Quotes of the day:

  "I would hope that all educated citizens would fulfill this obligation—in politics, in Government, here in Nashville, here in this State, in the Peace Corps, in the Foreign Service, in the Government Service, in the Tennessee Valley, in the world. You will find the pressures greater than the pay. You may endure more public attacks than support. But you will have the unequaled satisfaction of knowing that your character and talent are contributing to the direction and success of this free society." 

- John F. Kennedy

“James Lawson, a key figure in developing the Movement’s philosophy and tactics and in training a cadre of influential leaders, once commented, “Protracted struggle is a moral struggle that is like warfare, moral warfare.” Another activist, Charles Sherrod of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, in looking back, said, “It was a war. Though it was a non-violent war, but it was indeed a war.””

- Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968 by Thomas E. Ricks

 "The greatest enemies of success and happiness are negative emotions of all kinds." 

- Brian Tracy

1. With tension rising in the Pacific, US special operators have a new goal: Creating 'multiple dilemmas' for China

2. Meet the next Sergeant Major of the Army

3. IntelBrief: U.S. Continues to Closely Assess Chinese Military Modernization

4. IntelBrief: Arrests in Germany Target Far-Right and Anti-Government Extremists

5. HASC and SASC Release Text of FY23 NDAA Agreement

6. War has tamed Ukraine’s oligarchs, creating space for democratic change

7. B-21 Raider Stealth Bomber: Everything We Know Right Now

8. Botnets, Battlefields, and Blurred Lines: Optimizing an Information Strategy for Modern War

9. Making Joint All Demand Command and Control a Reality

10. House passes defense bill with more Taiwan, Ukraine security aid

11. Adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister talks post-war forces, industry

12. Ukraine Says Western Allies Shouldn’t Fear Russia Falling Apart

13. Army football alums make general more often than other officers — why?

14. Democrats ask consulting firms for information on retired military officers advising foreign governments

15.  What’s in and out of the House defense bill

16. Is the ‘axis of evil’ beginning to implode?

17. Why modern wars cannot escape the trenches

1. With tension rising in the Pacific, US special operators have a new goal: Creating 'multiple dilemmas' for China

Interestingly I included this in my remarks at the Irregular Warfare symposium at Fort Bragg yesterday.

Irregular warfare is the military contribution to political warfare. Political warfare is the action of the whole of government in strategic competition.

•      IW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems

Ø And creating dilemmas for our adversaries

•      IW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it requires integral support of the action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA. 

With tension rising in the Pacific, US special operators have a new goal: Creating 'multiple dilemmas' for China

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

A US Air Force pararescuemen crosses a waterway on a rope during jungle-warfare training in Hawaii in April.

US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer

• After decades fighting terrorism, US Special Operations Command is reorienting to take on China.
• SOCOM is now focusing on working with partners in the Pacific to support the US military's goals.
• US special operators are aiming to create "multiple dilemmas" for China, SOCOM's commander says.

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The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked the most significant conventional conflict in Europe since World War II.

Despite Moscow's attack, including threats to use nuclear weapons, US officials stress China remains the biggest long-term threat to US national security.

The US military as a whole is been reorienting toward what it sees as the potential for a war with China, but US Special Operations Command may be making the most profound shift.

After more than two decades of fighting insurgents and terrorists in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, SOCOM is moving into a new era in which kicking down doors to capture or kill high-value targets is not the main measure of success.

Now US special operators are focusing on working with allies and partner forces to shape the environment and support the rest of the US military in deterring and, if need be, fighting China.

Multiple dilemmas

US Navy SEALs, Philippine Navy special operators, and Australian special-operations soldiers during an exercise in Palawan in April.

US Marine Corps/Sgt. Mario A. Ramirez

In the Indo-Pacific, China has a home-field advantage. Much of the Western Pacific is a relatively short distance from the Chinese military's main bases, while the US military, which has several major bases in the region, is dependent on air and sea routes for major supplies and reinforcement.

The US's major allies and partners — especially Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan — are also dependent on imports, especially of food and fuel, and are both geographically and economically close to China, which Beijing has used for leverage.

During his confirmation hearing in July, SOCOM's new commander, Lt. Gen. Bryan Fenton, described how the US special-operations community would navigate those challenges in order to deter and potentially fight China.

Fenton said SOCOM's role is to work "in concert" with top US commanders to devise "asymmetric, scalable options" that can present "multiple dilemmas" to China by making use of the "placement, access, and influence" that US special operators have developed by deploying to the region and working with local forces.

A Green Beret discusses close-quarters battle with Philippine police and coast guard personnel on Palawan in May.

US Army/Sgt. 1st Class Jared N. Gehmann

US special operators need to continue "developing and strengthening the partner and ally piece that's a comparative and competitive advantage for this nation," Fenton said.

The goal, Fenton said, is to make it harder for Beijing's to achieve its goals both in a period of competition and during wartime.

Outlining what SOCOM's missions would look like, Fenton described "small teams in countries throughout the region" composed of operators who "speak the language, are culturally attuned, [and] have been aligned against that region for many years."

Those operators' relationships with conventional and special-operations units in the region are ideal force-multipliers in the event of a conflict, Fenton added.

Green Berets and Nepalese soldiers practice evacuating casualties in Nepal in February 2020.

US Army

Alliances and partnerships are probably one of the US's most valuable tools. Beijing has alienated many of its neighbors with its increasingly aggressive behavior and disregard for the international rules-based system, particularly in the South China Sea. The US can use that dissatisfaction to its advantage.

The "placement, access, and influence" of US special operators in other countries to provide "training, advising, and assisting" has been shown to be "extremely powerful" in countering aggression, Fenton said, citing SOCOM's training of Ukrainian forces.

Moreover, US special operators have been working closely with all US military branches to better understand how those branches operate and how SOCOM can support them in a conflict with China.

Fenton also said the Chinese Communist Party's global aspirations mean that competition with Beijing takes place across the world, especially in Africa and South America. The SOCOM leader said he would follow the "same recipe across the globe" and use the same methods to counter malicious Chinese influence wherever it is found.

SOCOM and Taiwan

Taiwanese marines conduct night-time landing training in Kaohsiung in July 2018.

Tyrone Siu/Reuters

Unification with Taiwan has been a Chinese policy for decades, but Beijing has grown more assertive about that ambition under Xi Jinping, who took power in 2012 and was reappointed for third five-year term in October.

Beijing's rhetoric about Taiwan has grown more forceful and its military, especially its special-operations force, is growing in size and capability. Those trends have led US military leaders to believe China has sped up its timeline for capturing Taiwan.

Despite decades of support and a close defense relationship, including extensive arms sales, the US has not officially committed to defending Taiwan against a Chinese attack. (President Joe Biden has said several times that the US is committed to Taiwan's defense, but White House officials say US policy has not changed.)

Despite uncertainty about how the US would respond, US special-operations troops are already involved in preparing Taiwan's defense. In October 2021, The Wall Street Journal reported that a small contingent of US special-operations troops and Marines had been in Taiwan for at least a year to train Taiwanese forces.

The Pentagon's top special-operations official said in May 2021 that special operators could be "a key contributor" to resisting a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. US Army Special Forces soldiers, who lead SOCOM's foreign training efforts, "can be America's most potent tool" for countering a Chinese attack, a former Special Forces officer told Insider last year.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou

2. Meet the next Sergeant Major of the Army

Meet the next Sergeant Major of the Army

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · December 8, 2022

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville announced who the service’s next top noncommissioned officer Thursday afternoon during a professional forum in Alexandria, Virginia.

Command Sgt. Maj. Michael Weimer was selected to succeed Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael Grinston, who will depart the role in August 2023.

Weimer is currently the top NCO for Army Special Operations Command, a role he assumed in August 2021.

Army spokesperson Sgt. 1st Class Anthony Hewitt confirmed Weimer’s selection in a statement emailed to Army Times.

The Army’s top NCOs typically influence soldier welfare and quality of life issues across the force, though each develops their own portfolio of initiatives to address during their term.

For Grinston, that meant major changes to uniform policy, the rollout of the Army Combat Fitness Test, fostering parenthood policy changes, standardization of expert badges and more.

It’s not clear yet what Weimer’s priorities will be in his next role.

Who is Sgt. Maj. Michael Weimer?

Weimer is a career special operator, according to his official biography and details released by Hewitt.

He joined the Army in 1993 and graduated from Special Forces Assessment and Selection in 1994, becoming a Special Forces weapons sergeant.

Since then, Weimer has served in multiple roles across the special operations community, including time with 7th Special Forces Group. He also served as the top NCO for the special operations task force in Afghanistan from 2019 to 2020.

Hewitt added that Weimer has a bachelor’s degree in strategic studies and defense analysis from Norwich University.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.

3. IntelBrief: U.S. Continues to Closely Assess Chinese Military Modernization

IntelBrief: U.S. Continues to Closely Assess Chinese Military Modernization - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 9, 2022

December 9, 2022

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IntelBrief: U.S. Continues to Closely Assess Chinese Military Modernization

AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein

Bottom Line Up Front

• Last week, the U.S. Department of Defense released the 2022 China Military Power Report, assessing the military and security developments and directions of the People’s Republic of China.
• The report notes that the PRC’s nuclear expansion was likely accelerated in 2021, and that by 2035 they could acquire a stockpile of between 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear warheads (from around 400 today).
• The 2022 CMPR outlines several ways in which China could seek forceful unification with Taiwan, including blockades, asymmetrical campaigns, and a full-scale amphibious invasion.
• While these numbers may make for click-bait statistics highlighting a threat posed by the PRC to the U.S., it is important to place these numbers in context and adopt a comparative analysis; today, the U.S. possesses 5,000 nuclear warheads.

Last week, the U.S. Department of Defense released the 2022 China Military Power Report (CMPR), a Congressionally mandated report that assesses the military and security developments and directions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The report describes China as “the most consequential and systemic challenge to U.S. national security and the free and open international system,” an assessment also put forth in the October 2022 Biden-Harris National Security Strategy. The report details the global ambitions of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and how Beijing has frequently employed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to further economic, security, and military objectives. The 197-page report covers a range of critical areas and insight into the challenge the PRC poses to not only the United States, but also allies and the future stability in the Indo-Pacific, indicating that the trendlines that were highlighted in previous CMPR reports continue to be pursued by Beijing. These include increases in key capabilities such as nuclear warhead stockpiles, ISR satellite fleet, and considerations for overseas PLA military logistics facilities.

The report notes that China’s nuclear expansion was likely accelerated in 2021, and that by 2035—the timeline for military modernization of the PRC’s armed forces—they could stockpile between 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear warheads (from around 400 today). While these numbers may make for click-bait statistics to showcase the existential threat posed by the PRC to the United States, it is important to place these numbers in context and adopt a comparative analysis. Today, the United States possesses 5,000 nuclear warheads (four to five times as many that China may seek to acquire by 2035), leaving its deterrence capabilities intact. Another area of concern is the geographical expansion of the PLA’s long-range precision strike capability on U.S. bases in the Pacific, which now includes Guam. Coupled with economic, security, and diplomatic developments in the Pacific, such as the China-Solomon Island Pact, that indicates a more substantial PLA reach in the South Pacific in the future (both the Solomon Islands and the PRC have denied any plans for a Chinese military base in the Island nation). The 2022 CMPR report noted that “The PLA is most interested in military access along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.”

The report also noted that the PRC “intensified diplomatic, economic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 2021.” US-China relations have become increasingly tense in 2022 over the Taiwan Strait—especially following House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the island in August of this year. The 2022 CMPR outlines several ways in which China could seek forceful unification with Taiwan, including blockades, asymmetrical campaigns, and a full-scale amphibious invasion. The report notes that “the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan” but that “the circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have evolved over time.” One key aspect of the CMPR deserves closer attention is the PRC’s continued investment in space and counter-space capabilities, with implications for Taiwan. This is seen as a key capability by the PLA to “blind and deafen the enemy”—which can essentially be used to deter or deny any other state that may seek to come to Taiwan’s aid.

The possibility of China seeking a forceful unification with Taiwan in the coming years is certainly top of mind for policymakers in Washington D.C. However, it is important that the 2022 CMPR not be quoted out of context to overhype the threat of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. A sober analysis of the PRC’s ambitions and military capabilities can inform effective policy vis-à-vis Beijing and avoid an arms race. However, the 2022 CMPR must be considered against the background of wider U.S. geostrategic capabilities and priorities as outlined in the 2022 National Security Strategy and the February 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy. A consistent thread throughout the strategies is the readiness of the United States to compete responsibly with the PRC when it must, cooperate where it can, and not adopt a reactive posture to Beijing’s policies. While it is important to note developments in the PRC, a comparative analysis demonstrates the U.S. retains its deterrence capabilities.

The breakdown in diplomacy between Beijing and Washington during the early fall of 2022 was worrisome. Still, the Biden-Xi meeting in Indonesia in mid-November, followed by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s meeting with his counterpart in late November, and the planned visit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to China in January 2023 indicate that diplomacy is back on the menu. This bodes well for maintaining an open line of communication and avoiding miscalculations, including in the Taiwan Strait.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 9, 2022

4. IntelBrief: Arrests in Germany Target Far-Right and Anti-Government Extremists

IntelBrief: Arrests in Germany Target Far-Right and Anti-Government Extremists - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 8, 2022

December 8, 2022

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IntelBrief: Arrests in Germany Target Far-Right and Anti-Government Extremists

AP Photo/Michael Probst

Bottom Line Up Front

• German special forces officers and police conducted raids throughout the country earlier this week, arresting more than two dozen individuals suspected of supporting a domestic terrorist organization that planned to overthrow the government.
• The arrests in Germany also shed light on the growing anti-democratic movement in the country.
• The suspected individuals in the plot labeled the German government the ‘Deep State,’ the same term used by far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists in the United States, which has become a net exporter of anti-government ideology.
• Germany has been wracked by far-right extremist violence over the past several years, including the assassination of politicians, attacks against a synagogue, and a kidnapping plot targeting the country’s health minister.

German special forces officers and police conducted sweeping raids throughout the country earlier this week, arresting more than two dozen individuals suspected of supporting a domestic terrorist organization that planned to overthrow the government. In total, approximately 3,000 security forces conducted more than 130 raids in eleven of Germany’s sixteen states, with officers from the Spezialeinsatzkommando (SEK, Special Task Force) and GSG 9 der Bundespolizei (a tactical unit of the German Federal Police).

