Quotes of the Day:
"Question: Why are we Masters of our Fate, the captains of our souls? Because we have the power to control our thoughts, our attitudes. That is why many people live in the withering negative world. That is why many people live in the Positive Faith world."
- Alfred A. Montapert
“It is not to political leaders our people must look, but to themselves. Leaders are but individuals, and individuals are imperfect, liable to error and weakness. The strength of the nation will be the strength of the spirit of the whole people.”
- Michael Collins
Since the Korean War, U.S. and South Korea have established an enduring friendship with shared interests, such as denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, combating aggression abroad and developing our economies.
-Charles B. Rangel
1. With North Korea talks stalled, some wonder: What if we tried something different?
2. 'Peace game' provides clues to comprehensive deal with North Korea
3. Beyond Deterrence: A Peace Game Exercise for the Korean Peninsula
4. Small quakes reported near North Korea nuclear site amid talk of resumed testing
5. The diary of a doomed commando (north Korea)
6. Factbox: Houses, scandals, missiles: The issues at stake in S.Korea's presidential election
7. The threat of North Korea: The Statesman
8. U.S., of all places, warns against travel to Korea due to Covid
9. Five years since Kim Jong Nam's murder
10. U.S. diplomat eyes potential fallout from Ukraine crisis on S. Korea, other Asian countries
11. Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy envisions tighter triangular cooperation with S. Korea, Japan to confront China, N. Korea
12. N. Korea to issue commemorative coins marking late former leader's birthday
13. Most S.Koreans Dislike China as Much as N.Korea
14. North Korean authorities move to identify activists in Russia who help North Koreans defect
15. S. Korea to urge New York City officials to take actions against anti-Asian crimes
16. North Koreans in Russia ordered to work in groups so they can’t escape
1. With North Korea talks stalled, some wonder: What if we tried something different?
I participated in this USIP-Quincy event. I will forward my AAR comments with the report in the next message. I was the very lone voice of dissent and the token former military person.
With North Korea talks stalled, some wonder: What if we tried something different?
The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee LeeToday at 7:03 a.m. EST|Updated today at 7:31 a.m. EST · February 14, 2022
TOKYO — As his term comes to an end, South Korean President Moon Jae-in made a final plea last week to resume diplomatic talks with North Korea — the defining ambition of his presidency, and one that feels more out of reach than ever.
As that limbo drags on, some North Korea watchers are wondering: What if negotiators had taken a radically different approach? And what if President Donald Trump’s more hands-on approach was the norm?
To that end, researchers at three think tanks in Washington and Seoul envisioned a world where Moon’s (and Trump’s) efforts toward rapprochement with the nuclear state panned out.
A team of former diplomats, policymakers, academics and analysts created three scenarios in which, rather than walking away from the Hanoi summit in 2019, Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un reached an interim deal, which led to further negotiations.
For example, one scenario was set several years from now, in a world where the United States and North Korea had taken mutual confidence-building measures, such as Pyongyang declaring a list of nuclear facilities and Washington temporarily easing certain sanctions — both sticking points in real life as the two sides have hardened their positions.
The authors of the report, released Monday, acknowledge that it’s difficult to extrapolate too much from the exercise, but say it was designed to open up perspectives beyond the status quo. They argue that for too long, U.S. negotiators have viewed North Korea as a security threat to manage, rather than a country they can work with over time toward a peace agreement.
The research was conducted by analysts from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft (which advocates for military restraint), and the South Korean think tank Sejong Institute, whose leadership is allied with Moon.
“The problem with [the] conventional approach is that while it may have been successful in deterring and containing North Korea, and preventing a war, it’s also been equally unsuccessful in improving relations and reducing the threat and building peace,” said Frank Aum, a senior expert on Northeast Asia at the U.S. Institute of Peace and former Pentagon senior adviser on North Korea issues, who co-wrote the report.
The writers presented takeaways they hope will give new perspectives — including scenarios in which U.S. and North Korean “negotiators” were more willing to find areas of agreement and make concessions after they received instructions from their respective leaders to “seek, as best they could, to reach a final, comprehensive peace settlement.”
“The intractability of the Korean Peninsula problem and the calcification of positions over the last seven decades means that only the highest level of executive leadership can compel an end to the impasse,” the report read.
The finding reflects the view among some analysts that Trump’s summit diplomacy, while imperfect, was a new and “extraordinarily bold” approach that brought new momentum toward progress. For example, a recent NK News survey of 82 North Korea specialists from around the world found overwhelming agreement that Trump’s leader-to-leader approach with Kim “represents the best decision by Washington during the Kim Jong Un era.”
In addition, in response to a question about what Washington should do next, more than one-third of the respondents said they believed the United States “should take a radical turn in its policy toward North Korea.”
“It seems to me that we are very close to returning to a period of constant provocations. The situation is not good, and what we can expect is a chorus of people that say … we need to double down, squeeze North Korea even harder,” said Jessica Lee, a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute’s East Asia Program and co-author of the report. “I would say the situation on the peninsula has evolved, and we need fresh perspectives like the ones offered in this report.”
U.S. and South Korean negotiators have urged North Korea to return to talks, assuring Pyongyang that they have no preconditions. But the Biden administration has not shown it is willing to grant the sanctions relief that Kim seeks. Meanwhile, South Korea has continued to build up its military capabilities, which it describes as a defensive measure toward the nuclear-armed North.
North Korea views sanctions, South Korea’s arms buildup and U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises as “hostile” policies that are inconsistent with talk of negotiations. And there is little sign of either side backing down.
Read more:
The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee LeeToday at 7:03 a.m. EST|Updated today at 7:31 a.m. EST · February 14, 2022
2. 'Peace game' provides clues to comprehensive deal with North Korea
I participated in this "Peace Game." I had a much different take than the organizers and report authors.
'Peace game' provides clues to comprehensive deal with North Korea - Responsible Statecraft
‘Peace game’ provides clues to comprehensive deal with North Korea
New brief underscores need for flexible diplomacy, including gradual concessions that can be reversed if not reciprocated.
February 14, 2022
Achieving the long-desired U.S. goal of a comprehensive denuclearization agreement with North Korea will require the engagement of the highest levels of U.S. executive leadership, an initial focus on smaller and more reversible confidence-building measures, greater coordination with Seoul, and a conscious effort on Washington’s part to separate the North Korea issue from its strategic competition with China, according to a new Quincy Institute report released Monday.
The report is the result of a “peace game” exercise conducted last October. Its release comes in the wake of last month’s record number of North Korean missile tests which underlined the urgency of breaking the ongoing deadlock in talks between Pyongyang, its neighbors, and Washington.
“A decade into his rule, it appears that Kim Jong Un is prioritizing military modernization above all else,” said Jessica Lee, a Korea expert at the Quincy Institute and the new report’s co-author. “It’s a very worrisome situation that requires creative and high-level diplomacy by all parties.”
The peace game exercise, a collaborative project by the United States Institute of Peace, the Quincy Institute, and the South Korea-based think tank Sejong Institute, featured 16 regional experts tasked to play negotiators from the United States, China, and North and South Korea. Participants responded to three interconnected scenarios that progressively moved toward a final and comprehensive peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula. The game highlighted non-military steps that could be taken to reduce tensions and restart negotiations without undermining U.S. security interests.
Among the key findings from the exercise was that the United States and North Korea were the central actors, but also the players least willing to take the first conciliatory step or generate new ideas. The exercise also revealed a divergence between the U.S. and South Korean teams on the nature of the North Korean threat and the critical role to be played by presidential leadership and political will if a final agreement is to be reached.
“These findings suggest that a mutually acceptable deal between the United States and North Korea may be possible if one side is willing to assume some risk and take the first magnanimous step,” according to Frank Aum, a Korea expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace who also co-authored the report. “Also, since Washington and Seoul are allies, they need to harmonize their approach to risk and risk mitigation.“
The United States and South Korea frequently perceived the North Korean threat differently, hampering the alliance’s ability to make diplomatic breakthroughs and coordinate joint policies. And the cloud of U.S.-China strategic rivalry also created its own obstacles. The U.S. team was more likely to see Korean security issues as hedging against Beijing’s regional aspirations, thereby conflating matters of preeminent importance to Korean denuclearization — such as the possible withdrawal of the THAAD missile defense system — with suspicions about Chinese intentions in negotiations.
The most tangible progress in the peace game came about after a hypothetical directive from both the U.S. and North Korean presidents ordering their respective negotiators to use their best efforts to reach a peace settlement before the end of the exercise. This led to a more active discussion among the teams about areas of compromise and a greater determination to work out persistent disagreements.
The exercise’s central takeaway was that a peaceful resolution of the issues facing the Korean Peninsula is ultimately possible. Offering gradual concessions that are reversible, such as providing partial sanctions relief that can be reversed if not reciprocated, could help overcome the paralysis caused by risk aversion on the part of both North Korean and American negotiators, in particular.
