Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military. preparations. Campaigning is not business as usual – it is the deliberate effort to synchronize the Department’s activities and investments to aggregate focus and resources to shift conditions in our favor. Through campaigning, the Department will focus on the most consequential competitor activities that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages now and in the future."
- Secretary Austin, NDS 2022.

"Because humans are the executors of political conflict, regardless of the form it takes, narratives loom large. Technological developments, especially social media, mean that the use of force is under near-real time public scrutiny. In light of these developments, there is great need for a dynamic and compelling legitimation of a state’s military action."
- Narratives and Competing Messages, Assessing Revolutionary And Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) Studies

“Always be more than you appear, and never appear to be more than you are.”
- Horst Kastner



1. South Korea’s defense minister lays out four results from trip to US

2. Combined command in South Korea completes ‘historic’ move to Camp Humphreys

3. Biden warns North Korea on nuclear test. But he needs to act — now.

4. North Korea sees more use of cell phones, WiFi networks - U.S. researchers

5. Twenty Years of Mobile Communications in North Korea

6. South Korean general thanks US troops for rescuing civilians in Itaewon crowd surge

7. Through a Glass, A Little Less Darkly: North Korean Nuclear Command and Control in Light of Recent Developments

8. Yoon stumbles between Beijing and Washington

9. Textbook to refer to N. Korea as 'regime' instead of 'government'

10. Yoon, China's Xi hold 1st summit in Bali

11.  Biden says U.S. will have to take 'defensive' steps if N. Korea conducts nuclear test

12. China causes be targeted by trilateral security systems i

13.  IFJ slams S. Korean presidential office's decision to ban MBC reporters from boarding Air Force One

14. Yoon, Xi not on same page over North Korean threats

15. Facing North Korea’s Missile Threats, South Korea, US, Japan Reaffirm Joint Commitment

16. It’s too easy for the west to see North Korea as a WTF curiosity. We need to do better

17. Biden Threatens North Korea, War Games Continue in Philippine Sea





1. South Korea’s defense minister lays out four results from trip to US


Props to Minister Lee. This OpEd sets an important example for Korean military leaders when it comes to OPCON transition and a Korean General takes command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. While a Korean commander of CFC will never be as well known in the US as a the US commander has been in KOrea, it will be important for the Korean general to engage with the American media and to be the "face" of CFC. This is important because CFC is a bilateral command that is equally "co-owned" by the ROK and the US. It is now and will continue to be after OPCON transition. The Korean commander will have to be as comfortable reaching out to the US CJCS and SECDEF as the current US commander (like all previous US commanders) is in doing so.  Publishing this OpEd and providing his personal readout on the 54th SCM sets an important standard for the future Korean commander of the ROK/US CFC.



South Korea’s defense minister lays out four results from trip to US

Defense News · by Jong Sup Lee · November 14, 2022

Earlier this month, I co-chaired the annual Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, D.C., with the event in its 54th year and involving U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. The SCM functions as a ministerial-level defense consultative body and has served as the symbol of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. It was launched to enhance bilateral security consultation in the wake of North Korea’s capture of the U.S. naval intelligence ship Pueblo in 1968, and has played a key role as the South Korea-U.S. alliance developed into the most exemplary alliance across the globe.

It is worth noting that this year’s SCM was held when the security situation was more complex and serious than ever. Russia is threatening to use its nuclear weapons as the aggression in Ukraine continues, intensifying concerns of nuclear war from non-nuclear states. Meanwhile, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is exploiting the chaotic situation faced by the international community, using it as a window of opportunity to advance North Korea’s nuclear and missile development.

Kim Jong Un has conducted many ballistic missile launches and elevated tension on the Korean Peninsula to the maximum extent, passing a new law on nuclear forces policy and declaring the first use of nuclear weapons. Such provocations made by the Kim regime are posing a serious threat to the security and stability of not only the Korean Peninsula, but also the region and the world.

During this year’s SCM, South Korea and the U.S. shared an in-depth discussion to further deepen and develop deterrence and response options against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, as well as the South Korea-U.S. alliance, under the common vision to pursue a global comprehensive strategic alliance. Major accomplishments from this year’s SCM can be summarized into the following four points:

First, South Korea and the U.S. pledged to deepen cooperation in various areas in order to strengthen capabilities that implement the United States’ extended deterrence commitment to the Korean Peninsula, while noting that the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, recently released by the U.S. Department of Defense, made it clear that any nuclear attack from North Korea will result in “the end of [the Kim] regime.” The two nations also pledged to increase credibility of the United States’ extended deterrence commitment through timely and efficient employment of U.S. strategic assets, while monitoring North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations.

Second, the two countries shared the view to expand combined exercises and training events to strengthen the alliance’s Fight Tonight readiness posture against North Korean threats. Both sides noted that the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise this year, conducted and merged with the South Korean government’s wartime preparation exercise, signifies a complete restoration of theater-level combined exercise that had been scaled down and postponed for the past five years. We also assessed that various combined field training exercises, held in conjunction with the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise, made significant contributions in solidifying a robust combined defense posture. Based on these accomplishments, we pledged to further strengthen substantive capabilities in executing South Korea-U.S. combined operations in 2023 by expanding combined field training exercises at the regiment level or above, including the Ssang Yong combined amphibious exercise.


U.S. and South Korean forces participate in the exercise Ulchi Freedom Shield in August 2022. (Courtesy of the South Korean Defense Ministry)

Third, both nations concurred on promoting the role of the alliance for freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world. In particular, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense pledged to have close consultations as South Korea develops its Indo-Pacific strategy framework and establishes an action plan in the defense domain; they also committed to engage in coordination to develop defense cooperation with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as well as Pacific island countries. Meanwhile, both nations assessed progress in South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation in order to respond to North Korean threats, and they agreed to continue bolstering security cooperation through efforts including information sharing, senior-level policy consultations and trilateral exercises.

Fourth, the two nations pledged for close coordination on North Korea policy in order to facilitate North Korea’s denuclearization. Last August, the South Korean government proposed its Audacious Initiative to North Korea. The Audacious Initiative aims to strongly deter North Korea’s nuclear threat, dissuade North Korea’s nuclear development through international sanctions and pressure, and direct North Korea to the path of denuclearization through dialogue and diplomacy. This is also in line with U.S. overtures to North Korea, which keep the door to dialogue open and seek for diplomatic solutions, while ensuring deterrence based on the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Secretary Austin expressed his strong support for the South Korean government’s Audacious Initiative. South Korea and the U.S. shared a common understanding on the necessity for close policy coordination between the two nations in order to accomplish denuclearization by changing North Korea’s perspective, and the two countries pledged to continue relevant discussions.

This year’s SCM was the first for the Yoon administration, which underscores the importance of the South Korea-U.S. alliance as the linchpin of South Korean security policy. Dynamic developments for the alliance were already forecast through many accomplishments up to date, including the South Korea-U.S. summit in May, defense ministerial meetings held twice this year, and the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group that was reactivated after years of a hiatus. I assess that this year’s SCM reflected the ongoing momentum for a stronger alliance, reaffirmed the ironclad South Korea-U.S. security commitment, and laid a solid steppingstone for the alliance as it drives peace and prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula, but also in the Indo-Pacific region and the world.

The year 2023 carries a profound significance, marking the 70th anniversary of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty. At the end of the SCM, Secretary Austin and I promised to make 2023 a historic year that marks another great leap for the alliance. I once again renew my determination to further deepen and develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance into a global comprehensive strategic alliance that protects common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law. I am grateful to the people of South Korea and the U.S. as well as the international community for their support toward the development of the alliance.

Jong Sup Lee is South Korea’s defense minister.



2. Combined command in South Korea completes ‘historic’ move to Camp Humphreys


I hope this means a return to the normal organization in which ROK and US personnel work side by side every day and not just during exercises. One of the great strengths of CFC has been the strong relationships between ROK and US military personnel and their families. Unfortunately most ROK military officers' families will remain in Seoul so there will not be the family bonds that many of us have enjoyed and benefited from over the past 5 decades since CFC was established in 1978. But CFC will be stronger now than it has been since the move to Camp Humphreys began.



Combined command in South Korea completes ‘historic’ move to Camp Humphreys

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 15, 2022

South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup, left, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and South Korean Gen. Ahn Byung-seok attend the opening ceremony of the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command headquarters in Camp Humphreys, South Korea, Nov. 15, 2022. (South Korea Ministry of National Defense)


CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — The combined command that defends South Korea officially opened the doors on a new headquarters Tuesday, nearly three years after beginning its relocation from Seoul.

The Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command now resides at Camp Humphreys, Pyeongtaek, after 44 years at Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Republic of Korea is the official name for South Korea.

Humphreys, the largest U.S. military base overseas, now serves as the headquarters for U.S. Forces Korea, U.N. Command and the Combined Forces Command. Roughly 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea, the majority of them at Humphreys.

USFK commander Gen. Paul LaCamera and Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup during a ceremony at the new headquarters welcomed soldiers from both countries and thanked them for their help in maintaining the South Korea-U.S. alliance.

The Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command headquarters in Camp Humphreys, South Korea, officially opened Nov. 15, 2022. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)

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Since its creation in 1978, the Combined Forces Command coordinates the defense of South Korea with troops from Seoul and Washington. The command has operational control of over 700,000 active-duty U.S. and South Korean troops.

The move to Humphreys will “contribute to enhanced combined operational capabilities” and strengthen the “combined defense posture” of the U.S. and South Korea, according to Defense Department news release in 2021. The Defense Department and South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense officially began moving the Combined Forces Command from Yongsan to Humphreys in 2019.