An estimated 50 men and women are said to have been a part of the alleged plot to overthrow the German republic and replace it with a new state modelled on the Germany of 1871. United around their support for “Prince Heinrich XIII,” a minor aristocrat known for controversial and conspiracy-fueled views, the plotters had allegedly planned established a shadow government to be installed upon the coup d'état’s success. The group also allegedly had plans for the establishment of a military arm, which officials believe was made up of active and former members of the military, to eliminate democratic bodies at the local level. Among those arrested was a member of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, a far-right populist party that has surged in prominence since its 2013 founding and known for its anti-immigrant views. The individual has been identified in news reports as Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, who has served as a member of the Bundestag and now works as a judge at the Berlin district court. It is suspected she was to be lined up as the new justice minister in the shadow government. There was also a transnational element to the raids, with arrests in Italy and Austria, as well as a Russian citizen who attempted to make contact with the Russian government on behalf of some in the broader network.

The arrests targeted members of the Reichsbürger (Citizens of the Reich) network, which is akin to the sovereign citizen movement in the United States – a loosely organized collection of groups and individuals that believe they are not under the jurisdiction of the federal government and consider themselves exempt from U.S. law. The so-called “Citizens of the Reich,” a disparate set of small groups and individuals, reject the modern German state and refuse to pay taxes. The Reichsbürger members have close connections to far-right extremism in Germany and have cross-pollinated with Qanon conspiracy theorists, anti-vaxxers, and individuals opposed to COVID-19 lockdown measures. Many Reichsbürger members protested alongside these groups during mass street demonstrations against a vaccine mandate earlier this year, and some were present when protestors stormed the Reichstag – the German parliament – in August 2020. Although the movement has existed for some time, the German network coalesced during the pandemic as disinformation narratives proliferated online. Some of the ideology also overlaps with elements of the so-called ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy theory, wherein Germany is controlled by corporations and Jewish elites are scheming to replace native Germans with migrants from the Middle East and Africa.

The suspected individuals in the plot labeled the modern German government the ‘Deep State,’ the same term used by far-right extremists and conspiracy theorists in the United States, which has become a net exporter of anti-government ideology. Following the January 6, 2021 Capitol insurrection, the symbolism of storming the U.S. seat of government resonated with extremists on a global scale. The plot demonstrates how QAnon has become a worldwide phenomenon, and in countries where it resonates, the conspiracy has adapted to local contexts and circumstances. In South Africa, for example, the conspiracy has gained numerous followers and adapted old apartheid mythologies, promulgating that the Black-majority government is conspiring against white South Africans and the country as a whole. Anti-government ideology has proven to be a receptacle for conspiracies and disinformation — COVID-19-related conspiracies and racial and ethnic-related tropes like ‘Great Replacement’ theory, serve as accelerants that contribute to broader instability and violence.

The arrests in Germany also shed light on the growing anti-democratic movement in the country, exemplified when protesters motivated by COVID-19 skepticism, conspiracies, and anti-government sentiment stormed the Reichstag. Although they were quickly repelled, the symbolism was not lost on those who understand the history of anti-democratic movements. There are legitimate concerns that what may start as anti-democratic or anti-government behavior can evolve and blend with concepts such as accelerationism to increase the likelihood of plots targeting politicians, a prospect that has impacted Germany directly. In June 2019, German pro-refugee politician Walter Lubcke was assassinated by a neo-Nazi, who prosecutors argued was motivated by political extremism, racism, and xenophobia.

Germany has been wracked by far-right extremist violence over the past several years. During a 2016 police raid, a Reichsbürger member opened fire on police, killing one and injuring four. In October 2019, a far-right terrorist attacked a synagogue in Halle, killing two and injuring several others. In 2020, a man killed nine people at two shisha bars in the city of Hanau; the suspect had posted xenophobic conspiracy theories online and was believed to have acted out of “right-wing extremist, racist motives.” In April 2022, there was a disrupted plot where far-right extremists were planning to kidnap German health minister Karl Lauerbach. As far-right conspiracy narratives continue to adapt and resonate with often disaffected individuals – the Reichbürger movement is estimated to have as many as 21,000 adherents – the potential for radicalization and movement toward violence remains a pressing threat.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · December 8, 2022

5. HASC and SASC Release Text of FY23 NDAA Agreement

The 4408 page document can be downloaded here: https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR7776EAS-RCP117-70.pdf

​Pay close attention to (now) Sec. 1204. (was Sec. 1205 in the draft). ‘‘John S. McCain III Center for Security​ ​Studies in Irregular Warfare’’​ to be known as the "Irregular Warfare Center.​"

‘‘(c) IRREGULAR WARFARE CENTER.— ‘‘(1) MISSION.—The mission of the Irregular Warfare Center shall be to serve as a central mechanism for developing the irregular warfare knowledge of the Department of Defense and advancing the understanding of irregular warfare concepts and doctrine, in collaboration with key partners and allies, by—

‘‘(E) serving as a coordinating body and central repository for irregular warfare resources, including educational activities and programs, and lessons learned across components of the Department.

​

HASC and SASC Release Text of FY23 NDAA Agreement

armedservices.house.gov · December 6, 2022

WASHINGTON, DC – Representatives Adam Smith (D-WA) and Mike Rogers (R-AL), Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), U.S. Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Jim Inhofe (R-OK), Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), today released the text of an agreement they have reached on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 (FY23).

“We are pleased to announce we’ve come to a bipartisan, bicameral agreement on this year’s National Defense Authorization Act. This year’s agreement continues the Armed Services Committees’ 62-year tradition of working together to support our troops and strengthen America’s national security. We urge Congress to pass the NDAA quickly and the President to sign it when it reaches his desk,” the members said.

The legislative text is available here:

• H.R. 7776, the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023

This legislation is substantially based on two bills: (1) H.R. 7900, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which passed the House on July 14, 2022, by a vote of 329-101; and (2) S. 4543, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which was approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 16, 2022, by a vote of 23-3.

Because enacting the NDAA in a timely manner is critical, the two bills were combined through a series of negotiations led by the leadership of the SASC and HASC. Negotiators considered proposals offered by members of both parties that were filed in the Senate and in the House of Representatives. The final text of the bill promotes resilience, innovation, and the right tools for U.S. success in strategic competition, and provides vital quality of life improvements for the backbone of America’s fighting force: Our servicemembers and their families.

Click here for the HASC summary of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023.

###

armedservices.house.gov · December 6, 2022

6. War has tamed Ukraine’s oligarchs, creating space for democratic change

War has tamed Ukraine’s oligarchs, creating space for democratic change

By Kevin Sullivan, David L. Stern and Kostiantyn Khudov 

December 8, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Kevin Sullivan · December 8, 2022

Europe

Ukraine may have the opportunity to rebuild a postwar society that is more democratic, less corrupt and more economically diversified

By

,

Kostiantyn Khudov

December 8, 2022 at 1:00 a.m. EST

BURSHTYN, Ukraine — Over two days in October, eight Russian cruise missiles screamed out of the sky and obliterated tens of millions of dollars’ worth of critical machinery at this city’s hulking coal-fired power plant.

The attacks were designed to leave Ukraine cold and dark this winter. But they also deepened a financial crisis for the plant’s owner, Rinat Akhmetov, the country’s richest man.

Akhmetov’s wealth has dived from $7.6 billion to $4.3 billion since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, according to Forbes. In 2012, before Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatists in Ukraine’s east, locations where Akhmetov also had numerous assets, the magazine estimated his wealth at $16 billion.

The losses are largely from Russia’s destruction and confiscation of his vast networks of power and steel plants, coal mines and agricultural operations. Most notable were his two huge steel plants in the port city of Mariupol, including Azovstal, where Ukrainian fighters staged a defiant last stand against Russian forces earlier this year. Akhmetov is suing Russia for up to $20 billion in the European Court of Human Rights.

One billionaire becoming less of a billionaire isn’t breaking hearts in a country fighting a war for its very existence. But it provides some insight into how the Russian invasion is affecting Ukraine’s oligarchs, a group of fewer than 20 fantastically wealthy people who have wielded outsize — and often, anti-corruption activists contend, malign — influence over Ukraine’s politics, economy and society since the country’s independence in 1991.

In interviews with more than two dozen current and former Ukrainian and U.S. officials, analysts and others, nearly all agreed that the dominant power of oligarchs in Ukrainian life has been diminished. They cited vast losses from the war, growing government pressure and a newly energized population no longer willing to tolerate the politics of the past. They said that could give Ukraine the opportunity to rebuild a postwar society that is more democratic, less corrupt and more economically diversified.

“This is the end of an epoch, the end of a political culture,” said Viktor Andrusiv, a former adviser to Andriy Yermak, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s top aide, who has written extensively about Ukraine’s oligarchs and is now fighting on the front lines in the Ukrainian army.

Akhmetov, in exchanges with The Washington Post over WhatsApp, also said he supports economic diversification. Asked about his vision of Ukraine after the war, he called for a “new Marshall Plan” of hundreds of billions of dollars in investment and a country remade in the image of the West, not Russia.

“The goal is to build a new, strong, and European Ukraine, a member of the [European Union], with strong institutions, the rule of law, clear anti-corruption rules, a democratic political system, and fair treatment of citizens,” said Akhmetov, who declined an in-person interview but answered written questions.

Pressure on oligarchs had already been building before Russia’s invasion, with a “de-oligarchization” law promoted by Zelensky that took effect this year. The law places limits on the political activity of super-rich individuals who meet certain criteria, including those who have major holdings in television and other media to press their financial interests and political agenda. The Zelensky government is also crafting antitrust measures to crack down on monopolies controlled by oligarchs in areas from coal mining to electricity to railroads.

“The system was so strong and well institutionalized that it was quite difficult to break, but we will do everything we can to make sure it never recovers,” said Rostyslav Shurma, a close economic aide to Zelensky who previously worked for many years as a top executive in Akhmetov’s steel company, Metinvest.

Many cautioned that the country’s wealthiest people are still incredibly rich and influential.

“They are not disappearing,” Andrusiv said. “The key thing is to end their monopolies, which were produced by their political connections. Now they will have to act more like big businessmen.”

Akhmetov and other critics have warned that Zelensky’s attack on oligarchs could be a power grab dressed up as reform.

“Relations with business should be regulated in a civilized way followed by all developed countries, rather than through populist laws,” Akhmetov told The Post. “Neither the United States nor the E.U. has a law on ‘oligarchs’ that would allow making unlawful lists of undesirables through extrajudicial procedures. Instead, they have a law on lobbying in place.”

Akhmetov also disputed being called an oligarch.

“I am not an oligarch,” he told The Post. “I have never been and am not going to be an oligarch. I am the biggest private investor, employer, and taxpayer in Ukraine.”

Since the Russian invasion began on Feb. 24, Akhmetov said he has not left Ukraine and has been living in Kyiv, which has been his home since 2014. He has also become Ukraine’s largest private individual donor to the war. He has given more than $100 million worth of military and humanitarian aid — everything from drones to food. Most other oligarchs have also been loud and public with their patriotic support of Ukraine and Zelensky.

Some critics have said Akhmetov is trying to atone for his actions in 2014, when he appeared to be initially unclear about his allegiance after Russia annexed Crimea and backed separatists in the east. He eventually supported Ukraine.

“I will start respecting him after he starts selling all his mansions in Switzerland, France and Great Britain and creates a fund to support the army in Ukraine,” said Daria Kaleniuk, executive director of the Anti-Corruption Action Center, and one of the nation’s leading advocates of reform.

Asked about criticism that he should be doing even more, Akhmetov said, “My business has suffered the most. Maybe it’s not quite modest of me to say it, but I do help a lot more than anyone else, and I’m not going to stop.”

Ukraine has been gripped by oligarchs since the chaotic days after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, when a small number of individuals acquired on the cheap massive state-owned assets, including mines, factories, railroads and agricultural enterprises that were hastily privatized.

Those new capitalists amassed huge fortunes and protected their new empires by building — and sometimes buying — influence in media, key government agencies and, critically, parliament.

Akhmetov, for instance, ran for the Verkhovna Rada, or national parliament, and was elected in 2006 as a member of the Party of Regions, which was seen as close to Moscow. He was an early and enthusiastic supporter of Viktor Yanukovych who became Ukraine’s president in 2010. Yanukovych fled to Russia during Ukraine’s 2014 “Revolution of Dignity,” which was set off by his insistence on closer ties with Moscow after he reversed an earlier promise to move the country toward the European Union.

Ukraine’s oligarchs have also been able to wield greater political power than their counterparts in Russia partly because Ukraine has never produced an authoritarian leader like Vladimir Putin with the power to crush or co-opt them.

The result of oligarch influence has been a nation long weighed down by weak institutions, analysts said. That has left Ukraine “stuck in the transition between communism and capitalism,” said Vladyslav Rashkovan, a former deputy governor of the Ukrainian Central Bank who now represents the country on the International Monetary Fund’s executive board.

In a study of the oligarch system last year, before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Rashkovan noted that Ukraine had a greater per capita gross domestic product than Poland in 1990. But Poland, which embraced a much more open market economy, eventually leading to membership in the European Union, grew its per capita GDP to more than triple Ukraine’s. And Ukraine’s hope of E.U. membership, despite being an official candidate, remains a distant dream.

“Ukraine was actually a relatively wealthy country,” said Marie Yovanovitch, a former U.S. ambassador in Kyiv. “And if that money had been going back into the country to reinvest, rather than into people’s pockets and sent abroad, Ukraine would have been in a much better place. This was the fundamentally corrupt system that the oligarchs personified.”

Rashkovan’s study noted that the list of the top 20 richest people in Ukraine varies slightly each year. But only seven people have been on the list every year since 2007. And one of them has never budged from the top spot: Rinat Akhmetov.

Fabulous wealth

Born in 1966, Akhmetov was raised the son of a coal miner in Donetsk, the eastern region that, along with Luhansk, makes up Donbas, which borders Russia and has been a key focus of President Vladimir Putin’s aggression since 2014.

“I was born in a poor family that hardly met its end needs,” said Akhmetov. “We had a house of 20 square meters where the four of us lived and slept on the floor. There was a coal stove that we used in the morning, and the toilet was outdoor.”

Akhmetov said those childhood hardships shaped him: “My life philosophy is the philosophy of my business: I hate poverty and suffering of people. I want success for myself and for others. I want to see people happy.”