“[I]f policymakers believe that North Korea can be denuclearized in the long-term,” the report concluded, “that US-DPRK and inter-Korean relations can be improved, that regional tensions can be reduced, and that the arms race can be reversed, then innovative diplomatic strategies are essential. But innovation requires accepting and taking calculated risks.”
The exercise also revealed its shortcomings; the absence of actual North Korean participants limited its ability to generate fully informed decisions. Participants who were assigned to the North Korean team (one U.S and three Chinese experts on North Korea) played their roles as faithfully as possible but were constrained by their limited knowledge of the North Korean government’s current thinking on these issues.
In general, negotiators from the United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, and all other relevant parties must start with small, reversible measures to reduce tensions and build confidence before tackling larger issues, notably Pyongyang’s eventual denuclearization.
At stake is the possibility — underscored by Pyongyang’s tests last month — that diplomacy with North Korea will continue to stall as the situation on the peninsula worsens, leading slowly but surely to increased tensions, greater potential for regional proliferation, and an intensified risk of nuclearized military conflict.
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3. Beyond Deterrence: A Peace Game Exercise for the Korean Peninsula
Here are my summarized points for the AAR. I have much more detailed input that I provided throughout the exercise. I was the obstacle to the exercise on the US team. They did provide some of my input (readiness issues) but not all of it and almost none of my views are represented in this report. Some of my additional input is pasted below the EXSUM and introduction.
The bottom line for the exercise, in my opinion, is that it is a recommendation for appeasement of the Kim family regime based on a fantasy belief in the nature, objectives, and strategy of the regime.
Three points for the After Action Review/Final Report:
1. The scenario called for a suspension of disbelief. That calls for a strategic assumption. The assumption is that north Korea has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the north to ensure the survival of the Kim family regime.
This was necessary to drive the exercise to reach diplomatic solutions. This is fine. However, this assumption should be stated, and it should be acknowledged that if it proves to be wrong it means that the scenario and the diplomatic solutions developed will likely fail. If the strategy outlined above is not abandoned by Kim Jong-un then the security of the ROK will be at risk and the US may not be able to achieve its major strategic interest which is prevention of major conflict and war on the Korean peninsula.
2. The scenario has driven military readiness to an unacceptably low level. Four years of no training of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command will result in a headquarters that is unable to execute the defense plan for the ROK. This lack of readiness has also significantly eroded deterrence.
If military readiness is seriously degraded and deterrence is significantly reduced, then the chance of conflict will rise. I think this possibility should be acknowledged.
3. US military leaders will be compelled to provide their best military advice to the President and recommend withdrawal of all US forces from Korea because if they are unable to train, they cannot be left in harm’s way especially as the chance of conflict rises due to the degradation of deterrence. This will result in Kim Jong-un achieving his objective to get US forces off the Korean peninsula. The arguments that training can be reduced or adjusted and smaller scale training events can maintain readiness indicates a lack of understanding of the military instrument of power. If the ROK/US CFC cannot train at the theater level with its subordinate component headquarters it will not be able to execute the plans for the defense of the ROK.
I would like these points to be on the record with attribution to me.
A suggestion for a future exercise:
Make each team multi-national – have a US, ROK, and PRC representative on all four teams. However, this would require much more time allotted for team discussions but would also provide refined cross-leveling of ideas and understanding.
Beyond Deterrence: A Peace Game Exercise for the Korean Peninsula - Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Executive Summary
This report describes a virtual role-playing peace game exercise conducted in October 2021 that simulated diplomatic negotiations aimed at making tangible progress toward improving relations, enhancing security, and building confidence on the Korean Peninsula. The exercise, hosted by the United States Institute of Peace, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, and the Sejong Institute in Seoul, consisted of negotiating teams representing the United States, South Korea, North Korea, and China.
The U.S. and North Korean teams emerged as the principal actors in the exercise, determining whether negotiations remained static or moved forward. However, these teams perceived potential losses in negotiations more acutely than potential gains, which resulted in diplomatic inertia. Both teams seemed open to negotiations as long as the other side took the first conciliatory step, but presidential leadership and political will were necessary to overcome inaction. The U.S. team also seemed more driven by the risks of North Korean aggression and duplicity in negotiations than the South Korean team, which led to divergent policy approaches between allies. In addition, the U.S.-China rivalry fueled a zero-sum mentality that hindered opportunities for progress and heightened misunderstandings between the U.S. and South Korean teams. These observations lead to the following policy recommendations for the actors involved:
- Advancing peace and denuclearization will require the highest level of executive leadership and intervention from all parties to build support for a final agreement. For the United States, that means greater presidential prioritization and increased coordination with Congress.
- All parties should start with smaller, more reversible measures; mitigate the risk of failure; and highlight potential gains. The United States should consider confidence-building measures that jump-start negotiations but do not undermine its security interests.
- Washington should strengthen coordination with Seoul on North Korea policy and other key alliance matters to harmonize strategies.
- To achieve progress, all parties should separate issues pertaining to the Korean Peninsula from the U.S.-China contestations.
Introduction
For decades, U.S. policymakers have viewed North Korea primarily through the lens of a security threat. The fear of North Korean aggression, coercion, brinkmanship, instability, and attack based on the country’s provocative behavior since the 1950–53 Korean War has shaped how Washington views its objectives and risks on the Korean Peninsula. Likewise, North Korea’s own threat perception, based on what it sees as hostile U.S. behavior, has developed into a siege mentality that is used to justify repression at home and belligerence abroad.
In the United States, this security-focused perspective has led to analytical approaches, including war games, tabletop exercises, and simulations, that have focused primarily on how to deter, counter, manage, contain, and defeat the North Korea threat.
These approaches have contributed to the development of U.S. policies toward North Korea, particularly over the past decade, that have relied heavily on military deterrence and dominance, economic pressure, and diplomatic isolation from the international community. While these tools largely have been successful in achieving their intended objectives, particularly in preventing a war, they have also been severely inadequate in addressing the equally important goals of building peace and improving relations, which require different tools such as diplomatic risk-taking and confidence-building measures. Not surprisingly, there have been few sustained peacebuilding efforts on the Korean Peninsula during the last 70 years. As a result, the prevailing security paradigm has maintained a status quo that, while preserving the armistice and deterring major conflict, has not advanced peace and instead has heightened tensions and fueled a regional arms race.Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun meets with Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon, in Seoul, Korea, on December 9, 2020. (State Department photo/ Public Domain).
Even when diplomatic engagements have been launched, the inability of the United States, North Korea, South Korea, and China to advance negotiations beyond the initial stages has impeded opportunities to grapple with potential issues that could arise later in the peacebuilding process. The difficulty of resolving present challenges, such as how to initiate dialogue or develop reciprocal exchanges of denuclearization measures and sanctions relief, have pushed longer-term, but equally important, issues such as conventional force reduction, human rights, and the status of the United Nations Command (UNC) to the back burner.
Peace game exercises are not predictive of future behavior, but they can provide critical insights for current and future policymakers on a diplomatic solution to the North Korea challenge that can end the cycle of perpetual diplomatic stalemate and the security dilemma of constant military buildup.
To help overcome the narrow focus on deterrence and risk aversion and explore longer-term challenges in the peacebuilding process, the United States Institute of Peace, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington, D.C., and the Sejong Institute in Seongnam, South Korea, conducted a virtual role-playing “peace game” tabletop exercise that simulated diplomatic negotiations aimed at making tangible progress toward improving relations, enhancing security, and building confidence on the Korean Peninsula. The project sought to reframe the assumptions of traditional war game exercises, which often characterize North Korea only as a hostile threat and focus on the goals of deterring conflict, managing instability, achieving near-term denuclearization, and winning or avoiding a war. Instead, the exercise adopted new assumptions that highlight North Korea’s legitimate security interests and emphasize the goals of improving mutual relations, achieving tangible security benefits, reducing tensions, and reaching a final and comprehensive peace settlement.
The main objectives of the peace game exercise were twofold: (1) to encourage diplomatic risk-taking among participants by introducing conciliatory elements to the hypothetical scenarios that pushed progressively toward a negotiated settlement, and (2) to allow participants to explore opportunities and challenges that might arise in the later stages of a Korean peacebuilding process by having them engage with scenarios that bypassed traditional diplomatic stalemates.
Peace game exercises are not predictive of future behavior, but they can provide critical insights for current and future policymakers on a diplomatic solution to the North Korea challenge that can end the cycle of perpetual diplomatic stalemate and the security dilemma of constant military buildup. This exercise was also designed to help practitioners, academics, and students of North Korea chart a new way of thinking about the Korean Peninsula — one that is focused more on building peace than preserving the status quo.
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I wanted to flag a few points for you here that are not for negotiations, but I would recommend considering putting them in the report.
