Quotes of the Day:

"The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here." 

-- Abraham Lincoln

“There is general agreement that the greatest potential armed threats to US interests overseas lie in low- intensity conflicts, which include (some say feature) foreign internal defense. Debates about alleged “lessons of Vietnam,” however, create extensive inconsistencies between U.S. FID objectives, policies, practices, and forced postures. Political-military planners, who are uncertain how to proceed, see no sign that their doubts will soon disappear. Basic U.S. FID concepts still subscribe to the Nixon doctrine, which redefined relationships between helpers and the helped in 1969. “Experience has shown,” it stated, “that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government… [A] direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression... In such cases, we shall consider the efforts of our allies in determining our response.” Subsequent refinements, coupled with the so-called post-Vietnam syndrome, strengthened that prescription for self-help and a low U.S. profile.”

-John M. Collins, United States and Soviet Special Operations, 53-54 (1987)

"You must all be aware that modern war is not a mere matter of military operations. It involves the whole strength and all the resources of the nation. Not only soldiers, but also all citizens without exception, take part."

- Chiang Kai-shek

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (10.11.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Ukrainian official describes chaotic Russian withdrawal from strategic city

4. Southeast Asia leaders kick off ASEAN summit in Cambodia

5. Elon Musk Has No Idea What He’s Doing at Twitter

6. Russian retreat from Kherson city sets stage for more hard combat

7. The Ukraine War Is Not World War III

8. British Army deploys alongside US and Australian partners for future warfare experiment

9. China Puts Belt & Road Back on ASEAN Agenda

10. Top U.S. General Urges Diplomacy in Ukraine While Biden Advisers Resist

11. Interview: Taiwan FM Calls Biden-Xi Meeting Conducive to Taiwan Strait Stability

12. The US wants to play in China's backyard

13. Byte, With, and Through: How Special Operations and Cyber Command Can Support Each Other

14. War Books: A Reading List Inspired by Veterans Day

15.  How Democracy Can Win

16. U.S. Midterm Results Are a Net Plus for National Security

17. Special ops airmen get fewer new gunships than promised

18. What The West Misunderstands About Power In China

19. Israeli Weapons Sent to Ukraine Could End Up in Iran

20. Presidential Vacuum Persists in Lebanon

21. Iran’s terror drone pipeline to Moscow

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10 (Putin's War)

Maps/grpahics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast on November 10 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Russian withdrawal will take some time to complete, and fighting will continue throughout Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian troops advance and come up against pre-prepared Russian defensive lines, especially around Kherson City.
• ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions.
• Ukraine holds the initiative and is in the process of securing a major victory in Kherson. A ceasefire would provide the Kremlin with the pause it desperately needs to reconstitute Russian forces.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is increasingly wrestling with St. Petersburg officials over expanding Wagner Group recruitment in the city.
• Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian force will likely slow the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and in western Donetsk.
• Russian forces began constructing second line fortifications in Crimea and southern Ukraine.
• Russian citizens continue to oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine through protest, social media dissent, and desertions from the military.
• Russian mobilization efforts are channeling personnel to the Wagner group.
• Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity while mobilizing residents in Russian-occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10

Nov 10, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Katherine Lawlor, and Mason Clark

November 10, 8pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast on November 10 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian military officials and geolocated social media footage confirm that Ukrainian troops have made gains northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City in the past 24 hours and advanced up to 7km in some areas.[1] Russian forces so far appear to be withdrawing in relatively good order, and Ukrainian forces are making expected gains without routing Russian forces, as they did in the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Ukrainian strikes since August have successfully degraded Russian supply lines on the west (right) bank to force Russian forces to withdraw and will liberate Kherson Oblast to the Dnipro River in the coming days or weeks. The Russian withdrawal will take some time to complete, and fighting will continue throughout Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian troops advance and come up against pre-prepared Russian defensive lines, especially around Kherson City.

ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions. NBC News reported on November 9 that some US and Western defense officials are eyeing an “expected winter slowdown in fighting as an opportunity for diplomacy to begin between Russia and Ukraine.”[2] Autumn and springtime mud can slow or halt military advances, as can faulty or insufficient wintertime equipment. Some military equipment may need to be adapted for colder weather, and shortages of equipment or ammunition could slow advances due to logistical difficulties — not winter weather.[3] Winter weather could disproportionately harm poorly-equipped Russian forces in Ukraine, but well-supplied Ukrainian forces are unlikely to halt their counteroffensives due to the arrival of winter weather and may be able to take advantage of frozen terrain to move more easily than they could in the muddy autumn months. If fighting does halt this winter, it will be due to logistical challenges and the culmination of several campaigns on both sides. The Russian campaigns to capture all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts all culminated months ago (despite the repeated insistence of Russian forces on launching ineffective attacks), and Russian forces are firmly on the defensive across most of the frontline.

Ukraine holds the initiative and is in the process of securing a major victory in Kherson. A ceasefire would provide the Kremlin with the pause it desperately needs to reconstitute Russian forces. The major Ukrainian victory underway in Kherson Oblast will not be Ukraine’s last. Fighting will continue on the southern axis; in Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast (the only place Russian forces are still attempting meaningful offensives); and in northern Luhansk Oblast as Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations. Russian officials are busy attempting to train 120,000 conscripts to deploy to the frontlines in the spring.[4] Ukrainian forces likely aim to liberate as much occupied territory as possible before those Russian reinforcements arrive. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on November 7 that Ukraine is unwilling to negotiate with Russian forces until certain conditions are met, including the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the prosecution of Russian war criminals, payment for war damages, and promises that Russia will not again invade Ukraine.[5] A wintertime ceasefire would only benefit Russian forces, who would use that opportunity to bolster their faltering defenses and continue their genocidal campaign to eradicate Ukrainian identity in occupied parts of Ukraine.

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is increasingly wrestling with St. Petersburg officials over expanding Wagner Group operations in the city. Prigozhin’s press service stated that St. Petersburg officials refused to provide a permit for the newly opened Wagner Center in St. Petersburg on a technicality.[6] The press service noted that St. Petersburg officials are deliberately refusing to issue the permit based on their "ideological” differences, given that Wagner received the permission to construct the center in July.[7] The press service added that Wagner had petitioned the court and will take the issue further if the court recognizes St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and his government have committed any “crimes.”[8] Prigozhin also accused Beglov and other St. Petersburg “liberal” businessmen of financially supporting Ukrainian “nationalists” and betraying Russia in response to the situation.[9] Prigozhin has previously accused Beglov of failing to support the Russian war effort and demanded his resignation, likely as a result of resistance from Beglov on expanding Wagner’s presence in St. Petersburg.[10] ISW also reported that a Russian nationalist outlet Pravda.Ru, which consistently reports on Prigozhin-related news, published a defamatory piece on Beglov’s uninterest in creating volunteer battalions in August.[11] Prigozhin is increasingly weaponizing his role in the Russian invasion of Ukraine to push his business aspirations.

Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian forces will likely further reduce the pace of their campaign to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure, likely enabling Ukrainian authorities to address most of the damage to infrastructure. Ignat announced on November 10 that on the night of November 9 to 10 Russian forces did not conduct any air or cruise missile strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure facilities.[12] Ignat stated that Russian forces have begun to stockpile high-precision weapons systems to launch a future massive campaign reminiscent of the October 10 strikes, because small numbers of daily cruise missile and drone strikes are now generating few results.[13] Ignat stated Russian forces spent months accumulating the high-precision weapons systems they used in the October campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have greatly depleted their arsenal of high-precision weapons systems and have suffered significant aviation losses and therefore would struggle to maintain the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.[15] It will likely take Russian forces months to accumulate the number of high-precision weapons systems needed to return to the pace of strikes it conducted in mid-October despite Ignat’s reporting that Russian factories are drastically increasing the manufacturing of cruise missiles.[16] Ukrainian officials have previously stated that they could restore energy supplies to communities in Ukraine within a matter of a few weeks if the pace of the Russian campaign dramatically slowed.[17] ISW also assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have ordered the campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure to curry favor with the Russian pro-war nationalist camp that has been consistently demanding escalation in Ukraine.[18] A reduced pace in the campaign will likely contribute to renewed criticisms from the pro-war nationalist camp. Russian forces likely retain the capability to damage Ukrainian critical infrastructure and impose costs on Ukrainian civilians in the winter but are unlikely to be able to inflict decisive — and lasting — damage.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces steadily advanced in Kherson Oblast on November 10 as Russian forces conduct a withdrawal to the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
• The Russian withdrawal will take some time to complete, and fighting will continue throughout Kherson Oblast as Ukrainian troops advance and come up against pre-prepared Russian defensive lines, especially around Kherson City.
• ISW does not assess the fighting in Ukraine will halt or enter a stalemate due to winter weather, despite faulty Western assumptions.
• Ukraine holds the initiative and is in the process of securing a major victory in Kherson. A ceasefire would provide the Kremlin with the pause it desperately needs to reconstitute Russian forces.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin is increasingly wrestling with St. Petersburg officials over expanding Wagner Group recruitment in the city.
• Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ignat stated that Russian force will likely slow the pace of their campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and in western Donetsk.
• Russian forces began constructing second line fortifications in Crimea and southern Ukraine.
• Russian citizens continue to oppose Russia’s war in Ukraine through protest, social media dissent, and desertions from the military.
• Russian mobilization efforts are channeling personnel to the Wagner group.
• Russian occupation officials are continuing efforts to erode Ukrainian national identity while mobilizing residents in Russian-occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line on November 10. Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Oleksiy Hromov announced that Ukrainian forces advanced by two kilometers in an unspecified area of Luhansk Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novoselivske and Makiivka, about 19km northwest and 21km southwest of Svatove, respectively.[20] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Operation characterized Russian assaults in Luhansk Oblast as unsuccessful small-arms battles.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made over a dozen unsuccessful assaults along the Svatove-Kreminna line, including an assault on Kuzemivka, about 15km northwest of Svatove.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed to have repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Ploshchanka (about 16km northwest of Kreminna).[23] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces suppressed Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force attempts on Orlianka and Kyslivka, about 32km northwest of Svatove.[24] A Russian source also claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out a reconnaissance-in-force in the direction of Chervonopopivka, northwest of Kreminna.[25]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistics in Luhansk Oblast on November 9 and November 10. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are moving large quantities of supplies and many reserves in the direction of Svatove-Kreminna but noted that Ukrainian forces continue to shell Russian main supply routes.[26] Social media footage also showed ruined asphalt and muddy roads in Svatove due to the Russian transfer of heavy equipment on poor roads, which may also complicate Russian equipment transfers.[27] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik claimed on November 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Svatove with two HIMARS missiles.[28] Geolocated images posted on November 10 show the aftermath of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes on Stakhanov and a mine near Krynychne on the night of November 9 to 10.[29]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian forces made substantial gains throughout Kherson Oblast on November 10. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Valery Zaluzhny stated that in the past day, Ukrainian forces have advanced 7km and liberated six settlements in the Petropavlivka-Novoraysk direction (towards Beryslav) and advanced 7km and liberated six settlements in the Pervomaiske­­–Kherson City direction (towards Kherson City).[30] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces have advanced the frontline by 7km and liberated 12 settlements, amounting to over 260 square kilometers of territory in the past day.[31] Zaluzhny stated that since October 1, Ukrainian forces have taken back 41 settlements in the Kherson direction.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian troops continue efforts to partially withdraw troops from the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River but emphasized that Russian forces are conducting continued maneuvers on the west bank, statements in line with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces will conduct a fighting withdrawal.[33]

Social media footage and imagery confirmed Ukrainian gains in several sectors. Footage posted to social media shows Ukrainian troops in Kyselivka, a critical settlement along the M14 highway about 14km northwest of Kherson City.[34] Footage also shows Ukrainian soldiers in Pravdyne and Myroliubivka, both within 25km northwest of Kherson City.[35] Social media imagery additionally shows Ukrainian forces have advanced into Oleksandrivka and Stanislav, both about 33km west of Kherson City.[36] Ukrainian forces also made advances north of Beryslav, and social media footage confirms the presence of Ukrainian troops in Kachkarivka (36km northeast of Beryslav), Kucherske (33km north of Beryslav), Borozenske (36km north of Beryslav), Bruskynske (38km northwest of Beryslav), Yehenivka (47km northwest of Beryslav), Bobrovyi Kut (45km northwest of Beryslav), Chkalove (29km northwest of Beryslav), Starystya (34km northwest of Beryslav), and Ishchenka (39km northwest of Beryslav).[37] Geolocated imagery confirms Ukrainian forces liberated Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast (about 43km northeast of Kherson City) and the surrounding settlements of Vasylivka, Pavlivka, and Tamryne.[38]

Russian sources discussed Ukrainian ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on November 10, with some confirming that Ukrainian troops have taken control of several settlements northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to emphasize claimed strikes on Ukrainian concentration areas through Kherson Oblast, likely to detract focus on Russian territorial losses.[40]

Ukrainian forces continued their successful interdiction campaign against Russian concentration areas and military assets to support ongoing counteroffensive actions in Kherson Oblast on November 10. Advisor to the Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Head, Serhiy Khlan, stated that a Ukrainian strike hit Russian equipment in Oleshky, 7km southeast of Kherson City.[41] Local residents and Ukrainian officials also reported strikes in the Beryslav–Nova Kahkovka area between November 9 and 10.[42]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults around Bakhmut near Soledar (10km northeast), Klishchiiivka (6km southwest), Mayorsk (20km south), Yakovlivka (15km northeast), Andriivka (9km southwest), and Bilohorivka (20km northeast).[43] Ukrainian General Staff Deputy Chief Oleksiy Hromov reported that Russian forces continued to suffer significant losses in the Bakhmut direction and National Guard of Ukraine representative Mykola Urshalovych stated that Russian forces continue to make suicidal attempts to launch assaults on Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut with “maniacal persistence.”[44] Urshalovych noted that Russian forces are constantly conducting reconnaissance-in-force, which he said indicates that Russian forces have a low level of equipment within intelligence units. A Russian source stated that the Wagner Group is trying to advance to the city limits of Bakhmut on the eastern outskirts of the city, and that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions northeast of Bakhmut near Yakovlivka.[45] Ukrainian and Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 6th Cossack Regiment, continued fighting northeast of Bakhmut in Soledar.[46] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces fully captured Bakhmutske and that Russian forces and the Wagner Group control 40–50% of Bilohorivka.[47] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in the Bakhmut area.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vesele, Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Novomykhailivka, all along an arc of the western outskirts of Donetsk City.[49] The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) militia claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian transports, ammunition depots, and strongholds in the vicinity of Pervomaiske.[50] A Russian source reported that Russian forces conducted ground assaults near Novomykhailivka to reach Konstantinivka and cut off the road to Marinka from the south.[51] Russian sources claimed that tense battles are ongoing towards Opytne and Marinka.[52] Russian forces conducted routine shelling in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on November 10. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City) and claimed that Ukrainian forces retreated to the northern outskirts of the settlement, where they retain control.[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet operating in southern Donetsk and reported that Russian forces struck down a portion of nine Ukrainian UAVs near Yehorivka.[55] As ISW has previously observed, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade recently sustained substantial losses in this area and is likely fighting severely understrength.[56] Ukrainian Eastern Joint Forces Operation reported that Russian forces carried out a missile attack on Vuhledar.[57] Russian forces otherwise continued routine shelling along the line of contact in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[58]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces have begun constructing second-line defensive fortifications in Crimea and southern Ukraine, standard military practices that do not necessarily indicate an imminent Russian expectation of defending Crimea. American satellite imagery company Planet Labs published satellite photos on November 10 showing new trenches and restored defensive fortifications near Armiansk in Russian-occupied Crimea and near Chonhar, Kherson Oblast.[59] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 10 that Russian forces have also begun strengthening fortifications near Melitopol to protect the land corridor to Crimea.[60] The construction of defensive fortifications on secondary lines of defense is standard military procedure, one that Russian forces have not previously conducted at scale in northern Crimea and elsewhere in southern Ukraine. The construction of these new defensive fortifications is not an indicator that Russian forces expect to defend Crimea from a Ukrainian offensive in the near future.

Russian forces continued routine air, missile, and artillery strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts.[61] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Vilniansk, Zaporizhia Oblast.[62]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Mobilized men and their relatives continue to oppose the war through protests, social media dissent, and attempted desertions. Poor treatment and provisioning of mobilized Russian personnel are likely driving surrenders and desertions, as well as protests by the families of mobilized personnel within Russia. Russian forces are reportedly detaining those who refuse to fight (refuseniks) in a network of inhumane prisons in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, according to a November 10 report by the Ukrainian Telegram channel ASTRA.[63] Russian authorities reportedly beat, starve, and pressure the refuseniks until they agree to return to the frontlines. A group of imprisoned men in Zaitseve, Luhansk Oblast told the outlet that they were sent to the frontlines around October 20 after very little training, whereupon their officers abandoned them without communications or logistics capabilities for eight days. The men walked about 60km to Starobilsk, where their relatives rented a bus to bring them home. Russian forces detained the men at the border and imprisoned them in a Zaitseve basement instead. Relatives of forcibly mobilized Russian men in Vologda Oblast shared a video on November 10 demanding that their mobilized family members be returned from Svatove, Luhansk Oblast due to poor training and leadership on the front.[64]

Russian mobilization efforts are channeling mobilized Russian personnel to the Wagner Group, indicating the increasing importance of Wagner to Russian combat capabilities. Russian-language opposition outlet Agency News reported on November 10 that mobilized men from Omsk Oblast received military IDs that did not identify them as mobilized personnel, which then allowed Russian authorities to send the mobilized men to fight alongside the prisoners recruited by Wagner.[65] Private military companies are unconstitutional in Russia, and mobilized personnel cannot legally be deployed to fight with any armed group other than the Russian military. Wagner forces reportedly use the prisoners as cannon fodder to draw Ukrainian fire and keep actual Wagner personnel out of harm’s way, as ISW has previously reported.[66] Ukrainian National Guard Colonel Mykola Urshalovych noted on November 10 that Wagner prisoner recruits are the most likely demographic of all Russian forces to surrender to the Ukrainian National Guard, likely due to their poor treatment and dangerous deployments.[67]

Pro-Russian milbloggers and military units continue to call for economic mobilization to support the war effort. A Telegram channel affiliated with the BARS-13 reservist militia argued on November 10 that Russian authorities need to begin mobilizing the Russian economy and engaging in economic activities that will support Russian forces at the front.[68] A Russian milblogger wrote on November 10 that Russia’s reliance on Iranian-made drones and other systems humiliates the Russian military industry and deprives Russia of the chance to develop and produce suitable Russian-made modern weapons systems.[69] The milblogger called for better funding to the Russian military-industrial complex and warned that the West will likely eventually cut Russia’s access to Iranian-made equipment like drones and missiles by overthrowing the Iranian regime.

Russian occupation authorities are likely facing economic repercussions stemming from their policy of forcibly mobilizing men in Russian-occupied areas. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that local businesses in Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast are suffering major labor shortages because most men are either hiding from mobilization summonses or in the process of being mobilized.[70] The Center reported that Russian forces regularly conduct raids on homes and businesses to find men who are evading mobilization and that several businesses in Makiivka have shut down due to labor shortages. The Center also claimed that Russian officials send mobilized personnel from Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine to the front lines with insufficient training and ammunition because deaths among those forcibly mobilized personnel may result in their families hating Ukraine longer-term, driving a wedge between the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied areas.

Some Russian citizens are likely continuing to oppose the war through planned or executed attacks on Russian military locations. The Deputy Interior Minister of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), Vitaly Kiselev, claimed on November 10 that FSB agents detained an unnamed Russian citizen in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast and uncovered five incendiary devices which they claimed the person planned to use to attack unspecified “administrative facilities” in Yekaterinburg.[71] Kiselev claimed that the Russian citizen was affiliated with “terrorist” and “extremist” organizations.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are reportedly continuing their efforts to identify pro-Ukraine residents in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine but are less invested in creating pro-Russian sentiments among occupied populations. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian occupation officials have reduced payments to “socially vulnerable” populations in occupied parts of Zaporizhia Oblast since the September 30 pseudo-referenda.[72] The Center reported that those payments were used to acquire passport data to rig the referendum vote and that Russian authorities are stepping up filtration measures and other “terror tactics” because they no longer need to buy the goodwill of the occupied population. The Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration reported on November 10 that occupation officials installed cameras and microphones in a Novopskov hospital and ordered hospital staff to “conduct casual conversations with visitors to identify untrustworthy individuals.”

