Quotes of the Day:
”To this day America is still the abiding alternative to tyranny. That is our purpose in the world—nothing more, nothing less. To carry out that purpose our fundamental aim in foreign policy must be to ensure our own survival and to protect those others who share our values. Under no circumstances should we have any illusions about the intentions of those who are the enemies of freedom. We must understand those who would dominate us and deal with them with determination.”
- Ronald Reagan
"Russia should be thrown back into the Stone Age"
Garry Kasparov, Russian human rights activist and former world chess champion
"To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich."
- John F. Kennedy
1. Integrated Deterrence at Center of Upcoming National Defense Strategy
2. The Weapon the West Used Against Putin
3. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 5, 2022 | SOF News
4. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 15 (Institute for the Study of War - ISW)
5. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4 (institute for the Study of War - ISW)
6. How to help Ukraine and stay off the nuclear escalation ladder
7. Understanding Russia’s Various Hybrid War Tactics in Ukraine
8. I’m Writing From a Bunker With President Zelensky Beside Me. We Will Fight to the Last Breath.
9. 'Dad, Please Don't Die!': Harrowing Video Captures Deadly Russian Attack On Ukrainian Father And Son
10. The Russian Elite Can’t Stand the Sanctions
11. Rich Russians have been squirreling money away in the U.K. and U.S.
12. The propaganda war has eclipsed cyberwar in Ukraine
13. Keyboard army using restaurant reviews to take on Russian state media
14. How the US can beat Russia in Ukraine without firing a shot
15. The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age
16. Dollar reigns supreme after Russia's invasion
17. Ukraine: Ham Radio Help
18. Opinion | What Putin’s top aides need to tell him today
19. As war loomed, U.S. armed Ukraine to hit Russian aircraft, tanks and prep for urban combat, declassified shipment list shows
20. The West is trying to destroy Russia's economy. And analysts think it could succeed
21. Ukraine’s Special Forces Hold Off Russian Offensive on Kyiv’s Front Lines
22.European peace seems as fragile as ever
1. Integrated Deterrence at Center of Upcoming National Defense Strategy
The 1st principle of deterrence must be Sir Lawrence Freedman's observation: "Deterrence works, until it doesn't." Recognize it can & eventually will fail and thus maintain readiness. 2nd, deterrence must be built on a credible capability to defend & attack if necessary. 1/2
3d, integrated deterrence must include nuclear , conventional & UNCONVENTIONAL deterrence (resistance & resilience among populations) and include a psychological warfare competent (yes I will use that dreaded term) integrated with & supported by all elements of national power.2/2
(In response to Rep Mike Gallagher’s hearing question and tweet on integrated deterrence to ADM Lescher - See the video here:
https://twitter.com/RepGallagher/status/1499487269803245568)
Integrated Deterrence at Center of Upcoming National Defense Strategy
With China, Russia, Iran and North Korea all pursuing advancements in their own nuclear capabilities, and both China and Russia developing advanced hypersonic weaponry and space capabilities, the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as a central part of its own strategic deterrence. But there will need to be more than just nuclear weapons if the U.S. is to maintain its own security, said Sasha Baker, the deputy under secretary of defense for policy.
1:12:54
Right now, a new National Defense Strategy is in the works, and Baker said the new NDS, when released, will include the Missile Defense Review and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review nested within it.
"As directed by the president, the NPR has examined opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent and a credible extended deterrence," Baker said. "In order to do so we will continue to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear capabilities. And as we develop and implement integrated deterrence, nuclear weapons will continue to serve a unique role in our defense strategy."
At the core of the National Defense Strategy will be "integrated deterrence," which Baker said is a framework for working across warfighting domains, theaters and the spectrum of conflict, in collaboration with all instruments of national power, as well as with U.S. allies and our partners.
USS Louisiana
The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Louisiana transits the Hood Canal in Puget Sound, Wash., Oct. 15, 2017, as it returns to its homeport following a strategic deterrent patrol.
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Photo By: Navy Lt. Cmdr. Michael Smith
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Right now, Baker told lawmakers, potential U.S. adversaries are modernizing and expanding their own strategic capabilities
China, she said, is expanding its own nuclear forces and is investing in a nuclear triad like that of the United States — which includes land, sea and air-based delivery of nuclear weapons.
"The PRC is investing in a triad, implementing a launch-on-warning posture with advanced command and control architecture and increasing its stockpile," she said.
In space, China remains the primary, long-term competitor for the United States and seeks to exploit U.S. reliance on space and space systems.
Army Gen. James H. Dickinson, commander of U.S. Space Command, told lawmakers that in January, China demonstrated the capabilities of its SJ-21 satellite, for instance.
System Inspection
Airmen with the 742nd Missile Squadron perform an inspection of an intercontinental ballistic missile system at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., Jan. 15, 2019.
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Photo By: Air Force Senior Airman Jonathan McElderry
VIRIN: 190115-F-IY281-0022A
"The recently launched SJ21 'Space Debris Mitigation' satellite docked with a defunct PRC satellite and moved it to an entirely different orbit," he said. "This activity demonstrated potential dual-use capability in SJ-21 interaction with other satellites. U.S. Space Command is committed to deterring the use of these types of capabilities for nefarious purposes within the framework of the Department of Defense's integrated deterrence initiative."
Russia also continues to modernize its nuclear, space and hypersonic capabilities, Baker said, while North Korea demonstrates advancements in both nuclear capabilities and delivery systems pose in both Asia and the U.S. homeland.
Navy Adm. Charles A. Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command said he previously said that the U.S. must be able to deter two adversaries at the same time, but now that need is "an imperative."
Stratofortress Flight
A B-52H Stratofortress nuclear-capable bomber flies over an undisclosed area.
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Photo By: Air Force Senior Airman Luke Hill
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"I've said this before and I think it's worth repeating: every operational plan in the Department of Defense and every other capability we have, rests on an assumption that strategic deterrence and in particular nuclear deterrence is holding. And if strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, no other plan and no other capability in the Department of Defense will work as designed," he said.
Richard said the strategic security environment is now a three-party reality. "Our existing nuclear forces are the minimum required to achieve our national strategy," he said. "We must modernize and recapitalize the nation's nuclear triad, nuclear command and control, nuclear complex and supporting infrastructure to meet presidential objectives."
2. The Weapon the West Used Against Putin
This is one of the most important lessons or outcomes of the Ukraine crisis: using intelligence and information to attack the enemy's strategy. There are many benefits to conducting these types of operations (despite the naysayers who say revealing "classified" information is dangerous). First and foremost recognizing, understanding , EXOSING, and attacking the enemy's strategy can cause the enemy to change strategy and sometimes deter him. Of course that did not happen here. Putin still attacked. However, it can also prepare the security environment for what is about to happen. Although in this case Ukraine has long tried to prepare for the Russian attack, in the run up to the attack the Ukrainians did not accept the intelligence and still believed Putin was not going to immediately attack. But others did prepare. The international coalition and NATO were strengthened by this information and intelligence. Lastly the public can be inoculated against the enemy's strategy. This can reduce the effect of enemy propaganda and psychological warfare efforts. It can also increase public support for implementation of measures across the spectrum of the elements of national power. Lastly, in this instance, the intelligence community's estimates were proved true. This enhances the reputation of and trust in the IC.
So in this case all the potential positive effects were not realized but important ones were. This should be an object lesson to always recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack (RUEA - I wish I could create a pithy new acronym that would excite people) the enemy's strategy. This needs to be a fundamental tool in the national security toolbox: attacking the enemy's strategy.
Again, I would not get as wrapped up in the disclosure of intelligence (despite the dangers Dr. Zegart describes below), the key is attacking the enemy's strategy using all appropriate means necessary. But disclosure of intelligence about that strategy is one of the most effect tools for doing so.,
“Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.” - Sun Tzu (I hate to beat the dead horse with this quote since I use it so much, but I cannot emphasize this enough)
The Weapon the West Used Against Putin
The way in which the U.S. disclosed intelligence ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could drastically change geopolitics in the future.
By Amy Zegart
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looks like a horrific Cold War throwback. Once again, a strongman rules in Moscow, Russian tanks are rolling across borders, and a democratic nation is fighting for its survival, street by street, day by day, armed with little more than Molotov cocktails and a fierce belief in freedom. For all the talk of emerging technologies and new threats, the violence in Ukraine feels raw and low-tech, and the world suddenly looks old again.
And yet, amid all these echoes of the past, Russia’s invasion has ushered in one development that is altogether new and could dramatically change geopolitics in the future: the real-time public disclosure of highly classified intelligence.
Never before has the United States government revealed so much, in such granular detail, so fast and so relentlessly about an adversary. Each day over the past several weeks seemed to bring new warnings. Not vague, “Russia may or may not be up to something” kind of warnings, but “Here’s the satellite imagery showing up to 175,000 Russian troops in these specific locations near the border” kind of warnings. Even as Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that he had no plans to invade and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky complained that the U.S. was hyping the threat and roiling his economy, the intelligence disclosures kept coming—detailing updated troop numbers and locations, invasion timetables, casualty estimates, and more. It felt like watching a hurricane barreling toward landfall.
The disclosed intelligence wasn’t just about military movements. It was about secret plans at the core of Russia’s intelligence operations. American and British intelligence agencies sounded the alarm about plots to stage a coup in Kyiv, install a puppet regime, and conduct “false-flag operations” designed to generate phony pretexts to justify a real invasion. According to U.S. officials, one Russian scheme involved sending saboteurs to Eastern Ukraine to attack Russian separatists there, making it look like Ukraine was the aggressor and Putin’s troops were coming to the rescue. Another involved making a phony video depicting Ukrainian atrocities, complete with actors and corpses.
It is hard to overstate how much of a shift this represents. Intelligence is a closely guarded world, one where officials are loath to publicly air what they know, or how they know it, for fear of putting sources at risk or revealing to their rivals just how much information they have. In the past, the U.S. has openly shared intelligence only with the closest of allies, and restricted its use. Why has the White House been so open this time? So far, the Biden administration isn’t saying much about the aims of its radical-candor intelligence strategy. But three explanations seem likely.
The first has to do with inoculating the world against information warfare by getting the truth out before the lie. The essence of U.S. and allied intelligence disclosures has been “Don’t believe a word the Kremlin is going to tell you. It’s all a con.” The Russians are deception pros, and in previous episodes—as recently as the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2016 U.S. election—they’ve had the upper hand. Putin’s strategy has been to flood the zone with falsehoods, spreading disinformation early and often. Psychology research suggests why this is so effective: Once lies are believed, they are hard to shake, even in the face of overwhelming facts. The first-mover advantage in information warfare is huge. Getting the truth out before the con helps rally allies and shore up support in the U.S. and abroad.
Revealing intelligence also generates friction for Putin, knocking him off-balance. Instead of calling the shots and managing the Ukraine crisis on his schedule, Putin has to react to Washington. And instead of acting with impunity, he has to spend his most precious asset—time—worrying about his own intelligence weaknesses. How do the U.S. and its allies know what they know? What will they do with this advance knowledge? What Russian-intelligence vulnerabilities must be fixed? The more Putin stews about his own intelligence lapses, the less attention he can devote to hurting others. U.S. Cyber Command adopted a similar approach in 2018 called persistent engagement. The idea is simple but powerful: Weaken an adversary’s offense by making it work much harder at defense. Putin is an ideal target for this kind of strategy. He’s a former Russian-intelligence operative with a paranoid streak who obsesses about domestic enemies, not just foreign ones. You can take the man out of the KGB but not the KGB out of the man.
Finally, proactively disclosing intelligence makes it much harder for other countries to sit out the conflict or provide quiet support to Putin by hiding behind his fig-leaf narratives. Think of it as covert action in reverse—a forced outing of what’s really going on so that everyone has to take a side.
In covert action, governments conceal their official involvement in an activity. One of the key benefits of covert action is that it enables other countries to help on the sly. Even if everyone knows the truth, they pretend not to, and history suggests even the flimsiest of excuses can give countries surprising room to maneuver. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, for example, the U.S. launched a huge covert operation to arm the Afghan mujahideen. The Soviets knew what the U.S. was doing, and the U.S. knew that the Soviets knew. But the covert action enabled Pakistan and Egypt to quietly help American efforts without fear of Soviet reprisal. It benefited the Soviets, too, keeping a proxy war in Afghanistan from spiraling into a hot war against the U.S. and its nuclear arsenal.
In the current Ukraine crisis, intelligence disclosures are doing the opposite. By removing the fig leaf, the U.S. and its allies are leaving precious little room for other countries to stay on the sidelines or assist Putin easily. Switzerland, a country famous for its neutrality and willingness to bank with bad guys, signed on to European Union sanctions. Germany is wobbly no more, finally nixing the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and moving from NATO defense-spending laggard to leader with head-spinning speed. On Tuesday, about 100 diplomats literally turned their backs on Russia, walking out of a United Nations Human Rights Council meeting as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov was speaking. Even China has issued a relatively muted response over the invasion, calling for diplomatic solutions.
To be sure, it’s early days. World unity on any crisis never lasts that long. China still tilts heavily toward Moscow in almost everything. And intelligence is just one among many factors at play. No country wants to be caught in the cross fire of global sanctions, castigated as the weak link in NATO, or seen as being on the wrong side of history. But intelligence disclosures have become a powerful new tool in the mix. It’s a lot harder for countries to hide behind Russia’s false narrative when the narrative is debunked before it even comes out of Putin’s mouth.
This intelligence strategy is new and clever. But it’s not risk-free. Using secrets now may mean losing secrets later. Anytime intelligence is publicly disclosed, there’s a danger that sources and methods will be discovered by the enemy, threatening the lives of people on the ground and jeopardizing the ability to keep collecting intelligence from technical and human sources in the future. That’s why intelligence agencies have always so fiercely resisted disclosures.
Intelligence disclosures can also make crises harder to manage. Going public with an adversary’s secret intentions and capabilities can be humiliating. That may feel good, but the key to resolving crises isn’t backing your enemy into a corner; it’s finding face-saving exits. Diplomacy is giving the other guy a way out even if you hate him for what he’s done.
Finally, in a radical-disclosure world, intelligence successes can be misconstrued as failures. Imagine, for example, that the intelligence revelations about Putin’s invasion plans had changed his mind, and he decided not to invade Ukraine. The intelligence would have been accurate and effective, but it would have looked wrong and feckless. Many would have concluded that Putin must never have intended to invade in the first place, and that U.S. spy agencies—criticized over the Iraq war, the failure to stop 9/11, and countless other missteps—had erred again. Confidence in America’s intelligence community would erode, even though it shouldn’t.
So far, however, evidence from the Ukraine crisis suggests that the rewards of this intelligence-disclosure strategy far outweigh the risks. Until now, cyber-enabled deception seemed to have the upper hand—whether it was COVID misinformation or Russian interference in the 2016 election. Ukraine has taught us all that truth and disclosure can still be powerful weapons, even in the digital age.
3. Ukraine Conflict Update - March 5, 2022 | SOF News
A number of useful resources to follow the crisis from SOF News.
Ukraine Conflict Update - March 5, 2022 | SOF News
Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, Ukrainian defense, and NATO.
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Russian Campaign Update. The ground campaign is moving along for the Russians . . . although very slowly. The large 40-mile long convoy is approaching the Kyiv area and is now deploying into staging positions for an attack and possibly for a movement south and then west to encircle Kyiv from the southeast and southwest. Russian forces are already in position on the northeast, north, and northwest of the capital. Attacks are continuing around the rest of the country along the eastern Ukrainian border and on the coast line of the Sea of Azov. Russia has fired over 500 missiles in the first week of its invasion of Ukraine.
Drones – Effective ISR and Interdiction for Ukrainians. Consumer-grade drones are being used to spot Russian forces. Ukrainian civilians who own drones are being asked to put them to use to find Russian troops. Cheap off-the-shelf drones costs less then $100 but can provide valuable information on enemy locations and activities. “Send in the Quadcopters: Arm Ukrainian Citizens with Simple Drones”, Defense One, March 3, 2022.
Maritime Activities. The Ukrainians have scuttled their biggest warship to avoid it falling into the Russians hands. A Russian amphibious task force is off not far from Odessa on the coast of the Black Sea – presumably to land naval infantry and contribute to the attack on Odessa once Russian ground forces make their move from are north of the Crimea peninsular.
Kyiv. The capital city of Ukraine is considered the primary objective of the Russians. The Capture of Kyiv would allow Russia to put in place its puppet government. One key battle for the city that took place early in the invasion was the attempt to seize Hostomel Airport outside Kyiv to bring troops directly to the capital. However, a band of Ukrainian soldiers fought to keep the Russians from using the landing strip. Since then the Russians have been relying on two principal ground attacks – from Belarus in the north and from Russia in the northeast to move troops into the vicinity of the capital city. According to open source maps published by a number of organizations the only area on the outskirts of Kyiv not held by the Russians appears to be the southwest sector. A departure by vehicle from Kyiv would likely involve traveling southwest along the E95 route. As Russian forces move into Kyiv from the outskirts its offensive will slow down as it negotiates through a more dense urban environment. Trains heading west from Kyiv were running as of March 4; however a projected move of Russian forces along a north – south axis west of Kyiv could interrupt this train service.