His friend Serhiy Taruta, another of Ukraine’s wealthiest business executives and a member of parliament, said Akhmetov’s first real success was at the card table. “He was one of the five or six best card players in the Soviet Union and he traveled to competitions,” Taruta said.

Akhmetov said that overstated things. But he said in his early 20s he did play a popular Russian card game called “Podkidnoy Durak,” which he said translates as “Giveaway Fool.”

“I’ll tell you honestly, I earned my first capital by playing cards,” he said. “And this is what I’ve learned: Cards are about tactics and strategy, an analytical mind-set, a practice-oriented approach, and an ability to win.”

Akhmetov was 24 when Ukraine declared its independence in 1991. It was a messy time, especially in Donbas, a rugged industrial landscape of mines and factories. The region was riven with power struggles and violence as the country lurched from a collapsing Soviet command economy to something completely new.

“The entire economy, still run by the government, came almost to a halt,” said Akhmetov. “I decided to invest in industry.”

In 1992, Akhmetov said he and two partners started a company called ARS, which processed coal into coke — a key material in producing steel. “I remember we were very happy when we made our first $25,000,” he said.

One of Akhmetov’s partners was Akhat Bragin, who was also known as “Alik the Greek” and widely considered one of the most powerful crime bosses in Donetsk. Akhmetov said Bragin left ARS in 1993, but they remained close friends.

Akhmetov’s association with Bragin has led, at times, to media speculation about his potential ties to criminal networks. Akhmetov has successfully taken legal action against a number of media outlets that reported he had a criminal past.

“I have never been involved with any criminal organizations, I have never been prosecuted and no criminal charges were pressed against me,” he told The Post.

Taruta, who is also from Donetsk, said Akhmetov was simply a smart, tough kid who grew up in a rough place. “He was not a member of a criminal group, but he knew and he was friends with people who were,” Taruta said.

Bragin also owned FC Shakhtar Donetsk, a soccer team whose name means “Donetsk miner” in Ukrainian. In October 1995, he was killed by a bomb that detonated at the team’s stadium as he arrived for a match. The assassination was widely seen as a power play among Donetsk criminal gangs.

Eight years later, in 2003, a man from a rival crime gang was convicted of being involved in the killing and sentenced to life in prison. His sentence was upheld by Ukraine’s Supreme Court.

But at the time of the murder, suspicion immediately fell on Akhmetov.

“This is a lie, and this kind of lie gives me much pain,” Akhmetov told The Post. On the day of the bombing, he said, “Akhat and I were 5 minutes late for the match, and he rushed out of the car to the stadium without waiting for me. The gap was like 5 seconds, no more than that. The explosion happened as soon as I opened the door of my car.”

He said speculation that he was involved compounded the tragedy. “When your best friend dies before your eyes, you realize that death is 5 seconds late for you, and after that you are accused of something, it really hurts and is unfair.”

Akhmetov continued building his business empire as Ukraine’s second post-independence president, Leonid Kuchma, in office from 1994 to 2005, eagerly promoted the privatization of state industrial and agricultural businesses.

Many critics and historians argue that Kuchma presided over sweetheart deals that helped give rise to the oligarch system.

In 2004, for instance, Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, a business tycoon who had married Kuchma’s daughter two years earlier, paid $800 million to buy Kryvorizhstal, a state-owned company that produced about 20 percent of Ukraine’s steel output.

The purchase price was laughably below market value, analysts said. Viktor Yushchenko, elected president following Kuchma on a reformist platform, said the plant was “stolen” and canceled the sale. “The transaction was clearly corrupt,” Yushchenko said by text in response to questions from The Post in November.

The government then auctioned the company on live television and it sold for $4.8 billion — six times the previous sale price — to Netherlands-based Mittal Steel, then the world’s largest steel producer.

“It was important to hold a public auction so that Ukrainian society and foreign investors saw it as transparent and fair,” Yushchenko texted. “And to build trust in the privatization of government assets.”

Akhmetov defends Kuchma and said he deserves credit for helping to modernize Ukraine’s economy.

“State-run property was in a complete decline. The government was the worst and most corrupt manager,” he said. “Then the country started a large-scale privatization. Of course, it was not perfect. But was there any other way to develop the economy, except for moving from state ownership to private ownership and from a command economy to a market economy? No, there was not.”

ARS continued to succeed and within a couple of years Akhmetov said he used the profits to start the Donetsk City Bank, “which became my gateway to financial resources.”

Rashkovan, of the IMF, said Akhmetov approached business differently from other oligarchs, who established banks simply to siphon off money.

“Akhmetov’s bank was never used as a pocketbook; his bank was a bank,” he said. “He was smart. He structured his business the way a Western business would be.”

Akhmetov said he started buying other industrial assets, mainly in the coal mining and steel industries, which at the time were “dying industrial enterprises no one cared about.”

“I bought most of my assets in the secondary market, i.e. after their privatization,” he said. “We upgraded steel production and started conquering global markets in a highly competitive environment.”

In 2000, he created System Capital Management, a holding company for the multiple businesses he was purchasing and developing, which blossomed into a colossus.

By the mid-2000s, Akhmetov dominated the steel and energy sectors, along with major holdings in agriculture, transportation and other areas — including a growing empire of television channels and other media.

He even bought the Shakhtar Donetsk soccer team and turned it into a national powerhouse that has been successful in top European competitions. And he built his hometown a sparkling $400 million soccer stadium, which opened in 2009 with a concert by Beyoncé.

Fabulous wealth brought Akhmetov a $220 million apartment in London, reportedly the most expensive flat in the United Kingdom when he bought it in 2011. Eight years later, shortly after Zelensky took office, Akhmetov paid $221 million for a 19th-century villa in the south of France that had once been owned by King Leopold II of Belgium.

He also reportedly owns a home in the French Alps ski resort of Courchevel and bought his son a $60 million home on Lake Geneva in Switzerland.

Akhmetov had everything, including the one thing he didn’t want: the label of oligarch, with all its negative connotations.

Defining an oligarch

Zelensky’s relationship with oligarchs has been fraught from the start, especially with the one who was perhaps his most influential backer during his presidential campaign.

Ihor Kolomoisky made his fortune in the 1990s and 2000s on energy companies, banking, airlines and media. Kolomoisky’s 1+1 TV station was home to “Servant of the People,” the comedy show that made Zelensky a household name in Ukraine. Zelensky played a teacher who was elected president after a student posted a viral video of him denouncing corrupt oligarchs.

Still, when Zelensky decided to run for president in real life, he got a huge boost from an oligarch when Kolomoisky promoted him lavishly on his television station.

Rashkovan, of the IMF, recalled that on the day before the 2019 election, when television networks were prohibited by law from running political programming, Kolomoisky’s network was all Zelensky, all day.

It showed “Servant of the People” and a documentary about actor-turned-politician Ronald Reagan, for which Zelensky had done the Ukrainian-language voice-over. It wasn’t overtly political, but the intent was clear.

Despite the lift he got from Kolomoisky, Zelensky campaigned on a promise to attack corruption, and in 2021 he introduced the “de-oligarchization” bill in parliament.

Going after the country’s widely despised oligarchs was a politically shrewd move for a president whose approval ratings were flagging and who was under attack on the television stations owned by the oligarchs. Zelensky was very popular when he took office, but he was increasingly seen as ineffective as his term wore on — until the war made him an international icon.

“Zelensky is a super ambitious person who understands that if he doesn’t break the skeleton of this system, this system will destroy him,” said Serhiy Leshchenko, a Zelensky aide. “They decided to fight with him. And one day Zelensky decided, ‘Okay, you decided to challenge me? I accept the challenge.’ ”

Parliament quickly passed the anti-oligarch law, and when Zelensky signed it into law in November 2021, he vowed: “If someone is used to buying politicians to allow them to circumvent the law, then even the richest will have to say goodbye to this habit … There can be no other option but to dismantle the oligarchic system. Without this, it is simply impossible to overcome poverty in Ukraine and fully join the European Community.”

The new law defines an “oligarch” as anyone who meets at least three of four criteria: influence in politics, media holdings, economic monopolies and minimum total assets of around $100 million.

The law requires oligarchs to declare all their assets and bars them from taking part in privatizations or financing political parties. It also requires government officials to report interactions they have with oligarchs or their representatives.

Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, which Zelensky heads, will decide who qualifies as an oligarch and will place their names on a national register.

“The requirements of this law do not apply to me: I quit politics in 2012, long before the law entered into force, and I do not plan to come back into politics,” Akhmetov told The Post.

Shortly after the law took effect, Akhmetov announced that he was giving up the licenses to his media empire, including two major national TV channels.

“There is only one reason behind this decision: A discriminative law on oligarchs has entered into force,” he told The Post. “This is a hard and involuntary decision, which I made with a heavy heart.”

Shortly after Russia invaded in February, Zelensky placed all national television channels on a wartime footing, decreeing a “unified information policy” of identical news coverage. The policy was devastating to the channels’ bottom lines — no entertainment programming or more provocative news shows meant no lucrative advertising.

Zelensky has been undeterred by criticism that he is overreaching, placing billionaire former president Petro Poroshenko under investigation for alleged treason over controversial government purchases of coal from mines controlled by Russia-backed militants in eastern Ukraine, while he was in office. Poroshenko has denied any wrongdoing.

The Ukrainian government froze the assets of Viktor Medvedchuk, an oligarch and close friend of Putin. Medvedchuk was arrested earlier this year as he attempted to flee Ukraine disguised in a Ukrainian army uniform, then he was later included in a prisoner swap with Russia.

Zelensky also reportedly stripped Ukrainian citizenship from his old ally Kolomoisky, enforcing a little-enforced law barring dual citizenship.

Analysts said it was an effort to rein in Kolomoisky, who had been placed under sanctions by Washington over what Treasury officials called “significant corruption.” U.S. authorities are also pursuing a civil case alleging that he stole billions of dollars from a Ukrainian bank he once owned.

Kolomoisky could not be reached for comment. He has denied the allegations against him. Michael J. Sullivan, a lawyer for Kolomoisky, told The Post in 2020: “Mr. Kolomoisky emphatically denies the allegations in the complaints filed by the Department of Justice.”

Late last year, Zelensky also made a remarkable statement about Akhmetov. He claimed, without providing evidence, that Akhmetov was being recruited to join a coup against Zelensky’s government.

The allegation infuriated Akhmetov, who dismissed the allegation as “utterly absurd.”

On Feb. 22, two days before the Russian invasion, Zelensky addressed the nation calling for “economic patriotism” and saying, “Business should protect our economy.” That day Akhmetov announced that SCM, his holding company, would prepay about $34 million in taxes to “strengthen the country.”

The next evening, as U.S. and European officials warned of an imminent Russian invasion, Zelensky called Akhmetov and about 50 other top business leaders to his office to ask for their support. A few hours later, Akhmetov told The Post, he was in bed when “My assistant stormed in saying, ‘Wake up, the war has broken out.’ ”

More lawyers

Those interviewed said Ukraine’s focus at the moment is on the war, not on what comes after. But Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of the Kyiv School of Economics and a former government economic development minister, said the war has clarified for almost all Ukrainians that their economic future will follow a European or U.S. model, not a Russian one.

“It will be more civil, more Western,” he said. “It will be more lawyers and less bribers.”

Competition, he said, “is the real vaccine against oligarchs.”

Shurma, the Zelensky economic adviser, said there will still be room in the economy for major companies that dominate key sectors, including steel production. He said that model already exists in the United States and Europe, and makes sense for the industry.

“It is absolutely critical that we have strong businessmen, we have national champions, global champions,” he said. “But they should not interfere in politics.”

Akhmetov said he supported Ukraine joining the E.U. and becoming a more open and competitive economy: “Competition in economy means the market economy. Competition in politics means democracy … concentration of power leads to authoritarianism and economic decline.”

Yurii Nikolov, a journalist at the Our Money website in Ukraine, said Akhmetov has a chance to rebuild Dtek, his energy business, after the war. But he said increased competition is likely to mean the end of his near-monopoly — from controlling 90 percent of coal mining to the rail lines that carry the raw coal, to the power plants that burn it to produce electricity, to the power lines that distribute it.

“I hope that businessman Akhmetov will remain with us,” he said, “and oligarch Akhmetov will not be reborn.”

The Washington Post · by Kevin Sullivan · December 8, 2022

7. B-21 Raider Stealth Bomber: Everything We Know Right Now

B-21 Raider Stealth Bomber: Everything We Know Right Now

19fortyfive.com · by Sebastien Roblin · December 7, 2022

Just What Did We Actually Learn from the Air Force’s B-21 Reveal? In an exclusive ceremony at the U.S. Air Force’s Plant 42 facility near Palmdale, California last Friday, the Air Force unveiled the B-21 Raider, its first new bomber in three decades. The event began with project worker Johan Riley singing the national anthem while the Global Strike Command’s three active strategic bombers flew overhead: the iconic eight-engine B-52, the large but sleek supersonic B-1B Lancer, and finally the batwing-like B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.

Northrop-Grumman CEO Kathy Warden, Admiral Christopher Grady, and defense secretary Lloyd Austin each gave speeches. In between, a tarp was lifted to reveal a flying wing aircraft similar to but smaller than the B-2.

In truth, most of what was seen and said of the B-21 was in line with expectations established in concept art and prior official commentary.

Nor did the speakers reveal new, concrete details about incorporated technologies or performance characteristics. For more about those expectations, you can check out this prior article.

Nonetheless, some of the speakers’ rhetoric, and the physical characteristics visible at the unveiling, provide additional hints for what is effectively the 21st century’s first new bomber.

B-21: New stealth geometry.

Despite the expected resemblance to the B-2 (also built by Northrop), the B-21’s reduced size and weight allowed engineers to use just two instead of four wheels per landing gear. The B-21’s peculiar windows have also received much attention. Though it seems the crew may primarily rely on external sensors for situational awareness, the backup option of the Mark 1 eyeball has been retained. Positioned as they are, the windows seem most useful, providing visibility while ‘hooking up’ with refueling tankers above. The Raider’s engine inlets are also noticeably nestled even deeper into the wing than in the B-2, better shielding their radar-reflective fan blades.

