Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Without freedom there can be no morality."

- Carl Jung

"If you feel pain, you're alive. If you feel other people's pain, you're a human being."

- Leo Tolstoy

“You can sway a thousand men by appealing to their prejudices quicker than you can convince one man by logic.”

- Robert A. Heinlein, Revolt in 2100/Methuselah's Children

1. Chinese balloon part of vast aerial surveillance program, U.S. says

2. Expert reveals biggest under-the-radar takeaway from Chinese spy flight crisis

3. China’s Balloon Could Be America’s Awakening

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 7, 2023

5. ‘We killed three Russians’: the secretive Ukrainian special forces taking the fight across the border

6. China has more ICBM launchers than US, senior general tells lawmakers

7. Voice of America needs a reboot

8. U.S.-China trade hit record in 2022 despite tensions

9. 13 thoughts China’s balloon (probably) had while floating over America

10. "99 PLA Balloons" --An Update To A Cold War Classic by Peter W. Singer

11. Chinese Spy Balloon Spotlights CCP's Brazen Plot Against US

12. SASC chair to focus on reimagining how the military fights

13. Pentagon Breaks Through With Networked War....Drones, Ships, Stealth Jets & Tanks Will Attack Together

14. Why It Took So Damn Long To Shoot Down the Chinese Spy Balloon

15. US military not ready to deploy missiles to Japan, country’s defense ministry says

16. China’s Belt and Road objectives are shifting

17. China Hasn’t Given Up on the Belt and Road

18. Power in Asia: six surprising facts

19. Is Biden's Pentagon a warfighting organization? Amid China threat, you have to wonder

20. America’s Return to the Philippines Makes Sense

21. Alone and unafraid: How to prepare to fight and win the next war

22. What Tanks in Ukraine Tell Us About America in the Pacific

1. Chinese balloon part of vast aerial surveillance program, U.S. says

Good analysis here. The USG and Military are exposing the PRC/PLA/CCP strategy - now we need to attack it.

Recognize, Understand, Expose, and Attack our enemy's strategy.

To reprise my previous comments:

When are we going to conduct a superior form of political warfare to challenge China's Unrestricted Warfare?

POTUS needs to turn to the NSC (principals not the national security staff) and ask the following questions:

Recognize: (to the DNI): What is the Chinese strategy? How do we observe and assess? Can we identify it? What are the indicators?

Understand: (to the DNI, SECSTATE, SECDEF): What do I need to know about the strategy? What are the objectives of the strategy and what are its methods, lines of operation, etc.?

Expose: (to SECSTATE [GEC], SECDEF (JS J39 and USSOCOM): How do we explain the Chinese strategy to inoculate the American public and the international community to its actions and effects?

Attack: (to SECSTATE, SECDEF [USSOCOM]): How do I conduct a superior political warfare campaign to attack the Chinese unrestricted warfare strategy?

Chinese balloon part of vast aerial surveillance program, U.S. says

Spy balloon effort operates in Hainan province off China’s south coast and has for years collected information on military assets in several countries,

officials said

By Ellen Nakashima, Shane Harris, John Hudson and Dan Lamothe

February 7, 2023 at 6:44 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · February 7, 2023

The U.S. intelligence community has linked the Chinese spy balloon shot down on Saturday to a vast surveillance program run by the People’s Liberation Army, and U.S. officials have begun to brief allies and partners who have been similarly targeted.

The surveillance balloon effort, which has operated for several years partly out of Hainan province off China’s south coast, has collected information on military assets in countries and areas of emerging strategic interest to China including Japan, India, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines, according to several U.S. officials, who, like others interviewed for this story, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

Officials have said these surveillance airships, operated in part by the PLA air force, have been spotted over five continents.

“What the Chinese have done is taken an unbelievably old technology, and basically married it with modern communications and observation capabilities” to try to glean intelligence on other nations’ militaries, said one official. “It’s a massive effort.”

On Monday, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman led a briefing on China’s balloon espionage for some 150 people from about 40 embassies, said a senior administration official familiar with the matter. The department has also sent to every U.S. Embassy a “detailed information” on the espionage that can be shared with allies and partners.

Separately, U.S. officials have begun to share specifics with officials in countries such as Japan whose military facilities were targeted by Beijing.

“There has been great interest in this on the part of our allies and partners,” said a senior administration official.

“Many of them recognize that they, too, may be vulnerable or susceptible to this or an object of interest to the PRC,” the official said, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

In Japan in 2020, an aerial orb drew speculation. “Some people thought this was a UFO,” said a Japanese official. “In hindsight people are realizing that was a Chinese espionage balloon. But at that time it was purely novel — nobody had seen this. … So there’s a lot of heightened attention at this time.”

While most of China’s long-range surveillance efforts are conducted by its expanding military satellite array, PLA planners have identified what they consider to be an opportunity to conduct surveillance from the upper atmosphere at altitudes above where commercial jets fly, using balloons that fly between 60,000 and 80,000 feet or higher, officials said.

Analysts still don’t know the size of the balloon fleet, but there have been “dozens” of missions since 2018, said one U.S. official. They take advantage of technology provided by a private Chinese company that is part of the country’s civil-military fusion effort — a program by which private companies develop technologies and capabilities used by the PLA.

In a news briefing Saturday, senior Pentagon officials alluded to the PLA program, noting that balloons had been operating elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. “These balloons are all part of a PRC fleet of balloons developed to conduct surveillance operations, which also violated the sovereignty of other countries,” said one senior defense official.

The official flatly rejected China’s assertion that the airship moving over the United States was a weather balloon blown off course. “This is false,” the official said. “This was a PRC surveillance balloon. This surveillance balloon purposefully traversed the United States and Canada. And we are confident it was seeking to monitor sensitive military sites.”

Some commentators have made light of the Chinese effort, noting that balloons are not the most high-tech of platforms. But others caution against dismissing the balloons’ potential.

“For those who have a sanguine view about the actual intelligence collection capabilities of this balloon, I think they’re underestimating the creative ways the PLA might use it either for intelligence and surveillance purposes, or as a platform for weapons,” said Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chairman of the Select Committee on China, who was commenting on public remarks made by Pentagon officials over the weekend.

In recent years, at least four balloons have been spotted over Hawaii, Florida, Texas and Guam — in addition to the one tracked last week. Three of the four instances took place during the Trump administration but were only recently identified as Chinese surveillance airships. Other balloons have been spotted in Latin America and allied countries in the Pacific, officials have said.

President Biden directed that all sensitive sites were protected from espionage, “which was straightforward because we could track the path of the balloon and ensure no sensitive activities or unencrypted communications would be conducted in its vicinity,” said National Security Council strategic communications coordinator John Kirby. “At the same time, we turned the tables on China and collected against the balloon, so that we would learn more about China’s capabilities and tradecraft.”

Monitoring the recent balloon helped fill in gaps about the four others, officials said. The U.S. military sent up fighter jets and other aircraft over the past week to observe the airship. A Chinese spy balloon that crashed off the Hawaiian islands last June also yielded helpful information, including about the nature of the technology China is using, they said.

For instance, some of the balloons are outfitted with electrooptical sensors or digital cameras that, depending on their resolution, can capture highly precise images, officials said. They also are equipped with radio signal and satellite transmission capability, they said.

Hainan, one of the locations where officials said the balloons are based, is an island off the southern coast of China that has long been a PLA command and control location. Though known more for its naval facility, it features an airfield that was the home base for the Chinese J-8 interceptor fighter jet that collided with an American EP-3 spy plane in 2001.

In January, the U.S. military disclosed what it characterized as an unsafe maneuver in December by a Chinese fighter jet that U.S. military officials said flew too close to an American reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace near the island. The Chinese J-11 fighter pulled within 20 feet of the American plane’s nose, “forcing the RC-135 to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said in a statement.

The spy balloon shot down Saturday first entered U.S. airspace over Alaska on Jan. 28. It crossed north of the Aleutian islands, back over mainland Alaska, over Canada and then over northern Idaho last week, but the Pentagon did not acknowledge its presence until NBC News reported last Thursday that the Pentagon was tracking the balloon over Montana.

The resulting political uproar — some Republicans slammed the Biden administration for not shooting down the balloon sooner — led Secretary of State Antony Blinken to postpone a trip to Beijing, an announcement made hours before his plane was set to take off.

U.S. intelligence analysts have retroactively identified as spy balloons objects that were previously deemed unidentified, according to U.S. officials. New technologies have enabled the detection of measurement and signature intelligence, or MASINT, which typically includes information about radar or electromagnetic signals, such as those that might be emitted by surveillance balloons.

In some instances, the military and intelligence communities have been able to say that they originated in particular countries, including China, the officials said.

The retroactive discovery of the Chinese balloons helps explain why senior defense officials serving in the Trump administration were not aware of the incursions during their time in office, officials said.

China has made significant use of balloons to monitor targets on the ground, officials said. The balloons often don’t use the most cutting-edge technology — in most cases, the sensors aboard don’t capture more information than China could obtain with a satellite.

But balloons offer some advantages. They can linger over a target for hours, whereas a satellite orbiting Earth may have only minutes to snap a picture of its target. “If you have a balloon that’s moving extremely slowly you have persistence that you can’t get from a satellite,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Charlie “Tuna” Moore, a former fighter pilot who helped run operations out of NORAD and retired in October as deputy of U.S. Cyber Command.

Analysts think the balloons, like drones, can be remotely piloted — at about 30 to 60 mph, said one official. And because balloons float along high-altitude winds, their paths are less predictable and thus more difficult to track. The balloons are also much cheaper to produce and launch than space-based satellites.

Some of the balloons have been launched from China on flight paths that took them around the entire globe, officials said.

Officials noted that China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was apparently caught by surprise and was chagrined to see Blinken cancel his visit. The ministry initially issued a statement, saying China “regrets that the airship strayed into the United States by mistake.” Since then, Beijing has been contacting its neighbors to keep lines of communications open amid the burgeoning crisis — a signal, said one official in the Pacific region, that Beijing was embarrassed by the balloon’s flight across the United States and trying to quell the controversy.

In a statement over the weekend, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson appealed for maintaining “a coolheaded and prudent” approach to the incident.

A U.S. official said that “there was no sense that” the balloon’s incursion into continental U.S. airspace on the eve of Blinken’s visit was a deliberate provocation. But, the person added, “We are confident that this was a purposeful global program.”

“China’s foreign policy is a constant search for leverage and in most circumstances there are ample opportunities,” said the official. “In this one, there would appear to be very few. So when the Chinese appeal for calm and coolheadedness you can be sure they’re nearly out of options.”

Cate Cadell and Alex Horton contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · February 7, 2023

2. Expert reveals biggest under-the-radar takeaway from Chinese spy flight crisis

Excerpts:

Despite past rhetoric from the U.S. and Chinese governments, the crisis showed that high-level officials from the two sides were able to leverage crisis communications during an emergency, Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the nonpartisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News Digital.

"One of the one of the justifications for Secretary of State Blinken's upcoming, or now-canceled, trip to China was that it was intended to put a so-called 'floor' in the relationship to stabilize US-China ties," Singleton said in an interview. "And that included efforts to bolster these backchannel communications that could be used in a time of crisis. The implication was that, without these back channels, the two superpowers could veer towards a very serious sort of altercation or miscalculation."

"But I think what this entire episode demonstrates is that there are functioning backchannels that both governments can use to reach back into the highest levels in both Washington and in China," he continued. "That should force us to rethink the basis for our current and ongoing engagement with China."

Expert reveals biggest under-the-radar takeaway from Chinese spy flight crisis

foxnews.com · by Thomas Catenacci | Fox News

Video

Chinese spy aircraft was a 'middle finger' to America: Lisa Boothe

Fox News contributor Lisa Boothe says on ‘Outnumbered’ the balloon could be a ‘dry run for something bigger' by China.

An expert on U.S.-China relations said a major takeaway from the Chinese spy flight saga was the subtle revelation that a functioning backchannel between the two nations existed.

Despite past rhetoric from the U.S. and Chinese governments, the crisis showed that high-level officials from the two sides were able to leverage crisis communications during an emergency, Craig Singleton, a senior China fellow at the nonpartisan Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News Digital.

"One of the one of the justifications for Secretary of State Blinken's upcoming, or now-canceled, trip to China was that it was intended to put a so-called 'floor' in the relationship to stabilize US-China ties," Singleton said in an interview. "And that included efforts to bolster these backchannel communications that could be used in a time of crisis. The implication was that, without these back channels, the two superpowers could veer towards a very serious sort of altercation or miscalculation."

"But I think what this entire episode demonstrates is that there are functioning backchannels that both governments can use to reach back into the highest levels in both Washington and in China," he continued. "That should force us to rethink the basis for our current and ongoing engagement with China."

REPUBLICAN DEMANDS JOE BIDEN, KAMALA HARRIS RESIGN AFTER 'CATASTROPHIC CHINESE SPY BALLOON SPECTACLE'

The Chinese spy balloon drifts above the Atlantic Ocean just off the coast of South Carolina with a fighter jet and its contrail seen below it on Saturday, Feb. 4. (Chad Fish via AP)

"If the focus of that engagement is squarely on establishing guardrails and backchannels, well, this latest incident, while certainly a diplomatic dust up, suggests that backchannels exist and that they can be used," Singleton added.

On Thursday, the Pentagon acknowledged that a Chinese spy balloon carrying intelligence-gathering sensors and equipment had been detected flying above Montana. Officials said the device had first been detected five days earlier off the western coast of Alaska before flying across the state, into Canada and entering the continental United States in Idaho.

PENTAGON WORKING TO RECOVER CHINESE SPY BALLOON, EXPECTS VALUABLE INTEL FROM IT

Then, on Saturday, after the balloon continued its flight Friday through several Midwestern and southeastern states, a U.S. fighter jet shot it down off the coast of South Carolina in the Atlantic Ocean. The unmanned surveillance aircraft had ultimately gone seven days from the time it was first detected over the Pacific Ocean to the moment it was taken down.

As a result of the ongoing flight of the surveillance balloon, Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed his trip to China which was slated for this week. Blinken said the situation was "unacceptable."

President Biden is flanked by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during a cabinet meeting on Jan. 5. (Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

Blinken and several senior administration officials, though, engaged with Chinese counterparts in the ensuing days of the crisis, according to Singleton.

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"Meetings were held here in Washington with senior Chinese officials," he told Fox News Digital. "Secretary Blinken spoke at numerous points with very senior officials back in Beijing. Defense Department officials were in touch with their counterparts in the People's Liberation Army. You can't hope for any more robust dialog and backchanneling within hours of a potential crisis emerging."

"All of those contacts taken together suggest that, while the two sides clearly disagree about the scope of China's espionage activities and in particular whether China violated U.S. territorial sovereignty, the two governments were able to manage a great power crisis immediately, robustly and at multiple levels," Singleton said.

Thomas Catenacci is a politics writer for Fox News Digital.

foxnews.com · by Thomas Catenacci | Fox News

3. China’s Balloon Could Be America’s Awakening

Excerpts:

As it turns out, Washington couldn’t carry off such an audacious campaign to change American hearts and minds—but Beijing could. The stirring, rather than any intelligence it gathered or diplomatic friction it produced, will be the lasting effect of this strange stunt.

The notion that the United States is still asleep on China might seem odd to policymakers. China is, after all, the stated top priority of U.S. foreign policy. It is the U.S. military’s pacing threat. Increasingly, it is the explicit focus of government leaders who consistently make the public case.

China’s Balloon Could Be America’s Awakening

An alarming blunder may convince the U.S. public to take Beijing’s threats seriously.

By Richard Fontaine, the chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security.

Foreign Policy · by Richard Fontaine · February 7, 2023

If Beijing meant for its spy balloon to float across the United States undetected, then it could not have failed more spectacularly. The airship, which may have never been intended to fly so low or even take the course it did, looked less like a distant satellite and more like the Goodyear Blimp. And so while no one could have predicted it, China’s balloon may well spur America’s awakening.

The episode could hardly have been better designed to prompt U.S. concerns. Start by understanding that, surrounded by two oceans and friendly neighbors, Americans are exquisitely sensitive to physical violations of their sovereignty. National security threats tend to emerge “over there”—in Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, and the Western Pacific. Although they might feel secondary effects—rising gas prices, a higher grocery bill, or a family member in the military—these kinds of threats are intangible for most Americans most of the time. Beijing may fly spy satellites over the United States, conduct regular cyberattacks, cover up the origins of a global pandemic, and infiltrate American infrastructure, but the effects (though real) are largely unseen.

So imagine you could put in the air a tangible, sensational manifestation of Beijing’s menace—an enormous spy balloon, for instance. Watch the threat linger for several days over the heartland, drifting so low it can even be seen from the ground. Stir in fervor among Americans who suddenly wish to take matters into their own hands, even attempting to shoot into the air. Throw in a dash of denial from Beijing and a weak claim that the airship is nothing more than a weather balloon blown off course. Follow it almost immediately, and most inconveniently for China, with the appearance of another errant meteorological airship. End it all with an F-22 firing a missile into the spy balloon, puncturing the notion that U.S.-China friction will be confined to Asia rather than the homeland.

As it turns out, Washington couldn’t carry off such an audacious campaign to change American hearts and minds—but Beijing could. The stirring, rather than any intelligence it gathered or diplomatic friction it produced, will be the lasting effect of this strange stunt.