Kharkiv. The second largest city of Ukraine is Kharkiv located in the northeast of the country. It is receiving heavy artillery and rocket fire and Russians are probing the city attempting to make inroads toward the city center. It may be completely encircled at this time, although there are varying reports on this. It is unknown if the Russians will attempt to advance into the city or merely isolate it as a holding action and freeing up troops to take offensive action in other areas of Ukraine. There are reports the Russians have been using the FAB-500 high explosive bomb in the city.
Mariupol. Located on the Sea of Azov, the coastal city of Mariupol is under siege by the Russians. This city is situated along the coastal road network that would provide Russia with a land bridge between Russia and the Crimea. The Russians appear to be trying to capture this city to solidify its gains along the coast of the Sea of Azov. There is a heavy onslaught by Russian artillery, rocket, and missile fire.
Mykolayiv. Located on the west bank of the Dnieper River close to the coast of the Black Sea, Mykolayiv is a strategic objective for the Russians that is on the road to Odessa located further west along the coast of the Black Sea.
Wagner Group. This private military company (PMC) that is affiliated with the Russian government has been active in Syria, Africa, and elsewhere around the world. News last week broke that over 400 mercenaries from the Wagner Group were in Ukraine. In the last few days more news has come out that up to 700 may be in Ukraine. The Center for Strategic & International Studies published a report on Russia’s private military companies in September 2020 that provides good background on the Wagner Group and other PMCs.
Operational Assessment – YouTube. The Modern War Institute at West Point hosted a multidisciplinary panel to provide an operational assessment of the state and future projections of the war in Ukraine. (March 3, 2022, 1 1/2 hours).
General Information
Humanitarian Corridors. A partial ceasefire was declared by Russia on Saturday for some parts of Ukraine. Avenues of escape for civilians were announced allowing people to escape the Ukrainian cities of Mariupol and Volnovakha. The route heads west-north-west towards the Dnieper River. More than 400,000 residents of Mariupol have no food, water, electricity, and medical services. “Russia declares partial ceasefire to allow humanitarian corridors in Ukraine”, Reuters, March 5, 2022.
Urban Warfare Project. The conflict in Ukraine appears to be heading to be one of a fight for the big population areas. Typically, in a urban setting, the advantage (if properly supplied) goes to the defender. Most estimates say that the attacker needs a 5:1 numerical advantage to be successful. Of course, if the defenders run out of food and ammunition then it is a different story. Learn more about fighting in big cities at the Urban Warfare Project at the Modern War Institute at West Point.
“Molotov Cocktails” – a Little History. Much has been made of the citizens of Ukraine emptying bottles of wine and beer and pouring in gasoline and stuffing it with a rag. Apparently, it was the elite Finnish ski troops in the late 1930s who developed the fiery technique that can set Russian tanks and armored vehicles ablaze. “Hurling Molotov Cocktails at Russian Tanks – a Grand European Tradition”, by Matt Fratus, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 3, 2022.
Russian Iskander Missile Launcher. One of the key pieces of equipment used by Russian forces is the road-mobile Iskander missile launcher. The Iskanders are versatile and deadly and has fired hundreds of short-range missiles at Ukrainian targets. The weapons system has been in service since 2006 and its missiles have a payload of 1,500 pounds with a range of 310 miles. It is believed that the Russians have deployed up to 48 launchers in Belarus and other locations around the Ukrainian border. “Iskander: The Russian Ballistic Missile Creating Chaos in Ukraine”, 1945, March 3, 2022.
Nuclear Plant Attack. Europe’s largest nuclear power plant was attacked and seized by Russian forces on Thursday (Mar 3) after defeating Ukrainian forces defending the complex. Although the attack is now over . . . and the fire that broke out has been contained, there are still some major safety concerns. The reactors are still being operated by Ukrainian crews . . . although there are numerous armed Russians watching the operation. The plant provides 26% of Ukraine’s electricity. “How dangerous was Russia’s nuclear plant strike?”, AP News, March 4, 2022. There are five nuclear power plants in Ukraine. At least one is now under the control of the Russians. Another may soon be captured by the Russians.
The Coming Resistance
An Occupation, POWs, and Resistance Fighters. The legal status of a civilian turned combatant in the Ukraine war is complex. Geoffrey S. Corn attempts to clarify the situation in “Prisoners of War in Occupied Territory”, Lieber Institute West Point, March 3, 2022. Laurie Blank provides info on this topic as well in “Combatant Privileges and Protections”, Lieber Institute West Point, March 4, 2022.
Cyber and Information Operations
Podcast – Cyber War and the Invasion of Ukraine. A discussion about Russia’s history of cyber war and how it will continue to shape peace and conflict in the future. CyberSecurity Connect, March 4, 2022, 40 minutes.
Elon Musk’s Starlink Kits. The use of Starlink kits to access the internet via a satellite link up is a good work around if the Russians can shut down Ukraine’s internet service. However, there is a slight drawback. The uplink transmissions can be triangulated and targeted. So keep that antenna a healthy distance away from your position. “Elon Musk Just Realized Starlink Units in Ukraine Are Airstrike Magnets”, Coffee or Die Magazine, March 3, 2022.
Winning the IO Battle. One of the more remarkable things about the current conflict in Ukraine is how badly the Russians are doing in the area of information operations; and just how good the Ukrainians are doing in the fight for the “hearts and minds”. Stories like the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ (is he real?), the brave Ukrainian coast guard men who died on Snake Island (they didn’t), a brave, vocal, and very public President Zelensky, children making Molotov cocktails, grandmothers carrying rifles, and others are winning the battle of the airwaves and social media. Once Switzerland moves off the ‘neutral’ bench you kinda sorta know you lost the IO fight. Read more in “How Ukraine is winning the propaganda war”, Military Times, March 3, 2022.
IO – Differences Between Ukraine and Afghanistan. Jason Criss Howk compares the very successful information operations campaign of the Ukrainians with the extremely ineffective IO campaign waged by the Afghan government and its NATO allies. “Information Operations: How is Ukraine Different Than Afghanistan?”, Clearance Jobs, March 3, 2022.
World Response
No Fly Zone – Not Going to Happen. There are lots of people advocating for NATO to establish a zone over Ukraine that would prohibit the Russians from flying over the country. However, this is very problematic and a sure way to escalate into a shooting match with Russia. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said during a press conference that “allies agree that we should not have NATO planes operating over Ukrainian airspace or NATO troops on Ukrainian territory.” President Zelensky is furiously condemning NATO leaders for their refusal to implement a no fly zone.
Commentary
The Suwalki Corridor – the Next Target? On the Polish-Lithuanian border is a small slice of land that connects Belarus (a Russian client state) with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea. Russian seizure of the Suwalki Corridor would rob NATO of the real estate needed to transit troops and materials to the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Of course, this would be an attack on a NATO nation or nations (Poland and Lithuania). Still . . . it is a worrisome scenario that NATO needs to be concerned with. “NATO Must Prepare to Defend Its Weakest Point – the Suwalki Corridor”, Foreign Policy, March 3, 2022.
Not Quite “Shock and Awe”. Jamie McIntyre examines the initial failure of the Russian army to achieve success in the first several days of its invasion. He cites the inability to keep the Ukrainian air force on the ground, the continued existence of most of Ukraine’s air defense system, failure to close the western border of Ukraine to prevent resupply, and attacking on three main axes with several different avenues of attack. Add in the logistics resupply problem and it is a recipe for failure . . . or at least a stalled offensive. “Russia’s Potemkin Army”, Washington Examiner, March 3, 2022.
Pushing Finland and Sweden to NATO. The aggression that Russia has displayed over the past few decades has had the Nordic countries that don’t belong to NATO on edge. Although both Finland and Sweden have tried to tread a ‘neutral path’ they are having a hard time ignoring the expansionist nature of the current Russian regime. NATO membership could be on the horizon for both. “Will Finland and Sweden join NATO now?”, Atlantic Council, March 3, 2022.
SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, defense, or the current conflict in Ukraine then we are interested.
Maps and Other Resources
Russia-Ukraine Monitor Map. This map is a crowdsourced effort by the Centre for Information Resilience (CIR) and the wider open source community to provide reliable information for policymakers, journalists, and justice organizations about the evolving situations both on the ground and online.
UK Ministry of Defence. Check out the map posted by @DefenceHQ on Twitter.
Ukraine Graphics by Reuters. “Russia Invades Ukraine”
Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.
Janes Equipment Profile – Ukraine Conflict. An 81-page PDF provides information on the military equipment of the Russian and Ukrainian armed forces. Covers naval, air, electronic warfare, C4ISR, communications, night vision, radar, and armored fighting vehicles, Ukraine Conflict Equipment Profile, February 28, 2022.
Arms Transfers to Ukraine. Forum on the Arms Trade.
Urban Warfare Project. Modern War Institute at West Point.
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Photo: U.S. Air Force Airman 1st Class Chase Smith, right, 8th Airlift Squadron loadmaster, marshals a K-loader toward a C-17 Globemaster III, assigned to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, at Travis Air Force Base, California, Feb. 14, 2022. The 60th Air Mobility Wing supported the 621st Contingency Response Wing during the movement of security assistance cargo to Ukraine via commercial cargo aircraft. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency coordinated the effort. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Karla Parra)
4. UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 15 (Institute for the Study of War - ISW)
UKRAINE CONFLICT UPDATE 15
Institute for the Study of War, Russia Team
with the Critical Threats Project, AEI
March 4, 2022
This daily synthetic product covers key events related to renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Key Takeaways March 4
- Russian forces have advanced rapidly on the eastern outskirts of Kyiv, likely from the Sumy axis, and may attempt to encircle and/or attack the capital on the east bank of the Dnipro in the coming 24-48 hours.
- Russian troops did not press a ground offensive against Kharkiv in the last 24 hours but have instead diverted forces to the west and southeast, likely supporting efforts against Kyiv and in and around Donbas respectively.
- Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to destroy it or compel its capitulation.
- Russian forces have renewed their ground advance on Mykolayiv, having secured Kherson city, likely to set conditions for a further attack toward Odesa. Russian naval infantry are likely poised to conduct amphibious landings near Odesa when Russian forces have secured or are close to securing a reliable ground route from Crimea to Odesa.
- The Kremlin dramatically limited Russia’s already isolated domestic information environment and criminalized unfavorable coverage of the war in Ukraine on March 4, setting conditions to improve the domestic efficacy of its information operations.
- Ukraine is attempting to increase the flow of information about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to Russian citizens to increase domestic Russian opposition to the war.
- The Kremlin set conditions to justify potential Russian conscriptions and more aggressive operations in Ukraine.
- The Russian Defense Ministry said foreign citizens fighting for Ukraine will not be considered legal combatants and will not be protected under international law.
- Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko reiterated that Belarus will not enter the war in Ukraine but has likely already committed Belarusian troops.
- NATO rejected Ukraine’s request to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
- Russia has not yet followed through on its agreement with Ukraine to establish the humanitarian corridors that would enable civilian supply and evacuation.
- The US Department of Defense established a deconfliction line with its Russian counterpart to prevent accidental escalation near the Ukrainian and Belarusian borders.
- Finland and Sweden continued high-level discussions on NATO membership and multilateral defense measures.
Key Events March 3, 4:00 pm EST – March 4, 4:00 pm EST
Military Events:
The Russian military has concentrated considerable combat power around Mariupol to encircle and ultimately seize or destroy it. The purpose of this effort is not entirely clear. The capture or destruction of Mariupol will not likely materially affect the outcome of the war, whose decisive operations are more than 600 kilometers northwest around Kyiv. Russian forces have also renewed their ground offensive west from Crimea toward Odesa, currently focusing on advancing from Kherson to Mykolayiv, and seized the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant north of Crimea. The continued pursuit of objectives along three diverging axes by the same group of forces in Crimea has hindered the Russian military’s ability to generate decisive effects on any of the three.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
1) Main effort—Kyiv: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east. Russian forces are continuing their grinding effort to envelop Kyiv from the west, making limited gains but continuing to suffer notable setbacks. The Russians have been more successful in their advance on Kyiv from the east, especially on the axis from Sumy via Konotop and Nyzhin. Russian forces are unlikely to complete the encirclement of Kyiv on the west side without significant reinforcements as long as Ukrainian defenses continue to hold as they have done over the past few days. Russian forces have focused on Sumy rather than on their Chernihiv axis over the last 24 hours. The rapid advance of Russian forces on the Sumy axis will likely slow as Russian troops enter the more built-up and congested areas of eastern Kyiv and its suburbs.
2) Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv: Russian forces around Kharkiv appear to have focused on continued bombardment of the city combined with drives to the east and west bypassing it in support of other efforts rather than attempting to take it. Russian troops have not encircled the city or launched renewed ground offensives against it in the past 24 hours. The likelihood of a renewed Russian ground offensive to take Kharkiv in the next 24-48 hours is unclear, as is the likely outcome of any such attempt. Russian forces, for now, appear to be de-emphasizing the seizure of Kharkiv itself in favor of supporting other efforts.
3) Supporting effort 2—Mariupol: Russian forces still encircle Mariupol and are continuing an artillery, rocket, and missile barrage on the city while concentrating ground forces likely in preparation to seize and secure it within the next 24-48 hours. Russian and proxy forces will likely secure and/or destroy Mariupol within the coming days.
4) Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward: Russian forces have taken advantage of having consolidated control of Kherson city to launch a renewed offensive toward the city of Mykolayiv, which houses the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy. Ukrainian efforts to stop the renewed Russian advance have had limited success thus far, although it remains to be seen how well Russian forces will be able to retain their momentum as they enter the dense and congested areas of Mykolayiv itself. Russian ground forces likely must secure most of Mykolayiv city if they are to secure a key bridge to establish a reliable ground line of communication between Crimea and Odesa. Russian naval infantry may be waiting for ground forces to secure Mykolayiv’s bridge before attempting an amphibious landing near Odesa.
Russian forces attacked and captured the Zaporizhzhia nuclear powerplant and surrounding areas after a firefight with Ukrainian forces that caused a fire resulting in a damaged nuclear reactor. The Kremlin falsely blamed Ukraine for attacking Russian forces near the plant. Russian forces seized Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in a direct assault on March 4, causing a fire in the nuclear complex. The Kremlin likely targeted the plant to gain the ability to shut down a substantial portion of Ukraine’s electrical grid; Zaporizhzhia supplies about half of Ukraine’s total electricity.[1] The Kremlin attempted to deflect international outrage by falsely reframing the incident as a dangerous Ukrainian attack on a Russian-controlled facility while Ukrainian leadership leveraged the Russian aggression to call for additional NATO intervention in the conflict.
- Plant status: More than half of Ukraine’s nuclear reactors are offline after Russian forces seized the Zaporizhzhia powerplant on March 4.[2] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said in a March 4 press conference that there was no radiation release or damage to the reactors.[3] Grossi stated that “no security or safety systems have been compromised near the reactors themselves” and that technical operations are continuing normally.[4] Russian forces took control of Zaporizhzhia on March 4. The head of nuclear power generator Energoatom, Petro Kotin, claimed via a March 4 Telegram that Russian forces are forcing Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant employees to work at gunpoint. [5]
- Russian framing: Russian Ministry of Defense spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov falsely claimed that a Ukrainian sabotage group attacked a mobile patrol of the Russian Guard adjacent to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in the early morning of March 4, resulting in a firefight, and set fire to the facility as they fled.[6] The fire sparked international alarm after it caused a fire in the administrative building and the training center, resulting in damage “to the structure of the reactor compartment” and one of six reactors.[7] Konashenkov falsely claimed that the nuclear plant had been under Russian control since February 28, and Russia claimed to have secured Enerhodar on March 2.[8] Konashenkov again claimed around 4:35 am local time on March 4 that Russian forces took control of Enerhodar city, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and the territory adjacent to it.[9] Russian forces likely forced Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov to release under duress an awkward March 4 video stating that Russian forces did not fire live rounds at Ukrainian civilians and that any rounds people may have heard or seen were blanks.[10] Unconfirmed March 4 reports described Russian forces patrolling the streets of Enerhodar and destroying caches of Molotov cocktails.[11]
- Ukrainian framing: Ukrainian officials confirmed Russia’s seizure of Zaporizhzhia to the New York Times on March 4.[12] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of conducting a “premediated” terror attack that involved intentionally firing at nuclear reactors on March 4.[13] The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that 90 Russian units belonging to Chechen leader Ramazan Kadyrovwith amassed near Enerhodar with thermal imagers and night-vision gear prior to the engagement.[14] Workers at the power plant allegedly told Ukrainian media that Chechen forces control the nuclear facility as of March 4 and have placed explosives near the reactors.[15] ISW cannot independently confirm those claims. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated his request to NATO to implement a no-fly zone over Ukraine and said that only a “closed sky” over Ukraine would guarantee Russia would not bomb nuclear installations.[16] Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs official Vadim Denisenko stated at 3:28 pm local time on March 4 that Ukraine still controls Zaporizhzhia and “the Ukrainian flag remains above the [Enerhodar] city council building,” but that Russian forces control the perimeter of Zaporizhzhia.[17] Denisenko’s claim that Ukraine still controls Zaporizhzhya is likely false.