The Raider had very few visible seams or hardpoints for weapons and sensors, the protrusion of which increases radar cross-section. That suggests the B-21’s optical and radar sensors may be built into the aircraft’s skin. Such a configuration could also enable the implementation of future upgrades or equipment swaps internally without degrading the stealthy exterior geometry.

The Raider’s side and rear aspects were not shown. Concept art suggested a cleaner, more straightforward configuration than the sawtooth pattern on the B-2, which was a compromise between stealth and improved low-altitude handling.

What’s certain is that the Raider, like the B-2, will be aimed at rare “all-aspect stealth.” That is because its job is to penetrate deep into hostile airspace, its side and rear aspects must also remain low-observable to radar installations it slips past.

Grady stated the B-21 will deliver both standoff range and implicitly shorter-range precision weapons. The former indeed refers to the AGM-158 JASSM stealth cruise missiles and the in-development LRSO nuclear-armed cruise missile; the latter includes B61-12 nuclear glide bombs, 15-ton Massive Ordnance Penetrator bunker-busting bomb, and other shorter-range missiles and bombs.

High-flying ghosts

The Raider is painted a ghostly light grey in contrast to the B-2’s non-reflective black. This is not a choice driven by aesthetics; it hints at how the B-21 may be used differently than the B-2, which was optimized to penetrate hostile airspace at low altitudes at night.

The new Raider with a simplified tail, however, seems likely to fly at high altitudes, where a muted gray visually blends into the surrounding sky and clouds better than a stark black silhouette.

As friction-inducing air molecules are thinner at high altitudes, high flying allows airplanes to go further, faster, while beyond the reach of many short-range air-defense weapons. However, up high they’re more exposed to long-distance air defense radars and missiles. The change likely reflects greater confidence the B-21’s low observability has advanced to the point it can handle increased exposure while reaping the benefits of high-altitude operations.

What they didn’t say—unmanned capability.

One word left unuttered during the unveiling was “optionally-manned”, referring to aircraft capable of flying with or without onboard crew. Initially, optional unmanned operations were advertised as a feature, but over time the Pentagon mentioned this less and less.

The failure of speakers at the ceremony to bring it up while enumerating many other features likely means it won’t be part of the B-21’s regular operational capabilities at service entry. Likely, it has been designed with capacity to support unmanned operations but the underlying systems will only be matured into service later, if ever.

The Air Force may also need time to develop doctrine on which scenarios it would dispatch B-21s on crewless missions, balancing risks to the crew’s lives against the loss of situational awareness and reactivity onboard crew provide.

It can fly far, but also operate out of bases the B-2 can’t.

One factor contributing to very high B-2 operating costs is dependence on highly specialized facilities for maintenance, particularly removal and reapplication of radar-absorbent materials. That limited B-2s to sustainably operating from only a handful of specially prepared airbases. Because of its lower maintenance demands, the presenters highlighted B-21s could be dispersed to attack from more locations in global conflict in addition to mounting long-distance strikes from North America. Dispersal is important as adversaries would attempt to target landed stealth bombers in a high intensity war.

Digital tools and aerospace engineering revolution

Given the torturous development problems afflicting the Pentagon’s prior stealth aircraft, the Air Force and Northrop Grumman are justifiably proud to have developed the B-21 under budget, on schedule, and without drama—so far.

But while disciplined program management clearly was important, CEO Kathy Warden also emphasized the importance of new digital design tools permitting aviation engineers to tinker digitally with the design without having to very expensively iterate numerous ‘one off’ physical prototypes. That means the initial physical prototypes are built much closer to the final configuration of production aircraft, in turn allowing Northrop to build an actual production line for the prototypes that will remain useful for series production.

While it’s good those digital tools helped shepherd the B-21’s development, their potential to “usher in a new paradigm in aircraft design, development and manufacturing” as Warden put it with a “new [faster-paced] acquisition model” could improve the development of future combat aircraft across the board, particularly the Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) stealth fighter being developed by the Air Force. NGAD’s missions potentially including long-distance escort of B-21s in penetrating raids.

The bomber that’s not just a bomber.

Since the 1960s, U.S. military aircraft designations use common letter codes to identify their role: B for bomber, C for Cargo, R for reconnaissance and so forth. When an aircraft is modified to perform different roles, extra letters are added—for example, the RC-135 is a cargo aircraft adapted to a reconnaissance role.

Judging by the rhetoric, the B-21 could defensibly be described designated the ERB-21, as beyond the core strategic strike mission, its “long-range sensors” (per Admiral Grady) will have an important role in long-endurance intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) missions, electronic warfare, and battle management of air and surface forces by helping network command-and-control links.

The Raider has also been described as the first-ever ‘sixth generation aircraft’, a debatable claim as the ‘generation’ descriptor historically has applied only to fighters, not bombers.

Fighting alongside friends.

One message emphasized by all speakers was the B-21’s interoperability with foreign allies. Literally, that means the bomber has datalinks that can easily be adapted to transmit time-sensitive, mission critical data to allied military units and their command and control centers. Such convenient interoperability was not a feature of the F-22 Raptor.

However, there’s political messaging there too. Bombers are seen as offensive weapons, but the Raider’s most important use-cases involve coming to the defense of U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. The speakers also argued a robust B-21 force might potentially deter aggressors from using military force entirely.

The emphasis on allied integration may also encourage speculation that allies like Australia, Japan or the United Kingdom could be greenlit to procure their own B-21 forces. There are indeed indications the U.S. might extend such an offer to Australia, possibly as an alternative to nuclear-powered submarines. Whether these countries could foot the bill for even a small B-21 fleet is debatable, though.

It’s here to last.

Though there’s little question the Air Force will receive 100 B-21s, the service would like to expand that to 145 or 175 Raiders if it can—as Austin hinted, ensuring it’s built “in numbers reflecting the strategic environment ahead,” giving the U.S. an “edge that will last for decades to come.”

That was reflected in rhetoric highlighting the bomber’s “strong bipartisan support in Congress,” as well as Warden’s invocation of the 40 states producing parts for the aircraft, and promises to bring “new companies into our supplier base.”

But besides such appeals, the speakers emphasized the Raiders will be in service for long time, with capacity for frequent upgrades (“rapid technology insertions” per Warden) and support for “weapons that haven’t even been invented yet” (Austin) thanks to its open architecture systems.

What lies ahead?

Northrop has already built or is building six B-21 prototypes, the first couple of which will first undergo ground tests. If these proceed without major snags, that should lead to a first flight in 2023. Meanwhile, work will begin on integrating mission systems.

If all goes well, then the finalized design could begin production in 2025 from the same line used to build the prototypes.

Sébastien Roblin writes on the technical, historical and political aspects of international security and conflict for publications including The National Interest, NBC News, Forbes.com, War is Boring and 19FortyFive, where he is Defense-in-Depth editor. He holds a Master’s degree from Georgetown University and served with the Peace Corps in China. You can follow his articles on Twitter.

19fortyfive.com · by Sebastien Roblin · December 7, 2022

8. Botnets, Battlefields, and Blurred Lines: Optimizing an Information Strategy for Modern War

Conclusion:

Cyber-enabled information operations present a pernicious threat. If the populations in the West are unable to discern fact from fiction, we risk the atrophy of the will of our people to stand against unjust actions by revisionist powers like Russia and China. We cannot afford to lose our center of gravity in hybrid warfare. A whole-of-society approach is one fix. Teaching our young basic data literacy and research skills will help stem this problem. However, the lag time for that effort is long. In the meantime, DoD must act. We must acknowledge the nature of our strategic competition—that hybrid war, especially in the information environment, is upon us. As such, DoD should chart a comprehensive social media strategy (not just a policy that outlines dos and don’ts for its own personnel), target audiences, promulgate the truth and its narratives early and often, and work with industry to expose bad actors in the sea of the information environment.

Botnets, Battlefields, and Blurred Lines: Optimizing an Information Strategy for Modern War - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by John Nagl, Michael Posey · December 9, 2022

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“A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes.”

The character of war, as Clausewitz reminds us, is always evolving. The line between conventional war, conducted by uniformed service members representing the interest and the will of nation-states, and irregular warfare, conducted by forces not in uniform and often not representing conventional states, has blurred. After two decades of irregular conflict in the Middle East, the United States is recognizing this reality as it focuses on deterring any Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, even as Russia unjustly invades Ukraine in the bloodiest European conflict since World War II. In this blurred “hybrid war” environment, information operations are essential to ensuring the accomplishment of American and allied objectives and securing the support of populations around the globe. Keeping popular support at home and abroad—our center of gravity in this environment—effectively demands a reconceptualization of both war and the role of information in war. As we ponder information’s future role in hybrid war, we must consider social media’s immersive yet potentially misleading nature. Further, we must think through ways to work with information technology companies to achieve national and coalition objectives and how cyber-enabled information operations can amplify messages and target receivers to bolster our strategic narratives.

Reconceptualizing the Role of Information in War

War continues to be the use of force to compel our enemy to do our will—but that force is increasingly applied in the virtual and information spaces. As long ago as World War I, T.E. Lawrence noted that the printing press was the most powerful weapon in the armory of military commanders of the time; as technology has advanced through radio, television, and now the internet, the ability of information providers to shape the perceptions of both adversaries and affected civilian populations has expanded dramatically in scope, scale, speed, and number of messengers. One advantage accruing to insurgencies in recent history is the democratization of information-spreading ability away from the exclusive control of governments and into the hands of substate groups and super-empowered individuals. Counterinsurgency doctrine notes that information is the dominant line of operations in this kind of war. Still, even so-called conventional large-scale combat operations against state actors will increasingly involve an information component. The current conflict in Ukraine, with enormously successful information operations conducted by the Ukrainian government and by individual Ukrainians on platforms such as Twitter to influence Western public opinion—and hence armament shipments—is a stunning example of how the democratization of information shapes the conduct of war. How we craft, aim, transmit, and protect information will determine how well we conduct hybrid war.

Social Media and the Modern Information Environment

Social media offers a vast sea of information DoD needs to chart and operate in. Almost 60 percent of the world’s population uses social media, with higher user percentages in rich countries like the United States. However, many accounts on social media are not human. Bots account for two-thirds of all tweets with links to current events or news sites on Twitter. Likewise, Facebook removed 6.5 billion bots in 2021 alone. With Instagram, a bevy of marketing companies offer to create armies of bots posing as real people to boost an account’s number of followers. These internet robots sing in choruses as part of loose networks (botnets) where the voices are neither genuine nor human and where the bots further their coders’ agendas. While many botnets seek to advertise products, others are nefarious. In 2016 and 2020, Russia created and deployed botnets that sought to change our political landscape. Researchers from the University of Colorado confirmed this campaign’s effectiveness, concluding that the misleading, divisive information promulgated by accounts linked to Russia’s Internet Research Agency on Twitter notably changed the tweeting behavior of English-speaking users who engaged with those accounts. Likewise, Taiwan endures China’s constant, cyber-enabled propaganda. As social media feeds are subject to proprietary machine-learning neural networks, users are immersed in curated, siloed information. As we examine the operational environment, DoD must understand the nature and impact of social media platforms. Social media constructs interactive highways of information flow where disinformation can propagate without attribution. Misinformation is often shared, forwarded, and consumed by citizens who become victims of machine learning–enabled confirmation bias.

Social media reflects narratives and messages disseminated by humans—authentic or sock puppets—and by bot users. These highways of cyber-enabled information flow likewise inspire, enlighten, and reduce friction for everything from economic growth to human connection. Think of typical users who use social media to get the news from media outlets they like, buy products through targeted ads, and share information that conforms to their worldviews. Social media gets a user’s attention for brief bursts of time, and our adversaries can spread misinformation that spurs emotion and aligns with cognitive biases. But unfortunately, as the United States slowly and ponderously navigates ethical and responsible responses to Russian and Chinese disinformation, we lose the audience’s attention. The quote that opened this article—“A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is putting on its shoes”—is apocryphally attributed to Mark Twain, a demonstration of false information’s remarkable staying power. But the pithy expression’s origins extend back even further, to a time of a news cycle lasting twenty-four hours—or even more—with hard copy newssheets distributed by riverboat or literal horsepower. It is infinitely more true today due to the instantaneous nature of social media. The United States must rebalance its bureaucratic processes to engage more quickly with misinformation and propagate its messages in narrative competition. Swaying a population that swims in information ubiquity can only stem from persistent, targeted, fast, and straightforward messaging to counter viral misinformation.

The embrace of social media by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) offers a recent historical example of how to message proactively. In the summer of 2006, Israel retaliated against Hezbollah for kidnapping two IDF soldiers. Although the IDF conducted precise conventional attacks, it lost the battle of the narrative against Hezbollah. Despite Hezbollah’s clunky efforts in the information environment, it commanded the narrative and influenced world opinion against the IDF. However, Israel rapidly learned from its missteps. In 2012, when Israeli forces were once again in combat, this time against Hamas, the IDF tweeted in near-real time, showcasing its accurate weapons and sharing sophisticated battle damage assessments on YouTube. Noted in the media as the first war to be broadcast on Twitter, the IDF told its story better and cast Israel in a better light than during the IDF’s 2006 conflict. To rapidly convey our narrative, the United States must break down barriers to sharing information, including intelligence. Although the United States is now quickly sanitizing and turning around intelligence for Ukraine, breaking down barriers in intelligence still has a way to go. While imperfect, the United States should continue this forward-leaning mindset to share information with our allies, partners, and industry. These actions demonstrate the best American qualities; we are transparent and truthful. In addition to US Cyber Command’s hunt-forward operations, which allow cyber teams access to networks traditionally within the sphere of Russian influence, the US government must embrace US-led information technology industries as partners.

Unity of Effort with the Private Sector

In a hybrid war, DoD must look for opportunities to achieve unity of effort with information technology corporations. Cyberspace is a human-made domain where private sector companies play an outsized role. For instance, social media companies can amplify or firewall voices. Microsoft defended the Ukrainian network by detecting, tracking, patching, and forecasting Russian cyber threats as Russia invaded Ukraine. Likewise, Elon Musk’s SpaceX-run satellite internet service company, Starlink, opened information conduits for a war-rattled Ukraine. Embracing tech companies to achieve unity of effort protects our center of gravity in a hybrid war, the population. In counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgent must defend everywhere, all the time, while the insurgent can choose both the target and the time of attack, constantly slipping away to fight another day if the time isn’t right. This maxim holds true in the information environment, as well. In the West, bound by truth, we must defend a large attack surface by debunking misinformation spread by our adversaries. The nefarious actors, anonymized by their onion routers, slip onto mainstream platforms, plant their narrative landmines, and slip away again. Leveraging tech industries can help illuminate who these actors are and what their patterns are to rapidly call them out and shut down their mistruths. At a minimum, DoD could amplify industry voices when corporations catch authoritarian nation-states spying, planting malware, or promulgating false narratives.