The notion that the United States is still asleep on China might seem odd to policymakers. China is, after all, the stated top priority of U.S. foreign policy. It is the U.S. military’s pacing threat. Increasingly, it is the explicit focus of government leaders who consistently make the public case.

FBI Director Christopher Wray, for instance, has said, “The Chinese government’s disregard for global leadership norms, ruthless hunger for economic superiority, and desire to influence American politics make it a threat to U.S. national security.” U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo warns that “China today poses a set of growing challenges to our national security. That is a fact. It’s deploying its military in ways that undermine the security of our allies and our partners and the free flow of global trade.” The U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has labeled China as “the only competitor out there with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, a power to do so.” The only congressional committee focused on a single country is, unsurprisingly, dedicated to competition with China.

For the American public, however, it’s a different story. In a list of threats, a November 2022 survey found China ranked behind domestic political divisions, cyberattacks, rising authoritarianism, surveillance technology, terrorism, Russia, biological attacks, and global pandemics. Another found the majority of Americans worried about Chinese territorial ambitions, but only a third of people surveyed believe the United States should lead an international response to China’s rise. Other polls show China ranking higher than other national security issues and higher than in previous years. But it is still not the top priority.

The perception of a China threat has grown significantly in recent years, but a gap between the public and Washington remains. Rising public concern has made some moves politically possible—like spending more on defense, pursuing a new industrial policy, and imposing export controls on high-end semiconductors. But that momentum has been insufficient to get the harder things done: an affirmative trade policy in Asia, a strategic approach to immigration, and a military transformation to prepare for a possible clash in the Pacific.

This reality has led political leaders and policymakers to bring the message home. By better informing the American people about the China challenge, the thinking goes, and by preparing them for a long period of competition against a major power, the United States can ensure the political support necessary to succeed. Those efforts, however, have thus far met limited success.

The balloon may just have made the difference. It turns out that a vivid representation of Chinese intentions focuses minds to a far greater degree than inveighing against threats to the liberal international order or lamenting land reclamation in the South China Sea. Will even greater political support now exist for a highly competitive approach to China? It’s hard to say. On the one hand, the focus may not last. On the other hand, a fine line exists between motivation to compete and overreaction to perceived threats. American foreign policy is replete with examples on both sides of that ledger. Prudence and resolve, not panic and bravado, should be the watchwords.

But this odd event is precisely the kind that could prompt a shift in wider American perceptions of the salience of the China challenge. At the end of the day, it was just a balloon—unmanned and probably unsuccessful in its mission. But it signifies something greater. Beijing’s blunder may well represent—forgive the expression—a great-power trial balloon. And it may even spur a broad American awakening.

Foreign Policy · by Richard Fontaine · February 7, 2023

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 7, 2023

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2023

Key Takeaways

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is likely attempting to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine.
Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power.
The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline.
Russian state energy company Gazprom may be creating its own private security force, likely in an effort to normalize state-affiliated paramilitary groups and undermine non-state private military companies (PMCs).
The Kremlin may be implementing some demands previously voiced by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to build rapport with other nationalist figures who advocated for similar policies.
The Russian State Duma further formalized the institution of social benefit schemes in occupied territories of Ukraine in order to further consolidate administrative control of occupied areas.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut.
Russian forces did not make confirmed territorial gains on the southern axis.
Russian officials appear to be investing in railway infrastructure to increase the efficiency of military logistics.
The Russian MoD is reportedly proposing a bill to allow all military personnel, including conscripts, to voluntarily participate in Russian peacekeeping missions.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 7, 2023

Feb 7, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

February 7, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a press conference on the status of the war on February 7, likely in an attempt to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine. Shoigu claimed that Russian forces are successfully developing operations near Bakhmut and Vuhledar and claimed that Russian troops have recently taken control of Soledar, Klishchiivka, Pidhorodne, Krasnopolivka, Blahodatne, and Mykolaivka in the Bakhmut area and Lobkove in Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Shoigu likely held this press conference in order to create the guise of formality and legitimacy for the Russian MoD as it continues efforts to reform the Russian military, prepare for a renewed offensive, and set conditions for prolonged operations in Ukraine. ISW has previously noted that Russian officials are preparing for an imminent Russian offensive in Ukraine in the coming months, and that these preparations are also happening on the strategic level with Russian command structures.[2]

Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power. The UK MoD assessed on February 7 that Russia has highly likely been attempting to launch a major offensive operation to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders since early January 2023 but had only been able to gain several hundred meters of territory per week.[3] The UK MoD attributed such a slow pace to Russian munitions shortages and a lack of maneuver units that are necessary for a successful and rapid offensive. The UK MoD noted that Russia is unlikely to build up the combat power necessary to substantially affect the outcome of the war while Russian military command continues to demand for unrealistic and sweeping advances. ISW similarly assessed on January 28 that Russian leadership may be once again planning a decisive offensive based on erroneous assumptions about Russian military capabilities and likely lacks the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation.[4] ISW also observed the Kremlin signaling preparations for an early 2023 offensive in December but assessed that the time and space relationship may hinder Russian rapid and large-scale advance aspirations as Ukraine heads into a muddy spring season unsuitable for maneuver warfare.[5]

The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline. One prominent milblogger warned that Russian forces should not fall into the trap of attempting to start numerous offensive operations like they did in spring 2022 but instead focus on gradual advances that would generate high casualties among Ukrainian forces. The milblogger added that Russian military command should prioritize tiring Ukrainian forces and disrupting their logistics rather than conducting a frontal assault. Another milblogger stated that Russia still needs to create a breakthrough force and reject its current tactic of launching small, localized offensives that waste Russian combat on “capturing fields.”[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian efforts to conduct spoiling attacks and to fix Ukrainian forces further undermine the sustainability of a major offensive.

Russian state energy company Gazprom may be creating its own private security force, likely in an effort to normalize state-affiliated paramilitary groups and undermine private military companies (PMCs). The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 7 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin privately authorized Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Nafta to establish a 70 percent stake in its own private security company under a law on the safety of fuel and energy complex assets.[7] While it is not inherently unusual for state and private energy companies to establish private security forces to protect their assets, the GUR noted that the creation of this PMC aligns with ongoing tensions between the Kremlin and Wagner Group PMC financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russia may use these Gazprom security forces for purposes other than protecting Russian energy assets.

The Kremlin may be considering implementing some demands previously voiced by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to build rapport with other nationalist figures who advocated for similar policies. Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Vasily Piskarev is reportedly preparing amendments to the Russian Criminal Code to include provisions against discreditation of individuals who participated in combat operations and volunteer detachments that assist the Russian Armed Forces during the war in Ukraine.[8] Russian state media credited Prigozhin as the initiator of the amendment, and the provision will likely include Wagner mercenaries whom the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) repeatedly labeled as “volunteers.”[9] The largest Russia media holding company, Gazprom Media, is reportedly planning to ban its media outlets (which include Russian federal TV channels) from publishing content on YouTube.[10] Russian outlets also speculated that Gazprom Media’s bans may be connected to efforts to block YouTube in Russia — another initiative that Prigozhin advocated for since late 2022.[11] Both provisions, if authorized, do not legalize Wagner or elevate Prigozhin’s coveted political authority in Russia. However, those provisions appeal to the broader nationalist and milblogger communities who had been calling for stricter limitations on Western media in Russia and for the Kremlin’s recognition of volunteers — which include proxy armed formations, volunteer battalions, and the Russian Combat Reserve (BARS).

The Russian State Duma further formalized the institution of social benefit schemes in occupied territories of Ukraine in order to further consolidate administrative control of occupied areas. State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin stated on February 7 that the Duma adopted the first reading of four bills on the legislative integration of social rights of the residents of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[12] The bills define the minimum level of income, pension payments, sick leave, pregnancy and childcare benefits, and social support for veterans and the disabled and notably allows residents to submit documents to apply for social benefits in Ukrainian without a notarized translation into Russia.[13] The Duma bills represent the highest level of legislative integration of social benefit schemes thus far, having previously been defined and advertised in local forms by individual occupation officials. ISW continues to assess that such social benefit measures are a method of consolidating administrative control of occupied areas, as residents of occupied areas are forced to interact with Russian-controlled administrative organs to receive necessary payments.[14] The Duma bills codify and formalize these practices are part of the Russian legislative code.

Key Takeaways

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is likely attempting to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine.
Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power.
The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline.
Russian state energy company Gazprom may be creating its own private security force, likely in an effort to normalize state-affiliated paramilitary groups and undermine non-state private military companies (PMCs).
The Kremlin may be implementing some demands previously voiced by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to build rapport with other nationalist figures who advocated for similar policies.
The Russian State Duma further formalized the institution of social benefit schemes in occupied territories of Ukraine in order to further consolidate administrative control of occupied areas.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut.
Russian forces did not make confirmed territorial gains on the southern axis.
Russian officials appear to be investing in railway infrastructure to increase the efficiency of military logistics.
The Russian MoD is reportedly proposing a bill to allow all military personnel, including conscripts, to voluntarily participate in Russian peacekeeping missions.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna on February 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Novoselivske, 13km northwest of Svatove.[15] Kremlin-sponsored news outlet RIA Novosti published footage reportedly of Russian forces repelling a Ukrainian ground attack in Novoselivske on an unspecified but likely recent date.[16] Geolocated footage posted on February 6 shows that Russian T-90 tanks firing at Ukrainian forces in Novoselivske.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Kreminna and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[18] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced several kilometers near Bilohorivka, from which the milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces had previously withdrawn.[19] Ukrainian forces still maintain a presence in Bilohorivka, as ISW has recently reported.[20]

Russian sources are increasingly framing Russian offensive operations around Siversk (17km southwest of Kreminna) as supporting a broader effort against Lyman (23km west of Kreminna) rather than Bakhmut. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that Russian forces experienced unspecified successes near Siversk and claimed that Russian forces must take Siversk in order to later take Lyman.[21] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing towards Siversk from the northeast near Bilohorivka, from the east near Zolotarivka, and from the southeast near Spirne.[22]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhokamyanske (30km northeast) and Vesele (17km northeast); north of Bakhmut near Zaliznyanske (6km north), Krasna Hora (4km north), and Paraskoviivka (5km north); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[23] Geolocated footage published on February 6 confirms Russian tactical advances north of Bakhmut near Blahodatne (7km north of Bakhmut) and Krasna Hora.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are continuing efforts to take Krasna Hora and Paraskoviivka but that Ukrainian troops still hold these two settlements.[25] One milblogger claimed that Wagner has cleared up to 50 percent of Krasna Hora.[26] Several Russian sources also claimed that Wagner Group forces reached the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway but did not offer specifics on where this may have occurred.[27] Russian milbloggers continue to report that Ukrainian troops maintain control of Ivanivske, a critical settlement along the T0504.[28] Regardless of whether Wagner has reached the T0504, they are already close enough to the highway to substantially threaten Ukrainian supply capabilities along the route. The fact that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut continues despite tangible threats to the T0504 suggests that its interdiction will not be the operationally significant victory that Russian sources have presented it as.

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area or in western Donetsk Oblast on February 7. A Russian milblogger reported that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Somalia” and “Sparta” battalions and “Slavic” Brigade are responsible for operations in the Avdiivka area.[29] Russian media outlet RT posted a report from Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and claimed that Ukrainian forces are fighting for the western part of the settlement but that it is harder for Ukrainian forces to hold their fortified areas due to high losses.[30] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian troops conducted limited counterattacks near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) on the evening of February 6.[31] Footage and imagery posted to social media shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions near Vuhledar, and a Ukrainian reserve officer claimed that Russian forces lost up to 30 armored vehicles during the counterattacks and associated strikes.[32]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not make confirmed territorial gains on the southern axis on February 7. Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Administration member Vladimir Rogov claimed on February 7 that Russian forces secured their frontline positions in Zaporizhia Oblast and are fortifying new positions seized in January.[33] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on February 6 that Russian forces continue to shell the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River to encourage Ukrainian civilians living there to relocate deeper into occupied areas.[34] Ukrainian forces additionally continue to target Russian concentration areas in Kherson Oblast on February 7. Khlan added that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian watercraft and struck a Russian base on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[35] Geolocated footage published on February 7 showed a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service drone and artillery strike on Russian positions in Kardashynka (13km south of Kherson City on the east bank of the Dnipro) in Kherson Oblast.[36] Russian forces continued routine shelling in Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts on February 7.[37]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to consolidate control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Advisor to the Head of Rosenergoatom Renat Karchaa claimed on February 7 that Russian repairmen are completing the construction of structures to protect nuclear waste storage from shelling.[38] Karchaa claimed that Ukrainian workers who refused to sign contracts with Rosenergoatom are not allowed to work at the ZNPP.[39]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials appear to be investing in railway infrastructure to increase the efficiency of military logistics. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed during a teleconference on February 7 that Russia has been working to construct the Ulak-Fevralsk section (339km) of the Baikal-Amur Mainline Railroad since April 2021.[40] Shoigu claimed that Russian workers have completed the most intensive portion of the project and will fulfill the reconstruction task in a timely manner. Russian President Vladimir Putin also met with Russian Railways CEO Oleg Belozyorov on February 6.[41]

Russian officials continue efforts to target opposition voices who have left Russia. Russian State Duma Committee on Culture chairperson Elena Yampolskaya stated on February 6 that the Duma is forming a working group to establish potential punitive measures against people who left Russia, discredit the Russian Armed Forces, and support Ukraine.[42] The Duma working group will reportedly hear proposals on the confiscation of personal property, removal of state awards, and internet content bans and will report to Duma chairman Vyacheslav Volodin, who first proposed the confiscation of property in January.[43] Russian State Duma Committee of State Construction and Legislation chairperson Pavel Krasheninnikov, however, opposed efforts to punitively confiscate property from those who left Russian and emphasized the need for legislative amendments for existing law before such a motion can pass.[44] The divergence between Krasheninnikov and the Volodin camp suggests that there are certain fractures within the Russian political sphere on how to treat those who fled the country due to the war, as ISW has previously assessed.[45] United Russia parliamentarian Andrey Kolesnik called for those who left Russia and criticize the Russian Armed Forces to face the death penalty, suggesting that even more hardline factions continue to advocate for their positions. [46]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly proposing a bill to allow all military personnel, including conscripts, to voluntarily participate in Russian peacekeeping missions.[47] Russian outlet RBC claimed on February 7 to have received a document pertaining to the bill, which reportedly proposes to expand categories of personnel eligible for participation in peacekeeping missions to be recruited ”on a voluntary basis by military personnel who have undergone preliminary special training,” which includes conscripts under existing Russian law.[48] The explanatory note on the document states that the Russian MoD is proposing this law to “improve the procedure” and “expand the possibilities” of recruitment for peacekeeping activities.[49] It is unclear why the Russian MoD is pursuing this proposal as it continues efforts to formalize Russian operations in Ukraine, but it may be an effort to set conditions to secure capabilities for peacekeeping missions abroad.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to target religious organizations that lack Kremlin backing. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on February 7 that Russian occupation authorities are searching churches and detaining religious leaders of several denominations, including the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, in order to decrease local competition for influence with the state-affiliated Russian Orthodox Church.[50]

Russian authorities simplified the process to deprive Ukrainian citizens of their citizenship. The Russian State Duma adopted the first reading of a bill on February 7 that automatically deprives Ukrainian citizens of Ukrainian citizenship when they file to renounce their citizenship.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 7 that occupation authorities in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, threaten to dismiss state employees without Russian citizenship and require all employees with Russian citizenship to renounce their Ukrainian citizenship in writing.[52] The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated on February 7 that occupation authorities in Luhansk Oblast predicate pensions and teaching positions on renunciation of Ukrainian citizenship and possession of a Russian passport.[53] The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration also stated that occupation authorities near Kremmina allow teachers who have not renounced Ukrainian citizenship and accepted Russian citizenship to continue working but reduce their salaries by 30 percent.[54]

Ukrainian partisans continue to target Russian military infrastructure in rear areas of occupied Ukraine. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 7 that Ukrainian partisans committed arson against a Rovenky-Antratsyt railway connection control station near Yasenivskyi, Luhansk Oblast.[55]

Russian authorities continue to frame partisan activity and other forms of resistance in occupied Ukraine as terrorist activity to justify crackdowns against pro-Ukrainian actors. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense Headquarters announced on February 7 that the DNR is forming an anti-terrorist commission to organize law enforcement efforts and official means of preventing alleged “terrorist and extremist manifestations.”[56] A prominent Russian news source claimed that some Ukrainian residents near the Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast front line who refuse to evacuate to rear areas may transmit information about Russian troop movements to Ukrainian forces.[57] The source claimed that Russian forces see the “evacuation” of civilians to rear areas as the best solution to this problem, suggesting that Russian authorities may increase measures to force civilians to evacuate and cooperate with the occupation government.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Senior Belarusian leadership, including unspecified members of the presidential administration, security council, and department heads, conducted a large-scale training simulation on national security responses at the Belarusian Military Academy on February 7.[58] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense previously announced a snap military readiness check of the Military Academy of Belarus on February 6, as ISW has reported.[59]

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Two unspecified airborne assault companies of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Assault Brigade conducted live fire and reconnaissance exercises at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus, on February 7.[60]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/24008; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-02-07

[7] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/hazprom-stvoriuie-vlasnu-pryvatnu-viiskovu-kompaniiu.html

[10] https://t.me/bazabazon/15722; https://t.me/bazabazon/14188; https://me... io/news/2023/02/07/baza-proektam-gazprom-media-zapretili-vykladyvat-kontent-na-youtube

[11] https://t.me/bazabazon/15722; https://t.me/bazabazon/14188; https://me... io/news/2023/02/07/baza-proektam-gazprom-media-zapretili-vykladyvat-kontent-na-youtube; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/288; https://t.me/concordgroup_official/17

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1622901317520818178; https://twitter.com/chris__759/status/1622778797224349696; https://twitter.com/TankDiary/status/1622728548166340608

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/24008; https://telegra dot ph/Vstupitelnoe-slovo-Ministra-oborony-Rossijskoj-Federacii-generala-armii-Sergeya-SHojgu-na-tematicheskom-selektornom-soveshchanii-02-07

[42] https://iz dot ru/1464646/vasilisa-iaseneva/narushiteli-v-poriadke-v-gd-otceniat-mery-protiv-diskreditiruiushchikh-stranu-relokantov; https://t.me/tvrain/62479; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-5-6

[43] https://iz dot ru/1464646/vasilisa-iaseneva/narushiteli-v-poriadke-v-gd-otceniat-mery-protiv-diskreditiruiushchikh-stranu-relokantov; https://t.me/tvrain/62479; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-5-...