As of yesterday's scenario, there has been no training of the ROK/US CFC HQ for two years. I am not sure what is the time frame of scenario three. But the issue is that the CFC HQ is no longer a viable HQ due to lack of training. This also has significant impact on OPCON transition if anyone still cares about it at this time. But the military advice the military leadership will provide to the President is that we now have to remove US forces from the peninsula because we can no longer train. Of course the President is unlikely to accept that recommendation and he will keep some forces there. But eventually this will be a 60 Minutes television issue as they investigate the lack of readiness of US forces in Korea. I strongly recommend that as we move to a successful outcome as desired in this scenario we objectively address what these actions do to military readiness and deterrence (keeping in mind that prevention of war on the peninsula is in the US strategic interests. I know the argument will be that with an end of war declaration , denuclearization, and a peace treaty will prevent war but I do not think that is the case, especially after US forces are withdrawn.
The course of action to reduce troops from 28,000 to 22,000 with an increase in air and naval assets is unrealistic. We have already said no deployment of strategic assets. But from a military perspective it makes no sense to say we are increasing air and naval assets in theater. Where are we going to station them in the KTO? We are not going to homeport naval assets in Korea. We cannot expand the air bases at Osan and Kunsan to station more assets. The statement that we will increase air and naval presence is really a throwaway that cannot be executed but saying we will do so only irritates the Chinese and north Koreans. Of course we can now use that as a bargaining chip and say we will not deploy increased air and naval assets and then maybe we can get something for nothing.
In regards to a peace treaty I really think we have to make the case that the treaty needs to be negotiated between north and South as the two identified belligerents in the UNSCRs 82-85.We should emphasize the US did not declare war on north Korea and of course intervened under UN authorities. The US and China could appropriately provide security guarantees, but the main peace treaty should be between the ROK and the north. And based on scenario three with the US is being basically written out of security on the Korean peninsula this makes more sense.
In regards to calling for the withdrawal of US forces "controlled" by the UNC we should emphasize the Mutual Defense Treaty which provides the legal basis for US forces presence, not the UN Security Council resolutions.
The NLL is correctly described as a self-imposed administrative control line to prevent alliance shipping from straying into the north. It is not a recognized international boundary and was not established dot be one but of course it has de facto served as one. As the NWI island UN control is a fig leaf. They are totally controlled by the ROKG and defended solely by ROK forces. It is really only an annotation on a map that says they are under UN control. Maybe as part of negotiations they should be established as ROK sovereign territory, and a maritime boundary be established between ROK and north Korean territorial waters. Of course due to the proximity of the islands and north Korean mainland this will be complex.
I just wanted to give you a few points for consideration.
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If this is the end of the scenario and we are going to do the hotwash next week I will offer my military recommendation to withdraw US troops. There are no "smaller exercises" that can adequately train the CFC HQ and components to execute the defense plan. We would not have completed OPCON transition because it could not be completed without the training that only the major exercises can provide. The way this scenario has run the logical conclusion is there is no longer a combined defense capability to command and control combined forces. US military leaders must argue for the withdrawal of US troops because otherwise they are at risk. Leaving untrained forces and an untrained HQ in place is simply untenable from a military perspective. The diplomats who negotiated these agreements need to know and understand the effects of their actions. They may get a peace agreement and denuclearization but the north will still pose an existential threat to the South and we will have eliminated the primary deterrent capability. I hope it will scare the heck out of our ROK counterparts. Be careful what you ask for.
We will leave the defense of the ROK to the ROK military. Please note also that we will no longer have a military force in place that will be capable of executing a NEO should hostilities occur.
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Yesterday I forwarded the Yonhap article that this is derived from. However, Yonhap (the semi-official news service of the ROK government) left out the following anecdote from Mr. Biegun that is probably one of the most important ones that we need to read, understand, and heed. Thanks to the former NIO Markus Garlauskus for flagging the difference in the two articles (which may have had the original anecdote in it at Yonhap but seemed to be later edited out).
Excerpt:
He underlined the importance of finding the right mix of incentives for a country such as North Korea, noting he and former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, during their trip to Pyongyang prior to the 2019 Hanoi summit, had asked the North Korean leader if he would consider North Korea's membership in the World Bank as part of an economic incentive for denuclearization.
"I will never forget the answer. After all the hours of study and planning that we had put in place in order to queue up this initiative, Chairman Kim looked at Secretary Pompeo and said, 'What's the World Bank?' And that sent us the message that we had a lot a lot of work to do here," said Biegun.
"I'm afraid this concept of a brighter economic future was a bait that was much more attractive to us at the end of the day than it was to a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship."
This illustrates two key points. First, it is incredible that Kim Jong-un did not know what the World Bank was. Surely Mr Biegun and his team laid the groundwork for this proposal with KJU's "negotiators." What is just as incredible as Kim not knowing what the World Bank was is that his subordinates do not appear to have briefed him on the proposal so that he was caught unaware of the World Bank (and of course maybe his subordinates assumed he knew what the World Bank was or that if he did not know they could not give the appearance that they knew he did not know as that would undermine the perception of his omniscience.
The second point is that we view all the concessions we want to offer through our eyes and what we might think is logically good for Kim and north Korea.
The last administration's mantra was if Kim makes the right strategic decision (give up nuclear weapons) north Korea and Kim can have a brighter future. Of course we described that brighter future in terms of economic engagement visualized as hotel complexes in Wonsan shown on an iPad video. But what we failed to understand was that the right strategic decision and the brighter future for north Korea (and we assumed the Korean people too) were both threats to Kim Jong-un's rule and the survival of the regime. Of course Kim cannot make the right strategic decision because he likely believes giving up his nuclear weapons will undermine the power of the regime and give up a tool that is critical for deterrence, blackmail diplomacy, political warfare, and warfighting. The Treasured Sword is just too valuable and important for him to sacrifice and especially to sacrifice for the dangerous brighter future.
The second part of our equation, the brighter future was also likely perceived as a threat to the regime by Kim. The brighter future means economic engagement, investment, and development. This means opening to the outside world. With that comes information. And we fail to understand that outside information is an existential threat to the regime (this is why Kim Yo-jong speaks with the rhetoric she does and had the South Korean liaison building in Kaesong destroyed to extort the South into passing the anti-information law). I am always reminded of Dr. Jung Pak's (now the DASS for East Asia, and formerly of Brookings, and the CIA) critical question: "Who does Kim Jong-un fear the most: The US or the Korean people in the north?" The answer is the Korean people living in the north and I would add when they are armed with information. We know how much he fears the Korean people based on the entire system that has been developed by Kim Il-sung to control (and repress and oppress) a population of 25 million.
So what may seem logical and good to us may not be viewed the same way by KimJong-un. We must re-examine our assumptions (continually) about Kim and north Korea and we must try to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
Lastly, I think we should keep in mind that if Kim is contemplating engaging it is likely for two reasons. One could be desperate because he assesses the pressure is too great and that he cannot solve the problems without outside help (which he can never admit). The second could be that he assesses that engaging will bring him an advantage and that his political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy is working. We need to consider these two reasons as we move forward.
N. Korea may be considering engaging with S. Korea, US: Biegun
N. Korea may be considering engaging with S. Korea, US: Biegun
Published : Oct 16, 2021 - 10:23
Updated : Oct 16, 2021 - 10:29
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This may be of interest to everyone as it provides a common (USG and US military) assessment of the threat from north Korea. I would just say as a general comment for the hot wash that the peace game we are playing is really based on an assumption (our suspension of disbelief) that the DIA threat assessment is either wrong or is no longer applicable in 2026-2030. Our peace game scenario has removed both the deterrence capability and caused a dangerous decline in readiness to defend the ROK. As Sun Tzu warned, "Never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible."
The long awaited DIA report. Along with a couple of other Korea Watchers, I participated in the review of earlier drafts of this report more than 2 years ago. This has been very difficult to get through the bureaucracy.
This is very useful in that it provides a common unclassified assessment of north Korea that informs planners and policymakers as well as the press and the public.
It is worth perusing for all those who have an interest in understanding the threat from north Korea.
There are many excerpts worth highlighting but i will provide this one on north Korean Security Strategy:
North Korea’s national security strategy has two main objectives: ensure the Kim regime’s long-term security, which the leadership defines as North Korea remaining a sovereign, independent country ruled by the Kim family, and retaining the capability to exercise dominant influence over the Korean Peninsula. Since the mid-2000s, the North’s strategy to achieve these goals has been to prioritize the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver nuclear weapons to increasingly distant ranges while maintaining a conventional military capable of inflicting enormous damage on South Korea. Kim Jong Un expanded the nuclear and missile programs in an effort to develop a survivable nuclear weapon delivery capability that the regime could use, in theory, to respond to any external attack. Pyongyang’s goal is to maintain a credible nuclear capability, which it believes will deter any external attack. It also seeks to use its nuclear and conventional military capabilities to compel South Korea and the United States into policy decisions that are beneficial to North Korea. As part of his strategy, Kim Jong Un has publicly emphasized the ability of North Korean nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to strike the United States and regional U.S. allies in an attempt to intimidate international audiences.
