Note that I am traveling this week (15-21 Oct) and in Hawaii (work, not vacation) so my daily news will be about 6 hours later.
Quotes of the Day:
“The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. If you try it, you will be lonely often and sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself.
- Rudyard Kipling
"I don't know what your destiny will be, but one thing I do know: the only ones among you who will be really happy are those who have sought and found how to serve."
- Albert Schweitzer
"This is the lesson: never give in, never give in, never, never, never, never - in nothing, great or small, large or petty - never give in except to convictions of honor and good sense. Never yield to force; never yield to the apparently overwhelming might of the enemy."
- Winston Churchill
1. “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea’s October 10 Missile Statement
2. Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities
3. S. Korea to conduct annual Hoguk defense exercise next week amid N. Korea threats
4. The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation
5. N Korea tests put Seoul and Tokyo on a narrow bridge
6. Experts call for realistic policy to contain North Korea
7. USS Ronald Reagan may have precipitated N. Korean 'tantrum': Seventh Fleet Commander
8. U.S. calls on N. Korea to cease all provocations and engage in dialogue
9. IMF chief downplays possibility in Korea’s financial crisis
10. Ex-defense minister grilled over 2020 murder at sea
11. North Korea’s Provocations Push Tensions With the South to Highest in Years
12. US Air Force takes flak in new Korean War film
13. North Korea preps for nuclear war
1. “A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea’s October 10 Missile Statement
Analysis worth discussing. The regime is developing and showing off its "advanced" warfighting capabilities. It intends to be able to fight war whether we want to believe it or not.
“A Strong Military Warning:” Four Key Implications of North Korea’s October 10 Missile Statement
https://www.38north.org/2022/10/a-strong-military-warning-four-key-implications-of-north-koreas-october-10-missile-statement/
North Korea on October 10 published the first direct commentary on its ballistic missile activities in over six months,[1] focusing on the period between September 25 and October 9 and including a score of photographs.[2] The statement had four main points:
- Foot-stomping “tactical nukes.” The bulk of the statement makes the case that Pyongyang has an operationally deployed, reliable, and varied delivery capability for “tactical” nuclear weapons—now including the KN-23 and KN-25 short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs). We still do not know the size, yield, or number of the “tactical nukes” being touted, but the North clearly sees substantial propaganda and deterrent value in brandishing them.
- Deterring preemption by threatening a new basing mode. The most unexpected reveal in the statement was that the SRBM launched on September 25 was a KN-23 fired from an “underwater silo” located “under” an inland reservoir. Most likely, the launch came from a submersible barge/platform containing the “silo” that was submerged beneath the waters of the reservoir. It remains to be seen whether such a capability actually is deployed as it makes little sense for SRBMs. While technically it may show more promise for longer-range missiles or as an alternative to submarines, it is more important in the near-term as another demonstration that North Korean missiles can survive against revived South Korean threats of “decapitation” and “preemption.”
- Revealing a “new-type” Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The statement and photos also revealed that the missile launched over Japan on October 4 was a “new-type” IRBM. It currently is unclear whether the missile is a modified version of the previously-tested Hwasong-12 or entirely new, but the launch underscored North Korea’s ability to target Japan and Guam.
- Making a “strong military reaction warning” to the Alliance. The statement puts the recent missile activities squarely in the political and deterrent context of purportedly reacting to a series of recent and ongoing US-ROK combined military drills. The North is making clear that it is not intimidated by, and wants to show it has a credible deterrent against, the alliance’s military moves and capabilities.
Unlike North Korean statements on missile activities earlier in the year, which focused largely on technical issues rather than policy/political ones, the October 10 statement had substantial political and deterrent content and its technical details were intended to convey such messages. As the statement itself notes, North Korea clearly is not interested in negotiations on its nuclear or missile programs anytime soon.
Foot-Stomping “Tactical Nukes”
The bulk of the North Korean statement is devoted to making the case that Pyongyang has an operationally deployed, reliable, and varied delivery capability for “tactical” nuclear weapons. It pointedly described the missile launches from September 25 to October 9 as “military drills” of “units for the operation of tactical nukes…under the simulation of an actual war at different levels.” The North previously had only associated the new, small SRBM first tested in April 2022 with “tactical nukes. The October 10 statement and accompanying images now also so associate the KN-23, the larger KN-23 variant, and KN-25 SRBMs, all of which Western analysts previously assessed were nuclear-capable. (Interestingly, the North did not acknowledge any further launches of the new, small SRBM as part of the drills, or any of the nuclear-capable KN-24 SRBM last known to be tested in January.)