[44] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/02/2023/63e0c86a9a79473064054a7c?from=from_main_4; https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-feb-5-6

[47] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/02/07/minoborony-rf-predlozhilo-razreshit-uchastvovat-v-mirotvorcheskih-missiyah-vsem-voennym-v-tom-chisle-prizyvnikam; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/02/2023/63e1134a9a794758bbe93eef?from=from_main_1

[48] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/02/2023/63e1134a9a794758bbe93eef?from=from_main_1

[49] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/07/02/2023/63e1134a9a794758bbe93eef?from=from_main_1

[50] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/02/07/rosiyany-utyskayut-nepidkontrolni-konfesiyi/

understandingwar.org

5. ‘We killed three Russians’: the secretive Ukrainian special forces taking the fight across the border

Excerpts:

The second eldest of the three men, Taras, says he returned two weeks ago from what he described as a straightforward operation. “Our group needed to bring a certain amount of explosives to the territory of Russia and leave them in a certain place,” he says. “I don’t know for what and whom this explosive was intended. But I know for sure that some people in Russia are ready to help Ukrainians.”

But six weeks ago, he says, he completed the most successful operation yet. It had a jittery start. “We had a task to destroy a Russian helicopter transporting high-ranking officials of the Russian ministry of internal affairs,” says Taras. “On the first time in, bad weather prevented the laser sight from accurately aiming to hit the target. In addition, we had internal problems within the group, arguments, so we entered Russian territory but turned back, took into account our mistakes … and in a week we made a second attempt.”

The taskforce of five men set off at 7am, easily stalking through the forests and fields, to cross into Russia. “We walked all day,” says Taras. “Then we spent the night at the location and at 9am we heard a helicopter. I had a small reconnaissance drone with me and it confirmed it was the same helicopter.

“We fired from a portable anti-aircraft missile system at a helicopter from a distance of 4km. Unfortunately, we didn’t see the hit as we were so far away, but we heard the explosion. And then we quickly fled from our positions. We left behind the tripod used for the portable anti-aircraft missile system. We returned twice as fast.”

‘We killed three Russians’: the secretive Ukrainian special forces taking the fight across the border

Kyiv and western governments deny they exist, but saboteurs say they are striking Russia on its soil with the help of its people

Russia-Ukraine war – latest news

The Guardian · by Daniel Boffey · February 4, 2023

If the worst happens, Taras, 23, Vladyslav, 21, and their commander, Olexiy, 39, are well aware that the Ukrainian government will deny any knowledge of them. In western capitals, there is a collective shudder at the very thought of them.

They are members of the Bratstvo battalion, a volunteer group of Ukrainian special forces, taking the fight against Vladimir Putin beyond the frontlines of the war in Ukraine, past the occupied areas of their country – and deep into Russia.

Their work ranges from the kidnapping of senior Kremlin officials, to the destruction of key military infrastructure and the downing of enemy aircraft on Russian territory.

It might seem odd for a battalion such as theirs to allow their stories to be heard in public. But that is to misunderstand their purpose. In everything they do, there is a single message they want to send. “It is very easy for us to cross the Russian border,” says Vladyslav, the youngest of the three, with a smile.

The volunteers of the Bratstvo, Ukrainian for brotherhood, have a peculiar status, technically independent from Ukraine’s army but operating side by side with the official forces. Their arm’s-length status offers deniability.

Olexiy is in “intelligence”, he says, but the battalion recruits mainly civilians, or plucks the brightest from other voluntary battalions. He says he understands why their work must remain apart. The reasoning is nevertheless hard for them all to swallow.

Ukrainian saboteurs Taras, Olexiy and Vladyslav in Taras Shevchenko Park in central Kyiv. Photograph: Ed Ram/The Guardian

It comes down to the west’s nervousness at the thought of Ukraine having the capacity to hit Russia in Russia, as highlighted by the protracted debate over Germany’s provision of Leopard 2 tanks, and the refusal of the US and others to supply F16 fighter jets.

Much of that anxiety is probably linked to the Kremlin’s threat to use nuclear weapons if the “very existence of the state is put under threat”.

“It turns out that Russians can go to Ukrainian territory, but Ukrainians cannot go into Russia,” Olexiy says.

The Bratstvo volunteers are not deterred. They insist it is vital for the Russian high command to feel the heat of battle on their own territory.

Wearing jeans, jumpers and hoodies, they are drinking coffee in Kyiv’s Taras Shevchenko Park as they tell of their adventures, while on a break from training, planning and missions. The only hint of who they are is the handgun on Vladyslav’s hip.

Because of their unofficial status, their stories could not be independently verified but they are convincing and credible. They are also extraordinary in their daring.

The second eldest of the three men, Taras, says he returned two weeks ago from what he described as a straightforward operation. “Our group needed to bring a certain amount of explosives to the territory of Russia and leave them in a certain place,” he says. “I don’t know for what and whom this explosive was intended. But I know for sure that some people in Russia are ready to help Ukrainians.”

But six weeks ago, he says, he completed the most successful operation yet. It had a jittery start. “We had a task to destroy a Russian helicopter transporting high-ranking officials of the Russian ministry of internal affairs,” says Taras. “On the first time in, bad weather prevented the laser sight from accurately aiming to hit the target. In addition, we had internal problems within the group, arguments, so we entered Russian territory but turned back, took into account our mistakes … and in a week we made a second attempt.”

The taskforce of five men set off at 7am, easily stalking through the forests and fields, to cross into Russia. “We walked all day,” says Taras. “Then we spent the night at the location and at 9am we heard a helicopter. I had a small reconnaissance drone with me and it confirmed it was the same helicopter.

“We fired from a portable anti-aircraft missile system at a helicopter from a distance of 4km. Unfortunately, we didn’t see the hit as we were so far away, but we heard the explosion. And then we quickly fled from our positions. We left behind the tripod used for the portable anti-aircraft missile system. We returned twice as fast.”

Whether the Kremlin officials in the helicopter were killed or not, for Taras it was a successful mission, achieving the central purpose of the battalion’s initiatives.

“We showed we can enter the territory of Russia and show the Russians that Ukrainians can act,” he says. “After the Russians find out that saboteurs are working on their territory, they need to move a lot of soldiers to find these saboteurs. It is very demoralising to the enemy. The helicopter was for the Russian leadership. And the very fact that Ukrainian saboteurs are shooting at Russian commanders is already a point of tension for Russians. This makes the Russian command nervous.”

The last operation in Russia in which Vladyslav took part was a month ago in the region around the city of Belgorod, where a number of ammunition stores have exploded in recent months.

Fires and explosions reported at military targets in Russia and Crimea

The small taskforces, often just four or five soldiers, work out where the safe routes lie into Russia by examining the movement of livestock, or taking the advice of those who smuggled contraband before the war.

Vladyslav and his fellow fighters were tasked with “capturing or killing one of the high-ranking officers of the FSB”, the Russian security services.

“He worked close to the border with Ukraine, but on the territory of Russia,” says Vladyslav. “We had the route of this Russian officer’s car and we decided to set up an ambush.”

They were in position for hours but the car did not arrive, and the primary goal had to be abandoned as day broke. They needed to get out but they faced the challenge of breaking back into Ukraine, past the watching Russian forces gathered at the border.

“We met a border post of Russian border guards,” Vladyslav recalls. “We engaged, we were four on four. We killed three Russians and slightly wounded one. We captured him, took him to Ukrainian territory and handed him over to the Ukrainian military.”

The Ukrainians had survived another day with just one of their group suffering a gunshot wound to his arm.

But it does not always go to plan. On Christmas Day, four of their colleagues, Yuriy Horovets, 34, Maksym Mykhaylov, 32, Taras Karpyuk, 39 and the rookie of the mission, 19-year-old Bohdan Lyagov, were killed 12.5km (seven miles) into Russia’s Bryansk region, north-east of Ukraine.

The first Olexiy knew of the disaster was when photographs of their dead colleagues lying in the snow emerged on Russian Telegram channels on 26 December. The Kremlin-supporting media outlet, RIA Novosti, reported the men were carrying “SIG Sauer submachine guns, communication and navigation devices, and four bombs with a total capacity of about 40 kg in TNT equivalent”.

They were, the FSB, said, set on carrying out “sabotage and terrorist acts”. The FSB published a video showing the bodies, spread between the pine trees of a Russian forest. “Everyone was shocked,” Olexiy says. “They were our best fighters.”

The manner of their deaths remains unclear. Their bodies have not been recovered. The three older men of the group were hiking champions and veterans of this kind of work, having operated before on reconnaissance missions in the occupied Chornobyl region, among others.

“The guide led them to a certain distance from the border of Ukraine deep into the territory of Russia and left them there,” Olexiy recalls. “We were very calm for these guys and were sure everything would be fine. We do not know the details, but we assume that they accidentally entered the second line of the Russian defence. And in front of it, the Russians laid mines in the ground.”

The men were filmed in the moments before they set out on their mission, putting on their “snow camo” uniform, and readying their weapons. “I asked them, ‘How are you feeling?’’, says Olexiy. “And Yuriy answered: ‘This is my dream. I’m doing the operation I’ve dreamed about all my life’. All these guys were very bright and very motivated.”

It was a hard reminder of the risks they take. Asked whether their parents know about their work, the two younger men, in their early 20s, exhale loudly and laugh. “My parents only know that I am currently at war,” says Vladyslav. “But you have to understand that when we plan our operations, very few people know about it. Information about the operation can be passed to the enemy. The soldiers nearby may say something to their colleagues and the Russians may find out about it. It is better for our parents not to know what we do now.”

Taras adds: “Our operations are actually twice as safe as those performed by the Ukrainian armed forces. It seems that this is a very dangerous job, but we are very seriously preparing for it.”

The importance of their role, for all that it is denied by the government in Kyiv and disliked by western capitals, is clear to them.

“[Western readers] may expect from us that we are going to blow up the Kremlin, but so far this is not the case,” says Taras. “My opinion is that you should start with small tasks and then move on to more complex ones. A friend of mine has a saying: ‘To destroy an enemy military base, you must first blow up the doghouse.’”

The Guardian · by Daniel Boffey · February 4, 2023

6. China has more ICBM launchers than US, senior general tells lawmakers

China has more ICBM launchers than US, senior general tells lawmakers | CNN Politics

CNN · by Haley Britzky · February 7, 2023

Washington CNN —

A senior American military officer notified lawmakers in January that China has more land-based fixed and mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers than the US, according to a letter sent to Congress.

The letter from Gen. Anthony Cotton, commander of US Strategic Command which oversees the US nuclear arsenal says that as of October 2022 China’s inventory of land-based fixed and mobile ICBM launchers “exceeds the number of ICBM launchers in the United States.”

The letter also says that China’s does not have more ICBMs or nuclear warheads than the US.

A joint statement released on Tuesday by Republican leaders of Congress’ Armed Services committees called the letter “a wake-up call for the United States.”

“It is not an understatement to say that the Chinese nuclear modernization program is advancing faster than most believed possible. We have no time to waste in adjusting our nuclear force posture to deter both Russia and China. This will have to mean higher numbers and new capabilities,” the statement said.

The details of the letter were first reported by the Wall Street Journal.

Though the US has larger nuclear arsenal than China, Beijing’s efforts to modernize and increase its nuclear capabilities have alarmed lawmakers and garnered the attention of US military leaders.

The news of the letter comes as tensions between the US and China have increased over a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon the US military shot down over the Atlantic Ocean on Saturday. The balloon resulted in Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponing his anticipated trip to Beijing, calling the balloon’s presence over the continental USA a “clear violation of US sovereignty and international law.”

China has maintained that the balloon crossing into the US was “completely an accident” and said on Sunday that China reserves “the right to make further necessary reaction.”

ICBMs are a staple in the US nuclear triad, which includes nuclear delivery systems on land and in the air and sea. According to the Defense Department, they are distributed across 400 “hardened, underground silos” with another 50 silos “kept in ‘warm’ status.”

The US arsenal also includes more than a dozen submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles and a fleet of nuclear-capable bombers.

The US stockpile of nuclear warheads far surpasses China’s; in 2022, the US had more than 5,000 total nuclear warheads, with 1,644 of them deployed according to the Federation of American Scientists. China, meanwhile, has recently surpassed 400. And while the difference in stock is significant, a Pentagon report released in November said China is building its nuclear stockpile at an increasingly fast pace, and could have roughly 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 if they maintained that pace.

“We see, I think, a set of capabilities taking shape and new numbers in terms of what they’re looking to pursue that raise some questions about what their intent will be in the longer term,” a senior defense official told reporters at the time.

CNN · by Haley Britzky · February 7, 2023

7. Voice of America needs a reboot

Yes there have been some bad decisions like in any bureaucracy. If the reports below are true, particularly the Ukraine example, then we must do better.

However, some of the examples are from 2004 and 2016. Have there been any improvements from those examples? If they still persist then that is a problem.

I think the entire argument here is that a political appointee who is assessed by the author as not qualified has led to a bloated bureaucracy that is causing problems going back to 2004 and 2016.

I also wonder if the author has ever read a target audience analysis. One size does not fit all.

I notice there is no criticism of the Korean Service of VOA and Radio Free Asia. The Korean Service is doing very good work and I hope it is not branded with the same criticism. I can attest to its great work and the professionalism of their journalists as I deal with many of them almost every day.

Voice of America needs a reboot

Washington Examiner · by Michael Rubin · February 6, 2023

The United States spends almost a quarter of a billion dollars annually on Voice of America (VOA). On paper, it looks like a good deal. It broadcasts in 48 languages around the globe. Resourcing does not matter, however, if leadership fails to deliver. The war in Ukraine shows how, in times of crisis, resourcing matters less than how management spends it.

Consider Ukraine: Perhaps at no time in VOA’s nearly 75-year history of Ukrainian broadcasts has its programming been so important. And, yet, VOA only broadcasts TV programs 5.4 hours per week. Much of this is wasted. While VOA provides a 30-minute TV news broadcast, much of this features international news or reports developments in the U.S. What Ukraine needs is real-time, credible news about the war, not documentaries.

The situation is even worse when it comes to Russian broadcasting . It is important to provide an alternative to the indoctrination inherent in Russia’s media bubble. Yet, VOA only provides 12.5 broadcast hours weekly. Within this, a weekly program dedicated to space and technology reflects misplaced priorities. So too is a weekly program to showcase New York City and "iconic New York spots." Now, more than ever, it is crucial to reach Russians, not simply entertain them.

The problem is reminiscent of the Radio Sawa debacle. The successor to VOA Arabic, Radio Sawa prioritized American and Arab pop music to build a youthful market share. On February 1, 2004, I was in Iraqi Kurdistan with a senior American official when we got word of a large bombing in Erbil. We tuned to Radio Sawa to get news, but got Britney Spears. Ultimately, we had no choice but to rely on Radio Damascus.

The problem is leadership. President Barack Obama appointed Amanda Bennett, a professional journalist, and wife of the Washington Post CEO, to head VOA in March 2016. After President Joe Biden nominated her, the Democrat-led Senate confirmed Bennett to head the U.S. Agency for Global Media in September 2022. There is nothing wrong with a political appointee at the helm, but competence matters. Bennett was an accomplished journalist and editor, but had considerably less management experience. She has fumbled her tenure in three ways.

First, she arbitrarily reduced the number of staffers who could attend editorial meetings. VOA’s choice of coverage should not be secret, however, nor should Bennett avoid debate. Especially, that is, as she is a non-expert presiding over area experts not only at VOA, but across America’s other government-sponsored broadcast platforms.

Second, she has also assembled a top-heavy team, appointing deputies and senior advisors where none existed before and draining resources away from programming. Lastly, she fails to understand the audience and mission. Documentaries may make sense for a traditional American for-profit network or streaming service, but they are a waste of money for VOA and its partners. Nor, should television necessarily be dominant.

