost all of this goes to the military, primarily to female personnel, Kharchenko said.
With about 50,000 servicewomen — including some 5,000 on the front lines, according to Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar — the Ukrainian military is one of the most feminized armed forces in Europe.
‘A Job Called Defending The Fatherland’
More than 600 kilometers east of Kyiv, in the village of Yatskivka in the Donetsk region — part of the Donbas — Lieutenant Lyubov Plaksyuk was getting ready for another battle.
Plaksyuk — the first woman to head an artillery unit of the Ukrainian Army — has been fighting in the war since the morning of February 24, when her unit came under what she described as “nonstop total shelling” from the Russian side in the first hours of the full-scale invasion.
During a cigarette break from the paperwork to prepare to take her artillery unit back to the front line, Plaksyuk told RFE/RL that the situation around Kreminna — a key logistical hub that Ukrainians have been trying to recapture since their successful counteroffensive in the neighboring Kharkiv region — is “under control but quite difficult.”
“It is hard to fight against an opponent who is superior both in numbers and armaments and does not care what he shoots at,” she said by telephone.
Plaksyuk, who took part in the liberation of Lyman, a key Donetsk region railway hub, and other settlements this autumn, is now responsible for artillery reconnaissance. “We send out little birds that fly a little farther than we can see, look for those who need a little present, and we destroy the enemies,” she said with a laugh, describing her everyday work with drones and artillery.
Plaksyuk was in her 20s when she left a career as a history teacher more than seven years ago, after the school she worked in was closed, and decided to pursue her “dream” of joining the military.
“There is a job called defending the fatherland, and this is what I do now,” she said.
Plaksyuk is one of only two women in her unit. Her gender “does not play a role,” she said, adding that her male subordinates “fully respect” her because of her professionalism.
“I am where I am because I strove for it,” she said.
‘Life Had Not Prepared Me For It’
More than 1,100 kilometers to the west, in the town of Ustyluh on Ukraine’s border with Poland, 26-year-old border guard Alina Panina carries out customs checks with the help of a spaniel sniffer dog.
Panina has always been interested in working with dogs and had wanted a career in uniform since childhood, she told RFE/RL, but — unlike Plaksyuk — she never expected to find herself in the epicenter of the war. “Life had not prepared me for what was about happen,” she said.
When Russia launched the full-scale invasion in February, she was in Mariupol, an Azov Sea city in the Donbas that had long been a target for Russia, working at the port checking cargo for contraband.
Shortly after the first Russian missiles hit Mariupol, she was ordered to join forces defending the city’s smaller steel plant, known as Azovmash, and then moved on to the besieged Azovstal steelworks. As the Russian troops were leveling the last stronghold of Ukrainian resistance, she was supporting Ukrainian fighters, cooking for them, and caring for the wounded along with other women.
“They said the sight of us gave them hope,” she recalled.
In mid-May, Panina was among hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers who surrendered to an uncertain fate after weeks of hiding in bunkers and tunnels at Azovstal. She was then held captive for four and a half months in the notorious Russian-controlled Olenivka prison in Donetsk, where dozens of captives were killed in a deadly strike in July.
There, she lived in “inhuman” conditions with 28 other women in a cell designed for four. But the hardest part was “being cut off from the outside world,” she said.
Panina was released with more than 100 Ukrainian women in a large prisoner swap in October. After many days of a blindfolded journey back home through Russian territory and Crimea. Her husband, also a soldier, with whom she lived in Mariupol, remains in Russian captivity.
“I have become tougher and stronger than I ever thought possible,” Panina said, “but I learned that men cry, too, when they watch their comrades die every day.”
After a short period of rest and rehabilitation, she said, she decided to return to military service to do “whatever I can to bring victory closer.”
Painful Path
Back in the Ukrainian Women Veteran Movement headquarters in Kyiv, two soldiers — a man and a woman nicknamed Monk and Bambi — arrived from the war zone to collect supplies.