South Korea paid the lion’s share of the nearly $10.8 billion cost to expand Camp Humphreys from an airfield to the equivalent of a small town, Gen. Vincent Brooks, former USFK commander, said in 2018.

LaCamera, whose role as USFK commander puts him in charge of the U.N. Command and the Combined Forces Command, likened the relocation project to “moving of a mountain” during a speech at the headquarters.

“While our addresses changed, our pledge to defend you and maintain your trust is forefront in our minds,” LaCamera said. “While the scenery, seasons, people and locations may have changed, what has not changed is the pride to serve in the land of the morning calm.”

Lee said the Combined Forces Command’s move was a “historic moment” and that its new location evokes for him as the country’s defense minister a “wide array of emotions.” He previously served as a staff officer at Yongsan.

“Opening the Pyeongtaek-era of the [Combined Forces Command] in the face of advanced North Korean threats, conveys a big significance,” Lee said in his speech. “Staff that worked separately in Yongsan and Pyeongtaek for years can now work shoulder to shoulder yielding a firmer cooperation system between the [South Korea] and United States.”

Through the Combined Forces Command’s efforts, South Korea “was able to develop into a successful liberal democracy and an economic powerhouse,” Lee said.

Lee met Defense Secretary Lloyd Austion on Nov. 3 in Washington, where the two reaffirmed “the robustness” of their military alliance, Lee said at Humphreys. The Combined Forces Command is evidence of that pact, he said.

“We explicitly made clear that any attempt of nuclear attack by North Korea will result in the end of the Kim regime,” Lee said, referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

North Korea has fired over 65 missiles in 31 rounds of testing so far this year, a record. The communist regime has also fully prepared to conduct its first nuclear test since 2017, according to U.S. and South Korean officials.

Despite provocations by North Korea and preparations for combat by the U.S. and South Korea, “we pray for peace,” LaCamera said.

“Our love of peace, freedom and security has not changed,” he said. “It has only gotten stronger.”

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 15, 2022



3. Biden warns North Korea on nuclear test. But he needs to act — now.


An important critique from my FDD colleague. We certainly can and must do better on sanctions. (He criticizes every administration since the Clinton era Agreed Framework, to include the Trump administration).


But sanctions are not a strategy and while critically important they are insufficient in pressuring the Kim family regime. Until we add a human rights upfront approach, and comprehensive influence campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea we will never desert the necessary pressure on Kim Jong Un. 

Biden warns North Korea on nuclear test. But he needs to act — now.

The U.S. president issues a vague threat in talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Imposing tough sanctions are what's needed.

NBC News · by Anthony Ruggiero, former National Security Council director for North Korea · November 15, 2022

In his first face-to-face meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping since he became president, President Joe Biden on Monday issued a stark warning: Xi needed to attempt to make it clear to close ally North Korea that launching “long-range nuclear tests” was unacceptable and that if Pyongyang ignored Xi, the U.S. would take certain “defensive” actions to “send a clear message to North Korea.”

But warnings aren’t enough. Pyongyang is launching missiles at an unprecedented pace and reportedly exporting artillery shells to Russia, and it is believed to be preparing for a seventh nuclear test. The U.S. should do more than delegate responsibility for clamping down to Xi, especially after Biden admitted it’s unclear whether Beijing can “control North Korea.”

The Biden administration needs to take concrete measures now — specifically, immediately restoring the once-robust sanctions regime that has atrophied since Donald Trump embraced summit-level diplomacy with Kim in 2018.

The U.S. should also do more than wait for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to escalate further. Exactly what the defensive measures Biden hinted at are hazy, though last week Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, said, “If North Korea keeps going down this road, it will simply mean further enhanced American military and security presence in the region.”

Instead, the Biden administration needs to take concrete measures now — specifically, immediately restoring the once-robust sanctions regime that has atrophied since Donald Trump embraced summit-level diplomacy with Kim in 2018 and then lost interest when it became clear Kim had no intention to disarm.

As things stand, some foreign policy voices are arguing that the lesson of the failure of Trump and preceding U.S. presidents to stop North Korea’s nuclear program is to accept North Korea as a nuclear power.

Last month, Bonnie Jenkins, the undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, suggested that the Biden administration would welcome “arms control” negotiations with North Korea, a phrasing that evokes talks with the Soviet Union that accepted that each side would maintain a nuclear arsenal.

Ned Price, the State Department’s spokesperson, has soundly rejected Jenkins’ comments on multiple occasions. That’s good — but not good enough. In practice, even disarmament talks have resulted in agreements that Pyongyang soon repudiates.

President Bill Clinton spent both of his terms engaged in negotiations, including an agreement in which Pyongyang was supposed to reduce its nuclear program — only for the Kim regime, then headed by Kim Jong Il, to admit in 2002 that it was developing a covert uranium enrichment program that “nullified” the curbs agreed to under Clinton.

Similarly, President George W. Bush spent most of his second term trying to negotiate and implement a disarmament agreement. Bush imposed financial pressure on the Kim family regime through U.S. sanctions and later a U.N. Security Council resolution that was passed just after Pyongyang’s first nuclear test in October 2006. But after North Korea re-engaged in negotiations, he reduced sanctions in exchange for promises of denuclearization, which Pyongyang soon violated.

President Barack Obama increased sanctions after North Korea’s second nuclear test during his first term in 2009 but didn’t maintain the momentum. He tried to jump-start negotiations with the Leap Day deal — and these efforts were short-lived, because Pyongyang launched a satellite using ballistic missile technology soon after the conclusion of the agreement.

Finally, in 2016, the Obama administration escalated sanctions against North Korea after a nuclear test and a ballistic missile launch that had real teeth. They included sanctions and an indictment against a Chinese company and four Chinese people who helped North Korea evade U.S. sanctions.

This robust sanctions policy in the last year of Obama’s presidency extended into the beginning of his successor’s term. Trump labeled it a “maximum pressure” policy, which was accurate, and kept it in place the next two years.

The policy reinforced that countries had to decide whether they wanted to do business with the U.S. or North Korea, because it could no longer do both. More than 20 countries curtailed diplomatic or commercial relationships with North Korea. And the U.S. also sanctioned Chinese companies, individuals and banks that were aiding North Korea’s sanctions evasion. Some experts predicted that Beijing would increase its support for Pyongyang, but China didn’t want to lose its access to the U.S. financial system, and it implemented the North Korea sanctions by severely restricting cross-border traffic.

It’s not a coincidence that Kim then agreed to summits with Trump in 2018 and 2019. Trump ended up walking away from the table after he realized Kim wasn’t serious about denuclearization. Yet, instead of ratcheting up pressure on North Korea, Trump turned to other issues for the rest of his term.

Shifting American attention elsewhere did keep things relatively quiet on the Korean Peninsula. Rather than provoke Seoul and Washington with missile launches, Pyongyang focused on quietly upgrading its arsenal.

Biden, too, has prioritized other things, including nuclear talks with Iran and responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Naturally, the White House had no interest in additional problems. But ignoring Kim worked only until Kim decided to make trouble.

It’s true that sanctions haven’t prevented North Korea from going nuclear. Yet Washington constantly disrupted its sanctions program to pursue fruitless negotiations. It has never had the patience to maintain sanctions until Kim has to bend, yet the pattern suggests that sanctions have been important in at least getting North Korea to the bargaining table.

A robust sanctions program today can limit the Kim regime’s revenue, forcing it to make difficult decisions among pursuing its nuclear program, maintaining military discipline and ensuring the loyalty of North Korean elites.

In the nearly 30 years since Clinton first tried to limit Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Washington has tried the same failed approach, hoping for a different result each time. If Biden really wants to try something different, he should give a robust sanctions policy a chance to work.

NBC News · by Anthony Ruggiero, former National Security Council director for North Korea · November 15, 2022


4. North Korea sees more use of cell phones, WiFi networks - U.S. researchers


This is important. This is one reason why we need a comprehensive influence campaign. Information can be transmitted within north Korea. We just have to get more information in. I will forward the 38th North report separately.


North Korea sees more use of cell phones, WiFi networks - U.S. researchers

Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin

SEOUL, Nov 15 (Reuters) - Up to 7 million North Koreans use cell phones daily, and WiFi networks have sharply expanded in recent years as the mobile devices increasingly became a key tool for market activity in the isolated country, U.S. researchers said on Tuesday.

Martyn Williams and Natalia Slavney of the Washington-based Stimson Center's 38 North programme say their latest study on digital communications in North Korea, which included an analysis of satellite imagery and a survey of about 40 defectors who fled the North between 2017 and 2021, shows a stable rise in cellular subscribers.

Since 3G network services began in 2008, the number of users has risen to 6.5 million to 7 million, more than a quarter of North Korea's 25 million population, the researchers said.

"More than 90% of the people who participated in the survey reported using the phone at least daily, and most of the calls were made to family members and traders," Slavney told a briefing.

They showed an estimated coverage map of North Korea's cellular network by identifying base stations, accompanying antennas and solar panels from satellite images, which Williams said suggested the service is available not only in cities but also "deep into the rural areas."

"The cellular coverage is still expanding, sometimes we're finding base stations where if you look at the same area two years ago, the antenna was not there," he said.

The country's antiquated 3G network and limits on foreign investment in upgrades because of sanctions over its weapons programmes has prompted the emergence of faster WiFi networks around the country, Williams said.

The WiFi networks do not offer any Internet access but provide connections to domestic services, especially scientific databases for the research community, he added.

Poor infrastructure means there are few landlines, the researchers said, so mobile phones fill gaps and serve as a critical tool for participating in a private market economy, which has become a key source of income for many.

The private sector has overtaken state-led agents to become North Korea's biggest economic actor in recent years, with its rationing system crumbling and leader Kim Jong Un allowing markets abhorred by his father.