We still do not know if the “tactical nukes” Pyongyang is touting are similar in size and yield to those intended for its longer-range systems, just deployed on shorter-range systems, or if it seeks or possesses much smaller-yield warheads akin to US and Soviet/Russian “tactical nuclear weapons.” (The latter probably would require additional nuclear explosive testing.) Nor do we know how many nuclear weapons are or will be allocated to “units for the operation of tactical nukes.” What is clear is that North Korea’s SRBMs will continue to have important conventional warfighting missions, which will require arsenals of several hundreds of missiles to be effective.
North Korea clearly sees substantial propaganda and deterrent value in brandishing “tactical nukes,” whatever their actual number and capabilities. This is further underscored by the North linking the test of two long-range land-attack cruise missiles on October 12 to “the units of the Korean People’s Army for the operation of tactical nukes.”[3] Such weapons uniquely threaten South Korea. At the same time, Pyongyang probably relishes the common perception that “tactical” nukes imply more technical sophistication. The North probably also hopes that touting a substantial tactical nuclear capability, in concert with its capability to threaten the US homeland with strategic nuclear weapons, will help dissuade US escalation in a crisis or provocation and erode Seoul’s confidence in the credibility of US extended deterrence.
Deterring Preemption by Threatening a New Basing Mode
The most unexpected aspect of the October 10 statement was its revelation that the SRBM launched on September 25 came from an “underwater silo” located “under” an inland reservoir. The accompanying photographs showed a KN-23 SRBM launching out of an inland body of water, akin to the previous launch of this system from the submerged Gorae-class submarine off North Korea’s east coast in October 2021. The new “missile launching drill” was said to have confirmed “the orientation of building a planned silo beneath the reservoir.”
The statement could be interpreted as claiming the North had, or will, dig a missile launch silo into the lakebed of the reservoir. Much more likely, however, is that the September 25 launch came from a submersible barge/platform containing one or more missile launch tubes (the “silos” referred to in the statement) that was emplaced on the surface of the reservoir, submerged beneath the waters of the reservoir (rather than beneath the reservoir itself), conducted the launch, and then surfaced for reuse or removal. North Korea and other countries use such barges as part of their submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test programs to develop the ejection and launching of SLBMs to the point where testing from an actual submarine is deemed safe.
It remains to be seen whether North Korea continues to develop and deploy a submerged inland-water launch capability. It has long deployed SRBMs much more cost-effectively, with high survivability, on road-mobile launchers. As with the earlier effort to deploy the KN-23 from a rail-mobile launcher, the submerged inland-water launch capability may have more promise for IRBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that are larger and harder to move around on land-mobile launchers. Even rail-mobility would be more cost-effective for such systems while still being survivable. A submerged inland-water launch capability would, however, be more cost effective than building ballistic missile submarines—which the North has seemingly been working on for a few years now without producing any—much less lake-bed silos, and immune from anti-submarine warfare attacks. It would, however, still potentially be vulnerable to detection and attack when surfaced or by spotting any associated land-based infrastructure/activity.
In the near term, the revelation of this new SRBM launch mode is more important politically and in deterrence terms than technically or operationally as it reflects how the North Koreans are trying to demonstrate that their missiles are survivable and signal to the South Koreans that strategies to “decapitate” or “preempt” North Korean forces in a crisis or conflict are doomed to fail. It reinforced messaging in the North’s new law “on the state policy on the nuclear forces” announced on September 8 that contained repeated references to the will to use nuclear weapons if an attack “on the state leadership and the command organization of the state’s nuclear forces was launched or drew near.”[4] The October 10 statement likewise emphasized “that our nuclear combat forces holding an important mission of war deterrent maintain high alert of rapid and correct operation reaction capabilities and nuclear response posture in unexpected situation at any time.”