Among other things, they received New Year’s gifts for female soldiers donated by a partner organization — items that included painkillers, medicines, frostbite creams, wet tissues, condoms, and bandages. Kharchenko added a hand-knit female soldier doll to each bag.
“Ukraine is moving forward at a superfast pace. We have proven that we could withstand the Russian invasion, but all this is not enough to ensure our imminent victory,” Priymak said, sitting back in an armchair in the middle of the bustling office.
Now a manager at an organization with some 500 members, Priymak was 21 years old when Russia stoked tensions that started the war in the Donbas in 2014, after the Euromaidan protests that pushed Moscow-friendly President Viktor Yanukovuych from power.
Back then she enlisted with a volunteer medical battalion and spent 11 months serving as a paramedic on the front line.
“Age and gender play no role in the motivation to fight,” she said. “After Euromaidan my social circle strongly felt that if we don’t take up the fight, we will lose the right to freedom of conscience, to self-identification, and to shape the place we live in.”
But the reality was that when the Donbas war broke out the Ukrainian Army — which was haunted by corruption, a lack of basic supplies, and many other problems — was often openly hostile to women, she said.
“We kept on hearing phrases like, ‘War is not a place for women,’ ‘You’d better stay at home with children,’ or, ‘When a woman dies, everybody’s morale is lost’ all the time,” she recalled.
Until 2018, Ukrainian legislation did not allow women to be assigned to combat positions, said sociologist Anna Kvit, who has been researching Ukrainian female soldiers since 2015 along with colleagues from the Invisible Battalion advocacy project.
As a result, she told RFE/RL, the volunteer fighters were enlisted as cooks, cleaners, or accountants, even if they were taking part in hostilities as snipers, grenade launcher operators, reconnaissance soldiers, or artillerists.
This legal discrimination, Kvit said, deprived most women who served in the war in the Donbas of access to social or military benefits, military awards, and career opportunities in the armed forces.
Now, with the legal discrimination gone mainly due to advocacy and pressure from civil society, multiple problems remain, and new ones emerge.
The fact that the Ukrainian military began issuing uniforms for women after almost nine years of war is “a sign of progress” but also shows that “even basic infrastructure is not prepared for women,” Kvit said.
Priymak — who spent two weeks serving as a medic during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the Kherson region — said that Ukrainian female soldiers entered the spotlight after “years of being invisible,” but “the intensity of warfare reinforces archaic primordial instincts, and that affects women’s rights.”
“War is a difficult time for criticism, but there is more and more to criticize as it grinds on,” she said.
‘All This Torture’
According to Kvit, despite gradual changes in the status of women in the military, sexual harassment is not well defined in Ukrainian law, there are still no relevant procedures to deal with it in the army, and it remains underreported.
Oksana Hryhoryeva, gender adviser to the commander of the Ukrainian military’s Land Forces, told RFE/RL that, since the beginning of Russian full-scale invasion, she received reports of only two cases of harassment or gender discrimination. But she claimed this is an accurate reflection of reality.
“There is no harassment on the front line,” she said, adding that “women in the army make men reveal their better selves.”
Most of her efforts, Hryhoryeva said, are connected to dealing with the consequences of Russian sexual violence in areas recaptured by Ukraine, rehabilitating soldiers with post-traumatic stress disorder, including those who had been captives of Russian, and supporting the families of soldiers killed in the war.
“The belief that the army is no place for women is a relic of the Soviet mentality,” Hryhoryeva said, adding that women are a “great resource for all the levels of the military.”
But Priymak believes that if it weren’t for Ukrainian women who “fought for their rights as they fought for their country,” the Ukraine’s military would have far fewer women and would not be what it is today.
“Perhaps we need to go through all this torture to continue to develop as a society,” she said. “Otherwise, we will cease to exist as a nation and state.”