"For the last five to 10 years, the rise of the private economy and private marketplaces was one of the biggest changes in the country," Williams said. "In a way, one of the pillars of the entire market economy is the wide availability of basic telephone and text messaging."

Reporting by Hyonhee Shin. Editing by Gerry Doyle

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin


5. Twenty Years of Mobile Communications in North Korea



​This is important information for PSYOP and influences professionals and practitioners. This shows the great potential inside north Korea for information dissemination. Yes there are challenges. Yes the regime cracks down on this. But the Korean people. in the north are creative and resilient because they thirst for information.


Photos/graphics at the link.


The international community can help the Korean people in the north address some of the challenges described in this conclusion:


Conclusion
North Korea continues to roll out mobile telecommunications technology to its people but keeps close control over what the people can do with it. The country has a lot to gain from deploying this technology, especially in a nation where at least some telephone calls are still patched through by hand.
During the coronavirus pandemic, the national intranet and a domestic video conferencing system called Rakwon meant North Koreans could continue to hold meetings despite COVID-19 restrictions. And for individuals, just the ability to make and receive calls and messages on the move can mean a more efficient life.
However, none of these benefits are absolute. The government continues to monitor domestic communications and has the ability to collect data via these networks, which can potentially be used against individuals in the future. Moreover, restrictions on information access—a fundamental human right—have increased during the pandemic years, increasing punishments for unauthorized communications and consumption.



Twenty Years of Mobile Communications in North Korea



https://www.38north.org/2022/11/twenty-years-of-mobile-communications-in-north-korea/


A Pyongyang 2425 cellphone. (Image: Martyn Williams.)

Two decades ago this month, North Koreans in Pyongyang and Rason were the first in the nation to get a taste of cellular telephony. In a country where landline phones were still the exception rather than the rule, mobile communications had the potential to revolutionize the way people communicate.

Data from recent interviews with North Korean escapees conducted by the authors indicates that cellphone usage is now ubiquitous; not only is it used for communication with friends and family, but it underpins North Korean’s private economy—a vital tool for communicating with suppliers, buyers and distributors necessary to do business.

In addition, this is not exclusive to Pyongyang or major cities. Data from the 38 North Digital Atlas shows the cellular network covers vast stretches of the country, extending well beyond urban areas into rural North Korea. Interviews with recent escapees corroborate smartphone ownership is larger than previously reported, potentially between 50 and 80 percent of the adult population.

As a result, despite the increased possibility for state surveillance through cellphone usage, mobile communication has become an integral and indispensable part of North Korean daily life.

Early Days

North Korea’s first cellular network, Sunnet, was switched on in November 2002 in Rason and Pyongyang by Loxley Pacific, a Thai company that had secured rights to build and operate the network from the North Korean government. It cost 750 euros to sign up, a further 300 euros for a phone and telephone calls cost 15 North Korean won per minute.[1] The 2G Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) network was based on second-hand equipment purchased from Vodafone Hungary when it was upgrading to 3G.[2]

Within a couple of months, it had 3,000 subscribers, and this grew to over 20,000 users by the end of 2003 when coverage had expanded to several provincial capitals and major highways.[3]

But that service was short lived. In May 2004, an explosion tore through a train yard in Ryongchon near the Chinese border about nine hours after a train carrying Kim Jong Il passed through the station. Rumors spread that it was an assassination attempt triggered by a cellphone, and while the actual cause remains a mystery, the North Korean government suspended civilian use of the network shortly afterward.[4]

That network, however, was not totally shut down. For several years after the suspension of service, signals from Sunnet could be received by visitors to North Korea and from certain points along the inter-Korean border. It is likely that the government found significant benefit in cellular telephony and kept the network on the air for official use.

Figure 1. The Sunnet network shown on an iPhone in Pyongyang in 2008.

(Image: Stephan/Flickr.)

A Second Chance

The government gave mobile phones a second chance in 2008 when it awarded Egypt’s Orascom Technology a contract to launch a 3G network. The service, called Koryolink, started in December 2008 and is still in operation today. Orascom owns a 75 percent stake in the network, with the North Korean government holding the remaining 25 percent.[5] Orascom announced its first million subscribers in February 2012 and had two million subscribers by May 2013.[6]

Koryolink began with basic feature phones but soon began offering smartphones to North Korean users. The basic Android handsets originally came with few restrictions and even allowed citizens to watch foreign content, but in 2014 the government forced an update on phone users that brought several new restrictions. The biggest change was the introduction of a digital certificate system that meant a phone could only show government-approved content.[7]

But despite this onerous new restriction, the popularity of smartphones continued to grow. This was probably because basic communications—that is, the ability to easily call or text message family members and friends—remained the killer app that attracted people in the first place.

Penetration of landlines in North Korea was and remains low. According to the International Telecommunication Union, there are just 1.2 million households with landlines in North Korea, so for many North Koreans, mobile phones might have been their first taste of basic telephony.

Figure 2. Timeline of North Korea mobile telecommunications from 1998-2019.

A Financial Disagreement

When North Korea welcomed Orascom Telecom into the country, it received millions of dollars in inward investment. A few years later, when the business became more lucrative and Orascom wanted to start withdrawing profits, the relationship soured.

Orascom and the North Korean government disagreed on the exchange rate that should be used to convert North Korean won into foreign currency, and months of negotiations followed. What exactly transpired remains a mystery, but in 2015 Orascom said it had effectively lost control of Koryolink despite still owning a majority stake.

Further, it said the North Korean government had launched its own cellular network to compete with Koryolink.

Orascom is still involved in Koryolink and, in 2018, received a sanctions exemption from the United Nations to continue operating the network.[8]

Cellular Telephony Today

Today, North Korea is covered by both Koryolink and Kang Song, the network launched by the North Korean government around 2013.

Much less is known about Kang Song than Koryolink, including whether the North Korean government built an entirely new network, which seems unlikely, or is running it over the same infrastructure. Both are 3G.

In interviews conducted this year by the authors, recent North Korean escapees have stated the Koryolink service is now mainly used in Pyongyang, and Kang Song is used by people in other regions. They also say large numbers of people have smartphones. Many estimated most homes own at least one mobile phone, with total penetration between 50 and 80 percent of the country.

These figures are backed up by a survey published last month by Unification Media Group that surveyed 50 current North Korean residents and found 46 of them had used North Korean mobile phones, and 41 of them, or 82 percent, reported owning a mobile phone. More than 90 percent of people reported using the phone at least daily, and most calls were to family members and traders. Because of the low incidence of landlines, cellular appears to have filled a significant need for basic telephony.

Based on previous data, statements from escapees and network coverage, the authors estimate that North Korea’s cellular networks likely have a total of between 6.5 million and 7 million subscriber lines.

Figure 3. North Korean cellular subscriptions.

Nationwide Coverage

Together, both networks cover much of the country. The 38 North Digital Atlas has identified over 1,000 cellular base stations from satellite imagery, photos and videos. The following map is based on an estimated five-kilometer range for each base station, although exact coverage will differ depending on local terrain, antenna placement and power levels.

Figure 4. Estimated North Korean cellular coverage map with five-kilometer cellphone tower range.


The area around Pyongyang is heavily covered, but notably, there is wide coverage around all major North Korean cities.

This second map, which includes major roads, shows how coverage follows highways into the interior of the country and includes numerous towns and villages.

Figure 5. Estimated North Korean cellular coverage map with five-kilometer cellphone tower range and major roads.


Actual coverage is almost certainly greater than what is currently depicted, as there are almost certainly additional base stations that have not yet been identified. Further attempts to map the network will continue as additional sources become available.

Looking Ahead

While the country’s current 3G network provides basic telephony, data speeds are well below what is common in most parts of the world.

At the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, Kim Jong Un called on the country’s telecommunications sector to “step up the technical updating of its infrastructure and turn mobile communications into the next-generation ones as early as possible.”

State media has been quiet on how such a feat might be accomplished. With the struggles of Orascom still fresh in memory, and sanctions on the import of goods, it seems unlikely that North Korea will be able to secure another foreign telecommunications company to provide a more advanced network for the foreseeable future.

Instead, the country might be looking towards public Wi-Fi networks.

In 2017, the Mirae network was set up in Pyongyang. It offers speeds of at least 33 Mbps, according to North Korean media. That’s about 10 times faster than the 3G network. A recent report said it had been extended beyond the capital to at least Pyongsong and Nampho.

North Korean media has also talked about a second network called Ullim, which appears to be Wi-Fi based, but very little is known about it.

Conclusion

North Korea continues to roll out mobile telecommunications technology to its people but keeps close control over what the people can do with it. The country has a lot to gain from deploying this technology, especially in a nation where at least some telephone calls are still patched through by hand.

During the coronavirus pandemic, the national intranet and a domestic video conferencing system called Rakwon meant North Koreans could continue to hold meetings despite COVID-19 restrictions. And for individuals, just the ability to make and receive calls and messages on the move can mean a more efficient life.

However, none of these benefits are absolute. The government continues to monitor domestic communications and has the ability to collect data via these networks, which can potentially be used against individuals in the future. Moreover, restrictions on information access—a fundamental human right—have increased during the pandemic years, increasing punishments for unauthorized communications and consumption.