Revealing a “New-Type” IRBM
The North Korean statement also revealed that the missile launched over Japan on October 4 to a range of about 4,600 km was a “new-type” IRBM. The associated photographs showed a missile with: 1) a different engine configuration and thrust-vector control (steering) system than the previously-tested Hwasong-12 IRBM, 2) a differently-shaped and possibly shorter nosecone or reentry vehicle, and 3) possibly a slightly longer second stage.
That said, it currently is unclear whether the missile or its propulsion system are a modification of the Hwasong-12 or entirely new. Although the new-type missile flew farther than the previously longest-range Hwasong-12 flight of 3,700 km (already sufficient to hit US bases in Guam), the Hwasong-12 was assessed to be capable of 4,500 km, which does not add much in the way of new targets.
In addition to proving out a new or modified missile type, the launch served to underscore North Korea’s ability to target Guam—significant both as US territory and as a key hub for projecting US military power against the Peninsula, especially during a conventional conflict. Overflying Japan also was significant as an act of political defiance and as emphasizing the ability to strike Japanese and US forces there as well. Interestingly, the October 10 statement also included the IRBM launch as one of the “seven times of launching drills of the tactical nuclear operation units” conducted from September 25 to October 9. It is unclear whether the North Koreans regard IRBMs as “tactical” or if they inadvertently swept the new-type missile up into their ballyhooing of “tactical nukes.”
Making a “Strong Military Reaction Warning” to the Alliance
The October 10 statement puts “tactical nukes” and all of the recent missile activities squarely in the political and deterrent context of purportedly reacting to the “ongoing dangerous military drills” of the US and South Korea and their “steady, intentional and irresponsible acts of escalating the tension.” Pyongyang’s steps are “an obvious warning and clear demonstration of informing the enemies of our nuclear response posture and nuclear attack capabilities.” The North is making clear that it is not intimidated by, and wants to show it has a credible deterrent against, US-ROK alliance military moves and capabilities. Although statements from US and ROK officials and Western press coverage have portrayed the North’s recent flurry of activities as intending to “raise the stakes in future negotiations,” the October 10 statement reiterated the notion that Pyongyang has no inclination to do so.
- [1]
-
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes,” Rodong Sinmun, October 10, 2022. http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2022-10-10-0004
- [2]
- Photo, Rodong Sinmun, October 10, 2022. http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_02&newsID=2022-10-10-0004_photo
- [3]
-
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of Long-Range Strategic Cruise Missiles,” Rodong Sinmun, October 13, 2022. http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2022-10-13-0001
- [4]
-
“Law on DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA, September 9, 2022. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/5f0e629e6d35b7e3154b4226597df4b8.kcmsf
2. Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities
No one plays the blame and threat game better than. north Korea.
Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities
A day after it announced testing of a long-range strategic cruise missile, North Korea fired about 560 artillery shots and a short-range ballistic missile.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · October 14, 2022
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North Korea fired about 560 artillery shots and a short-range ballistic missile on Friday, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The artillery shots were launched from both North Korea’s east and west coasts and fell into the buffer zone along the two Korea’s maritime border. The artillery firings took place in two waves, with 170 rounds fired in the middle of the night and another 390 in the late afternoon.
In its public statement, the JCS called the North’s artillery shots “a clear violation of the military agreement” that was signed during the inter-Korean summit between then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang in 2018. Urging the North to halt its missile launches immediately, the JCS also gravely warned that the North’s consistent provocations are escalating military tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
Based on the military agreement signed in 2018, the two Koreas cannot use force against each other in any case. They also agreed to not take any provocative measures to invade or attack each other’s territories.
According to the South’s military, the artillery shots were at least the fourth violation by North Korea since the agreement was reached. The last incident that was explicitly cited as a violation was when North Korea fired shots against the South’s observation post in the demilitarized zone in Gangwon province in 2020.
The head of the ruling People Power Party said that Seoul should abrogate the military agreement is North Korea conducts a nuclear test, widely expected in the coming weeks. South Korea’s Presidential Office said that the future of the agreement depends on North Korea’s attitude.
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Hours before North Korea fired its first round of artillery shots, 10 North Korean warplanes staged menacing flights nearby the inter-Korean border, triggering South Korea to deploy F-35A fighter jets. North Korea has dispatched warplanes to the area in the past few days as part of its ongoing responses to the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises.