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americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty · January 27, 2023
17. West to deliver 321 tanks to Ukraine, says diplomat, as North Korea accuses US of 'crossing the red line'
My math may be outdated.
@ 14 tanks x company, 4 x companies per battalion (56 tanks per bn) , 3 battalions per brigade (168 tanks per bde). So this is about a 2 US brigades worth of tanks.
There will be some maintenance and logistics challenges.
West to deliver 321 tanks to Ukraine, says diplomat, as North Korea accuses US of 'crossing the red line' | CNN
CNN · by Pierre Meilhan,Heather Chen · January 28, 2023
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Retired lt. general on what will happen after Ukraine gets tanks
02:14 - Source: CNN
CNN —
Western countries will deliver more than 300 tanks to Ukraine, Kyiv’s ambassador to France said Friday.
“As of today, numerous countries have officially confirmed their agreement to deliver 321 heavy tanks to Ukraine,” Vadym Omelchenko told French TV station and CNN affiliate BFM television.
He did not specify which countries would provide the tanks or provide a breakdown of which models.
The figure from Omelchenko comes after the US this week pledged to provide 31 M1 Abrams tanks and Germany agreed to send 14 Leopard 2 A6s. Previously the United Kingdom has pledged 14 Challenger 2 tanks, while Poland has asked for approval from Germany to transfer some of its own German-made Leopard 2s to Ukraine.
Omelchenko’s interview came as North Korea accused the United States and its allies of “further crossing the red line” by sending tanks to Ukraine.
The US has a “sinister intention to realize its hegemonic aim by further expanding the proxy war for destroying Russia,” said Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in a statement run by North Korean media on Friday.
She accused the US and other Western countries of “wrecking the global peace and the regional security while handing military hardware running into astronomical sums of money over to Ukraine in total disregard of Russia’s concern about security” – and vowed North Koreans would “always stand in the same trench” as the people of Russia.
When the tanks will arrive in Ukraine remains unclear. Omelchenko said delivery dates would vary depending on the type of tank and the country of origin, and the timing would be adjusted during the next round of consultations between Ukraine and Western countries.
Ukraine's ambassador to France, Vadym Omelchenko.
Adrien Fillon/NurPhoto/Getty Images
However, echoing the words of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who had previously urged the West to provide what some experts see as game-changing military hardware, Omelchenko said Ukraine needed the assistance “as fast as possible”.
“If it had to wait until the month of August or September, it would be too late,” he said.
M1A2 Abrams tanks stand on the grounds of the 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division during a visit by the German president to U.S. forces on July 13, 2022, Bavaria, Grafenwoehr. Photo: Daniel Karmann/dpa (Photo by Daniel Karmann/picture alliance via Getty Images)
Daniel Karmann/dpa/picture alliance/Getty Images
Ukraine's new tanks won't be the instant game-changer some expect
Ukrainian forces have warned they are in a race against time. The country fears that a second Russian offensive may begin within two months and is bracing for the coming weeks.
Previous military aid, like the American HIMARS rocket system, has been vital in helping Ukraine disrupt Russian advances and make a series of successful counter-offensives in recent months.
But tanks represent the most powerful direct offensive weapon provided to Ukraine so far, military experts said.
This week, several Western nations led by Germany and the United States said they would send contingents of tanks to Ukraine.
US President Joe Biden said he would be providing 31 M1 Abrams tanks to “enhance Ukraine’s capacity to defend its territory and achieve its strategic objectives” in both the near and long terms.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in parliament on Wednesday said that his government would send 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine, wrapping up months of deliberation and several days of tense negotiations with NATO partners.
“This is the result of intensive consultations that took place with Germany’s closest European and international partners,” a German government statement read.
Ukraine hopes that Berlin’s announcement will encourage other European nations who own Leopard tanks to re-export some of their vehicles.
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Poland on Tuesday formally asked for approval from Germany to transfer some of its German-made Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.