  1. [1]
  2. “Modernization of Communication Networks Promoted in DPRK,” People’s Korea, December 13, 2003.
  3. [2]
  4. Interview by Martyn Williams with a Sunnet staff member.
  5. [3]
  6. “Modernization of Communication Networks Promoted in DPRK,” People’s Korea, December 13, 2003.
  7. [4]
  8. “Thailand urges N. Korea to lift mobile phone ban,” Kyodo News, August 29, 2005.
  9. [5]
  10. “3G mobile network starts,” Pyongyang Times, December 23, 2008.
  11. [6]
  12. “Koryolink Reaches Two Million Subscribers,” Orascom news release, May 28, 2013.
  13. [7]
  14. Nat Kretchun, Catherine Lee and Seamus Tuohy, Compromising Connectivity: Information Dynamics Between the State and Society in a Digitizing North Korea (Washington, DC: InterMedia, 2017), 44, https://www.aquietopening.org/s/Compromising-Connectivity-Full-Report.pdf.
  15. [8]
  16. Orascom Company news release, September 23, 2018; and “UPDATE 1-Orascom’s Koryolink JV granted right to operate in North Korea,” Reuters, September 23, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/update-1-orascoms-koryolink-jv-granted-r-idUSFWN1W70SU.


6. South Korean general thanks US troops for rescuing civilians in Itaewon crowd surge


South Korean general thanks US troops for rescuing civilians in Itaewon crowd surge

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 10, 2022

A mourner places flowers at a memorial on Oct. 31, 2022, for 156 people killed during Halloween festivities in Itaewon, South Korea. (David Choi/Stars and Stripes)

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CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — The top general in South Korea in a letter Friday to the commander of U.S. Forces Korea thanked American troops who rescued victims trapped in the Itaewon crowd surge that killed 156 people.

Gen. Kim Seung Kyum, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed his “profound gratitude” toward the U.S. service members “for their act of valor in saving the lives of 30 Korean civilians” trapped in the fatal surge Oct. 29 in Seoul, according to the letter to U.S. Army Gen. Paul LaCamera posted on USFK’s Facebook page Thursday.

Kim’s letter does not identify the soldiers but states they all “are the ultimate embodiments of the word ‘hero’ and complete personifications of the spirit of our [South Korea]-U.S. alliance.”

Jarmil Taylor, Dane Beathard and Jerome Augusta, three soldiers stationed in Camp Casey, South Korea, told Agence France-Presse that they pulled people from the crowd after becoming aware of the danger, according to an Oct. 30 report from the news outlet.

Four days later, South Korea’s Yonhap News reported that an unidentified South Korean man recognized the three Americans. One of the soldiers, according to Yonhap, “rescued him from the crowd as if pulling radishes from a field.”

“While we continue to receive heartbreaking news from the incident, our people are deeply moved by the heroic tales of these USFK service members,” Kim said in the letter. “The citizens who were rescued by these gentlemen are calling them lifesavers, and widespread praise from our citizens are sweeping our nation.”

The crowd of revelers surged into a narrow, sloping alley during Halloween festivities in a nightlife district of the city. Twenty-six of the victims were foreigners, including two Americans. At least 33 people are still considered seriously injured, according to a Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters news release Thursday.

U.S. military police stationed in nearby Yongsan Garrison were also at the scene providing first aid and assisting with crowd control, USFK spokesman Wesley Hayes previously told Stars and Stripes.

“Such selfless sacrifice significantly decreased casualties, and their service will forever be etched in the hearts of the Korean people in the name of the ... alliance,” Kim added.

USFK, which is responsible for roughly 28,500 troops in South Korea, offered its condolences to “everyone impacted by last night’s tragic event in Seoul,” according to an Oct. 30 statement from the command.

“The Itaewon community has opened its arms to us for many years and is part of the reason our alliance is so strong,” according to the USFK statement. “During this time of grief, we will be there for you just as you have been there for us.”

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · November 10, 2022


7. Through a Glass, A Little Less Darkly: North Korean Nuclear Command and Control in Light of Recent Developments


Figuring out command and control of north Korean nuclear forces is one of the most important and most difficult intelligence tasks.



Through a Glass, A Little Less Darkly: North Korean Nuclear Command and Control in Light of Recent Developments

https://www.38north.org/2022/11/through-a-glass-a-little-less-darkly-north-korean-nuclear-command-and-control-in-light-of-recent-developments/

Kim’s Strategic Dilemma

In 2021 we began a study to examine alternative approaches to nuclear command and control (NC2) that North Korea could pursue, given the strategic goals of its nuclear program.[1] Our premise: North Korea’s ability to operationalize a nuclear strategy for assured retaliation or regional warfighting will depend critically on the NC2 system it adopts—and that its choices with respect to NC2 would reflect an effort to reconcile a number of competing imperatives unique to Pyongyang’s political and military culture. Whatever approach North Korea adopted would tell the world something important about how it intended to achieve the missions assigned to its nuclear forces.

Our framework for analysis focused directly on identifying the dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with alternative NC2 models North Korea could consider. We viewed this as a critical but underdeveloped area in Western analysis of the North Korea nuclear problem and assumed that even as we puzzled through the options facing the regime, it, too, was working its way toward decisions on this question. Indeed they were. We completed the study in August 2022. On September 8, 2022, Pyongyang enacted a new law that reaffirmed some aspects of nuclear policy, refined its nuclear doctrine and revealed decisions about how nuclear command and control will operate.

(Source: KCNA)

The NC2 provisions of the new nuclear policy law, discussed in greater detail below, point to the balancing act Kim Jong Un must sustain—and the risks that could result—as he seeks to maximize the deterrence value and operational utility of his maturing nuclear arsenal within the constraints of his highly personalized governing system and the North’s peculiar political, military and social structure. Whether North Korea principally emphasizes the goal of assured retaliation or moves toward a more ambitious warfighting strategy, it must put in place procedures for transmitting or transferring authority to employ nuclear weapons beyond Kim in case he is unable to give such orders during a crisis or conflict. Otherwise, attacks or operations directed at Kim personally could be an effective means to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear capability and undermine its deterrent.

Alternative NC2 Models

In our study, we describe five models by which North Korea could address this central dilemma to convey launch authority beyond Kim himself. All pose significant tradeoffs for the regime and its emerging nuclear strategy.

An “automatic” model—closest to what is described in the new law—is probably the simplest NC2 approach North Korea could adopt. The proverbial “button on Kim’s desk,” this likely would involve a pre-programmed or pre-recorded order that would be provided to military commanders under extraordinary circumstances in which Kim fears an imminent attack might remove him from command. This approach seems most suited to North Korea’s one-person rule system, as Kim would retain sole authority to employ nuclear weapons; this would be prioritized over attaining a higher degree of readiness and responsiveness in the nuclear force. This model likely would involve tight physical controls over the weapons themselves to preclude unauthorized access. For example, weapons and delivery systems could be maintained at separate locations under distinct though parallel chains of command. During a crisis, Kim could direct mating and dispersal of these nuclear systems and issue orders to nuclear operators to await further instruction.

To ensure maximum political control, this model accepts a high degree of vulnerability to outside threats by creating a single point of nuclear failure and powerful incentives for adversaries to target Kim himself. This would suggest a highly fragile form of deterrence by calling into question any claim the regime makes about its ability to absorb attacks and impose unacceptable costs on an adversary. An automatic model also offers little or no flexibility in the employment of nuclear forces, emphasizing instead likely pre-determined orders to be transmitted quickly to units at a time of extreme stress.

A “devolution” model would feature an institutionalized line of succession to maintain political continuity over nuclear operations in the event that Kim cannot transmit orders or convey launch authority. Such a system could not be established reliably in an ad hoc way during an acute crisis. Instead, it would need to be established in advance, codified and promulgated to lower tiers of the chain of command referencing conditions under which orders from someone other than Kim are to be executed. Those in the line of succession would require deep understanding of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and operations to manage these forces effectively if and when the time comes. A separate command center from which to manage nuclear operations would also be required; the “next in line” cannot be in the same location as Kim if he is expected to be the target of attacks.

A devolution model would also ensure, in Kim’s absence, continuity in political leadership that would be necessary to bring a conflict to an end prior to a larger nuclear exchange. But it could also undermine North Korea’s assured retaliation deterrent if there are questions or doubts about whether Kim’s successor would be prepared to respond decisively to a decapitation strike that targeted Kim—or would choose instead not to respond in order to preserve their own survival. Politically, a devolution approach presents a high degree of vulnerability for Kim: In naming a successor, he risks undermining North Korea’s leader-dominant or Suryong-based system of governance on which the regime has long relied. As with all personalized autocracies, naming an heir apparent or line of succession could encourage alternative centers of domestic power, rivalries and potentially even challenges to Kim’s rule.

A “delegation” model envisions Kim Jong Un granting military authorities a degree of discretion in the execution of a nuclear employment decision he has already made. This would allow him to maintain personal control over release authority for as long as possible, delegating decisions of an operational nature only after he has issued a launch order. A key challenge in this type of approach is calibrating the timing of an order to launch a nuclear strike. Whether for political reasons or because of poor situational awareness, Kim could wait too long to issue a launch order; it’s also possible he could be eliminated or incapacitated prior to such a point. Indeed, he could, alternatively, delegate too soon out of fear that he might be the target of a decapitation strike and lose the ability to manage a crisis to an outcome in which he survives.

A “pre-delegation” model would transfer conditional launch authority to the military in case Kim loses contact with his forces or becomes incapacitated, in particular at the outset of a conflict. This model maximizes military readiness and operational flexibility regarding when, where and how to employ nuclear weapons. In so doing, pre-delegation also increases the risk of unintended or accidental launch of nuclear weapons, given that those at lower echelons of command may lack the situational awareness to make appropriate nuclear employment decisions. Further, in adopting this type of model, Kim would, in essence, be signaling to his people that others are equally or better suited to make such fateful decisions for the nation, potentially undermining his absolute authority.