Russian Activity
The Kremlin dramatically limited Russia’s already isolated domestic information environment and criminalized unfavorable coverage of the war in Ukraine on March 4, setting conditions to improve the domestic efficacy of its information operations. Russia could also leverage the information blackout to commit additional atrocities in Ukraine without further eroding domestic Russian support of the invasion.
Russian mass media censor Roskomnadzor blocked several Western media outlets for spreading “fake news” on March 4. The blocked sites include Facebook, Twitter, Voice of America, BBC, Deutsche Welle, Meduza, and Radio Free Europe. The Kremlin also blocked the Apple Store and Google Play platforms, likely to prevent the installation of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to bypass media blackouts.[18] BBC and Voice of America announced that they will continue to provide accurate Russian-language news coverage despite the blocks.[19] Roskomnadzor blocked the sites due to their alleged distribution of ”fake” information about “the essence of the special military operation in Ukraine, its form, the methods of combat operations (attacks on the population, strikes on civilian infrastructure), the Russian armed forces’ losses and civilian victims.”[20] Independent Russian media outlet Znak announced it was preemptively suspending its work and closing its site due to media censorship on March 4.[21] Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta stated it would remove all material related to the Russian military in Ukraine due to censorship restrictions.[22] Regulators additionally shut down independent Russian news outlet TV Rain.[23] TV Rain ended its final broadcast with its staff resigning en-mass and saying “no to war” on March 3.[24]
The Russian legislature consolidated censorship measures on March 4 and unanimously passed a bill criminalizing “fake news” about Russian military activities in Ukraine.[25] Putin signed the bill into law on March 4.[26] NPR reported that “under the new bill, prison sentences for spreading news that discredits the Russian military would range from up to three years for members of the public, five to 10 years if the offender used an official position or if their actions had extreme motives, and 10 to 15 years if the consequences are deemed to be serious.”[27] The fines may cost up to 1.5 million rubles ($14,000).[28] Russian law enforcement separately conducted a search of the independent human rights groups Memorial International and Civic Assistance, both of which help migrants and refugees, on March 4.[29]
Russian forces announced that they had “liberated” the so-called “Kherson People’s Republic” on March 4 as Russia seized control of local media outlets.[30] The Kremlin will likely use this rhetoric of liberating the “people’s republics” to justify Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine. Ukraine’s Interior Ministry announced that Russian forces seized a TV tower broadcasting Ukrainian stations to disseminate pro-Russia propaganda and disinformation in Kherson, Ukraine, on March 3.[31] Russian forces broadcasted 24 Russian TV channels and 3 radio stations that promoted Russians as “liberators” of Kherson on March 3.[32] Russian forces likely took Kherson-based Ukrainian channels offline to monopolize the information environment and more effectively control the local population.
The Kremlin set conditions to justify potential Russian conscriptions and more aggressive Russian operations against Ukraine on March 4. Russia The Kremlin emphasized that the West may be planning nuclear provocations against Russia that would force Russia to respond, setting conditions for a false-flag operation to justify additional demands on the Russian population and to stoke nationalist anti-West fervor. Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the “normalization” of relations with other states and said that Moscow has “absolutely no ill intentions” toward neighboring states on March 4. Putin additionally claimed that the Russian military offensive in Ukraine was only “in response to unfriendly actions toward Russia.”[33]
The Russian Federation Council—the upper house of the Russian parliament—and Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov claimed on March 4 that the West had been preparing Ukraine for a “provocation” against Russia from Kharkiv, Ukraine, in concert with Western journalists.[34] The Federation Council alleged that Ukraine’s “sudden” need of nuclear weapons only intensified Russian national security concerns.[35] Russian Foreign Intelligence Services Director Sergei Naryshkin stated that the West “not only seeks to revive the Iron Curtain, but also to destroy Russia.”[36] Russia-backed former Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov wrote on Facebook on March 4 that Ukraine and the West are planning a nuclear genocide against civilians in eastern Ukraine that will provoke a Russian response.[37] Azarov warned that NATO plans to deploy forces to Ukraine in summer 2022 and that there will be a Third World War by the end of 2022.[38]
The Kremlin reiterated its framing of the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a humanitarian effort on March 4 while painting Ukrainian leadership as fleeing the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that accusations that Russian troops have been bombing Ukrainian cities are “gross propaganda fakes” on a call with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on March 4.[39] Putin told Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko over the phone that Russia’s objective in Ukraine is to “protect the civilian population of Donbas” and that Russian military operations are going “according to plan” and will be carried out “in full” on March 4.[40] Lukashenko continued expressing his support for Russia.[41] Russian Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin continued to falsely claim that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is in Poland on March 4.[42]
The Russian Defense Ministry announced that foreigners fighting against Russia in Ukraine will not be considered legal combatants, removing their protections under international law.[43] Russia will not grant foreign combatants in Ukraine prisoner-of-war status. Russia will likely prosecute captured foreign combatants through the Russian justice system.
Belarusian Activity
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that Belarus will not enter the war in Ukraine on March 4.[44] Lukashenko said that “there is no need for Belarus to participate in the ‘special operation’” regardless of the provocations of outside forces.[45] Lukashenko emphasized that his task is to protect Belarus on Belarusian land and that the West wants Belarus to enter the war.[46] Separately, Lukashenko officially approved a referendum amending Belarus’ constitution on March 4. The constitutional amendments will give the Kremlin more de facto military control over Belarus and allow Belarus to host Russian nuclear weapons. The revised Belarusian constitution also ends Belarus’ previously constitutionally enshrined neutral status. Lukashenko falsely claimed that the vast majority of citizens democratically supported the amendments.[47] Lukashenko said that the new constitution marks the building of an independent and sovereign state as well as a new state ideology.
Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed support for Belarus’ interest in obtaining access to the Baltic Sea and developing port facilities in a phone call with Lukashenko on March 4.[48] Lukashenko and Putin signed legislation approving a draft customs cooperation agreement on March 3.[49] The agreement provides for information interaction, joint customs control, and the creation of an “interstate center within the customs committee of the Union State” to assess risk management and analytical functions when monitoring customs operations.
Ukrainian Activity
Ukraine is attempting to increase the ability of Russian citizens to learn about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine despite Russian media censorship, likely to increase domestic Russian opposition to the war. Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs advisor Anton Geraschchenko posted a list of over 100 Russian prisoners of war (POWs) to Facebook.[50] The post included personal details about each POW and information about how their families can retrieve them from Ukrainian territory. Russia banned domestic access to Facebook on March 4.[51] Ukrainian volunteers directly reached out to the families of Russian POWs via the Russian-owned Telegram app to inform their friends and family of their capture. Volunteers provided details for families to come to Kyiv and collect the POWs, an unlikely journey in the midst of Russia's invasion.[52]
Ukraine has additionally galvanized volunteer support to conduct cyberattacks against Russian government sites.[53] Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection Viktor Zhora stated that the “IT Army” could be as large as 400,000 people from Ukraine and other countries and that the group has temporarily taken down various Russian government and bank websites.[54] Zhora additionally said that the “IT Army” is working to combat domestic censorship within Russia by sending Russian citizens pictures and information about the reality of the war over texts and other messaging apps.
Military Support to Ukraine
NATO rejected Ukraine’s request to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine on March 4.[55] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized that NATO will continue providing material support to Ukraine but will not operate planes or troops in Ukraine to avoid a larger conflict with Russia. The establishment of a no-fly zone in Ukraine would require NATO willingness to use lethal force against Russian aircraft, functionally entering the war on Ukraine’s behalf.
NATO and EU countries continued to provide lethal and non-lethal military equipment and aid to Ukraine on March 4.[56]
- Japan announced on March 4 it would send military supplies but not weapons to Ukraine.[57]
- A senior US defense official told CNN on March 4 that approximately $240 million of a $350 million US security assistance package has been delivered to Ukraine.[58] The “most-needed” items, including anti-armor weapons, were delivered and the remainder will arrive in Ukraine within one month. The US defense official said that the United States has also coordinated the delivery of military aid to Ukraine from other countries.
- US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels on March 4 and encouraged NATO to continue to respond to Ukraine’s requests for supplies and equipment to defend against Russian military aggression.[59]
Sanctions and Economic Activity
The Kremlin continued to struggle with the effects of international sanctions on Russia’s economy. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Andrey Belousov said that the Russian government is considering three options for foreign companies, including continuing operations as before, foreign shareholders transferring their share to Russian partners, and shuttering the companies’ Russian operations through “accelerated bankruptcy” procedures.[60] The Russian Central Bank announced on March 4 that the Russian stock exchange will remain closed at least through March 8.[61] S&P Global severely cut Russia’s credit rating from investment grade to CCC- on March 4 for failing to pay both its local currency and dollar debts.[62] Russian state-owned news agency TASS reported that Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry recommended suspending Russian fertilizer exports, a move that would increase prices and potentially affect farmers worldwide, on March 4.[63] The Russian Duma adopted a law that allows Russia to promptly raise pension payments on March 4, likely to reduce the effect of sanctions-driven inflation on Russian pensioners.[64]
Humanitarian Concerns
Russia has not yet established humanitarian corridors to enable civilian supply and evacuation as Russia had agreed to in its March 3 negotiations with Ukraine. Russian sieges continue deteriorating living conditions in southern Ukraine despite increased Western efforts to coordinate humanitarian aid.[65]
- Mariupol Mayor Vadym Boychenko appealed for military aid and the creation of a humanitarian corridor to evacuate more than 400,000 residents on March 4 amidst a Russian siege that has left the city with little water, food, heat, and electricity.[66]
- Kherson Mayor Igor Kolykhayev announced on March 4 that Russian forces are not implementing the recently agreed-upon humanitarian ceasefire corridors and that Russian forces are instead planning to distribute their own humanitarian aid.[67] The Kremlin will likely leverage images of Russian forces distrusting aid to mitigate the brutality of the occupation to domestic Russian audiences.
- The EU Council unanimously voted to introduce temporary protection to persons fleeing Ukraine.[68] Temporary protection is an emergency mechanism that gives displaced persons rights to residence, the labor market, housing, education, and medical assistance across the EU for up to one year.[69]
- German Chancellor Olaf Scholz asked Russian President Vladimir Putin to immediately cease all hostilities in Ukraine and allow humanitarian aid into territories where the fighting continued in a phone call on March 4.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu accepted a request from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to collaborate more closely with the UN to address humanitarian issues in Ukraine in a phone call on March 4.[70]
Other International Activity
The US Department of Defense established a deconfliction line with Russia’s Ministry of Defense to prevent possible military incidents near Ukraine and Belarus on March 1.[71]
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted Finland and Sweden to increase high-level discussions on NATO membership and multilateral defense measures.[72]
- US President Joe Biden met with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö at the White House on March 4 to discuss the NATO-Finnish relationship and the possibility of Finland becoming a NATO member state.[73]
- The Nordic Council of Ministers suspended all cooperation projects with Russia and Belarus on March 4 in response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine.[74] Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and the autonomous Finnish island Åland comprise the Nordic Council.[75]
- Finnish Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen will meet with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Biden administration representatives in the United States on 7-9 March.[76] The parties will discuss the US-Finland defense relationship and the security situation in Europe. Kaikkonen will also visit Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas, and Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to assess an F-35A fleet. American defense contractor Lockheed Martin plans on delivering an unspecified number of F-35A Lightning II multi-role fighter jets to Finland as part of a contract established before Russia’s invasion.[77]
- Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and Swedish Minister of Defense Peter Hultqvist will meet with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, and Finnish Minister of Defense Antti Kaikkonen on March 5 for bilateral security discussions.[78]
- A majority of Swedes support NATO membership for the first time following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, according to polling released on March 4.[79]
Turkey continued positioning itself as a leading candidate to mediate negotiations with Russia and Ukraine on March 4. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said he wants to mediate discussions between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum in Ankara, which will run from March 11-13.[80] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also emphasized that Turkey was “striving” for an “immediate ceasefire” during a phone call with UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson on March 4.[81] Erdogan discussed the fighting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on a separate phone call shortly after his conversation with Johnson.[82] Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman also offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine in a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 3.[83]
https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3419795-about-90-enemy-equipment-units-kadyrov-forces-groups-amassed-near-enerhodar.html
[14] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3419795-about-90-enemy-equipment-units-kadyrov-forces-groups-amassed-near-enerhodar.html
[30] https://apostrophe dot ua/news/society/accidents/2022-03-04/okkupantyi-v-hersone-zapustili-feyk-o-sozdanii-hernr-chto-pridumal-vrag/261318
[35] https://iz dot ru/1300396/2022-03-04/v-sovfede-rasskazali-o-podgotovke-ukrainy-k-provokatcii-protiv-rossii
[36] https://iz dot ru/1300396/2022-03-04/v-sovfede-rasskazali-o-podgotovke-ukrainy-k-provokatcii-protiv-rossii
[37] https://iz dot ru/1300447/2022-03-04/eks-premer-ukrainy-rasskazal-o-planakh-nato-razviazat-tretiu-mirovuiu-voinu-s-rf; https://iz dot ru/1300460/2022-03-04/eks-premer-ukrainy-rasskazal-o-planakh-kieva-po-unichtozheniiu-naseleniia-donbassa
[38] https://iz dot ru/1300447/2022-03-04/eks-premer-ukrainy-rasskazal-o-planakh-nato-razviazat-tretiu-mirovuiu-voinu-s-rf; https://iz dot ru/1300460/2022-03-04/eks-premer-ukrainy-rasskazal-o-planakh-kieva-po-unichtozheniiu-naseleniia-donbassa
[44] https://reform dot by/301058-lukashenko-belarusskaja-armija-ne-namerena-uchastvovat-v-vojne-v-ukraine
[45] https://reform dot by/301058-lukashenko-belarusskaja-armija-ne-namerena-uchastvovat-v-vojne-v-ukraine
[46] https://reform dot by/301058-lukashenko-belarusskaja-armija-ne-namerena-uchastvovat-v-vojne-v-ukraine
[60] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/03/04/pravitelstvo-rassmatrivaet-tri-varianta-otnosheniy-s-inostrannymi-kompaniyami-prekraschenie-raboty-v-rossii-rastsenyat-kak-umyshlennoe-bankrotstvo
[64] https://iz dot ru/1300537/2022-03-04/v-gosdume-priniali-zakon-o-prave-pravitelstva-operativno-povyshat-doplaty-k-pensiiam
5. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4 (institute for the Study of War - ISW)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4
Fredrick W. Kagan, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko
March 4, 3:00 pm EST
Russian forces continue their focus on encircling Kyiv. The western envelopment remains bogged down but Russian troops have moved more rapidly from the east and are arriving in the capital’s outskirts on the Sumy axis. The speed of the advance from the east is likely to slow as Russian forces leave sparsely-inhabited and flat terrain and enter the more congested and built-up eastern suburbs. Russian mechanized forces around Kharkiv appear to be supporting operations toward the east and west of the city, likely weakening their ability to encircle or seize it.
The Russian military has concentrated considerable combat power around Mariupol to encircle and ultimately seize or destroy it. The purpose of this effort is not entirely clear. The capture or destruction of Mariupol will not likely materially affect the outcome of the war, whose decisive operations are more than 600 kilometers northwest around Kyiv. Russian forces have also renewed their ground offensive west from Crimea toward Odesa, currently focusing on advancing from Kherson to Mykolayiv, and seized the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant north of Crimea. The continued pursuit of objectives along three diverging axes by the same group of forces in Crimea has hindered the Russian military’s ability to generate decisive effects on any of the three.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces have advanced rapidly on the eastern outskirts of Kyiv likely from the Sumy axis and may attempt to encircle and/or attack the capital on the east bank of the Dnipro in the coming 24-48 hours;
- Russian troops did not press a ground offensive against Kharkiv in the last 24 hours but have instead diverted forces to the west and southeast, likely supporting efforts against Kyiv and in and around Donbas respectively;
- Russian troops have surrounded Mariupol and are attacking it brutally to compel its capitulation or destroy it;
- Russian forces have renewed their ground advance on Mykolayiv, having secured Kherson city, likely to set conditions for a further attack toward Odesa. Russian naval infantry are likely poised to conduct amphibious landings near Odesa when Russian forces have secured or are close to securing a reliable ground route from Crimea to Odesa.
Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:
- Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);
- Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
- Supporting effort 2—Mariupol; and
- Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances westward.
Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis consist of a main effort aimed at enveloping and ultimately encircling the city from the west and supporting efforts along the Chernihiv and Sumy axes to encircle it from the northeast and east.
Russian forces are continuing their grinding effort to envelop Kyiv from the west, making limited gains but continuing to suffer notable setbacks. The Russians have been more successful in their advance on Kyiv from the east, especially on the axis from Sumy via Konotop and Nyzhin. The large concentration of Russian forces between the Dnipro and the Desna northeast of Kyiv has remained unable to take the town of Chernihiv or its crossings and has been less successful in efforts to advance directly on Kyiv itself.
Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro
Russian forces have continued operations attempting to envelop and encircle Kyiv from the west using as many as 15 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[1] Intense fighting for the town of Hostomel continued on March 3 after Russian forces apparently secured Antonov (Hostomel) airfield.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on March 4 that Ukrainian Special Forces killed 50 soldiers belonging to the Russian 31st Airborne Brigade based at Ulyanovsk in fighting in Hostomel on March 3.[3] It is unclear whether those airborne troops attempted an airdrop or air assault or drove down, possibly with the long convoy previously reported. Russian attacks elsewhere in the vicinity appear to have culminated on March 4 with few Russian gains, and the Ukrainian General Staff claims that the Russian effort has “partially lost its offensive potential” after making limited gains.[4] Russian forces attempting the envelopment of Kyiv that had been driven west by Ukrainian counter-attacks on March 3 appear to have stalled and partially withdrawn.[5] Russian forces are unlikely to complete the encirclement of Kyiv on the west side without significant reinforcements as long as Ukrainian defenses continue to hold as they have done over the past few days.
Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv axis
Russian activity northeast of Kyiv was very limited over the past 24 hours as Russian forces are apparently focused on the Sumy axis rather than the Chernihiv axis.
Subordinate supporting effort—Sumy axis
The Sumy axis is currently the most successful and dangerous Russian avenue of advance on Kyiv. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that 14 BTGs of the Central Military District and the 14th Army Corps (of the Northern Fleet) are driving on the eastern Kyiv suburbs.[6] Social media reports indicate that Russian armored spearheads reached as far as Brovary, roughly 20 kilometers from the center of Kyiv as of March 4.[7]
Russian forces on this axis have likely come along two arterial highways running from Sumy via Romny and Priluky in the south and from Krolevets via Baturyn and Bobryk to the north. The terrain in that area is flat and sparsely populated, offering few good defensive positions. Ukrainian forces may not have contested the advance as determinedly on ground that favors a mechanized attacker as they have in the more built-up and congested areas west, northwest, and northeast of Kyiv. Russian forces at Brovary may also have come from the north, having bypassed Chernihiv in some way, as the most recent UK Ministry of Defense map suggests.[8] ISW has observed no definitive indicators of the route the forces in Brovary might have taken.
Russian forces arriving in the more densely populated eastern outskirts of the capital may begin to encounter the sorts of challenges that have slowed their comrades’ advances on the west bank of the Dnipro, depending on the strength and capability of Ukrainian forces attempting to defend on the east.
Russian forces on this axis can choose any of four main options once they have consolidated in or near their current frontline trace.
- From Brovary, they could attempt to cross the Desna and reach the east bank of the Dnipro, possibly aiming to link up with Russian forces on the west bank via the bridge across Kyiv’s hydroelectric dam. They might attempt to seize the dam and/or damage or destroy its electrical generation or transmission facilities. They might also hope that such a maneuver will trap Russian forces defending near Chernihiv;
- They could bring up tube and rocket artillery in the eastern suburbs and begin to bombard Kyiv itself more heavily;
- They could continue to drive southwest via Boryspil International Airport to reach the Dnipro south of Kyiv; and/or
- They could attempt frontal assaults into and through Kyiv’s eastern outskirts to seize its bridges and then secure or destroy the government center on the west bank.
The Russians might attempt any or all of these operations in any combination depending on the amount of force they can concentrate at or near their current front-line trace. The rapid advance of Russian forces on this axis will likely slow, however, as Russian troops enter the more built-up and congested areas of eastern Kyiv and its suburbs.
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:
Russian forces around Kharkiv appear to have focused on continued bombardment of the city combined with drives to the east and west bypassing it in support of other efforts rather than attempting to take it. Russian troops have not encircled the city or launched renewed ground offensives against it in the past 24 hours. Of the 16 BTGs the Ukrainian General Staff claims to be operating around Kharkiv, a small number have bypassed Okhtyrka to the west to concentrate in the Zinkiv and Gadyach Districts in northeast Poltava Oblast.[9] Another group of BTGs has attacked southeast toward Novoaidar and Severodonetsk, likely seeking to link up with elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army and the forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk proxy republics.[10] The likelihood of a renewed Russian ground offensive to take Kharkiv in the next 24-48 hours is unclear, as is the likely outcome of any such attempt. Russian forces for now appear to be de-emphasizing the seizure of Kharkiv itself in favor of supporting other efforts.
Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol:
Russian forces still encircle Mariupol and are continuing an artillery, rocket, and missile barrage on the city while concentrating ground forces likely in preparation to seize and secure it within the next 24-48 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff, various social media reports, and claims by DNR and LNR forces suggest that Russian forces drawn from the 8th Combined Arms Army (likely of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, among others) supported by elements of the Donetsk and Luhansk proxy militias are engaged in this operation.[11] Russian and proxy forces will likely secure and/or destroy Mariupol within the coming days.
Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and west:
Russian forces have taken advantage of having consolidated control of Kherson city to launch a renewed offensive toward the city of Mykolayiv, which houses the headquarters of the Ukrainian navy. The Ukrainian General Staff reports that as many as 15 BTGs are driving toward Mykolayiv, prompting the Ukrainian navy to scuttle its flagship on March 3 to prevent its capture.[12] Russian forces involved reportedly include airborne elements, likely of the 7th Airborne Division.[13] Ukrainian efforts to stop the renewed Russian advance have had limited success thus far, although it remains to be seen how well Russian forces will be able to retain their momentum as they enter the dense and congested areas of Mykolayiv itself. Russian ground forces must secure most of Mykolayiv city if they are to secure passage of the only permanent bridge across the Southern Bug River. They need that bridge to establish a reliable ground line of communication between Crimea and Odesa unless they are confident in their abilities rapidly to construct, maintain, and defend a hasty bridge across a wide body of water.
Russian naval infantry may be waiting for ground forces to secure Mykolayiv’s bridge before attempting an amphibious landing near Odesa. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that two Russian large amphibious ships were at sea approximately 40 kilometers east of Chornomorsk, a town roughly 24 kilometers south of Odesa’s city center.[14]
Zaporizhya
The Russian attack on the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been widely reported. Russian forces have seized the city of Enerhodar in which the ZNPP is located and the perimeter of the powerplant, but Ukrainian officials and technicians retain control of the plant itself and are operating it as of March 4.[15] Enerhodar has no operational military significance other than as the location of the ZNPP. Russian forces likely seized the plant—and risked damaging it in the process—in order to be able to cut off electricity supply to eastern Ukraine at their discretion. Some reports indicate that forces belonging to Chechen leader Ramazan Kadyrov are present in or near the ZNPP, but ISW has been unable to confirm them.[16]
Immediate items to watch
- Russian operations in the eastern outskirts of Kyiv could weaken Ukrainian defenses of the west bank of the Dnipro and/or threaten to cut off Ukrainian forces defending in and around Chernihiv;
- Russian forces will likely take or destroy Mariupol within the next 24-48 hours;
- Russian airborne and/or Spetsnaz forces may attempt to seize the bridge in Mykolayiv as mechanized forces advance from the east;
- Russian naval infantry, possibly supported by airborne and/or Spetsnaz forces, could attempt to land near Odesa;
- Russian reinforcements have begun to move from the Eastern Military District and could begin to arrive in the theater of war within the coming days;
- Belarusian troops currently mobilizing near Minsk might enter the conflict or deploy to the Polish or Lithuanian border;
- Russian forces could seize the Zaporizhya Nuclear Power Plant itself and damage it or otherwise cut or curtail the supply of electricity to the Ukrainian power grid;
- Russian forces near Kyiv could attempt to disrupt the operations of the hydroelectric power station on the Dnipro.
6. How to help Ukraine and stay off the nuclear escalation ladder
Conclusion:
If democracies do not support one another against a nuclear-capable tyrant, like Putin, we are all in big trouble. Ukraine may be the first, but it certainly won’t be the last to fall to an oppressor. The motto of the U.S. special forces is De Oppresso Liber, which translated from the Latin means “to free the oppressed.” The Russians overmatch the Ukrainians in every military category except courage. I can think of few times in their history when the Green Berets were needed more.
How to help Ukraine and stay off the nuclear escalation ladder
by Robert Bruce Adolph
How to help Ukraine and stay off the nuclear escalation ladder
The United States and Russia have the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons. But only two people are talking about their potential use: Russian President Vladimir Putin and his foreign minister. Let’s call it what it is. Nuclear blackmail.
Putin knows the weaknesses of democracies. He knows that no politician in the West would ever seriously contemplate the use of even tactical nuclear weapons, fearing the escalation ladder and threat to their populations. He knows that he can do as he pleases with Ukraine, and without fear of significant Western reprisals beyond EU and U.S. economic warfare that crashed the ruble.
He wants Ukraine, period. Sanctions and diplomatic discussions will not change his behavior. Nor will humanitarian concerns of over a million refugees. Nor will the deaths of hundreds and perhaps soon thousands of Russians and Ukrainians. It was his plan to invade Ukraine all along. The fact that he is willing to place nuclear capable forces on high alert when facing a non-nuclear adversary is telling. The goal is intimidation.
From the autocrat’s perspective, regaining control over Ukraine would be the capstone that would secure his historical legacy as the great Russian patriot. At 69 years of age, he may feel the passage of time more acutely. Hence, his need to act now.
What can be done? There is an option that I hope is being discussed behind closed doors in Europe and America: sending in clandestine military units, special forces (Green Berets), to assist their Ukrainian freedom-loving kin. Simply put, clandestine means secret and deniable. There are U.S. and European special operations warriors that already speak the language and could blend in with the populace. The objective would be to further train and support the Ukrainian resistance: to take the fight to the Russians. Special forces employment — with political plausible deniability — could be a highly effective tool against conventional Russian units. NATO, a defensive alliance, would not be directly involved. Individual countries, who are NATO members, could be. It is a distinction with an important difference. Special forces employment in this manner keeps us off the nuclear escalation ladder.
The French supported the 13 colonies in their war of independence against an absolutist English king. The United States of America might not exist today without their intervention. The Ukrainians are in the same fight, a battle for their liberty. There is no nobler cause. Plus, I hate the thought of surrendering to any dictator’s intimidation, nuclear or otherwise.
If democracies do not support one another against a nuclear-capable tyrant, like Putin, we are all in big trouble. Ukraine may be the first, but it certainly won’t be the last to fall to an oppressor. The motto of the U.S. special forces is De Oppresso Liber, which translated from the Latin means “to free the oppressed.” The Russians overmatch the Ukrainians in every military category except courage. I can think of few times in their history when the Green Berets were needed more.
Robert Bruce Adolph is a former senior Army Special Forces soldier and United Nations security chief, who holds graduate degrees in both international affairs & strategy. He is the author of the new book entitled, “Surviving the United Nations: The Unexpected Challenge.”
7. Understanding Russia’s Various Hybrid War Tactics in Ukraine
Understanding Russia’s Various Hybrid War Tactics in Ukraine
WSJ · by Stephanie Stamm and Hanna Sender
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Moscow began a hybrid war in Ukraine weeks before any battalions entered the country. Ukrainian officials say that Russia stepped up a destabilization campaign involving cyberattacks, economic disruption and new tactics. The new misinformation methods such as a deluge of emailed bomb threats and texts to residents informing them that ATMs were down can cause panic. While they may sow immediate doubt and confusion, they can be easily disproved.
A U.S. official cautioned on Friday that Russia plans to discourage Ukrainian soldiers with false reports about the widespread surrender of Ukrainian troops. Throughout the month U.S. intelligence has warned of several propaganda and panic-causing misinformation strategies that could have a longer-lasting impact. Officials accused the financial blog Zero Hedge of publishing propaganda articles created by Russia-controlled media. They also released newly declassified intelligence that shows Moscow seeks to use false video as justification for attack. No videos of staged, false explosions with corpses, actors depicting mourners and images of destroyed buildings and military equipment have been released.
A distributed denial of service attack Wednesday on major government and financial institutions’ websites was short-lived. However, more destructive cyberattacks in the traditional sense—wiper software, ransomware and other malware—could have long-term or delayed impacts on a country’s stability.
In this conflict there have been no known infrastructure or systems attacks that have caused irreparable harm so far. Some experts at the WSJ CIO Network Summit warned companies to prepare for phishing and password-spraying attacks that recycle passwords from past password data dumps to access corporate networks.
John Hultquist, director of intelligence analysis at the U.S.-based cyber intelligence firm Mandiant, said major attacks linked to Russia have typically either disrupted critical infrastructure, leading to widespread impact, or relied on either a supply-chain hack or strategic web compromise to infect scores of victims. The recent activity in Ukraine so far appears to lack either of those components, though it is possible those elements exist but haven’t been activated yet, he said.
—Dustin Volz contributed to this article.
8. I’m Writing From a Bunker With President Zelensky Beside Me. We Will Fight to the Last Breath.
At some point we may have to conduct an in extremis exfiltration/extraction of Zelensky. He will never voluntarily leave but we may need to gently but forcibly help him to live to fight another day. He will need to have a legitimate MacArthur moment -"I shall return." We cannot allow him to fall into Russian hands. If he is martyred he will go down in history but he will be of greater value alive and leading, even if it is a (temporary) government in exile, while they bleed the Russians to the point that they cannot sustain their occupation.
I’m Writing From a Bunker With President Zelensky Beside Me. We Will Fight to the Last Breath.
By Andriy Yermak
Mr. Yermak is head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine.
KYIV, Ukraine — In launching a war on our country, President Vladimir Putin claimed Russia would “de-Nazify” and free Ukraine. But Ukraine — a nation that lost as many as eight million lives in World War II, a country that has a Jewish president — does not need to be freed from the liberated path it has chosen.
Not since the end of World War II has Europe seen violence and naked territorial ambition at such a scale.
I am writing this appeal from a bunker in the capital, with President Volodymyr Zelensky by my side. For a week, Russian bombs have fallen overhead. Despite the constant barrage of Russian fire, we stand firm and united in our resolve to defeat the invaders. We will fight to the last breath to protect our country.
But make no mistake: Other autocrats are watching, taking lessons. They can create a coalition of bad will — just look at how once-peaceful Belarus is now serving as a staging ground for Russian troops.
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Listen to what Mr. Putin is saying. For years, the West listened to Mr. Putin but didn’t hear him; it is just now waking up to the existential challenge he poses to the world order. Ukraine has never underestimated his intentions — not since Russian aggression against our country began in earnest in 2014 — nor his willingness to achieve domination by any means necessary.
That’s because we know this war is not just about Ukraine. The Kremlin wants to create a new Russian empire.
Image
The author, Andriy Yermak, with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in 2020.Credit...Gleb Garanich/Reuters
We Ukrainians have proved that we are able to effectively repel the invasion force alone. We have used the weapons the West has provided. We are thankful to our American and European friends, to democracies worldwide including Australia and Japan, for their quick decisions to help us, for their sanctions against the Russian economy, for the armaments and equipment to deter the aggressor.
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But it’s not enough. We need more — and, please, stop telling us military aid is on the way. Nothing less than our freedom — and yours — is at stake.
In President Zelensky’s call with President Biden on Tuesday, he again appealed for more security, military and humanitarian assistance.
Since 2014, the West’s critical security assistance helped to transform a Ukrainian military that is now capable of mounting a defense and inflicting large-scale casualties against the Russian invaders. Ukraine is not asking for its allies to put boots on the ground. But we need the West to back us up in order to keep defending our families and our land. We need to show Russia — in painful terms — the mistake it has made.
The Russians underestimated our resolve and we’ve held them off for now. But as we speak, a 40-mile-long convoy of Russian troops and equipment is closing in on Kyiv.
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We need antitank and antiaircraft weapons and other ammunition delivered to our brave soldiers right now.
We are calling on the West to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine. We recognize that this would be a serious escalation in the war and that it could bring NATO into direct conflict with Russia. But we firmly believe that Russia won’t stop at just Ukraine, which would potentially drag NATO into this conflict anyway. A no-fly zone would at least give Mr. Putin some pause.
We also ask the West to increase the nonmilitary costs on Russia. We welcome the coordinated measures thus far, but we need more. Every Russian bank — not just a select few — must be cut off from the SWIFT banking system, and every Russian oligarch must be sanctioned. We are also calling for a full embargo on Russian oil and all Russian exports to the United States and Europe. These measures would not be without cost to the world economy, but the alternative is far worse.
