Attorneys, Scott Salmon and Renne Steinhagen, have filed a brief on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
The brief addresses arguments made by the defendants.
1. The Defendants criticize the Petitioners for seeking preliminary injunctive relief.
“What is preliminary injunctive relief?” you might ask and “Why were the Plaintiff’s seeking it?”
In this case, it is a court order to stay the printing of the November ballots until this matter can be resolved.
The Plaintiff’s argue that it is standard procedure in a case like this because it is the only remedy "given the time-sensitive need to be heard before ballots are printed and an election conducted.”
2. The defendants make highly technical arguments about which New Jersey statutes apply to amending the date of Teaneck’s municipal elections.
The law is a living thing. It evolves over time in light of changing circumstances and experience.
New Jersey has several statutes that address how to change municipal government. They were written at different times and they differ depending on the form of municipal government and the type of change sought, that is, whether it is a change in the form of government or just an amendment to an existing form of government. And the process by which a change is made also differs depending on whether the change is sought by the residents or by the governing body.
The One Town One Vote Plaintiffs have not sought to change Teaneck’s form of government, which is known as the Council-Manager form under the Faulkner Act. The Plaintiffs have sought only one specific amendment to our existing form - an amendment regarding the timing of municipal elections.
And, most importantly, the Plaintiffs did not petition for a change from nonpartisan to partisan elections.
The gist of Defendant Ruccione’s lengthy argument is that these statutes are in conflict with one another. He interprets one, the Uniform Nonpartisan Elections Law, to override another. He claims that the Plaintiff’s brought their petition under the wrong statute and that the statute the Plaintiff’s cite may only be used to amend the date of the election when the election itself is being switched from nonpartisan to partisan, or vice versa.
The Plaintiff’s argue that the statutes are not in conflict at all, but must be understood in light of each other, as they have a common purpose to define the processes by which a form of government may be changed or amended.
The Plaintiffs say that Defendant Ruccione’s
“…argument is based on an incorrect reading of the statute that requires one to squint to see words that are not actually present.”
Furthermore, they note that Defendant Ruccione shores up his argument by citing a bill introduced in 2000 that
“…was never brought up for a vote, never passed by the Legislature, and never signed into law”
Defendant Ruccione also argues that an amendment (A5404) to one of the statutes in question, which did indeed become law in 2019, changed the required number of petition signatures from 10% to 25%.
The Plaintiff’s argue that his interpretation of this amendment is incorrect, that A5404
“was intended to increase the signature requirement only to changes from nonpartisan to partisan elections and vice versa, and no other type of charter amendment [such as the timing of the elections].”
And finally, the Plaintiffs point out that
“Defendant Ruccione concedes that the Committee has more than satisfied both requirements by obtaining in excess of the higher 25% standard…Therefore, it [the argument that 25% rather than 10% is required] is not critically relevant...”
3. The defendants argue that the petition is invalid because it did not include an ordinance.
Defendant Ruccione argues that the form of the petition submitted to him was incorrect because it did not include an Ordinance for the signatories to see, but merely posed the question that the Petitioners wanted to place on the ballot.
The Plaintiffs respond that including an ordinance is unnecessary and makes no practical difference. They hold that Defendant Ruccione's convoluted arguments only muddy the waters. They note that Defendant Ruccione does not argue that the question posed by the Petitioners would be substantively different than what an ordinance might contain. Therefore, the Plaintiffs say
“…any ordinance would just be an affirmative declaration of the same language that is now posed in question form on the Committee’s petition…which was read by the signatories to the petition before signing… Requiring petitioners to initiate an ordinance when changing the charter is therefore superfluous and, in effect, meaningless.”
4. The defendants argue that the Petition must be rejected because it is confusing to voters.
After One Town One Vote rushed to gather additional signatures demanded by the Town Clerk, Defendant Ruccione then added a new reason for rejecting the petition in his Second Notice.
Not only did he claim that the necessary ordinance was missing, but that the question itself would confuse the voters because it conflates two different statues.
The Plaintiffs first point out that Defendant Ruccione only introduced this new reason after the time period when the plaintiffs could have fixed it. As the town’s election official in this matter, the Clerk is obligated by law to state this objection in the Initial Notice to the Petitioners when there was still time to act on it. They say,
“It cannot be stressed enough that the rejection of a petition is not meant to be a guessing game. It is not the Committee’s obligation to divine what Defendant Ruccione’s “real” basis for rejection might be at some point in the future. If Ruccione believed there was a valid basis for rejecting the petition, it was his obligation to inform the Committee of that basis in his Initial Notice—if not during earlier communications with the Committee—so that the Committee may have had an opportunity to cure the deficiency, as permitted by law”
The Plaintiffs also assert that by making this claim that voters would be “confused”, Defendant Ruccione has exceeded his assigned role, which is simply to certify whether the petition is signed by a sufficient number of qualified voters and a proper statement.
And they go on to note that Defendant Ruccione himself admits that the question posed by the Petitioners and its interpretative statement make it clear that elections would remain nonpartisan even if the referendum were passed.
The Plaintiffs thus assert that Defendant Ruccione himself is the one creating confusion.
What the Plaintiffs are trying to do, i.e., put the timing of the election on the ballot for voters to decide, is abundantly clear, and that is really all that matters here.
5. The defendants argue that the technical defects of the petition should result in its rejection by the court.
The Plaintiffs respond by asserting that even if an ordinance were required, legal precedents have firmly established that “perceived minor technical noncompliance” is not a sufficient reason to keep a public question off the ballot.
Since it is obvious that an ordinance would contain the same content as the question posed, they summarize by quoting precedent,
“Indeed, ‘a technical ballot error should not override the clear choice of the electorate to save taxpayer dollars and increase voter participation’ by holding municipal elections in November…Here, the voters have clearly spoken that they want this question to be placed on the ballot, so they have a choice to accept or reject it...Ultimately, the question may pass or fail, but it deserves to do so at the hand of the voters, not an unelected clerk.”