In contrast to the first two models, which emphasize, each in its own way, political primacy in nuclear decision making, delegation and pre-delegation place greater importance on operational considerations and judgment. As a crisis escalates, forces in the field presumably would be in possession of operationally ready weapons with expressed or conditional authority to release them. These approaches would rest heavily on Kim’s confidence that military authorities would faithfully and effectively execute orders as intended or exercise sound judgment in making their own decisions. This runs sharply counter to experience, as Kim historically has not evinced a high degree of trust in his military leadership. The exceptionally high rate of turnover among his senior military leaders compared to that of his father and grandfather attests to this.

A “hybrid” model might be organized around weapon type and function with the goal of limiting the risks inherent in delegation and pre-delegation to a limited number of elite nuclear units. This would make the most sense if North Korea followed through on earlier statements indicating that it might soon deploy “tactical” nuclear weapons to front-line units. Classifying such systems (e.g., short-range missiles) as tactical could be intended to signal a shift toward a warfighting strategy. In turn, Kim might consider that the deterrent and operational utility of such capabilities would be maximized if authority over their release were delegated to appropriate levels of military command under specified conditions. In this model, nuclear forces that are clearly strategic (e.g., those that could target Japan, Guam and the continental United States) would remain under Kim’s strict authority.

The New Nuclear Policy Law

The new law addresses several aspects of North Korea’s nuclear policy, as assessed in a number of news reports and expert commentaries. There are elements of continuity with earlier laws and pronouncements but apparent refinements to nuclear doctrine, as well, including language indicating preparedness to consider the use of nuclear weapons preemptively to counter imminent attack “against important strategic objects” or to seize the initiative in an unfolding conflict. This clearly would include strikes assessed to be imminent against regime leadership and the nuclear command system—undoubtedly a reference to South Korea’s “Kill Chain” strategy and the emphasis being placed on it by the new government in Seoul.

Kim’s heightened fear of decapitation strikes—whether from South Korean, US or combined forces—is reflected not only in the law’s reference to preemption, but also in the nuclear command and control arrangements it establishes. Here, the new law largely adopts the command and control model we describe as “automatic”—an approach that prioritizes Kim’s decision making primacy and provides for rapid execution of pre-determined nuclear strike operations if he is eliminated or incapacitated.

Regarding Kim’s sole authority, the law states: “The nuclear forces of the DPRK shall obey the monolithic command of the president of the State Affairs on the DPRK” and that Kim possesses “all decisive powers” regarding nuclear weapons. Eliminating the reference found in the preceding 2013 nuclear law to authority vested in Kim as the “Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army” may reflect broader issues in the state of civil-military relations and may also suggest why NC2 arrangements that involve a greater role for military authorities seem unlikely.

With respect to “automatic” command and control arrangements, the law states: “In case the command and control system over the state nuclear forces is placed in danger owing to an attack by hostile forces, a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately to destroy the hostile forces….according to the operation plan decided in advance.” While this language suggests something akin to the Soviet “dead hand” system known as Perimeter, the new law actually points to “humans in the loop” by stating: “The state nuclear forces command organization composed of members appointed by the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK shall assist the president of the State Affairs of the DPRK in the whole course from decision concerning nuclear weapons to execution.”

How these elements— “an operation plan decided in advance” and assistance to the president in the “whole course” of decision making—are reconciled in practice remains to be seen and bears watching. Our view is that the policy is weighted toward a pre-planned operation not intended to be reviewed or reassessed by surviving leadership figures. This likely would be an order prepared in advance to launch available weapons from pre-designated sites against pre-assigned targets. There is nothing in the law to suggest an intent to pass launch authority or operational command to a successor; rather, the emphasis seems to be on expediting transmission of an execution order to better ensure retaliation.

Quo Vadis?

From Kim’s vantage, these choices make sense, given the threats he perceives and the nature of his rule. But the credibility of an automatic NC2 model may be limited if there are doubts about whether it will be viable under the stresses of war—in which case it may do little to deter decapitation strikes intended to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear capability. Were this the case, “use or lose” pressures could dominate crisis dynamics as Kim weighs the benefits and costs associated with early or later use of his nuclear weapons. This risk is inherent to the model.

Additionally, institutionalizing an automatic NC2 model that prioritizes political imperatives is likely to constrain North Korea’s nuclear strategy, even if its capabilities grow and diversify. The simple reason is that such an approach to command and control is viable only for strategies that rely on forms of spasmodic retaliation that seek to inflict maximum destruction with no clear theory of victory and little regard for what comes next.[2] Here, the basic requirement is to be able to detect that an action or attack has occurred that warrants a nuclear response and then quickly transmit a one-way launch order to the force. There is no need in such an arrangement for the complexities associated with NC2 models, such as devolution and delegation. These models are best suited for more nuanced and demanding strategies that emphasize controlled retaliation or limited employment of nuclear weapons, or even broader battlefield use of nuclear weapons.

We are not suggesting that North Korea has foresworn such strategies or the option to use nuclear weapons first or in limited ways. Indeed, the new law clearly signals that such options are part of an emerging strategy that envisions an offensive role for nuclear weapons beyond deterrence and retaliation. But we believe that adopting and implementing such strategies would compel the regime to reconsider its approach to NC2 and reassess the political risks of less assertive, more delegative models that would not necessarily prioritize Kim’s absolute authority over nuclear release.

The new law makes clear that North Korea will “constantly assess outside nuclear threats” and adjust its nuclear posture accordingly. For now, the regime’s tolerance for political risk is likely to remain a key indicator of its ability to adapt its nuclear strategy in response to evolving threat perceptions and advances in the size, diversity and sophistication of its nuclear forces. Recent decisions on nuclear policy raise important questions about whether North Korea’s purported nuclear ambitions are attainable.

  1. [1]
  2. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
  3. [2]
  4. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 308.


8. Yoon stumbles between Beijing and Washington


Is "stumbling" a fair characterization? South Korea and President Yoon are in a tough position, geographically, economically, and in terms of national security.  


Yoon stumbles between Beijing and Washington | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Daniel Mitchum · November 14, 2022

Author: Daniel Mitchum, New York

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is feeling the heat of the recent restrictions by the US Department of Commerce on technology exports to China. While the export controls could hamstring South Korea’s lucrative semiconductor industry, they are emblematic of a larger issue — that balancing between the United States and China is becoming more difficult for Seoul.


It may not matter that South Korea was granted a one-year amnesty on semiconductor exports to China. In an increasingly bipolar world, Yoon is likely not up to the task of balancing engagement with China.

South Korea’s proclivity for balancing its security engagement with Washington and economic engagement with Beijing met a harsh reality in 2016 during the Moon presidency. Moon Jae-in was elected president during a high point in ROK–China relations. But when Seoul procured the US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system, Beijing retaliated.

Concerned over Washington’s sphere of influence and the potential for THAAD’s radar to be extended into Chinese territory, Beijing imposed a series of unofficial sanctions and tariffs on big-ticket South Korean exports, cultural goods and the tourism industry. Six years later, the South Korean economy still suffers from China’s retribution.

Yoon ran as a pro-Washington China hawk but recently signalled his desire to cooperate with Beijing, stating that close communication was needed to ensure that the THAAD does not affect ties. Some viewed his snubbing of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, during her 2022 visit as a goodwill gesture to Beijing. But Yoon had no experience in politics before becoming president. If the more experienced Moon had trouble navigating China, Yoon has his work cut out for him.

Washington’s latest export controls have significant ramifications for South Korea’s semiconductor industry. In 2021, US$523 billion worth of sales to China accounted for nearly 40 per cent of South Korea’s semiconductor exports. South Korean chip manufacturers heavily rely on Chinese components and cutting them off from such a valuable market could have dire economic impacts.

Despite being granted a one-year moratorium on semiconductor exports, pressure is mounting on Seoul to join the Washington-led Chips 4 Alliance — a push to build a semiconductor supply-chain cooperative between Taiwan, the United States, Japan and South Korea that excludes China. Beijing has threatened retaliation should South Korea join the initiative.

While Seoul has been tight-lipped over its intentions, it joined the preliminary Chips 4 meeting with Taiwan and Japan in September 2022. Some domestic commentators argue that Seoul should confine engagement with Chips 4 to a track-1 dialogue without letting the group dictate the activities of South Korean corporations.

The winds of realpolitik are not in Yoon’s favour. His cabinet includes members like Minister of Economic Security Wang Yun-jong — an outspoken China hawk whose opinions are influential among Yoon’s foreign policymakers. Yoon’s bloc, the People’s Power Party, is staunchly pro-Washington.

Some of Yoon’s presidential campaign promises were certain to antagonise Beijing, including the procurement of more anti-missile weapons and engagement with the Quad. It will be difficult for him to renege on such pledges when engagement with China is a highly partisan and important issue to voters. The Asan Institute’s yearly public opinion survey found that South Korean views of Beijing have declined since the THAAD controversy — they view China more negatively than North Korea.

Yoon’s profound lack of diplomatic know-how won’t help. Framing his neglect of Pelosi as a move to placate Beijing seemed an obvious explanation. But the confusing messaging from the Office of the President following the snub, combined with evidence that Yoon had been on a staycation, drinking and socialising a short car ride away from Pelosi, signals it was most likely a failure of diplomacy.

More blunders occurred during Yoon’s September 2022 overseas tour. The trip first saw him head to the United Kingdom for Queen Elizabeth II’s funeral, where he failed to pay his respects to the Queen. Yoon blamed traffic, yet it later emerged that the President had missed the event because he ‘was hungry’.

Yoon then arrived in New York to address the United Nations General Assembly. The brief bilateral discussion he held with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines was a positive step in South Korea–Japan relations. Even that small victory was nearly torpedoed as Seoul had unilaterally announced the meeting without prior discussion with Tokyo, catching Kishida off-guard and tempting the Japanese Prime Minister to skip it entirely.