The North also has traditionally used periodic, limited-scope military actions to pressure South Korea and to underscore the fragility of the armistice, which it seeks to replace with a peace treaty on its terms. During the 1960s and 1970s, these actions took the form of aggressive skirmishes along the DMZ and overt attempts to assassinate South Korean leaders, including the South Korean president, with special forces raids and terrorist tactics.34 In recent years the North has confined aggression against the South to targeted engagements in the disputed Northwest Islands area. Confrontations between patrol craft and other incidents along the Northern Limit Line have claimed more than 50 South Korean lives since 1999.35 In 2010, North Korea attacked and sank a South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors, and bombarded a South Korean Marine Corps installation on Yeonpyeong Island, resulting in 2 military and 2 civilian deaths.36,37
No comparable attack on the South has yet occurred under Kim Jong Un’s rule, but North Korea’s willingness to strike South Korea with lethal force endures. In August 2015 a landmine detonated in the DMZ and wounded two South Korean soldiers, kicking off a monthlong confrontation with the South that ultimately led to artillery fire along the border. Escalation to a wider conflict was possible although averted in this instance.38
There is a lot of important information and insights in the three paragraphs above. But synthesizing them leads me to asks these two questions (yes, these are not new!):
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the mafia like crime family cult known as Kim family regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
Defense Intelligence Agency releases report: North Korea Military Power
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4. Small quakes reported near North Korea nuclear site amid talk of resumed testing
I am still waiting for a geological expert to answer my query as to whether six nuclear tests in the area cause some kind of long term instability that makes the area vulnerable to earthquakes. The article provides some useful insights.. Or perhaps these are a warning from Mother Nature to Kim ong-un not to conduct any further nuclear testing (note attempted humor).
Excerpts:
In the weeks after that explosion, experts pointed to a series of tremors and landslides near the nuclear test base as a sign the large blast had destabilised the region, which had never previously registered natural earthquakes.
After one such quake in 2020, South Korean government experts said the nuclear explosions appeared to have permanently changed the geology of the area, while some experts raised fears that radioactive pollution could be released if North Korea ever used the site again.
Seismic activity induced by nuclear tests is not unusual, and has been documented at other major nuclear test sites such as the Nevada Test Site in the United States and the former Soviet Union's Semipalatinsk site in Kazakhstan, said Frank Pabian, a retired analyst with the United States' Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Small quakes reported near North Korea nuclear site amid talk of resumed testing
SEOUL, Feb 15 (Reuters) - A series of small earthquakes has struck near North Korea's shuttered nuclear test site, South Korea has said, highlighting the area's geological instability as Pyongyang hints it could resume testing for the first time since 2017.
At least four earthquakes, all of which occurred naturally, have hit the region in the past five days, according to the Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) in Seoul.
The latest was a 2.5 magnitude quake on Tuesday morning, which was centred about 36 km (22 miles) from the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. A pair of 2.3 magnitude earthquakes were reported in the area on Monday and another at 3.1 magnitude on Friday.
Punggye-ri in northeast North Korea is the country's only known facility for conducting nuclear tests. The last known weapons test was conducted in Sept. 2017, when North Korea detonated its sixth and largest nuclear bomb, which it claimed was a thermonuclear weapon.
In the weeks after that explosion, experts pointed to a series of tremors and landslides near the nuclear test base as a sign the large blast had destabilised the region, which had never previously registered natural earthquakes.
After one such quake in 2020, South Korean government experts said the nuclear explosions appeared to have permanently changed the geology of the area, while some experts raised fears that radioactive pollution could be released if North Korea ever used the site again.
Seismic activity induced by nuclear tests is not unusual, and has been documented at other major nuclear test sites such as the Nevada Test Site in the United States and the former Soviet Union's Semipalatinsk site in Kazakhstan, said Frank Pabian, a retired analyst with the United States' Los Alamos National Laboratory.
"Such seismicity should not prevent the Punggye-ri nuclear test from being used again in the future," he said. "The only difference being that any future testing would be limited to only previously unused tunnels."
The entrances to those tunnels were blown up in front of a small group of foreign media invited to view the demolition when North Korea closed the site in 2018, declaring its nuclear force complete. North Korea rejected calls for international experts to inspect the closure.
Leader Kim Jong Un has said he no longer is bound by the self-imposed moratorium on testing, and the country hinted in January that it is considering resuming tests of nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles because of a lack of progress in talks with the United States and its allies.
Since the closure, monitoring groups have said that satellite imagery so far shows no major signs of activity at Punggye-ri beyond routine security patrols and maintenance.
Reporting by Josh Smith; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan
5. The diary of a doomed commando (north Korea)
A fascinating article especially for those of us who were there for this operation. This provides some interesting insights. I was unaware of the operators' log/diary and it is interesting where it was found. I would take the writings in the diary with some grain of salt, especially its critique of the ROK forces. And of course we have always wondered about the one never found.
An interesting anecdote not in the article. The north Korean special operations forces broke into the ski resort at Pyongcheng (site of the 2018 Olympics). They pilfered all the vending machines since it was September and the resort was closed at the time. They hung out there for a day or two before moving on.
I have scoured the internet looking for this book. I do not think this is published in English yet.
The diary of a doomed commando
A Dutch author dives deep into one of North Korea’s deadliest special operations
FEBRUARY 14, 2022
SEOUL – Jeroen Visser traveled to the winter Olympics – the last Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea, in 2018 – to cover the Games. But on the ground in South Korea’s freezing east coast, the Dutch journalist discovered something more compelling than winter sports: A captured North Korean mini-submarine.
“I found the submarine – it is one of the major tourist attractions – and the ‘Unification Museum’ where they have Kalashnikovs, grenades and rocket launchers displayed,” Visser, 42, told Asia Times.
The submarine and its related exhibits are set – somewhat incongruously – in a coastal park just outside the coastal resort town of Gangneung, which hosted 2018’s indoor winter sports events.
They memorialize a bloody incident that captured Visser’s imagination. They also compelled Visser, who is now based in Stockholm for the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant, to write a book, North Korea Never Says Sorry.
The non-fiction account of the operation and its aftermath was published in Belgium and Holland last month. One reviewer said “it reads like an unlikely, thrilling adventure story.” Others call it “disturbing” – even “insane.”
The 1996 mini-submarine used to infiltrate special operations personnel into South Korea. Photo: Andrew Salmon/Asia Times
A mission goes lethally wrong
In September 1996, Pyongyang’s espionage arm, the Reconnaissance General Bureau, or RGB, deployed a Sango, or Shark, class mini-submarine, with 26 crew aboard, on an intelligence-gathering mission to the South. Its target was an airbase adjacent to Gangneung.
Three spies aboard the vessel, all expert infiltrators, landed and completed their mission – a photo-reconnaissance of the airbase and its surroundings. But as they attempted to extract on the night of September 17, things went badly wrong.
“There was a storm and high waves and the submarine was stranded 20 meters off the coast,” Visser recalled. “They tried to blow up the sub, but failed, and so the 26 persons aboard set off in groups. The book is about what happened next.”
A taxi driver looking for a late-night fare spotted a group of suspicious figures and reported them to police. That, and the discovery of the stranded submarine in the rocky surf line at daybreak, sparked a massive manhunt involving 40,000 South Korean troops, including elite airborne rangers.
That operation would continue for 49 days.
At its outset, 11 of the submarine’s crew appear to have been killed by their own comrades. Some believe this was harsh punishment for the sailors’ failure to get the submarine off the rocks.
Others believe they consented to be killed, on the understanding they would never be able to make the grueling escape-and-evasion of almost 100 kilometers, through mountainous terrain, across the DMZ and back to the North.
A South Korean Navy team prepares to move a North Korean mini-submarine that ran aground in September 1996. Photo: AFP
“This provocation, with all these absurd details, made it very interesting to sort of reconstruct what happened,” Visser said.
But this story was extensively reported at the time – and is now well known. What new information does Visser bring to the table?
One of the most curious parts of the story is that two of the spies kept – in defiance of the kind of guidelines that govern Western special forces operations – a log of their daily activities, right up until their deaths in a gunfight. The log was captured with their bodies.
“I managed to get hold of the whole diary,” Vissers said. Although it is not publically available, he and his translator discovered it in the library of Seoul’s National Assembly. “I know of no other case when the commandoes of the Reconnaissance General Bureau made a record of their mission,” Visser said.
Visser found the diary, which was interesting, entertaining and sinister.
“They disclose their tactics, how they work, and who they kill,” he said. “And they make fun of the South Koreans, of how badly trained they were, and how easy it was to escape from them – but in the background, there is a tension, this tension of if they will get caught.”