When I arrived in Baghdad a few months after the war, Al-Hurra was in its infancy. It had slick production, but the bus drivers, tea house workers, and car mechanics did not have the satellite dishes to receive it. By default, they listened to Iran’s Al-Alam which broadcast terrestrially and on AM radio. Arguably, these Iraqis represented the masses that Washington needed to win over, but never tried. Ukrainian soldiers in the field or their Russian counterparts on the other side of the trenches will not watch documentaries or television; they seek to tune in via shortwave. Will Washington ignore them?

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM RESTORING AMERICA

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is doing a very good job reaching out to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. To replicate their success, VOA and other outlets need to downsize bureaucracy and increase news programming. Save the entertainment and travelogues for a time when the liberal order is not on life support. Congress may want to investigate Bennett and VOA for protecting an employee who falsified her credentials but, frankly, this is the tip of the iceberg. It is time for a far broader examination of VOA and its governing body.

Michael Rubin ( @mrubin1971 ) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Washington Examiner · by Michael Rubin · February 6, 2023

8. U.S.-China trade hit record in 2022 despite tensions

U.S.-China trade hit record in 2022 despite tensions

Robust cross-border flows run counter to talk of 'decoupling'

https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/U.S.-China-trade-hit-record-in-2022-despite-tensions2?utm

MARRIAN ZHOU and RINTARO TOBITA, Nikkei staff writers

February 7, 2023 22:46 JST

NEW YORK/WASHINGTON -- Trade between the U.S. and China set a record last year, official figures released Tuesday show, despite bilateral tensions running high.

Imports and exports of goods between the countries hit $690.6 billion, a U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis report shows. The U.S. imported more toys and other consumer products, with China increasing imports of soybeans and other foods. The robust figures run counter to talk that the world's two largest economies are on track to decouple.

Exports to China increased by $2.4 billion, to $153.8 billion, while imports from China rose $31.8 billion to reach $536.8 billion, underpinned by strong U.S. consumer spending in the first half. The previous high for imports and exports between the two countries was $659 billion in 2018.

"For U.S. importers, the benefit of buying cheap Chinese products was compelling, even with the sanction tariffs," said Kensuke Abe of trading company Marubeni's Washington office.

Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods such as toys and plastic products -- worth $370 billion -- during the Trump administration mostly remain. The Biden administration weighed cutting them as part of dealing with the acute inflation, but the momentum for the move faded after Sino-American tensions rose, partly due to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan last summer.

"The record-high bilateral trade flows for 2022 underscore that despite the steady imposition of export controls and the continuation of the Trump tariffs, commercial ties between the United States and China remain strong," said Wendy Cutler, vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former acting deputy U.S. trade representative.

"While there may be decoupling in certain strategic product areas, other sectors remain untouched, including a wide variety of manufactured and agricultural products," she said.

David Dollar, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Treasury official, said that U.S. imports of "a few high-tech products such as semiconductors were down, but this was dwarfed by increases in other areas."

China's overall international goods trade hit a record annual high in 2022, according to a Xinhua report last month. The figure totaled 42.07 trillion yuan ($6.2 trillion) in General Administration of Customs data, up 7.7% from the year before. Exports climbed 10.5% to 23.97 trillion yuan, while imports rose 4.3% to 18.1 trillion yuan.

China's gross domestic product expanded a real 3% in 2022, among its weakest annual growth rates in decades, with the economy hamstrung by Beijing's zero-COVID policy.

Vice Premier Liu He reassured the audience at the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in Davos last month that China is prioritizing economic growth and opening up in all directions.

"Some people say China will go for the planned economy. That's by no means possible," the economic policy chief said. "China's door to the outside will only open wider," he said.

U.S. economic growth slowed to 2.1% in 2022 from 5.9% the year before. But with the unemployment rate at historic lows and inflation slowing, overly pessimistic sentiments toward the American economy have receded.

Whether U.S.-China trade will continue to grow remains uncertain. Diplomatic relations have been strained further by the suspected Chinese spy balloon that flew over American airspace and was shot down by the U.S. military the over the Atlantic Ocean. In a report released last month, Boston Consulting Group forecast that bilateral trade will decline about 10% through 2031.

Additional reporting by Takafumi Hotta in New York.

9. 13 thoughts China’s balloon (probably) had while floating over America

Okay. A little levity from the balloon.

13 thoughts China’s balloon (probably) had while floating over America

militarytimes.com · by Sarah Sicard · February 6, 2023

The Chinese spy balloon that took its American journey last week has finally ended. While floating over Billings, Montana, on Wednesday, it rose (quite literally) to prominence among the American public, prompting political outrage, 24/7 watch parties, and, of course, the generation of thousands upon thousands of memes.

Chinese surveillance balloon detected over Montana

There are no immediate plans to shoot it down, due to concerns about debris. But steps have been taken to prevent the collection of sensitive information.

And while much of the coverage centered on what the U.S. government should do and how its military should respond, the perspective of the balloon was given no credence ... until now.

These are the thoughts the balloon (probably) had while floating adrift over the United States, until its epic demise at the hands of an F-22 fighter jet over Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.

1. I’m in Idaho. What a ridiculous name for a place. Do they not know what it sounds like?

2. What exactly is Montana? A state? A famous quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers? It’s really pretty here though.

3. I am definitely a weather balloon. I think. Am I? This is probably a bad time for an existential crisis. I don’t feel like a spy balloon though...

4. Why is there a Kansas City in Missouri when Kansas is right next door? It makes no sense at all.

5. They call so much of the Midwest “flyover country.” It’s perfect for me. I’m a balloon. This is where I belong.

6. ...Okay, I get it now. This is really, really boring. Why is there SO MUCH CORN? What do they even do with it? Corn pudding, corn dogs, corn cob pipes.

7. There’s been a lot of chatter about blowing me up lately. I’m a balloon. Technically I’m already blown up! HA!

8. It’s awfully nice of the FAA to suspend flights along my path. There’s nothing scarier than a roaring Boeing 737 with 348 passengers headed straight for you. I never liked playing chicken in the pool, much less in the air.

9. Is that water? WATER! I’ve made it to the coast. Finally.

10. I love the beach. It’s a shame I forgot the sunscreen though. My white skin is going to burn something fierce!

11. Huh. What’s that sound? It’s like an air conditioning unit is running inside of a washing machine.

12. That F-22 Raptor looks awfully close.

13. Oh God. Oh NO. OH S***!

Observation Post is the Military Times one-stop shop for all things off-duty. Stories may reflect author observations.

About Sarah Sicard

Sarah Sicard is a Senior Editor with Military Times. She previously served as the Digitial Editor of Military Times and the Army Times Editor. Other work can be found at National Defense Magazine, Task & Purpose, and Defense News.

10. "99 PLA Balloons" --An Update To A Cold War Classic by Peter W. Singer

Some satire of the Chinese balloon incident.

"99 PLA Balloons" --An Update To A Cold War Classic

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/99-pla-balloons-an-update-cold-war-classic-peter-w-singer/

Peter W. Singer

Strategist and Senior Fellow at New America; Managing Partner, Useful Fiction LLC

February 7, 2023

"99 PLA Balloons"

(An update to the Cold War Classic by Nena https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiwgOWo7mDc)

The PLA in a little toy shop

Buy a bag of balloons with the yuan its got

Xi sets them free at the break of dawn

'Til one by one, they were gone

Back at NORAD base, warnings in the software

Flash the message "Something's out there"

Floating in the winter sky

99 PLA balloons go by

99 PLA balloons

Floating in the winter sky

Panic tweets, it's red alert

There's something here from somewhere else

The war machine springs to life

Opens up one eager eye

Focusing it on the sky

The 99 PLA balloons go by

99 Zoom meetings greet

99 pundits meet

99 Op-Eds that worry, worry, super scurry

Call the troops out in a hurry

This is what we've waited for

This is it boys, this is war

The President must decide

As 99 PLA balloons go by

99 knights of the air

Ride F-22 jet fighters there

Everyone now expert in Balloons

Everyone now Richard Bransons

With orders to identify

To clarify and over-classify

Scrambling the winter sky

99 PLA balloons go by

As PLA red balloons go by

99 silly interviews read

In every one, a PLA balloon

When it's all over, and I'm standing pretty

In this dust that was a city

If I could find a souvenir

Just to prove the world was here

And here is a PLA balloon

I think of war, and let it go

11. Chinese Spy Balloon Spotlights CCP's Brazen Plot Against US

From the Epoch Times.

Chinese Spy Balloon Spotlights CCP's Brazen Plot Against US

Communist China's expansive military, spy campaigns have targeted America since long before the balloon's incursion

theepochtimes.com · February 7, 2023

By Andrew Thornebrooke

February 7, 2023Updated: February 7, 2023

News Analysis

For eight long days, a Chinese spy balloon bobbed along in the skies above the United States and Canada.

First, it appeared to be heading north off Alaska’s Aleutian Islands, then east toward British Columbia, before suddenly diverting again south and east in a course that would bring it over some of the most critical U.S. military facilities.

The Biden administration has thus far declined to specify which sites the Chinese balloon surveilled, but the dirigible visibly traveled near at least three military bases responsible for overseeing America’s nuclear arsenal.

In Montana, the spy balloon lingered over Malmstrom Air Force Base, the site of 150 silos that house many of the nation’s nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In Nebraska, it hovered near Offutt Air Force Base, where U.S. Strategic Command oversees the maintenance and deployment of the military’s nuclear weapons.

In Missouri, it careened around Whiteman Air Force Base, which operates the Air Force’s nuclear-capable B-2 stealth bomber.

The White House lambasted the presence of the airship as a violation of U.S. sovereignty, with national leaders in a collective uproar over the spherical white menace as it plodded across the span of the continental United States.

The Chinese spy balloon drifts to the ocean after being shot down off the coast in Surfside Beach, S.C., on Feb. 4, 2023. (Randall Hill/Reuters)

President Joe Biden said that he wanted to order the military to shoot the balloon down when he was first briefed on the intrusion on Feb. 1. But the Pentagon wanted to ensure that no debris injured those below and so let the balloon continue its traversal of U.S. airspace until it reached the waters of the Atlantic Ocean on Feb. 4 and was finally met with a definite end in the form of a single Sidewinder missile fired from a U.S. fighter jet.

As the military continues efforts to recover what’s left of the downed device, the Pentagon and FBI’s analysis of the debris and its intentions is just beginning.

But Communist China’s efforts to use espionage and military coercion to undermine and overcome the United States have long been in the works, and congressional leadership remains stunned at the administration’s decision to let an adversarial aircraft meander through U.S. airspace at will.

Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck, who serves as commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, said on Feb. 6 that the incident provided the United States with “unique opportunities” to conduct counterintelligence against the balloon, but declined to comment on what capabilities were deployed to covertly examine the balloon.

VanHerck said that the intelligence gathered from the balloon and how it operated was “well worth” the wait of shooting it down and added that the United States conducted counterintelligence to prevent the balloon from gathering useful information, without detailing the specific measures.

For Reps. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) and Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.), who are the chair and ranking member, respectively, of the House select committee for competition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the incident was nothing less than a debacle that they believe demonstrates Washington’s continued inability to recognize that communist China is an adversarial nation.

“The Chinese Communist Party should not have on-demand access to American airspace,” Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi said in a Feb. 2 joint statement. “Not only is this a violation of American sovereignty … it also makes clear that the CCP’s recent diplomatic overtures do not represent a substantive change in policy.

“Indeed, this incident demonstrates that the CCP threat is not confined to distant shores—it is here at home and we must act to counter this threat.”

Military vehicles carrying hypersonic DF-17 missiles travel past Tiananmen Square during a military parade in Beijing, China, on Oct. 1, 2019. (Jason Lee/Reuters)

The Persistent Threat of Communist China

The presence of a Chinese communist spy balloon hovering over U.S. homes and military bases is alarming enough for most people.

For Paul Crespo, a former Marine officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency and now president of the Center for American Defense Studies, the story only gets darker from here.

In addition to collecting intelligence on U.S. nuclear facilities and military decision-making, Crespo believes that China’s balloon incursion could be a dry run for an attack that would likely take place during a U.S.–China war for Taiwan.

Crespo is concerned that the regime could use similar high-altitude balloons to conduct attacks using electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons against U.S. bases and infrastructure.

“The biggest threat is sending one or more of these high-altitude balloons over the U.S. with a small nuclear EMP device,” Crespo told The Epoch Times in an email.

“Detonated at extremely high altitude, EMPs could knock out power and communications across the U.S., wreaking widespread havoc for a year or more without firing a shot on the ground.”

EMPs are bursts of electromagnetic energy that disrupt communications and damage electronic equipment. An EMP can be created by nuclear missiles, radiofrequency weapons, and natural phenomena such as geomagnetic storms.

While any nuclear weapon can create an EMP, specialized EMP weapons such as so-called super-EMP bombs generate particularly strong gamma radiation that multiplies the effect of the pulse, extending the destruction over a greater range.

It has long been believed that the CCP is developing such weapons for a potential conflict with the United States.

In most scenarios, an EMP would need to be detonated at a much higher elevation than the Chinese spy balloon was at in order to cause mass destruction across a vast swath of territory.

If the EMP’s purpose were to knock out a smaller target, however, such as a U.S. nuclear command-and-control facility, a balloon like the one shot down over the weekend would be a near-perfect delivery device.

For Crespo, the Biden administration’s decision to allow the balloon to continue its malign adventure only increased the potency of such a threat.

By failing to take decisive action against the intrusion immediately, Crespo said, the administration had sent Beijing the signal that it’s willing to accept violations of its sovereignty.

“Despite those who claim otherwise, the unprecedented and slow-moving Chinese surveillance balloon across the entire U.S. gave China intelligence it couldn’t otherwise get on nuclear, communications, and other critical targets,” Crespo said.

“The balloon tested U.S. surveillance and counter-surveillance abilities and reactions. But, most importantly, it tested political will, and Biden’s willingness to let it cross the U.S. before finally downing it failed that test.”

It’s a stark assessment, but one that has traction among many political figures, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

Before it was revealed that Biden had ordered the balloon to be shot down, Pompeo said that the president’s delay gave the CCP all the indication it needed to conduct further hostilities against the United States, its allies, and partners. Particularly so, he said, against Taiwan.

“If we can’t take down this balloon, if President Biden won’t respond to this seriously, I doubt that his statement that we will defend Taiwan and help the Taiwanese people is something that [CCP leader] Xi Jinping will ever take seriously,” Pompeo said in a Feb. 3 interview with Fox News.

“The fact that they’ve now penetrated our airspace, put a very visible symbol of their country over our airspace, and we have done nothing, this is a green light for bad guys all around the world, including Xi Jinping.”

China’s leader Xi Jinping waves as he arrives for the opening session of the 20th Chinese Communist Party’s Congress in Beijing on Oct. 16, 2022. (Noel Celis / AFP via Getty Images)

Preparing an Arsenal

The CCP’s efforts to spy on U.S. military development aren’t new. But it’s vital to understand why the regime is interested in U.S. nuclear facilities now, and the preparation it has undertaken for a potential conflict with the United States.

Key to that effort is the CCP’s own nuclear modernization program, which is expected by the Pentagon to deliver the regime an arsenal of at least 1,000 nuclear weapons by 2030.

Such an arsenal will allow the CCP to coerce the international community more effectively, as the United States has no experience or strategy for simultaneously deterring nuclear escalations from both China and Russia.

This state of affairs is exacerbated by the CCP’s pursuit of technologies specifically designed to overwhelm or penetrate U.S. defenses, such as the hypersonic bombardment system it tested in the summer of 2021.

The weapon, according to senior military leadership, was likely intended to be used as a nuclear first strike against the United States in the event of a conflict. Moreover, such a weapon is likely to be used to target U.S. nuclear facilities to decapitate its strategic capabilities in wartime.

Killing With a Borrowed Sword

The CCP couldn’t accomplish this vast and highly sophisticated military modernization program on its own. To fully develop the systems needed to overcome the United States, the regime requires research and technologies developed first in America.

That’s one reason why the CCP uses illegal spy balloons to collect data on U.S. military bases, and why Chinese state-sponsored talent programs aim to infiltrate and export U.S. nuclear research.

By recruiting experts and scholars from abroad to study at work in China, such talent programs aim to develop a new generation of researchers in areas crucial for China’s technological and military development.

The most telling case of this phenomenon concerns the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the United States’ most advanced nuclear research center.

According to a 2022 report published by strategic intelligence firm Strider Technologies, 162 researchers from the LANL, many of whom came to the United States as part of China’s talent programs and including at least one who had a top-secret U.S. security clearance, now work for China, where many assist the regime’s development of its most cutting-edge weapons, including hypersonic missiles.

The TikTok logo is displayed outside a company office in Culver City, Calif., on Aug. 27, 2020. (Mario Tama/Getty Images)

An All-Encompassing Spy Campaign

The effort to steal vital technologies and research from the United States is part of a much larger campaign—one that’s decades in the making—to undermine the country, of which the spy balloon incident is just a small component.

FBI Director Christopher Wray has described the communist regime as the single biggest cyber and counterintelligence threat facing the United States.

“They are targeting our innovation, our trade secrets, [and] our intellectual property, on a scale that’s unprecedented in history,” Wray said in April 2022.