In addition, North Korea launched one short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) toward the waters off its east coast, the JCS said. The missile flew about 700 km with an altitude of 50 km from the Sunan area of Pyongyang, the capital of the North, and was launched about at 1:49 a.m. KST.
About 30 minutes after the North launched the SRBM, its state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a statement from a spokesperson for the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
“According to a report on enemy movements in the front, the South Korean army conducted an artillery fire for about 10 hours near the forward defense area of the KPA Fifth Corps on Oct. 13,” the spokesperson said in his statement.
The spokesperson also that the North’s military “took strong military countermeasures” after “taking a serious note of this provocation action by the South Korean military in the front area.”
“The KPA sends a stern warning to the South Korean military inciting military tensions in the frontline area with reckless action,” the spokesperson said.
As North Korea marked its 13th ballistic missile launch since South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May, Yoon recalled the military agreement and emphasized the necessity to check its effectiveness and imperativeness.
Calling the menacing flights of the North’s warplanes and its ballistic missile launches “violations” of the military agreement and the U.N. Security Council resolutions, Yoon asked his people to have “a firm hostile view” on North Korea. He also mentioned the country’s three-axis defense system as an effective defense means. The three-axis defense system consists of three key strategies: the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), and an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership.
With its military’s “tit-for-tat” response to the North’s missile threats, Seoul announced a plan to impose new sanctions on 15 North Korean individuals and 16 institutions that supported the North’s nuclear and missile development as well as Pyongyang’s efforts to evade existing sanctions. It is the first of new South Korean sanctions on North Korean individuals and institutions since December 2017, when the North tested its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and conducted its sixth nuclear test.
The annual Hoguk exercise of the South Korean military will run from October 17 to October 28, the South’s JCS said. The exercise, which will see partial participation of the U.S. military, will focus on improving the peacetime and wartime responses to the various threats of North Korea, the JCS added.
Considering the North’s ballistic missile launches in response to the South Korea-U.S. military exercises from late last month, it is likely we will see the North respond similarly to the Hoguk drills in the coming weeks. In particular, North Korea is widely expected to conduct a seventh nuclear test sometime this fall.
CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR
Mitch Shin
Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · October 14, 2022
3. S. Korea to conduct annual Hoguk defense exercise next week amid N. Korea threats
Never back down and never cancel exercises.
S. Korea to conduct annual Hoguk defense exercise next week amid N. Korea threats
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · October 14, 2022
By Yonhap
Published : Oct 14, 2022 - 10:44 Updated : Oct 14, 2022 - 10:44
(Eighth United States Army)
South Korea will kick off a major military exercise next week to hone defense capabilities to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, Seoul officials said Friday.
The annual Hoguk exercise, set for Monday to Oct. 28, has been arranged amid heightened tensions caused by North Korea's provocations, including its firing of a short-range ballistic missile and some 170 artillery shots early Friday.
This year's edition will focus on improving capabilities to carry out peacetime and wartime missions by simulating various threats from the North, including those from its nuclear arms and missiles, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It involves troops from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Some US troops will also partake as part of efforts to enhance interoperability between the allies, the JCS said. (Yonhap)
4. The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation
We cannot afford to neglect cyber and north Korea's all-purpose sword.
Excerpts;
First, the U.S. and South Korea governments should create a working group to combat North Korea’s cyber-enabled crimes – a group that allows for coordinated action and joint research. The coordinated action must leverage the United States’ economic influence and power of sanctions and South Korea’s monitoring and understanding of cryptocurrency crimes. South Korea has had strict regulatory framework since cryptocurrency trading increased in 2017, which allows for a better monitoring system: South Korea does not allow anonymous cryptocurrency accounts and increased reporting requirements for banks dealing with cryptocurrency.
In 2019, the U.S. and South Korea coordinated to takedown a South Korea-based child abuse site that used bitcoin transactions by using the power of a U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation combined with a criminal investigation by the Korean National Policy Agency. While the cooperation was not against a North Korean cyberattack, it was a successful example of leveraging the two nations’ advantages and coordinating various agencies’ efforts to takedown cryptocurrency-related illicit activity.
This working group should also incorporate specific joint research and investigations of cryptocurrency-related crimes and NFTs to better understand how to defend against such cybercrimes before they occur, especially as North Korea is increasingly using both technologies.