Military experts previously told CNN that the extra tanks could make a difference in the war. But some analysts said that the new tanks wouldn’t be the instant game-changer that some would expect.
CNN · by Pierre Meilhan,Heather Chen · January 28, 2023
18. China’s Top Nuclear-Weapons Lab Used American Computer Chips Decades After Ban
China’s Top Nuclear-Weapons Lab Used American Computer Chips Decades After Ban
State-owned institute continued buying Intel- and Nvidia-made chips despite inclusion on a U.S. export blacklist in 1997
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-top-nuclear-weapons-lab-used-american-computer-chips-decades-after-ban-11674990320?utm_source=pocket_reader
By Liza LinFollow
and Dan StrumpfFollow
Jan. 29, 2023 9:00 am ET
SINGAPORE—China’s top nuclear-weapons research institute has bought sophisticated U.S. computer chips at least a dozen times in the past two and half years, circumventing decades-old American export restrictions meant to curb such sales.
A Wall Street Journal review of procurement documents found that the state-run China Academy of Engineering Physics has managed to obtain the semiconductors made by U.S. companies such as Intel Corp. and Nvidia Corp. since 2020 despite its placement on a U.S. export blacklist in 1997.
The chips, which are widely used in data centers and personal computers, were acquired from resellers in China. Some were procured as components for computing systems, with many bought by the institute’s laboratory studying computational fluid dynamics, a broad scientific field that includes the modeling of nuclear explosions.
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Such purchases defy longstanding restrictions imposed by the U.S. that aim to prevent the use of any U.S. products for atomic-weapons research by foreign powers. The academy, known as CAEP, was one of the first Chinese institutions put on the U.S. blacklist, known as the entity list, because of its nuclear work.
A Journal review of research papers published by CAEP found that at least 34 over the past decade referenced using American semiconductors in the research. They were used in a range of ways, including analyzing data and generating algorithms. Nuclear experts said that in at least seven of them, the research can have applications to maintaining nuclear stockpiles. CAEP didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The findings underline the challenge facing the Biden administration as it seeks to more aggressively counter the use of American technology by China’s military. In October, the U.S. expanded the scope of export regulations to prevent China from obtaining the most advanced American chips and chip-manufacturing tools that power artificial intelligence and supercomputers, which are increasingly important to modern warfare.
Most of the chips procured by the academy ranged in size from 7 nanometers to 14 nanometers, many of which are difficult for China to mass produce. They are widely available on the open market: Versions of Intel’s Xeon Gold and Nvidia’s GeForce RTX chips purchased by CAEP can be bought off Taobao, one of China’s largest e-commerce marketplaces. The purchases didn’t include the latest generation of chips launched within the last two years.
China has been accelerating the expansion of its nuclear force and delivery capabilities, the U.S. Defense Department said in a recent report.
PHOTO: POOL/REUTERS
China’s People’s Liberation Army could stockpile about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035, the U.S. Defense Department report said.
PHOTO: MARK SCHIEFELBEIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Nvidia said that the semiconductors used in CAEP’s research were general-purpose graphics chips used in consumer products such as personal computers. With millions of PCs sold worldwide, the U.S. chip maker said no company can monitor or control where every PC ends up. Intel said it complies with export regulations and sanctions and so must its distributors and customers.
“It’s insanely difficult to enforce” the U.S. restrictions when it comes to transactions overseas, said Kevin Wolf, a former top Commerce Department official who is now an international trade lawyer. Purchases in China accounted for more than a third of the world’s $556 billion in chip sales in 2021, according to the Semiconductor Industry Association.
Founded in the late 1950s, CAEP is based in China’s western Sichuan province and employs some of the country’s best nuclear-weapons researchers. Physicists there helped develop the country’s first hydrogen bomb. It conducts research into computer science, electrical engineering and other fields.
Commerce Department officials in June 2020 expanded restrictions on CAEP by adding 10 entities owned or operated by the academy as well as 17 aliases it uses to the entity list for procuring U.S.-origin items in support of Chinese nuclear-weapon activities.