Russian occupation officials are continuing their attempts to erode Ukrainian national identity among residents of occupied territories while setting conditions to mobilize additional forces from the occupied Ukrainian civilian population years from now. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian occupation officials opened branches of the Young Army Cadets National Movement in Henichesk, Kherson Oblast and in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[73] The Center reported that “Yunarmia” is a militaristic association of schoolchildren under the auspices of the Russian Ministry of Defense that is responsible for the “militarization” of children. The Center reported that participation is supposedly voluntary, but that Russian officials forcibly enroll schoolchildren in Yunarmia in many Russian oblasts. Yunarmia recruits cadets between the ages of 8 and 18.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/; https://t.me/Tsaplienko/20040; https://twitter.com/Blue_Sauron/status/1... https://twitter.com/markito0171/status/1590711291576217610

[19] https://armyinform dot com dot ua/2022/11/10/mynuloyi-doby-nashi-vijska-prosunulys-na-luganshhyni-na-vidstan-do-2-kilometriv/

[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/

[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/z-1-zhovtnya-vidnovleno-kontrol-nad-41-naselenym-punktom-na-hersonskomu-napryamku-valerij-zaluzhnyj/

[33] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/1327682387994417/; https://arm... dot com.ua/2022/11/10/vijska-rf-shhe-zalyshayutsya-na-pravoberezhzhi-dnipra-u-hersonskij-oblasti/

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid09YyDruMCQiKPEXWt5Zq... https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/protyvnyh-zaznaye-suttyevyh-vtrat-brygadnyj-general-oleksij-gromov/

[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/11/10/vagnerivczi-z-chysla-dzhentlmeniv-udachi-zdayutsya-u-polon/

[70] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/10/na-tymchasovo-okupovanij-donechchyni-deficzyt-praczivnykiv-cherez-mobilizacziyu/

[72] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/10/na-zaporizhzhi-rosiyany-znachno-skorotyly-vyplaty-10-tys-rubliv/

[73] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/10/rosiyany-formuyut-na-tot-dytyachu-armiyu/

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (10.11.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (10.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

The Russian losses in the war against Ukraine exceed the losses of the Ukrainian army by approximately 10 times, President Volodymyr Zelensky said. "I can't say the exact numbers, but the difference is very significant. Because our military tactics are not to lose people, because people are more important."

There are more than 2,000 unidentified people in Ukraine who died as a result of the Russian invasion, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Mary Hakobyan told a briefing at the Military Media Center.

Russia is committing war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity by forcibly transferring and deporting civilians from Ukraine. When leaving home, people must go through an invasive screening process called “filtration”. They are interrogated, and searched, many are detained and subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, which is a war crime against the civilian population – Amnesty International said in its report.

As of November 10, more than 80% of boiler houses and heating stations are operational in Kharkiv Oblast, but the situation varies in different places, Oleg Sinegubov, the head of the Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration, said. There is no gas supply in the city of Vovchansk, which depended on Russia. Boiler plants are complete in Kupyansk, and some of them have already been started, in Izyum, 6 boiler plants out of 22 are being started (the rest were destroyed by Russian shelling and airstrikes). A total of 70 high-rise buildings out of 198 will be heated in Izyum.

Around 7 a.m., 2 rockets, probably S-300, exploded on the territory of an agricultural enterprise in the Vilnyanska community. Enterprise buildings and equipment were damaged, Oleksandr Starukh, head of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (OMA) said.

On Thursday morning, Russian troops shelled the liberated parts of Kherson Oblast, trying to hit humanitarian aid delivery points in the village of Zolota Balka, Novoaleksandrivska amalgamanet community, deputy head of the President's Office Kyrylo Tymoshenko said.

On November 10, the Russian military shelled the border areas of Sumy Oblast. A total of 49 explosions were recorded, the head of Sumy OMA, Dmytro Zhivytskyi, said. He added that there were no victims or destruction.

The Kyiv City Council has completely excluded the Russian language from the curricula of communally owned preschool and general secondary education institutions. "The leaders of the Russian Federation have repeatedly said that 'Russia reaches as far as the Russian language is spread.' In this regard, the Kyiv City Council members adopted a decision that will provide an

opportunity to avoid the escalation of tension in society and strengthen the protection of Kyiv’s educational space from the hybrid influences of the aggressor state. Language is important, and in times of war it is a matter of national security," Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education and Science, Family, Youth and Sports Vadym Vasylchuk noted.

Occupied territories:

The so-called evacuation of the population from the city of Kherson has been stopped due to the lack of those who are willing to leave, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces said. Also, the occupation authorities stopped paying wages and social benefits.

The Ukrainian Center of National Resistance reported that the Russian forces looted the Ukrainian Orthodox Church building in occupied Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhya Oblast. They took seven Orthodox icons dated between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century.

The EU will not issue Schengen visas to the people who have received Russian international passports in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts of Ukraine, as well as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the EU said in a statement.

Operational situation

(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 9) Developments)

It is the 260^th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories, concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and conducts the offensive in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka directions.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas around Novoselivske and Makiivka of Luhansk Oblast and Soledar, Klishchiivka, Mayorsk, Yakovlivka, Andriivka, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Nevelske, Pervomaiske and Novomykhailivka of Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military shells the Ukrainian troops along the contact line, fortifies frontiers, and conducts aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it continues to strike critical infrastructure.

Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 11 missile strikes and 22 air strikes and fired over 35 MLRS rounds. Areas around more than 30 towns and villages in Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Kherson Oblasts were affected. Near the state border, the aggressor shelled the villages of Hasychivka in Chernihiv Oblast and Popivka, Petrushivka, Myropillya, Zapsilya, Nova Huta, Novovasylivka and Starykove in Sumy Oblast, Hryhorivka, Kolodyazne, Strilecha, Vovchansk, Ohirtseve and Ternov in Kharkiv Oblast.

The Republic of Belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, receives and accommodates Russian servicemen, and provides training grounds.

The Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on the territory of the Republic of Belarus continues to form. The threat of enemy strikes and the use of attack UAVs from the territory of the Republic of Belarus persists.

The interior affairs bodies of the Russian Federation in the city of Tolyatti, Samara Oblast received an order to recruit 1,000 candidates for service in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. At the same time, the city's chemical enterprises are working on additional fundraising to support the regional division. This stirs indignation in the employees, who even without this face monthly deductions for the support of the mobilized servicemen who participate in the war on the territory of Ukraine.

Over the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 6 strikes against the enemy. 2 areas of weapons and military equipment concentration, and 2 anti-aircraft missile systems positions were hit. Over the past day, the Defense Forces shot down five "Shakhed" and three "Orlan" UAVs in different directions.

Ukrainian missile and artillery forces hit one Russian command post, 1 area of weapons and military equipment concentration, an ammunition depot, and other important Russian military targets.

On November 9, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation ordered the Russian troops to begin withdrawing from the western (right) bank of the Dnipro River to the eastern (left) bank. Shoigu's and Surovikin's statements mark the beginning of a steady, combative withdrawal of Russian troops across the Dnipro to prepared positions on the eastern (left) bank to preserve the combat power of Russian units, including elements of the 76th air assault division and 106th airborne division and 22nd Army Corps. The commander of the operation in Ukraine, General Surovikin, said that half of the troops withdrawn from the western bank of the Dnipro River will be redeployed to other regions of Ukraine. The battle for Kherson is not over yet, but Russian troops have entered a new phase. The priority is to withdraw their forces across the river in proper order and delay the Ukrainian forces, rather than trying to completely stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Topoli - Siversk section: approximate length of combat line - 154 km, number of BTGs of the RF

Armed Forces - 23-28, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 5.5 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments (TR), 245th motorized rifle regiment (MRR) of the 47th tank division (TD), 6th and 239th TRs, 228th MRR of the 90th TD, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRBr) of the 6th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 27th SMRBr of the 1st Tank Army, 252nd and 752nd MRRs of the 3rd MRD, 1st, 13th, and 12th TRs, 423rd MRR of the 4th TD, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th SMRBrs of the 2nd CA Army, 35th, 55th and 74th SMRBrs of the 41st CA Army, 275th and 280th MRRs, 11th TR of the 18th MRD of the 11 Army Corps (AC), 7th MRR of the 11th AC, 80th SMRBr of the 14th AC, 2nd and

45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, military

units of the 1st AC of so-called DPR, 2nd and 4th SMRBrs of the 2nd AC, PMC

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas around Ploschanka, Berestove, Stelmakhivka, Myasozharivka, Spirne, Bilohorivka, Makiivka, Nevske and Kyselivka.

Fighting continues along the Svatove-Kreminna highway and in the Bilohorivka area of the Luhansk Oblast.

Russian forces repulsed the Ukrainian attack northwest of Svatove in the direction of Kuzemivka and along the Ploshanka - Makiivka front line near the R66 highway.

The Ukrainian defense forces repelled Russian attacks northwest of Svatove in the area around Novoselyvske and south of Kreminna in the Bilohorivka area.

Donetsk direction

●  Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 144 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments (TR), 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th TR of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiment of the 106 airborne division, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade of Baltic Fleet, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas around Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Soledar, Ivanhrad, Yakovlivka, Mayorsk, Zelenopillia, New York, Vuhledar, Nevelske, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, Krasnohorivka and Vesele with tanks and artillery.

Russian troops continued their offensive around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

The joint forces repelled attacks on Bakhmut and near Klishchiivka, Maiorsk, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Yakovlivka, Bilohorivka, Vesele, Opytne, Pervomaiske, Pavlivka, and Novomykailivka.

Assault squads of the "Wagner" PMC and units of the Russian Armed Forces advanced to the southern part of Bilohorivka. They tried to break through the Ukrainian defenses on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, continued to attack in the direction of Opytne, Krasohorivka, and Maryinka. They also repelled Ukrainian counterattacks in the areas of Novomykhailivka, Pavlivka, and Vremivka. The weather conditions slowed down the Russian troops in the Novomykhailivka area.

The Russian occupation authorities set up "dragon's teeth" engineering barriers and mined the Ahrobaza - Berdyanske - Shevchenko - Pryazovske line near the Mariupol suburbs.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRBr) of the 29th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 38th and 64th SMRBrs, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th CA Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37th of the 36th CA Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 19th motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 58th CA Army, 70th, 71st and 291st MRRs of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CA Army, 136th SMRB of the 58 CA Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps (AC), 39th SMRB of the 68th AC, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st AC of the so-called DPR, and 2nd AC of the socalled LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Prechystivka, Velyka Novosilka, Pavlivka, Hulyaipilske, Vremivka, Zaliznychne, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, Novopil, Mali Shcherbaky and Poltavka.

Russian troops continued regular artillery and missile strikes on the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts in order to maintain control over the occupied positions. They launched an Iranian-made Shahed-136 UAV over the city of Dnipro, hitting the building of an unspecified logistics enterprise, and shelled settlements in the Nikopol district. Ukrainian air defense destroyed five Shahed-136 UAVs.

Ukrainian forces continued to shell elements of the logistics system of the Russian Armed Forces in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, destroying 15 pieces of military equipment, and injuring and killing up to 150 Russian servicemen.

Damage to the Kerch Strait bridge continues to disrupt Russian landline communications with southern Ukraine. According to estimates by the UK Ministry of Defense, the Kerch Strait bridge is unlikely to be operational until at least September 2023, which will reduce the ability of the Russian Federation to move military equipment and personnel by rail and road. Russian troops move fuel tanker convoys to supply Russian positions on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro through Mariupol due to the damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge.

Ukrainian partisans attacked the Russian occupation headquarters in Voznesenska on the northeastern outskirts of Melitopol.

The occupying power is intensifying the repression by law enforcement agencies and filtering measures in the rear areas. This is happening against the backdrop of fears of a Ukrainian counteroffensive after Russia announced the withdrawal from the right bank part of Kherson Oblast. Thus, in Berdyansk, the occupation authorities detained a group of alleged "Ukrainian

militants". They increased the number and density of checkpoints for owners of Ukrainian cars in the occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast and marked their license plates with Ukrainian coat of arms.

Russian sources claim that Melitopol residents are forming a "volunteer law enforcement battalion", presumably to curb partisan activity in and around the city.

Tavriysk direction

•  Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of

BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

• Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms (CA) Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps (AC) of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th CA Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd AC of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd AC of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

The Russian military shelled Pravdyne, Myrne, Ternovi Pody, Sukhy Stavok, Zolota Balka and Marhanets. It continued to conduct aerial reconnaissance intensively using UAVs, it made more than 15 sorties.

Ukrainian troops won victories near the border of the Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts to the northeast of Kherson. They began an offensive on Snihurivka, destroyed the Russian ammunition depot, and broke through the defense of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 49th Army and the airborne units of the Russian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian military continues to fight for full control over the town. Russian troops destroyed bridges in the Snihurivka area, which means that a controlled withdrawal of Russians from positions northeast of the city of Kherson as part of a wider retreat from the western bank of the Kherson region is underway.

The Ukrainian defense forces took control of Kalynivske, Mykolaiv Oblast.

Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Beryslav in the area of Sadok, Kachkarivka, and Pyatykhatky.

In the city of Dzhankoy (occupied Crimea), the invaders turned the civil hospital into a military hospital, where up to 800 wounded occupiers undergo treatment.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

The Russian fleet keeps 14 ships at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. For a week there were no Kalibr cruise missile carriers among these ships. But today one surface ship went on patrol with 8 Kalibr missiles.

In the Sea of Azov, the Russian military continues to control sea communications, keeping 1 ship on combat duty. In the Mediterranean Sea, there are 10 Russian ships, including 5 Kalibr cruise missile carriers, with a total salvo of 76 missiles.

During the day, the following ships passed the Kerch-Yenikal Strait in the interests of the Russian Federation:

To the Sea of Azov - 24 vessels, including 6 vessels that moved from the Bosphorus Strait;

To the Black Sea - 38 vessels, including 15 vessels that continued their movement in the direction of the Bosphorus Strait.

Russia continues to violate the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) by turning off automatic identification systems (AIS) on civilian vessels in the waters of the Sea of Azov.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved. The adversary monitors the water area adjacent to the grain corridor, thus staying ready to renew the blockade of Ukrainian ports.

Railway freight trains arrive on the territory of Kherson Oblast from the Crimean direction unloading military equipment and ammunition at the "Kalanchak", "Brylivka" and "Novooleksiiivka" stations.

On November 8, the Russians reported on the installation of the first span on the Kerch Strait Bridge. The span was rebuilt at enterprises in the east of the Russian Federation in the shortest possible time. They say they plan to install the next one in a few days. Meanwhile, the damage to the Kerch Strait bridge seriously limited the provision of supplies to the occupied Crimea from the territory of the Russian Federation. Even the alternative transportation route via Melitopol - Mariupol does not ensure the required volume of supplies but doubles their cost.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 10.11

Personnel - almost 78,690 people (+740);

Tanks 2,804 (+3)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,682 (+16);

Artillery systems – 1,805 (+3);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 393 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 205 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,242 (+15); Aircraft - 278 (0);

Helicopters – 260 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,499 (+16); Intercepted cruise missiles - 399 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

According to President Zelenskiy, 41 villages were liberated in the south of Ukraine. He said this in today's evening TV address.

Russian shelling of civilian infrastructure and constant blackouts may trigger an even greater reduction in Ukraine's GDP this year than the previously forecast 35%, the First Vice Prime Minister - Minister of Economy Yuliya Svyridenko said. According to assessments of the ministry, economic output fell by 39% in October after a 35% decline in August-September.

According to the data for 10 months of 2022, Ukrainian metallurgical plants produced 5.844 million tons of steel, which is only 32.6% compared to 2021, when 17.903 million tons were produced, concern "Metalurgprom" said.

International diplomatic aspect

"That's up to the Ukrainians. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine," the US President clarified his words that "it remains to be seen whether or not there'll be a judgment made as to whether or not Ukraine is prepared to compromise with Russia." Defense ministers of the UK, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Denmark said Ukraine should feel under no pressure to enter any peace negotiations with Russia.

"We want Ukraine to be able to discuss or resolve this issue from a position of strength, not a position of weakness. And that is the current direction of travel," said the UK defense minister. "What's important is that at this point, Ukraine knows that it can count on us," added the Dutch defense minister. Latvia's deputy prime minister and defense minister expressed his skepticism about any Russian offers of peace talks while "they are bombing civilians," and it was Russia that started the war in the first place.

Ambassador Daniel Fried warned about the "risks of rushing to negotiations." "Intensified calls for the West to initiate negotiations to end Putin's war on essentially his terms seem oddly timed – and potentially dangerous." The American diplomat argues that "European partners should not forestall the possibility, even likelihood, of more Ukrainian military success by insisting on a ceasefire in place or by assuming that it's impossible for Ukraine to, for example, liberate the Donbas or even Crimea. Furthermore, by pushing negotiations now, the United States would risk falling into a dynamic of undercutting Ukraine's strong position on the ground by becoming the supplicant ("demandeur," in diplo speak)." Ambassador Fried put the issue in the global context by saying that "Given the history and the stakes, it seems not just immoral but contrary to US interests to abandon Ukraine to a Russian sphere of influence imposed through war and setting a precedent for more such wars of conquest by Moscow, Beijing, and other aggressive governments." "In foreign policy, interests do not always align well with values, especially in the short run. In Ukraine, they do," concluded a seasoned diplomat.

"I think there's a widespread recognition that the stakes in Ukraine are just bigger than Ukraine," said Colin H. Kahl, the US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. "We don't want to live in a world where big countries believe that they can swallow up their smaller neighbors. That is a recipe for global disorder and large countries going on the march. We've lived in a world like that before: it was called the 1930s. And it ended in the most catastrophic global conflict in human history," Kahl said.

"In the area of foreign policy, I hope we'll continue this bipartisan approach of confronting Russia's aggression in Ukraine," stated POTUS. Commenting Republican Leader McCarthy that he is not prepared to write what he has called a "blank check" to Ukraine, Joe Biden said, "we've not given Ukraine a blank check."

"There's a lot of things that Ukraine wants we didn't — we didn't do." Joe Biden mentioned his refusal to close Ukrainian skies with US Airforce from the Russian missiles targeting Ukrainian cities and his unwillingness to provide long-range capabilities, so Ukraine won't be able to "start bombing Russian territory." "I would be surprised if Leader McCarthy even has a majority of his Republican colleagues who say they're not going to fund the legitimate defensive needs of Ukraine," concluded the POTUS.

The US is going to provide Ukraine with several Hawks and four Avenger systems. Spain will give Ukraine two more Hawk air defense systems, bringing the total number of committed weapon systems to six. Netherlands and Norway announced further commitments to the International Fund for Ukraine worth €100 million and €150 million, respectively. The UK-initiated fund is used to purchase equipment directly from manufacturers and deliver it to Ukraine.

The UK has frozen $20.5 billion worth of assets of the Russian "oligarchs" and government- related individuals. "We have imposed the most severe sanctions ever on Russia, and it is crippling their war machine. Our message is clear: we will not allow Putin to succeed in this brutal war," a junior government minister in the Treasury stated. The EU had frozen $13.83 billion. Ukraine has been calling on its Western partners to work out a mechanism that would allow this money to be used as compensation for the devastating war Russia is waging against Ukraine.

"Given our principal challenge today, Italy strongly supports the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and freedom of Ukraine," the Italian Prime Minister said NATO Secretary-General. "The political cohesion of the alliance and our full commitment to supporting the Ukrainian cause are, from our point of view, the best response that NATO allies can give." Meanwhile, Germany warned Hungary that "there is no grey area" when it comes to the ratification of Sweden and Finland's accession to NATO. Hungary, very much criticized for illiberal practices at home, plays a destructive role abroad. It has been blocking Ukraine's cooperation with NATO, softening sanctions against Russia, and threatening the EU's united stance on reducing dependency on Russian energy. Now, it undermines the security of two northern European nations and sabotages the whole alliance's decision.

Russia, relevant news

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, said that more than 100,000 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded during the war in Ukraine, CNN reported.

The Japanese manufacturer of trucks and pickups, Isuzu, presented a plan to withdraw from Russia. writes "Nastoyastchee vremya" with reference to the Kyodo agency. In March of this year, the car concern suspended production in Ulyanovsk. The reason for this decision was, in particular, logistical problems and restrictions on the supply of trucks from Japan. The Isuzu plant in Ulyanovsk has been operating since 2012. In 2021, 3,700 trucks left its assembly line.

Participants in the Russian advertising market expect that by the end of the year it will fall by 40- 60%, according to a study by NMi Group.

As of November 4, Russia's international reserves amounted to $541.6 billion, since October 28 they have decreased by $8.5 billion, the Russian Central Bank said.

According to the results of 2022, the volume of parallel imports to Russia may exceed $15 billion in terms of value and 2 million tons in terms of weight, Ruslan Davydov, First Deputy Head of the Federal Customs Service, said.

The Japanese automotive corporation Mazda Motor has decided to cease operations in Russia and transfer its stake in a joint venture in Vladivostok to PJSC Sollers Auto, the group said in a statement.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently, all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.