For years, CCP intelligence agents and their proxies have violated U.S. sovereignty and spied on American citizens, engaged in illegal campaigns to forcibly repatriate Chinese dissidents, and engaged in an array of brazen campaigns to covertly steal cutting-edge technologies.

Last year alone, CCP agents were charged by the Department of Justice for their roles in stalking a U.S. Olympic figure skater and her family, conspiring with a New York police officer to gather intelligence on the Asian American community, and even plotting to attack a U.S. Army veteran running for Congress.

The regime has also used cyber attacks to illicitly collect U.S. defense secrets, such as when suspected state-backed agents hacked into a U.S. government department last year and stole sensitive defense information.

Americans’ sensitive personal information also is a valued target, as evidenced by multiple massive hacks by Chinese actors over the years, including the breaches of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, credit-reporting agency Equifax, Marriott hotels, and insurer Anthem. These hacks resulted in hundreds of millions of Americans’ personal data being stolen.

In recent years, federal prosecutors have brought dozens of cases against Chinese and Americans over the theft of U.S. technology and trade secrets in a multitude of areas from cancer research to aviation secrets to seed technology.

Wray has said that almost half of the FBI’s nearly 5,000 counterintelligence investigations across the country are connected to China, adding that in the past decade, there has been roughly a 1,300 percent increase in economic espionage cases linked to the regime.

Another area attracting growing scrutiny is the hugely popular Chinese-owned app TikTok, which U.S. officials say could be used by the CCP to access Americans’ data and manipulate public opinion through the site’s addictive algorithm.

The regime also is engaged in an effort to purchase U.S. land, including large tracts of farmland adjacent to U.S. military bases, which experts believe could be used to conduct espionage and disrupt the country’s vital infrastructure.

All of these efforts, according to retired Air Force Gen. Robert Spalding, are part of the CCP’s larger doctrine of “unrestricted warfare,” through which the regime weaponizes academia, economics, diplomacy, media, and technology to achieve military ends without risking overt conflict with the United States.

And, much like shooting down a balloon, Spalding believes there’s only one way to stop the threat.

“There’s no way to counter unrestricted warfare or win unrestricted warfare when you have a Chinese Communist Party that has access to any part of U.S. society,” Spalding previously said.

“If they have any access to American society, then they’ll use that access to undermine American society. The only way to be successful … is to eliminate their access to American society.”

theepochtimes.com · February 7, 2023

12. SASC chair to focus on reimagining how the military fights

A "Joint Readiness Command?"

Technological and equipment or hardware focussed. Warfighting requires sound concepts and doctrine and their employment by a trained and well educated force.

Excerpts:

He also said there’s a “move afoot” to create a Joint Readiness Command, although he didn’t elaborate on what such an organization would do.

Reimagining how the military fights is all well and good, but it must also be underpinned by concrete modernization efforts, which Reed said will also be a big priority for his committee this year.

“We have to get equipment that is capable of operating effectively. In fact, we have to stay ahead of the competition in this regard. That requires research, investment and also requires developing production, operations and techniques to get the equipment out the door in time,” he said.

SASC chair to focus on reimagining how the military fights

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 7, 2023

With the current Congress sworn in and back to business, one of the main priorities for the top member of the Senate Armed Services Committee is helping the U.S. military adapt to technological developments.

“First is reimagining how we fight. We are in a tremendously dynamic situation where technology is changing rapidly, techniques are changing rapidly, operational issues, we are truly multi-dimensional,” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., told the Defense Writers Group Tuesday regarding issues he’d like the SASC to focus on this year.

The proliferation and importance of space capabilities, the reliance and criticality of the electromagnetic spectrum, and ubiquity of software all pose unique challenges and paradigm shifts from previous conflicts and eras.

“All of that has to be reimagined and integrated. And our experience in Ukraine is giving us insights for this transformation,” Reed said. “The most adaptable is the field of electronic warfare and the innovation that they’re seeing taking place, some of it spontaneously on the part of the Ukrainians just doing some ingenious things because desperate times require desperate need. They’re doing it.”

“One of the lessons I take away from this is this battle in Ukraine has been so much for in the spectrum in terms of individual Ukrainians developing software so that someone, anyone with a phone can report the location of a tank. It goes in, it’s analyzed quickly, but [with] the AI and then sent to a shooter. That’s the type of information and type of technique that we have to start evolving,” Reed continued. “The people who fight [like they did during] the last war usually end up losing it, and we don’t want to do that.”

There are steps the military has taken in recent years to get ahead of the curve, he noted. One example is the creation of Army Futures Command to spearhead the service’s modernization initiatives.

He also said there’s a “move afoot” to create a Joint Readiness Command, although he didn’t elaborate on what such an organization would do.

Reimagining how the military fights is all well and good, but it must also be underpinned by concrete modernization efforts, which Reed said will also be a big priority for his committee this year.

“We have to get equipment that is capable of operating effectively. In fact, we have to stay ahead of the competition in this regard. That requires research, investment and also requires developing production, operations and techniques to get the equipment out the door in time,” he said.

defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · February 7, 2023

13. Pentagon Breaks Through With Networked War....Drones, Ships, Stealth Jets & Tanks Will Attack Together

Photos and graphics at the link.

Pentagon Breaks Through With Networked War....Drones, Ships, Stealth Jets & Tanks Will Attack Together

https://warriormaven.com/global-security/pentagon-breaks-through-with-networked-war-drones-ships-stealth-jets-tanks-will-attack-together?mc_cid=59ee25f407

Air Force Research Lab Connects Drones With Army & Navy Attack Weapons

KRIS OSBORN, WARRIOR MAVEN - CENTER FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATIONFEB 6, 2023

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

(Washington D.C.) What if a satellite detected some kind of enemy movement behind a small mountain on a remote island somewhere in the Pacific and was able to quickly transmit threat data to an Air Force drone within range to “zero-in” on the target? Meanwhile, in near simultaneous fashion, the drone sends threat coordinates, imagery and even real-time video of the enemy movement to Navy amphibious assault ships and destroyers in position to take action with long-range precision weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles. Targeting specifics and intelligence can then also be sent to airborne ship-launched 5th-gen stealth aircraft such as Marine Corps F-35Bs able to both conduct additional surveillance or fire weapons at the enemy positions.

Concurrently, the amphib instantly launched an amphibious assault transporting Marines, weapons and armored vehicles toward the island. As surface ships approach the island and Marines and armored vehicles move ashore, air and surface platforms continuously send advancing ground forces real-time targeting detail and intelligence of critical operational relevance to the Corps’ attack.

What if, instead of needing to travel through various ground centers, command and control stations and an extensive decision-making process, all of this data sharing was secure, able to transition between otherwise disparate transport layer formats and taking place in a matter of seconds? Attacking fighter jets and advancing Corps ground forces, fortified by the multi-domain data-sharing network, would be able to operate with real-time knowledge of changing enemy movements, weapons positioning and tactical maneuvers in order to optimize timing, method and location of attack.

This kind of real-time scenario, in which attacking forces operate within or faster than an enemy’s decision cycle, increases prospects for a rapid, successful first strike attack, decreasing risk to friendly forces and ensuring near immediate destruction of enemy forces before they can launch offensive operations …. Is increasingly becoming realistic. It is the premise of the JADC2 program, a multi-service effort to connect “air-ground-sea-space-cyber” domains to one another seamlessly across a dispersed, multi-domain operational area.

Tactically speaking, this means 5th-Generation fighter jets will, among other things, control small groups of drones from the cockpit while in flight, breaking manned-unmanned teaming operations through into a new high-speed operational sphere. As an example, while manned-unmanned teaming is of course blazing a new trail at lightning speed across all the services, the Air Force is now reaching previously unprecedented levels of data sharing between 5th-generation stealth fighter jets and nearby drones and unmanned systems.

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The service has demonstrated data-exchange between an F-35 and its Valkyrie drone and is now engineering a new group of Combat Collaborate Aircraft, unmanned systems intended to operate alongside and in coordination with 5th and 6th-generation stealth fighter jets. One can only imagine the fast-emerging sphere of new tactical possibilities this introduces, as forward operating groups of drones could blanket an area with ISR, test or attack enemy air defenses or even launch weapons when directed by a human.

This invites a critical question, meaning where is this kind of breakthrough technology heading when it comes to JADC2 and joint, multi-domain interoperability? Chris Ristich, Director, Integrated Capabilities Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, told Warrior in an interview that this kind of fighter-jet-to-drone manned-unmanned teaming, involving intelligence transmissions and video-sharing are just a “part of a bigger picture where the ABMS (Advanced Battle Management System) effort is going.” The Air Force’s ABMS, which contributes to and supports JADC2 is, as Ristich describes it, “establishing that architecture, which is really an architecture of networks, related to how we pull that all together to be able to conduct warfighting operations. The manned-unmanned teaming part of it that you see in that example is just a portion of the challenge that we have too.”

As Ristich points out, manned-unmanned connectivity such as that anticipated between 5th and 6th-generation stealth fighters and multiple drones and unmanned systems is one element of a fast-growing and complex enterprise designed to network the entire force. The intent with ABMS, which is informing and contributing to the Pentagon’s multi-domain Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) networking initiative, is to not only connect drones to fighter jets but network other weapons systems, sensors, aircraft and command and control nodes.

“We look at distributed unmanned systems that are sensing platforms that would be working collaboratively to optimize their sensing locations, their resource management, and all of that to be able to create a target quality common operating picture to feed into our JADC2 network,” Ristich said.

DoD’s JADC2, integrates Army, Navy and Air Force weapons, platforms, command and control centers and forces into a secure, yet seamless network of interconnected combat “nodes” able to share time-sensitive information across a joint warfare environment in real-time.

The idea with the Air Force’s ABMS, which is fully aligned with the Pentagon’s JADC2, is to enable an ability to “fight at the speed of relevance” and massively truncate or shorten sensor-to-shooter pairing to expedite targeting, threat identification and attack possibilities.

“Latency is absolutely key in modern warfare. We're trying to understand what kinds of activities we can do through local area networks versus mesh back long range beyond line of sight,” Ristich told Warrior.

The service’s ABMS first emerged as a concept years ago when the service was conceptualizing anticipated future warfare environments and the need to be survivable in a contested environment wherein adversaries operate new generations of long-range precision weapons, multi-frequency air defenses, air-and ground radar detection systems and stealthy air platforms, among other things. This means, for example, that large non-stealthy platforms such as fixed wing J-STARS planes may not work as an optimal ISR solution in high-threat environments but rather needed to be supplemented by a dispersed networking of smaller, faster and in some cases stealthier interconnected “nodes” across broader maneuver formations in highly contested environments.

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Naturally, as Ristich indicated, an enterprise of this kind presents an entire sphere of technological and even tactical challenges, as transport layer formats and incoming sensor-gathered data need to essentially be “translated” and connected in a way not previously possible. For instance, perhaps an RF signal arrives from one node, while a wireless computer stream arrives from an otherwise disparate “node” or sensor, and both sets of incoming data need to be integrated, organized and analyzed along with still more information arriving from additional “datalinks,” “sensors,” “RF frequencies,” “wireless computer transmissions and other transport layer technologies. In order to accomplish these kinds of technical “translations,” as they could be called, many weapons developers are developing so-called “gateway” technologies, meaning advanced systems engineered with an “open” or “adaptable” architecture such that they can integrate, organize and transmit data from otherwise incompatible “transport layer” sources of data. In many cases, this requires common standards or IP Protocol that can essentially adapt to, incorporate and “translate,” different data formats. Essentially, interfaces could enable aerial drones to instantly share information with large fixed wing aircraft, stealth fighter jets, other unmanned systems and additional nodes across otherwise disconnected combat domains.

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Ristich addressed this technical challenge in a number of respects, one of which is software programmable radio and an ability to adjust waveforms.

“Maybe a broader technology area here is essentially RF defined apertures, radio frequency defined amplitudes. With software defined radios where we can change the frequency, we can change the waveform. We can actually change the function of the system too, where it can go from a radar to a communication system,” Ristich.

Yet another area of this networking involves the use of secure, yet flexible technological “interfaces” designed to enable otherwise incompatible data formats and information streams. This seems to be precisely what Ristich is referring to by suggesting that indeed the ABMS interoperability enterprise extends far beyond manned-unmanned teaming between drones and fighter jets but a broader, multi-domain interconnectivity involving space, surface nodes, land assets, ground vehicles on the move and a wide range of ground and aerial command and control centers.

“The interfaces are key to us, right? That's where open system architectures come back in. We're specifying the interface controls and documenting those. That's where we're primarily focusing right now,” Ristich explained.

These AFRL efforts work in close coordination with similar Army and Navy initiatives aimed at developing, refining and ultimately deploying an integrated, multi-domain network. The Army’s Project Convergence, for instance, is a series of war scenario experiments which are already demonstrating a paradigm-changing ability to shorten sensor-to-shooter kill chains from minutes down to mere seconds.

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For instance, using an AI-enabled computer called Firestorm, air-launched mini-drones were able to detect forward threat objects, relay information instantly to a larger drone and helicopter before sending relevant specifics to Firestorm. The AI-enabled system then performed analytics on the aggregated data, and, bouncing information off of a vast-database filled with historical information and weapons and threat detail, made a near instant sensor-to-shooter “pairing” and sends it recommendation to human decision-makers regarding the optimal method of attack. Targeting and location specifics can, for instance, now be sent to an armored ground vehicle best positioned to destroy the enemy target … in a matter of seconds. This entire kill-chain, which used to take 20 mins, can now be completed in 20 seconds, due to interfaces, high-speed AI-enabled computing and secure, real-time multi-domain networking.

The Navy’s Project Overmatch, for instance, has origins going back many years to a Office of Naval Research effort called Ghost Fleet. Ghost Fleet, also called Operation Overlord, is a groundbreaking initiative to link unmanned surface systems to one another and manned command and control nodes to exact a dispersed, high-lethal, network of surveillance and attack Unmanned Surface Vehicles operating in coordination with one another. The Air Force is also advancing a Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation program with the Navy as well, an effort which Ristich described as aimed at “building the kill chain of the future.”

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“We are Developing kill chains in the future, and JADC2 is going to be the layer that operates those kill chains. It's going to be with a mantra of any shooter, any weapon, any node, essentially, that is able to share that and conduct targeting operations in a joint way,” Ristich said.

Naturally, this kind of technological expansion introduces a time-sensitive need to adjust tactics, refine strategic thinking and explore new Concepts of Operations.

“We have been partnering with the operational part of the Department of the Air Force as well. If you look at a lot of our different activities in the Integrated Capabilities Directorate today, they're founded on bringing operators, technologists, and acquisition folks together from the very beginning so that we have the stakeholder buy in and understanding and ability to shape the concepts as they evolve, and that includes CONOPS development,” Ristich said.

As for what this might look like in terms of implementation, AFRL scientists, researchers and teams of innovators are looking at how breakthrough technologies might inform and shape future operations. Much of this, Ristich explains, detailed examination of both individual systems as well as the particular capacity in which they would integrate into a broader, multi-service JADC2 environment.

“What we're trying to do is understand the military utility of technology projected into the war fighter's hands. Looking at emergent systems, looking at disruptive technology, we're doing analytics to try and identify pockets of technologies that could be disruptive, for example, for us. But looking at that from a holistic system of systems, multi-domain point of view, and doing it with analytical rigor, that's the challenge that we have. The kinds of technologies that will emerge from that will be things like greater autonomy, information operations, right? The ability to generate courses of action for ourselves to inform the operators rapidly and faster than our opponents,” Ristich explained.

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Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics& Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

BY KRIS OSBORN, WARRIOR MAVEN - CENTER FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION

14. Why It Took So Damn Long To Shoot Down the Chinese Spy Balloon

Why It Took So Damn Long To Shoot Down the Chinese Spy Balloon

Popular Mechanics · February 7, 2023

On Saturday, a U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jet shot down a Chinese surveillance balloon off the coast of South Carolina.
It was the end of the line for a voyage over the U.S. that began in Alaska.
The balloon, as well as its payload of electronic intelligence equipment, is being collected for study.

The saga of a Chinese surveillance balloon and its flight across America came crashing down on Saturday, courtesy of the U.S. Air Force. An F-22 Raptor fighter jet shot the balloon down using a single AIM-9X Sidewinder missile, bringing the balloon—and its mysterious payload—down into the waters off South Carolina. The remains, currently being recovered by U.S. Navy divers, will likely make a trek to Ohio for further study, ensuring the Pentagon will have access to its secrets.

Long, Strange Trip

An F-22 Raptor fighter jet takes part in the NATO Air Shielding exercise near the air base in Lask, central Poland on October 12, 2022.

Getty Images

North American Air Defense Command first detected the balloon on Saturday, January 28, as it entered Alaska’s airspace, according to Politico. The U.S. Air Force states that the ballon entered U.S. airspace at the extreme west end of U.S. territory, near the Aleutian Islands. The balloon drifted into Canadian airspace and then back over northern Idaho on Tuesday, January 31, and then over Montana on Wednesday, February 1. The Pentagon alerted the public to the balloon’s existence on Thursday.

President Biden issued orders on January 31 for the military to provide options for shooting it down—once it was over U.S. territorial waters—in order to recover the balloon’s payload. (U.S. territorial waters extend 12 miles from the coastline to the open ocean.) Biden was briefed on February 3 about a plan to shoot the balloon down over the Carolinas, as early as the next day. Biden approved it.