The international community should consider expelling Russia from the United Nations or, at the very least, excluding it from the Security Council, where it has a veto.
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Russia is waging war on Ukraine to destroy its democracy, its alignment with the West and the spirit of the Ukrainian people. Not content to strangle most political opposition and forms of civic expression within Russia, the ex-K.G.B. clique now running the country is using its position to further a revisionist ideology — one that hungers to reassert Moscow’s control over the former Soviet Union countries and to discredit the democratic world for its failure to stay united and respond. Again, make no mistake: Mr. Putin aims to advance this ideology by going for blood beyond Ukraine. He must be stopped.
The shelling across Ukraine is not letting up; it’s gotten worse here in Kyiv, with women, children and other noncombatants taking refuge in bunkers and subway stations while Russia’s invading forces indiscriminately strike residential buildings and civilians. A high-rise apartment building has been hit, and at least one hospital has been damaged. They have fired rockets into the center of Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, and attacked the Chernobyl power plant.
This is Moscow’s way of war. Mr. Putin’s forces will continue to terrorize the country to induce surrender. If they don’t succeed, they will burn it all down. It’s either bow or vanish; no third option is allowed.
This is not going as planned for Russia, however. Everyday Ukrainians are confronting Russian soldiers, blocking tanks with their bodies. Russian forces are experiencing fierce resistance from both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and from Ukrainian citizens hurling homemade Molotov cocktails that Ukraine’s government is encouraging them to make. Ukrainians are defending their streets, their communities, their country and their identity. At the same time, Russian soldiers are surrendering en masse or sabotaging their own vehicles to avoid fighting, according to the Pentagon. They must know this war is unjust.
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We beseech our Western allies and partners to make the costs unbearable for Russia now.
Article 4 of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances guaranteed that the United States, Britain and Russia would seek “immediate” action from the United Nations Security Council “to provide assistance” if Ukraine “should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.” Just because the aggressor — Russia — vetoes U.N. Security Council action does not relieve the other parties of the promises they made to Ukraine.
Even though Mr. Zelensky and I cannot be physically alongside every brave Ukrainian fighting for this country, our spirit is with them.
Every day brings the possibility that our words may be our final ones. So let them be a plea for support for a free Ukraine.
We have been able to withstand intense fighting in recent days despite the vicious brutality of the Russian aggressors, and we will continue to fight — even if Russia becomes an occupying force in Ukraine. We are united around the Ukrainian flag, the symbol of our identity, our resolve and our will, but our state’s future and survival largely depend on the West.
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This war could be a prologue to a greater European or even global massacre. As President Zelensky wrote on Twitter after a strike hit near Ukraine’s sacred memorial to Jews massacred in World War II, “what is the point of saying ‘never again’ for 80 years, if the world stays silent?”
Standing with us today and helping us is the only way to achieve peace for all and ensure that history does not repeat itself — so that our future does not echo Europe’s darkest time.
Andriy Yermak (@AndriyYermak) is head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine.
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9. 'Dad, Please Don't Die!': Harrowing Video Captures Deadly Russian Attack On Ukrainian Father And Son
From Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
'Dad, Please Don't Die!': Harrowing Video Captures Deadly Russian Attack On Ukrainian Father And Son
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A Ukrainian civilian says Russian troops opened fire on his vehicle, killing his father as they were evacuating from the town of Ivankiv in the Kyiv region. The man captured video of the February 25 attack on his phone and said he and his father, Oleh Bulavenko, had returned to their home to rescue their three dogs. RFE/RL has verified that no Ukrainian troops were in the area at the time of the shooting. The sole surviving dog refused the leave Bulavenko's body after the shooting. (WARNING: Viewers may find the content of this video disturbing)
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'Dad, Please Don't Die!': Harrowing Video Captures Deadly Russian Attack On Ukrainian Father And Son
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10. The Russian Elite Can’t Stand the Sanctions
Excerpts:
I have spent the past 15 years researching the offshore wealth of the super-rich. In my efforts to understand how oligarchs’ wealth was hidden from tax agencies, divorcing spouses, and disgruntled business partners, I have been astonished again and again at how many oligarchs cannot seem to live without the splashy public display of their wealth, even when it puts them at risk. In recent days, Internet sleuths and government agents alike have been closely tracking the movements of Russian oligarchs’ private jets and multimillion-dollar yachts. Instagram posts from plush locations are a major strategic asset for anyone seeking to impose accountability on people who otherwise seem to be untouchable. For example, a niche profession has developed in tracking down transnational oligarchs via their social-media posts so they can be served with legal papers to freeze their assets in debt-collection proceedings. These high-end collection agents, the Boba Fetts of the ultra-high-net-worth crowd, can do their job precisely because the oligarchs and their globe-trotting family members can’t help themselves. They seem compelled to post photos of themselves hobnobbing with celebrities or posing with race cars, even when they know they are under investigation. Many people claiming bankruptcy in the face of heavy fines and court judgments have been exposed to the courts as frauds after unintentionally or intentionally exposing the extent of their assets.
This tendency appears pronounced among the families of Russian oligarchs. The now-locked Instagram account “Rich Russian Kids” acquired 1.5 million followers just aggregating the images of decadent luxury posted by the sons and daughters of wealthy Russians.
As social scientists have argued for more than a century, the evidence is overwhelming that, beyond a subsistence level, people will fight even harder for status than they do for money. We see that fight now in the anti-war comments and peacemaking efforts of Russia’s elites, after just a few days of sanctions pressure. They’re behaving exactly as sociologists would expect when status is threatened among a group accustomed to impunity: They’re angry, and they’re anxious. Their discomfort has not yet persuaded Putin to stop his aggression in Ukraine, but it’s a reminder that the U.S., U.K., and EU can and should confront a kleptocratic system that allowed Russia’s president to amass so much power in the first place.
The Russian Elite Can’t Stand the Sanctions
The latest measures are far more effective than Western powers’ past efforts to target Russia’s elite.
The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union had barely announced sanctions on overseas Russian wealth when the oligarchs began to whine and protest. That meant the policy—enacted after Russia invaded Ukraine—was working as intended, to punish Russia’s elites for supporting President Vladimir Putin. By last weekend in Moscow, the Russian-state-television host Vladimir Solovyev raged on camera over what the sanctions would mean for him personally: loss of access to his two luxury homes in Lake Como, Italy, near the villa of George Clooney.
Amid a broad suite of economic sanctions targeting the Russian financial system, which has driven the ruble’s value to record lows, Western powers also are significantly increasing their efforts to identify and freeze the assets of Putin’s business allies. And some of Russia’s best-known oligarchs—business figures who have built up huge fortunes, in most cases through their connections to the state—are now calling for an end to the war. By Sunday, the billionaire industrialist Oleg Deripaska and Mikhail Fridman, a founder of Russia’s largest private bank, both urged an end to Putin’s war. This was a startling break in ranks among the country’s elites. Deripaska is on the U.S. sanctions list; Fridman is on the EU’s. Even those who have not yet faced individual sanctions appear to be feeling pressure. Another billionaire businessman and close associate of Putin’s, Roman Abramovich, has put his British soccer club up for sale and vowed to donate the proceeds to “all victims of the war in Ukraine.” Over the weekend, Abramovich also accepted the Ukrainian government’s request for mediation help in peace talks with Russia. Oleg Tinkov, a banker and entrepreneur, frequently uses his Instagram account to post photos of things like his 253-foot yacht with mini submarine, but he told his 634,000 followers last week, “Innocent people are dying in Ukraine now, every day, this is unthinkable and unacceptable.”
If figures like these are calling for, even demanding, an end to the war, the sanctions are far more effective than past efforts by Western powers to target the Russian elite.
The oligarchs play essential roles in Putin’s Russia: They provide invaluable public support for the regime, lead key companies and institutions, and distract attention from and, by some accounts, help conceal the president’s own enormous wealth. As the jailed anti-corruption campaigner Alexei Navalny has been arguing for years, Putin’s continuing ability to exercise power requires the cooperation and support of others. Navalny listed 35 such individuals as essential supports to Putin’s regime. (Navalny, the U.S., the U.K., and the EU all have somewhat different names on their lists.)
Precisely how much power these figures exercise over Putin is a matter of debate, and some critics have argued that sanctions are designed only to make Westerners feel good. But the wealthiest Russians are far better placed than the average citizen to communicate to Putin how his invasion is devastating his own country. And the lavish lifestyles that oligarchs and their families lead mean they’re highly vulnerable to external pressure—if Western powers make a more concerted effort to target them than they have in the past.
Oligarchs who are cut off from accessing their offshore wealth won’t starve, but they will be unable to maintain their jet-setting luxury lifestyle. As Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, quipped in a now-deleted tweet, this means:
No more:
Shopping in #Milano
Partying in #SaintTropez
Diamonds in #Antwerp
That tweet attracted attention precisely because it touches on a phenomenon of great significance that is often overlooked: Looting your country’s wealth is pointless if you can’t show off the spoils.
What is an oligarch without ostentation? For many Russian elites, the answer is apparently “nothing.” The sanctions threaten oligarchs with a kind of annihilation, similar to the phenomenon that sociologists describe as “social death.” That is why Russian elites were so quick to gather up their expensive toys as soon as sanctions were announced, and why several have taken the extraordinary step of publicly begging Putin for a quick end to the war.
Although economists and policy makers may pooh-pooh such ideas, sociologists—including me—have long understood that the need to see and be seen is a fundamental driver of human affairs. Perhaps surprisingly, oligarchs need not just to be filthy rich; the need to be seen as such seems to only increase with economic wealth. That’s one reason billionaires such as Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos, and Richard Branson flamboyantly compete among themselves to launch rockets into space amid great media fanfare, rather than discreetly enjoying their fortunes in private.
I have spent the past 15 years researching the offshore wealth of the super-rich. In my efforts to understand how oligarchs’ wealth was hidden from tax agencies, divorcing spouses, and disgruntled business partners, I have been astonished again and again at how many oligarchs cannot seem to live without the splashy public display of their wealth, even when it puts them at risk. In recent days, Internet sleuths and government agents alike have been closely tracking the movements of Russian oligarchs’ private jets and multimillion-dollar yachts. Instagram posts from plush locations are a major strategic asset for anyone seeking to impose accountability on people who otherwise seem to be untouchable. For example, a niche profession has developed in tracking down transnational oligarchs via their social-media posts so they can be served with legal papers to freeze their assets in debt-collection proceedings. These high-end collection agents, the Boba Fetts of the ultra-high-net-worth crowd, can do their job precisely because the oligarchs and their globe-trotting family members can’t help themselves. They seem compelled to post photos of themselves hobnobbing with celebrities or posing with race cars, even when they know they are under investigation. Many people claiming bankruptcy in the face of heavy fines and court judgments have been exposed to the courts as frauds after unintentionally or intentionally exposing the extent of their assets.
This tendency appears pronounced among the families of Russian oligarchs. The now-locked Instagram account “Rich Russian Kids” acquired 1.5 million followers just aggregating the images of decadent luxury posted by the sons and daughters of wealthy Russians.
As social scientists have argued for more than a century, the evidence is overwhelming that, beyond a subsistence level, people will fight even harder for status than they do for money. We see that fight now in the anti-war comments and peacemaking efforts of Russia’s elites, after just a few days of sanctions pressure. They’re behaving exactly as sociologists would expect when status is threatened among a group accustomed to impunity: They’re angry, and they’re anxious. Their discomfort has not yet persuaded Putin to stop his aggression in Ukraine, but it’s a reminder that the U.S., U.K., and EU can and should confront a kleptocratic system that allowed Russia’s president to amass so much power in the first place.
11. Rich Russians have been squirreling money away in the U.K. and U.S.
This is very much worth a listen. Are we ever going to change the rules/laws to prevent this? It is fascinating that kleptocrats benefit from the lack of rules in their own countries that allow them to plunder at will, yet they want to park their money and wealth in democratic rule of law counties to protect it.
It is a very interesting thesis that "kleptocracy" is the greatest threat to democracy.
Rich Russians have been squirreling money away in the U.K. and U.S.
March 5, 20228:00 AM ET
Scott Simon talks with Tom Burgis, Financial Times reporter and author of "Kleptopia: How Dirty Money Is Conquering the World," about the ways Russian billionaires hide their money abroad.
12. The propaganda war has eclipsed cyberwar in Ukraine
Because it is all about influencing human behavior. The cognitive domain is more important than the cyber domain. Congestive over technical. But the cyber domain is now probably the most important conduit for accessing the cognitive. Cyber is supporting and reinforcing cognitive influence.
Yes, hacking, malware, spyware, phishing, cyber enabled economic warfare, etc are all important But in thened, in politics and war, influencing human decision making and behavior is the most important.
And of course there are nefarious actors who exploit the cyber domain in so many ways. Bot whether a state or non-state actor, or a grifter, we must consider the cognitive effects of actions on the people.
Maybe the Ukraine crisis will force us to focus on many of the problems that are undermining democracies.
The propaganda war has eclipsed cyberwar in Ukraine
Frauds, liars, and grifters are adding to the chaos of the fighting.
By Patrick Howell O'Neillarchive page
March 2, 2022
As Russia poured troops into Ukraine, the besieged country’s government was already thinking about a different way to strike back.
On February 26, Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov launched the “IT Army of Ukraine”—an unprecedented invitation to the world’s hackers to go on the offensive against Russia for his country. The IT Army is the most highly visible force in what’s become a byzantine cyber conflict marked by a chaotic mix of players, impossible-to-verify claims of sabotage, and a scant number of visible hacks.
Related Story
Even well-meaning attempts to participate in the news can play into bad actors’ campaigns.
In fact, hacking has remained mostly on the margins in the first week of the war. Instead, Ukraine’s IT Army and all the other groups now declaring their intent to launch such cyberattacks have all played into a roiling propaganda war touching not just Ukraine and Russia but the entire world.
Ukraine’s strategy of seeking out an international brigade of hackers makes sense for a country under siege, experts say. Would-be participants are directed to a Telegram channel where objectives are laid out clearly in a series of messages. Targets for hacking and DDoS attacks are listed next to manifestos outlining how to wage information war on behalf of Kyiv. The list of targets includes government and financial institutions, meaning that Russia’s critical infrastructure is in the crosshairs. Over 270,000 people have subscribed to the channel so far.
Numerous ransomware gangs have also declared their intentions in the conflict. But again, although the messages instantly made headlines, none of the groups have carried out any visible, verifiable attacks. Though hacktivist collectives like Anonymous have been vocal about their own involvement, including claims to have breached Russian government databases, multiple such claims have been quickly debunked. But the grandiose proclamations and misinformation have successfully spread like wildfire. Frauds, liars, and grifters are adding to the chaos of the war.
The confusion extends to groups organized by prominent figures and even governments. The Belarusian Cyber Partisans, an anti-regime hacking group with a track record of real activity inside its own country, claims to be a part of a hybrid cyber-physical effort to sabotage railroads transporting troops. That’s been impossible to verify.
A Ukrainian cyber resistance group, organized by officials from Ukraine’s defense ministry, says it is targeting railroads and power grids inside Russia. It’s a bold claim not backed by any proof. Experts believe that only a few nations possess the capability to interfere with power grids by cyberattack.
Ghostwriter, a hacking group linked to Russia and Belarus, has been seen targeting Ukrainian politicians and military personnel—but the group has so far failed to achieve any meaningful success. An unknown hacking group used destructive wiper malware against Ukrainian government targets just hours before the invasion, according to Jean-Ian Boutin, head of ESET Threat Research, but the actual impact there remains unclear as well.
Kaspersky, Russia’s biggest cybersecurity firm, declined an interview request to discuss what its experts are seeing inside Russia. But something is happening: Russian foreign ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told Russian media this week that the country is under attack by “cyber terrorists from Ukraine.”
Related Story
Russia and Ukraine promised to cooperate and help catch the world’s most successful hackers. But things didn’t quite go to plan.
“We’ve never seen all these different players coming out like this before,” says Adam Meyers, vice president at the US cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike.
But when millions of people in city centers are under heavy artillery bombardment, what’s the real value of leaked databases and crippled websites? And how much of an impact has this international “army” really had? It’s hard to tell. When the IT Army sends out an IP address, the target does often go down—usually sooner rather than later. Many Russian sites now work only within Russia itself because they deny all connections from abroad, a defense against international attack without historical precedent on this scale.
But denial-of-service attacks are technically simple, easily reversible, and far less destructive than Russian missiles striking city centers and Ukrainian Molotov cocktails being thrown to repel the invading army.
All of this plays into the information war happening in both countries and around the world. Russia’s attacks against Ukrainian government and financial institutions in the days before the invasion seemed designed to undermine confidence in Kyiv’s leadership. Likewise, the Ukrainian government’s attempts to take down Russian government sites and launch its own messages inside Russia amount to Kyiv’s brand of information warfare. Ukrainian resistance on the ground and on the cyber front is bolstered by support from the West, a crucial lifeline when the country’s capital is almost entirely surrounded.