Some companies in the tech industry may choose to distance themselves from the US government, especially after Edward Snowden’s release of the details of several NSA programs cast doubt on their security. However, the war in Ukraine offers encouraging signs that US-based tech companies will choose to side against repressive authoritarian regimes. Of course, public-private cooperation always brings challenges, but there are opportunities, and the US government must act deliberately to take advantage of them. American businesses, for example, offer significant technical expertise. The most talented coders, analysts, and developers work for large US tech firms. DoD offers two opportunities to attract those in tech to achieve unity of effort. First, the department presents a sense of doing the right thing. For instance, by patching and updating software, the tech industry keeps the Ukrainian people connected to each other and the global community. Second, DoD offers complex, dynamic problem sets against some of the savviest hackers in the world. China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all employ cyber espionage and cyber-enabled information operations. Leveraging the brightest minds from industry by reminding their employers that the United States stands on the moral high ground can better protect our vulnerable networks from being exploited while offering robust challenges to expert programmers.

Winning Wars with Information

In its 2022 Digital Defense Report, Microsoft added a cyber-enabled influence operations section for the first time, signaling a confluence of interests between private sector companies and the US government. The report recommends a four-stage process to combat this threat—detect, defend, disrupt, and deter. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should lead an effort to counter cyber-enabled influence operations within the United States, and DoD should support this effort by, where its authorities allow, harmonizing its own activities overseas with it. Moreover, the US government should consider adopting, modifying as needed, and implementing Microsoft’s basic framework. What each of these four stages entails is at least partly intuitive, but a few details about the way Microsoft defines them are instructive. Defending, for example, constitutes educating society on civics and data literacy, empowering journalists, and constructing innovative policies. Disruption for Microsoft boils down to increasing transparency of false messages’ content and origin. For DoD, proactive communications and truthful, transparent, and consistent narratives can both defend against and disrupt adversaries’ influence operations. Finally, Microsoft aims for multinational, multistakeholder agreements to deter cyber-enabled influence operations. DoD should seek a similar unity of effort with other stakeholders to achieve integrated deterrence. In concert with the other instruments of military power and alongside our allies, partners, and the tech industry, targeted, truthful communications offer a viable option to deny adversaries from meddling in US elections and other attempts to spread malicious misinformation.

Finally, DoD must conduct cyber-enabled information operations of our own. Combatant commanders’ and ambassadors’ truthful, culturally appropriate messages should be crafted and delivered through cyberspace to the right receiver at the right time. The good news is that a growing range of military commands recognize how important social media is as a tool to promote DoD messaging, counter that of adversaries, or improve data-driven decision-making. If algorithms can effectively dictate the ads we see on social media they can be modified to determine when a certain foreign individual may be particularly receptive to a certain, honest US government message. For example, for users living and working in an Indo-Pacific country, an appropriate message might emphasize how their nation’s economy, or even individual industries, fairs better with a free and open Indo-Pacific. That message can appear directly to that user in subtle but attention-getting ways. It might arrive in an email, be seen in stories curated by social media, and be spread in a trending video. Consistent messaging across multiple vectors, which audiences are already accustomed to using, would complement the efforts through traditional channels to powerful effect. Social media reaches most of the free world. There is no reason that the US government should be on its heels with messaging. Proactive, targeted messages should reach foreign audiences to educate and inform global populations of DoD’s efforts. The character of war has changed. The United States must play in cyber-enabled information operations, using the tools of the trade, or face being out-messaged in the information environment.

Cyber-enabled information operations present a pernicious threat. If the populations in the West are unable to discern fact from fiction, we risk the atrophy of the will of our people to stand against unjust actions by revisionist powers like Russia and China. We cannot afford to lose our center of gravity in hybrid warfare. A whole-of-society approach is one fix. Teaching our young basic data literacy and research skills will help stem this problem. However, the lag time for that effort is long. In the meantime, DoD must act. We must acknowledge the nature of our strategic competition—that hybrid war, especially in the information environment, is upon us. As such, DoD should chart a comprehensive social media strategy (not just a policy that outlines dos and don’ts for its own personnel), target audiences, promulgate the truth and its narratives early and often, and work with industry to expose bad actors in the sea of the information environment.

John Nagl is a retired Army officer and Michael Posey is an active duty Navy officer; both teach at the Army War College.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Senior Airman Nick Daniello, US Air Force (adapted by MWI)

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mwi.usma.edu · by John Nagl, Michael Posey · December 9, 2022

9. Making Joint All Demand Command and Control a Reality

Excerpts:

To be effective, joint all domain command and control should enable decision making — human and machine — at speeds and scales faster and larger than America’s adversaries. Commanders at all levels of operation need to be able to quickly synchronize shared understanding of a single, integrated, global battlespace. As the military teaches its members to operate within this construct, domain-centric thinking will evolve, the speed and quality of operations will improve, and JADC2 will become real.

Once implemented, joint all domain command and control will give combatant commanders and their forces the ability to observe their and others’ areas of responsibility, orient their forces accordingly, and decide what to do based on the real-time data they are getting. Successfully designing, developing, and implementing JADC2 requires a clear vision with an increasing emphasis on cross-service and cross-domain integration. History has repeatedly shown that victory goes to the side with the decision advantage. Given what is at stake, developing and implementing a successful vision for joint all domain command and control is more important than ever.

Making Joint All Demand Command and Control a Reality - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by David Deptula · December 9, 2022

Decision superiority — the ability to assimilate, analyze, and act upon information acquired from the battlespace more rapidly than an adversary — has always been crucial. It enabled the Royal Air Force to defeat a numerically superior German Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain and it formed the basis for North America’s defenses during the Cold War. Now, in an era where U.S. air combat capacity is dramatically shrinking in the face of a growing Chinese threat, achieving decision superiority is more important than ever. It has also become more challenging. Advances in telecommunications, sensors, processing power, and weapons, along with the growing utility of space as an operational domain, have fundamentally changed the character of effective command and control.

With this in mind, the Department of Defense has sought to achieve decision superiority through a concept known as joint all domain command and control, or JADC2. According to the Department, this concept “is intended to produce the warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and act at all levels and phases of war, across all domains, and with partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance.” But while this definition captures what JADC2 aims to achieve, it says little about how to achieve it.

As a result, joint all domain command and control has partially stalled due to a cloudy department-wide vision that every service views slightly differently. To make this concept a reality, the Pentagon needs a straightforward, clear, and understandable description of what its vision entails. The focus should be on creating a global targeting system that can enable the find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess functions of the kill chain. Rather than being limited to a single theater of operations, this system should enable the effective completion of a kill chain at any time and any place around the globe. This requires that land, sea, air, and space sensor data be made available, in real-time, to all combatant commanders and their forces. The data should be “tailorable,” allowing individual shooters to take what they need to successfully complete their missions while at the same time allowing combatant commanders and their staffs to gain real-time situational awareness of the unfolding battlespace.

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For the Department of Defense, achieving this vision begins with demanding that industry connect every current sensor that can support battlespace awareness, making sensor data available to any potential user, at any level of operation. This data-sharing construct can create “tailored battlespace awareness,” wherein actions in one part of the single, integrated, global battlespace can be understood and inform actions required in other areas of that battlespace. Next, the concept of sensor data sharing should be mandated in every acquisition program from today forward. There are already examples of how industry partners can work together to accomplish this goal. For example, Universal Command and Control Interface and Open Mission Systems standards provide options for integration.

Realizing joint all domain command and control will require more than just installing new telecommunications technologies. It will entail changes across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. Achieving this capability will require first, a vision to ensure that the command and control architectures being developed by the armed services are all aimed toward the common objective of creating a global targeting system, and second, efforts to align the services in working with one another to achieve the desired effects of the JADC2 vision. It also requires the department to prepare current and future battle managers to operate at the scales and timelines required by this global enterprise. Finally, the Department of Defense should also train the shooters of the future to operate in this new construct.

Ensuring Connectivity and Interoperability

At the macro level, joint all domain command and control involves gathering massive quantities of data through a broad range of distributed sensors and processing it into actionable information. Actors at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels harness germane elements of the resulting information flows to best execute their missions. The entire system is stitched together with a robust set of communication links. This does not mean all actors get all information, for that would leave everyone drowning in data. Instead, it entails allocating the right information to enable actors to achieve enhanced effects in their specific areas of responsibility.

In the past, conventional command and control activities were focused on the highest levels of theater operations. Today, while theater-level command and control will remain significant, space-based sensors, communications, and connectivity enable the creation of a global targeting system. Crucially, this is much more than simply a set of improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, and labeling it as such may incorrectly assign roles and responsibilities in mission execution. For example, consider the impact that unmanned aerial vehicles like the Predator and Reaper had in the battlespace. These aircraft quickly evolved from intelligence-gathering tools to become sensor-shooters delivering kinetic effects in real-time. But despite this, they remained subject to an intelligence-based tasking process.

Making joint all domain command and control a reality will require changing an intelligence community culture that has historically been focused on indications and warning into one that can focus on direct support for real-time targeting operations. This will be particularly challenging, as intelligence community priorities can change quickly and without warning based on the national intelligence priorities framework. As a result, the global targeting system should be able to function with support from the intelligence community, but not depend on systems that might be reprioritized elsewhere.

The collaborative nature of JADC2 will also require a targeting system that is exceptionally well integrated. Specifically, this means a system that can take a holistic approach to mission execution across all the service components when operating as part of joint task forces in all combatant commands. Maintaining clear lines of authority between strategic, operational, and tactical actors is crucial. The system will break down if senior leaders reach down to the tactical level, as we saw with early drone operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Trust needs to exist between the actors involved, further facilitated by an appropriate delegation of authority. Mission Command will be key as well. The networked connectivity of the force should also allow for robust cross-domain collaborative engagement to meet specific effects — in other words, satellites, ships, aircraft, and land forces teaming for a specific moment to yield the desired outcome that none could achieve on their own.

Ultimately, joint all domain command and control will not be an Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, or Marine Corps enterprise. But it depends on all of these services organizing, training, and equipping their forces to ensure their particular JADC2 elements work seamlessly with the others in a dynamic, “plug-and-play” fashion. Consider a combined/joint force air component commander — he or she is not interested in what nation or service provides a particular aircraft to the fight, only in the capability that it provides.

Creating this level of interoperability calls for an overarching joint all domain command and control champion with the clout and authority to direct the services and, if necessary, to modify their efforts to ensure integration with the overall enterprise. This past October, the Department of Defense announced the standup of an office to better integrate the multiple service efforts and realize the promises of JADC2. This is an important step necessary to guard against developing service-centric pathways that cannot partner effectively. Time will tell if this office has the power necessary to do so. But the office will be more likely to succeed if it has the authority to drive “system of systems integration” both inside the Department of Defense and across industry. This authority should include real oversight and tasking powers, as well as control over budgets and policy decisions. Additionally, it should have the strong backing and active support of the combatant commanders. They, individually and as a group, should insist on full interoperability for their areas of responsibility.

Command and Control in a New Context

Joint all domain command and control is also being launched in an era of tremendous technological progress that will fundamentally alter how mission effects are secured. Combat aircraft like the F-35 and B-21 are bringing more to the fight than any weapon systems previously fielded with their combined ability to penetrate enemy defenses, gather data, process it, and share it with a range of other actors as necessary.

Understanding the need to disaggregate and distribute command and control in new and unique ways will dictate how future battle managers operate. This may drive different stages of battle management operations. With technology enabling a clearer understanding of the battlespace on a more integrated, global scale, the military should begin to think about battle managers in a new light and perhaps have them embedded in all command and control centers. To support a global targeting system capability the intelligence community may also need to entertain new roles and responsibilities. Specifically, this means giving greater deference to Department of Defense priorities in order to deliver constant and uninterrupted targeting data driven by combatant command mission needs.

Changes in space will also shape the successful realization of joint all domain command and control. A new generation of on-orbit capabilities is now providing broad sensor networks and global communication links that were previously in the realm of science fiction. This is especially applicable for JADC2. Large-scale in-theater command and control centers, as well as legacy command and control platforms like Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar Systems or Airborne Warning and Control System, and a host of other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems, will not survive in a peer combat environment. Fortunately, new space capabilities can compensate for the fact that these legacy aircraft are no longer reliable. But the enemy also understands the value space-based capabilities deliver, which is why it is time to get serious about developing necessary offensive and defensive capabilities on orbit. Otherwise, U.S planners will have traded a set of vulnerable terrestrial systems for an equally vulnerable set of orbital ones.

Conclusion

Finally, it is important for planners to understand that joint all domain command and control is a set of technologies and processes that ultimately empower human decision-making. It cannot be achieved through machines and software alone but will require procedures to make sure information supports human users rather than burdens or overwhelms them. Consider how pilots flying third and fourth generation fighters in the Cold War had to process multiple concurrent conversations on numerous radio frequencies, monitor the radar, listen to missile warning alarms, and manage to fly the aircraft all at the same time. It placed pilots on the very edge of being overwhelmed at any given moment. That is exactly why 5th generation information fusion became a crucial priority. It helped pull the data processing load off the pilot. Machines took over this processing, which allowed pilots to view manageable information feeds and regain valuable thinking capacity.

To be effective, joint all domain command and control should enable decision making — human and machine — at speeds and scales faster and larger than America’s adversaries. Commanders at all levels of operation need to be able to quickly synchronize shared understanding of a single, integrated, global battlespace. As the military teaches its members to operate within this construct, domain-centric thinking will evolve, the speed and quality of operations will improve, and JADC2 will become real.

Once implemented, joint all domain command and control will give combatant commanders and their forces the ability to observe their and others’ areas of responsibility, orient their forces accordingly, and decide what to do based on the real-time data they are getting. Successfully designing, developing, and implementing JADC2 requires a clear vision with an increasing emphasis on cross-service and cross-domain integration. History has repeatedly shown that victory goes to the side with the decision advantage. Given what is at stake, developing and implementing a successful vision for joint all domain command and control is more important than ever.