Their drama soon turned deadly. “They ran into three older South Koreans – a woman and two men who were probably searching for mushrooms in the mountains – by chance,” Visser said.
At least two recent Western special forces missions – a British SAS patrol in Iraq and a US SEAL unit in Afghanistan – were compromised, with deadly results, after their hide locations were discovered by local civilians. In neither case did the SAS or SEALs silence their discoverers.
The North Koreans were more ruthless.
“They killed the civilians,” Visser said. “Two with bullets and one was strangled and hit with something.”
But the noise of the killings was overheard. South Korean troops converged and found the site 24 hours later. From there, the two North Korean operatives were tracked.
“In the end, they were seen about 10 miles from the DMZ,” Visser said. “They had been spotted before, but managed to escape – but now they were surrounded.”
In the ensuing firefight, the two killed three South Koreans and wounded 14, before being gunned down by South Korean special forces.
That deadly day, November 5, 1996, ended the manhunt – but not the story.
The missing men
Lee Kwang-soo, the submarine’s helmsman, was the only member of the crew to surrender. “He was trained to hold the sub at the right depth when spying through the periscope and helped the spies get on and off the submarine,” Visser said. “He was a well-trained RGB guy.”
Lee was turned and became an officer instructing the South Korean Navy in the RGB’s organization and tactics. What, then, of the crew member who was never found? Was he the lone survivor who made it back to North Korea?
“It is a very intriguing case,” Visser said. “He was one of the younger crew, not an officer, and he was never seen again. Lee testified that he was there, but nobody ever found a trace of him.”
The missing man has become something of a legend in the South.
“I spoke to a lot of sources in the South Korean intel services and they thought he made it back,” Visser said. “And if you go to the sub today, [the docents] tell you he made it back.”
However, Visser is convinced they are wrong. He believes that the case of the missing submariner has become mixed up, in the popular mind, with an officer from an even deadlier, earlier, North Korean commando mission with which the 1996 operation shares a number of parallels.
In January 1968, a platoon of North Korean commandos crossed the DMZ, infiltrated South Korea and launched an assault on the presidential Blue House.
Their aim was to assassinate the national leader. After that, a huge special forces operation was to be launched that would seize key communication and transport nodes – allowing North Korea to seize the headless South Korea by coup de main.
In the event, the commando assault ran into massive South Korean firepower. All the commandos were killed but two. One was captured and turned, another successfully exfiltrated through South Korea, across the DMZ, and back into the North.
The latter was promoted to general and, in subsequent years, even joined a number of delegations to the South.
Returning to the lost submariner, Visser is certain he was unable to reach the North. “There is no evidence that the guy made it back,” he said. “I found a North Korean documentary where they remembered the Gangneung incident 20 years later, and they had a list of 25 dead crewmembers, and he is part of that. So North Korea also believes he is dead. His grave is on film and his name is on a monument.”
All the dead crew members won official awards from Pyongyang and were buried in the national cemetery after their ashes were returned by South Korea in December 1996.
The cover of Visser’s recently published Dutch language book. The Korean characters read ‘regret.’ Photo: Courtesy Jeroen Visser
But Lee, the turncoat, who worked for the South Korean military, is never acknowledged by his former masters.
“They erased him from history, and, according to sources, sent his wife and family to a prison camp – he had a three-year-old son and brothers and sisters and parents,” Visser said. “They never forgot his betrayal.”
Indeed, Visser became aware of two North Korean operatives who attempted to track Lee down at his secure location inside South Korea.
“They sent two agents to learn more about his whereabouts – both stories are spectacular,” said Visser. “One of the guys that was used to find more info about him was ‘Black Venus’ – he is a famous double agent and his story was made into a film in 2018 that premiered at the Cannes Festival, The Spy Gone North.”
During his career, that spy even met the late national leader Kim Jong Il – during which he reputedly concealed a micro recorder in the urethral duct of his penis.
“During my research, I found one story after another,” Visser said. “It makes a fascinating book, but also told me about North Korea and the relationship between the Koreas.”
No apologies from Pyongyang
North Korea unleashed a range of deadly commando and espionage missions against the South in the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s.
In addition to the two operations detailed above, those missions include a special forces infiltration and guerilla campaign along South Korea’s east coast in 1968, the attempted assassination of the South Korean president during a state trip to Rangoon, Burma, in 1983, and the bombing of a South Korean airliner over the Middle East in 1987.
Today, however, these bloodbaths have tapered off.
North Korea retains a massive special operations capability under the auspices of the RGB – some estimates put their personnel at 200,000. The millennial RGB is also believed to be the agency responsible for Pyongyang’s cyber commandos, who engage in both intelligence gathering and larceny online.
However, North Korea’s current military priority, and its foremost investment, is in weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles. It is these assets, rather than commando troops, which get the country attention in the newsrooms and corridors of power in capitals such as Seoul, Tokyo and Washington.
What, then, does the grim tale of 1996 say about the Pyongyang of the 2020s?
“It taught me about the nature of the regime, which I think has not changed at all,” Visser said.
One issue that retains force on both sides of the border is the ongoing struggle for moral legitimacy.
“After the incident, North and South Korean negotiators battled around one tiny detail for months – that North Korea had to say sorry, and the tension would go away,” Visser said. “And eventually they said sorry, though of course, the apology was not sincere at all. That said a lot about relations between North and South Korea.”
Another lesson is North Korea’s diplomatic priorities. In those, Seoul, the junior partner in a cross-Pacific alliance, falls well behind the mightier Washington.
Outgoing South Korean President Moon Jae-in invested significant political capital in improving cross-DMZ relations. However, after the summit triumphs of 2018, he ended up being humiliated by North Korea – which blew up an inter-Korean liaison office and has largely ignored his late-term calls for an inter-Korean peace treaty.
“If you look at the way North Korea treated South Korea back in the day, all they wanted to do was talk to the US,” Visser said. “They don’t seem to care at all what South Korea thinks.”
Dutch reporter and author Jeroen Visser on assignment in South Korea. Photo: Jeroen Visser
6. Factbox: Houses, scandals, missiles: The issues at stake in S.Korea's presidential election
For those keeping track. The ROK presidential campaign is going into full swing.
Factbox: Houses, scandals, missiles: The issues at stake in S.Korea's presidential election
SEOUL, Feb 15 (Reuters) - The uncertain outlook for the upcoming presidential election in South Korea reflects the ups and downs of outgoing President Moon Jae-in's five years in office.
((For main story, click here L4N2UM18R))
From North Korea summits to stalled talks and missile tests, from COVID-19 success to soaring home prices and corruption scandals, here are some of the issues at stake in the March 9 contest:
HOME PRICES
In Seoul and the wider metropolitan area, which is home to about half of South Korea's population, the average price of an apartment has roughly doubled since 2017 to 1.26 billion won ($1.05 million) in January.
The net effect of some 26 sets of measures Moon rolled out over the past five years to cool prices, including tougher mortgage curbs and capital gains taxes, have been aggravating the situation. read more
YOUNG VOTERS
Discontent over the economic situation has driven away many young voters who initially backed Moon, according to polls. They comprise a lost generation that many see emerging as the key voting bloc that could swing this year’s presidential election.
One of the largest blocs to abandon Moon has been young men, who say the president's calls for gender equality are out of date, and misplaced in a competitive environment where all young men must complete mandatory military service that they say puts them behind women.
South Korea's gender wage gap is the largest in the OECD.
Corruption scandals have also made many younger South Koreans disillusioned with Moon's ruling Democratic Party, and some even had a single word to sum up their disgust with political leaders who they perceive as hypocritical and inept.
"Naeronambul" translates to "If I do it, it's a romance. If you do it, it's adultery."
HOUSEHOLD DEBT
As of June 2021, South Korea's household debt-to-GDP ratio at 105.8% was one of the highest in the world and almost double the average among Group of 20 advanced nations.
South Koreans have been borrowing more than ever before and policymakers are increasingly worried the 1,845 trillion won ($1.54 trillion) debt pile could become unsustainable as interest rates rise. read more
JOBS
An average of 173,000 jobs were created every year since 2017, government data showed, far short of Moon's pledge to add more than 500,000 private sector jobs annually.
The minimum wage in South Korea has risen 41.6% to 9,160 won ($7.65) per hour this year from 2017, during which time manufacturers moved 180,000 jobs to offshore locations, data from the Federation of Korean Industries showed.
COVID-19 RESPONSE
Moon faced an initial nightmare in early 2020 as South Korea became the scene of the first large-scale coronavirus outbreak outside of China.
A campaign of aggressive testing, tracing, and quarantines helped South Korea keep numbers in check and the death toll low, without major lockdowns.
A slow start to the vaccination campaign later made up for lost ground, but businesses have chafed under new rules imposed to curb a surge in Omicron infections, and Moon's successor will be tasked with navigating how to live with COVID-19.