We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email to cds.dailybrief@gmail.com

Please note, that we subscribe only verified persons and can decline or cancel the subscription at our own discretion

We are independent, non-government, non-partisan and non-profit organisation. More at www.defence.org.ua

Our Twitter (in English) - https://twitter.com/defence_centre

Our Facebook (in Ukrainian) - https://www.facebook.com/cds.UA

Our brief is for information only and we verify our information to the best

3. Ukrainian official describes chaotic Russian withdrawal from strategic city

Excerpts:

Serhiy Khlan, a member of Ukraine's regional council for Kherson, said a large number of Russian soldiers had drowned trying to escape Kherson, while others had changed into civilian clothes and were trying to hide.

The city was almost under the control of Ukrainian forces, he said. He advised residents not to leave their homes while searches for remaining Russian troops took place.

Earlier, the Russian defence ministry said it had finished pulling its troops from the western bank of the Dnipro river, where Kherson lies, just two days after Moscow announced the retreat.

Ukrainian official describes chaotic Russian withdrawal from strategic city

Reuters · by Jonathan Landay

• Summary
• Companies
• Russia says pullout from Kherson is complete
• Ukraine had said withdrawal would take at least a week

BLAHODATNE, Ukraine/KYIV Nov 11 (Reuters) - Russia announced the completion of its withdrawal from the strategic city of Kherson in southern Ukraine on Friday and a regional official said Ukrainian partisans had raised a flag there, but that many Russian troops had been unable to leave.

Reuters could not immediately verify the full extent of Ukraine's advance, the status of Russia's retreat or the fate of any Russian soldiers who may have been left behind as Moscow rushed to pull its troops across the wide Dnipro River.

Serhiy Khlan, a member of Ukraine's regional council for Kherson, said a large number of Russian soldiers had drowned trying to escape Kherson, while others had changed into civilian clothes and were trying to hide.

The city was almost under the control of Ukrainian forces, he said. He advised residents not to leave their homes while searches for remaining Russian troops took place.

Earlier, the Russian defence ministry said it had finished pulling its troops from the western bank of the Dnipro river, where Kherson lies, just two days after Moscow announced the retreat.

"Not a single unit of military equipment or weapons have been left on the right (western) bank. All Russian servicemen crossed to the left bank," it added, saying that Russia had not suffered any loss of personnel or equipment during the withdrawal.

Pro-Russian war bloggers had reported late on Thursday that Russian forces crossing the river were coming under heavy fire from Ukrainian forces. The Russian ministry said Ukrainian forces had struck Dnipro River crossings five times overnight with U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket systems.

[1/33] Members of the Russian Emergencies Ministry help a wheelchair user, who was evacuated from the Russian-controlled part of Kherson region of Ukraine, to leave a bus upon arrival at a local railway station in the town of Dzhankoi, Crimea November 10, 2022. REUTERS/Alexey Pavlishak

Ukraine's Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov had told Reuters on Thursday it would take at least a week for Russia to pull out of Kherson. He estimated Russia still had 40,000 troops in the region, and said intelligence showed its forces remained in and around the city.

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in an overnight address that Ukrainian forces had recaptured 41 settlements as they advanced through the south, indicating one of the swiftest and most dramatic shifts of control in almost nine months of war.

There was no sign of Russian forces when Reuters reached Blahodatne, 20 km (12 miles) north of Kherson.

Villagers said about 100 Russians had held the village for eight months and throughout the occupation broke into vacant homes and looted them, removing furniture, televisions, stoves and refrigerators.

They had killed a man who approached too close to their trenches and taken away two other men and a young woman whose fate remains unknown. The Russians withdrew in trucks without a fight on Wednesday night and Ukrainian troops moved in on Thursday, the villagers said.

It is the third major Russian retreat of the war, and the first to involve abandoning such a large occupied city. Moscow's forces were driven in March from the outskirts of the capital Kyiv and ousted from the northeastern region of Kharkiv in September.

Kherson province is one of four that Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed to have annexed from Ukraine in late September. The loss of the regional capital would appear to end dreams expressed by some Russians of seizing Ukraine's entire Black Sea coast, although Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the region's annexed status remained unchanged.

Reporting by Jonathan Landay in Blahodatne, Tom Balmforth and Max Hunder in Kyiv, and Reuters bureaux; Writing by Philippa Fletcher; Editing by Peter Graff

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Jonathan Landay

4. Southeast Asia leaders kick off ASEAN summit in Cambodia

Excerpts:

Leaders from the U.S., China, South Korea and Japan will also be meeting ASEAN leaders in Phnom Penh.

"Looking to the future, ASEAN needs to strongly promote the values that have made ASEAN successful over the past five decades. It is a result of hard work and perseverance that we all need to cherish to continue to record success in the time ahead," said Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia at the opening ceremony.

"The U.S.-China relations are the most important relations, not just to the two countries, but also to our regional development as well," said Kung Phoak, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Cambodia, told CNBC "Squawk Box Asia" Thursday, before the summit officially started.

...

Collectively, ASEAN is the U.S.'s fourth largest goods trading partner, according to the U.S. Trade Representative office. U.S. goods and services trade with the bloc reached an estimated $362.2 billion in 2020, it said.

According to Chinese state media, with China remaining the largest trading partner of ASEAN for 13 consecutive years, according to an August report. Trade between China and the ASEAN reached $544.9 billion in the first seven months of this year, state-backed media Xinhua reported.

ASEAN currently has free trade agreements with the two powerhouses aiming for free flow of goods, services, and investments.

"China may be the number one trading partner of ASEAN, but ASEAN looks to the U.S. for innovation," said Ted Osius, president and CEO of U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.

"It's about diversification when it comes to ASEAN and you don't want to have your economy dominated entirely by one other economy. The ASEAN nations want more trading partners, the more, the better," he told CNBC's "Street Signs Asia" on Thursday.

Southeast Asia leaders kick off ASEAN summit in Cambodia

KEY POINTS

• Cambodia, this year’s chair for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is hosting the weekend summit in Phnom Penh — the group’s first in-person meeting since the Covid pandemic.
• 
  
• “We do not want to choose sides. ASEAN wants to work closely with both the U.S. and China,” said Kung Phoak, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Cambodia, on strained relations between the two nations.
• 
  
• Ukraine signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia on Thursday, committing to peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation among states in the region.
• 
  

CNBC · by Sheila Chiang · November 11, 2022

From L-R: Philippines' President Ferdinand Marcos Jr, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Thailand's Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, Vietnams Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen, Indonesias President Joko Widodo, Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah, Laos' Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh and Malaysia's lower house speaker Azhar Azizan Harun wave on stage during the opening ceremony of the 40th and 41st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summits in Phnom Penh on November 11, 2022. (Photo by TANG CHHIN Sothy / AFP) (Photo by TANG CHHIN SOTHY/AFP via Getty Images)

Tang Chhin Sothy | Afp | Getty Images

Southeast Asian leaders kicked off the ASEAN summit in the Cambodia on Friday, with Myanmar's political crisis and the U.S.-China rivalry expected to dominate discussions.

Cambodia, this year's chair for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is hosting the weekend summit in Phnom Penh — the group's first in-person meeting since the Covid pandemic.

The 10-nation bloc is made up of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Myanmar, however, was not invited to this year's summit, following the military coup in 2021 which saw its elected leader Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi ousted from power.

Leaders from the U.S., China, South Korea and Japan will also be meeting ASEAN leaders in Phnom Penh.

"Looking to the future, ASEAN needs to strongly promote the values that have made ASEAN successful over the past five decades. It is a result of hard work and perseverance that we all need to cherish to continue to record success in the time ahead," said Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia at the opening ceremony.

"The U.S.-China relations are the most important relations, not just to the two countries, but also to our regional development as well," said Kung Phoak, Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Cambodia, told CNBC "Squawk Box Asia" Thursday, before the summit officially started.

watch now

VIDEO2:1302:13

We don't want to choose between U.S. and China: Cambodian government official

Squawk Box Asia

He said the bloc is "looking at ways on how we can strengthen ourselves."

"We put forward a number of frameworks, strategies and policies and also expand partnerships with not just the U.S. and China, but with many other countries as well," said Kung.

'The more trading partners, the better'

Just last month, the U.S. restricted China's ability to obtain and manufacture some specific types of advanced computing chips, thereby crimping China's access to key technology.

"ASEAN remains neutral in this competition and we don't want to choose sides. ASEAN wants to work closely with both countries," Kung told CNBC.

The U.S. and China are two of ASEAN's top trading partners.

Collectively, ASEAN is the U.S.'s fourth largest goods trading partner, according to the U.S. Trade Representative office. U.S. goods and services trade with the bloc reached an estimated $362.2 billion in 2020, it said.

According to Chinese state media, with China remaining the largest trading partner of ASEAN for 13 consecutive years, according to an August report. Trade between China and the ASEAN reached $544.9 billion in the first seven months of this year, state-backed media Xinhua reported.

ASEAN currently has free trade agreements with the two powerhouses aiming for free flow of goods, services, and investments.

"China may be the number one trading partner of ASEAN, but ASEAN looks to the U.S. for innovation," said Ted Osius, president and CEO of U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.

"It's about diversification when it comes to ASEAN and you don't want to have your economy dominated entirely by one other economy. The ASEAN nations want more trading partners, the more, the better," he told CNBC's "Street Signs Asia" on Thursday.

Building peace

Besides establishing strong economic cooperation, ASEAN is also in ongoing dialogue with nations to establish peace.

"We want to get more [nations] to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation," said Kung. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia is a peace treaty among Southeast Asian countries established in 1976.

watch now

VIDEO2:1302:13

ASEAN wants to keep picking up pace of trade with the U.S.: Ex-U.S. ambassador

Street Signs Asia

Ukraine signed the treaty on Thursday, bringing the number of state parties to the treaty of ASEAN to 50.

"We don't support threat or use of force against another sovereign country. And Ukraine is one of the partners we are hoping to further deepen the relationship going forward," Kung said when asked about Russia invading Ukraine.

On the Myanmar military's violent crackdown on dissent, Kung reiterated that "Myanmar is an integral part of ASEAN."

"The more we deviate from the Five-Point Consensus and the ASEAN charter, the more difficult it is to move forward with the regional agenda," he said.

The Five-Point Consensus refers to ASEAN leaders' agreement in April last year, which called for the immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar.

The military administration of Myanmar has shown no commitment to the Five-Point Consensus, despite agreeing to it in a special meeting in April, two months after the coup which overthrew the democratic government.

For this reason, the military administration of Myanmar has been excluded from high-level meetings of the bloc.

"It's in the best interest of all the ASEAN member states to find a way to make sure that the problems there can be solved as soon as possible," Kung added.

CNBC · by Sheila Chiang · November 11, 2022

5. Elon Musk Has No Idea What He’s Doing at Twitter

Elon Musk Has No Idea What He’s Doing at Twitter

nytimes.com · by Farhad Manjoo · November 10, 2022

Credit...Frederic J. Brown/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

In April, Elon Musk disclosed that he had purchased a big stake in Twitter and agreed to join its board of directors. Then he decided not to join the board and to instead buy the whole company. After signing the contract, he changed his mind again and said no, actually, he didn’t want the company anymore. Then, facing an uphill legal battle to get out of the deal, he re-reversed himself and said, OK, fine, he would buy the social network if he was going to be forced to do so.

Confused yet? I hope not, because in the two weeks since he finally took the helm at the social network, Musk’s takeover has grown only more anarchic, with his plans for Twitter flipping and flopping as furiously as a fish farm.

At first I had some hope that Musk’s chaotic approach would be tempered as he settled into the role; his other companies have also gone through periods of intense tumult. But the latest zigs and zags suggest something deeply amiss with what the world’s richest man is doing to Twitter.

Now he is raising the ire of the nation’s top privacy regulator, the Federal Trade Commission. Three Twitter executives in charge of privacy and information security resigned on Wednesday. According to The Verge, a company lawyer warned fellow employees that Musk’s urgency in pushing changes to the service risked violating a consent order that Twitter signed with the F.T.C. stemming from previous security lapses. Violations of the decree could lead to hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in fines for Twitter.

“We are tracking recent developments at Twitter with deep concern,” an F.T.C. spokesman said in a statement on Thursday. “No C.E.O. or company is above the law, and companies must follow our consent decrees. Our revised consent order gives us new tools to ensure compliance, and we are prepared to use them.”

Musk’s desperation about his expensive new toy seemed clear in his first email to employees since the takeover. “The economic picture ahead is dire,” he wrote, on Wednesday. He told them it was urgent that Twitter begin to make money by selling subscriptions in addition to its traditional business of advertising.

He’s not wrong that Twitter’s business is a mess. But he seems to only be making things worse.

In seemingly every move he makes, Musk stumbles into long-known difficulties that Twitter and other social media companies had developed ways of managing — but that Musk, in his eagerness to do everything differently, unthinkingly abandoned.

Consider all that he has done — and then undone — in so short a time. Within days of taking over he capriciously laid off about half of Twitter’s 7,500 employees — and then immediately began trying to hire some indispensable workers back. He promised advertisers that he valued their business and said he worried about social media spreading partisan hate and divisiveness — then posted a hateful and divisive conspiracy theory and threatened to “thermonuclear name & shame” advertisers who ran for the hills. He told Tesla shareholders that he wouldn’t sell any more stock to fund the Twitter adventure — but disclosed on Tuesday that he’d recently sold about $4 billion in shares.

Before Thursday’s chaos, Musk’s confusion seemed to have reached an absurdist peak on Wednesday morning, when Twitter began rolling out a new set of verification badges to large brands, media organizations and some high-profile individual Twitter users. Within hours, Musk announced that he’d killed the rollout. It was maybe the most ill-advised, short-lived major product launch since Amazon tried to make a phone.

The saga reveals the deep confusion bedeviling Musk’s entire approach to his new company. It shows the hollowness of his plan: Musk says he wants to make Twitter a trusted source of information and a haven from online toxicity, a place where “comedy is now legal” and “the bird is free” but also does not feel like a “free-for-all hellscape.” This is a tall order, but it’s made taller by Musk’s apparent indecision and need to be loved — he wants to create a social-networking nirvana without having to make any tough choices about what kind of content the network should allow, disallow, promote or curb.

For years, Twitter has offered some accounts a blue-and-white checkmark as a symbol of authenticity. Although its process was far from transparent, the company had added the checkmarks to the accounts of journalists, politicians, celebrities, brands and others to signify that they really were who they claimed to be. How could you be sure that, say, @fmanjoo really was the Twitter profile of the beloved newspaper columnist? Because of the checkmark.

But the checkmark also functioned as a kind of class marker on Twitter, and Musk and his lieutenants argued that the blue checks gave some Twitter users unearned status. He pitched his $8-a-month plan as a way to add an egalitarian sensibility to Twitter (and, of course, to make money). No longer would the “blue checks” — a term that had become a derisive label for out-of-touch “elites” — get special treatment from the social network. Now everyone would have to pay to stay verified, as Musk told Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the leftist New York congresswoman, in a tweet:

The trouble was that Musk’s plan to charge for the checkmark threatened to throw authenticity into disarray. If anyone could pay to be verified, wouldn’t that effectively mean that nobody was verified? What if someone paid $8 for a check and then claimed to be Farhad Manjoo — how would you tell which Farhad to trust?

Thus the second set of badges. On Tuesday, Esther Crawford, a Twitter executive, announced that the company had developed a new label — gray checkmarks labeled “Official” — to distinguish really authentic accounts from those that only paid to get the checkmark. The new designation would be given out at Twitter’s discretion to “select accounts,” she tweeted, and people could not purchase them. Among the first accounts to get the official designation were news organizations like The Times, government accounts, brands and some politicians. Even Ocasio-Cortez got the Official check.

Of course, the new check effectively undermined the paid-for check — if Twitter was going to mark some accounts as official without charging for the label, what was the point in paying for your account to carry a checkmark that didn’t signal Official status?

Right; there was no point. After announcing the end of the Official check, Musk tweeted what for him is as close to an apology as you can get: “Please note that Twitter will do lots of dumb things in coming months. We will keep what works & change what doesn’t.”

Twitter was far from a perfect company before Musk bought it. Its last profitable year (and one of its only profitable years) was 2019; in July, in its last quarterly earnings report as a public company, the company reported a net loss of $270 million. As troubled as it was, though, Twitter was not a clown show — it demonstrated basic competence in running its service, and advertisers and users did not have to worry about a daily blowup.

In the last two decades, web companies have developed lots of ways to test new features on small groups of users before rolling out possibly disruptive ideas for the entire service; if Musk hadn’t fired half of Twitter’s staff, he may have gleaned some of this. He could have made the changes more deliberately, with far better communication to users, advertisers and employees. (Like a certain former president, Musk has a bad habit of managing Twitter by tweet.)

In the spirit of confessing dumb mistakes, though, I should end by noting my own bad call. In April, after Musk first bid for Twitter, I wrote a column pooh-poohing alarmists who said he’d be the death of Twitter. He was an accomplished tech executive, I noted; how bad could he be at running Twitter?

The answer: Much, much worse than I ever imagined.

Office Hours With Farhad Manjoo

Farhad wants to chat with readers on the phone. If you’re interested in talking to a New York Times columnist about anything that’s on your mind, please fill out this form. Farhad will select a few readers to call.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here's our email: letters@nytimes.com.

nytimes.com · by Farhad Manjoo · November 10, 2022

6. Russian retreat from Kherson city sets stage for more hard combat

Excerpts:

“I would hate to be a Russian soldier sitting in a trench in southern Ukraine,” Hodges said. “This is another example of them trading bodies for time.”

Soldiers with poor discipline may find it hard to endure freezing sentry duty, leaving gaps in security for Ukrainian forces to exploit, said Rob Lee, an expert on the Russian military and senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Another challenge for both sides will be limiting how much the cold reveals their positions. Vehicles and people produce thermal energy detectable with infrared scopes hand-carried by soldiers and mounted on some drones and vehicles.

Winter also will reduce the amount of overhead concealment, with leafless trees providing little cover. Even a generator concealed in a trench will emit heat that will help identify targets for an artillery strike, Lee said.

Meanwhile, Russian mercenary forces have built elaborate trench lines in southern Ukraine, studded with concrete antitank pyramid obstacles nicknamed “dragon’s teeth.” The move could be a public-relations stunt, Lee said, or it could be a hard lesson learned from Kharkiv, where Ukrainian forces steamrolled unfortified Russian lines.

Either way, front lines are likely to harden again at the river’s edge as Russian and Ukrainian forces lob artillery and mortars at each other in an icy winter of human suffering.

Russian retreat from Kherson city sets stage for more hard combat

Ukraine’s advance in the south has Moscow’s forces on the run. But Russian fortifications and the Dnieper River will slow a push on Crimea.

By Dan Lamothe, Liz Sly, Alex Horton, Missy Ryan and Michael E. Miller 

November 10, 2022 at 7:40 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · November 11, 2022

Russia’s expected military withdrawal from the southern city of Kherson opens the door to more Ukrainian battlefield advances, U.S. and Ukrainian officials said, but significant gains beyond that are unlikely to come soon as winter bears down and both sides bolster combat units with additional weapons, ammunition and personnel.

The assessments came amid signs that Moscow’s forces were following through on Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s order Tuesday to pull back to the southeast across the Dnieper River in an effort to preserve their forces. The decision left open the possibility that Ukrainian troops could enter the city — home to nearly 300,000 people before Russia’s invasion in February — within days, said Roman Kostenko, a Ukrainian army colonel and member of parliament.

“We see all these signs — blown up bridges, leaving the villages, heading towards the Dnieper River,” Kostenko said. “We see that they are pulling back.”

The moves jumbled a battlefield picture that already was chaotic after nine months of fighting. Some officials in Kyiv have questioned whether Russia’s announcement is a trap meant to draw in Ukrainian forces. It also remained unclear Wednesday whether some Russian forces could be stranded on the west side of the river, depending on how quickly Ukrainian troops advance.

U.S. officials assessed that Moscow made the decision to avoid a repeat of their chaotic, bloody failure in the Kharkiv region, in which Ukrainian forces broke through Russian front lines in September, seizing hundreds of square miles and vast quantities of hastily abandoned Russian military equipment. This time, it appears that the Russian retreat is strategic — proactively pulling back to safer positions and preparing for future combat.

“Russia realized it would be better to have an early withdrawal than to be overrun by Ukrainians and suffer massive losses,” said Jim Stavridis, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO. “Ukrainians will not stop until they fully retake the city — nor should they. It has enormous geographic, military and psychological value.”

The recapture of Kherson, complete with Ukraine raising its blue-and-yellow flag over a city that Russian forces seized in March, would mark the latest major battlefield setback for the Kremlin in Ukraine. Hawkish Russian military bloggers have lamented the retreat, calling it a betrayal.