Second, as the majority of North Korea’s espionage efforts have targeted companies and research institutions, the two nations’ private entities should engage, share information, and develop better defense mechanisms. For example, in 2021, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power – a South Korean nuclear operator and target of a North Korean cyberattack in 2014 – signed an agreement with the U.S. Utilities Service Alliance to develop innovative solutions that enhance nuclear power plant safety and performance, and formally collaborate on safety practices including developing defenses against cyberattacks.
The public sector can promote such information sharing by adopting the structure of U.S. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) into a bilateral organization. ISAOs are government-backed organizations that encourage cybersecurity intelligence sharing and research between the public and private sectors. In 2015, U.S. Executive Order 13691 supported the creation of domestic ISAOs for U.S. national security. The U.S. government should create a bilateral ISAO with South Korea government and private sector partners to allow for increased bilateral information sharing about North Korea’s cyberattacks as they are an increasing threat to the United States.
The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation
North Korea’s reliance on cyberattacks is growing, but the South Korea-U.S. alliance has yet to catch up.
thediplomat.com · by Seungmin "Helen" Lee · October 14, 2022
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Despite the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic disruptions and U.N. sanctions, North Korea has found new, and illegal, ways to support the regime: cyberattacks garnering nearly $400 million in cryptocurrency last year and nearly $1 billion in 2022 thus far. While the United States has evidently made attempts to prevent these cyberattacks – such as sanctioning virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash for supporting North Korean hackers – additional measures are needed to better prevent future cyberattacks, including increased cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea.
North Korea Cyber Trends
North Korea’s cyberattacks generally fall within three common types. First, espionage, disruptive attacks, and destructive attacks, such as the 2013 Operation Dark Seoul and the parallel espionage operation in which North Korea paralyzed South Korean broadcasting stations, banks, government websites and stole information. Second, cyberterrorism and revenge attacks, such as the 2014 Sony Hack in which North Korean hackers threatened Sony and its employees with terrorist attacks on movie theaters if Sony released “The Interview,” a satire about assassinating Kim Jong Un. Third, cyber bank and cryptocurrency exchange robberies – such as the 2016 Bangladesh Bank Heist and the 2017 FASTCash Campaign – that maintain North Korea’s economy in the face of international sanctions.
In recent years, North Korea state-backed hacking group Kimsuky has targeted financial institutions, stealing more than $50 million between 2020 and mid-2021 from three currency exchanges. In March 2022, North Korea hackers stole more than $615 million in ether and USD coin from the Ronin Network by forging withdrawals.
North Korea also appears to have increased its cyber espionage efforts since late 2020. In 2021, Kimsuky is believed to have hacked into South Korea’s nuclear research center, the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, stealing information on nuclear power plants. In February 2021, North Korea tried to steal information regarding COVID-19 vaccines and treatments from Pfizer.
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North Korea has increased phishing and social engineering attacks for espionage purposes as well. In Operation Dream Job, a North Korean hacking group – the Lazarus Group – created fake LinkedIn profiles to reach out to employees at targeted companies, sent “dream job” offers with hidden malware, maintained conversation with the targets, and collected intelligence regarding the companies’ activities and finances. The attacks first seemed to target government employees. Then, the Lazarus Group targeted companies that work closely with the government such as Israeli defense manufacturers and Boeing. By April 2022, the Lazarus Group was sending fake job offers with Trojan horse programs to the chemical sector and information technology firms as well.
South Korea Cyber Cooperation
As North Korea is increasingly using sophisticated cyberattacks and targeting the United States, it is important for the U.S. and South Korea – North Korea’s usual target – to cooperate against these attacks and to implement the already existing high-level commitments to mutual defense.
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One of the reasons that deeper South Korea-U.S. cyber cooperation doesn’t yet exist is because Seoul’s first venture into cybersecurity cooperation with the international community was recent: its 2019 National Cybersecurity Strategy and National Cybersecurity Basic Plan. One of the strategy’s six pillars is international cooperation, and the Basic Plan’s 100 tasks include international collaboration and norm setting.