Become a Member

David A. Deptula is a retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General who was the principal attack planner for the Operation Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom air campaigns. He has twice been a joint task force commander. He is the dean of the Mitchell Institute of Aerospace Studies and a senior scholar at the Air Force Academy’s Center for Character and Leadership Development.

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warontherocks.com · by David Deptula · December 9, 2022

10. House passes defense bill with more Taiwan, Ukraine security aid

House passes defense bill with more Taiwan, Ukraine security aid

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · December 8, 2022

WASHINGTON — The House on Thursday passed 350-80 the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act after making several concessions to the Senate, which did not pass its own version of the bill for the second straight year in a row.

The $858 billion NDAA amounts to an 8% increase over FY22 defense levels and is $45 billion more than the White House requested in its budget proposal last spring. It also provides increased aid to Taiwan and Ukraine. The Senate is expected to vote on the legislation next week.

The compromise bill with the Senate drops various House provisions that would have complicated arms transfers to some countries and irregular forces over human rights concerns. House lawmakers had previously attached those provisions as amendments when they passed their version of the NDAA in a 329-101 vote in July.

Additionally, the final bill blocks the Biden administration’s efforts to retire certain weapons systems and discontinue a couple of nuclear weapons platforms.

Securing Taiwan and Ukraine

Despite some of the House concessions, Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith, D-Wash., and the panel’s top Republican, Mike Rogers of Alabama, both praised the bipartisan comprise bill as necessary to deter Russia in Europe and China in the Indo-Pacific region.

“This is a great product,” Rogers said Wednesday. “It’s helpful in Eastern Europe, but it is imperative as we move toward our concerns with China and [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s area of responsibility] that we pass this bill.”

The bill authorizes $10 billion in military aid for Taiwan through FY27 and includes measures intended to help address the multibillion-dollar backlog of U.S. foreign military sales for the island nation. Congressional appropriators have yet to strike a deal on how to pay for the authorization, with some expressing concern that the high dollar amount authorized for Taiwan security aid could eat into the U.S. State Department’s $56 billion budget.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen watches soldiers operate equipment during a visit to a naval station on Penghu, an archipelago of several dozen islands off Taiwan's western coast, on Aug. 30, 2022. (Taiwan's Defense Ministry via AP)

Meanwhile, Smith noted Wednesday that the bill provides $800 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative “to help them defend against Russia’s war of aggression.”

That fund allows the Pentagon to contract for new weapons and equipment for Ukraine beyond the billions of dollars in weapons that President Joe Biden has already transferred to Kyiv using presidential drawdown authority. The modified language this year now allows portions of the fund to go toward replenishing equipment for allies and partners that have sent weapons to Ukraine.

While the initial House bill included language from retiring Rep. Adam Kinzinger, R-Ill., that would have authorized $100 million to train Ukrainian pilots to fly U.S. aircraft, that provision was folded into the scaled-up Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding. Both the Biden administration and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., have previously expressed skepticism over that provision.

The bill also requires the Biden administration to submit a plan for short- and mid-term Ukraine security aid, which must address the Ukrainian Air Force’s needs.

“We expect this report will cover Ukraine’s aerial capability needs over that duration and the plan to build and improve upon such capacities,” according to the report accompanying the bill.

In addition, the bill requires a report on the framework the inspectors general use to oversee Ukraine aid amid growing skepticism from the right flank of the Republican caucus.

“We have the [Defense Department] report before us regularly in a classified setting to tell us about this,” Rogers said Wednesday, expressing frustration over claims within his party that Ukraine aid is not subject to enough oversight.

“There is no evidence that the money we’ve given, the supplies we’ve given, aren’t going where they’re supposed to go,” he added. “It’s my hope that we can figure out how to give more information that’s accurate to the public rather than just the classified stuff we deal with. That would be helpful.”

Arms restrictions

Negotiators on the House Armed Services Committee agreed to drop a provision from Rep. James McGovern, D-Mass., that would have banned arms sales and transfers to any government that has committed genocide or violations of international humanitarian law.

Another dropped provision from Rep. Gerry Connolly, D-Va., would have limited future offensive arms sales to Saudi Arabia until the country stops targeting dissidents at home and abroad.

Reps. Frank Pallone, D-N.J., and Chris Pappas, D-N.H., also lost their provision that would have complicated Turkey’s efforts to make a $6 billion purchase of 40 Lockheed Martin Block 70 F-16 fighter jets. That provision would have required Biden to submit “a detailed description of concrete steps” to ensure that Turkey does not use the F-16s to violate Greek airspace before proceeding with the sale.

Solo Turk, the aerobatic team of the Turkish Air Force, fly their F-16 fighters over Istanbul in 2018. (Ozan Kose/AFP via Getty Images)

Outgoing Rep. Tom Malinowski, D-N.J., also lost out on his provision that would have prevented the transfer of two Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigates to Egypt unless Biden certifies the country is in compliance with a 2017 Russia sanctions law and is not wrongfully detaining U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.

The final bill also dropped a House provision that would have codified into law U.S. funding and support for irregular forces under the NDAA’s Section 1202, while banning that assistance if those groups have committed gross human rights violations.

First established in 2018 in response to Moscow’s support for Ukrainian separatists, Section 1202 authorities allow special operations units to arm irregular forces in gray zone conflict areas with the goal of deterring advanced competitors such as Russia and China. House lawmakers had hoped that codifying those authorities into law would have helped expand those operations into the Indo-Pacific.

Retirements and divestments

Amid concerns over China’s naval modernization efforts, the final bill maintains a requirement for the U.S. Navy to maintain 31 operational amphibious ships despite opposition from the White House.

The White House also issued a statement in July noting that it “strongly opposes” the bill funding a third Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. The final bill nonetheless allocates $2.2 billion to fund the third Arleigh Burke ship.

Additionally, the bill sets aside $25 million to continue the sea-launched cruise missile nuclear development program, also known as SLCM-N, despite the Biden administration’s attempts to cancel it. It also prevents the administration from proceeding with a plan to retire the B83 megaton gravity bomb, which is 80 times more powerful than the bomb the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, during World War II.

However, the bill does allow the Air Force to begin retiring the A-10 Warthog after previous congressional opposition to doing so.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

11. Adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister talks post-war forces, industry

Adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister talks post-war forces, industry

Defense News · by Jaroslaw Adamowski · December 8, 2022

WARSAW, Poland — As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, the Ukrainian military has liberated large portions of its territory previously occupied by Russian forces. Western funds and weapons have played a major role in helping Ukraine combat the Feb. 24 invasion. However, this is not the first time Russia has targeted its neighbor; Moscow seized and then annexed Crimea in March 2014.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s leading state-run defense enterprise, Ukroboronprom, is developing its capacities for the supply of multiple-rocket launchers as well as anti-tank and anti-ship missiles. Senior industry representatives say the domestic defense industry is observing a spike in demand from foreign customers interested in acquiring weapons already proven in combat against Russia’s military.

In an interview with Defense News on Sept. 20, Yuriy Sak, an adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, described how the war has transformed the military and defense industry, what security guarantees the nation needs to prevent further Russian aggression and which weapons will be most useful in securing a Ukrainian victory.

This interview was edited for length and clarity.

How do you expect this conflict between Russia and Ukraine to end?

We not only expect, but are confident this war will end with Ukraine’s victory. As we have shown over the past months, the Ukrainian military is highly capable, motivated and professional. We have demonstrated that we are able to efficiently combat what was formerly known as the second-largest army in the world. Our allies see we are able to learn very fast how to use modern, Western weapons. Ukrainian soldiers use them very efficiently, and we take great care of them because we respect our allies.

What can Ukraine do to ward off another Russian invasion?

This war began in 2014 when Russia first invaded our territory, and the United Nations security system failed to stop this aggression from happening. In 1991, Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union and agreed to give up nuclear weapons for the sake of the greater good. We signed the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, but nearly 30 years later we see that what was supposed to guarantee Ukraine its safety, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence failed to do so. One of the memorandum’s signatories [has ended up] conducting an aggressive war and committing violent crimes against Ukrainian civilians.

Russian troops guard an entrance of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station, a run-of-river power plant on the Dnieper River in the Kherson region in Ukraine on May 20, 2022. (AP)

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as well as Ukraine’s top political and military leaders have repeatedly said we need a new set of guarantees. An international working group on security — led by the head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, and former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen — has developed a very clear list of key guarantees Ukraine will need to stop this kind of aggression from happening in the future.

Compared with the Budapest Memorandum, we will also need more countries as signatories of this new agreement. Russia would probably not dare to invade Ukraine if it would directly trigger action by the signatory countries.

Has the war transformed the Ukrainian military into a more modern and well-equipped force? If so, what are the main areas of progress?

We have gained invaluable battlefield experience since 2014. We have exchanged this experience with our foreign partners through regular exercises, joint drills and training. This is why we were able to surprise the world with our resistance and thwart Russia’s initial plans to conquer our land within seven days.

What we need now is to continue to receive high-quality weapons to prevent tragedies, such as the massacre of Mariupol, from happening again. The United States leads the way in terms of its military assistance to us, and we can also count on the U.K., Poland, Germany, France, Norway, the Baltic States and many other countries.

We hope to receive soon air defense systems to protect our cities from being destroyed by Russia. We also need more Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger missiles, 155mm howitzers and cannons. We know how to make good use of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System and Harpoon missiles, and we are grateful to our partners for providing us with such weapons. The same goes for the Panzerhaubitze howitzers and Gepard anti-aircraft vehicles from Germany, the Zuzana howitzers from Slovakia, and the Caesar howitzers from France.

What will Ukraine’s military look like after the war?

The past months have brought a continuous, fast-tracked transformation of the Ukrainian armed forces toward Western standards. We are now fully aware that we need to be, as Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov said, interoperable with Western armies. Our command structures and military planning resemble those of Western armies. Our military is very much unlike the Russian military, which is both mentally and organizationally stuck in World War II.

The Ukrainian defense industry is currently exclusively serving the needs of your armed forces. What role will this industry play in Ukraine’s post-war future?

We understand that, for Ukraine to be able to shield itself from our neighbor, we need to think strategically, and we can’t just rely on foreign deliveries of weapons. Our leadership wants to continue to reform Ukroboronprom. This reform was already initiated some time before the war.

Now we understand the needs our military has. Some of these needs have already been covered, but our military personnel increased so greatly that it was simply impossible to immediately equip all soldiers with helmets, bulletproof vests, uniforms and all the necessary gear.

We also understand how urgently we need ammunition, and in the future our defense industry needs to secure sufficient capacities to cover our ammunition needs.

Ukraine has been able to draft a large number of conscripts. Russia’s government has had problems convincing its population to enlist, and there are reports of thousands fleeing the country to avoid deployment to Ukraine. What made your conscription efforts effective?

The main reason behind this success is what Russian leadership failed to understand and appreciate. Ukraine is a sovereign nation, and Ukrainians have a very strong national and civic identity. We don’t want to live under a dictator, and we won’t let a tyrant ruin our children’s future. This is why, after the war broke out, the lines in front of our military recruitment centers became so huge that many volunteers were actually sent to other services where their capacities could be of best use.

Russian soldiers are demoralized and have little motivation to die in Ukraine for the delusions of their leaders, which is why Russia is recruiting criminals to its armed forces. They promise them their prison sentences will be scrapped if they kill Ukrainians. This is symptomatic of the state of their military.

Ukrainians perfectly understand the stakes: that we’re fighting for our freedom and for the freedom of our children. This is why we will win.

About Jaroslaw Adamowski

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

12. Ukraine Says Western Allies Shouldn’t Fear Russia Falling Apart

But we do and we should. (but we should prepare for it)

But I do believe the Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves by all means necessary.

Ukraine Says Western Allies Shouldn’t Fear Russia Falling Apart

Ukrainian foreign minister says Kyiv has the right to strike inside Russia to defend itself, refuses to compromise on territory and sees no prospect for peace talks

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-says-western-allies-shouldnt-fear-russia-falling-apart-11670505120?mod=hp_lead_pos7&utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d

By Yaroslav TrofimovFollow

 and Matthew LuxmooreFollow

Updated Dec. 8, 2022 10:45 am ET

KYIV, Ukraine—Ukraine’s foreign minister called on the country’s allies not to fear a possible breakup of the Russian state as a consequence of the war, while defending Kyiv’s right to strike targets on Russian soil and vowing that Ukraine would never accept a peace settlement that leaves occupied lands, including Crimea, under Moscow’s control.

Though Ukraine’s Western allies are united over the goal of preventing a Ukrainian defeat, not all embrace the objective of a full-blown Ukrainian military victory, with Kyiv regaining not just the lands it lost since the February invasion but also the Crimean Peninsula and the parts of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions that fell under Russian rule in 2014.

Some of these allies worry that such an outcome could profoundly destabilize the nuclear-armed Russian state, potentially leading to its fragmentation and wide-scale unrest, with unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Monday that Washington’s focus is on supporting Ukraine to take back territory seized by Russia since launching its invasion on Feb. 24.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, who expressed confidence in continuing U.S. backing for Kyiv, said fears about preserving Russia reminded him of the so-called “Chicken Kiev” speech of 1991. Then, President George H.W. Bush in a speech to Ukrainian lawmakers warned against “suicidal nationalism,” urging Ukrainians to preserve the Soviet Union and abandon their quest for independence from Moscow.

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“I’m calling on the world not to be afraid of Russia falling apart. If the wheels of history begin to turn, no human will change it,” Mr. Kuleba said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in Kyiv.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said his country wouldn’t accept a compromise that leaves Crimea and Donbas in Russian hands.

PHOTO: ANDREI PUNGOVSCHI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“Instead of thinking of how to help Russia survive and become a normal member of the international community, it’s time to accept the fact that this Russia cannot be a normal member of the international community,” he said. “I don’t think the world will fall apart if Russia falls apart. But it will be the people of Russia who will make their country fall apart, as it happened with the Russian Empire” in 1917.

Russia is a multiethnic country with several regions, such as some Muslim-majority parts of the North Caucasus, that were beset by separatist insurgencies in the 1990s.

In nine months of fighting, Ukraine’s military has already ousted Russian forces from more than half of the territories that they occupied in the initial weeks of the war. Last month’s Russian withdrawal from the southern city of Kherson returned to Ukrainian hands the only regional capital that Moscow had managed to seize. President Vladimir Putin’s October claim to have annexed the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions means that virtually all the fighting now takes place in areas that Russia considers its own sovereign territory.