Stavridis predicted that Ukraine could seize a “windfall” of left-behind Russian military equipment and perhaps uncover additional evidence of Russian war crimes, “including what has become their modus operandi of rape, torture, detention and mass murder.”

In the Mykolaiv region, to Kherson’s northwest, a Ukrainian medic, Ivan Malenkyi, said Wednesday that his unit already was cleaning up mines laid there by Russian forces, in a potential preview of what might await Ukrainian troops in Kherson.

“Now we don’t understand ourselves what’s the front line, the second line or whatever,” Malenkyi said. “We just know that they left. Where they went and what they left behind is not clear.”

U.S. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday night that 20,000 to 30,000 Russian forces remained on the western bank of the river and that it would take time for them to withdraw. But he, too, saw “initial indicators” that the retreat was underway, he said.

“This won’t take them a day or two,” Milley said, speaking at an event at the Economic Club of New York. “This is going to take them days and maybe even weeks to pull those forces south of that river.”

Ukrainian forces have been slowly advancing toward Kherson for weeks, targeting ammunition centers, command posts and supply facilities in the region and putting pressure on Russian forces, said Yuriy Sak, an adviser to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry.

“Literally it’s no longer possible for them to stay in Kherson because they’re unable to provide munitions to their army, provide provisions,” Sak said in an interview. “It’s no longer possible for them to continue to fight.”

Despite exuberant troops posting social media videos and selfies of retaken villages, Ukrainian military commanders are reluctant to broadcast their next moves.

“The winter will be a factor,” Sak said. “It could be slower, it could be faster depending on weather conditions. But we’re not going to stop. We’re going to continue our counteroffensive meter by meter, village by village.”

Departing Russian forces are laying mines and blowing up bridges as they pull back from Kherson city, and there is concern that some troops may be hiding in the city, waiting to spring a trap, Ukrainian officials said. Advancing Ukrainian soldiers also will be within range of Russian artillery on the opposite bank of the river.

But a full retreat from Kherson city is now seen as inevitable. Ukrainian forces have targeted Russian supply lines and choked off Moscow’s ability to support front-line troops.

“The Russians can definitely organize some traps in Kherson still, but they never had enough troops or logistics to keep those right-bank positions,” said another adviser to the Ukrainian government who was not authorized to speak to the press and commented on the condition of anonymity.

Ahead of Shoigu’s announcement, a NATO official said that Russian troops were in a “dire situation” in Kherson, with just one resupply line to the east.

The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to share an analysis of the evolving situation, said that while Russian officials had called for the evacuation of civilians from the city and pulled more-experienced troops eastward across the river, troops mobilized more recently had been sent into the city, leaving the overall number of Russian forces there unchanged. NATO officials don’t understand why Russia’s military made that decision, the official said.

But just as the Dnieper River presented an obstacle for the Russians to resupply troops, Ukraine is not expected to easily be able to press east and south to Crimea from there. Instead, outside observers and Ukrainian officials said, Kyiv is likely to focus on interdicting remaining Russian supply lines from the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia seized from Ukraine in 2014, and then shift forces to contest other occupied territory.

“We have no geographical opportunity to liberate Crimea soon,” said the second Ukrainian adviser. “We need to liberate all of the south of the Ukraine first and we are not going to do that from the right bank of the river. We now have a left-bank theater, and all the activity will be on the left bank.”

Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general who has been closely tracking the war, said that the Ukrainian forces crossing the Dnieper would be a major operation and that the Russian military would inflict significant casualties on them if they do.

“I don’t see it in the short term,” said Ryan, who visited Ukrainian officials in Kyiv last month. “The Ukrainians are likely to look at other axes of advance to clear the south.”

Ryan said that Ukraine taking back Kherson city is “not a game changer” in its goal to retake Crimea but is a “step closer.” Seizing other parts of the Kherson region and neighboring Zaporizhzhia, to the east, must come first, he said.

“This will be a methodical and deliberate sequence of battles and campaigns in the south that should culminate in a campaign for Crimea,” Ryan said.

Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. Army Europe, also predicted that Ukrainian commanders may soon make a push on Zaporizhzhia, home to a nuclear plant seized by Russian troops. Sabotaging access to electricity ahead of the harsh winter has been a key strategy for Moscow, Hodges said, and taking back control could be a priority.

Hodges said that there have been reports of Russian commanders swapping out battle-hardened troops for freshly mobilized soldiers in the south as Moscow beefs up lines of defense beyond the river. While it makes tactical sense to force Ukraine to cross the river to advance, poorly trained and equipped conscripts could struggle to do so, he said.

Hodges predicted that Ukraine may be able to retake Crimea by the end of next summer. But that mission would be easier with long-range artillery that the United States has so far withheld from Ukraine, he said.

The United States has provided rocket artillery with a range of about 50 miles, which puts Crimea still out of reach from Kherson, Hodges said. For months, Kyiv has asked for U.S. rockets with a range of nearly 200 miles, known as the Army Tactical Missile System, which could reach Russian military targets on the peninsula, but the Biden administration has declined to send them, seeing it as an escalation that could provoke Moscow.

The winter months could come with additional hardships on the battlefield.

As the temperature drops and the war becomes more of a test of endurance and will, units with personnel and morale problems may see those issues become worse.

“I would hate to be a Russian soldier sitting in a trench in southern Ukraine,” Hodges said. “This is another example of them trading bodies for time.”

Soldiers with poor discipline may find it hard to endure freezing sentry duty, leaving gaps in security for Ukrainian forces to exploit, said Rob Lee, an expert on the Russian military and senior fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Another challenge for both sides will be limiting how much the cold reveals their positions. Vehicles and people produce thermal energy detectable with infrared scopes hand-carried by soldiers and mounted on some drones and vehicles.

Winter also will reduce the amount of overhead concealment, with leafless trees providing little cover. Even a generator concealed in a trench will emit heat that will help identify targets for an artillery strike, Lee said.

Meanwhile, Russian mercenary forces have built elaborate trench lines in southern Ukraine, studded with concrete antitank pyramid obstacles nicknamed “dragon’s teeth.” The move could be a public-relations stunt, Lee said, or it could be a hard lesson learned from Kharkiv, where Ukrainian forces steamrolled unfortified Russian lines.

Either way, front lines are likely to harden again at the river’s edge as Russian and Ukrainian forces lob artillery and mortars at each other in an icy winter of human suffering.

Sly reported from Kyiv and Miller from the Mykolaiv region.

The Washington Post · by Dan Lamothe · November 11, 2022

7. The Ukraine War Is Not World War III

??? I hope so, but hope is not a method or a course of action.

Excerpt:

Russia quitting to cut its losses is a far more likely end to this war than a general war – especially a nuclear conflict.

The Ukraine War Is Not World War III

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · November 10, 2022

Since the start of the Ukraine war in February, there has been a regular current of alarmism and exaggeration among observers in the West. We have heard repeatedly that Ukraine is leading us into a massive conflict, one that might even end with a nuclear exchange between NATO and Russia. The Ukraine war, in this reading, is a great-power war. Russia is fighting not just Ukraine, but the whole West. It is similar to World War I, a general conflict during which all of Europe’s major powers lined up on one side or the other in a war of attrition.

The implication of this analogy is its great danger in the nuclear age. A full-scale great power war, however terrible, did not create an existential risk in the pre-nuclear era. Even though Germany was defeated in World War I, it was not annihilated, nor could it annihilate its opponents. Russia today, by contrast, has a nuclear arsenal, and if the Ukraine war is similar to World War I, then we are on the cusp of World War III with a nuclear adversary. This alarming interpretation appears routinely in the Western debate. If Russia believes it is facing all of NATO, we hear – or if it sits on the edge of a catastrophic defeat – it could go nuclear.

Ukraine War Is a Quagmire, Not a General War

A general war between Russia and NATO is highly unlikely, but it is certainly more conceivable than it was before the Ukraine war began. And such a war could indeed escalate toward a nuclear exchange. Any conflict involving a nuclear-armed great power automatically entails escalation risks, especially if that great power fails to achieve victory. Instinctively, large powers expect military victory. Their elites and the public will feel frustrated and cheated if a much smaller power somehow thwarts the expected triumph. Putin has groomed this resentment in Russia with years of chest-thumping about Russia’s status and its great-power role.

We saw such frustration in France’s defeat in Vietnam, the American stalemate in Korea and its own defeat in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan. The brief consideration of nuclear weapons in these cases mostly reflected elite frustration at the inability to win. But the geopolitical risks of nukes vastly exceeded the costs of stalemate or defeat. In each case, the expected winner found it cheaper to lose and simply exit the field.

This is a more realistic analogy for the contemporary Russian experience in Ukraine. Russia is not so much locked in a large war with the West as it is bogging down in a “small war” with Ukraine. The model most obvious to American readers here is the Vietnam War. The U.S. backed its way into a war that ended up surprising Americans with its scale and ferocity. Washington responded with escalation and growing frustration, yet no amount of conventional force seemed to bring victory closer. Vietnam became a quagmire, a constant, infuriating stalemate drifting toward defeat. This, rather than Russia’s crushing defeat in World War I, captures the dynamic of Russia’s dilemma in Ukraine.

NATO and Russia Will Not Somehow Tumble Into a War

Analogies to a world war require significant extrapolation. Right now, NATO and Russian forces are not, in fact, exchanging fire. NATO troops are not in Ukraine. NATO support is limited to aid, which is something we have seen in proxy wars for decades. The two most famous examples are Soviet and Chinese support for Vietnam against the Americans in the 1960s and 1970s, and U.S. support for Afghan rebels against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Neither of these escalated into World War III. None of the Cold War proxy conflicts did.

Analysts pushing World War III scenarios need to explain how NATO and Russia would slide from today’s geographically contained conflict into a general contest – especially when all players are acutely aware of the nuclear risks such an escalation would carry. Indeed, we just learned that the U.S. and Russia have been speaking behind the scenes to prevent such escalation, while China appears to be signaling with increasing intent that Russia should not use nuclear weapons. This sort of diplomacy is precisely what you would expect given Russia’s nuclear arsenal, and it strongly mitigates the ill-defined risk of a tumble into nuclear war. Russia itself knows the risks of a nuclear exchange, and Russian President Vladimir Putin had to back down after much of the world rejected his recent nuclear bluffing.

Explain Instead that the War has Noticeably NOT Escalated

Indeed, the war has notably not escalated. For nine months, we have heard it will spin out of control, but that is very obviously not happening. Instead, the war remains limited, even as Russia is losing. That empirical reality is far more interesting than constant, inaccurate World War III scenarios.

Tu-22M3M from the Russian Air Force.

To continue to suggest that we are on the precipice of some epochal conflict – when we are not, even after many months – increasingly looks like a stratagem by those who want Russia to win the war. Framing the war in such terms is meant to scare the West into halting its aid for Ukraine. We should not succumb to such fear-mongering. Russia is losing a war of choice, and its looming defeat is not a national existential threat – Ukraine and NATO are not going to invade Russia after its loss. The easiest option for Russia will increasingly be to simply lose and go home – just as the Americans did from Vietnam, and the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Russia quitting to cut its losses is a far more likely end to this war than a general war – especially a nuclear conflict.

Expert Biography: Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RoberEdwinKelly.com) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Robert Kelly · November 10, 2022

8. British Army deploys alongside US and Australian partners for future warfare experiment

British Army deploys alongside US and Australian partners for future warfare experiment

United Kingdom, United States and Australia showcase pioneering equipment during Project Convergence exercise in California

From:

Ministry of Defence

Published

10 November 2022

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ranger-unit-serves-alongside-us-special-operations-forces

• Multi-national experimentation promotes rapid data sharing and decision making.
• Members of the UK Ranger Regiment deployed alongside the US 75th Ranger Regiment for the first time.

Allies from the UK, US and Australia demonstrated the integration of cutting-edge technology alongside key industry leaders, in a series of experimental firsts.

The event, Project Convergence 2022, examines how using artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and autonomy can improve battlefield situational awareness, connecting sensors with shooters and accelerating decision-making speeds.

At Fort Irwin in California the UK deployed 450 troops and 17 technologies were showcased and experimented with, including long-range fires, uncrewed aerial systems, autonomous fighting vehicles and next-generation sensors.

The Rangers worked with the Special Operations Forces and the US 75th Ranger Regiment to explore the deployment and use of the British Army’s new Special Operations Brigade and Ranger Regiment.

Delivering the UK element of the project, 450 soldiers from the British Army, under the UK’s 20th Armoured Combat Brigade Team (20 ABCT), were supported by more than 20 scientists and engineers from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory.

Experimentation, science and research enables better data capture and analysis to identify successes and address challenges for future war fighting. Supported by Industry partners, PC22 was a whole force demonstration of the direction of the British Army’s modernisation.

Attending the project, Defence Procurement Minister Alex Chalk said:

Delivering on our ambitions outlined in Future Soldier and the Integrated Review, Project Convergence highlights the progress the British Army is making to being more lethal, agile and expeditionary force, through key collaboration with our longstanding international allies and partners.

The project also saw a number of other firsts for the UK:

• A UK Air Surveillance Radar (Giraffe) has connected to a US network to control and manage targets (normally a US only system) for battlefield data sharing.
• ZODIAC, a UK artificial intelligence enabled decision support system that can help Commanders make decisions, was connected to US ‘sensors’, feeding information into a multinational intelligence network.
• A US F35 fighter jet has cued fires for a UK GMLRS missile platform, without the requirement for a person in the loop, cutting the strike time down from minutes to seconds.
• The UK have manufactured US parts using 3D printing, helping them resupply at reach and sharing technical designs of vehicle and weapon parts.
• UK HoloLens (augmented reality lenses) have been used to help logisticians and maintainers fix equipment supported by a technical expert on the other wide of the world.
• Supported by 1 Signal Regiment, a complex multi-national network was established that allowed 20th Armoured Brigade Combat Team to share information with our international partners at speed.
• In a significant collaboration between the new Experimentation and Trials Group, TommyWorks, DE&S and our industry partners, the British Army’s first Robotics Autonomous enabled Close Combat platoon from 2 YORKS was digitally integrated with our allies for the first time.

Through the tri-national collaboration, Project Convergence has placed a renewed emphasis on how data can be transformed into information which can be exploited across weapons systems for the UK, our allies and partners. Support provided by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) ensured a wealth of data and analysis was captured will be used to identify the best way to employ these technologies in the future.

Share this page

• Share onFacebook Share onTwitter

Published 10 November 2022

9. China Puts Belt & Road Back on ASEAN Agenda

One belt one road should be the competition battlespace. ​We should be working to help our friends, partners, and allies counter Chinese malign influence (dept trap diplomacy and wolf diplomacy as well as unrestricted warfare and the three warfares),

China Puts Belt & Road Back on ASEAN Agenda

November 11, 2022 5:36 AM

Luke Hunt

voanews.com

PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA —

China on Thursday announced approval for a slew of infrastructure projects in mainland Southeast Asia at this year’s round of Association of Southeast Asian Nations summits, being held here this week, signaling its Belt and Road Initiative is moving back on track after a hiatus of almost three years because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Among them is a $1.6 billion expressway to be built from Phnom Penh to Bavet, at the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and backing for a rail link between Phnom Penh, Bangkok and Vientiane, Laos, from which a high-speed rail link has already been constructed into China.

Cambodian Public Works and Transport Minister Sun Chanthol said during the signing ceremony that the expressway would hook up with Vietnam’s expressway between Ho Chi Minh City and the Moc Bai border gate with Bavet.

Both are expected to be completed by the end of 2026 or early 2027, he said, and to form a vital link with Asian Highway 1, connecting China through Myanmar to Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

“The expressway will be 138 kilometers long, with one long bridge,” Sun Chanthol said. “The estimated cost is just a little less than that of the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, though its length is shorter.”

A $2 billion, Chinese built, 187-kilometer expressway from the capital to the southern port city of Sihanoukville, cutting the five-hour road trip in half, was officially opened by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and Chinese Premier Li Keqiangon on Wednesday.

The expressways are also expected to link with a new Phnom Penh international airport, which is being constructed under the Belt and Road Initiative by the China Construction Third Engineering Bureau Group Co,, and is expected to be operational by 2025.

Li told reporters that this week’s meetings would focus on development, multilateralism and free trade, and a need for regional countries to preserve secure and smooth global industrial and supply chains.

This included Chinese assistance “in the construction of bridges across the Mekong River and construction of the railway connecting Cambodia-Thailand-Laos and China,” a dispatch from the semiofficial Cambodian Fresh News said.

The Chinese premier also signed off on 18 protocols with Cambodia, which included health care, support for Phnom Penh hosting next year’s Southeast Asian Games and assistance to improve the livelihoods of “Cambodian citizens.”

FILE - A security officer walks past the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) sign as he guards outside its secretariat building in Jakarta, Indonesia, Oct. 27, 2022.

Five of those protocols also backed further road and bridge construction which will form a web of transportation – rail, road and waterway – inside Cambodia, which is strategically located between Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and the Gulf of Thailand.

Analysts said many of the projects had been put on hold due to China’s strict COVID-19 policies and rising anti-China sentiment which preceded the pandemic and was particularly strong in this country’s south, where Sihanoukville became a haven for Chinese casinos and organized crime.

“The infrastructure projects that appear to be signed off on are, we have to admit, are entirely necessary for the future integration of the region,” said Bradley Murg, of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace.

He said China was again moving to fill those infrastructure gaps but also noted that Beijing had made commitments about 18 months ago to improve the standards and processes in providing high-quality Belt and Road Initiative projects.

“So if Beijing is going to move ahead with these, then it’s also set itself a test of demonstrating to the world that it will adhere to the promises and commitments that it made regarding these sorts of projects and now we’ll have a chance to actually see if China is on the level,” he said.

The announcements also followed an agreement struck in March between Hun Sen and Chinese President Xi Jinping to promote the Belt and Road Initiative by building more physical infrastructure in Cambodia.

Ross Milosevic, a risk consultant with R&R International Group said the Bavet expressway would complete China’s Belt and Road Initiative ambitions in Cambodia’s east, while the rail line would extend its reach to the west and into Thailand, from which it would like to head southward into Malaysia.

“From a perspective of security I think there has to be some form of concern from certain governments in the region, but also the QUAD,” he said, referring to the security partnership among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

“They’ll see this infrastructure project as just another delivery of China’s continual march south,” Milosevic added.

voanews.com

10. Top U.S. General Urges Diplomacy in Ukraine While Biden Advisers Resist

Is Ukraine gaining a position of strength with Russia on its heels? Shouldn't Ukraine negotiate from a position of strength?

President Kennedy: "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."

Top U.S. General Urges Diplomacy in Ukraine While Biden Advisers Resist

nytimes.com · by Peter Baker · November 10, 2022

Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the case that the Ukrainians should try to cement their gains at the bargaining table.

President Biden flanked by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, left, and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at the White House last month.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

WASHINGTON — A disagreement has emerged at the highest levels of the United States government over whether to press Ukraine to seek a diplomatic end to its war with Russia, with America’s top general urging negotiations while other advisers to President Biden argue that it is too soon.

Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made the case in internal meetings that the Ukrainians have achieved about as much as they could reasonably expect on the battlefield before winter sets in and so they should try to cement their gains at the bargaining table, according to officials informed about the discussions.

But other senior officials have resisted the idea, maintaining that neither side is ready to negotiate seriously and that any pause in the fighting would only give President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia a chance to regroup. While Mr. Biden’s advisers believe the war will likely be settled through negotiations eventually, officials said, they have concluded that the moment is not ripe and the United States should not be seen as pressuring the Ukrainians to hold back while they have momentum.

The debate, which the officials described on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss private deliberations, has spilled out into public in recent days as General Milley made public comments hinting at his private advice. “Seize the moment,” he said in a speech in New York on Wednesday.

He elaborated in an interview on CNBC on Thursday. “We’ve seen the Ukrainian military fight the Russian military to a standstill,” he said. “Now, what the future holds is not known with any degree of certainty, but we think there are some possibilities here for some diplomatic solutions.”

The White House, however, made a point of distancing itself from any perception that it is pushing President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine to do anything that would cede territory to Russian invaders even as Moscow pulls forces back from the strategic city of Kherson.

“The United States is not pressuring Ukraine,” Jake Sullivan, the president’s national security adviser, told reporters on Thursday. “We’re not insisting on things with Ukraine. What we are doing is consulting as partners and showing our support not just through public statements and moral support but through tangible physical support and the kind of military assistance I mentioned.”

• Retreat From Kherson: Moscow announced a retreat of Russian forces from the strategically important city in southern Ukraine, one of the most significant reversals of the Kremlin’s war effort. But Ukrainian officials expressed skepticism, saying that the withdrawal could be a trap.
• Peace Talks Remain Distant: Western officials say peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia are unlikely in the near future, even as the Biden administration tries to fend off some U.S. lawmakers’ questions about aid for an open-ended war.
• Aerial War Heats Up: As the battle above Ukraine escalates, Ukrainian officials are celebrating the arrival of advanced Western air-defense systems but claim Russia is buying new long-range weapons from Iran.
• Sticking by Ukraine: Despite inflation and anxiety over nuclear weapons, European governments across the ideological spectrum are maintaining support for Ukraine and tough sanctions on Russia.