Yoon then spoke with US President Joe Biden regarding Washington’s ratification of the Inflation Reduction Act. He was soon overheard on a hot mic referring to the US Congress with a word that translates to anything from ‘idiot’ to much harsher expletives.

Yoon’s dearth of diplomatic savvy has confused otherwise straightforward interactions — and engagement with Beijing is anything but straightforward. That and domestic factors bode poorly for Yoon’s attempts to navigate US–China competition.

With his approval ratings crumbling, Yoon cannot afford to look soft on China but will certainly invite renewed animosity should he continue his engagement with US-led initiatives such as the Chips 4 Alliance. The administration has a rough road ahead.

Daniel Mitchum is an Asian politics research analyst based in New York who specialises in great power politics, the Korean Peninsula and Indo–Pacific relations.

eastasiaforum.org · by Daniel Mitchum · November 14, 2022



9. Textbook to refer to N. Korea as 'regime' instead of 'government'




In principle I am opposed to any government deciding on what should be in school textbooks.


But to reveal my hypocrisy, I am pleased with this development. I justify my hypocrisy by the fact that the Korean government's past school textbook revisions have been favorable toward the regime in the north. This administration is undoing that. Once undone I would hope the Korean government could get out of the micro management of textbooks. But I do not think that will suit Korean political culture.


This is also a very important development because it puts South Korea on the path to a free and unified Korea. It tacitly recognizes that the future is a United Republic of Korea (UROK). It is providing a foundation of legitimacy here.


Excerpt:


The advisory panel recommended that the term "government" be replaced with "regime" in the historical reference of the North's birth in consideration of the United Nations' approval of South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.



Textbook to refer to N. Korea as 'regime' instead of 'government' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · November 15, 2022

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- The historical description of North Korea will be modified in a South Korean school textbook to refer to the North's authorities as a regime, instead of a government, the education ministry said Tuesday.

The ministry said its advisory committee has asked a publisher to replace the expression "establishment of the DPRK government" with "establishment of the DPRK regime" in its social studies textbook authorized for elementary school fifth graders.

The DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.

The advisory panel recommended that the term "government" be replaced with "regime" in the historical reference of the North's birth in consideration of the United Nations' approval of South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula.

In response, the publisher, Jihaksa Publishing Co., has agreed to revise the controversial expression in its fifth-grade social studies textbook to be used from next year until 2025, according to the ministry.

The planned revision is one of 90 amendments proposed by the advisory committee for nine social studies textbooks for elementary school fifth and sixth graders due to errors or possible ideological bias.

The ministry recently formed the advisory panel comprised of private experts after some politicians and media outlets pointed out ideologically controversial expressions in the concerned textbooks.


ycm@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 유청모 · November 15, 2022


10. Yoon, China's Xi hold 1st summit in Bali




(3rd LD) Yoon, China's Xi hold 1st summit in Bali | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 15, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with summit taking place)

By Lee Haye-ah

BALI, Indonesia, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol held his first summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali on Tuesday, his office said, with North Korea expected to have been a key topic amid concern it could conduct another nuclear test.

The two leaders met on the sidelines of a Group of 20 summit, the presidential office said. No other details were immediately available.

The summit came on the heels of a separate meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Xi the previous day. Biden told reporters afterward that he told Xi he thought China had an obligation to try to make it clear to North Korea it should not go ahead with what would be its seventh nuclear test and that the United States would have to "take certain actions that would be more defensive" in the event the North went ahead.

Biden said those actions could be "more up in the face of China."

Yoon was expected to use his summit with Xi to further press Beijing to use whatever leverage it has to rein in Pyongyang's nuclear and missile ambitions.

Tensions have escalated significantly in recent weeks as North Korea has launched missiles at an unprecedented rate and simulated nuclear strikes on South Korea.

The summit with Xi was expected to be the last bilateral meeting Yoon will have during his Southeast Asia tour that also included separate summits with Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and a trilateral summit involving all three.

North Korea featured prominently in those meetings as well, with Yoon and Biden vowing to respond with "overwhelming force using all available means" in the event North Korea uses nuclear weapons.

The last time the leaders of South Korea and China met was in December 2019, when then President Moon Jae-in held a bilateral meeting with Xi on the sidelines of a South Korea-China-Japan summit in Beijing.


hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 15, 2022




11. Biden says U.S. will have to take 'defensive' steps if N. Korea conducts nuclear test


It would be great to begin with an integrated missile defense system with the ROK and Japan, among many other actions.

Biden says U.S. will have to take 'defensive' steps if N. Korea conducts nuclear test | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 15, 2022

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- The United States will have to take certain actions that will be "more defensive" should North Korea conduct a nuclear test, President Joe Biden said Monday.

The U.S. leader said he has also called on Chinese President Xi Jinping to try and prevent North Korea from taking further escalatory steps, noting the U.S.' defensive actions, if taken, will be "up in the face of China."

"I made it clear to President Xi Jinping that I thought they had an obligation to attempt to make it clear to North Korea that they should not engage in long range nuclear tests," Biden said when asked in a press conference if China had enough influence over North Korea to stop the reclusive country from conducting a nuclear test.


The press conference was held in Bali, Indonesia where Biden held his first in-person summit with Xi since taking office early last year.

"And I made it clear as well that if they did, they meaning North Korea, that we would have to take certain actions that would be more defensive on our behalf," Biden added.

The U.S. president was earlier quoted as saying that the U.S. will be required to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific if North Korea conducts a nuclear test.

He said the more defensive actions the U.S. may take in case of a North Korean nuclear test will be "up in the face of China."

"But it wouldn't be because of China (but) because of what was gong on in North Korea," he told the press conference.

Biden said he has also explained to his Chinese counterpart that such actions will not be directed at China but North Korea, adding, "The biggest concern I have is a misunderstanding about intentions or actions on each of our parts."

Seoul and Washington have said the North appears to have completed all preparations for what will be its seventh nuclear test and that it may go ahead with a test in the very near future.

Such an assessment followed a series of recent North Korean missile tests.

Pyongyang has fired more than 40 missiles since September 25, including 23 missiles of various types launched in a single day on November 2. Since the start of the year, the recalcitrant country has fired some 60 ballistic missiles, including seven intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"I am confident China is not looking for North Korea to engage in further escalatory (actions), I mean because I made it clear and I made it clear from the very beginning and last year as well that we will do what it needs to defend our capacity, to defend ourselves and our allies, South Korea, as well as Japan," said Biden.


bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 15, 2022


12. China causes be targeted by trilateral security systems i


Despite the awkward headline translation, this is an important development. I am hopeful that this is a step toward an effective integrated missile defense system.  


China causes be targeted by trilateral security systems i

donga.com

Posted November. 14, 2022 07:54,

Updated November. 14, 2022 07:54

China causes be targeted by trilateral security systems i. November. 14, 2022 07:54. .

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol held a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, separately, and a trilateral talk with the two leaders on Sunday in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to reach an agreement for the strengthening of trilateral security-related cooperation amid the nuclear and missile threats from North Korea. The three heads of state agreed that a comprehensive range of pressure should be put on China which has provided protection to the regime. U.S. President Biden plans to have his first face-to-face meeting on Monday to ask it to fulfill its responsibilities for resolving North Korea nuclear issues.


A series of summit talks on Sunday aimed to reaffirm their determination to bolster and expand trilateral cooperative systems for security matters against North Korea’s escalating provocations. Although the last thing that Beijing wants is a stronger trilateral cooperative relationship in terms of security among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo, it seems to be in an awkward position as it has only turned a blind eye to Pyongyang’s wrongdoings and tried to take sides with the regime. With tension growing over an imminent 7th North Korean nuclear test, China may have to be anxious about being targeted by the trilateral security cooperative system.


Washington has recently made it clear that it will keep looking at not only Pyongyang but also Beijing more closely military-wise. U.S. National Security Advisor to the White House Jake Sullivan commented before a U.S.-China summit talk that if Pyongyang keeps walking this path, Washington will inevitably have to strengthen the stationing of forces for military and security reasons in the region. He also described trilateral security cooperation as the power not only to respond to a common threat from North Korea but also to enhance regional peace and stability. Clearly, this message implies that the U.S. government will expand U.S. forces and the arrangement and deployment of arms to become militarily stronger across the region, which means that its target goes beyond North Korea to China to keep its military power at bay due to Beijing’s behind-the-scenes influence.


Losing all hope for China’s role, the South Korean government now seems to join the United States and Japan in keeping China in check. President Yoon shared common values and goals with Washington and Japan in the ASEAN summit talks by making explicit remarks on China such as zero tolerance for changes in circumstances by power and the freedom of navigation in the South Pacific Ocean. As such, North Korea’s reckless provocations have only caused Seoul to get closer to Washington, leaving behind concerns over diplomatic tensions with Beijing, the dispute between Tokyo and Seoul over wartime wrongdoings, and trade discrimination issues between Seoul and Washington.


China strongly argues that there is only so much it can do to influence the regime. However, it is an obvious fact that it has offered a shield to North Korea let alone hold the regime accountable for taking reckless action as if it aimed to put Northeast Asia on the frontlines of the rising New Cold Era. Thus, it is time that Beijing should prove that it can play a constructive role in ensuring denuclearization by walking the walk, not talking the talk.

한국어

donga.com



13. IFJ slams S. Korean presidential office's decision to ban MBC reporters from boarding Air Force One



​Again, who is advising President Yoon?


This is an "own goal," a self inflicted wound, and a shot in the foot. There is no excuse for this action.​ This should not have happened.