“Cyber is a tool leveraged in warfare and spycraft,” Meyers says. “There is an open armed conflict happening. This is no different than Ukraine asking people to come to the country to get a Kalashnikov and help fight the Russians on the ground.”
But the picture looks a bit different when you’re in Washington or London. For years Western governments have condemned cyberattacks from Russian soil. What happens now that Ukraine is openly appealing to hackers for help?
“Despite the United States government saying ‘We’re not allowing hacktivists to use American routers to do DDoS attacks on your state propaganda sites,’ Russia is probably not going to believe that,” says Michael E. van Landingham, a former Russia analyst at the CIA. “Russia uses cyber tools as an extension of state power. And Russian leaders mirror-image a lot. I think they’ll perceive attacks from Anonymous or any Western collective as attacks that Western governments promote.”
Much of what the IT Army of Ukraine is promoting is clearly a crime in the United States and every Western country. But the situation raises more than legal questions; it also forces new moral and geopolitical questions to the forefront.
“Governments in the West should strictly enforce laws against hacking against anyone who would attempt to deface or DDoS Russian sites or do anything [illegal] in the cyber realm,” says van Landingham. “That’s the only signaling we have to show it wasn’t a CIA plot, it wasn’t a Cyber Command attack—here’s the person, and here’s what we’re doing about it.”
Despite the chaotic environment, the seeming lack of verifiable major cyber operations coinciding with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is one of the big unknowns looming over the entire war. Russia has launched devastating cyberattacks on Ukraine in recent years but so far has stuck with traditional warfare since its invasion. The question is whether it may still turn to cyber in the coming weeks and months as the war drags on.
13. Keyboard army using restaurant reviews to take on Russian state media
Keyboard army using restaurant reviews to take on Russian state media
Reuters · by Jacob Gronholt-pedersen
March 2 (Reuters) - Rather than commenting on the food and service at Russian restaurants and cafes, some users have begun posting online reviews detailing Russian actions in Ukraine to try to smuggle information past the tight control of state media.
Russia's communications regulator has accused 10 local media outlets of falsely depicting what Russia calls a special operation to demilitarise Ukraine. On Tuesday, Russia took radio station Ekho Moskvy off air, because of its coverage of the invasion. read more
But online comments on platforms such as Google Maps and Afisha.ru, a widely used lifestyle and entertainment website in Russia, are harder to contain - especially as internet users turn to online tools such as VPNs to circumvent restrictions on social media. read more
In a review of one of Moscow's most popular seafood restaurants on Afisha.ru, one user wrote: "The deployment of troops in Ukraine is a war, not a special operation. Russian military kill children and civilians!!!!"
Another wrote: "The place was nice! However, Putin spoiled our mood by invading Ukraine. Rise up against your dictator, stop killing innocent people! Your government is lying to you."
Russia rejects the term invasion, saying its actions are not designed to occupy territory but to destroy Ukraine's military capabilities and capture what it regards as dangerous nationalists.
The identity of the authors behind the online comments could not be verified.
The numerous reviews prompted Moscow's mayor Sergei Sobyanin to say foreign online users were mounting a "psychological information attack", saying most of the information was coming from bots.
"Please do not fall for the calls of provocateurs. They are aimed at undermining the governance of the city and creating an atmosphere of chaos," he said. "They are trying to divide us."
A Twitter account associated with international hacking collective Anonymous, which has announced plans to take aim at Russia's online presence, has urged people to write reviews on Google Maps about what is happening in Ukraine.
Online users in Russia also recommended a strategy of posting pictures of Ukraine in reviews for popular eateries.
"In the text, write about the war and attach a photo of destroyed houses, casualties and people in bomb shelters," one Instagram user wrote.
Reporting by Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen; Additional reporting by Reuters in Moscow; Editing by Alison Williams
Reuters · by Jacob Gronholt-pedersen
14. How the US can beat Russia in Ukraine without firing a shot
Someone will always have to fire a shot somewhere.
Fortunately SOCEUR, 10th Special Forces Group, and a group of retired SF leaders have been quietly conducting unconventional warfare preparation of the environment to advise and assist in developing resistance potential since Russia invaded Crimea.
Time for everyone to bone up on resistance.
In the article below Andrew Milburn is operationalizing the theory and doctrine (though the US military lacks any significant doctrine on resistance and has long resisted unconventional warfare).
Thanks to USASOC and Johns Hopkins APL for providing the intellectual foundation for the study of resistance (Paul Tompkins single handedly led this effort and he deserves great credit). Read these publications (and the additional ones on revolutions, insurgency, undergrounds, and unconventional warfare) and you will have completed the foundational coursework for your advanced degree in resistance. . (note I cannot say resistance is the PhD level of warfare because the COINDINISTAs already co-opted that term. But I would not say that anyway, I argued at the time that "war" is the PhD level of warfare and all other forms of warfare are subsets of war which is a basic state of nature and humankind, but I digress. We must understand all aspects of warfare: nuclear, conventional, and irregular warfare)
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/ARIS.html
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/arisbooks.html
Science of Resistance
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/science-resistance.pdf
Resistance Manual
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-manual.pdf
Understanding States of Resistance
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/understanding-states-resistance.pdf
Understanding States of Resistance - Pocket Guide
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/understanding-states-pg.pdf
Resistance and the Cyber Domain
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/resistance-cyber.pdf
Narratives and Competing Messages
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Narratives_v2.pdf
Conceptual Typology of a Resistance
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/typology-resistance.pdf
Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/ARIS_Legal_Status-BOOK.pdf
"Little Green Men" A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-14
https://www.soc.mil/ARIS/books/pdf/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UNCLASS-hi-res.pdf
From SOCEUR (which is responsible for developing and operationalizing the resistance operating concept).
Resistance Operating Concept
https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/U-SMA-Brief-SOCEUR-Resistance-Operating-Concept.pdf
From the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) which has been teaching UW and resistance to those in the military and interagency who recognize the importance of such study.
Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) by Otto C. Fiala with foreword by Major General Kirk Smith and Brigadier General Anders Löfberg
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=54216464
How the US can beat Russia in Ukraine without firing a shot
Despite a brave showing by the Ukrainian army and people, Russian victory seems inevitable — but what then?
Watching the Ukrainian conflict unfold on television has been indescribably painful. For those U.S. military veterans whose experience of war lacks perhaps the moral clarity of the Ukrainian cause, the feeling of helplessness is particularly acute. Despite a brave showing by the Ukrainian army and people, Russian victory seems inevitable — but what then?
“We will be fighting,” Oksana Markarova, the Ukrainian ambassador to the United States announced last week. “Not only our brave and motivated military but all Ukrainians … We don’t expect others to fight with us, but we expect all the support we can get.”
Ambassador Markarova’s promise — echoed repeatedly in the press by her compatriots — offers hope that a post-invasion Ukrainian resistance will turn the tide on Putin, and convince Russia that Ukraine is untenable. For readers of a certain era, that thought will conjure up images from the “Guns of Navarone” — with David Niven and Gregory Peck creating havoc with a hapless Wehrmacht in the mountains of Yugoslavia. (A slightly younger generation might think of “Red Dawn.”) The reality, of course, is that getting a respectable resistance movement up and running requires deliberate planning, and — despite some blithe commentary in the media suggesting otherwise — is by no means a straightforward task for any government to pull off successfully. In the early parts of the Cold War, efforts by the CIA and MI6 to back resistance in countries behind the Iron Curtain, such as Ukraine, the Baltics and Albania, all ended in disaster. More recently, a U.S.-led effort to raise a local force to fight ISIS in Syria also failed.
If the United States is serious about supporting a resistance movement in Ukraine, the decision to do so needs to be made now and a deliberate plan put in place before the Russian Federation has engulfed the entire country.
Fertile ground for Ukrainian resistance
A Ukrainian police officer carrying an assault rifle walks on a platform backdropped by people waiting for a Kiev-bound train in Kostiantynivka, Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022. Russia launched a wide-ranging attack on Ukraine on Thursday, hitting cities and bases with airstrikes or shelling, as civilians piled into trains and cars to flee. (AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)
Ukrainian national resolve appears unshaken, which augurs well for a nascent resistance movement. And as anyone who has worked with the Ukrainian military will tell you, the last eight years of war with Russia, and increasingly close relations with the West, have led to a strong feeling of nationhood among the Ukrainian people. In a December poll of Ukrainians taken by a Kyiv think tank, 45% of respondents said they would resist a Russian invasion, weapons in hand. Even allowing for false bravado, that is a strong indicator of national resolve.
Evidence of this has been seen in the fight put up by the Ukrainian army from the outset of the invasion — the counter-attacks to take lost ground and the determined last stand made by a number of units and individuals. If Kyiv falls, the Ukrainian government will likely set up in Lviv, the largest city in western Ukraine, the birthplace of Ukrainian nationalism where 60% of the population say that they plan to resist a Russian occupation.
Popular support, however, while necessary for any resistance movement is by itself not enough. The U.S. government must now ensure that other conditions are in place.
What are the legal implications of supporting resistance in Ukraine?
A man stands in front of a Russian Ka-52 helicopter gunship is seen in the field after a forced landing outside Kyiv, Ukraine, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022. Russia on Thursday unleashed a barrage of air and missile strikes on Ukrainian facilities across the country. (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)
The first step must be to ensure that the domestic legal requirements for supporting a resistance movement are in place. If the Russians capture the whole country, then the question becomes one of sponsoring resistance against a sovereign nation, which is illegal in the absence of a Presidential Finding to permit covert action.
No finding will be needed if the United States recognizes a government in exile as the legitimate government of Ukraine. There’s a good chance that this question is already being discussed, or at least it should be. In 2016, while serving as a special operations task force commander in the counter-ISIS fight, our plans to raise an active resistance in Mosul were, at the last minute, stymied by a legal requirement that forbade us from using proxy forces for lethal action.
A clear policy: How far are we prepared to go?
President Joe Biden delivers remarks to Department of Defense personnel, with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10, 2021. (DoD photo by Lisa Ferdinando)
The United States needs to establish clear campaign objectives for the resistance, with the resources required and an assessment of the risks involved. The goal will be to sustain a viable resistance and cause pain for the Russians — ultimately forcing them to withdraw without risking armed conflict with Russia. But what will that entail?
Lethal aid has previously been thought of as the Rubicon for any country supporting an insurgency, but it’s not that simple anymore. Some of the most effective assistance that the United States can give a resistance movement in Ukraine will probably be in the cyber domain and on the electromagnetic spectrum — actions to selectively jam or deceive Russian command and control systems. Such actions, even if confined to those units in Ukraine, heighten the risk of escalation. This isn’t a topic that the United States can just back into. It needs to be discussed now.
A grinding war of attrition will not benefit the Ukrainian people. The longer the resistance continues, the more savage reprisals are likely to be; Russia has a track record of using brutal methods to suppress such activity, as witnessed in Chechnya. Washington will want to insist that members of the resistance are treated by the Russians as combatants with all protections that accrue under this heading. Convincing the Russian government that it is in its interests to do so will be the trick — it may seem that they have little more to lose at this point. As with everything that involves Putin, some creative diplomacy will be required in crafting a message that things will most certainly get worse for him if he mistreats captured members of the resistance or commits atrocities against the Ukrainian people. The story of Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of Serbia who died in his cell at the Hague while undergoing a trial for war crimes, provides a relevant cautionary tale.
Setting up safe havens
Ukrainian soldiers walk at the line of separation from pro-Russian rebels near Katerinivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine, Tuesday, Dec 7, 2021.(AP Photo/Andriy Dubchak)
Every successful resistance requires a safe haven, a secure area where a resistance force can resupply, train, treat its casualties, and plan future operations. The need for such a location is as much psychological as physical since a safe haven helps guard against the debilitating sense of isolation and vulnerability to exposure that must inevitably undermine the morale of any movement fighting an occupation force.
It is difficult, if not possible to seal a country’s borders hermetically. Historically, no counterinsurgency campaign has been completely successful in doing so — not the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam, the British in Northern Ireland nor again the U.S. military in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Ukraine, Europe’s second-largest country, has thousands of miles of border, much of which abuts against NATO territory. The Russians will not be able to stop the flow of aid to a resistance group across these borders, but safe-havens come at a cost for those countries that provide them, wittingly or otherwise. Occupying armies tend not to respect international boundaries when it becomes apparent that insurgent forces are using them for protection — cross-border air and artillery strikes and raids are the common methods used in such circumstances to destroy safe havens and to deter countries from hosting them. In some cases, safe havens incur a full-scale invasion — as was the case with Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 or South Africa’s incursions into Angola and Botswana in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the four NATO countries bordering Ukraine — Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania — this concern will already be weighing in a decision whether to support a Ukrainian resistance. Indeed, the ramifications of Russian retribution go beyond the individual countries involved — since any violation of their borders will trigger NATO’s Article V, thus challenging the principle of collective self-defense that lies at the heart of the organization’s founding treaty. Washington needs to move now to ensure that the countries concerned are on board, with a focus on Poland since that country’s position, length of border, and current U.S. military footprint make it the best option. Because of the potential downside involved for those countries, this will involve a concerted diplomatic effort.
The need for a safe haven is heightened by the transparency of the modern battlefield. Escaping the reach of occupying forces is harder now thanks to drones, satellites, and thermal imagery. But technology, of course, works both ways. U.S. assistance will need to involve direct support to enable resistance units to defeat Russian drones and other methods of surveillance.
Supply sensors and shooters
Ukrainian servicemen load a truck with the FGM-148 Javelin, an American man-portable anti-tank missile provided by the US to Ukraine as part of military support, upon its delivery at Kyiv’s airport Boryspil on February 11, 2022, amid the crisis linked with the threat of Russia’s invasion. (Photo by Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP) (Photo by SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP via Getty Images)
Careful planning has to go into supplying the resistance with what it most critically needs. Logistics lines that are set up from point of manufacture or warehouse to distribution in-country or at a safe haven, are bound to be vulnerable. Redundancy is therefore all-important — as is prioritizing what gets passed along these lines.
Since resistance fighters are likely to be outnumbered in every engagement, they will need more than small arms or anti-tank weapons to give them the ability to engage the Russians outside the range of the latter’s weapons. Man-portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles have been making the news, but U.S. assistance should also include plentiful drones such as the Bayraktar TB-2, which is capable of penetrating Russian air defense systems and loitering munitions, which can search out and destroy with precision targets several miles from the operator. Even simple kamikaze drones such as the Switchblade, which has a range of roughly 6 miles and is relatively inexpensive, would be the ideal weapon to provide en masse to the Ukrainian resistance.
The Javelin anti-tank guided missile, already supplied to the Ukrainians, is the only such weapon capable of defeating the Russian T-90 tank’s reactive armor, but it requires a particular model of warhead to do so. It’s unknown if the Ukrainians are already in possession of this particular model, but if not, it should now become a priority to get it to them.
The same goes for the latest model of the famed Stinger anti-aircraft launcher, which advertises the ability to shoot down fast-flying fixed-wing aircraft. And lastly, a hand-held counter-drone capability will be worth more than its weight in gold.
Western military observers will have noticed the tendency among Russian mechanized infantry to remain “buttoned up” in their vehicles after contact with the enemy, effectively ceding the initiative and leaving themselves vulnerable to mass casualties from a single anti-tank projectile. This is partly a function of the way that the Russian battalion tactical groups are organized with just a few soldiers per vehicle, and partly a result of poor training. In a few weeks will come the springtime thaw, or rasputitsa – a term that means “time without roads” in that part of the world. The same intractable mud that stopped the Wehrmacht will now slow Russian operations and logistics efforts – making the armored vehicles upon which they are so dependent even more vulnerable.
Stand up a cyber resistance
U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Alex Oley, a field radio operator with 8th Communication Battalion, conducts a radio communication check during Exercise Cyber Fury 21, at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, July 26, 2021. Cyber Fury 21 is the third iteration of this exercise designed to enhance the capabilities of Delta Company by simulating a series of cyberspace attacks in order to sharpen and hone cyberspace defensive countermeasures. Oley is a native of Oahu, Hawaii. (U.S. Marine Corps photo illustration by Cpl. Armando Elizalde)
U.S. assistance should include cyber and electromagnetic operations targeting Russian forces in Ukraine. This carries with it the risk of escalation, but in the current situation the United States can make a clear distinction between cyber-attacks launched against the Russian homeland, and those directed against Russian military forces violating Ukrainian sovereignty, with the latter declared fair game. This last point could be made as an explicit red line to Putin to avoid turning a tactical cyber campaign into mutually assured paralysis.
Alternatively, because cyber and electromagnetic spectrum operations are notoriously hard to attribute and because their intermittent use in support of resistance operations could be below the threshold of Russian detection, the United States might choose not to claim ownership.