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China has been accelerating the expansion of its nuclear force and delivery capabilities in recent years, the Department of Defense said in an annual report to Congress released in November. The People’s Liberation Army could stockpile about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 if it continues at its current pace, up from more than 400 now, the department estimated.
The U.S.’s Bureau of Industry and Security, which regulates the sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies, said U.S. and foreign parties are responsible for conducting the due diligence to prevent commodities, software and technology from getting to listed entities.
“As mass-market products move through multiple parties in global supply chains, full visibility on ultimate end users is a large undertaking,” the Commerce Department agency said, adding that it would vigorously enforce the new rules introduced in October.
China’s military and its suppliers can circumvent end-user restrictions by using shell companies and other export-control evasion tactics, said Gregory Allen, a former U.S. Defense Department official who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
A large number of U.S.-designed chips are manufactured overseas, which can place them outside Washington’s export-control rules. In November, Nvidia started marketing a replacement for its A100 chip with a narrower bandwidth to send and receive data so that it can be sold in China under U.S. export restrictions.
Procurement tenders from CAEP include one in November 2020 that sought computing systems with 60 Intel processors and 49 Nvidia chips, including four of Nvidia’s high-end V100 graphics processing units that speed up analysis of large volumes of data.
Left: An undated artist's rendering of 192 laser beams converging at the center of the target chamber of a facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. Right: The chamber is used to research inertial confinement fusion. The lab recently made a fusion-energy breakthrough using ICF technology.
JAKE LONG/PHILIP SALTONSTALL/LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS
Beyond chips, the state-run academy in September called for bidders to service its printed circuit boards, which hold chips and other electronic components together, that were designed by U.S. firm Cadence Design Systems, Inc. CAEP also sought to purchase integrated circuits from other American chip makers.
Cadence said it follows all U.S. export control regulations, including those regarding entity-list companies.
CAEP’s tenders were mostly fulfilled by small Chinese companies for uses including supercomputing, official documents show.
Six of the seven CAEP research papers reviewed by the Journal that were relevant to nuclear stockpile maintenance, including one published as recently as August, related to inertial confinement fusion, or ICF, which involves the use of high-powered lasers to generate fusion reactions similar to those occurring on a large scale in thermonuclear weapons.
In the six papers, scientists at CAEP described the use of graphics processors and other chips to improve the functioning of ICF devices. One paper, co-written by authors from CAEP and published in March, described using an Intel Core i7-7800X processor and an Nvidia GeForce GTX 1080 Ti graphics card.
The seventh described the use of similar chips in research with applications in fluid dynamics and explosion mechanics.
ICF is used by the U.S. and other nations to refine computer codes used to maintain nuclear stockpiles in the absence of nuclear testing under longstanding agreements by countries including China, said Frank von Hippel, a nuclear physicist at Princeton University, who reviewed the papers.
Ian Stewart, executive director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, D.C., who also reviewed the papers, said a primary driver for ICF work is the insights it provides to nuclear weapons.
For U.S. export policies to be effective, there is a “need to control this tech by not allowing it to be sold by distributors when the end user is unknown,” said Mr. Stewart.
In December, the Energy Department announced a breakthrough in fusion-energy research using ICF technology at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, Calif.
Separately, in 2017, researchers at an affiliate of CAEP, the Beijing-based Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics, wrote about the key role Intel chips had played in China’s Tianhe-2 supercomputer and nuclear reactor analysis.
The Tianhe-2 was used by researchers in China to conduct calculations in nuclear explosive activities, according to the Bureau of Industry and Security. The Chinese institute conducts research into nuclear-warhead design computations, according to the Federation of American Scientists, a nonprofit think tank.
Write to Liza Lin at liza.lin@wsj.com and Dan Strumpf at Dan.Strumpf@wsj.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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