POLITICAL SCANDALS
Moon avoided any major personal scandals, but his party's standing took hits from a series of controversies that undermined his pledge to clean up the office after his predecessor was impeached and removed.
Cho Kuk, a key Moon aide, was forced to resign as justice minister after just one month in office amid accusations including bribery and document fraud.
The prosecutor who indicted Cho is now the leading conservative candidate for president in the upcoming election.
An insider property speculation scandal also damaged the prospects for Moon's party amid anger over home prices.
NORTH KOREA
Polls show foreign policy issues such as North Korea are overshadowed by domestic concerns for most voters, but whoever wins the March 9 election will inherit a standoff that could worsen further as North Korea threatens to resume long-range missile or nuclear weapon tests for the first time since 2017.
Moon met North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in a rare summit at the countries' fortified border in 2018, and played a major role in a flurry of diplomacy that saw Kim hold unprecedented meetings with then-U.S. President Donald Trump.
That all stalled, however, amid disagreements over the North's nuclear weapons and its demands for sanctions relief, and in January North Korea conducted a record number of missile tests.
Reporting by Josh Smith, Heekyong Yang, Cynthia Kim, and Joori Roh; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan
7. The threat of North Korea: The Statesman
Political warfare and blackmail diplomacy while conducting warfighting reparations. We must understand the full scope of the threat.
The threat of North Korea: The Statesman
The paper says the tests by North Korea are viewed by many as an attempt to pressure the Biden's administration into easing the cache of sanctions.
By Hermes Auto The Straits Times3 min
People watch a a news broadcast with footage of a North Korean missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan 30, 2022. PHOTO: AFP
NEW DELHI (THE STATESMAN/ASIA NEWS NETWORK) - The frequent missile tests by North Korea have caused a flutter in the trilateral roost. Towards that end, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met his Japanese and South Korean counterparts in Hawaii over the weekend to discuss the threat posed by nuclear-armed North Korea after Pyongyang began the year with a series of missile tests.
In Blinken's reckoning, North Korea is "in a phase of provocation" and the three countries condemned the recent missile launches. "We are absolutely united in our approach, in our determination," he said after talks with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi, and the South Korean Foreign Minister, Chung Eui-yong.
The countries are "very closely consulting" on further steps they may take in response to North Korea, but no specifics have been offered. The three countries are reportedly eager for talks; the joint statement urged North Korea to engage in dialogue and cease its "unlawful activities."
They claimed they had no hostile intent towards North Korea and were open to meeting without preconditions. North Korea has a long history of using provocations such as missile or nuclear tests to seek international concessions.
The latest tests come as the North's economy, already battered by decades of mismanagement and crippling US-led sanctions, is hit hard by pandemic border closures. The tests are viewed by many as an attempt to pressure US President Biden's administration into easing the cache of sanctions.
The Biden administration has shown no willingness to do so without meaningful cuts to the North's nuclear programme, but it has offered open-ended talks. North Korea has rebuffed US offers to resume diplomacy, saying it won't return to talks unless Washington drops what it says are hostile polices.
The North bristles at both the sanctions and regular military exercises the United States holds with South Korea. The tests also have a technical component, allowing North Korea to hone its weapons arsenal.
One of the missiles recently tested - the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile - is capable of reaching the US territory of Guam. It was said to be the longest-distance weapon the North has tested since 2017.
Pyongyang appears to have put the tests on hold during the Winter Olympics in China, its most important ally and economic lifeline. But analysts believe North Korea will dramatically increase testing after the Olympics. South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who helped set up the historic talks between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and former US President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019, said last month that the tests were a violation of UN Security Council resolutions and urged the North to cease "actions that create tensions and pressure."
The Security Council initially imposed sanctions on North Korea after its first nuclear test in 2006. It made them tougher in response to further nuclear tests and the country's increasingly sophisticated nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
China and Russia, citing the North's economic difficulties, have called for lifting sanctions like those banning seafood exports and prohibitions on its citizens working overseas and sending home their earnings.
- The Statesman is a member of The Straits Times media partner Asia News Network, an alliance of 23 news media entities.
8. U.S., of all places, warns against travel to Korea due to Covid
I wonder what is the thinking behind this. Did someone type South instead of north?
Or is it at the request of the Korean government (or somehow believed to be in support of the Korean government) to reduce the spread of COVID to Korea since we have a lot more COVID in the US than in Korea?
Tuesday
February 15, 2022
U.S., of all places, warns against travel to Korea due to Covid
A sign at a pharmacy in Seoul says that Covid test kits are available for 6,000 won ($5) each on Tuesday, as the government introduced a new pricing policy amid a spike in demand. [YONHAP]
The U.S. warned its people not to travel to Korea because of the spread of Covid-19 here.
Both the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) raised their travel advisories for Korea on Monday to the most severe categories: “Level 4: Do Not Travel” for the State Department and “Level 4: Very high level of Covid-19” for the CDC.
If a trip to Korea was inevitable, the CDC advised travelers to get vaccinated and boosted before leaving. Even if travelers are up to date with their vaccines, they may still be at risk of getting or spreading the virus, the CDC warned.
The CDC’s Level 4 travel health notice is issued if a country reports more than 500 new cases per 100,000 population over the past 28 days. Korea reported 696 infections per 100,000 people reported in the last seven days.
Previously Korea had been under a “Level 3: High” warning, which recommends unvaccinated travelers to avoid nonessential travel to the country.
A total of 137 countries are under the CDC’s highest warning level with Belarus, Azerbaijan, Comoros, French Polynesia, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon added along with Korea.
Korea has seen soaring infections since Omicron became its dominant strain of Covid-19.
The daily infection count broke the 10,000 mark for the first time on Jan. 26, and just a week later, on Feb. 2, it surpassed 20,000.
Daily cases topped 50,000 on Feb. 5 and stayed above that mark for six days in a row by Tuesday.
Despite facing the worst virus wave yet, the government hinted at easing social distancing measures, possibly this Friday.
“We are planning to come up with a decision within this week,” said Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum in a KBS television interview on Monday. “We will make a decision that does not fuel the spread of Omicron while also relieving the burden [on small business owners].”
Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) commissioner Jeong Eun-kyeong said she “agrees with the need to gradually ease the distancing measures.”
“It is necessary to balance the socio-economic impact and the impact on public health measures by adjusting restrictions put on business hours, the size of private gatherings, and the scope of vaccine passes,” Jeong said.
Since December, Korea has been under a social distancing regimen that limits gatherings to six people and requires restaurants and cafes to close at 9 p.m. Other businesses and facilities considered to be less at risk, such as movie theaters, concert halls and hagwon (cram schools), have a 10 p.m. curfew. The measures are set to expire this Sunday.
In addition, Jeong said the government is considering ending the digital check-in system based on QR codes or calling a designated number.
Currently, QR scanners are installed at many venues in Korea, which are used to check visitors' entry.
However, as the country recently started making Covid-19 patients report their own past locations and contacts voluntarily, some say the digital check-in system is no longer needed.
But a vaccine pass system is, which also uses QR codes.
“Considering the cost effectiveness of achieving policy goals to minimize hospitalizations and deaths, we believe there is more need to maintain vaccine passes than the distancing measures,” said Son Young-rae, senior epidemiological strategist at the Central Disaster Management Headquarters, in a press briefing on Tuesday.
The country hit another record number of daily infections on Tuesday, 57,177, bringing the total to 1,462,421, according to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA).
The number of patients in critical condition has been rising too but relatively slowly, staying in the 300s for two days straight and recording 314 on Tuesday.
Sixty-one more people died of the virus, nearly triple the previous day’s 21 deaths. The death toll now stands at 7,163.
Following soaring demand for Covid-19 home testing kits, the government set a price cap of 6,000 won ($5) per kit, which can be bought at pharmacies and convenience stores nationwide. Sales are limited to five kits at a time.
To better treat at-home care patients, from Wednesday, all local pharmacies will be allowed to prescribe and deliver Covid-19 drugs, except for the antiviral pill Paxlovid.
BY SEO JI-EUN [seo.jieun1@joongang.co.kr]
9. Five years since Kim Jong Nam's murder
A terrorist act using a chemical weapon. All part of Kim Jong-un's consolidation of power and eliminating threats.
Five years since Kim Jong Nam's murder | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News
Sunday, Feb. 13, 2:22
Sunday marks the 5th anniversary of the murder of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, at Kuala Lumpur International Airport.
An Indonesian woman and a Vietnamese woman were accused of smearing the highly-toxic VX nerve agent on Kim's face. They pleaded not guilty and said they believed the act was part of a prank for a reality TV show. Prosecutors eventually dropped their case against the Indonesian woman. They also dropped the murder charge against the Vietnamese woman and she was sentenced to a lesser charge of causing injury. The women were released and returned to their home countries.