IFJ slams S. Korean presidential office's decision to ban MBC reporters from boarding Air Force One | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 15, 2022

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) on Tuesday condemned the South Korean presidential office's decision to ban reporters of local broadcaster MBC from boarding Air Force One to cover President Yoon Suk-yeol's trip to Southeast Asia.

In a statement posted on its website, the IFJ said South Korea "has a proud history of democracy and press freedom that must be defended," and that Yoon's targeting of MBC "sets a dangerous precedent."

"The Korean media has rightly defended its media freedom, and the IFJ commends ongoing solidarity efforts from journalists and media workers to call out government acts of intimidation and censorship through attempts to block media access," it added.

Last week, the presidential office informed MBC of the decision, citing what it called the broadcaster's repeated "distorted" coverage. The notice came just two days before Yoon left for Cambodia and Indonesia for his two-nation tour which includes his attendance at various summits involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Group of 20.

The presidential office did not specify which reports were distorted, but the TV network was caught up in controversy after it first released hot mic footage of Yoon during his trip to New York in September, which the ruling bloc accused as being unfair reporting against Yoon.


nyway@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 15, 2022





14. Yoon, Xi not on same page over North Korean threats



​Hardly surprising. We cannot expect the PRC to solve ROK and US security problems with north Korea.


Yoon, Xi not on same page over North Korean threats

The Korea Times · by 2022-11-15 17:18 | Foreign Affairs · November 15, 2022

President Yoon Suk-yeol shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their summit at a hotel in Bali, Indonesia, Tuesday. YonhapBy Nam Hyun-woo

President Yoon Suk-yeol and Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday showed subtle differences in their perceptions toward North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.


During the first Seoul-Beijing summit held in nearly three years, President Yoon called for China to play an "active and constructive role" in reining in North Korea to stop its provocations amid its continued launches of various missiles, despite international condemnation.


In response, the Chinese leader urged South Korea to find its role and do as much as it can in order to get inter-Korean relations back on the right track.


According to South Korea's presidential office, Yoon and Xi sat down for talks for 25 minutes on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. The meeting was first of its kind since Dec. 23, 2019, when Yoon's predecessor Moon Jae-in and Xi met on the sidelines of a trilateral summit between South Korea, China and Japan in Beijing.


During the summit, Yoon voiced worries that North Korea is waging unprecedented provocations with its missile launches and being set for another nuclear test, and asked China, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a neighboring country, to play an "active and constructive role."


In response, Xi said that both South Korea and China have "common interests on the issues of the Korean Peninsula" and he hopes South Korea will do its part to improve inter-Korean relations actively.


Xi also said the success of Yoon's "audacious initiative," a proposal calling for the denuclearization of North Korea in exchange for massive economic incentives, hinges on North Korea and he will support the initiative if North Korea reacts positively.



Yoon calls for end to protectionism at G-20 Summit


Along with North Korea issues, the two leaders showed subtle differences in setting their nations' ties moving forward.


In his opening remarks, Yoon said, "South Korea will closely communicate with China and cooperate to build mature bilateral ties based on the value of mutual respect and reciprocity."


Yoon also noted that "the South Korean government is pursuing freedom, peace and prosperity of East Asia and the international community based on universal values and norms," noting China's role is critical to bring peace and prosperity to the region, as well as the international community.


Xi called the two countries "inseparable partners" sharing "a broad range of common interests," and said he hopes the two countries can work together to achieve "true multilateralism," as opposed to unilateralism dominated by one single country.


The Chinese leader's remarks are interpreted to show his opposition to the U.S.-led coalition to contain Beijing.


Since Yoon's inauguration on May 10, there has been a shift in South Korea's position on the U.S.-China rivalry. South Korea has prioritized its relations with the United States over its ties with any other countries.


Yoon has been calling for increased reciprocity and mutual respect in Seoul-Beijing relations.



In this combined photo, President Yoon Suk-yeol and Chinese President Xi Jinping talk during their summit at a hotel in Bali, Indonesia, Tuesday. Yonhap


During the summit, Xi said he had been unable to visit Seoul in person due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but he would be delighted to accept Yoon's invitation if the pandemic situation stabilizes, adding that he hopes Yoon will visit Beijing at a convenient time.


Earlier, Yoon and Xi were in a tug of war over the venue for their summit. Through the Chinese delegation to Yoon's inauguration in May, Xi invited the South Korean leader to visit China at a time of mutual convenience. In response, Yoon said he would like to invite the Chinese leader to visit Seoul for a summit. Xi's last visit to Seoul was in 2014. Yoon's predecessor Moon visited Beijing twice, in 2017 and 2019.


Tuesday's summit came as a surprise, as multiple sources at Seoul's presidential office had said earlier that there might be a casual talk between Yoon and Xi but chances were slim for them to have a formal summit.


Pundits said that the South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral summit on Sunday might have prompted Xi to sit down with Yoon. During the trilateral summit, the three countries agreed to share real-time data on North Korean missiles, which is a sign that their military cooperation is intensifying, and the leaders also mentioned issues relating to the Taiwan Strait.



The Korea Times · by 2022-11-15 17:18 | Foreign Affairs · November 15, 2022



15. Facing North Korea’s Missile Threats, South Korea, US, Japan Reaffirm Joint Commitment


Again, yes, a possible step toward an integrated missile defense system. Many of us have been advocating this for a number of years.


And someday a trilateral alliance which will really strike fear into the hearts of the regimes in China and north Korea.



Facing North Korea’s Missile Threats, South Korea, US, Japan Reaffirm Joint Commitment

In the trilateral summit on Sunday, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo reaffirmed their joint commitment in the face of Pyongyang’s missile threats, but no new measure to renew the stalled dialogue were announced. 

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · November 15, 2022

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South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden met on November 13 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. This 50-minute bilateral meeting came two months after they met on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain.

Yoon and Biden discussed North Korea’s series of missile launches in the past few weeks. According to the readout of the White House, Biden “reaffirmed the U.S. extended deterrence commitment” to South Korea that covers “the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, and missile defense.” They also agreed to strengthen their firm coordination and joint military readiness posture while reaffirming that the South and the United States will use every possible resource if North Korea uses its nuclear weapons in any way.

To respond to the North’s record-breaking missile launches this year, Washington has vowed to provide full support under the “U.S. extended deterrence” to defend South Korea. Since Yoon took office in May, Seoul and Washington have reinvigorated their joint military drills. North Korea’s unprecedented missile launches on November 2 were its response to one of those drills – “Vigilant Storm,” the largest-ever South Korea-U.S. joint military air exercise conducted earlier this month. North Korea also launched its Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in response to South Korea-U.S. military exercises this month.

Asking Biden to sustain his interest in consultations between military officials over the building of a powerful and effective extended deterrence system, Yoon also emphasized that it is important to show North Korea that there is nothing it can achieve with its nuclear and missile programs.

Along with the bilateral meeting with Biden, Yoon also met his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, on Sunday. During the 45-minute summit, the two sides also discussed the recent series of North Korean missile launches and strongly condemned them as a grave act of provocation to the security and peace of not only the East Asia region but also the international community. In response, they agreed to strengthen the South Korea-U.S.-Japan security cooperation.

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Yoon has been eager to restore the tense relations with Japan, and he also discussed ways to resolve the historical disputes with Kishida, according to the briefing from his office. No specific details were outlined by Yoon’s office.

After their bilateral summits, the leaders of South Korea, the United States, and Japan met for a trilateral summit lasting 15 minutes on Sunday. The discussions covered similar ground to the bilateral summits. Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, said that the three leaders “did coordinate on a joint response in the event there would be a seventh nuclear test by the DPRK” during a press briefing on Sunday. (DPRK is an acronym of North Korea’s official name: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

According to the South’s media reports, the three sides also agreed to share “real-time missile warning data” to cope with the North’s missile launches appropriately. With this, Seoul and Japan will likely normalize their General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) – which the Moon Jae-in administration threatened to scrap in the wake of Japan’s trade restrictions on South Korea.

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Although Yoon, Biden, and Kishida reaffirmed their joint commitment to tackle the North’s nuclear and missile threats, none of the bilateral or trilateral meetings offered a new approach to renew the deadlocked nuclear talks with North Korea.

Since the Biden administration completed its months-long review of its North Korea policy in April 2021, it has publicly shown its willingness to sit down with North Korean officials with “no preconditions.” However, since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019 between then-U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang has demanded the United States make concessions first if it wants to restore the stalled dialogue. In North Korea’s eyes, the talks collapsed due to Trump’s political decision to say “no deal” in Hanoi; therefore, the United States must demonstrate its seriousness before Pyongyang will engage in more talks. The concessions North Korea seeks are lifting at least partially the devastating economic sanctions and halting South Korea-U.S. joint military drills.

North Korea has not shown any interest in the offers of dialogue from South Korea and the United States, but neither Seoul nor Washington has introduced a new approach to de-escalate the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Instead, both governments keep repeating their old-school approach.

The Biden administration’s approach seems to be an updated version of the “strategic patience” approach taken by former U.S. President Barack Obama. Washington has used the two-pronged approach on North Korea with carrots (unconditional dialogue) and sticks (scaling up the joint military drill with South Korea). But to most analysts, this passive policy demonstrates that North Korea issues are not a priority for Biden, and the U.S. goal is keeping the status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

To entice Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, Yoon introduced his “audacious initiative,” which offers economic packages to North Korea if the regime shows the “will” to denuclearize the country, in August. However, this plan was not audacious enough to convince Pyongyang, as it was harshly denounced by Kim Yo Jong, the powerful sister of Kim Jong Un and the main voice on inter-Korean relations. This plan is essentially an updated version of “Vision 3000: Denuclearization and Openness,” the failed plan of the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration. This was pointed out by Kim Yo Jong, who denounced Yoon’s offer as “a replica” of Lee’s.