Indeed, the Pentagon on Thursday announced that it is sending another $400 million in military aid to Ukraine. Among the weapons being shipped will be the first mobile Avenger Air Defense Systems provided by the United States as well as Stinger missiles, mortars, artillery rounds, Humvees, cold weather gear and ammunition for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, that have proved so effective in pushing back the Russians.

However, the Defense Department rebuffed Ukrainian requests for Gray Eagle MQ-1C drones, which American officials fear could be used to escalate the war and provoke Russia into another escalation of its own, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The question of where the United States stands on negotiations has dominated conversations on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean in recent days as American, Ukrainian, Russian and European officials try to decipher the sometimes mixed signals from Washington.

A trip by Mr. Sullivan to Kyiv last week left some with the impression that the Biden administration was pressing Mr. Zelensky to at least show willingness to negotiate, but American officials denied that.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

Instead, they said, at the end of a meeting mainly focused on other issues related to the war, Mr. Sullivan suggested that Mr. Zelensky think about what “a just peace,” a phrase used by the Group of 7 nations, would look like when the time does arrive for negotiations down the road.

The confusion was exacerbated by ambiguous comments by Mr. Biden at a postelection news conference on Wednesday. Asked if he thought Ukraine now had the leverage it needed to begin negotiations, the president left the door open. “It remains to be seen whether or not there’ll be a judgment made as to whether or not Ukraine is prepared to compromise with Russia,” he said.

Pressed later about whether he was suggesting that Ukraine consider negotiating a deal giving up some territory, Mr. Biden quickly said no. “That’s up to the Ukrainians. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine,” he said, repeating the official line that any resolution has to be determined by Kyiv, not the United States or Europe. “I do know one thing: We’re not going to tell them what they have to do.”

Some current and former officials said the nuance of the administration’s view has been lost. While not currently pressing for talks, the administration wants to be prepared for diplomacy at some later date when it might make sense.

“My sense is the administration is dipping its toe in the possibility of diplomacy,” said Charles A. Kupchan, a Georgetown University professor who served as a Europe adviser to President Barack Obama. “They’re trying to thread the needle. They want to introduce the possibility of diplomacy without appearing to be telling the Ukrainians what to do.” He added: “It’s setting the table but it’s not sitting at the table.”

The evident willingness to entertain talks at some point has drawn sharp criticism from some foreign policy experts who argue that it would be a mistake to bet against Ukraine’s ability to win more of its territory back from Russian occupiers.

“The United States and European partners should not forestall the possibility, even likelihood, of more Ukrainian military success by insisting on a cease-fire in place or by assuming that it’s impossible for Ukraine to, for example, liberate the Donbas or even Crimea,” Daniel Fried, a longtime former career diplomat now at the Atlantic Council, wrote on the Just Security website after reports about possible negotiations.

Mr. Zelensky and his aides reiterated this week that Ukraine had repeatedly proposed resuming peace talks with Russia, and that such talks could not begin until Russian troops withdraw and return the territory they have seized. But analysts noted that the Ukrainian leader did not repeat earlier statements that talks seemingly could not start while Mr. Putin was leading Russia.

More broadly, there has been huge support in the Ukrainian public for sustained military offensives against Russian positions, and each announcement of Russian setbacks has been met with an outpouring of public enthusiasm. Even before the recent wave of Ukrainian military gains, Mr. Zelensky was under heavy and continuous political pressure to refuse any concession that would leave Russian forces in control of Ukrainian territory.

In internal discussions, General Milley has been a strong voice for diplomacy but does not want to give the impression of undercutting the Ukrainians, officials said. He has pointed to satellite imagery showing that the Russians are digging trenches and establishing firm lines through much of the occupied territory in preparation for winter, when the fronts presumably will stabilize.

Given that, officials said, the general has argued that the fighting may ease during the cold weather months with less chance of further fundamental change on the ground, offering a window of opportunity for talks. In White House discussions, he cites World War I when the two sides engaged in years of trench warfare with little change in territory but millions of pointless casualties, an example he aired in his New York speech this week as well.

The point is not to reward Mr. Putin, officials said in describing the general’s view, but that maybe this is a time when Ukraine and its allies can start working toward a political solution because a military solution may not be obtainable in the near future.

General Milley’s view is not shared by Mr. Biden or Mr. Sullivan, the officials said. Mr. Putin has shown no sign of being willing to negotiate, they said, and the Ukrainians have been emboldened by their success on the battlefield, making them reluctant to trade away territory at the bargaining table.

If they pushed for talks at this point, the officials said, reflecting Mr. Sullivan’s point of view, that would send a message to Mr. Putin that all he had to do would be to drag out the war a little longer and eventually the Americans would do his work for him.

nytimes.com · by Peter Baker · November 10, 2022

11. Interview: Taiwan FM Calls Biden-Xi Meeting Conducive to Taiwan Strait Stability

Excerpts:

VOA: Do you agree with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's assessment that PRC is determined to bring Taiwan under its control, possibly by force, on a much faster timeline?

Wu: We share the same sense of urgency on the situation across the Taiwan Strait. Of course China has been threatening Taiwan militarily for quite some time. If you look at their military preparations or military exercises in this region: In 2020, they have sent 380 sorties to violate our air defense identification zones. Last year, their sorties went up to 970, violating our air defense identification zones. And for this year, in August and September alone, there are already more than 2,000 sorties. Therefore, the Chinese military threat against Taiwan is not only real, but also intensified.

Under these kinds of circumstances, we need to continue to caution China that the use of military force against Taiwan is not conducive to peace and stability in this region and is not going to be welcomed.

The status quo across the Taiwan Strait serves the best interests of all parties concerned.

Interview: Taiwan FM Calls Biden-Xi Meeting Conducive to Taiwan Strait Stability

November 10, 2022 10:10 AM

Nike Ching

voanews.com

State Department —

Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu spoke with VOA State Department Bureau Chief Nike Ching in a recent exclusive interview on the prospect of a dialogue between China and Taiwan during an upcoming APEC economic summit, implications of the in-person meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping during the G-20 summit, and the possibility of a meeting between U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and founder of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, Morris Chang.

The following are excerpts from the skype interview. They have been edited for brevity and clarity.

VOA: Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company founder Morris Chang will represent Taiwan, for the sixth time, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Summit in Bangkok. People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping will also be at the summit. Is Taiwan open to talks with China without preconditions?

Wu: The APEC is an occasion for all leaders from the APEC economies to get together. There will be plenty of opportunities for the leaders or the leaders' representatives to encounter each other in a very natural way. We don't have any set appointment to talk with him [Xi Jinping], but if there's an opportunity to interact, naturally, we would not reject it.

VOA: There have been no substantial government-to-government talks for years. What are the hurdles?

Wu: The Chinese side does not seem to be interested in speaking with Taiwan, or open for dialogues. We have been calling on China for dialogues to resolve the differences between the two sides, and also to safeguard peace and stability in this region. But the Chinese [government] has been setting very high bars for any kind of official contacts between the two sides. They asked Taiwan to accept "one country, two systems" model; that is something that the Taiwan side cannot accept at all. If you have public opinion surveys on this question here in Taiwan, you will find absolute majority of the Taiwanese people reject that.

VOA: In 2018, Morris Chang had a pull-aside with then-U.S. Vice President Mike Pence on the margins of APEC in Papua New Guinea. Given the precedent, is Morris Chang meeting with current U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris, who will represent the U.S. at APEC this year?

Wu: The APEC meetings, especially in the Economic Leaders' Summit, is an opportunity for the leaders to encounter each other. Whether it's going to be a formal meeting or pull-aside, there are all kinds of precedents.

We do not rule out any kind of opportunity for the president's (Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s) representative Morris Chang to meet with the U.S. representative, which is going to be the vice president of the United States. We are trying to make appointments with some of the leaders who are coming to APEC this time around. We hope that we will have an opportunity for Morris Chang to meet with Vice President Harris.

VOA: What is your message to PRC for this type of meeting?

Wu: The meeting between our APEC representative and the senior officials from the United States participating in the APEC leaders meeting is a very natural way for the two sides to encounter with each other. This is a long-established precedent in the APEC official meetings or leaders' meetings. I certainly hope that the Chinese won't take that as an exception because this is already a long-established tradition of the APEC leaders' meetings.

VOA: U.S. President Joe Biden is very likely to meet bilaterally with PRC President Xi Jinping at G-20 Summit. Do you see open lines of communication between the United States and China conducive to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait?

Wu: Yes, of course. For China right now, we can understand that China has been threatening Taiwan militarily and trying to isolate Taiwan internationally. They refuse to speak with Taiwan's officials. Therefore, this is a condition or a situation for the international leaders to think about how to resolve the differences between Taiwan and China, and to establish an environment that is conducive to peace and stability in this region.

If the senior leaders or the president, the vice president of the United States are able to speak with the Chinese leaders to address the concerns about the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait or China's violation of the status quo, I think it's going to be very helpful to regional peace.

And, of course, there's been no official contact between Taiwan and China for quite some time. If the United States is able to talk to the Chinese side some of the concerns on the Taiwanese side, that will be very helpful to Taiwan as well.

We hope that through the high-level dialogue between the United States and China, the two sides would be able to speak with each other, and to understand each other more and to formulate an environment that is more conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, in the Indo Pacific, and around the world.

VOA: Do you agree with the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's assessment that PRC is determined to bring Taiwan under its control, possibly by force, on a much faster timeline?

Wu: We share the same sense of urgency on the situation across the Taiwan Strait. Of course China has been threatening Taiwan militarily for quite some time. If you look at their military preparations or military exercises in this region: In 2020, they have sent 380 sorties to violate our air defense identification zones. Last year, their sorties went up to 970, violating our air defense identification zones. And for this year, in August and September alone, there are already more than 2,000 sorties. Therefore, the Chinese military threat against Taiwan is not only real, but also intensified.

Under these kinds of circumstances, we need to continue to caution China that the use of military force against Taiwan is not conducive to peace and stability in this region and is not going to be welcomed.

The status quo across the Taiwan Strait serves the best interests of all parties concerned.

voanews.com

12. The US wants to play in China's backyard

​Excerpts:

For all its overtures, no US administration has been willing to pursue free trade agreements - and that has certainly soured the deal for what is perhaps the most trade-dependent region in the world.

A relationship with China, on the other hand, has already led to the world's largest trading bloc linking Asean, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Even Indonesia, the largest Asean state and with the region's most China-sceptic foreign policy, has under President Joko Widodo eagerly sought Chinese investment, loans and technology.

The US can draw comfort from the knowledge that Asean will still engage other powers as much as possible - as a counterweight to China. And China is unlikely ever to have close military allies here, in the way the US does in Japan and Australia.

But all Asean countries - to varying degrees - now accept that China will be the dominant power in this region and one that is unwilling to make concessions where its own interests are at stake.

The question for Mr Biden: is it too late for the US to reshape alliances in China's backyard?

​

The US wants to play in China's backyard

BBC · by Menu

• Published
• 1 hour ago

Share page

About sharing

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Mr Biden hosted a historic meeting with Asean leaders at the White House in May 2022

By Jonathan Head

South East Asia correspondent

Nowhere has Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy had a greater impact than in South East Asia, China's strategic backyard.

But as Beijing's power has grown, so has Washington's unease - and now after years of see-sawing, the US is trying engage with the region again.

When he attends the annual summit of the Association of South East Asian Nations or Asean this week in Cambodia, President Joe Biden becomes the first US leader to make that trip since 2017. He was there virtually last year too. And then he goes to Indonesia, another important player in the region, where he is scheduled to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping before they both attend the G20 meeting.

But the US is now operating in a more treacherous diplomatic environment than in the past.

Asean, once considered essential for diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, has struggled to remain effective in an increasingly polarised world. It has fashioned itself as a zone of peace and neutrality, where its 10 member states seek consensus, avoid criticising each other and feel free to engage different powers. Its small and weak secretariat, and lack of any process for enforcing decisions on members, reflects this mindset.

• How Xi Jinping made himself unchallengeable
• Americans in the crosshairs of China's spy game

This worked well while there was a broad, US-led global consensus that championed trade and growth. But China's arrival on the global market and growing influence from the early 2000s coincided with diminishing US interest, as it focussed on the Middle East.

China embarked on a charm offensive in the region, following former leader Deng Xiaoping's mantra "hide your strength, bide your time". But under Mr Xi, now in power for 10 years, China's strength was no longer hidden.

In the last decade, China's occupation and military development of reef islands in the South China Sea has brought it into direct conflict with other claimants, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. Attempts by Asean to get China to agree to a "code of conduct" in the disputed areas have gone nowhere. Beijing has simply stalled negotiations for 20 years. It has also dismissed an international court ruling in 2016 that its claims are invalid.

It has been just as evasive on problems caused by its large-scale damming of the Mekong River.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Mr Xi with Mr Biden in 2012, when the latter was the US vice-president

But the countries that make up Asean are in a sticky position. First, China is so important economically, and so powerful militarily, that few dare confront it openly.

Even in Vietnam, which went to war with China only 43 years ago and where anti-China sentiment runs high, the ruling communist party is cautious when dealing with its giant neighbour. They share a long border, China is Vietnam's largest trading partner, and a vital link in the supply chain that fuels its world-beating exports.

• Can the US live in Xi Jinping's world?
• Can Asia help Myanmar find a way out of coup crisis?

Second, China has effectively destroyed Asean unity by picking off smaller states, such as Laos and Cambodia, which are now so dependent on Beijing's largesse they are more or less client states. This was clear even in 2012, when Cambodia last took the rotating Asean chair, and blocked a final statement critical of Beijing's position in the South China Sea.

While wariness of China might sound like good news for the US, the truth is South East Asian countries have also become disenchanted with Washington.

They see it as an unreliable partner, too preoccupied with human rights and democracy. The US forced the region to accept hugely unpopular and tough economic measures after the 1997 Asian financial crash, disengaged almost completely during President George Bush's war on terror, and has since flipped from President Obama's much-hyped "pivot" to Asia, to President Trump's narrow approach to what he called unfair Asian trading practices.

The US focus today on the Quad alliance with Japan, India and Australia has also weakened Asean, leaving it feeling stuck between two powerful sides. And Washington's willingness to challenge China in Asia frightens them because they have a great deal to lose from a superpower confrontation.

For all its overtures, no US administration has been willing to pursue free trade agreements - and that has certainly soured the deal for what is perhaps the most trade-dependent region in the world.

A relationship with China, on the other hand, has already led to the world's largest trading bloc linking Asean, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Even Indonesia, the largest Asean state and with the region's most China-sceptic foreign policy, has under President Joko Widodo eagerly sought Chinese investment, loans and technology.

The US can draw comfort from the knowledge that Asean will still engage other powers as much as possible - as a counterweight to China. And China is unlikely ever to have close military allies here, in the way the US does in Japan and Australia.

But all Asean countries - to varying degrees - now accept that China will be the dominant power in this region and one that is unwilling to make concessions where its own interests are at stake.

The question for Mr Biden: is it too late for the US to reshape alliances in China's backyard?

BBC · by Menu

13. Byte, With, and Through: How Special Operations and Cyber Command Can Support Each Other

Excerpt:

There is a growing need for flexible, low-profile capabilities to identify and disrupt adversary activities short of war. Greater cooperation between Special Operations Command and Cyber Command will help each command fulfill its traditional missions more efficiently and create novel options for U.S. policymakers. A special operations component more closely integrated with Cyber Command operations and priorities would provide quick and flexible military options its currently lacks. Special Operations Command also has the flexibility to operate across the dual hat arrangement between Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. Implementing any of these changes would require overcoming resourcing, staffing, and training challenges, but would enable the U.S. military to field a potentially decisive force over multiple domains. Integrated cyber and special operations capabilities are achievable in the near term and would be a significant force multiplier for the U.S. military, intelligence community, and foreign partners across all levels of competition.

Byte, With, and Through: How Special Operations and Cyber Command Can Support Each Other - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Josh Golding · November 11, 2022

At first glance, special operations and cyber operations may seem worlds apart from each other. However, Special Operations Command and Cyber Command share global areas of responsibility with missions that span the gap between peacetime and war. The Department of Defense is already taking incremental steps to combine special operations forces and cyber capabilities. On a site visit to Afghanistan in 2019, former Special Operations Command commander General Richard Clarke noted that 60 percent of the special operations community’s focus was now on “working in the information space,” a dramatic change from the 90 percent focus on kinetic operations he observed between 2002-2011. Meanwhile, in 2016, Cyber Command hackers took down media servers and online networks in support of a campaign to defeat the Islamic State largely led by special operations forces.

But despite these successes, the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, General Stephen Townsend, acknowledged that “[w]e are going to have to do better.” Left with a bloated Special Operations Command numbering 70,000 people after 20 years of counterterrorism operations, the Pentagon must make the tough calls about what to prioritize during the shift to peer competition. Here, greater cooperation between U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Cyber Command would help. Both commands can draw heavily from a foundation of existing capabilities and structures, while also creating a focal point for cooperation with electronic warfare and space capabilities. To achieve these benefits, the military should develop easier-to-deploy cyber units, enhance the role of special operations forces in enabling cyber operations, and integrate cyber warfare into special operations forces advising missions. Organizationally, this could be facilitated by creating a special operations structure dedicated to supporting the U.S. offensive cyber and information warfare missions, as well as expanding special operations cyber training pipelines, and incorporating special operations expertise into cyber capacity building with U.S. partners.

Bringing Cyber to the Front Lines

The Army is already making strides to position specialized cyber and electronic warfare units on the front lines as part of an ongoing drive to integrate the special operations, cyber, and space capabilities triad. Army scholars have highlighted existing expertise in these areas in the Special Mission Units, but this capability should be increased in scale and better integrated with mission planners. In 2019, a new Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) created the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion as part of a pilot program “to build tactical, on-the-ground cyber and electromagnetic teams to augment units with cyber, electronic warfare and information operations capabilities.” The Army plans to create ​​12 expeditionary cyber and electromagnetic activities teams by 2026 that “will help plan tactical cyberoperations for commanders and conduct missions in coordination with deployed forces.”

Become a Member

Though these units are in the early stages of their development, the potential benefits of operating alongside special operations forces are promising. Recently, the 915th tested its ability to gain access to “Internet of Things” devices inside a house containing mock terrorists to gather intelligence and potentially create effects to drive out the group. Expeditionary cyber operators achieved this by gaining proximal access to the target house from a nearby office in Maryland. This sort of operation is reminiscent of an attempted Russian intelligence close-access operation conducted from a car in The Hague to gain access to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ networks in 2018. For operations like this, special operations forces could play a vital role in providing access to a target. The U.S. Government has discussed using human intelligence-enabled technical operations “to seize collection opportunities in the rapidly emerging high-tech environment.” Planners will have to balance the risk calculus of placing individuals in harm’s way with the potential for unique capabilities in contested areas that would threaten more traditional platforms.

In parallel, Special Operations Command is increasing its efforts to operate effectively in the information domain. It has requested Congress more than double its “next-generation effects” budget for FY22 to $36 million to augment cyber, electronic attack, and directed-energy capabilities. The types of operations tested by the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion could prove invaluable to information gathering on terrorist networks. When compared to on-site exploitation, proximal cyberoperations could potentially reduce the risk to special operations forces, who would help establish access to networks that Cyber Command could later exploit. With effective coordination, the ability of Special operations forces to operate in contested or denied environments would amplify the effectiveness of cyberoperations, electronic warfare, and psychological operations.

Fusing special operations and cyber with broader U.S. information warfare efforts could also provide significant force multiplying effects during conflict. Employing cyberattacks as part of an information warfare strategy in conjunction with influence operations and electronic weapons would amplify their impact. Cyberoperations and electronic weapons could disrupt communications networks and portions of the electromagnetic spectrum alongside direct action missions against supply lines in order to create chaos. Special Operations Command recently released an open call for industry partners to submit proposals for “Next Generation [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance]” capabilities and “Next Generation Effects”, specifically for use in areas where the U.S. lacks air dominance. In addition to cyber tools to exploit the Internet of Things and mobile devices, this could include “cyber payloads with deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy capabilities that are able to be employed to both networked and air-gapped computer devices and systems.” These capabilities would position special operations forces as a key enabler of U.S. cyberattack capabilities and position the U.S. to create cascading effects against an adversary.