Four North Korean men were suspected to have instructed the women. They are believed to have returned to their country after the attack.
South Korea's intelligence service believes the murder was an organized terrorist attack led by Kim Jong Un, saying the North's secret police was involved.
Kim Jong Nam's body was handed over to North Korea. Pyongyang claims that the cause of death was a heart attack.
Relations between North Korea and Malaysia deteriorated as the North refused to cooperate in the investigation. Pyongyang severed diplomatic ties last year and closed its embassy in Kuala Lumpur.
The North Korean diplomats who left Malaysia are believed to be staying at the North's embassy in Beijing, as they have not been able to return to their country due to the coronavirus pandemic.
10. U.S. diplomat eyes potential fallout from Ukraine crisis on S. Korea, other Asian countries
Everything is connected in this global world and there are second and third order effects to every action (and non-action).
U.S. diplomat eyes potential fallout from Ukraine crisis on S. Korea, other Asian countries | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- A U.S. diplomat on Tuesday did not rule out the possibility of the economic and security fallout from a conflict between Russia and Ukraine on Asian countries like South Korea.
Speaking during a virtual forum, Mark Lambert, deputy assistant secretary of state for Korea and Japan, said the world is "so intertwined" when asked if there could be a role for Seoul to play in defusing the standoff over Ukraine.
"It is also important that the countries of Asia make it clear to Europe that countries like Korea are looking at what happens in Europe and how it affects the economic prosperity and security of this region," Lambert said in the forum hosted by the Korea-U.S. Alliance Foundation and Korean Defense Veterans Association.
"The world is so intertwined, and the days of when a country or a leader can go off and think that well, most of the planet won't pay attention to this, I think, are over," he added.
His remarks came amid speculation that the U.S. could try to piece together support from South Korea, Japan and other allies and partners should Russia invade Ukraine to initiate a full-blown war.
Lambert, however, pointed out that it is up to each individual country to determine what to do in response to the European crisis.
"I would leave to the leadership at Blue House ... specific things the Republic of Korea or Japan wishes to do in response to something that we're all hoping doesn't take place," Lambert said, referring to South Korea's presidential office.
The Russia-Ukraine standoff was a "key topic" of weekend discussions in Honolulu among South Korea's Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong and his U.S. and Japanese counterparts, Antony Blinken and Yoshimasa Hayashi, the diplomat said.
"If you read the trilateral statement, it made very clear that all three foreign ministers called out our shared concern, that Ukraine be respected, that the situation be resolved peacefully, and that Russians stop its provocative behavior," he said
Commenting on the U.S.' drive to strengthen trilateral cooperation with its Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, the diplomat stressed the importance of fostering a "layer of trust" among the three countries.
The push for greater three-way cooperation has been impeded by historical antagonism between Seoul and Tokyo stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.
"I think we should all collectively -- both those of us in government, but those of you who have previous government experience and also smart people from academia -- should be looking at things that we can do together to enhance trust and enhanced cooperation," he said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
11. Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy envisions tighter triangular cooperation with S. Korea, Japan to confront China, N. Korea
We need to observe the Korean and Japanese press (and the comments from officials and thought leaders in both countries) to see how they are going to accept this line of effort in the US Ondo-Pacific strategy.
(News Focus) Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy envisions tighter triangular cooperation with S. Korea, Japan to confront China, N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
By Song Sang-ho
SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden looks set to cement trilateral cooperation with its Asian allies, South Korea and Japan, as a core lever to counter China's assertiveness and North Korea's nuclear ambitions under its newly unveiled Indo-Pacific strategy, analysts said Tuesday.
Last week, the White House released a 19-page document highlighting a focus on marshaling "collective capacity" from a network of regional allies and partners, which it pitched as "our single greatest asymmetric strength" in the midst of an intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry.
Expanded three-way cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo is part of the strategy's "Indo-Pacific Action Plan" to be pursued in the "next 12 to 24 months" -- an apparent call for the two allies to move past their historical enmity and refocus on shared challenges.
The fleshed-out strategy came as Japan's bid for the UNESCO heritage designation of a mine linked to wartime forced labor has added to tensions between Seoul and Tokyo already caught in long-simmering territorial and historical feuds.
"Central to the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy is restoring regional alliances and promoting solidarity among them so as to keep a rising China in check," Park Won-gon, professor of North Korean studies at Ewha Womans University, said.
"Given the central pillars of security and economics in the strategy, there's no doubt that South Korea and Japan are the Indo-Pacific allies well-placed to undergird those pillars -- a reason why the U.S. needs to galvanize trilateral cooperation," he added.
For its security pillar, the strategy employs a set of multilateral mechanisms, such as the three-way cooperation with South Korea and Japan and the Quad forum involving the U.S., India, Australia and Japan, as well as the AUKUS platform consisting of the U.S., Britain and Australia.
On the economic pillar, the document unveiled Washington's still sketchy plan to put forward an "Indo-Pacific economic framework" for cooperation with partners on trade, digital economies, cross-border data flows and "resilient and secure" supply chains.
Except for shared toughness on China, Biden's Indo-Pacific strategy stood in stark contrast with the "America-first" approach of his predecessor, Donald Trump, which critics said smacked of isolationism and alienated allies.
Washington's current pursuit of broad-based regional cooperation comes as it strives to prevail in an increasingly acrimonious rivalry with China over maritime security, technological leadership, trade and other fronts.
"We seek to build the collective capacity to rise to 21st century challenges and seize opportunities, whether that has to do with climate, with PRC behavior or preparing for the next pandemic and recovering from this one," a senior Washington official said on condition of anonymity last Friday, referring to China by its official name, People's Republic of China.
The inclusion of three-way cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo in the strategy has raised speculation that Washington might envision a more formalized mode of cooperation with the Asian allies -- a goal long hamstrung by their historical animosity.
Despite the recent flare-up of historical tensions between the Asian allies, it signals Washington's intent to double down on that goal, underscoring the need to put up a united front against Pyongyang.
The desired unity of purpose was on full display Saturday when the top diplomats of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan -- Chung Eui-yong, Antony Blinken and Yoshimasa Hayashi -- met in Hawaii on the weekend in response to the North's seven rounds of missile tests last month.
America's emphatic appeal for solidarity also came as it seeks to stitch together support from allies and partners to cope with the looming Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Stakes are high for the U.S. in the standoff over Ukraine as an escalation into a full-blown war could mean a deterrence failure for America and its allies, and could lead to yet another forceful redrawing of the European map akin to one caused by Moscow's 2014 annexation of the Crimea.
"The Secretary and Foreign Ministers discussed the Russian military build-up along Ukraine's borders and shared unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity," the three countries said in a joint statement following the talks in Hawaii. "They committed to work closely together to deter further Russian escalation."
Ostensibly, however, the U.S.' push for trilateral cooperation with the South and Japan appears to put more emphasis on the North Korean challenge.
"Nearly every major Indo-Pacific challenge requires close cooperation among the United States' allies and partners, particularly Japan and the ROK," the document reads. "We will continue to cooperate closely through trilateral channels on the DPRK."
The ROK and the DPRK stand for South and North Korea's official names -- the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Beyond the security front, the U.S. will also work with South Korea and Japan on regional development and infrastructure, critical technology and supply-chain issues among others, it added.
"The U.S. cannot help but emphasize at least rhetorically the importance of broad-based cooperation with the Asian allies beyond the hitherto security centric partnership, as its rivalry with China unfolds in terms of values, ideology and across the board," Kim Tae-hyung, professor of international politics at Soongsil University, said.
Touching on Pyongyang's "destabilizing nuclear and missile" programs, the strategy document said Washington will continue to seek "serious and sustained" dialogue while strengthening extended deterrence to respond to North Korean provocations and remaining "prepared to deter -- and, if necessary, defeat -- any aggression to the United States and our allies."
Extended deterrence means the U.S.' stated commitment to mobilizing a full range of military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, to counter North Korean aggression.
The Biden administration's strategy poses a key geopolitical question to South Korea's next government to be launched in May: How will it modulate the depth and width of three-way cooperation with the U.S. and Japan?
"Along with how to deal with North Korean threats, the issue of the degree to which Seoul reinforces trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo will be a priority matter for the next administration in Seoul as it's also linked to relations with China," Shin Bum-Cheol, director for diplomacy and security at the Research Institute for Economy and Society, said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
12. N. Korea to issue commemorative coins marking late former leader's birthday
Coins? With all the suffering of the Korean people in the north, all the regime can do is produce commemorative coins?
You cannot eat coins.
(LEAD) N. Korea to issue commemorative coins marking late former leader's birthday | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES with other celebratory events in last 2 paras; ADDS photo)
SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea will issue commemorative coins to mark the upcoming birth anniversary of its late leader, state media reported Tuesday, in a move to kick up a festive mood for the national holiday.