Enter the Sidewinder

U.S. Airmen with the 325th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron load an AIM-9 Sidewinder missile on an F-22 Raptor at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, December 15, 2020.

U.S. Air Force photo by 2nd Lt. Kayla Fitzgerald/DVIDS

On Saturday, February 4, a pair of F-22 Raptor fighters, backed up by F-15 Eagles of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, and supported by aerial refueling tankers, set up an intercept of the balloon. One F-22 made the attack, launching an AIM-9X Sidewinder, a short-range infrared guided missile, at the target. According to Ward Carroll, a former F-14 Tomcat radar intercept officer and journalist, the Sidewinder did not carry its usual high-explosive blast fragmentation warhead. The Sidewinder struck the balloon, sending it plunging towards the sea.

Get the Facts: Chinese Spy Balloon

The Pentagon reports the F-22 fired the Sidewinder missile at an altitude of 58,000 feet, and that the balloon was at 60,000–65,000 feet in elevation at the time. The balloon wreckage fell into an estimated 47 feet of water, and in an area reported to be about seven miles, though other sources claim 1,500 meters by 1,500 meters (5,000 feet by 5,000 feet). The U.S. Navy dispatched the amphibious dock ship USS Carter Hall, cruiser USS Philippine Sea, and destroyer USS Oscar Austin, to recover the balloon’s remains. The FBI is also reportedly involved in the search.

In a nod to history, the call signs of the two F-22s involved in the shootdown were FRANK01 and FRANK02, after Lt. Frank Luke, “The Arizona Balloon Buster,” a WWI ace with 19 kills, the most scored against German observation balloons. The shootdown was also notable for being the first air-to-air kill by an F-22 Raptor, the first shootdown of a hostile craft over the United States, and likely the highest-altitude air-to-air kill in history.

Why No Earlier Shootdown?

American World War I fighter ace, Frank Luke Jr (1897–1918), with his SPAD S.XIII biplane, France, September 18, 1918.

Getty Images

Biden Administration and Pentagon officials stated that once the balloon was detected, the military was able to take measures on the ground to prevent it from collecting useful data. The Department of Defense, knowing the balloon’s trajectory, was able to shut down any activities that it could have collected information from.

Gen. Glen VanHerck, the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, described it as 200 feet wide with a payload of a “couple of thousand pounds.” The Pentagon, with the help of NASA, assessed “that there was [an] undue risk of debris causing harm to civilians while the balloon was overland.” VanHerck also did not rule out the possibility of there being explosives on the balloon. These factors, and the precautions taken to prevent the balloon from capturing meaningful data, seemed to have toned down the urgency to shoot it down.

In the meantime, the Pentagon also says it was able to gain information on what kind of data the balloon was transmitting back to China. CNN quoted a senior defense official as saying, “We have learned technical things about this balloon and its surveillance capabilities. And I suspect, if we are successful in recovering aspects of the debris, we will learn even more.” With an over-land shootdown ruled out, the focus seemed to settle on an over-water shootdown, which would provide the balloon’s intelligence-gathering payload a gentler landing.

Past Visits: Revealed

A U.S. Coast Guard HH-65 helicopter taking part in the recovery effort of a Chinese balloon off the coast of South Carolina.

Getty Images

The Department of Defense revealed that there had been several balloon incidents in recent years, including one off the coasts of Hawaii and Guam, and others near Texas and Florida. Two Chinese balloons were detected near Florida in two separate incidents, while the other locations were each visited by one balloon.

Past incidents were only discovered long after the fact, and former President Trump, in office for some of the incidents, was not alerted to their presence, The Washington Post reports. The briefing also mentioned the balloons entered U.S. airspace, but it’s unclear whether or not the balloons overflew U.S. territory.

The Biden Administration was criticized by members of the Republican Party, as well as some Democrats, for not shooting down the balloon sooner. At least one complained the balloon could have been shot down as early as the Aleutians, a sparsely occupied area, though recovering the balloon from the Bering Sea in the middle of winter would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Modern-Day Treasure

U.S. Navy divers hoist a diving stage over the side of the fleet-ocean tug USNS Catawba. The divers are working to recover and salvage an aircraft lost at sea.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Tyler N. Thompson

A team of Navy divers, using uncrewed underwater vehicles, is operating from the Carter Hall to recover as much of the balloon and its payload as possible. The next stop for any recovered debris is the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, or NASIC, located at Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio. NASIC is likely the agency that has compiled data on past flights, and its mission is to “discover and characterize air, space, missile, and cyber threats.”

Other agencies might join in on the analysis, depending on the nature of the balloon’s surveillance package. If the mission of the balloon was to take images of the ground below, the National Reconnaissance Office would probably be interested in the recovered gear. If the drone was involved in electronic intelligence gathering—including such things as recording radar emissions, other electromagnetic signals, and communications—the National Security Agency may get involved.

Why Balloons?

A Long March-6 rocket blasts off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in north China’s Shanxi Province, April 27, 2021. Balloons can observe the ground from far closer than satellites in space.

Getty Images

One major question regarding the entire bizarre episode is why China would be so bold as to fly surveillance balloons over U.S. airspace. The United States flew manned reconnaissance missions against China up until 1971, using U-2 spy planes with Taiwanese pilots, but ceased the flights as relations with Beijing improved, and the capabilities of U.S. spy satellites also improved.

China already has spy satellites, so why use balloons over U.S. territory? A balloon, even at 60,000 feet, is far closer to the ground than China’s latest Yaogan remote-sensing satellite, which flies overhead at 1,584,000 feet. This results in greater image resolution and clarity. Unlike spy satellites, which take years to design, and are in orbit for years, a balloon-based optical system can quickly and easily change out payloads, using the latest in technology. Spy satellites also follow predictable orbits, and savvy military powers can wheel experimental jets and other secret capabilities under overhead cover until the satellite passes by.

Dive Deeper

The Pentagon’s New Secret Weapon: Spy Balloons

China’s overflight of the United States with surveillance balloons is the most brazen violation of sovereign territorial rights in decades, and it is a mystery why Beijing would attempt such an act guaranteed to damage its reputation worldwide. Will it happen again? If it was indeed an accident, probably not. But if China really is testing the United States, it almost certainly will.

Kyle Mizokami

Writer on Defense and Security issues, lives in San Francisco.

Popular Mechanics · February 7, 2023

15. US military not ready to deploy missiles to Japan, country’s defense ministry says

Perhaps we know the initial results of a "trial balloon" we recently sent up.

US military not ready to deploy missiles to Japan, country’s defense ministry says

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · February 7, 2023

A Tomahawk missile launches from the guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey somewhere in the Western Pacific, Aug. 16, 2018. (Devin Langer/U.S. Navy)

TOKYO — The United States is not ready to deploy a variety of new missiles in Japan, contrary to a recent newspaper report, the country’s Ministry of Defense said this week.

The U.S. is developing new missiles but it’s too early to consider where to deploy them, Japanese officials were told by their U.S. counterparts, according to a ministry statement emailed Monday to Stars and Stripes.

The ministry was responding to a report Saturday by the Sankei newspaper, citing multiple anonymous U.S. and Japanese sources, that the U.S. government had suggested deploying medium-range, hypersonic and Tomahawk missiles to Japan’s southern island of Kyushu.

Tensions are rising near Japan’s southern islands amid a Chinese military buildup and its claims on Taiwan, about 700 miles south of Kyushu. Beijing considers democratic, self-governing Taiwan to be a breakaway province that must be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary.

U.S. Forces Japan had no comment on the Sankei report, USFJ spokesman Air Force Maj. Thomas Barger said in an email Monday.

“We continuously work closely with our Japanese Ally to ensure we maintain capabilities necessary to uphold our treaty obligations of mutual security and cooperation,” he said. “U.S. Forces in Japan continue to train and posture in order to remain ready for any potential future crisis or contingency.”

The Sankei article runs counter to a Jan. 23 report by the Yomiuri newspaper — also citing unnamed U.S. and Japanese sources — that said American missiles would not be deployed to Japan.

Tokyo approved a national security strategy in December that includes acquiring counterstrike capabilities to attack enemy bases with missiles. That led Washington to forgo deployment of its own missiles, the Yomiuri report said.

The U.S. military does not operate ground-launched missiles with a range between 310 and 3,400 miles. The weapons were banned in 1988 under the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which expired in 2019.

Medium-range ballistic missiles travel between 620 and 1,860 miles, according to The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation website.

However, the U.S. Army recently took delivery of a prototype Typhon Weapon System, which is intended to fire missiles at ranges between 300 and 1,725 miles.

The system, armed with SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, is intended to hit targets at ranges between the Army’s Precision Strike Missile, about 300 miles maximum, and the developmental Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon system, about 1,725 miles maximum, Naval News reported Dec. 5.

“The [Marine Corps] is also looking at land-based Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles launched from trailers,” the news site reported.

Beijing has more than 1,900 ballistic missiles that can reach Japan, according to a 2022 Pentagon report on China’s military capabilities.

U.S. withdrawal from the INF treaty meant inevitable talk of deploying missiles in Japan, according to James Brown, an international affairs expert at Temple University’s Japan campus.

“One of the reasons for withdrawal from the INF Treaty was to enable the US to deploy ground-based intermediate range missile(s) in Asia as a means of countering China's large advantage in this category of weapon,” he said in an email Monday.

Kyushu is a logical spot for the missiles given that the East China Sea is a focal point for tension between the U.S. and China, Brown said. There are also limited alternatives, he said.

“Guam is too far,” he said. “In South Korea, it would provoke too much public backlash. And Taiwan is not yet an option. Okinawa is also a possibility but there is a widespread feeling, especially on Okinawa itself, that US deployments within Japan should be spread more evenly. “

Missiles won’t arrive any time soon, Brown predicted.

“Rather, I imagine the Japanese government is quietly raising this idea as a trial balloon as a means of gauging the public reaction,” he said.

U.S. policy toward China will be aggressive after the downing Saturday by an F-22 fighter of a Chinese spy balloon, according to Riki Ellison, founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance.

Deployment of missiles to Japan enables U.S. and Japanese forces to distribute launchers, which could be placed on other small islands in the Far East, he said by email Monday.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · February 7, 2023

16. China’s Belt and Road objectives are shifting

The dollar as the reserve currency and the continued use of petro dollars are key elements of strategic competition.

Excerpts:

As the BRI continues to buckle, China’s top leaders are refocusing their foreign-policy goals with a new push in the Middle East. One of China’s long-term foreign-policy objectives is breaking up the dollar-denominated oil trade so that oil is bought and sold in other currencies. To that end, Chinese companies have invested handsomely in oil-producing countries. China even made a bid to take a significant stake in Saudi Aramco.

The Chinese president recently traveled to the Arab Gulf region and held the first China-Arab Summit in Saudi Arabia, in which Beijing pledged deeper economic cooperation across various sectors. The real focus was on oil and guarantees for more Chinese imports of Middle Eastern crude.

The BRI is too large to disappear overnight but it’s going to have to change rapidly. As the cheerleaders of emerging-market economies quiet down, China is quietly recasting its foreign objectives away from poorly built projects in debt-laden countries toward areas that promise real return.

Breaking the dollar-denominated oil trade is one such area. Expect to see Chinese leaders around the Middle East much more in the coming years.

China’s Belt and Road objectives are shifting

The BRI is too large to disappear overnight but it’s going to have to change rapidly

asiatimes.com · by More by Joseph Dana · February 8, 2023

When the history of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is written, it’s unclear how much there will be to say that is positive.

After spending more than US$1 trillion to build a network of infrastructure projects across emerging-market countries designed to connect large portions of the global economy to Beijing, cracks are beginning to form. Funding is drying up, existing projects are falling apart, and receiving countries are drowning in debt.

This is leading some nations to rebel openly against Chinese influence in their back yards. Given the softening global economic outlook, it’s time to ask some hard questions about the future of the BRI and how China might pivot its foreign-policy efforts in the near future to cover over BRI’s endemic challenges.

From its origin, the BRI was a vehicle for extending Chinese influence across emerging markets, from Asia to South America. In the mid-2010s, when the BRI gained real momentum, the collective economic narrative was one of irrational hope for emerging markets.

From the World Economic Forum to the pages of the financial press, emerging markets were heralded as the next great economic miracle. Greater connectivity through smartphones and aviation links gave hope that a new middle class would arise from Kenya to Kazakhstan. Buoyed by fast urbanization and even faster birth rates, this middle class would propel the global economy to new heights.

As the world superpower closest to these population centers, China moved quickly to insert itself into these changing economic tides. Beijing was eager to connect these new hives of economic activity to the Chinese economy through the deployment of infrastructure programs, cheap loans, and technology partnerships.

TikTok, the viral Chinese social-media application that has taken the world by storm, has arguably been an arm of this expansion.

The BRI was the “project of the century,” in the words of Chinese President Xi Jinping, that would reshape the global order with China at the center.

This was all possible in an era of cheap money spurred by low interest rates and blockbuster Chinese economic growth, but the picture is gloomier now. The Chinese economy is struggling to regain its huge growth rates in the face of a global economic downturn and continued restrictions from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Complicating matters is anger from several countries over the quality of their BRI projects. The Wall Street Journal recently reported on several BRI projects from Ecuador to Zambia that have experienced severe construction flaws.

Ecuador’s $2.7 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric project is a prime example. Thousands of cracks have emerged in the Chinese-built plant that could knock the entire thing offline. As it is one of the largest sources of power in Ecuador, fixing the plant could drive the country deeper into debt.

The breakdowns in BRI projects is adding fuel to claims that China has engaged in predatory lending practices (known as debt-trap diplomacy) that have contributed to debt crises in places like Sri Lanka. Other critics have said that the breakdowns confirm that China moved too aggressively in building projects that were often mismatched for a country’s existing infrastructure or excessively damaged the environment.

Last year, the Chinese government quietly made some changes to the structure of the BRI. Dubbed Belt and Road 2.0 in internal discussions, Chinese policy markets agreed to evaluate new projects more rigorously and allow for debt renegotiations, which was a red line previously.

The changes will likely continue if the global economy enters a prolonged recession and projects fail. Economists Sebastian Horn, Carmen Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch were quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that countries in financial distress hold nearly 60% of China’s overseas loans. This is compared with just 5% in 2010.

De-dollarizing oil trade

As the BRI continues to buckle, China’s top leaders are refocusing their foreign-policy goals with a new push in the Middle East. One of China’s long-term foreign-policy objectives is breaking up the dollar-denominated oil trade so that oil is bought and sold in other currencies. To that end, Chinese companies have invested handsomely in oil-producing countries. China even made a bid to take a significant stake in Saudi Aramco.

The Chinese president recently traveled to the Arab Gulf region and held the first China-Arab Summit in Saudi Arabia, in which Beijing pledged deeper economic cooperation across various sectors. The real focus was on oil and guarantees for more Chinese imports of Middle Eastern crude.

The BRI is too large to disappear overnight but it’s going to have to change rapidly. As the cheerleaders of emerging-market economies quiet down, China is quietly recasting its foreign objectives away from poorly built projects in debt-laden countries toward areas that promise real return.

Breaking the dollar-denominated oil trade is one such area. Expect to see Chinese leaders around the Middle East much more in the coming years.

This article was provided by Syndication Bureau, which holds copyright.

asiatimes.com · by More by Joseph Dana · February 8, 2023

17. China Hasn’t Given Up on the Belt and Road

Excertps:

Finally, the United States and its partners should stop shying away from promoting democracy alongside development. Indeed, the United States Agency for International Development has already started down this path; alongside the Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy, USAID has reemphasized the importance of healthy democratic institutions to long-term development. But too many of the United States’ industrialized partners are hesitant to openly embrace or emphasize the notion that democratic institutions such as independent courts, strong legislatures, a free press, and well-run elections can enable development. Some analysts have long expressed concern that calls for democratization could recall the United States’ own Cold War–era interventions or could alienate countries where leaders are not democratically inclined. The more that other democracies and major aid donors can add their voices to Washington, the less validity these concerns will have. The United States alone touting the benefits of democracy could easily be dismissed as the product of a Cold War mindset; a coalition of democracies stretching from Canada to Japan doing the same would be much harder to brush off.

The sooner policymakers can acknowledge China’s shifting international strategy and reconfigure their own approach, the better. China’s party-state is quickly learning what the United States discovered after its own emergence as a superpower: that changing other societies is a complicated, messy business, and that trying to do it through large infusions of cash can backfire in damaging ways. How Beijing applies these lessons, and whether it is successful in its pursuit of power, remains one of the most pressing questions for democracy globally. It is up to the United States and its democratic partners to develop answers of their own—and to make them as effective as possible.

China Hasn’t Given Up on the Belt and Road

Beijing’s Development Aid Plan Is Less Flashy—but No Less Ambitious

By Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole

February 7, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole · February 7, 2023

In the decade since Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing’s huge infrastructure and investment program has become a defining part of its foreign policy. In the BRI’s early years, dozens of emerging economies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America embraced the program, driven in large part by Beijing’s no-questions-asked approach to lending for megaprojects such as container ports, railway networks, and large-scale dams, and its seemingly limitless financial firepower. The lending spree caught Washington and its democratic partners by surprise, prompting wide concern that Beijing was saddling countries with unaffordable debt while financially backstopping authoritarian friends.