Integrating Special Operations and Cyber Units

To this end, Special Operations Command should also leverage its network of psychological operations, now called Military Information Support Operations, and Civil Affairs units, to work with Cyber Command to develop front-line cyber capabilities. A good starting point would be the creation of a Theater Special Operations Command under Cyber Command to provide consistent coordination and support to cyber and information operations, and develop specialized cyber training pipelines for special operations forces and their cyber counterparts. While broader reductions in Theater Special Operations Command funding may complicate implementation, a relatively small “Special Operations Command, Cyber (SOCCYBER)” could provide benefits that cross the borders of the geographic combatant commands. Much like Special Operations Command provides special operations forces to the commander of European Command via Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), the same can be done for the commander of the National Security Agency and Cyber Command. This would formally align special operations forces with Cyber Command objectives and provide its commander an organic special operations capability. A “Special Operations Command, Cyber” would provide Cyber Command with more tools against adversaries and enable them to respond more quickly. Less specialized personnel could be called upon to augment missions as required, but a Special Operations Command, Cyber would provide a central cadre of expertise for special operations support to Cyber Command.

To facilitate cooperation most effectively, the Department of Defense will have to close the distance between its special and cyber forces while recognizing the limitations of both communities. Army Cyber Command’s exercise flagged a potential hurdle in developing this concept: balancing physical and technical personnel requirements. To operate alongside special operations forces, personnel must have both the technical skills to conduct cyberoperations and meet the physical requirements. Special Operations Command’s specialized training pipelines could help overcome technical and physical limitations in each community. This shift in training priorities would better integrate special operations forces with Cyber Command personnel in order to overcome the inevitable growing pains of combining different levels of specialization and experience.

The U.S. should also consider leveraging special operation forces’ expertise in security force assistance to further develop partner cyber capabilities, including through Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward initiative. Security force assistance is a cornerstone of U.S. support to allies and partners, like Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Taiwan. Cyber Command and a more specialized, still nonexistent cyber incarnation of the Army’s conventional Security Force Assistance Brigade units could provide significantly more overt cyber capacity to partner forces. Special operations forces, in turn, could provide at-risk allies and partners more discrete support, helping incorporate cyber capabilities into an envisioned resistance operating concept. This support would focus on establishing common operating languages and techniques so that U.S forces could operate effectively with local resistance networks. In seeking to develop resistance capabilities to sustain drawn-out insurgencies across multiple domains, Special Operations Command and Cyber Command could engage partners with commercial-off-the-shelf tools as appropriate. Special operations forces could serves as valuable interlocutors in helping Cyber Command engage with host nation hackers and could serve as an important element of broader resistance. While the intent of integrating Special Operations Command is not to match Cyber Command’s capabilities or expertise, it does position Special Operations Command to complement Cyber Command’s Hunt Forward cyber security force assistance mission.

There is a growing need for flexible, low-profile capabilities to identify and disrupt adversary activities short of war. Greater cooperation between Special Operations Command and Cyber Command will help each command fulfill its traditional missions more efficiently and create novel options for U.S. policymakers. A special operations component more closely integrated with Cyber Command operations and priorities would provide quick and flexible military options its currently lacks. Special Operations Command also has the flexibility to operate across the dual hat arrangement between Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. Implementing any of these changes would require overcoming resourcing, staffing, and training challenges, but would enable the U.S. military to field a potentially decisive force over multiple domains. Integrated cyber and special operations capabilities are achievable in the near term and would be a significant force multiplier for the U.S. military, intelligence community, and foreign partners across all levels of competition.

Become a Member

Josh Golding is a Masters in Public Policy candidate at Yale University’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. He previously served as a cyber analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Josh Golding · November 11, 2022

14. War Books: A Reading List Inspired by Veterans Day

War Books: A Reading List Inspired by Veterans Day - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu · by MWI Staff · November 11, 2022

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

What does it mean to be a veteran? There’s no single answer—which means the books we read, as veterans, to process out military experiences and understand the way our military service shapes our identities vary widely. There’s no comprehensive list of books that could remotely cover such a subject. But several MWI staff members were asked to respond to a single, simple question: What books, more than any others, speak to you as a veteran? Why? Their responses are below.

Colonel Patrick Sullivan, MWI director and active duty Army officer

The Things They Carried, by Tim O’Brien

The Things They Carried is a collection of semiautobiographical short stories that recounts O’Brien’s experience as a draftee infantryman in Vietnam from 1969 until 1970. I first read it as an ROTC cadet at Duke University in the early 1990s as an assignment from one of my military science instructors, and it has stayed with me since. There is nothing quite like it in the Vietnam canon or other accounts of soldiering. O’Brien perfectly captures the full gamut of what one can feel and experience in combat, from the “truth is stranger than fiction” episodes of hilariously bad judgement that all soldiers can display, to the quiet moments of brotherhood, to the coping masked as morbid resignation, to the stupidities borne of alpha-male posturing, to the devastating pain of loss, and, finally, to the sobering realization that life goes on without you. O’Brien’s stories come fast and with an unpredictable tone, and you never quite figure out what O’Brien’s reality was and what is straight fiction, and how he might have blurred the lines between the two in a form of meta-commentary. That’s the point, however, because who knows with certainty the line between truth and fiction in the recounting of their own combat experiences? We are each our own unreliable narrators, after all. The Things They Carried will make you laugh and cry, deeply and in equal measure, but most importantly, it will make you reflect. I cannot recommend it highly enough.

John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies and retired Army officer

Tribe, by Sebastian Junger

Junger discusses the complex topic of why soldiers miss war, why they miss the deep bonds and the sense of community—call it a tribe if you like, as Junger did—experienced by men and women who have served in the military and combat. Junger explores the the attributes, meaning, and norms of tribes, examines the issues soldiers have when returning from war or leaving military service and reentering society as civilians—a society that is increasingly divided and where a sense of community, tribe, and togetherness is often lacking.

Timothy Heck, deputy editorial director and Marine Reserve officer

The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit, by Sloan Wilson

I first read The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit sitting atop the HESCO barriers of my small firebase in Fallujah waiting to do something. It was late 2007 and the war, by the time I showed up, was all but over in Anbar province. So, to fill the time while not working out or watching Lost, I read voraciously. Wilson’s story of a veteran trying to find meaning in his world resonated with me. Tom Rath’s changes and struggles were different than mine, but something connected me to him. How, after all, can someone ever be the same again after seeing the elephant?

Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Fox, MWI deputy director and active duty Army officer

The Art of Command, edited by Harry S. Laver & Jeffrey J. Matthews

This is an excellent read for leaders at all levels, leveraging lessons learned from influential military leaders over the past 250 years. The integrity of George Washington, the determination of Ulysses Grant, the followership of Colin Powell, and other leadership examples highlight the very best that our country has to offer and show aspiring leaders the standard of courage and perseverance to which we should all strive. This book serves as a terrific gift idea for newly minted officers and those about to assume the mantle of command.

The Servant as a Leader, by Robert Greenleaf

This is more of a pamphlet than a book, but its brevity belies its importance. It coined the term “servant leader”—which simply describes leaders who are empowered to help others. This book was especially impactful when I read it as a company commander charged with the morale and welfare of over a hundred soldiers and their families. Training warrior tasks, marksmanship, and battle drills is important, but soldiers cannot give their all unless they are cared for. By position and authority, leaders should remove obstacles, provide resources, and enable their subordinates so that the organization can execute at optimum capacity.

The Killer Angels: The Classic Novel of The Civil War, by Michael Shaara

A historical novel portraying the decisions and events leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg, this book describes the political pressure put on the field generals to achieve decisive victory. It also shows the softer side of leadership in action with the compassion and care of Longstreet and the heroism and the fortitude of Chamberlain’s bayonet charge. It brings the reader onto the battlefield, describing the sight, smell, and horror of the Civil War.

John Amble, editorial director and former Army officer

A Small Place in Italy, by Eric Newby

When I arrived in Afghanistan, I spent the first few days at Bagram Airfield. The very first morning, I walked out of the plywood hut—one among many that served as transient housing—and was stopped dead in my tracks by the beauty of the mountains beyond the base’s walls. They felt close enough to touch, and I thought immediately about what a draw this country should be for tourists from around the world—if only the country could find sustained peace. I badly wanted to be one of those tourists and return one day. But even then, in 2011, it was hard to imagine the necessary peace coming. Contrast this with Eric Newby’s experience. A British officer fighting in Italy during World War II, he was captured, was held prisoner, escaped, and was hidden and given aid by friendly civilians. After the war, he returned, eventually buying a house in the same rugged area of Liguria where he had previously been on the run. He wrote about his wartime experiences in Love and War in the Apennines, but his book about his experience returning to live in Italy after the war, A Small Place in Italy, connected more strongly with me. I couldn’t help but think back to the unavoidable sense that peace would elude Afghanistan indefinitely. The book forced me to think about war termination and the deep, and sometimes unsatisfied, desire to believe that the places we go to war will end up better for it.

Connected Soldiers, by John Spencer

Full disclosure, the author is a coworker and friend. I had the good fortune of witnessing this book come together. And yet when I sat down and read it in full, it connected with me. John was an infantry platoon leader during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and a company commander returning to Baghdad in 2008, and the advances in technology and available connectivity between those two deployments fundamentally changed the way that his soldiers bonded with one another. Returning from a difficult mission in 2008, when each soldier could reach out to friends and family back home with phone calls, emails, and Facebook messages, was very different from the shared processing of shared experiences that characterized John’s 2003 deployment. The book raises questions about how some of the most important features of combat experience and veteran identify are changing.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Sgt. Courtney White

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.usma.edu · by MWI Staff · November 11, 2022

15. How Democracy Can Win

Excerpts:

Over the past few years, many observers have become increasingly pessimistic about democracy’s future. Citing the spread of authoritarianism in many parts of the world, they have come to view contemporary developments through an undifferentiated dystopian lens. But there has been no return to fascism and there is no immediate threat to democracy in Western Europe. Instead, Europe’s right-wing populists have been forced to significantly temper their radicalism. That this moderating process has occurred even in Italy—a country that has never fully confronted its fascist past and that has been plagued by political instability and economic stagnation for decades—reflects the strength of democracy in such a place, and also that healthy democracies in general are able to resist destructive forces.

By failing to understand this process, scholars and commentators risk only reinforcing the movements they are concerned about. For one thing, alarmist discussion of the populist far right may foster fear and polarization. Calling a party “fascist” creates panic among those who do not support the party in question and resentment among those who do; it is also likely to have very little effect on the party’s vote share. Second, labeling a party “antidemocratic” contributes to misunderstandings about what is going on with democracy today. Despite pervasive pessimism, most of the West’s wealthy, long-established democracies remain robust and flourishing. Indeed, the United States is less an example of a general trend than an outlier, as one of the only countries in this category in which democracy is in significant peril. (Notably, Freedom House and other groups that track democratic development, such as V-Dem, have noted a marked decline in the strength of American democracy but have found no similar decline in Western Europe.)

It is possible, of course, that the efforts by Le Pen, Meloni, Akesson, and other right-wing populists to bring their parties into the mainstream is purely tactical; in their hearts, perhaps they do harbor extremist, antidemocratic sentiments. But that was surely the case with many early postwar communists, as well. Nonetheless, because communists recognized that radical and antidemocratic positions were limiting their votes and barring them from power, they gradually ceased advocating them. Over time this approach became institutionalized in the parties’ appeals and policies, thus conditioning a new generation of communist leaders and sympathizers to the rules of democratic politics. Anyone interested in strengthening democracy today should favor pushing right-wing populists along a similar path—but this will not be possible if their moderation is derided rather than rewarded.

The threats to American democracy in particular should not be understated, even though the courts and other officials were able to block attempts to overthrow the results of the 2020 presidential election. But to properly understand the nature of the threat posed by populist far-right parties, we should spend less time trying to peer into the hearts of their leaders and more time focused on the incentives and constraints that these parties face. If democracy is effective and responsive, there will be little constituency for explicit antidemocratic or radical appeals, and governments and other political actors will be able to enforce the democratic rules of the game. In such contexts radicals have only two choices: marginalization or moderation.

How Democracy Can Win

Europe, America, and the Taming of the Far-Right

By Sheri Berman

November 11, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Sheri Berman · November 11, 2022

Among the many takeaways of the U.S. midterms, one of the most striking is the alarming number of election deniers that were on the ballot, often in uncontested districts. Across the country, dozens of candidates for House, Senate, and state-level positions have who have refused to recognize the 2020 election results are coming to office. As such, they are the latest signs in what some observers see as a dangerous democratic decline across the West. According to this view, what has happened in the United States since the January 6, 2021, assault on the Capitol has found echoes in Western Europe, where far-right parties recently achieved stunning success in Italy and Sweden and shown new strength in France.

Witnessing this trend, commentators are consumed by fears that, as the nonprofit group Freedom House puts it in its latest global survey, “around the world, the enemies of liberal democracy … are accelerating their attacks.” Just as many see the large number of election deniers, conspiracy theorists and insurrection trivializers in the Republican party as evidence of the erosion of long-held democratic norms, they see the victories this fall of the Brothers of Italy and the Sweden Democrats, parties with far-right roots, as a sign that fascism is returning and democracy is imperiled—even in Western Europe, where it has long been taken for granted.

But this doomsday view overlooks the varied political contexts in which these developments are playing out. There are, of course, many reasons to worry about far-right movements, particularly when they deny election results or otherwise seek to undermine democratic institutions. But there are crucial differences between what has happened in some European countries, where once far-right parties have moderated over time, and the United States, where one of the mainstream parties has embraced far-right, antidemocratic ideas. Indeed, rather than showing that European democracy is endangered, the evolution of the Brothers of Italy and the Sweden Democrats offers reasons for cautious optimism. Like many other right-wing parties in Western Europe, these parties have extremist roots but have recognized that winning votes and political power requires moving away from those roots, moderating their appeals and policy platforms, and pledging to adhere to democratic norms.

The evolution of the Brothers of Italy, the Sweden Democrats, and other Western European right-wing populist parties reflects something critical but counterintuitive about the relationship between extremism and democracy: whether extremist groups will become significant threats to democracy depends less on the groups themselves and more on the nature of the democracies in which they emerge. When democratic norms and institutions are weak, extremists may have little incentive to moderate, since they will be able to gain supporters and even actual power without playing by the rules. But where democratic norms and institutions are strong, extremists will be forced to moderate because there will be little constituency for explicitly antidemocratic or radical appeals and because if they don’t, other political actors and institutions will be able to keep them from power in any case.

This dynamic bears directly on how threats to democracy can be managed, including in the United States. Moreover, while unfolding political events can be hard to judge dispassionately, radical or extremist political movements have challenged democracy on numerous past occasions as well, and these can be evaluated with the benefit of hindsight. A particularly illustrative case is the fate of communist parties in Western Europe during the interwar period and after World War II. During these decades, the political systems of European countries faced large-scale changes—whether toward or away from democracy—and examining the course of those events offers insight into the factors that shaped these parties’ behavior.

Nasty and Brutish

Although interwar Europe is primarily remembered for the rise of fascism and Nazism, democracy during this time was also challenged from the left. After 1917, the Russian Revolution triggered the formation of revolutionary, insurrectionist, antidemocratic communist parties in almost every European country. In Italy, the party that initially had the greatest strength, the Italian Socialist Party, had little interest in democracy, and it cheered the endless riots, strikes, and insurrections plaguing the country. Taking an even harder line, some socialists broke away to form the openly revolutionary Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1921, which soon increased its own insurrectionary activity and helped to dismantle Italian democracy. Indeed, at the PCI’s 1922 congress, party leader Amadeo Bordiga focused on the need to fight social democracy rather than fascism, even though the Fascist Party was only months away from being handed power.

Similarly, in Germany’s Weimar Republic, the Communist Party (KPD) consistently attracted around 10–15 percent of the vote and maintained an armed militia that engaged in street brawls and insurrections. When the Great Depression caused chaos in Germany during the early 1930s, the KPD’s vote share grew, as did its violent and antidemocratic activity. Indeed, so eager was the KPD to hasten the republic’s downfall that it joined with the Nazis in September 1932 in a vote of no confidence, toppling the existing government and ushering in the election in November that would bring Hitler to power.

Crucial to these developments was the weakness of European democracy in this period: in addition to being unable to respond to the demands of their citizens, many governments were unable to prevent communists and other extremists from fielding private militias and engaging in extraparliamentary activity. At the same time, in many countries liberal parties collapsed, and the other main forces capable of defending democratic institutions—social democratic and socialist parties—proved unable or unwilling to do so. Without governments able to enforce the democratic rules of the game and other parties able to make extremists pay a price for antidemocratic behavior, communists and their right-wing counterparts had few incentives to moderate their behavior.

Less Lenin, More Aristotle

When the dust cleared at the end of World War II, communist parties reemerged in many Western European countries. In many cases, these parties received even more support than they had before the war, because of the communists’ heroic wartime resistance and the prestige enjoyed by the Soviet Union for its role in defeating Hitler. The communist parties’ initial postwar strength—combined with their destructive role during the interwar period and their close ties to the Soviet Union—led many to view them as a threat to fragile democracies. (In his famous Iron Curtain speech in 1946, for example, the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill referred to these parties as “fifth columns.”) Yet over the coming decades all Western European communist parties moderated dramatically, dropping their support of violence, committing themselves to democracy, and distancing themselves from the Soviet Union.

Take the French Communist Party (PCF). It began its postwar career as a particularly rigid and Moscow-centric party, as it had been during the interwar years. It received 26 percent of the vote in France’s first election after the war, and as a result was asked to join the government. Yet by 1947 it had been pushed out of power due to its extreme and unyielding positions. The party initially responded to its ouster by reverting to radicalism, proclaiming its commitment to revolution, and trumpeting its strong ties to the Soviet Union. But as the context facing the PCF changed, so did the party. Strong postwar economic growth and the formation of the Fifth Republic in 1958 stabilized French democracy, diminishing the constituency for radicalism and revolution. In 1969, a new (democratic) socialist party, the Parti Socialiste (PS), emerged and quickly drew significant support. As a result, the Communists agreed to join with the PS and the left Radicals, a center-left social-liberal party, in an electoral alliance, abandoning a host of communist symbols and principles, including the hammer-and-sickle insignia and the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The PCF also took a more critical stance toward the Soviet Union. At its 1976 congress, the party proposed the idea of “socialism in French colors,” reflecting its commitment to France, as opposed to Moscow, as well as its full acceptance of democracy. Its days as an antidemocratic revolutionary force were over.

When democratic norms and institutions are weak, extremists may have little incentive to moderate.

The postwar Italian Communist Party followed a similar trajectory. It won 19 percent of the vote in Italy’s first postwar election and was included in the government but was kicked out in 1947. Over the coming years, the Italian economy boomed and Italian democracy stabilized, and a strong, unified, democratic center-right Christian Democratic party kept the PCI out of power at the national level. Although a spate of terrorist incidents committed by far-left and far-right fringe groups rocked Italy during the 1960s and 1970s, in contrast to the interwar years, these incidents were broadly condemned, and the PCI succumbed to pressure to explicitly denounce violence. In addition, the party made clear its commitment to playing by the democratic rules of the game, distanced itself from the Soviet Union, and moved to the forefront of an emerging Eurocommunist movement committed to a Third Way between Soviet-style communism and social democracy. The party also sought alliances with other parties on the left, and even made clear its willingness to work with the Christian Democrats and to accept Western alliances and NATO membership, which the far left had previously shunned. In short, like the French Communists, the PCI ceased to be a threat to democracy long before the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s.

In fact, the steady moderation of Europe’s postwar communist parties was primarily a response to the growing strength of democracy. As governments delivered unprecedented economic growth and built strong welfare states, popular support for radicalism diminished. In turn, the growing legitimacy of democratic institutions enabled these governments to constrain and, if necessary, punish antidemocratic actors. Democracy was also buttressed by the development of strong center-right and center-left parties that were fully committed to upholding democratic institutions and accordingly unwilling to ally with extremist forces. These factors led European communists to recognize that if they wanted to gain support and influence, their interwar playbook had to be cast aside. Over time, this trend was solidified by the emergence of a new generation of communist leaders and supporters who understood and were prepared to play by the democratic rules of the game.

Kittens, Not Fascists

But it was not just Europe’s communist parties that were forced to moderate during the postwar period. In the sixties and seventies, extremist, neofascist parties such as the German Reich party, the Dutch People’s Union, and the British National Front emerged in Western Europe. Yet most of these groups attracted little support and faded into oblivion. The few that survived are the predecessors of the parties that are feared by commentators today, such as the Brothers of Italy and the Sweden Democrats. Although it is important not to whitewash these parties’ origins, the reason they have survived is because they recognized, like the communists, that if they did not moderate they would be consigned to irrelevance: their support would remain limited, and they would be blocked from political power by the state and other political actors.