Since then, there does seem to be growing commitment to enhance bilateral cooperation on countering North Korea’s cyber activities. The 2020 Joint Communique of the 52nd South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting committed to close communication and coordination in the cyber domain, highlighted the need for cyber command exchanges, and increased science and technology cooperation in cyber defense. In May 2021, the United States and South Korea pledged to further expand cyber cooperation by establishing a cyber working group that will increase law enforcement and homeland security agencies’ cooperation on cybercrime and ransomware attacks and by creating a public-private Domestic Violence and Cyber Exploitation Working Group. The 2022 South Korea-U.S. Joint Statement included broadening cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, deepening regional and international cyber policy, and confronting North Korean cyber threats.
However, despite the continued dialogue, there has been little impact on the implementation level. Efforts so far failed to outline specific efforts against North Korea’s use of cryptocurrency and other financial technology; did not leverage the two countries’ advantages such as the United States’ economic power and South Korea’s knowledge of cryptocurrency risks and North Korea; and failed to see the opportunities in structural differences between the two governments.
Recommendations
Given the flaws of South Korea-U.S. cyber cooperation and North Korea’s recent focus on cybercrime and espionage, the two nations can take the following steps to further their collaborative efforts against Pyongyang’s cyberattacks.
First, the U.S. and South Korea governments should create a working group to combat North Korea’s cyber-enabled crimes – a group that allows for coordinated action and joint research. The coordinated action must leverage the United States’ economic influence and power of sanctions and South Korea’s monitoring and understanding of cryptocurrency crimes. South Korea has had strict regulatory framework since cryptocurrency trading increased in 2017, which allows for a better monitoring system: South Korea does not allow anonymous cryptocurrency accounts and increased reporting requirements for banks dealing with cryptocurrency.
In 2019, the U.S. and South Korea coordinated to takedown a South Korea-based child abuse site that used bitcoin transactions by using the power of a U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation combined with a criminal investigation by the Korean National Policy Agency. While the cooperation was not against a North Korean cyberattack, it was a successful example of leveraging the two nations’ advantages and coordinating various agencies’ efforts to takedown cryptocurrency-related illicit activity.
This working group should also incorporate specific joint research and investigations of cryptocurrency-related crimes and NFTs to better understand how to defend against such cybercrimes before they occur, especially as North Korea is increasingly using both technologies.
Second, as the majority of North Korea’s espionage efforts have targeted companies and research institutions, the two nations’ private entities should engage, share information, and develop better defense mechanisms. For example, in 2021, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power – a South Korean nuclear operator and target of a North Korean cyberattack in 2014 – signed an agreement with the U.S. Utilities Service Alliance to develop innovative solutions that enhance nuclear power plant safety and performance, and formally collaborate on safety practices including developing defenses against cyberattacks.
The public sector can promote such information sharing by adopting the structure of U.S. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) into a bilateral organization. ISAOs are government-backed organizations that encourage cybersecurity intelligence sharing and research between the public and private sectors. In 2015, U.S. Executive Order 13691 supported the creation of domestic ISAOs for U.S. national security. The U.S. government should create a bilateral ISAO with South Korea government and private sector partners to allow for increased bilateral information sharing about North Korea’s cyberattacks as they are an increasing threat to the United States.
Seungmin "Helen" Lee
Seungmin "Helen" Lee is a research intern with Stimson Center's 38 North Program. A graduate of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, Helen also conducts research with the North Korea Cyber Working Group, an initiative of the Belfer Center's Korea Project.
thediplomat.com · by Seungmin "Helen" Lee · October 14, 2022
5. N Korea tests put Seoul and Tokyo on a narrow bridge
Excerpts;
Domestic politics, not the absence of a viable compromise proposal, is the real obstacle on this narrow pathway to restoring normal ties between Japan and Korea.
“Going forward, Yoon and Kishida are likely to move slowly to avoid getting out too far ahead of the respective publics,” says Revere, who has long experience as an American diplomat in both countries. But the window of opportunity may not be open long – the Japanese and Korean officials now holding talks are looking to make a deal by the end of the year.
In that timeframe, Revere says, “North Korea can be counted on to remind Seoul and Tokyo that they have a strong common interest in working together.”
N Korea tests put Seoul and Tokyo on a narrow bridge
Yet Pyongyang’s provocations are driving Japan and South Korea together, witnessed in recent naval drills and improving opinion polls
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · October 14, 2022
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, perhaps emboldened by his embrace of Russia’s war in Ukraine, has unleashed a wave of missile tests with a possible nuclear test to come. The Pyongyang regime claims to be developing tactical nuclear weapons and to be responding to recent joint military exercises by the US, South Korea and Japan.