But the BRI lending wave has receded surprisingly quickly. China’s overseas infrastructure lending is now a fraction of what it was five years ago, driven down by the country’s domestic economic woes, by Beijing’s drastic (and widely underappreciated) 2016–17 retooling of its regulations for overseas investment, and by a series of high-profile BRI failures in countries from Ecuador to Sri Lanka. Beijing is not giving up on Belt and Road—far from it. But today, the BRI of the popular imagination—a dominant, globe-spanning infrastructure lending project aimed at cementing China’s power—is effectively dead. In its place is a less flashy, less expensive model of engagement, predicated on cultivating ties more organically in fields such as trade, telecommunications, green energy, and academia.

Policymakers in both developed and emerging economies should take note. Leaders across the global South seeking new financing from China should exercise caution, given that Beijing is increasingly unlikely to sign on to fund big infrastructure projects. The United States and its industrialized partners will have to contend with a shifting paradigm of Chinese influence—one that is moving away from infrastructure megaprojects toward more diffuse, more sustainable engagement. And both groups will need to work together to address the legacy of Beijing’s lending spree, which has fueled corruption, encouraged antidemocratic practices, and saddled recipient states with enormous debts.

Faced with China’s morphing influence campaign, the United States and its industrialized partners have a twofold challenge. They must revise their own development strategy to help meet demands for infrastructure and democratic accountability across the developing world, but they must also help partners in the developing world cope with Beijing’s revamped approach. As China is buffeted by growing economic and demographic headwinds, Beijing is confronting its limits and learning from its mistakes. China’s revamped BRI will pose new challenges to policymakers seeking to respond to China’s expansive economic reach—and its power to deepen democratic backsliding across much of the world.

THE RISE AND FALL OF BEIJING’S MEGA-LENDING

When the Belt and Road Initiative was first rolled out, it was hailed by analysts around the world as “transformative” and “potentially game-changing.” The early numbers on Chinese international lending seemed to bear out that view. According to the AidData research lab, during the first five years of the BRI, China’s overseas development spending averaged more than double the equivalent U.S. expenditures, peaking at an incredible $120 billion in 2016. Beijing’s lending program found an immediate audience because it targeted a genuine and pressing problem: numerous developing countries urgently need large-scale transport and energy infrastructure but are held back by price tags that routinely run into multiple trillions of dollars. Moreover, traditional development lenders such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank often provide loans to developing countries with conditions that borrowers have described as onerous or even patronizing. By contrast, Beijing’s no-strings-attached loans have been lauded by leaders seeking more flexible forms of financing.

But China’s infrastructure investment nonetheless came at a price. As research by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and others has shown, authoritarian-leaning leaders have used the BRI not only to fund infrastructure projects but also as a financial backstop for their worst antidemocratic impulses, secure in the knowledge that they could pursue authoritarian policies without endangering Beijing’s financial support. In 2016, for instance, China offered Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, then at the center of a swelling corruption scandal, assistance in spying on critics of BRI projects within his own government—an offer allegedly approved by Xi himself.

Today, the BRI of the popular imagination is effectively dead.

In fact, the prospect of large-scale financial support from China appears to have emboldened would-be authoritarians around the world—a dynamic that Beijing has encouraged. IRI’s research, for instance, has documented how Beijing routinely dangles the prospect of lending to cement ties with Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, who has led an assault on El Salvador’s democratic institutions since ascending to the country’s presidency in 2019. A similar dynamic appears to be playing out in the Solomon Islands, where President Manasseh Sogavare recently moved to alter the country’s constitution to extend his rule, backstopped by the prospect of ongoing support.

But although many burgeoning autocrats may still believe that Beijing stands ready to open its coffers for them, its support is no longer guaranteed. Data from a variety of sources indicate that BRI financial commitments have dramatically slowed. According to Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center, China’s sovereign lending commitments dropped by a whopping 94 percent from 2016 to 2019, from $75 billion to only $3.9 billion. Other regional and global datasets generally confirm the direction and magnitude of the drop. Partial information from 2020 and 2021 suggests that the COVID-19 pandemic may have pared down China’s lending even further: another Boston University database that focused on BRI investment in Africa, for example, indicates that in 2020, China’s lending to African governments dropped to its lowest level since 2004.

But this decline in lending, which was underway as early as 2017, cannot be attributed solely to the economic havoc wreaked by COVID-19. Rather, it is the result of a complex mix of mutually reinforcing factors from both inside and outside China. Taken together, they make it extremely unlikely that Beijing will seek to revive BRI infrastructure lending at its previous scale anytime soon.

NOT TOO BIG TO FAIL

The BRI’s large-scale lending program has slumped partly because of growing headwinds, the most obvious of which are the initiative’s own high-profile failures. In many cases, Beijing simply overestimated the ability of its infrastructure-centered development approach to thrive on foreign soil. From 2007 to 2014, for instance, China loaned Sri Lanka $1.5 billion to build a port and airport at Hambantota—both of which continue to sit largely empty nearly a decade later. Sri Lanka’s economy continues to suffer from the debt it racked up during this period, and China looks set to play spoiler in an agreement with the IMF and other international creditors that could give Colombo much-needed relief. Leaders from countries burned by boondoggle BRI megaprojects are understandably cautious about signing up for another round of loans, and enthusiasm for PRC investment initiatives has declined in the face of these blunders.

Many observers, however, tend to overlook other political and economic factors in China itself, which have played a far bigger role in driving the slowdown in lending. Most important was a 2016–17 top-to-bottom overhaul by China’s economic regulators of the rules that govern and authorize large overseas investment and lending projects, with the express purpose of dramatically reducing the number and size of overseas megaprojects. Regulators took this step in part because the surge of capital outflows at the BRI’s peak was destabilizing China’s broader macroeconomic stability. The BRI had also increasingly become associated in Beijing with illicit capital flight and wasteful, hubristic spending overseas, as China-based companies slapped the BRI label on theme parks in wealthy countries such as France rather than public infrastructure projects in developing countries in Africa and South Asia.

The regulatory overhaul had its intended effect: China has undertaken far fewer large-scale lending projects in the years since. Beijing’s effort to clamp down on gargantuan foreign investments, coupled with China’s deteriorating domestic economic situation, suggests that a return to the status quo ante of almost unlimited overseas lending seems unlikely at best. Xi seemed to indicate the shift in a keynote address to African leaders in late 2021, in which he didn’t use the word “infrastructure” even once.

CHINA’S TIGHTENING BELT

Rather than marking the end of the BRI, however, Beijing’s reorientation away from unbridled lending may push the program toward a more sustainable model. As it moves away from infrastructure megaprojects, Beijing appears to be embracing less capital-intensive, more organic forms of economic collaboration with developing economies. As research by IRI and others has shown, the “Belt and Road” label now extends far beyond infrastructure to encompass less flashy and expensive initiatives in fields such as academia, telecommunications, green energy, and even tuna fishing.

Beijing is transforming the BRI, and it is doing so discreetly and intentionally; neither China’s overall reduction in lending nor the diffusion of the BRI beyond infrastructure is entirely accidental. Even as BRI lending peaked in 2016 and 2017, policymakers and researchers in China had already begun to call for a BRI that was better tailored to host country needs, more environmentally friendly, and less concentrated in high-profile infrastructure projects.

Beijing has shifted the BRI accordingly. It has increased China’s involvement in the think-tank and academic worlds, working to get first dibs on structuring the field of China studies in countries with emerging Sinology programs—such as South Africa—through academic exchanges, grant programs, and Confucius Institutes. Under the BRI’s auspices, China has also expanded its footprint in the media sector throughout the developing world—most notably in Africa, where the China-based satellite broadcaster StarTimes has won market share from national state broadcasting companies and private competitors alike. China’s efforts to bring its technology to the developing world are likewise growing: although Huawei, for instance, has now been largely shut out of industrialized countries’ telecommunications networks, its 4G and 5G business continues to perform strongly in many countries in Africa and South Asia. Investment by China’s state-owned and private companies in green energy and power grids continues to perform well, and Chinese companies and state institutions are stepping up their cooperation with other countries such as Tanzania, Myanmar, and the Solomon Islands in security, surveillance, and “governance” training.

Beijing has not abandoned its quest for global influence through economic development. It has adjusted its strategy—in some cases out of necessity—in more flexible, targeted, and organic directions. China’s party-state continues to try to win the political and economic allegiance of low-income countries around the world—and it has found a cheaper way to do so. Although Beijing’s decision to move away from large infrastructure projects that tend to foster antidemocratic behavior might seem like a blessing to Washington and its partners, it is at best a mixed bag for everyone involved.

A CHANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

China’s reoriented approach offers new opportunities for the United States and its G-7 partners, but to take advantage of them, democratic leaders will need to craft a far more proactive and coordinated development strategy. First, China’s step back from infrastructure has given Washington and its allies a chance to step forward. Critical infrastructure gaps remain throughout the world and given the mixed results of China’s no-strings-attached financing, leaders—and, more important, voters—across the developing world may be more ready to embrace lending that comes with greater accountability and clearer benchmarks.

Moreover, many of the BRI’s ongoing target areas, such as academia, telecommunications, and trade, are fields in which industrialized democracies are well-positioned to compete. The United States and its democratic partners must invest far more in a shared approach to building ties with countries struggling to keep relations with China on a healthy footing—for example, by promoting trade and business, supporting journalism and academic exchanges, and providing scholarships and technical training. Washington and its partners could also invest in creating a new fund for development and democracy, which would demonstrate a shared desire not only to support developing countries’ physical infrastructure but their democratic infrastructure, as well.

Beijing has not abandoned its quest for global influence through economic development.

The United States and its partners must also expend more effort on building relationships with smaller countries. China’s ongoing reorientation of the BRI will make these countries more, not less, important to Beijing. Although China may be backing away from multibillion-dollar commitments in large developing economies, smaller commitments can still go a long way in places like the Solomon Islands or Serbia. It has become a cliché in foreign policy circles to say the United States and its partners just need to work on simply showing up—but the truth holds that the unglamorous work of maintaining a presence remains the best way to build the trust and relationships that yield crucial opportunities.

Finally, the United States and its partners should stop shying away from promoting democracy alongside development. Indeed, the United States Agency for International Development has already started down this path; alongside the Biden administration’s Summit for Democracy, USAID has reemphasized the importance of healthy democratic institutions to long-term development. But too many of the United States’ industrialized partners are hesitant to openly embrace or emphasize the notion that democratic institutions such as independent courts, strong legislatures, a free press, and well-run elections can enable development. Some analysts have long expressed concern that calls for democratization could recall the United States’ own Cold War–era interventions or could alienate countries where leaders are not democratically inclined. The more that other democracies and major aid donors can add their voices to Washington, the less validity these concerns will have. The United States alone touting the benefits of democracy could easily be dismissed as the product of a Cold War mindset; a coalition of democracies stretching from Canada to Japan doing the same would be much harder to brush off.

The sooner policymakers can acknowledge China’s shifting international strategy and reconfigure their own approach, the better. China’s party-state is quickly learning what the United States discovered after its own emergence as a superpower: that changing other societies is a complicated, messy business, and that trying to do it through large infusions of cash can backfire in damaging ways. How Beijing applies these lessons, and whether it is successful in its pursuit of power, remains one of the most pressing questions for democracy globally. It is up to the United States and its democratic partners to develop answers of their own—and to make them as effective as possible.

MATT SCHRADER and J. MICHAEL COLE are the Adviser for China and the Senior Adviser for China, respectively, at the International Republican Institute. They are lead researchers on the recent IRI report Coercion, Capture, and Censorship: Case Studies on the CCP’s Quest for Global Influence.
MORE BY MATT SCHRADER MORE BY J. MICHAEL COLE

Foreign Affairs · by Matt Schrader and J. Michael Cole · February 7, 2023

18. Power in Asia: six surprising facts

Japan, Thailand, China, Brunei, US.

Power in Asia: six surprising facts | Lowy Institute

Following the launch of the 2023 Asia Power Index, the

authors dig into data that reveals how power is shifting in Asia.

lowyinstitute.org · by Jack Sato

This year’s Lowy Institute Asia Power Index – an annual measure and analysis of each country’s resources and influence in the region – uncovered a number of unexpected findings.

Japan was the most searched country online among Index members

Which countries in the region are most interested in Japan online?

Japan maintained its position as the most frequently searched Asia Power Index country via online search engines in other Asia Power Index countries. The trend was most pronounced in Southeast and East Asia, where it was the most searched country among ten of the 14 countries, including Cambodia, China, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. However, this was not the case in South Asia, where, generally, India or the United States was the most searched nation. Consistently high online search interest in Japan is one of 15 indicators used to calculate Cultural Influence in the Asia Power Index and is a proxy reflection of Japan’s soft power and attractiveness in Asia.

Thailand lost 85 per cent of its tourists during the pandemic

While traditionally one of Thailand’s strongest indicators, in 2020, the total number of foreign tourists from other Asia Power Index countries dropped from nearly 33 million in 2019 to five million in 2020 due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. This included a loss of more than one million tourists from India, Japan, Laos, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore, and nearly 11 million from China. When considering all tourists, it’s even more pronounced – dropping from nearly 40 million to under seven million. This trend continued in 2021, when the number of tourists dropped to less than half a million. All countries lost tourism revenue during the pandemic, but our data shows the uneven impact, with tourism accounting for around 10 per cent of Thailand’s GDP in 2019.

In 2022, the number of international flight routes from Beijing halved

One of the more noticeable changes in the 2023 Asia Power Index is the large loss of points for many nations in the connectivity sub-measure. Of these, it’s most noticeable in the travel hubs indicator. Measured in July 2022, the number of international flight routes declined for 16 Asia Power Index countries, including double-digit loses for cities Tokyo, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Moscow, Taipei, Bangkok and New York. While flight routes from many countries were cancelled in 2022, this was most extreme in China, with flight routes halving to 53 due to its protracted lockdowns and border closures. China also suffered large losses in other connectivity indicators, including those related to global trade and investment flows, which affected its overall Economic Capability and power scores.

China’s share of investment in Brunei reached 94 per cent

Following limited investment by Japan in Brunei in recent years, the share of capital investment from China among Asia Power Index countries over the ten-year period 2013–21 soared above 90 per cent. Almost all this investment, worth more than US$13.5 billion, came from one joint petrochemical project. While this is an extreme case, the overall trend in the region suggests that China is becoming a more important source of investment compared to Japan. Since the first edition of the Asia Power Index in 2018, the average share of Japanese investment across the region has dropped from roughly 12 per cent to ten per cent. By contrast, Chinese investment has increased from 16 per cent to 22 per cent.

The United States was the top bilateral defence training partner for half of the Index nations

Which countries in the region do the greatest share of their defence dialogues with the United States?

The United States is the most important bilateral military training partner for Australia, Bangladesh, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, as measured by the number of combined trainings in 2021. Notably, the United States accounted for a quarter of Australian joint trainings, around 80 per cent of both Japan and South Korea’s, and more than half of the Philippines’. This highlights the preeminent role the United States plays as a defence partner in the region, a key source of relative US advantage.

More than a third of Japan’s bilateral diplomatic dialogues were with the United States

This edition of the Asia Power Index includes new data, tracking the extent of high-level diplomatic engagement among Index countries in 2021. Japan and the United States met more frequently than any other pair of Asia Power Index countries. Japan held ten meetings with the United States out of a total of 27 meetings tracked. These included two 2+2 meetings, four foreign ministerial-level meetings, and four at the leader level. The next most common pairings were between South Korea and both China and the United States – six each – and five between Australia and the United States. In addition, China met with more than three-quarters of the Index countries, while the United States met with less than a third. This data highlights that deep partnerships with select allied countries are a hallmark of US–Asia strategy, in contrast to China, which prioritises shallower relationships with a larger number of partners.

These data points are drawn from the 133 indicators that the Lowy Institute uses to measure power in the Asia Power Index. For more on the Index and its findings, visit power.lowyinstitute.org.

lowyinstitute.org · by Jack Sato

19. Is Biden's Pentagon a warfighting organization? Amid China threat, you have to wonder

Is Biden's Pentagon a warfighting organization? Amid China threat, you have to wonder

Amid China's spy flights, you would think we would want military leaders who focus on warfighting

By Dakota L. Wood | Fox News

foxnews.com · by 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Video

China spy flight debris on its way to FBI lab

Fox News’ Jennifer Griffin reports on the Pentagon’s claims that they did not shoot down the Chinese spy balloon sooner because it was not demonstrating ‘hostile act or hostile intent.’

NEWYou can now listen to Fox News articles!

In a recent memo, Gen. Michael A. Minihan, commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, said he has a "gut feeling" that the U.S. will be at war with China in 2025. Written to the men and women under his command, it was clearly meant to spur them to "attain higher readiness, integration, and agility" deemed necessary to win in such a fight. Minihan’s blunt talk, aggressive instructions to his troops, and sense of urgency differs starkly from the Biden administration’s approach to the threat posed by China.

Minihan has said provocative things before. "Every part of your life is better [when] you can kill your enemy" nettled some. But his prediction of war with China just two years down the road, sent senior officials and national security analysts scurrying to distance themselves from both his forecast and the tone of his memo.