Consider the French National Front, one of Western Europe’s oldest and probably its most influential right-wing populist party. The National Front emerged from France’s far-right scene in the 1970s. During its early years, it garnered few votes, but its vote share expanded during the 1990s and 2000s, partially as a result of rising concerns about immigration, Islamic fundamentalism, and national identity, before falling back to 4.3 percent in the 2007 presidential elections. Over time, members of the party recognized that its success was limited by its perceived radicalism, and particularly the racism and Holocaust denialism of its leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The result was a palace coup by Le Pen’s daughter Marine, who forced her father out of the party and embarked on a concerted effort to dédiabolise—un-demonize—the National Front. Le Pen changed the party’s rhetoric on its signature issue of immigration, distancing herself from racism (and anti-Semitism), claiming instead that the party aimed to defend Republicanism, secularism, and French values from those who rejected them. Le Pen also shifted the National Front’s policy profile, most notably by repositioning the party as the champion of France’s “left-behind” citizens. To enhance her respectability, Le Pen surrounded herself with (often young) technocrats, many of whom defected from conservative or center-right parties. And in the runup to France’s 2022 election, Le Pen sought to moderate her party’s image even further by changing its name to National Rally, dropping her rejection of the European Union, and presenting herself as a kindly “mother of cats.” Although she has not brought her party to power, she has increased her party’s vote share in every presidential contest in which she has run, most recently gaining 41 percent of the vote against incumbent French President Emmanuel Macron in April 2022.

Europe’s right-wing populists have been forced to significantly temper their radicalism.

The Sweden Democrats and the Brothers of Italy have followed a similar path. The Sweden Democrats were formed in 1988 by representatives of extreme nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations. Like its predecessors, the party initially received few votes and was shunned by other parties. To change this, its politically astute leader, Jimmie Akesson, who took over the party in 2005, when he was 25, began to distance the party from its extremist, neo-Nazi roots, excluding members with overt ties to such groups, changing its symbol from a somewhat threatening flame to a pretty blue flower, making clear its commitment to democracy, and expanding its policy profile to appeal to disaffected Swedish voters, particularly those from the working class. The party has continued to emphasize the dangers of liberal immigration policies, but it has moved away from the more openly racist appeals and the ethnic conception of national identity that it had previously been known for, claiming instead that it objects to immigrants who refuse to assimilate by speaking Swedish and accepting “Swedish values,” and that it opposes levels of immigration that strain government resources. In making this shift, the Sweden Democrats have attracted growing popular support and ultimately enabled other conservative and center-right parties to form alliances with them, including the country’s current conservative minority government.

Similarly, the Brothers of Italy has among its ancestors the Italian Social Movement, founded by fascists after World War II. But its leader, Giorgia Meloni, has distanced herself from fascism and suspended members who openly praised or had ties to extremist groups. Meloni calls herself a conservative and claims that her party advocates “traditional conservative values and policies” like low taxes, strong borders, limited immigration, the centrality of the family, and the importance of Christianity to Western and Italian identity. Meloni also now stresses her support for the European Union and for Italy’s Western alliances, having previously criticized the former and raised concerns about her commitment to the latter. In adopting these positions, Meloni facilitated the Brothers of Italy’s electoral success in September 2022, which made her Italy’s first female prime minister.

From Mainstream to Mayhem

The importance and distinctiveness of the evolution of Western European right-wing populism becomes particularly clear when compared with comparable developments in the United States. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, when many Western European right-wing populist parties were recognizing that if they wanted to gain votes and power they would have to moderate their rhetoric and behavior, one of the two mainstream U.S. parties, the Republican Party, began moving in the opposite direction. As exemplified by Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Contract With America,” the party’s rhetoric became increasingly divisive and negative, its policy profile shifted from moderate to conservative, and its behavior in Congress grew increasingly obstructionist. The election of Donald Trump, in 2016, turbocharged these trends. Trump had little regard for democratic norms and institutions, and rather than checking his impulses Republicans indulged or even condoned them.

After Trump’s loss, in 2020, the party radicalized further, refusing to forthrightly condemn Trump’s election denialism or even a violent insurrection against Congress that was designed to prevent a lawful transition of power. It also repudiated those leaders within the party, like Representative Liz Cheney of Wyoming and Senator Mitt Romney of Utah, who were willing to stand up for democratic institutions and deviate from the party’s increasingly antidemocratic path. That this trend has continued has been shown in the midterms, in which the party fielded nearly 300 election deniers, in races in 48 out of 50 states. And while some of the more extreme candidates lost—including Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate Doug Mastriano, who participated in the pro-Trump rally at the Capitol on January 6—radical, conspiracy-minded figures like Marjorie Taylor Greene and Matt Gaetz are now firmly ensconced in the party.

Curb Your Extremism

Over the past few years, many observers have become increasingly pessimistic about democracy’s future. Citing the spread of authoritarianism in many parts of the world, they have come to view contemporary developments through an undifferentiated dystopian lens. But there has been no return to fascism and there is no immediate threat to democracy in Western Europe. Instead, Europe’s right-wing populists have been forced to significantly temper their radicalism. That this moderating process has occurred even in Italy—a country that has never fully confronted its fascist past and that has been plagued by political instability and economic stagnation for decades—reflects the strength of democracy in such a place, and also that healthy democracies in general are able to resist destructive forces.

By failing to understand this process, scholars and commentators risk only reinforcing the movements they are concerned about. For one thing, alarmist discussion of the populist far right may foster fear and polarization. Calling a party “fascist” creates panic among those who do not support the party in question and resentment among those who do; it is also likely to have very little effect on the party’s vote share. Second, labeling a party “antidemocratic” contributes to misunderstandings about what is going on with democracy today. Despite pervasive pessimism, most of the West’s wealthy, long-established democracies remain robust and flourishing. Indeed, the United States is less an example of a general trend than an outlier, as one of the only countries in this category in which democracy is in significant peril. (Notably, Freedom House and other groups that track democratic development, such as V-Dem, have noted a marked decline in the strength of American democracy but have found no similar decline in Western Europe.)

It is possible, of course, that the efforts by Le Pen, Meloni, Akesson, and other right-wing populists to bring their parties into the mainstream is purely tactical; in their hearts, perhaps they do harbor extremist, antidemocratic sentiments. But that was surely the case with many early postwar communists, as well. Nonetheless, because communists recognized that radical and antidemocratic positions were limiting their votes and barring them from power, they gradually ceased advocating them. Over time this approach became institutionalized in the parties’ appeals and policies, thus conditioning a new generation of communist leaders and sympathizers to the rules of democratic politics. Anyone interested in strengthening democracy today should favor pushing right-wing populists along a similar path—but this will not be possible if their moderation is derided rather than rewarded.

The threats to American democracy in particular should not be understated, even though the courts and other officials were able to block attempts to overthrow the results of the 2020 presidential election. But to properly understand the nature of the threat posed by populist far-right parties, we should spend less time trying to peer into the hearts of their leaders and more time focused on the incentives and constraints that these parties face. If democracy is effective and responsive, there will be little constituency for explicit antidemocratic or radical appeals, and governments and other political actors will be able to enforce the democratic rules of the game. In such contexts radicals have only two choices: marginalization or moderation.

• SHERI BERMAN is Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and the author of Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Régime to the Present Day.

Foreign Affairs · by Sheri Berman · November 11, 2022

16.  U.S. Midterm Results Are a Net Plus for National Security

Wishful thinking? I am not seeing Congress unified on Foreign Policy and I am not sure it will be more nifed after this election.

Conclusion:

None of this is to say that the Biden White House will enjoy dealing with a Republican-controlled House, that U.S. allies will stop worrying about the extremes in U.S. politics, or that these extremes will go away. But if there is a pattern connecting the last three nationwide elections—2018, 2020, and 2022—it is that there is a strong anti-Trump wall on the electoral map and that Congress has emerged each time more unified than divided on the most important foreign-policy questions of the day.

U.S. Midterm Results Are a Net Plus for National Security

Foreign Policy · by Michael J. Green · November 11, 2022

Shadow Government

A front-row seat to the Republicans' debate over foreign policy, including their critique of the Biden administration.

As Trumpism deflates, internationalist Republicans will press the Biden administration on China, defense, and trade.

By Michael J. Green, the CEO of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media during an election night event at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, on Nov. 8.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to the media during an election night event at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach, Florida, on Nov. 8. Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Just before the 2022 midterm elections, I argued in Foreign Policy that a Republican victory in the House of Representatives would not be all bad for U.S. strategic competition with China because of the Republicans’ attention to defense spending and trade policy and the broad bipartisanship around the Biden administration’s alliance-centric strategy for the Indo-Pacific. The actual result looks to be even better than that, even if we won’t know the final outcome for a few days or weeks. Yes, a Republican House may well go after Hunter Biden and outgoing Rep. Liz Cheney—and generally provide bread and circuses for their base that makes U.S. President Joe Biden look weak and Congress look dysfunctional to U.S. allies. But the public spectacle won’t change the fact that Republican control of key House committees will also give the Biden administration’s hawks and realists a helpful boost. While watching Jacobin show trials on cable TV, foreign-policy experts should remind themselves of what the author Mark Twain said about the music of German composer Richard Wagner: “It’s not as bad as it sounds.”

First, as I noted in my previous assessment, the likely Republican leaders of key House committees and subcommittees for defense, international relations, and trade are all internationalists and realists who will push resources for defense and scrutinize progress on capability-building and ambitious initiatives with allies, such as the Australia-U.K.-U.S. agreement (known as AUKUS) to build nuclear-powered submarines and advanced defense capabilities. This will discipline a Biden administration where many policy areas, particularly trade and extended deterrence, face obstruction from left-wing protectionists and arms control purists in the administration.

But on top of that, the likely election result—a Republican-controlled House, with the Senate still up for grabs as of this writing—will add a bit more wind to the sails of the administration’s effort to organize for strategic competition with China.

First, the deflation of former U.S. President Donald Trump—and Trumpism in general—will help U.S. diplomats abroad, who are contending with a damaging narrative that their country’s democracy is broken. In Australia, for example, coverage of U.S. elections has recently even eclipsed coverage of Australia’s own national elections. It has been very hard for Australians to ignore the ugly spectacle of the Jan. 6 insurrection, election denialism, Trump’s outrageous attacks on democratic norms, and extremists campaigning for posts that regulate the democratic election process. At a time when threats from China are pushing allies closer to the United States, it is unnerving for friendly governments to contemplate increased dependence on a United States that seems to have lost its democratic bearings, with a radical shift in Washington’s foreign policy potentially just one presidential election away.

There is a strong anti-Trump wall on the electoral map—and Congress has emerged more unified than divided on the most important foreign-policy questions of the day.

In a United States Studies Centre survey published last month, approximately half of Australians said they were “very concerned” about the direction of U.S. democracy, which is a problem when Western alliances are based not only on a common threat perception but also on common values. China’s official narrative against the United States regularly features Jan. 6 as evidence that democracy is not the best form of government, despite surveys showing strong support for democracy and its principles over China’s model. The midterm elections will likely change that narrative and make it easier to be a U.S. diplomat around the world. Voter turnout, the diversity of elected officials, the pushback against the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on abortion rights, and especially the underperformance of Trumpist candidates in the polls will all be reassuring to the United States’ friends, regardless of whether they prefer Republicans or Democrats in charge in Washington.

Second, the likely size of the Republican victory in the House seems just right to empower the relevant committees to push the Biden administration on defense and trade—but not so overwhelming that it would bring even more disrupters seeking to undercut U.S. engagement and long-term strategy. If Rep. Kevin McCarthy is elected House Speaker, he will find fewer members than he might have expected in his ranks who will be pushing to cut support for Ukraine or questioning the U.S. commitment to NATO. Should Democrats hold the Senate, it will further block any excesses by the “Make America Great Again” crowd in the national-security space. Strong bipartisan support for strategic competition in Congress reflects the sentiments of the American people in surveys by the U.S. Studies Centre and other organizations—and it has now been ratified by the midterm results.

None of this is to say that the Biden White House will enjoy dealing with a Republican-controlled House, that U.S. allies will stop worrying about the extremes in U.S. politics, or that these extremes will go away. But if there is a pattern connecting the last three nationwide elections—2018, 2020, and 2022—it is that there is a strong anti-Trump wall on the electoral map and that Congress has emerged each time more unified than divided on the most important foreign-policy questions of the day.

Michael J. Green is the CEO of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a distinguished scholar at the Asia Pacific Institute in Tokyo, and a former senior National Security Council official on Asia policy during the George W. Bush administration. Twitter: @JapanChair

Foreign Policy · by Michael J. Green · November 11, 2022

17. Special ops airmen get fewer new gunships than promised

"People, ideas, hardware—in that order" - John Boyd

"Along the way, Boyd developed the most important of his many trinities: people first, ideas second, and things third. That is the priority for developing successful strategies. It is also good advice f​or leading a successful life. Most militaries, however, do it in reverse—people must be interchangeable parts to avoid single-point failures in combat. However, Boyd wanted to emphasize the human dimension of conflict."

Excerpts;

The newest J-model is said to be the most heavily armed gunship in history, with the ability to tout 30mm and 105mm cannons, AGM-176A Griffin missiles, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. It has also acted as a testbed for an experimental high-energy laser weapon.

“The AC-130J provides ground forces an expeditionary, persistent direct-fire platform that is persistent, ideally suited for urban operations and delivers precision low-yield munitions against ground targets,” according to the Air Force.

Spurred in part by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, the military is now turning its attention to hardware and software that could give it the upper hand in competition against advanced militaries like China.

"The idea that anybody at the headquarters thinks special tactics is irrelevant and should be disbanded is patently false."

That’s led to decisions to divest and downsize aircraft that may be less useful in those scenarios, including the Air Force’s move to shrink its combat search-and-rescue helicopter fleet by about 25 airframes.

AFSOC is likewise exploring what the next chapter could look like for its elite airmen. Slife has indicated the command could venture farther into the space and cyber realms, and figure out how to adapt traditional missions like close air support for a more challenging fight.

“The future is going to be different than what we have experienced for the last 20 years,” Slife said. “One thing I’m certain of is, this airplane will be relevant to whatever the future operating environment brings.”

Special ops airmen get fewer new gunships than promised

airforcetimes.com · by Rachel Cohen · November 10, 2022

Editor’s note: This story was updated Nov. 10 at 8:52 p.m. with additional information from Air Force Special Operations Command.

The Pentagon has quietly cut procurement of its new AC-130J Ghostrider special operations gunships, downsizing the fleet from 37 to 30.

U.S. Special Operations Command originally planned to buy nearly 40 Ghostriders to replace three older gunships: the AC-130H Spectre, AC-130W Stinger II and AC-130U Spooky. Each of those 37 aircraft are now retired.

Rather than swap out the airframes one-for-one as expected, SOCOM wants to end the decade-long AC-130J acquisition seven short of the full program.

RELATED

Meet the Air Force’s ‘ultimate battle plane’ and your new close-air support

When it hits the battlefield in a few short years, the AC-130J Ghostrider will be the most heavily armed gunship in history – a badass plane providing close-air support to U.S. troops on the ground, and delivering withering firepower that will send enemies running for the hills.

SOCOM tucked mentions of the change into its fiscal 2023 budget request, writing that it would maintain a total of 30 AC-130Js. Each airframe costs $165 million apiece, according to an Air Force fact sheet.

The military has purchased 31 of the gunships from Lockheed Martin for combat purposes, but will not replace one that was flown too hard during testing and is no longer airworthy. That plane now serves to train airmen on the ground.

“There is no buy planned in [fiscal] 2024,” SOCOM said.

The military opted to pursue a smaller AC-130J fleet as a way to “better position [Air Force Special Operations Command] for the future fight,” spokesperson Lt. Col. Becky Heyse said Thursday.

“The C-130Js were already purchased and it was decided to not modify them to become AC-130J (extensive mods required to add the gun and other capabilities),” Heyse said. “The remaining C-130Js are going to the 193rd [Special Operations Squadron as MC-130Js to recapitalize their fleet.”

RELATED

AFSOC gets latest, most advanced AC-130J gunship

It remains unclear whether this Block 30 Ghostrider is able to carry Hellfire missiles.

The final AC-130J arrived at Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico, on Nov. 2.

“The airplane and its predecessors have exceeded all our expectations and kept more Americans alive than any other airplane on the battlefield,” Air Force Special Operations Command boss Lt. Gen. Jim Slife said at the delivery ceremony.

The remaining 30 Ghostriders are stationed at Cannon and Hurlburt Field, Florida. The schoolhouse is slated to move from Hurlburt to Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, by October 2023.

AC-130 gunships have been a combat mainstay since the Vietnam War and are constantly deployed for conventional and special operations missions around the world.

Two pilots, one combat systems officer, one weapon system operator, one sensor operator and four special mission aviators comprise the Ghostrider’s crew.

RELATED

AC-130J gunship team honored for saving 88 Americans, Afghans in overseas shootout

Another AC-130J Ghostrider team has been recognized for their combat valor in Afghanistan.

The newest J-model is said to be the most heavily armed gunship in history, with the ability to tout 30mm and 105mm cannons, AGM-176A Griffin missiles, AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs. It has also acted as a testbed for an experimental high-energy laser weapon.

“The AC-130J provides ground forces an expeditionary, persistent direct-fire platform that is persistent, ideally suited for urban operations and delivers precision low-yield munitions against ground targets,” according to the Air Force.

Spurred in part by the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, the military is now turning its attention to hardware and software that could give it the upper hand in competition against advanced militaries like China.

RELATED

Air Force special ops chief says it’s time to embrace new missions

"The idea that anybody at the headquarters thinks special tactics is irrelevant and should be disbanded is patently false."

That’s led to decisions to divest and downsize aircraft that may be less useful in those scenarios, including the Air Force’s move to shrink its combat search-and-rescue helicopter fleet by about 25 airframes.

AFSOC is likewise exploring what the next chapter could look like for its elite airmen. Slife has indicated the command could venture farther into the space and cyber realms, and figure out how to adapt traditional missions like close air support for a more challenging fight.

“The future is going to be different than what we have experienced for the last 20 years,” Slife said. “One thing I’m certain of is, this airplane will be relevant to whatever the future operating environment brings.”

About Rachel S. Cohen

Rachel Cohen joined Air Force Times as senior reporter in March 2021. Her work has appeared in Air Force Magazine, Inside Defense, Inside Health Policy, the Frederick News-Post (Md.), the Washington Post, and others.

18. What The West Misunderstands About Power In China 

Excerpts;

A more recent example of local influence in central policymaking is the stagnation of reform in the land market. The third plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 pledged to increase farmers’ share of income in rural land transactions. But this would harm the interests of local governments, which earn a large portion of their extra-budgetary revenue by seizing farmland. As a result, progress has been slow so far.

While Western democracies rely on mechanisms external to the present leadership — such as the media, the legal system and opposition parties — to curb the opportunism of incumbent leaders, China relies on a different kind of power decentralization, one that exists along the hierarchies of the government. This system leaves room for innovation and competition on the part of localities, while also allowing the central authority to monitor its subordinates and hold the country together.

As important stakeholders of China’s political system, local governments are not just subordinates who execute the orders of their superiors. Their actions and interests actively shape the policies of the central authority. Looking beyond Beijing, therefore, is crucial for understanding China’s politics and policies.

What The West Misunderstands About Power In China | NOEMA

Often overlooked in media portrayals of China, provincial and local officials in fact have the greatest impact on day-to-day governance, and their actions actively shape national politics.

noemamag.com · by Xiao Ma

Credits

Xiao Ma is an assistant professor of political science at Peking University. His research interests include bureaucracy, political elites and development. He is the author of “Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China’s High-Speed Railway Program” (Oxford University Press, 2022).

BEIJING — China is often portrayed as a monolithic authoritarian country, with the whole government acting on the command of a few top leaders. But this is a very large country — as large as the entire European continent. No ruler can govern alone. For most ordinary Chinese, Beijing is as distant and abstract as Washington for someone in rural Arkansas or Colorado. As an old Chinese proverb goes: “Mountains are high, and the emperor is far away.”

Instead, the government officials with the most impact on ordinary Chinese people’s lives are local officials, whose policies they interact with on a daily basis. Understanding how these administrations work not only reveals much about how nearly a fifth of humanity lives and is governed, but also helps to disrupt some commonly held myths and misperceptions about Chinese politics.

China has five levels of government. Under the national administration, there are 31 province-level regions, then 333 municipalities, 2,800 counties and, finally, at the bottom, more than 40,000 townships. Within each jurisdiction, leaders enjoy considerable autonomy over economic and social policymaking. They govern like national leaders, only with a reduced sphere of influence.

Personnel appointment is the key to holding this extensive bureaucracy together. Leaders at each level are appointed by their superiors one level above them (e.g., central leadership appoints the provincial-level party secretaries and governors). In addition, the central government also holds regulatory power over key economic resources. The construction of new railway projects, for example, requires Beijing’s approval.