In recent weeks, Russia has rained hundreds of cruise missiles on Ukraine, seeking to destroy its electricity supply and other infrastructure and compel Kyiv to start peace negotiations that would leave Moscow in control of occupied lands. In response, Ukraine appears to have intensified clandestine strikes deep inside Russian territory, aiming to redress the power asymmetry.

A fire at a residential building hit by a Russian strike in Bakhmut, eastern Ukraine.

PHOTO: STRINGER/REUTERS

While Ukraine hasn’t claimed official responsibility, Russia and Western officials say Kyiv was behind this week’s long-range drone attacks on three Russian military airfields, including two from which strategic bombers flew on missions to launch missiles into Ukraine. At least two aircraft were put out of order, according to satellite footage. Russia said the attacks, in Engels, Diagilevo and Kursk, killed three service members.

Mr. Kuleba declined to discuss specific incidents, but said Ukraine can’t be expected to hold back while it wages an existential war.

“We are first and foremost focused on striking targets in the occupied territories of Ukraine, on liberating our own territory. But of course the notion that Russia can do whatever it can technically afford doing in Ukraine while Ukraine doesn’t have the same right is conceptually, morally and militarily wrong,” Mr. Kuleba said.

“Ukraine should not be endlessly victimized. We are a country that is fighting on all fronts for its survival, for its territorial integrity,” he added. “The most important thing is that no one treats Ukraine’s behavior—as long as it complies with international laws of warfare—from the perspective that Russia can do everything it wants while Ukraine has to respect certain red lines in defending itself.”

Ukraine has pledged to the U.S. not to use American-supplied weapons to strike Russian soil. That agreement, Mr. Kuleba said, doesn’t apply to Crimea, which is internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory. The U.S. has also refrained from supplying Ukraine with the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which has a range of some 200 miles, and has modified the Himars artillery systems that it has provided to Ukraine so that they couldn’t fire ATACMS missiles into Russia should Ukraine obtain them from another source.

For Mr. Putin, annexing Crimea—which many Russians consider to have been unfairly attached to Soviet Ukraine in 1954—represents a crucial part of his legacy, and losing the territory would severely undermine his ability to govern. That shouldn’t concern Kyiv, Mr. Kuleba said.

“Crimea is no different from the rest of Ukraine,” he said. “Ukraine will take all of its territories including Crimea, some by military means and others by diplomatic means. It’s too premature to make any forecasts on the balance between the two.”

An attack struck the bridge connecting Russia and Crimea in October.

PHOTO: -/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Despite Moscow’s repeated statements that it seeks to engage in peace talks, Russia’s behavior shows that it really isn’t interested in peace, Mr. Kuleba added. Since withdrawing from Kherson, Russia has moved forces to the eastern Donbas region, where it is pushing to seize the city of Bakhmut. “They are preparing for new battles, and for new offensive operations, not for talks. So nothing speaks in favor of Russia being ready to talk,” Mr. Kuleba said.

Mr. Blinken, in his remarks at The Wall Street Journal CEO Council Summit on Monday, expressed similar skepticism about prospects for a negotiated outcome. “Unless and until Russia demonstrates that it’s interested in meaningful diplomacy, it can’t go anywhere,” he said.

The Minsk cease-fire agreements in 2014 and 2015, which left parts of Donetsk and Luhansk under de-facto Russian control, showed the futility of negotiations with Moscow, the Ukrainian foreign minister added.

“What will not be negotiated is the issue of the territorial integrity of Ukraine,” Mr. Kuleba said. “We’ve suffered too much in the last nine months—we learned the lesson of the so-called Minsk process that had tortured us for eight years—to be ready to make any concessions on territory and people who live there.”

Mr. Kuleba said Russia’s behavior suggests Moscow still seeks a military victory, including the conquest of all of Ukraine. “Putin and his closest entourage are hoping for a miracle that will happen and turn the tables,” he said, reiterating Ukraine’s call on allies to provide it with more weapons, including Western-made tanks, jet fighters and ATACMS missiles.

In the past, Mr. Kuleba said, the U.S. and allies lifted longstanding taboos and supplied Ukraine with the weapons that they refused to provide in the past, such as 155 mm howitzers or Himars, when the tide of the fighting turned against Kyiv.

Mr. Kuleba said that at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization foreign-ministers meeting in Bucharest late last month he urged his counterparts to “completely change the optics: Instead of waiting for a crisis in order for them to make a decision, they have to make decisions now in order to avoid a crisis.”

Asked about the response to the proposal, Mr. Kuleba said the NATO governments need time to reflect.

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com and Matthew Luxmoore at Matthew.Luxmoore@wsj.com

13. Army football alums make general more often than other officers — why?

Although Marshall's quote is supposedly a myth it may offer an explanation:  

“I want an officer for a secret and dangerous mission. I want a West Point football player.”

But are these numbers statistically significant?

That said (although not a West Point football player, I attribute my personal development as being heavily influenced by being part of a football team from about 7 or 8 years old through my first year of college)

Army football alums make general more often than other officers — why?

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · December 8, 2022

It’s one of the most hallowed traditions in college sports.

When they take the field for games, whether at home in Michie Stadium, on the road, or at a neutral site like the one set for Saturday’s 123rd playing of the Army-Navy game, West Point’s football players all touch a bronze plaque bearing a purported quote from Gen. George Marshall, the service’s chief of staff during World War II.

Held each week by a different officer with ties to the program, it reads, “I want an officer for a secret and dangerous mission. I want a West Point Football player!”

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Army Times senior reporter Davis Winkie reflects on the methods and inspiration that led to his recent story.

While it’s not certain that Marshall ever uttered those words, other key Army leaders (such as Gen. Ray Odierno, who served as chief of staff from 2011 to 2015) previously reflected on the value of their West Point football days.

This inspired Army Times to test a related hypothesis: are West Point football players more likely to become general officers than their peers, and are they more likely to ascend into key three- and four-star roles?

In short, yes. To reach this conclusion, we analyzed data from the West Point Association of Graduates, the Army’s General Officer Management Office, the Defense Manpower Data Center, official Army histories and legislative archives. We also researched biographies of former chiefs of staff.

Army Times found that West Point football players who graduated between 1975 and 1998 were more likely to attain every leadership category we studied:

• West Point football players have been 3.41 times more likely to make it to at least brigadier general than the entire population of officers (165,909) who didn’t play football there.
• The disparity between the two groups is even greater for senior general roles, with West Point football players being 6.02 times more likely to earn a third or fourth star.
• The football players even outpace their West Point peers, attaining general officer rank at a 1.4 times greater rate than members of the Long Gray Line who aren’t gridiron vets.
• For senior roles, football alumni have reached the three- and four-star ranks at a 1.89 times higher rate than West Point grads who weren’t on the team.

The study’s methodology, and its potential shortcomings, are discussed at length in a companion story. Army Times reviewed existing literature on general officer promotions and was unable to locate any publications that have previously documented the link between West Point football graduates and the general officer ranks.

But correlation doesn’t necessarily indicate causation.

Why would more football players become generals?

Army Times discussed the analysis with two experts on the service’s general officer ranks: Col. Todd Woodruff, a West Point sociologist and director of the West Point Leadership Center, and Katherine Kuzminski, who oversees the Center for a New American Security think tank’s Military, Veterans, and Society Program. Both have studied what factors predict career success for Army officers.

Woodruff told Army Times that its findings were “not surprising” but confirmed their novelty. He argued that the link isn’t due to any “nefarious thing…like nepotism,” but rather because of “a combination of the special qualities and characteristics that are built” through a football player’s experience at the academy.

In Woodruff’s eyes, most officers who are competitive for promotion to brigadier general have similar capabilities and operational backgrounds — successful battalion and brigade command time, successful stints in professional education, exceptional performance evaluations and more.

Both he and Kuzminski pointed to an “academy advantage” that researchers have documented. According to a 2019 RAND study co-authored by Kuzminski, West Point grads — regardless of football — “surge in their share of officer positions” when entering the general officer ranks. And by the time they reach three- and four-star roles, members of the Long Gray Line “make up the vast majority of positions.”

Physical fitness, or “physicality” also matters within the Army’s culture, the experts said. Young officers are evaluated on their fitness and their “presence” while leading, and top-performing football players are anecdotally more likely to be tall and in good physical shape.

“Culture matters,” said Woodruff. “And in the case of the U.S. Army, physicality matters.”

Woodruff also emphasized that officers in combat arms branches such as infantry or armor (which he said football players are more likely to select) are more likely to become generals than their peers. Kuzminski’s 2019 study highlighted that phenomenon, demonstrating that combat arms officers begin with a plurality of brigadier generals and increase in their overrepresentation with seniority. Nearly 90% of four-star generals they studied were from the infantry or armor branch.

West Point officers already benefit from a significant networking advantage once they enter the force, too. And for football players, that effect might be heightened.

Woodruff highlighted that football players have “an even closer group that…[they’ve] struggled and bonded with,” adding that “those closer ties in a broader network do matter.”

The CNAS expert agreed. “If you think that the network of West Pointers is tight, then the network of former football players is even tighter,” she said. “And the fact that there’s historically been more general officers who played football at West Point means that football players who come up behind them are part of that network.”

Gender also plays an undeniable role in the data — for the majority of these officers’ careers, women have been shut out from the combat arms branches and the promotion advantage it provides. And all West Point football players are men.

Kuzminski argued that football players experience a “compounding of that network effect and the selection effect” that favors the traits they possess as physically-imposing, male academy graduates who skew towards combat arms careers.

“There’s already so many gates to get to” the general officer ranks, but if you’re a West Point football player, she explained, “There are advantages at every gate you pass.”

Woodruff and Kuzminski also suggested further research could determine whether the football phenomenon is unique, or if other athletes with similar traits also become generals at similarly elevated rates. Both agree that any of the factors described would need to be controlled in future studies in order to isolate sports participation as the only variable.

The CNAS official said she’s curious whether athletes on other very physical NCAA sports teams such as hockey or basketball (men’s and women’s) are also overrepresented among generals.

But Woodruff thinks there might be merit to the idea that football is special.

“They develop grit, commitment, [and] conscientiousness. They understand the practice of building teams — and cohesive winning teams,” the colonel explained. “And then when you combine with that the network effect, and maybe some more intensive mentoring that they get…those things come together to give them some advantages.”

His conclusion was clear.

“This is good, and it’s largely something that they’ve earned.”

Notable West Point football alums who became generals

• Gen. (and future president) Dwight Eisenhower was a running back on the West Point football team until he injured his knee.
• Gen. Omar Bradley, who was the service’s chief of staff from 1948 to 1949, was Eisenhower’s teammate at the academy. He also was a star baseball player there.
• Gen. Matthew Ridgway, the 82nd Airborne Division’s original commanding general and later chief of staff from 1953 to 1955, was a manager for the football team.
• Gen. Harold Johnston, chief of staff from 1964 to 1968, was an assistant manager for the football team. He reportedly feuded with the Air Force chief of staff Gen. John McConnell during the early days of the Vietnam War due to disagreements dating back to their time working together as managers.
• Gen. Creighton Abrams Jr., chief of staff from 1973 to 1974, was a lineman on the football team at West Point.
• Gen. Ray Odierno, chief of staff from 2011 to 2015, was recruited to play football at the academy but switched to baseball after suffering injuries. After retiring from the Army, he became chairman of USA Football and served on the College Football Playoff selection committee.
• Gen. David Rodriguez, who retired in 2016 after leading U.S. Africa Command, played football while at the academy.
• Gen. Darryl Williams, current head of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, described his experiences playing defensive line for the Black Knights in a 2020 ESPN interview.
• Lt. Gen. Willard Burleson III, who leads the 8th Army in South Korea, lettered in football at West Point, according to an archived yearbook.
• Lt. Gen. Christopher Donahue, former Delta Force commander, last soldier to leave Afghanistan and current 18th Airborne Corps commander, also was on the West Point football team.
• Lt. Gen. Steven Gilland, who commanded the 2nd Infantry Division and is now West Point’s superintendent, played football for a year while at the academy.
• Lt. Gen. Scott Spellmon, current commander of the Army Corps of Engineers, detailed his experiences as a wide receiver for Army during a 2021 podcast interview.
• Lt. Gen. John Thomson III, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division and retired in 2020, played football as well.
• Maj. Gen. Richard Angle, who heads 1st Special Forces Command, was a member of the football team at West Point.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army, specializing in accountability reporting, personnel issues and military justice. He joined Military Times in 2020. Davis studied history at Vanderbilt University and UNC-Chapel Hill, writing a master's thesis about how the Cold War-era Defense Department influenced Hollywood's WWII movies.

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armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · December 8, 2022

14. Democrats ask consulting firms for information on retired military officers advising foreign governments

Democrats ask consulting firms for information on retired military officers advising foreign governments

BY ZACH SCHONFELD - 12/08/22 1:51 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3767372-democrats-ask-consulting-firms-for-information-on-retired-military-officers-advising-foreign-governments/?utm

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) sent letters to the leaders of five consulting firms on Wednesday asking for information on their companies’ work with foreign governments in response to a recent Washington Post investigation.

The Post’s investigation found that more than 500 retired U.S. military personnel have taken jobs with foreign governments, mostly in countries known for human rights abuses and political repression.

“This was an alarming finding, raising questions about whether these former U.S. military officials and the firms that hire them are working in the best interests of the United States government and its citizens, or in the interests of some of the world’s worst regimes,” Warren and Jacobs, who sit on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, respectively, wrote.

“Given these concerns, I ask that you provide information regarding the employees of your firm that have worked on behalf of foreign governments, particularly those with a history of repression and human rights abuses, and how your firm ensures its officials are not involved in illegal or inappropriate activities that harm U.S. national security interests,” the letter continues.

The letters ask each firm — Booz Allen Hamilton, Fairfax National Security Solutions, Jones Group International & Ironhand Security, Iron Net Cybersecurity and The Cohen Group — to answer five questions by Dec. 21 about their work with foreign governments, including a list of former servicemembers at their firms who engage with those clients.

“By funneling U.S. expertise through ‘consulting’ firms that collect six- and seven-figure paychecks, foreign governments have been able to build up their military forces with U.S. assistance and without ongoing oversight from the U.S. government,” the lawmakers wrote.