Electronic and cyber-attacks could be used to target the command and control nodes of those Russian units on Ukrainian soil. Such attacks would involve more than intermittently shutting these systems down. They would instead create ambiguity — a perception that Russian forces are not where they are supposed to be, and Ukrainian forces are everywhere.
The United States should also target Russian logistics via cyberattacks against rail networks in Ukraine and leading into Ukraine. A number of the Ukrainian rail lines are electrified and therefore vulnerable to cyber interference with control stations and power sources.
Get into Ivan’s head
ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN – JANUARY 12, 2022: A Russian peacekeeper is seen while passengers of an evacuation flight to Russia board a plane at Almaty International Airport. Russian military planes have evacuated 1,719 Russian and foreign citizens from Kazakhstan. Protests began in several Kazakh cities on January 2. Thousands of people were injured, some were killed. President Tokayev asked the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for help. Valery Sharifulin/TASS (Photo by Valery SharifulinTASS via Getty Images)
Insurgencies tend to be particularly nasty wars that bring out the worst in people. U.S. efforts should focus on delivering this fact to the Russian people — while undermining the morale of Russian soldiers in Ukraine. The occupation force is likely to be comprised — as most of the Russian Army is — of conscripts who lack the training, maturity, and discipline required to fight a successful counterinsurgency. They are less likely than regular soldiers to take the trouble to do those little but burdensome tasks that help keep you alive in such an environment.
They are more likely to succumb to grief and anger following the loss of comrades. And they are more likely to overreact to provocation, with results that undermine their cause. These are fertile conditions for a coherent information campaign, which could be launched by the Ukrainian resistance with U.S. technical assistance.
Build Ukrainian resistance networks
A woman and child peer out of the window of a bus as they leave Sievierodonetsk, the Luhansk region, eastern Ukraine, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022 (AP Photo/Vadim Ghirda)
The resistance must have roots in the heartland. Cross-border raids will have limited effect, so the resistance needs to strike instead where Russian forces are most vulnerable: logistics supply lines and command and control nodes. For these targets it is much easier to use resistance fighters already in the area — people living ostensibly normal lives but with access to weapons and communications — than to try to infiltrate a force from outside. The best approach may be to combine the two, which requires planning and preparation to put in place. The U.S. will likely be working now to identify and contact these networks, and if not, it probably should.
The U.S. military will need to set up a fusion cell with Ukrainians to process information collected, shared, and disseminated in support of the resistance. One proviso: U.S. military personnel involved will need to overcome their squeamishness about commercial platforms. In 2016, most traffic between my counter-ISIS task force and resistance groups in Mosul took place on WhatsApp and Skype. We shouldn’t expect the Ukrainian resistance to act differently.
Rescue the leaders
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy holds a press conference in regard of Russia’s attack on Ukraine in Kiev, Ukraine on February 24, 2022. (Photo by Ukrainian Presidency / Handout/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Russia’s leaders are already alleged to have drawn up capture or kill lists of those who might be involved in any resistance to prevent it from developing. Indeed, they would be foolish not to do so. The immediate aftermath of Russia capturing the country will see a round-up of these Ukrainians with an effect on the nascent resistance that is impossible to estimate now.
The United States should work with the Ukrainian government to get many of these leaders out of the country now, and into one of the safe havens being established to support the resistance.
Provide continuous training
Ukrainian soldiers ride in a military vehicle in Mariupol, Ukraine, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022. Russian troops launched their anticipated attack on Ukraine on Thursday, as President Vladimir Putin cast aside international condemnation and sanctions, warning other countries that any attempt to interfere would lead to “consequences you have never seen.” (AP Photo/Sergei Grits)
Creating resistance fighters from scratch is a labor and time-intensive enterprise with results that are more often than not disappointing. Ideally, resistance fighters are already familiar with the tools of the trade, and just need to be fed and equipped, as was the case, for instance, with Mujahedin fighting the Russians in Afghanistan. One can expect for there to be in Ukraine a pool of such men and women with the training and motivation to continue to resist: former soldiers of the Ukrainian Army in addition to the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian civilians with military experience. U.S. training efforts will focus therefore on specialized skills — such as the employment of drones and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapon systems or the manufacture of improvised explosive devices. U.S. trainers must also plan to collect and propagate by training specific tactics and techniques that have proved to be particularly effective against the Russians. These efforts will require semi-permanent camps, far enough from the border to avoid surveillance or attack. Such camps excite international interest and trigger political sensitivities, all of which Washington must be prepared for.
Where we go from here
Invading a country is one thing, occupying it is quite another, and barring escalation, time is on the side of the Ukrainian resistance. The Russians will move quickly to detain or kill resistance leaders, whose identities we must assume they know. These initial successes may disrupt initial plans for the resistance, but won’t be fatal. Other leaders will take the place of those who were arrested, or killed, and the organization will adapt and gain momentum.
Time may be on the side of the Ukrainians, but that does not mean that the insurrection will end quickly. The fall of the Taliban in 2002 at the hands of the Northern Alliance was an anomaly that may have left policymakers with a false impression. Resistance movements take time to build momentum and achieve their goals, usually years. Supporting an insurgency throughout will take political will and strategic patience — resources that are perhaps most likely to run out first.
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Andrew Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after a 31-year career as an infantry and special operations officer. His last position in uniform was Deputy Commander of Special Operations Central (SOCCENT), and prior to that commanding officer of the Marine Raider Regiment and Combined Special Operations Task Force – Iraq. Since retiring, he has written a critically acclaimed memoir, When the Tempest Gathers, and has had articles published in a number of national publications.
What’s new on Task & Purpose
15. The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age
The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age by Will Irwin and Dr. Isaiah "Ike" Wilson III
The Fourth Age of SOF: The Use and Utility of Special Operations Forces in a New Age is a sweeping monograph that chronicles the history of modern Special Operations Forces (SOF) and insightfully describes their new challenges. The authors have compiled an excellent, concise history of SOF’s three earlier ages: 1941–1960, 1961–1979, and 1980–2020, setting the stage for projecting SOF’s Fourth-Age roles in the emerging era of strategic competition. The early years were not easy, but with determination and perseverance, the SOF community prevailed, and four decades of remarkable and unprecedented SOF achievements resulted. As they begin their Fourth Age, SOF will again be challenged.
The 134 page monograph can be downloaded here:
16. Dollar reigns supreme after Russia's invasion
Dollar reigns supreme after Russia's invasion
Axios · by Neil Irwin · March 3, 2022
Money is memory, as the economist Narayana Kocherlakota once wrote. Ultimately, the dollars in a person's wallet, or checking account, are a record of having produced something of value to someone else, an entry in a cosmic ledger.
Driving the news: But memories can be forgotten. The Russian government and countless Russian companies and individuals are learning that the hard way.
Why it matters: Within the space of just a few days, the U.S. and its allies accomplished the astonishing feat of cutting Russia out of the global financial system. In the process they may have further entrenched the centrality of the U.S. dollar to the global economy.
The big picture: The Russian government had built up $630 billion in reserves to protect its economy against capital outflows. It now looks largely useless after the U.S. and allies cut off the Russian central bank's access to West.
- In a way, it's a startling reminder of the sheer power that nation-states have over the use of currency. In just a few days, they turned the world's 11th largest economy into the equivalent of a drug kingpin sitting on a big pile of un-laundered cash they can't spend.
Traditionally, there has been a tradeoff when the U.S. takes advantage of the dollar's primacy in the world economy to implement its foreign policy goals. The more that power is used, the more you risk losing it.
- So when the U.S. has enforced sanctions on Iran, North Korea and other countries by threatening those who violate them with cutting off access to the dollar-based financial system, it increases the urgency of China and other nations to create international financial alternatives.
In its scale and speed, the retaliation against Russia dwarfs any previous use of the global banking system to cut a nation out and render its assets unusable. So an important question is whether it commensurately puts the whole thing at risk.
Yes, but: This is not a situation in which the U.S. is acting alone. Rather, it is represents a rare moment of global unity, in which the vast majority of nations are appalled by Russia's actions, as evidenced the U.N. General Assembly vote to condemn the invasion: 141 to 5 with 35 abstentions.
- In that sense, it amounts to a moment when the value of the dollar-based global financial system is in clearer view — it creates a mechanism for the world to come together and call out a bad actor.
-
As Bloomberg's Matt Levine puts it, "If you do something so outrageous that society as a whole decides you are a pariah, then money is a way for society to express that."
The bottom line: Yes, there is always risk that using the tools of financial warfare will make them less useful in the future. But Russia's invasion is also showing the world just how costly it is to become a pariah state.
Axios · by Neil Irwin · March 3, 2022
17. Ukraine: Ham Radio Help
From a couple of trusted friends who are working the Ukraine problem. If anyone can help, please do. Please feel free to pass this on to anyone who might be able to assist - In government or the private sector.
1. Message One:
I received the following from a NATO SOF commander:
Here’s the report from the region:
“Info from _______ who has connections in Rus.
Because internet is mostly shut down in Russians to get the news, Russians are trying to get info from west through their radio amateurs and common folk from shortwave radios.
Lot of people are angry, don't understand sanctions, but most are scared of state so they think only how to get by. Young people and art people are most ready to get info and fight back. 40+ who get their info from russian tv are the hardest to convince, they are, like russians said, zombified or scared.
Radio is now the main channel where they expect to get free world info.”
If we can get this info into the ham radio network it would go viral.
My wife checked FB for a ham radio group and found one. She copied/pasted this info into a post on the group’s page.
Maybe you guys can help spread the word.
2. Message Two:
I ask the rhetorical question: WE have the capacity. What are WE doing? The DOD / US military / USG have the MARS (Military Auxiliary Radio System). HAM radios with certified / vetted local civilian volunteers. We all remember signing up for time to speak to our families when we were deployed to wind swept isolated global areas. And we all taught our kids the military “Over” so the HAM operator could flip the transmit / receive switch.
It takes a lot less moral courage than a no-fly zone or Lend Lease programme of ANG / USSOCOM Predators and Reapers piloted by Ukrainians from a third nation.
Here is the USAF System, and FYI, most Army bases have downsized MARS:
18. Opinion | What Putin’s top aides need to tell him today
Opinion | What Putin’s top aides need to tell him today
Michael Vickers, a former CIA officer, played a key role in supporting the Afghan resistance during the 1980s. He was undersecretary of defense for intelligence from 2011 to 2015.
Imagine yourself today in the unenviable shoes of Vladimir Putin’s national security aides, charged with briefing the Russian president on his options roughly one week into his disastrous Ukraine invasion.
The briefing, if it is an honest one, ought to go something like this:
Here is the situation, Mr. President: Our rapid-strike plan was supposed to have caused the Zelensky government to quickly capitulate, enabling us to install a puppet regime in Kyiv and incorporate Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Instead, it has unified the West, kindled in the Ukrainian people a fierce resistance, and led the NATO alliance and the European Union to boost their military support for Ukraine and impose economy-destroying sanctions on Russia.
We have suffered thousands of casualties and have been forced to disclose the names of at least some of them to the Russian people. We have lost hundreds of combat vehicles. Our main invasion force spent days stalled in what looks more like a traffic jam than an attack column.
Our options now are not great: We could double down in Ukraine by leveling Kyiv, Kharkiv and other major cities with artillery, missiles and airstrikes, killing large numbers of civilians. We could use chemical weapons, as Assad did in Syria, to terrorize the population further.
But the costs of taking these steps would be high and are unlikely to compel the Ukrainian people to give up. Even if we find and eliminate President Zelensky, he will be replaced by another leader, even in exile, and the war will go on. The longer it does, the more casualties we will suffer; and the more our military will be degraded.
We were driven out of Afghanistan in 1989 after we suffered 26,000 war dead over nine years. But Ukraine will be far worse for us. The size of our armed forces is a fraction of what it was during the 1980s. We can’t sustain such losses.
A resistance movement needs favorable terrain, a population willing to fight, neighboring states that can provide sanctuary, and an external sponsor willing to supply it with weapons, training, intelligence and political support.
Ukraine has all of these elements going for it.
Its active military and reserves number some 400,000 to 500,000. Many of them will survive to join the resistance. We have nowhere near the forces required to occupy and conquer a country of more than 40 million people the size of France. If we withdraw, any puppet regime we install will be in mortal danger.
The Ukrainian resistance will be equipped with many times more Stinger antiaircraft missiles and far more lethal antitank weapons than fighters had in Afghanistan. Were Turkey to supply more of the drones that are destroying our combat vehicles, we will be in even more trouble.
In short, Ukraine will be the mother of all insurgencies.
Meanwhile, our economy is swooning. Many foreign companies are refusing to do business with us. The West is already denying us the semiconductors and other advanced technology on which our armed forces and economy depend. We might soon be cut off entirely from SWIFT, the global financial messaging system. And the more we escalate, the faster the West will place crippling sanctions on our energy sector, which provides more than 40 percent of our government revenue. Sanctions on the energy sector will crater the Russian economy.
Escalation is not attractive for other reasons.
We could hit the West with cyberattacks to damage their economy, but the West will respond in kind. We can strike the NATO front-line states whose territory is being used to supply the Ukrainian resistance, but that could well lead to a war with NATO that will only make our position much worse. Killing large numbers of Ukrainian civilians might even lead the United States to use its air power to stop the bloodshed. The Americans would make short work of us.
We could again threaten to use nuclear weapons, but the West will realize that this is an empty threat. Even the most limited use would provoke the indirect destruction of Russia, and massive use would lead to our rapid and complete destruction.
In sum, every day this war goes on, more of our economy and military power will be destroyed. We risk our people rising up against us. Instead of ending Ukrainian democracy, this war might end our rule.
If we are rational, we should find a way to declare victory and extricate ourselves from this no-win war right away.
19. As war loomed, U.S. armed Ukraine to hit Russian aircraft, tanks and prep for urban combat, declassified shipment list shows
Doing the right thing.
I am reminded of how the Special Forces motto "De Oppresso Liber" should be interpreted: "To Help The Oppressed Free Themselves."
As war loomed, U.S. armed Ukraine to hit Russian aircraft, tanks and prep for urban combat, declassified shipment list shows
The Washington Post · by Karoun Demirjian and Alex Horton Today at 10:13 p.m. EST · March 5, 2022
The United States drastically enhanced its shipments of lethal military aid and protective equipment to Ukraine as the prospect of a Russian invasion became more apparent and then a reality, according to a declassified accounting of transfers and sales reviewed by The Washington Post.
The list indicates that as early as December, the Pentagon was equipping Ukrainian fighters with arms and equipment useful for fighting in urban areas, including shotguns and specialized suits to safeguard soldiers handling unexploded ordnance. Over the last week, the Biden administration has increased such shipments, sending Stinger antiaircraft missile systems for the first time and further augmenting Kyiv’s supply of antitank Javelin missiles and other ammunition.
Taken together, the variety, volume and potency of firepower being rushed into the war zone illustrate the extent to which the United States sought to prepare the Ukrainian military to wage a hybrid war against Russia, even as President Biden has expressly ruled out inserting American troops into the conflict.
“This is a continuous process. We are always, always looking at what Ukraine needs, and we’ve been doing this for years now,” a senior defense official told reporters Friday on the condition of anonymity under ground rules established by the Pentagon. “We have just accelerated our process of identifying requirements and accelerated our consultations as well with the Ukrainians, talking to them daily, as opposed to periodic meetings that we did before this crisis.”
John Kirby, the Pentagon’s chief spokesman, declined to comment. The list of materiel reviewed by The Post generally tracks with the administration’s broad public statements about the transfers. It does not contain any information designated classified.
Though Ukrainian fighters have managed to slow the invasion, Russian forces continue to make gains as they bear down on urban areas. The capital, Kyiv, and Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, have come under heavy bombardment. Russian troops also are closing in on the strategic port city of Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov, and pressing from Crimea toward Ukraine’s other large port city, Odessa.
Many experts say that despite the Ukrainian military’s efforts to exhaust Russian forces, the war is destined to turn into a street fight, particularly if Moscow is able to assert control over key cities. The shipment list suggests that the Biden administration anticipated Ukraine would need to arm itself for a multipronged invasion.
It affirms that the Biden administration has sent Stinger man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, to Ukraine in the last several days, weapons that would aid soldiers targeting Russian aircraft. Those were provided alongside shipments of Javelin missiles and launchers, a mainstay of military assistance to Ukraine since 2018, as well as ammunition.
About $240 million of the $350 million in military assistance that was approved in late February has already been transferred to Ukraine, according to a senior defense official.
The Pentagon has declined to specify the amount or confirm the full roster of military equipment being supplied to Ukraine since Russian threats against the country sharply escalated over the winter. U.S. officials have cited concerns about identifying what capabilities the Ukrainians have at their disposal.
The United States is one of 14 countries that have delivered security assistance to Ukraine, some of which includes materiel that was originally provided to other U.S. allies but was approved for transfer to Ukraine. Such third-party transfers include anti-armor and antiaircraft systems, according to the list reviewed by The Post.