This elaborate hierarchy supplies high-powered career incentives for local leaders. The five layers, along with deputy positions at each level, produce a bureaucracy with 10 different ranks of increasing power and privilege. The desire to reach higher positions generates incentives for local officials to reach and balance goals such as promoting growth, attracting investment, preserving the environment and maintaining social stability.

Local leaders have to be entrepreneurial to outperform their equally motivated peers in local development. Some resort to policy experiments, transforming the local bureaucracy to make it more amicable to residents and outside investors; others lobby their superiors, in particular those in the central government, for additional policy handouts. Local leaders differ significantly in their governance style, experience and achievements. Many are poker-faced officials, but some get the spotlight for unorthodox governing methods or unique personas. For example, Geng Yanbo, the former mayor of Datong, became the subject of an internationally acclaimed documentary for his aggressive leadership style as he tried to transform the once-industrial city into a coveted tourist destination.

Local leaders are closer to their people compared with decision-makers in the distant capital; they have better knowledge of local conditions and are more capable of coming up with policies tailored to local needs and endowments. They develop closer connections with their constituents and identify more closely with their interests than with the ideology of central leaders. In Zhejiang Province, home to some of China’s most successful private enterprises like Alibaba and Geely, leaders at the county level played an important role in protecting grassroots capitalism during the tumultuous periods of the Cultural Revolution and the early years of market reform, when private business was still constitutionally illicit. They allowed commune and brigade-run firms, for example, despite Beijing’s call to cut such “capitalist tails.”

“Local leaders are closer to their people compared with decision-makers in the distant capital.”

China’s central leaders are aware of the informational advantage local officials enjoy and encourage them to craft economic and social policies that befit local conditions. The center also has a number of channels to keep a close eye on local government behaviors. For example, journalists in state-owned mouthpieces such as Xinhua and the People’s Daily are regularly tasked with writing internal reports only for the eyes of top party leaders. These reports are, in theory, more forthright about governance problems than reports written for a general audience. Recognizing the influence of these reports, local leaders often treat these state journalists with great deference — inviting them to lavish dinner parties in the hopes of being portrayed positively.

As Chinese and Western scholars have shown, the central government allows room for discussion on social media partly in order to collect information on local governance. Censors don’t suppress everything that is critical of the government. Chinese netizens make all kinds of complaints about local officials on social media platforms such as WeChat, Weibo and Douyin, and scandals or misconduct that starts trending is often met with swift punishment. The most recent high-profile example is the removal of the party secretary in Feng County in Jiangsu Province in February, after a brief video showing a chained woman, later found out to be trafficked, went viral online. The county government gave inconsistent answers to the netizens’ inquiries about the case and demands for accountability, provoking further outrage online and eventually leading to an investigation by the provincial authority.

When local authorities lobby the central government for policy resources, their actions also provide a different kind of information to the central policymakers. Places across China differ significantly in their history, environment, levels of economic development and policy needs. Central policymakers need detailed information on local conditions to make appropriate decisions when they allocate critical resources in their control. Such information, however, is not easy to gather. The absence of a contested legislature eager to represent regional or group interests impairs central decision-makers’ ability to ascertain the true distribution of demands for policy benefits in society.

Tolerating lobbying by the local governments mitigates this problem. In my study of China’s high-speed railway program, I found that local governments frequently send their leaders to the central ministries like the Ministry of Transport to make a case for the railway projects to be approved in their jurisdictions. Such emissaries also provide central bureaucrats with a superior grasp of the socioeconomic situations (e.g. fiscal capacity) and policy needs (e.g. transportation infrastructure) in specific localities. These interactions are so frequent that most Chinese provinces and cities have established permanent offices in Beijing (also known as the “Beijing Office” of the local government) to accommodate and aid officials traveling to Beijing. In a country with a strong central authority and decentralized governance, Beijing offices play the important role of facilitating communication between the central and local authorities.

Become a print subscriber today.

China’s decentralized local governance system also allows leaders to test new policies in certain locales without jeopardizing the wider system if the experiment fails. Many of China’s economic reform measures of the late 1970s and early 80s, such as the establishment of the household responsibility system in rural China and the introduction of foreign investment in the cities, were first piloted in a few localities before they were implemented nationwide. These market-oriented reforms were hugely controversial at a time when the planned economy dominated. But the small-scale experiments created less internal opposition than massive reform, and when they succeeded, elites and the public became more willing to see the policies broadened.

A more recent example of such experimentation was the adoption of cellphone QR codes for health status in the city of Hangzhou in February 2020, shortly after the outbreak of the coronavirus. The measure was quickly emulated elsewhere — including by the central government in an effort to make long distant travel more convenient. Of course, not all local experiments have gone nationwide. In 2011, the government introduced a property tax in a few selected cities such as Shanghai and Chongqing. But concerns over the tax’s disruptive impact on the housing market, one of the pillars of China’s economy, have prevented the experiments from spreading more broadly.

Because the country is divided up into units of similar sizes, endowments and economic structures, it’s easier to transplant policy experiments from one place to another. A policy that has increased economic growth in one city is likely to have the same effect in another city with a similar economic structure.

“The central government allows room for discussion on social media partly in order to collect information on local governance.”

This differs from the Soviet Union, which was organized as a unitary system with subnational units. Each had its unique place in the planned economy system and differed significantly in economic specialization from one another. This limited Soviet leaders’ ability to carry out Chinese-style, “experiment-first, diffuse-later-if-successful” reform. They were forced to change the whole system at once, which was riskier and ultimately less successful.

While local government officials have the advantage of being closer to their people, new technologies have been giving the central government a more immediate window into residents’ daily lives in recent years. For example, it now has access to more than a billion people’s consumption, recreation and social network information through a few platforms like Taobao and WeChat. This development raises the question of whether decentralization is becoming obsolete — and whether China’s decentralized governance system can endure central leaders’ attempts to consolidate power from the localities.

The answer to this question is multifold. First, decentralization is the natural consequence of scale. The scale of China means that any leaders have to share power with the localities if they want to accomplish goals like growing the economy. Modern Chinese history is not short of examples in which central leaders’ attempts to impose one-size-fits-all policies ended in disaster (e.g. the Great Leap Forward).

Second, the CCP also has a few institutions in place to protect the power of localities. Within the CCP’s Central Committee — the 205-person top decision-making body that holds the statutory power to elect and remove the party’s top leadership — provincial leaders (i.e. party secretaries and governors) have been regularly taking a third of the seats since the beginning of the market reform, dwarfing other voting blocs. Provincial party secretaries and governors also gain the qualification to attend the annual Central Economic Work Conference, which takes place every December and sets the tone for the next year’s economic policies. Also, as an informal rule, the experience of serving as a provincial leader is considered a prerequisite for a politician’s elevation into top party leadership. Among the seven members of the newly elected Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress, only two did not serve as a provincial party secretary before.

Because of these formal and informal institutions, provinces are not just subordinates of the central government. They are instead important and powerful stakeholders of China’s political system. In the early 1990s, when the conservative faction within the party’s leadership tried to reverse the course of market reform, the provinces that had benefited from the reform put up strong opposition and prevented such a reversal.

A more recent example of local influence in central policymaking is the stagnation of reform in the land market. The third plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 pledged to increase farmers’ share of income in rural land transactions. But this would harm the interests of local governments, which earn a large portion of their extra-budgetary revenue by seizing farmland. As a result, progress has been slow so far.

While Western democracies rely on mechanisms external to the present leadership — such as the media, the legal system and opposition parties — to curb the opportunism of incumbent leaders, China relies on a different kind of power decentralization, one that exists along the hierarchies of the government. This system leaves room for innovation and competition on the part of localities, while also allowing the central authority to monitor its subordinates and hold the country together.

As important stakeholders of China’s political system, local governments are not just subordinates who execute the orders of their superiors. Their actions and interests actively shape the policies of the central authority. Looking beyond Beijing, therefore, is crucial for understanding China’s politics and policies.

Enjoy the read? Subscribe to get the best of Noema.

noemamag.com · by Xiao Ma

19. Israeli Weapons Sent to Ukraine Could End Up in Iran

Israeli Weapons Sent to Ukraine Could End Up in Iran

fdd.org · November 10, 2022

Latest Developments

According to a report published on Wednesday, a Russian military aircraft secretly transported a British NLAW anti-tank missile, a U.S. Javelin anti-tank missile, and a Stinger anti-aircraft missile to Tehran on August 20. This news will reinforce opposition in Israel to sending weapons to Ukraine for fear they could end up in the hands of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Expert Analysis

“There are three simple reasons for Israel’s reluctance to send weapons to Ukraine: a desire to avoid tensions with Moscow that could constrain operational freedom in Syria, concerns about weapons leaking to Iran, and insufficient missile defense capacity at home. Those sitting in safety in the United States and western Europe should think twice before lobbing ill-informed criticisms at Israel, which confronts multiple wolves at its door.”

– Bradley Bowman, Senior Director of FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power

Growing Threats in Ukraine, Increasing Pressure in Israel

Confronting an escalating barrage of cruise missile and drone attacks, as well as the prospect of future attacks using Iranian-made Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles, Kyiv asked Israel last month to provide a number of air and missile defense systems, including the Iron Dome system. In a phone call on October 24 with his Ukrainian counterpart, Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz reportedly reiterated Jerusalem’s support for the Ukrainian people and continued readiness to deliver “humanitarian aid and life-saving equipment,” while making clear that “Israel will not provide weapons systems to Ukraine.” Israel has offered to help Kyiv develop an early-warning system to detect imminent missile and drone attacks.

‘Operational Considerations’

In explaining why Israel “will not deliver weapon systems to Ukraine,” Gantz cited “operational considerations.” Foremost among them is the need to maintain a status quo in which Moscow does not oppose Israeli attacks in Syria against Iranian elements transporting weapons to Hezbollah or attempting to create another front for terrorist attacks. A change in that modus vivendi would put Israel on the horns of an unacceptable dilemma: either going toe-to-toe with a superpower or giving Iran and Hezbollah free rein in Syria.

Leakage to Iran and Insufficient Missile Defense Capacity

Israel also worries that advanced weapon systems sent to Ukraine could end up in Iranian hands. While this risk could be mitigated at least partially by placing systems such as Iron Dome far from the frontline, Israelis may point to Russia’s August flight to Tehran carrying Western weapons as evidence that such concerns are not far-fetched. Tehran and its terror proxies would undoubtedly use information about Iron Dome to develop capabilities to circumvent its defenses, reducing the system’s effectiveness and increasing the ability of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad to kill Israelis in future conflicts.

Additionally, Israel lacks sufficient missile defense capacity to deal with an attack from Lebanon-based Hezbollah. The Iranian terrorist proxy wields an estimated 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicles and 150,000 surface-to-surface rockets and missiles, a growing number of which are precision-guided munitions. It is not surprising that a country confronting such a threat is reluctant to send its finite missile defenses elsewhere.

Related Analysis

“What’s Behind Israel’s Reluctance to Share Iron Dome with Ukraine?,” by Bradley Bowman

“Why Israel must not provide the Iron Dome to Ukraine,” by Jacob Nagel

fdd.org · November 10, 2022

20. Presidential Vacuum Persists in Lebanon

Presidential Vacuum Persists in Lebanon

fdd.org · November 10, 2022

Latest Developments

The term of Lebanese President Michel Aoun ended last week, but the country’s parliament has so far failed to elect a successor. The presidential vacuum, which compounds Lebanon’s political and economic problems, persists because Iranian proxy Hezbollah, the dominant political force in Lebanon, has yet to choose a president from among its two main Christian allies: Aoun’s son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, and Suleiman Franjieh, a grandson of Lebanon’s fifth president, also named Suleiman Franjieh. Hezbollah fears that favoring one means losing the support of the other.

Expert Analysis

“Lebanon has four living former presidents and half a dozen former prime ministers, but only one actual ruler: Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. The statelet of Hezbollah now dominates the failing state of Lebanon, replicating the Iranian model where a supreme leader and his militia control the country, rendering popular elections irrelevant.”

– Hussain Abdul-Hussain, FDD Research Fellow

Why the Presidential Vacuum?

Hezbollah is a state-within-a-state that has its own institutions, budget, and army. Its self-sufficiency has partially shielded its partisans from the ongoing Lebanese economic crisis but has not been enough to retain the support of key parliamentary allies, including Shiite Speaker Nabih Berri and a slew of lesser factions, such as the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood and the followers of Druze Chief Talal Arslan.

In this context, because Hezbollah seeks to retain as many allies as possible, it has refrained from voicing a preference regarding Aoun’s successor. Thus, the parliament is now stuck in gridlock, with some members supporting Bassil, others Franjieh; neither has received the two-thirds majority support necessary for a quorum. The two candidates do not hold significantly different policy views and would both support Hezbollah’s agenda.

A Weak Interim Prime Minister

Without a sitting president, the interim prime minister, Najib Mikati, has become the acting chief executive. In an acting capacity, the prime minister and his cabinet cannot stop or mitigate Lebanon’s economic freefall. For example, they cannot implement any of the reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as a prerequisite for receiving economic rescue packages.

U.S. Policy on Lebanon

Over the past decade, U.S. policy on Lebanon has been one of crisis management. America has been bankrolling the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to prevent a complete collapse of law and order. For example, Washington has supplied the LAF navy with boats to preempt a flood of refugees out of the country. The United States has also been funding the World Food Program and other humanitarian programs to ensure that the Lebanese — as well as refugees from Syria and elsewhere who reside in Lebanon — receive the minimum required daily sustenance.

A complete collapse of the Lebanese government not only would spill over across the Mediterranean to Europe, sending it refugees and narcotics, but would also make it harder for Hezbollah to control an impoverished and restive nation. This means that by subsidizing the LAF, which ultimately answers to Hezbollah, America has made it easier for the pro-Iran militia to maintain its iron grip over the country.

Related Analysis

“America’s Regional Integration Scheme Benefits Iran,” by Tony Badran

“Missing the Mark: Reassessing U.S. Military Aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces,” by David Kilcullen

fdd.org · November 10, 2022

21. Iran’s terror drone pipeline to Moscow

Iran’s terror drone pipeline to Moscow

english.alarabiya.net · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · November 10, 2022

On October 17, Kyiv residents woke up to loud explosions. Russia had just launched a wave of drone attacks on civilian targets across Ukraine, which it carried out with Iranian-made Shahed-136 “suicide drones.” The Ukrainian targets had little military value but spread fear among the population and signaled the potential scale of wanton destruction Russia can still inflict on Ukraine despite Moscow’s battlefield losses.

By airlifting deadly weapons to Russia, Iran has become a willing accomplice in the rape of Ukraine. Yet the supply chain enabling these attacks goes further than flights transferring weapons and personnel. It includes logistics on the ground, production, acquisition of foreign technology, and—potentially—assistance by third parties such as Syria and Venezuela. Sanctioning Iran’s supply chain at each step of the way should be a priority for the US and its allies.

Advertisement

For the latest headlines, follow our Google News channel online or via the app.

Iran can send weapons to Russia with relative ease—after a decade of equipping Syrian tyrant Bashar al-Assad with the means to butcher his own people, Tehran has perfected its methods. The supply chain that leads from Iran’s drone factories to Russia’s killing fields in Ukraine is a straightforward cargo airlift that appears to employ the same airlines and aircraft that once flew to Damascus. Iran is also reportedly deploying personnel to Ukrainian occupied territories to help Russian forces operate the drones. Ukrainian official sources recently claimed to have killed 10 Iranian military advisors in Crimea.

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran has run frequent cargo flights to Moscow via Iran Air, Fars Air Qeshm, Puya Air, and Saha Airlines, all linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC. According to aviation watcher, Gerjon, as of October 10, Iran has flown at least 62 cargo flights to Russian airports since the beginning of the invasion.

The active and frequent travel to Moscow by Iranian cargo has not escaped notice.

In September of this year, the Biden administration added four Iranian cargo planes to its US Department of Commerce blacklist of aircraft involved in export control violations. Among those aircraft is a Boeing 747 operated by Qeshm Fars Air, which the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned in 2019 for its role supplying Syria-based Iranian forces and their proxies with military equipment. According to Treasury, Qeshm Fars operated regular cargo flights to Damascus “delivering cargo, including weapons shipments” on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ special operations branch, the Quds Force.

Qeshm Fars’ planes have been flying to Russia since the February invasion of Ukraine. Commercially available flight tracking data from the website FlightRadar24 show that the only operational aircraft currently in Qeshm Fars’ fleet, a Boeing 747 with registration number EP-FAA, flew more than 20 times between Tehran and Moscow since Russia’s invasion began on February 22. That same plane only flew twice to Moscow in the six months preceding the invasion). EP-FAA discontinued its flights in early September, likely due to maintenance issues, but flights continued with Saha Airlines’ only aircraft, another Boeing cargo 747, which since August has visited Moscow six times. Alongside these two aircraft, Iranian cargo forays to Moscow since February 24 include 28 flights operated by Puya Air and 12 by Iran Air. These flights may be carrying different types of military supplies, but the Department of Commerce designations in September make it clear their cargo includes drones.

Iran began to supply Russia with its drones since at least this past summer, according to US officials. Evidence obtained from debris of downed drones shows that, in addition to the Shahed-136, Russia is deploying the Mohajer-6, a drone Iran is said to have supplied to Venezuela as well. Venezuela’s state-owned and US-sanctioned airline, Conviasa, recently acquired long-haul aircraft from US sanctioned Iranian carrier, Mahan Air, through a Dubai intermediary. Mahan sold Venezuela four aircraft in the summer of 2021, including a Boeing 747 cargo, currently operated by Conviasa’s subsidiary Emtrasur.

The Emtrasur plane was seized in Argentina in June, where it is currently grounded, subject to a US seizure warrant. Its flight logs, seized during searches conducted by local authorities, show that Emtrasur flew to Moscow at least once during its short-lived operation between February and June 2022. Conviasa also bought passenger aircraft from Mahan—three Airbus 340s. Two of these planes have also routinely flown to Tehran and then Moscow before returning to Caracas. Passenger manifestos for some Conviasa flights operated by this aircraft, which the author obtained from a Venezuelan opposition source, indicate the planes are flying with hardly any passengers, a potential sign that they could be transporting cargo.

Iranian ability to reverse engineer Western technology, including drones, is well-documented. In at least one publicized US court case, Hezbollah proxies procured technology for Hezbollah’s UAV program from US companies. Thanks to these technological acquisitions, Iran has been able to enhance its arms manufacturing industry, which Iran is establishing beyond its borders to support its imperial ambitions. Just last week, media reports indicated that Israel bombed a Syria-based drone factory manned by IRGC and a Hezbollah unit with suspected links to the IRGC’s Quds Force. Last summer, Iran inaugurated a UAV manufacturing facility in Tajikistan where Ababil-2 drones are said to be produced. During a large drone exercise, also last summer, which Russian, Belarusian, and Armenian forces attended alongside their Iranian counterparts, Iranian state media disclosed an underground drone manufacturing facility inside Iran.

Iran’s drone threat should be no surprise to Middle Eastern audiences. Not only has Iran transferred its drone technology to its regional proxies, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, which were used to attack civilian infrastructure targets inside Gulf countries. It has also repeatedly tested Israel’s mettle by trying to penetrate its airspace with drones from the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. The use of drones for kamikaze attacks, as it happened in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, is eerily reminiscent of their recent use in Ukraine. It reminds us that that spreading terror is integral to Iran’s military doctrine, in brazen disregard of the laws of war.

There is much that countries in the region can do to push back. First, and foremost, they should recognize that Ukraine is facing the same threat confronting Israel and Gulf countries. Hitting back at Iran and Russia is therefore imperative. Aircraft participating in the Russia airlift should be banned by regional powers—the Iran Air 747 that routinely flies to Moscow has been also flying into Doha and Dubai lately, for example.

The US too should expand its blacklist of aircraft and move to expand sanctions against those involved in the airlift, extending its designations to Iranian pilots. Sanctions should mirror US efforts to target manufacturers and logistics companies too. These measures cannot prevent Iranian and Russian aircraft from flying the Moscow-Tehran route. But they can exact a heavy price on Iranian and Russian civil aviation operations elsewhere.

Beyond sanctions, Israel and the Gulf countries should step up their diplomatic, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine. What happens in Ukraine, as both Saudis and Emiratis have learned from recent drone attacks on their own civilian infrastructure, has happened and can happen again in the Middle East.

The use of drones against civilian targets is a war crime. If met with indifference and rewarded with impunity, it will become the standard by which countries like Iran and Russia can bleed their adversaries financially while terrorizing their populations. For the Middle East, whose civilian infrastructure has already been targeted by Iran, this should be a wake-up call to push back before it is too late.

Read more:

Popular Iranian actress Taraneh Alidoosti expresses support for protests

A tale of two Irans

english.alarabiya.net · by Emanuele Ottolenghi · November 10, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com