The standing committee of the Supreme People's Assembly decided to issue the gold and silver coins in celebration of the 80th birthday of Kim Jong-il, late father of current leader Kim Jong-un, which falls on Wednesday this year, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
The coins are engraved with an image of the former leader and the other side has that of what the North claims to be his birthplace located at the foot of Mount Paekdu, the highest peak on the Korean Peninsula, a released photo showed.
The North has often released commemorative coins on the occasion of landmark anniversaries and events.
The move comes as the North is holding various events for the milestone anniversary, with keen attention being paid to whether it will stage a large-scale military parade.
The third-day performance of an arts concert took place in Pyongyang on Monday. Other events included a ball hosted by the Socialist Women's Union of Korea, a speech symposium on the late leader's achievements and cooking contests, according to the KCNA.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
13. Most S.Koreans Dislike China as Much as N.Korea
Most S.Koreans Dislike China as Much as N.Korea
February 15, 2022 12:10
China scored a mere 2.6 out of 10 points in a Chosun Ilbo poll of South Koreans' views of other countries.
China scored even lower than former colonial power Japan and as low as North Korea. Some 30.5 percent of respondents gave zero points to China, vastly outnumbering the nine percent who gave it high marks from 6 to 10 points.
By political orientation, centrists and progressives gave China fewer points than conservatives, but the range was only between 2.55 points and 2.69 points. Anti-Chinese sentiment was particularly strong among the under-40s.
Twenty-somethings gave China a mere 1.78 points and 30-somethings 1.93 points, about a half of the over-60s' 3.29 points.
North Korea scored a fraction lower with 2.42 points. Some 38.5 percent gave the North a zero points, but a die-hard 8.8 percent viewed the North favorably. The U.S. did relatively well with 7.24 points, distantly trailed by Japan with 3.4 points.
Those were the only countries on the questionnaire.
But 40.4 percent supported the Moon Jae-in administration's policy of balancing between the country's two most important trading partners, joining neither the U.S.-led missile defense shield nor a Seoul-Washington-Tokyo military alliance. An almost equal 43.8 percent were against.
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
14. North Korean authorities move to identify activists in Russia who help North Koreans defect
This is serious and puts many people we know working to help Koreans escape at risk. I am sure the north has been doing this in China as well but if there is a concerted effort by the Russians and Chinese to support this (or at least turn a blind eye to north Korea ctions) it will really change the dynamics of escaping from the north.
North Korean authorities move to identify activists in Russia who help North Koreans defect
North Korean authorities may be trying to silence North Korean nationals as word of an attempted defection has hit the news
North Korean authorities are trying to ascertain the identities of activists in Russia who help North Koreans living and working in the country to defect.
The move — coming after North Korea placed a North Korean military officer in detention at the North Korean consulate in Vladivostok after he tried to defect while deployed to Russia — apparently aims to stop defections by North Koreans working overseas.
According to a Daily NK source in Russia on Monday, the Ministry of State Security has recently ordered agents of the Reconnaissance General Bureau and ministry officials based in Russia to collect and systematically manage identification information on Russians, missionaries, NGO activists, and other individuals who have contacted North Korean nationals or who help North Koreans defect.
In the order, North Korean authorities label South Korean missionary groups active in Russia as “US spies,” and call on agents to make them “major targets.”
The authorities also said because Russian-Koreans who speak Korean often interact with North Korean workers and abet their defections, they should be included as a target of “focused management.”
The order even designated a female staffer of the UNHCR in Moscow who handles asylum requests by North Koreans as a subject for the Ministry of State Security’s attention.
The authorities have ordered Ministry of State Security agents in Russia to collect the real names, ages, addresses, contact information, family details, personal circumstances, and even photos of people who help North Koreans defect.
North Korean authorities also plan to restrict the activities of foreigners who help defections by hacking their emails or bank accounts.
In particular, North Korea will apparently use this personal information to ascertain the movements of North Koreans who come into contact with those foreigners and strengthen inspections and controls over North Korean nationals working overseas.
The Golden Bridge in Vladivostok (Wikimedia Commons)
In fact, North Korea issued a notification on Feb. 8 calling on officials to make no mention of the arrest of Major Choe Kum Chol — a cyberwarfare officer who has been detained since attempting to defect last September — to North Korean workers and officials working and residing in Russia.
Daily NK previously reported that North Korea issued a “No. 1” order in the name of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un last month calling for Choe’s repatriation “without fail.”
This suggests that with word of Choe’s arrest spreading and reports of his impending repatriation making the news, North Korean authorities are trying to silence North Korean nationals.
Moreover, the authorities ordered officials to tighten surveillance of North Korean workers and officials overseas, and submit by Mar. 15 a list of people at each workplace or group suspected of planning to defect or who have behaved strangely.
The order also said that while would-be defectors have not been repatriated due to COVID-19, with the authorities simply detaining them in detention facilities operated by local Ministry of State Security agents, they could now face immediate forced return to North Korea.
Because of this, even workplaces without cases of attempted defections must report suspicious employees up the chain of command. North Korea typically strengthens surveillance when workplaces or organizations fail to report suspicious individuals.
Additionally, workplace bosses and manager-level cadres with mobile phones who have accessed outside information will likely become targets of a severe crackdown. The authorities have ordered that their phones be confiscated and investigated.
The source said it appears random raids and inspections will be bolstered. He also noted that workplaces in Russia that employ North Koreans are “petrified” of what is to come.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
15. S. Korea to urge New York City officials to take actions against anti-Asian crimes
Terrible and tragic recent events in New York.
S. Korea to urge New York City officials to take actions against anti-Asian crimes | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Feb. 15 (Yonhap) -- The South Korean government plans to call formally on the New York City authorities to step up actions to counter a surge in crimes there against Asians in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, officials here said Tuesday.
Chung Byung-hwa, South Korea's consul general in New York, will meet with Edward Mermelstein, New York City's commissioner for international affairs, on Friday to convey concerns over unprovoked attacks on Koreans and those of Korean descent.
"(Chung) will deliver the Korean American community's concerns over the surge in anti-Asian crimes and request that the New York City make proactive efforts to prevent the recurrence of such incidents," a foreign ministry official told reporters on the customary condition of anonymity.
A Korean American woman was stabbed to death in her Manhattan apartment on Sunday. Last week, a South Korean diplomat with the nation's diplomatic mission to the United Nations was punched in the face by an unknown assailant near Koreatown, and an investigation is currently under way.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
16. North Koreans in Russia ordered to work in groups so they can’t escape
Slave labor.
North Koreans in Russia ordered to work in groups so they can’t escape
The new rules guard against workers becoming ‘ideologically lax.’
By Jieun Kim
2022.02.14
North Korean construction workers in Russia are being prohibited by their government back home from taking on small-scale side jobs, a policy change designed to prevent them from escaping, sources in Russia told RFA.
An estimated 20,000 North Koreans have been dispatched by their government to Russia to earn foreign cash for the regime. The government keeps the lion’s share of the wages they earn while abroad.
After several North Koreans disappeared while working apart from their handlers in mid-January, authorities gave the order that side jobs are no longer allowed. A Russian citizen of Korean descent from Vladivostok in the Russian Far East that authorities fear the workers will become “ideologically lax.”
“Since January, North Korean workers here in Russia have not been able to take on any individual small-scale contract work,” the source told RFA’s Korean Service on Feb. 9.
“From now on, all workers must work in groups of 10 to 20 people under mutual surveillance,” said the source, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
The workers also are prohibited from living outside of a designated dormitory, according to the source.
“The human resources officials used to confiscate the workers’ passports and gave them paper identification. Now they have even confiscated the papers,” he said.
“One North Korean worker I knew at a job site said that authorities ordered that nobody go out alone or speak to the locals. There are security cameras in the dormitory, and they are fenced in with iron plates. Security is set up to prevent their escape,” said the source.
Authorities also confiscated the workers’ cellphones, according to the source.
“The workers are prohibited from working alone so that they won’t have a chance to become ideologically lax,” he said.
The workers working alone in nearby Nakhodka have all returned to their handling company there, another Russian citizen of Korean descent told RFA.
“The North Korean authorities established new business rules to prevent ideological hazards and increase foreign currency earning potential,” said the second source, who requested anonymity to speak freely. “Workers should be organized in groups of 10 or more, and each company requires them to offer about U.S. $700 per month each.”
Supervisors who are unable to raise the $700 will be removed from their positions, the second source said.
“Their worker groups will be disbanded, and the workers will be reassigned to other groups that perform better,” the second source said.
North Korean labor exports were supposed to have stopped when United Nations nuclear sanctions froze the issuance of work visas and mandated the repatriation of North Korean nationals working abroad by the end of 2019.
But Pyongyang sometimes dispatches workers to China and Russia on short-term student or visitor visas to get around sanctions.
Translated by Claire Lee and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