In the last year, the United States has committed more than $1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine, the senior defense official said. That includes counter-mortar radars, secure radios, electronic equipment, medical equipment, vehicles and a steady supply of Javelin missile systems, according to the list The Post reviewed. At least nine Island-class patrol boats and five Mi-17 transport helicopters have also been provided to Ukraine from the U.S. reserve of excess defense articles.
Ukraine had previously received 210 Javelins through the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing program in 2018 and purchased an additional 150 Javelins that arrived in 2020.
The United States has committed about $3 billion in military aid to Ukraine since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.
The Washington Post · by Karoun Demirjian and Alex Horton Today at 10:13 p.m. EST · March 5, 2022
20. The West is trying to destroy Russia's economy. And analysts think it could succeed
A strategic strangulation campaign.
But will the American people support it with the likely economic blowback on the US economy? Can we do something for the greater good? We might suffer economic pain. But the Ukrainians may be at the nexus of the competition between authoritarianism and democracy and the outcome could very well shape the international order and democracy for decades and generations to come. Apologies for the seeming hyperbole but I think we are at a very real inflection point. And there is the opportunity to take advantage of the inflection point and shape a positive outcome. If we are willing to make the necessary sacrifices.
The West is trying to destroy Russia's economy. And analysts think it could succeed
KEY POINTS
- The Group of Seven, or G-7, major economies have imposed unprecedented punitive sanctions against the Central Bank of Russia along with widespread measures by the West against the country’s oligarchs and officials.
- French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire on Tuesday told a French radio station that the aim of the latest round of sanctions was to “cause the collapse of the Russian economy.”
CNBC · by Elliot Smith · March 3, 2022
VIDEO5:2005:20
The West's unprecedented sanctions against Russia could cripple its economy
LONDON — Western nations have responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine with a raft of sanctions intended to cripple the country's economy, and economists suggest it could work.
Key Russian banks have been barred from the SWIFT international payments system, preventing them from secure international communication and ostracizing them from much of the global financial system.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken appears on a screen as he delivers a speech during the 49th session of the UN Human Rights Council at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, March 1, 2022.
Salvatore Di Nolfi | Reuters
Sanctions announced by the U.S. over the weekend also targeted the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
They also effectively prohibit Western investors from doing business with the central bank and freeze its overseas assets, not least the vast foreign currency reserves the CBR has used as a buffer against the depreciation of local assets.
In the latest crackdown on Moscow, U.S. President Joe Biden announced Tuesday that Russian flights would be banned from U.S. airspace, following similar decisions by the EU and Canada.
French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire on Tuesday told a French radio station that the aim of the latest round of sanctions was to "cause the collapse of the Russian economy."
The Russian ruble has plunged since Russia invaded its neighbor last week and hit an all-time low of 109.55 against the dollar on Wednesday morning. Russian stocks have also seen massive sell-offs. The Moscow stock exchange was closed for a third consecutive day on Wednesday as authorities looked to stem the bleeding in local asset prices.
VIDEO3:3003:30
'Unprecedented' for the G-7 to sanction a G-20 central bank, says think tank
Meanwhile, the country's largest lender, Sberbank, exited its European operations and saw its London-listed shares fall more than 95% to trade at a penny. Shares of the country's other major players on the London Stock Exchange, including Rosneft and Lukoil, also collapsed.
The CBR on Monday more than doubled the country's key interest rate from 9.5% to 20% in a bid to curtail the fallout, but analysts believe the move to freeze its foreign exchange reserves is the key to blocking its ability to stabilize the Russian economy.
Swedish economist and former Atlantic Council senior fellow Anders Aslund tweeted Wednesday that the Western sanctions effectively "took down Russian finances in one day."
"The situation is likely to become worse than in 1998 because now there is no positive end. All Russia's capital markets appear to be wiped out & they are unlikely to return with anything less than profound reforms," he added.
Facing a 'serious financial crisis'
"While previously the CBR could rely on its reserves to smooth out any temporary volatility in the Ruble, it is no longer able to do so. Instead, it will need to adjust rates and other non-market measures to stabilize the Ruble," said Clemens Grafe, chief Russia economist at Goldman Sachs.
"Limiting Ruble volatility without adequate reserves is more difficult and the Ruble has already sold off, with implications for inflation and rates."
Goldman Sachs has raised its end-of-year forecast for Russian inflation to 17% year on year from a previous projection of 5%, with risks skewed to the upside given that the ruble could sell off further, or the CBR may be forced to hike rates more to maintain stability.
Economic growth is also expected to take a severe hit, and the Wall Street giant cut its 2022 GDP (gross domestic product) forecast from a 2% expansion to a 7% contraction year on year, though Grafe acknowledged uncertainty surrounding these figures.
"Financial conditions have tightened to a similar level to 2014 (Russia's annexation of Crimea), and hence we think domestic demand will contract by 10% [year on year] or slightly more," Grafe said.
VIDEO3:0803:08
Putin's counter sanctions have shaken the credibility of Russia, economist says
"While exports are, in principle, not significantly restricted by the sanctions so far, we expect them to contract by 5%yoy because of the physical disruption of exports through the Black Sea ports, which are instrumental for dry bulk exports, and the risk of sanctions reducing other exports."
This scale of decline is similar to the 7.5% fall during the 2008/9 financial crisis and the 6.8% contraction during Russia's financial crisis in 1998.
"The ratcheting up of Western sanctions, alongside a tightening of financial conditions and the prospect of a banking crisis, mean that Russia's economy is likely to experience a sharp contraction this year," Liam Peach, emerging markets economist at Capital Economics, said in a note Tuesday.
Although the outlook remains highly uncertain, Capital Economics' baseline forecast is for a 5% contraction in Russian GDP in 2022 compared with its previous forecast for 2.5% growth, and for annual inflation to reach 15% this summer.
Peach suggested that a worst-case scenario for Russia in terms of international sanctions would involve restrictions on the flow of oil and gas, which represents about half of all goods exports and a third of government revenue.
"Restricting these would also choke off a key source of dollar incomes for energy companies that have FX debts and perhaps cause a much more significant financial crisis in Russia," he added.
Depth of recession depends on exports, China
"Russia has also moved a large portion of their foreign exchange reserves into the Chinese currency and switched their payment systems to Chinese banks. China may hold the key to Russia's ability to sustain the conflict," Bell added.
As yet, there are no sanctions on Russian exports, and SWIFT exclusions are targeted at specific banks to allow export payments to continue being processed. Goldman Sachs' Grafe suggested that this might not be the case much longer.
VIDEO2:4602:46
Need to watch the Russia-China links, analyst says
"The willingness of the G7 to incur costs is rising and it might ultimately imply that restricting Russian exports and accepting higher commodity prices could become politically feasible," Grafe said.
A major constraint for Russia is its inability to use its foreign exchange reserves to underwrite the ruble, but Grafe suggested this could be overcome by changing the ruble's reference currency to the Chinese yuan from the U.S. dollar.
"This would also allow the CBR and the Ministry of Finance to adhere to their fiscal rule that channels the excess fiscal savings due to higher oil prices into foreign assets," he said.
However, creating a cross-currency market would need full cooperation from Beijing, which Goldman Sachs sees as unlikely given the risk to China of secondary sanctions for helping Russia sidestep Western sanctions.
CNBC · by Elliot Smith · March 3, 2022
21.
22.
Ukraine’s Special Forces Hold Off Russian Offensive on Kyiv’s Front Lines
Graphics and video at the link.
Ukraine’s Special Forces Hold Off Russian Offensive on Kyiv’s Front Lines
Weapons from the West make a big difference—as do the Russians’ poor tactics, Ukrainian officers say
| Photographs by Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal
March 4, 2022 1:06 pm ET
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IRPIN, Ukraine—Every day for the past week, Russian forces have tried to fight their way through this suburb of Kyiv to reach the Ukrainian capital. And every day, Ukrainian troops have forced them to retreat, leaving burning tanks and armored personnel carriers behind.
“We go out to hunt and destroy them,” said Volodymyr, a Ukrainian special-forces team leader, as his squad, armed with a British .308 sniper rifle and British-made antitank weapons, waited for the latest Russian attack. “They certainly didn’t come here expecting that, expecting that we know how to fight.”
Volodymyr, left, with the Ukrainian special-forces team he leads, in Irpin on Friday.
The Ukrainian special-forces unit has been going on missions near Irpin every night.
The front lines here have largely held fast since the first day of the war, on Feb. 24, when a Russian column pushed in from Belarus to the north. In some places, including the neighboring town of Bucha, the Russians have been pushed back.
“Ukraine is fighting in a way nobody expected, not the Russians and not our Western partners,” said Mykhailo Podolyak, a Ukrainian presidential adviser and member of Kyiv’s delegation at cease-fire talks with Russia. “Kyiv was supposed to have fallen in three days.”
In part, that is because Ukraine has deployed elite special-forces units, trained by the U.S. and allies over the past several years, to defend Kyiv. Armed with British NLAW and American-made Javelin antitank weapons and Stinger antiaircraft missiles, they have helped blunt the Russian advantage in aviation and long-range missiles and artillery.
Ukrainian forces took cover from shelling in Horenka, on the outskirts of Kyiv, on Friday.
Soldiers said cloud cover has hampered Russia’s use of combat helicopters.
“We’re in shock at how dumb their behavior is,” said another member of the Ukrainian special-forces unit who has been going on missions in the area every night. His unit, he said, had lost two soldiers since the war began nine days ago, and killed more than 60 Russians in recent days. “Now, we mostly focus on hitting their rear, their supply convoys, because if they don’t get fuel, they can’t do anything.”
Morale among Ukrainian defenders was high in Irpin on Friday, even as a Russian attack airplane flew low over a housing block and sounds of artillery rounds landing got closer and closer. Big plumes of black smoke rose to the north and south of town, along other major routes where Russian forces have been trying for more than a week to break into Kyiv.
Cloud cover has hampered Russia’s use of combat helicopters, soldiers here said. But to be prepared in case enemy choppers or attack planes approached, one of the soldiers took a position with a portable antiaircraft missile on his shoulder. Troops here say they operate their own small drones, including some with thermal cameras, to hunt for Russian targets.
“The Russians keep trying to enter and to encircle us, but they just can’t. We are together, we are organized, and we are strong-willed,” said Alyona Pavlova, an Irpin native and a soldier who was helping evacuate civilians from the town on Friday. “It’s a real war—and nobody was really ready at first, because nobody really believed that Russia would do something this mad.”
Civilians have fled the fighting in Irpin and other cities under Russian control.
Children were evacuated from the fighting in Irpin on Friday.
Ukrainian and foreign civilians have been streaming out of Irpin and cities beyond that are under Russian control, walking toward the relative safety of Kyiv despite shelling and airstrikes.
With a bridge over the Irpin River blown up, they have to climb down and under the span and then navigate a precarious pathway, their suitcases and pets in their hands. There was no formal agreement with Russia on the humanitarian corridor here, Ukrainian soldiers said, and the risk of a Russian shell hitting the area, something that happened before, was constant.
“I’ve spent seven days hiding in a shelter, but today the power went off and enough is enough,” said Mykhailo, a screenwriter who hiked with two backpacks for more than an hour from the other side of Irpin, near the next town of Bucha. He declined to provide his surname.
“The Russians are hitting everywhere, and it’s blowing up just outside my home now,” he said. It is the second time Mykhailo said he has had to move. He fled his hometown of Luhansk after pro-Russian forces took it over in 2014.
Tanya Rybko and her two children spent the entire morning walking from the town of Hostomel north of here. Russian forces control several parts of town, while Ukrainians are deployed in others. “And tonight, we were right in the middle of it all, between the two sides,” she said.
Russian troops, she added, had taken over a nearby apartment building, holding civilians hostage and seizing their phones so residents don’t phone in tips to Ukrainian troops. Hungry, the Russian forces were also looting local stores and homes, looking for food, she said.
Civilians evacuating from Irpin on Friday. Some of them are seeking shelter in the relative safety of Kyiv.
The risk of a Russian shell hitting the area was constant, Ukrainian soldiers said, as there was no formal agreement with Russia on a humanitarian corridor in Irpin.
Mohammad Amin, a Tunisian information-technology specialist, has been living in Ukraine for the past 10 years. On Friday, Mr. Amin, his Ukrainian wife and their 4-year-old son, with a small suitcase in tow, left the apartment they had purchased in Irpin and walked for nearly an hour to the bridge, hoping to get to Kyiv and then on to the European Union.
“I just cannot sit in the shelter anymore,” Mr. Amin said, out of breath. “The Russians, they are just jealous. They feel themselves defeated, and so they are just hitting apartments with civilians in them. They know very well where civilians live.”
He pointed to Ukrainian soldiers guarding the bridge, with bright-yellow tape on their helmets. “And these people,” he said, “they are heroes. Believe me, I am telling the truth.”
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During Russian shelling on Friday, a fire broke out at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and raised concerns over a potential environmental disaster. The Ukrainian president called for a direct meeting with Vladimir Putin, who said the operation is going as planned. Photo: Energoatom/Reuters
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Appeared in the March 5, 2022, print edition as 'Ukraine Special Forces Stymie Russia on Kyiv’s Front Lines.'
European peace seems as fragile as ever
By Kevin Connolly
BBC News
Published
5 hours ago
WWII Soviet propaganda poster depicting hoped-for victory over the Nazis - which Putin constantly references
There are moments when the tectonic plates of history shift beneath our feet and Europe is violently remade. It is time to recognise that we are at such a moment. Time too, to stop saying that it is somehow unbelievable that this can be happening in 2022.
It is no more unbelievable now than it was in 1914 or 1939 - nothing predetermined that they would be years when darkness would descend. That's not to say, of course, that we are on the edge of a war that will suck in the rest of Europe or even the world.
The point is that peace is always fragile - and that what happens even in the most distant corners of Europe will always affect all of us.
Drawing the right lessons from those big moments when everything changes is not easy.
The French military commander Ferdinand Foch called the end of World War One a "20-year" ceasefire - because he felt the victorious allies had overplayed their hand in dealing with the defeated German Empire. He was about a year out.
Image source, Getty Images
Image caption,
Ferdinand Foch circa 1914
The question for our generation is whether or not we made a similar miscalculation over how to handle Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed. We rejoiced as Poland, the Baltic States and others took their place among the free nations of the world.
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - once occupied by Soviets - joined Nato in 1999. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia followed five years later.
But the dark energy that drives Vladimir Putin is the other side of that coin. He saw Russia diminished, humiliated and stripped of what he saw as its right to a buffer zone of subordinate states.
He illustrates the point with a story - which might even be true - from his own shadowy past. A former colonel in the counter-intelligence corps of the KGB, Putin was reduced to acting as a part-time taxi driver. One imagines he would have been rather a difficult one.
At some point he conceived an almost mystical concept of restoring lost Russian greatness. He must have been encouraged by the way in which he got away with the annexation of Crimea - from Ukraine - in 2014. After all, four years later we were enjoying the World Cup in Russia.
Western Europe's main reaction to the end of the Cold War was to take a 30-year holiday from serious defence spending.
Image source, Getty Images
Image caption,
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union's dissolution and his resignation on 25 December 1991
At one point a few years ago, only four of Germany's 128 fighter aircraft were combat ready and the Dutch had a plan to dispose of every one of their heavy tanks. The Dutch have thought again and the Germans are now proposing to spend an extra €100bn (£83bn) on defence.
It is good of course that Germany reflects on its past, but it's even better that it is thinking of the future too.
The German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is a Social Democrat who certainly didn't run for office on a promise of raising defence spending but he has risen to the historical demands of the moment rather impressively.
"With the invasion of Ukraine we are in a new era," he told the German parliament - defining the challenge of that new era as a simple question: "Whether we allow Putin to turn back the clock, or whether we mobilise power to set boundaries for warmongers such as Putin."
They are extraordinary words from the leader of a country where politicians once argued that the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 made it impossible to stand up to the Kremlin.
Image source, Getty Images
Image caption,
A Ukrainian soldier with rocket launchers in Kyiv
Sweden, which is wealthy and well-armed but militarily non-aligned, was the first country to feel colder winds blowing from the East and perhaps the first to act. It is increasing defence spending by an extraordinary 40% in its current five-year cycle - raising new infantry regiments and buying American Patriot anti-aircraft missiles.
The Swedish Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist said simply: " We have a situation where Russia is prepared to use military means to achieve political goals."
So the rather decadent view - that the only weapon the West would ever need is economic sanctions - is out of fashion now. You can't fight tanks with banks. No-one wants to see this continent turned into an armed camp of course, but when you feel those tectonic plates shifting you have to shift with them. Acting now - buying weapons and donating money - is the easy bit when the hot sharp stab of outrage is fresh.
But this new age of containment is going to call for much more. The will to stand with Ukrainians first - but then the grit, vision and staying power to stand guard over freedom wherever and whenever the next attack might come.
Russia attacks Ukraine: More coverage
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