Pentagon officials said Minihan’s comments were "not representative of the Department’s view on China." That’s true enough. Their phrasing and word choice has consistently implied that they are more focused on building alliance structures that achieve security objectives peacefully and that do not antagonize China than in driving a military posture that is capable of and ready for combat action should the need arise.

This is a pity and a missed opportunity.

CHINA OUTPACES US IN MISSILE LAUNCHERS, PENTAGON TELLS CONGRESS

Video

Rather than chiding the general for his aggressive spirit, defense officials and national security glitterati should have embraced and leveraged Minihan’s passion for combat readiness and warfighting effectiveness to make the point that the U.S. military is not something to be discounted by the likes of China. Many people today are inclined to dismiss talk of "peace-through-strength" as the fading gasp of aged Cold Warriors. Lost in tut-tutting this trite but true maxim is an appreciation for what "hard power" really is and what it takes to have it not just in material form—tanks, ships, aircraft, and missiles—but also in attitude, posture, training, and focus.

The federal government is awash in agencies that deal with all aspects of America’s engagement with the larger world apart from military action. There are the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, and (pseudo-)independent agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, International Trade Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and more. These organizations presumably ensure that U.S. interests in public health, stewardship of natural resources and the environment, trade, international relations, thwarting criminality, and so forth are addressed.

What none of them do is ensure the U.S. can defeat enemies in combat. That is why we have a Department of Defense and the military services.

With that in mind, you would think we would want military leaders who focus on warfighting and instilling in our troops the mindset that combat is serious business, and they need to be serious about being ready for it. When it comes to the defense of our country and our people, isn’t it better to have military leaders who lean into a fight, who want their people to be prepared for a fight than to have people in leadership positions who are more concerned about carbon footprints, generating statistics for equity czars and gender-confused apparatchiks, and worrying about whether an exercise with an ally might be seen as too provocative by our enemies?

Video

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Our military prizes the American commitment to civilian control of our armed forces and wouldn’t have it any other way. We do not want a political military or a military that becomes a political power in its own right. But neither do we want a military or military leaders who forget what their sole purpose is: to defend our country and defeat our enemies in battle. With that mindset and ensuring our forces are equipped, trained, and operationally ready to do that, the war they are prepared to win will be the war that doesn’t happen because our enemies will know they will be defeated. That is what deterrence is all about. And it is leaders like Gen. Minihan who create those favorable conditions.

The most recent example that proves this point? Balloongate, the nationally embarrassing spectacle of a Chinese intelligence collection asset serenely floating across the United States snapping up pictures, electrons, and who knows what else undisturbed by any U.S. intervention until it had completed its task for the Chinese Communist Party. Cleary, Xi Jinping, China’s autocratic leader, believes Beijing can act with impunity even in America’s sovereign airspace. Why is that? Perhaps because China believes it has nothing to fear. And what if others – Iran, North Korea, Russia – have come to the same conclusion?

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Our national leaders and senior officials should embrace Minihan and those like him rather than distance themselves from them and making excuses for their zeal. Look to other agencies for economists, trade specialists, law enforcement and public health professionals, and career diplomats. They work to maximize the blessings of peace, liberty, and prosperity. But to create and sustain the peace that enables all the rest, our military needs warriors.

Preach on, Gen. Minihan! And that’s from a career Marine who appreciates a military leader when he sees one, regardless of service branch.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM DAKOTA WOOD

A 20-year veteran of the Marine Corps, Dakota L. Wood is The Heritage Foundation’s senior research fellow for defense programs and editor of the think tank’s .

foxnews.com · by 2018 Index of U.S. Military Strength

20. America’s Return to the Philippines Makes Sense

Location, location, location. Geography, geography, geography.

America’s Return to the Philippines Makes Sense

A new agreement to allow the US access to more military bases will help counter China’s influence and stabilize the region.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-02-07/us-military-s-return-to-some-philippine-bases-makes-sense?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d&sref=hhjZtX76

ByJames Stavridis

February 7, 2023 at 5:00 PM EST

When I was a junior officer in the Navy during the Cold War, I spent a great deal of time in the Western Pacific. I regularly pulled into Subic Bay Naval Station and its associated Cubi Point Naval Air Station — which, along with the even larger Clark Air Force Base to the north, made the Philippines the US military’s central hub in the Pacific. Thousands of Philippine citizens served in the US Navy, and we felt a strong bond with the country.

At the same time, when I got off the bases — walking the crowded streets of Manila, say, or taking a break in the beautiful highlands near Baguio — I could sense the ambivalence about our presence. More than 30 years ago, the US was asked to leave its former colony, and we departed with regret.

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Last week, both nations announced that the US would again have significant access to additional military sites in the Philippines, this time in the northern part of the country on the large island on Luzon. It is a decision that will have considerable strategic, operational and diplomatic impact over the coming decades — especially, as my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Hal Brands notes, when it comes to the US relationship with China.

First, it is important to note the US is not re-creating the vast naval and air bases of the past. The arrangement, worked out by Department of Defense, the State Department and their counterparts in the Philippines, will merely build on current agreements and grant access to four crucial additional sites within the country.

The location, in the far north on Luzon, is significant. A glance at a map shows the new logistics hubs will “fill in” the great arc around the contested South China Sea, stretching from the Japanese home islands, through the Philippines, and then south to significant bases in northern Australia. Equally important, the location is just to the southwest of Taiwan, providing the US with significantly enhanced ability to organize and coordinate logistics, ammunition, fuel, surveillance and command-and-control.

Meanwhile, in Guam — a US territory — the US Marine Corps is building its first new base in 70 years, Camp Blaz, named after a heroic son of the territory. The combination of base access in the Philippines with a muscular Marine base in Guam is a sea change in America’s presence.

Finally, the access agreement is a significant diplomatic success for the US. Under the previous Philippine president, the mercurial Rodrigo Duterte, the nation leaned toward China on many issues. But with President Bongbong Marcos, the son of former dictator Fernand Marcos, the Philippines is more attentive to the long-term danger of Chinese territorial claims in their front yard, the South China Sea.

The new access agreement is a very strong signal to Beijing that the Philippines will remain fiercely independent and will develop the geopolitical relationships needed (not only with the US, but with a militarily resurgent Japan) to contest the region. And the Philippine military will receive enhanced training, equipment and engagement with the US military.

China is watching closely, and last week’s balloon excursion over the US may indeed have been a response to the basing agreement with the Philippines and the new US base in Guam. The timing would certainly suggest that, but whether China intended such a public incident (especially days before a visit by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken) is difficult to prove.

What can be said with certainty is that the US is strengthening alliances and relationships with old friends such as the Philippines, staunch post-World War II allies such as Japan and South Korea, and traditional partners such as Australia. To say that all of this is landing like a lead balloon in Beijing is a cheap pun. But for those of us who have spent time in the Philippine Islands, and appreciate America’s historical relationship with the country, this agreement comes as welcome news indeed.

More From Bloomberg Opinion:

The Philippines Is a Flashpoint in the New Cold War: Hal Brands
The Philippines Can’t Afford to Go Back to the Past: The Editors
Counter China in the Pacific Through Friendship: David Fickling
It Would Cost the US to Defend Taiwan From China: Tobin Harshaw

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Subscribe to our daily newsletter.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

James Stavridis at jstavridis@bloomberg.net

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More From Bloomberg Opinion:

The Philippines Is a Flashpoint in the New Cold War: Hal Brands
The Philippines Can’t Afford to Go Back to the Past: The Editors
Counter China in the Pacific Through Friendship: David Fickling
It Would Cost the US to Defend Taiwan From China: Tobin Harshaw

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Subscribe to our daily newsletter.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

James Stavridis at jstavridis@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net

America’s Return to the Philippines Makes Sense

A new agreement to allow the US access to more military bases will help counter China’s influence and stabilize the region.

ByJames Stavridis

February 7, 2023 at 5:00 PM EST

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More From Bloomberg Opinion:

The Philippines Is a Flashpoint in the New Cold War: Hal Brands
The Philippines Can’t Afford to Go Back to the Past: The Editors
Counter China in the Pacific Through Friendship: David Fickling
It Would Cost the US to Defend Taiwan From China: Tobin Harshaw

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Subscribe to our daily newsletter.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

James Stavridis at jstavridis@bloomberg.net

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More From Bloomberg Opinion:

The Philippines Is a Flashpoint in the New Cold War: Hal Brands
The Philippines Can’t Afford to Go Back to the Past: The Editors
Counter China in the Pacific Through Friendship: David Fickling
It Would Cost the US to Defend Taiwan From China: Tobin Harshaw

Want more Bloomberg Opinion? Subscribe to our daily newsletter.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:

James Stavridis at jstavridis@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:

Michael Newman at mnewman43@bloomberg.net

21. Alone and unafraid: How to prepare to fight and win the next war

Remember that we have to outthink our adversaries too. We need to invest in education and training as much technology and equipment, and weapons systems.

Alone and unafraid: How to prepare to fight and win the next war

Defense News · by Lt. Col. Ernest “Nest” Cage · February 7, 2023

A near-peer conflict between the U.S. and China will be a nightmare lived in real life. Just how scary the nightmare of war might be is dependent on what is done now. As policymakers and war planners prepare for the potential of near-peer conflict — the biggest fight of modern times — two imperatives must be considered: the rapid investment and fielding of highly employable technology, and greater autonomy and expectations from novel warfighters on the battlefield.

In a recent conversation at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David Berger said that we will have to use everything in the cupboard to prevent conflict with China. At present, open-source war games predict that American fire power and expertise would prevail in a conflict with China. However, the current “victory gap,” is not static, and our military advantage over a near-peer adversary is not guaranteed in perpetuity.

While progress has been made to step up the pace of acquiring new weapon systems through existing acquisition authorities, it can be argued that much more speed is needed to ensure the force is ready for the next fight. This will mean more robust legislative reforms that entrust the Department of Defense with the authority to speed up the acquisition of emerging technology from future years to real-time relevance. It may even mean a radical idea: Buy now and report as soon as possible.

Moving faster should not mean less oversight and accountability of taxpayer dollars but rather a shared understanding of the high stakes that face the future of rules-based order.

Emerging technology being fielded by industry today has enormous potential to provide the U.S. military with the competitive advantage that will be needed to sustain and win on the battlefield. Large U.S. companies are pushing beyond the envelope with 5G technology, all-electric aircraft and autonomous systems, which could prove critical in a near-peer fight. The U.S. military’s imperative is to rapidly find, fund and field the very best ideas.

In a near-peer fight in the Indo-Pacific region, distributed operations will not just be a paragraph in the overall operational campaign executed by high-end forces; it will have to be the main order of battle. A key to the success of distributed operations could be a new concept using multicapable warfighters defined as individual effects teams, or IET.

These basic combat skills trained two-person teams — sourced from across the ranks of the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force — that could be deployed with discrete mission tasks all designed to deceive, disrupt, deny and defeat the enemy. A radical approach to the IET is that the ideal candidate would not be an infantry professional at all; an Army finance clerk could be tasked to join up with an Air Force Security Forces airman, or a Marine cook could join an Army admin troop.

Armed with combat skills training, leading-edge technology and discrete mission orders, nontraditional front-line combatants could provide critical effects enabling deceive-campaign effects.

IETs would not just shoot, move and communicate; in fact, they might not directly engage the enemy at all. Each team could be strategically deployed alone but unafraid and armed with cutting-edge technology. IETs could deploy in mass, creating a “swarm effect.” Thousands of IETs operating in front of, behind and next to the enemy’s line would be designed to prep and shape the battle space by overwhelming the adversary’s battlefield situational awareness, providing gaps for conventional forces and supporting fires to make strategic advances.

In effect the enemy would die a death of a thousand cuts as IETs — along with conventional and special forces — focus on defeating key centers of gravity.

IETs could be tasked with a single mission: to simply deploy to an area and do nothing as part of a larger mission effects profile. Alternatively, an IET could deploy disruptive technology the size of a backpack and return to base.

A more involved mission for an IET might involve setting up an austere landing field, which could include flying onto a deserted island as a passenger on an automated, low-signature, all-electric vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft. Once on the ground the IET could set up a pocket-sized communication node, and generate water from the air and aircraft fuel from sea water hours before the first aircraft landing.

The Department of Defense and Congress must push the envelope harder to reduce the time it takes to field and acquire new systems — technology at the speed of relevance. The private sector is ripe with cutting-edge solutions, but many are dying on the vine.

Finally, the services should fully explore the cumulative effects that multicapable warfighters can bring to the vast, distributed battlefield. Every service member deployed to the front lines except for medical personnel and chaplains should be prepared to operate outside the wire as a multicapable warfighter as part of an individual effects team.

War is horrible, and those who have seen it hope it never returns. However, man is not perfect and is a reliable creature of habit, so we must prepare to win today.

U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Ernest “Nest” Cage is a senior defense fellow at the Center for a New American Security think tank. He previously served as deputy executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This commentary does not necessarily represent the official policies or views of the U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Defense Department.

22. What Tanks in Ukraine Tell Us About America in the Pacific

What Tanks in Ukraine Tell Us About America in the Pacific

U.S. hopes that Europe can take care of itself appear to be farfetched.

defenseone.com · by John R. Deni

Germany’s insistence that the United States move first in the decision to send tanks to Ukraine tells us much about security dynamics in Europe, but it also has implications for America’s strategy in the Indo-Pacific: it reveals the futility of hoping that Europe might soon stand on its own so that Washington can focus more on the Pacific theater.

Deliberations over whether to send tanks to Ukraine took longer than many hoped, but the end result should nonetheless help increase the odds of a Ukrainian victory. The deal was clinched by U.S. willingness to take the lead, announcing it would supply Ukraine with American-made M1A2 Abrams tanks, even though these tanks require a more robust maintenance and logistical support capability. Moreover, Washington will only provide 31 Abrams tanks—just 10 percent of what Ukraine has apparently indicated it needs—and they won’t arrive in any case for several months, meaning they probably won’t play any role in an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive this spring.

The fact that Germany in particular refused to provide tanks without America doing so first is frustrating to Washington. Berlin alone has the economic, technological, and political heft to lead Europe; other candidates all fall short for various reasons. Great Britain is looking increasingly less “great,” thanks in large part to Brexit, which is forcing its military to shrink. France has the will to lead but lacks the economic and military strength; Macron’s commitment to expand military spending from 2024-30 will take years to yield results. Paris also lacks the respect of Eastern Europeans, who perceive it as too willing to negotiate with Moscow over the heads of Warsaw, Prague, Vilnius, and so forth. Farther afield, Italy and Spain appear largely uninterested in a broader leadership role in Europe – perhaps more importantly, they both have their eyes trained on instability to the south and the waves of migrants it generates.

Germany’s singular heft notwithstanding, it currently lacks the will to lead. Berlin steadfastly avoids getting ahead of either international or domestic opinion. Internationally, Berlin is unwilling to act without consensus among allies, otherwise known as “leading from the middle.” Domestically, German leaders reflected the reluctant but slowly shifting sentiment among the German electorate.

Moreover, Berlin still wants the United States in the pole position when it comes to security matters in Europe. After all, Germany lacks a nuclear deterrent of its own, remaining reliant on America’s umbrella. And the albatross of historical guilt remains around Berlin’s neck when it comes to sending military forces or even military equipment anywhere but especially in Eastern Europe.

All of this has implications for the United States, certainly in Europe but also well beyond. First, it’s clear that for the foreseeable future, Washington will need to lead actively in Europe. Even if war in Ukraine ended tomorrow with a victory for Kyiv, however that’s defined, any subsequent attempt by Washington to pull up stakes in Europe or ‘lead from behind’ is likely to backfire. Prematurely backing away from Europe would endanger enduring vital American interests there.

More consequentially, in the event of a crisis in the Indo-Pacific, Washington can’t rely on Europeans to completely ‘backfill’ the United States in Europe. Aside from the lack of will in Germany – the only major European ally with the wherewithal to lead – most major U.S. allies in Europe are either limiting or reducing their military capacity while they focus on building capabilities over this decade.

As it has for several generations—and because it has vital interests across two oceans—America will probably need to maintain its leading security role in East Asia and Europe. In Europe, the character of that role may change somewhat. For instance, it may mean a different configuration of U.S. forces based in Europe following a Ukrainian victory. But the United States will still need to sit at the head of the table, leading from the front.

In the Indo-Pacific, the United States will need to maintain and strengthen its ability to project military force and political influence across the Pacific’s vast distances and over time. However, and to the extent possible, Washington should continue to prioritize keeping strategic competition with China within the realms of economics, trade, governance, diplomacy, development, and information. Relying too strongly on a military framing for competition with China risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy and could result in overextension or worse.

Although China remains the primary long-term challenge to American interests and security, it’s equally clear Russia will remain a spoiler in Europe at least through the end of this decade and possibly longer. Moscow’s conflation of security and subservient buffer states is likely to continue running headlong into the West’s vital interest in sovereignty and self-determination. The deal to send tanks to Ukraine should remind Washington that it must continue to exercise leadership in both theaters vital to the American way of life, carefully balancing the resources necessary to do so in each.

John R. Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He’s the author of “Coalition of the unWilling and unAble.” The views expressed are his own.

defenseone.com · by John R. Deni

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