Ostensibly, it is a good sign that the South, the United States, and Japan are uniting to confront the North’s provocations. However, what should be noted following the meetings of these three leaders is that they are not introducing any new measures to resolve the conflict with diplomacy and dialogue. Kim Jong Un has vowed to strengthen his nuclear power and made clear that his nuclear arsenals are not negotiable anymore, yet South Korea, the U.S., and Japan have not updated their policies to reflect the new reality.

If Seoul, Washington and Tokyo are hoping to stabilize the region peacefully, they will need to try something new to bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · November 15, 2022

16. It’s too easy for the west to see North Korea as a WTF curiosity. We need to do better


We could do better by striving to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.


We must know that what happens on the Korean peninsula will have global effects.


It’s too easy for the west to see North Korea as a WTF curiosity. We need to do better | Tania Branigan

As viral stories about the hermitic country abound, North Koreans face devastating hunger and Covid clampdowns

The Guardian · by Tania Branigan · November 14, 2022

Until January 2020, the joint security area of the Korean demilitarised zone (DMZ) was the one place on the peninsula where forces from North and South Korea stood face to face – a spot where Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump even met and shook hands. The US and South Korean troops stationed there have a lonelier watch now. On the North’s side, weeds poke out from the gravel and sprout between the steps of its Panmungak Hall, set just behind the demarcation line. Occasionally, soldiers venture out on to the terrace that runs along its first floor – but only clad in full hazmat suits. On an autumnal morning, the sole sign of life is a distant face peering through binoculars from the second floor. This wearer is in full protective gear too, though stationed safely behind glass. Since the emergence of Covid-19, the few windows into the country have slammed shut.

The victims are the North Korean people, now more isolated than ever. It’s also bad news for the rest of us, our ability to understand a totalitarian country with an ever-expanding nuclear programme even further reduced. Pyongyang’s recent flurry of missile tests, and the likelihood of a seventh nuclear test, have rightly commanded headlines. There is also, less happily, an insatiable appetite for tales of the country’s absurdities or lurid excesses, real or imagined. We’ve been told that Kim Jong-un had his ex-girlfriend killed by firing squad (she later appeared on television), that his uncle was not just executed but fed to dogs (a claim that originated as satire), and that state media insisted until recently that his grandfather had mastered teleportation. These stories feed on the west’s gullibility and desire for sensation and the regime’s well-documented cruelty, bombastic propaganda and genuine oddity – but also on Pyongyang’s obsessive secrecy: when so little can be seen, anything seems possible.

It turns out that even a hermit kingdom can judge itself insufficiently reclusive. The inner workings of Kim’s regime, like those of his father and grandfather, have always been shrouded in mystery. The totalitarian system imposes tight controls on borders, communications and culture. Foreigners working in or visiting the country have their movements tightly controlled. But in some ways, the North has gradually became more porous, thanks to citizens who traded with China or worked there illicitly, and to North Koreans glimpsing the US and South Korea via smuggled foreign movies and TV shows.

Then came Covid. The North was among the first countries to close its borders, and warned that anyone attempting to cross the buffer zones it created would be “unconditionally shot”. Its troops reportedly killed a South Korean official on a boat near the maritime border and incinerated his body, possibly after he tried to defect. The terror of the virus is real: its health system is in tatters. But the virus has also been an opportunity for authoritarian leaders to impose measures that further increase their control. Nowhere has that been clearer than the North: “Covid has given a lot to Kim Jong-un,” says the elite defector Tae Yong-ho.

Pyongyang has turned down offers of aid, blocked almost all official and unofficial trade and severely restricted domestic travel – with devastating impact: it has long been unable to meet basic needs, leaving citizens to scrape a living through trade and the informal economy. One expert on the North’s economy warns that food availability has probably fallen below basic human needs and, on one metric, is at its worst since the deadly famine of the 1990s. In December 2020, it also introduced a law attacking foreign influence that made distributing or watching foreign media punishable by long prison terms, and encouraging others to view punishable by the death penalty – intensifying previous campaigns.

Even before the pandemic, the regime had halted and then reversed very limited economic changes that incentivised individuals, fearing they were reducing its control. The failure of the unprecedented bilateral talks with the US, and of the South’s attempts to thaw relations, left Pyongyang more suspicious of the west than ever, and more closely tied to Russia and especially China, which is propping it up with deliveries of food, fuel and fertiliser.

Covid has exacerbated these shifts. Due to the harsh restrictions, NGOs shut down and all western diplomats left the country: only eight embassies are functioning at all, around a third of the previous total, and with much-reduced staff. Experts say state media is less revealing than ever, and fewer publications can be read from overseas now. A once steady stream of defectors is said to have plummeted from 1,000 in 2019 to 195 in the first nine months of 2020, with perhaps 19 arriving in the South in the first half of this year. The shutting down of smuggling networks has reduced the flow of information out, as well as in. The result: “Our knowledge of North Korea is the worst for 35 years,” says Andrei Lankov, a leading expert on the country.

While some call for the South to attempt to penetrate the North’s barriers to information – for instance, resuming propaganda broadcasts along the border – such measures would risk destabilising relations for probably minimal return. At best, it might enlighten some North Korean troops; it would not improve outsiders’ knowledge of the country. Continuing to offer it vaccines and other supplies, despite its snubs, and to petition for the return of diplomats and other foreign workers, would be a wiser choice – albeit one requiring considerable patience.

Last year, we were told that North Korea had banned the population from wearing leather trench coats like Kim’s. This January, reports that the country claims burritos as its own invention circulated widely. Meanwhile, the increased hunger and isolation of North Koreans has been largely overlooked. It is long past time to treat the country not as a WTF-inducing curiosity and a heavily armed security nightmare but as a place in which 25 million people live, in dire economic straits, subject to what the UN has described as “unparalleled” human rights abuses by their own leadership, and now under tightened control. Standing at the DMZ, looking into North Korea, it is clear that it has shut the world out even more decisively. But how hard did we try to see it in the first place?

  • Tania Branigan is a Guardian leader writer; she spent seven years as the Guardian’s China correspondent

The Guardian · by Tania Branigan · November 14, 2022



17, Biden Threatens North Korea, War Games Continue in Philippine Sea




Biden Threatens North Korea, War Games Continue in Philippine Sea

coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · November 14, 2022

While US President Joe Biden threatened to take unspecified defensive actions against North Korea over its ongoing missile tests, an armada from four nations continued war games in the Philippine Sea.

Gathering warships from India, Japan, Australia, and the US 7th Fleet, Exercise Malabar 2022 began Tuesday, Nov. 8, and runs 10 days. Officials said the forces will focus on anti-submarine warfare, air defense, multinational replenishment-at-sea operations, communications, gunnery, maritime interdiction, and operational planning.

Malabar kicked off in 1992 with joint maritime maneuvers by the US and India. This year’s exercises will mark the third time Japan and Australia have participated.

“This exercise represents an outstanding opportunity for our like-minded maritime forces to work together, demonstrating our shared commitment to the region and collaborative approach toward security and stability,” said Rear Adm. Michael “Buzz” Donnelly, the commander of the US 7th Fleet’s Task Force 70 and the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, in a prepared statement. “Now, it is more important than ever for the forward-deployed carrier strike group to work closely with other maritime forces and deter all who challenge a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

The US Navy’s only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, Ronald Reagan, steams in formation with ships from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Royal Australian Navy, and Indian Navy during Exercise Malabar 2022 in the Philippine Sea, Nov. 11, 2022. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael B. Jarmiolowski.

The maneuvers come amid growing tensions sparked by North Korea and China.

During a Monday press conference in Indonesia, Biden told reporters gathered for the G-20 economic summit in Bali that he’d warned his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, that Beijing has “an obligation” to stop neighboring North Korea from lobbing long-range test missiles across the Pacific, and that the US would take unnamed “defensive” actions if it continued.

While Biden assured reporters that his forces wouldn’t target China for reprisals, the president said he wanted to “send a clear message” to North Korean strongman Kim Jong Un that the US will “defend our allies as well as American soil and American capacity.”

That capacity is on full display south of Tokyo this week, with the US 7th Fleet sending the Ronald Reagan and its embarked air wing, plus the guided-missile cruiser Chancellorsville and the guided-missile destroyer Milius.

Sailors with US Naval Special Warfare, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Special Boarding Unit, and Indian Navy Marine Commando Force use rigid-hull inflatable boats to conduct a visit, board, search, and seizure drill Nov. 8, 2022, as part of Malabar 2022. US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class MacAdam Kane Weissman.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class MacAdam Kane Weissman.

They’re joined by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s helicopter destroyer Hyūga, the guided-missile destroyers Shiranui and Takanami, the replenishment ship Ōmi, and multiple P-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

The Royal Australian Navy added the guided-missile frigate Arunta, the oiler Stalwart, the diesel-electric submarine Farncomb, and Royal Australian Air Force P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.

India deployed the stealth frigate Shivalik, the anti-sub corvette Kamorta, a P-8I maritime patrol and reconnaissance jet, and an undisclosed number of Marine commandos, according to the US 7th Fleet.

“Participation in high-end maritime exercises, such as Exercise Malabar, demonstrates Australia’s commitment to working with strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region,” said Rear Adm. Jonathan Earley, commander of the Australian Fleet, in a prepared statement. “This exercise contributes to regional security by deepening professional relationships among India, Japan and the United States to build interoperability in the maritime domain.”


coffeeordie.com · by Carl Prine · November 14, 2022











De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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