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The letters also criticize a former general who the lawmakers said worked for two of the firms and published op-eds in The Hill and multiple other outlets advocating for support for Saudi Arabia without disclosing the relationship.

The Washington Post’s investigation has also garnered scrutiny from both sides of the aisle.

Warren and Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) sent a letter to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin late last month requesting information about the investigation.

14. What’s in and out of the House defense bill

Out of 4000 pages the Hill gives us this. They did the reading so we would not have to! :-). 

NotedDC — What’s in and out of the House defense bill

BY AMEE LATOUR, ELIZABETH CRISP AND JESSE BYRNES - 12/08/22 4:50 PM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/noteddc/3767744-noteddc-whats-in-and-out-of-the-house-defense-bill/?utm

NotedDC is a newsletter looking at the politics, policy and people behind the stories in Washington. Sign up here or in the box below.

Lawmakers from both parties have wrangled over what to include or omit from the annual defense policy bill, considered a must-pass piece of legislation by year’s end.

The House passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) on  Thursday in a 350-80 vote. Now it’s on to the Senate.

WHAT’S IN (so far): The bill supports a topline budget of $847 billion in defense spending, plus $10.6 billion for “Defense-related Activities Outside NDAA Jurisdiction.” That’s $45 billion above what President Biden requested.

It also includes language ending the vaccine mandate for service members, which House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) said was necessary for the bill to pass. Our colleagues present a number of perspectives on that here.

WHAT’S OUT: For one, Sen. Joe Manchin’s (D-W.Va.) permitting reform proposal, which he’s seeking to revive.

Manchin asked Senate Majority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) to pull the proposal from a continuing resolution in September when it was clear it had insufficient support.

The West Virginia Democrat, who’s up for reelection in 2024, said the Senate should add a modified version of his proposal as an amendment to the NDAA.

The changes to Manchin’s proposal “appear aimed at garnering GOP support,” our colleagues wrote in The Hill’s Energy & Environment newsletter. (See their latest for more on permitting reform.)

ALSO OUT: A marijuana-related package including banking and record expungement provisions, which a bipartisan group of senators supported and Schumer took the lead on. Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) was a vocal critic.

LAST-MINUTE DELAY: A House vote was expected Wednesday, but the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) pushed for simultaneous movement on a voting rights bill, and the House delayed for further discussion. 

“The House last year had already passed the voting rights bill, named after the late Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.),” our colleagues Mike Lillis and Mychael Schnell reported. “But the Senate never took it up, and CBC leaders were seeking a way to force a vote in the upper chamber, even knowing the measure likely to fail.” 

The House ended up voting for the NDAA under suspension of the rules, expediting a vote and requiring two-thirds support. 

WHERE BIDEN STANDS: At a press conference Wednesday, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the White House opposes the vaccine mandate removal. Asked if Biden would veto the NDAA because of it, Jean-Pierre said Biden “is going to look at the NDAA in its entirety and make his judgment on that.” 

Jean-Pierre said Monday that Biden supports adding the permitting reform proposal to the NDAA. On Wednesday, she said the White House “will continue to work with Congress and find the best path forward so we can … enact this bill.” 

The defense bill provides a blueprint on how funds will be allocated, though Congress must still pass funding — and passage of an omnibus bill before the end of the year remains uncertain.

This is NotedDC, we’re The Hill’s Amée LaTour, Liz Crisp and Jesse Byrnes.

 Have a tip or something you want to share? Email us: ecrisp@thehill.com and alatour@thehill.com.

16. Is the ‘axis of evil’ beginning to implode?

Imploding is better than exploding.

Is the ‘axis of evil’ beginning to implode?

BY JONATHAN SWEET AND MARK TOTH, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 12/08/22 7:30 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3764194-is-the-axis-of-evil-beginning-to-implode/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Nearly 21 years ago, President George W. Bush forewarned on Jan. 29, 2002, in his first State of the Union speech that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were devolving into an “axis of evil” and were intent on destroying the West and its neo-liberal culture. Operation Iraqi Freedom ended Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in April of 2003; however, Iran and North Korea, largely unchecked, have continued to finance, train and equip terrorist organizations throughout the Middle East. 

Russia, meanwhile, under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, has gradually elected to embrace the “axis of evil” as global partners against what Moscow perceives to be unipolar Washington dominance — and in the process, given its faltering “special military operation” in Ukraine, has transformed the growing partnership into the Kremlin’s “arsenals of evil.” 

Desperate for resupply of ammunition, drones, ballistic missiles and other assorted military aid to carry out Putin’s terror campaign on Ukrainian civilians, Moscow increasingly has become overly dependent on Tehran and Pyongyang. Nowhere has this been more obvious than when the Kremlin appeared to resort to removing nuclear warheads from the 1980s vintage AS-15 Kent air-launched cruise missile (Kh-55) inventories to strike Ukraine.

Analysts believe Russia has fired more than 400 Iranian-made attack drones into Ukraine since August and reached an agreement with Tehran to begin manufacturing hundreds of unmanned weaponized aircraft in Russia. A separate report suggests as many as 200 Shahed-136 and Arash-2 kamikaze drones and Mohajer-6 reconnaissance and combat UAVs were shipped to Russia in early November, and that Iran has agreed to supply Russia with surface-to-surface missiles — Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar. But Russia soon may experience supply chain issues of their own, at a time when they can least afford it.

The weight of this new Russian-led “axis of evil” may be becoming too much. Moscow, reportedly, is withdrawing S-300 air defense missiles in Syria, thereby leaving nearby Iranian forces exposed to Israeli airstrikes. Tehran, teetering from domestic protests, undoubtedly does not welcome this development — or threat to its position in Syria and, by extension, its influence on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.

Domestically, Iran is in trouble — and so too, the “axis of evil.” The Iranian government has a history of cracking down on nonconformists, but the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman from northwestern Iran, who died in the custody of the morality police after being beaten for not wearing a headscarf while she was visiting Tehran in September, ignited a powerful and growing response among Iranian women that has been festering beneath the surface for years.

By the thousands, Iranian citizens have taken to the streets to protest this injustice. Demonstrations have taken place spanning Amini’s hometown to Tabriz, Mahabad, Zahedan and the capital city of Tehran. From all walks of life, sex, age and ethnic backgrounds, the intolerance and restrictions on freedom are reaching a culminating point across Iran. Fear of subjugation and imprisonment has been replaced with a renewed sense of protest regardless of cost. Female students at Al-Zahra University removed their headscarves and chanted anti-government slogans at police. Protesters in Tehran erected and burned barriers while shouting “Death to the dictator!” Demonstrators set fire to the ancestral home of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the city of Khomein. Then, at the World Cup in Doha, Qatar, the Iranian men’s soccer team stood silently as the Iranian national anthem played before their match with England, despite official threats of retaliation against the players and their families.

Solidarity throughout Iran is building and uniting a population once wholly subservient to the ruling Islamic theocracy, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, whose rulings are enforced by the Intelligence and Public Security Police (PAVA), Islamic Police (The Guidance Patrol, aka morality police) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These protests are different from those in 2017-2018 and 2019-2020, when economics, politics and the cost of fuel drove the unrest. 

Restrictions upon personal freedoms are the driving force, its building momentum, and has the regime in the reaction mode to surpass its growth. On Nov. 8, a letter supported by 227 of the 290 members of the Iranian Parliament called for harsh punishments of protesters, asking the judiciary to issue “retribution” sentences [execution], which was followed by chants of “death to seditionists” — not very helpful. According to Carnegie Endowment fellow Karim Sadjadpour, as many as 15,000 Iranian citizens have been arrested and their fates are in question.

Iran’s recent announcement that it will abolish the morality police is seen for what it is by many — a publicity or public relations stunt designed somehow to appease a growing movement of subjugated citizens. It may have more of a “Band-Aid being ripped off an open wound” effect on a public weary of the strict religious guidelines of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution.

What was once considered a distraction quickly has become a movement that could threaten the Iranian theocracy. The movement gained additional traction with the death of Mehran Samak, who was killed by security forces Bandar Anzali while celebrating the U.S. World Cup victory over Iran, and could impact Russia’s ability to continue its terroristic attacks on Ukraine’s civilians and critical infrastructure — thus removing yet another arrow from Putin’s diminishing quiver when he can least afford it.

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How ironic would it be if Putin lost not only in Ukraine, but, given his desperation for weaponry from his “arsenals of evil,” caused the axis itself to collapse? Likely just as ironic as new reports that Iranian drones can’t operate on the cold winter battlefields of Ukraine. “Fubar,” as U.S. troops used to say in World War II. Everything is f—-d up beyond all recognition — including Putin’s “axis of evil.”

Jonathan Sweet, a retired Army colonel, served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. His background includes tours of duty with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), DIA, NSA and NGA. He led the U.S. European Command Intelligence Engagement Division from 2012-14, working with NATO partners in the Black Sea and Baltics. Follow him on Twitter @JESweet2022. 

Mark Toth is a retired economist, historian and entrepreneur who has worked in banking, insurance, publishing, and global commerce. He is a former board member of the World Trade Center, St. Louis, and has lived in U.S. diplomatic and military communities around the world, including London, Tel Aviv, Augsburg and Nagoya. Follow him on Twitter @MCTothSTL.

17. Why modern wars cannot escape the trenches

Why modern wars cannot escape the trenches

BY MICHAEL P. FERGUSON , OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/08/22 8:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3765218-why-modern-wars-cannot-escape-the-trenches/?utm_source=pocket_saves

As Ukraine heads into a long, cold winter, images from the front near Bakhmut are hauntingly reminiscent of European battlegrounds a century ago — more like Verdun than any vision of futuristic warfare. Such photos reveal an inconvenient truth that western nations have labored to escape for generations: War is still a hellish and mostly human endeavor. Nuclear weapons and information-age machines have done little to change that, but not for lack of trying. 

Since the 1970s, defense policies that relied on technology to offset force imbalances between the United States and Soviet Union induced visions of a largely robotic future battlefield. “War Without Men,” published in 1988, and “Waging War Without Warriors?” published in 2002, examined the possibility of automated conflicts merely administered by distant human beings. Others have gone so far as to argue that the latest war in Iraq was a “war of robots.” My experience there compels me to disagree. 

Still, narratives declaring an imminent mechanization of the battlefield remain popular. Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov proclaimed as much in 2013, but nearly a decade later we see the fruits of such thinking. Russia can barely field a tank on improved roads 100 miles from its border, much less a sophisticated robot army half a world away in adverse terrain. Granted, the automation of warfare has indeed increased since the turn of the century, but nature remains one of the most restrictive forces on mechanical devices. 

Putting the ethics debate aside, intricate machines cannot man muddy trenches in deep snow or driving rain for long periods without human support. And all but the most sophisticated (and expensive) unmanned aerial systems are severely limited by inclement weather. A recent study compiled by British think tank RUSI based on data from the Ukrainian General Staff found that 90 percent of the drones employed in Ukraine this year were lost, which means expendable platforms are the most useful.

Someone must bring these smaller drones within range of enemy positions and hope for favorable conditions once there. Maintenance of advanced land and air systems is complex as well, often requiring non-combatant engineers to fix them in a rear area and someone else to transport them to and from the front where they are employed.  

All this movement on the battlefield exposes forces to enemy tar​​geting, thus amplifying the importance of the principle of dispersion that analysts are rediscovering in Ukraine. Above-ground command posts concentrate forces in a single area, making them easy targets, while trenches and subsurface routes allow formations to disperse with some degree of protection. These concepts are not new.

Theories of dispersion and concentration have been hallmarks of military thought since at least the Napoleonic Wars (1796-1815). A century later, British soldiers tunneled their way under the kill zones of World War I to reach enemy positions. At Messines in 1917, after a year of digging, 455 tons of explosive charges detonated underground, killing about 10,000 Germans.  

The history of warfare is not linear, and introducing new capabilities to the battlefield can elicit the return of old ones. One of the greatest military historians to ever live, Sir Michael Howard, explained how lessons from the last war can mislead as much as they inform. Yet the human fascination with novelty often compels us to draw broad inferences about the future from those lessons. 

Russia’s war on Ukraine has evolved into a sort of Protean tarot card that observers can use to support conclusions in line with their interests. One such theory outlines an emerging political doctrine involving aggressive, sustained military aid that the United States could replicate elsewhere. This is yet another form of offset, but rather than using machines, advocates claim the United States could rely entirely on another nation’s military to achieve U.S. policy objectives. This works, of course, until it does not.  

Western arms packages are only as effective as the arms into which they fall, and luckily those are now Ukrainian. But that will not always be the case. Without a trained, disciplined and numerically significant army ready to die wielding them, no number of modern weapons can be decisive. Reports of Russian soldiers failing to employ high-tech artillery systems because they were untrained in their use are a testament to that truth. The success of U.S. policy in Ukraine, it seems, is as much a reflection of Ukraine’s uncommon martial aptitude as the policy itself. 

Shortly after the 2020 collapse of Kabul, historian Andrew Bacevich wrote that relying on foreign armies to defend American interests is always a gamble. Turning such gambles into policy could cause future wars to descend into anachronistic grudge matches over which U.S. arms deliveries have little control. In such instances, when American defense is in for a penny, it is typically in for a pound. 

As the United States continues to invest in exquisite technologies and foreign military aid, the challenge put to Washington is one of balancing the urgent demand for battlefield mechanization with the enduring yet inconvenient realities of ground warfare. A thought-provoking study on military innovation from Kendrick Kuo at the U.S. Naval War College found that “what is lost in an innovation process may be as important as what is created.” If those creations do not perform as expected in war, the loss of both old and new places the U.S. military at a capability deficit. At that point, assuming past is prologue, the grunt bears the burden of such miscalculation in the trenches. 

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The war in Ukraine may offer valuable lessons upon its conclusion, especially those pertaining to the importance of reducing digital signatures to confound enemy targeting methods in modern warfare. But the lesson most overlooked in Ukraine is a bitter truth that military historians such as T. R. Fehrenbach already knew: If you want to keep for civilization that portion of land called home, you still need to be willing to put your sons and daughters in the mud to defend it. This winter, it is there that many Ukrainians will sleep.  

Capt. Michael P. Ferguson is an officer in the U.S. Army with two decades of combat, staff and security cooperation experience on four continents. He has authored dozens of articles and is coauthor of a forthcoming military history of Alexander the Great. 

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the policies or positions of the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. government. 

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com