Ironically, the most immediate impact of North Korea’s relentless pace of missile testing, highlighted by the flight of an intermediate-range missile over Japan on October 4, has been to draw Japan and South Korea closer and to give life to entreaties by the US to its two allies to join in closer trilateral security cooperation. The most significant sign of this shift was visible two days later in the waters between Korea and Japan.
In those seas, two American guided-missile ships were joined by two Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers and the Korean navy’s most advanced destroyer in carrying out a first-ever trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise. During the same week, the three countries carried out joint air exercises as well.
This was a highly symbolic move toward, as the US Indo-Pacific Command put it, “the interoperability of our collective forces.” The exercise involved the detection, tracking and interception of potential incoming missiles, with almost instantaneous sharing of information among the three navies.
This kind of quiet cooperation on missile defense has been going on for several years, with Korea providing tracking data on North Korean launches to the de facto joint US-Japan Air Defense Command set up at Yokota airbase outside Tokyo.
“North Korea’s unprecedented series of ballistic missile tests, its newly legislated nuclear doctrine and threats to carry out preemptive nuclear attacks and the prospect of a seventh nuclear test (and more to come) have served as a powerful reminder to Tokyo and Seoul of the common danger they face,” observes former senior US State Department official Evans Revere.
North Korean weapons of mass destruction on parade. Photo: RAND Corp
“That danger has encouraged the ROK [Republic of Korea] and Japan to work together, and with the United States, to confront their shared threat by strengthening defenses, increasing readiness, and enhancing bilateral and trilateral security cooperation.”
The creation of a more formal trilateral missile defense structure is the logical next step, though it faces considerable political hurdles in both Korea and Japan. This possibility has alarmed not only the North Koreans but also the progressive opposition in South Korea.
The leader of Korea’s Democratic Party, Lee Jae-myung, made headlines by denouncing the trilateral drill as a “pro-Japanese act” that was heading toward the creation of a military alliance.
“We cannot imagine the day when the Japanese military invades the Korean Peninsula and the Rising Sun Flag again hangs over the peninsula, but it could come true,” railed Lee, who narrowly lost the presidential election earlier this year to conservative Yoon Suk-yeol.
The ruling People Power Party (PPP) quickly denounced Lee’s inflammatory remarks as “a frivolous take on history.” But President Yoon is struggling with sagging popularity ratings that make him vulnerable to the Democratic Party, which continues to control the National Assembly and is sharply critical of the President.
“The Korean public is generally supportive of improved relations with the US, cautious regarding China, generally supportive about Japan,” says Scott Snyder, who heads the Korea program at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Overall Yoon is doing what South Koreans want to see in foreign policy – but increasingly he is in danger of not getting credit for it and is in danger because of his own unpopularity.”
Despite those problems, Yoon’s efforts to make a breakthrough with Tokyo have broad backing in Korea. In their recently published annual poll of Japanese and South Korean opinion, Japan’s Genron NPO and the Korean East Asian Institute found a significant shift in positive views toward each other.
It was the largest improvement since the survey began a decade ago, with the most marked change in South Korea. In particular, the Genron-EAI poll showed a growing fear of China in Korea, beginning to echo what has been the case in Japan
Solving the forced labor problem
Trilateral security cooperation, even with the North Korean threat to propel it, still depends on solving the wartime historical issues that arose out of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea. Japanese and Korean officials, and their American counterparts, emphasize the need to look forward – but all also understand that the history problems are a sword of Damocles, always threatening to send Korea-Japan relations back into a deep freeze.
Attempts to resolve the issue of compensation for the Koreans forced to work in Japanese mines and factories during the wartime period remain stalled, with a looming threat by Korean courts to seize the assets of Japanese companies that used that labor.
Publicly, Japanese officials continue to insist that they are waiting for Korea to make a concrete proposal to resolve the forced labor problem. According to multiple Korean official and other sources engaged in this issue, however, a proposal is on the table and is being actively discussed at the director-general level of the two foreign ministries, most recently on Tuesday in Seoul.
Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, who have a longstanding and friendly personal relationship, have held detailed talks, most recently in New York at the United Nations.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo in July. Photo: Pool / JIJI
The Korean proposal emerged out of the advisory group that was formed in the summer under the leadership of Korean Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong. The Korean idea is to compensate up to 300 South Korean victims with payments made through an existing fund – the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan – set up by the Korean government in 2014.
The fund already has a significant contribution from the Korean steelmaker POSCO, which benefited from Japanese economic assistance provided under the 1965 Japan-Korea Claims Agreement that accompanied the normalization of relations between the two countries.
Using this fund indirectly acknowledges Japan’s insistence that compensation was settled by that 1965 agreement. The amount of money already in the fund is more than sufficient. But the victims who filed suit in Korean courts, and their legal representatives who participated in the advisory committee meetings, insist that the Japanese companies also contribute to this fund.
Park proposed two steps to be taken by Japan, according to a senior Korean official who has been working on this issue for many years. “One is that the Japanese government and the related companies have to express regrets,” he told this writer. “The other is that the Japanese government should allow the private sector to contribute voluntarily to the compensation fund.”
At this moment, the Japanese officials involved in the talks have not ruled out this solution. “The Japanese side does not show a negative attitude toward the voluntary contribution of Japanese firms,” says Ambassador Wi Sung-lac, a former senior foreign ministry official and a foreign policy advisor to Democratic party leader Lee. To that degree, “bilateral consultation is moving forward,” says Wi, who is actively involved in these efforts.
Korean officials are concerned about the lack of apparent readiness on the part of Prime Minister Kishida and his advisors to grasp this moment. For the Korean government to be able to sell this proposal within Korea, where it will undoubtedly face fierce attack by the progressives, it is essential that Japan take a step forward.
“Money itself is not a problem,” says the senior Korean official. “Rather it is a matter of pride and emotion. But the Japanese government seems to be very reluctant to agree on a deal to resolve the issue.” The Japanese have yet to budge from their standing position that this issue was settled by the 1965 agreement and are reluctant to reopen it in any way.
The largest obstacle to this agreement remains the domestic politics of both countries. “The political weakness of Yoon and Kishida is a factor that influences the process,” says Professor Park Cheol-hee, one of the most influential Korean scholars on Japan and a close advisor to the Yoon government.
The opposition Democrats in Korea are poised to oppose this bargain. Wi has proposed the creation of a bipartisan group that might include Democratic party leaders who back the deal and has been publicly urging Yoon to take this approach.
But it is equally crucial for Prime Minister Kishida to be prepared to offer the kind of gestures that might make it possible to garner broad public support in Korea. Japan needs to go beyond its overly legalistic stance, argues US Korea expert Snyder. “The Koreans need some kind of reciprocating gesture from the Japanese side in order to make it sustainable.”
Unfortunately, Kishida remains imprisoned by the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party, which deeply distrusts the Koreans. And that is compounded by his own political weakness, which increasingly mirrors that of Yoon.
South Korean protesters hold a sign during a weekly anti-Japanese demonstration supporting comfort women who served as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during World War II, near the Japanese embassy in Seoul on July 24, 2019. Photo: AFP / Jung Yeon-je
Domestic politics, not the absence of a viable compromise proposal, is the real obstacle on this narrow pathway to restoring normal ties between Japan and Korea.
“Going forward, Yoon and Kishida are likely to move slowly to avoid getting out too far ahead of the respective publics,” says Revere, who has long experience as an American diplomat in both countries. But the window of opportunity may not be open long – the Japanese and Korean officials now holding talks are looking to make a deal by the end of the year.
In that timeframe, Revere says, “North Korea can be counted on to remind Seoul and Tokyo that they have a strong common interest in working together.”
Daniel Sneider is a lecturer on international policy at Stanford University and a former Christian Science Monitor foreign correspondent.
This article originally appeared in The Oriental Economist and is republished with kind permission. Follow Daniel Sneider on Twitter at @DCSneider
asiatimes.com · by Daniel Sneider · October 14, 2022
6. Experts call for realistic policy to contain North Korea
I do not see a single realistic policy in this article.
Arms control = victory for Kim.
"B61 gravity bombs" in Korea - but we never confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons? How will something like deter? And what will happen at Osan and Kunsan when the anti-nuclear protesters learn we have such weapons there?
How has the carrot and stick approach worked in the past?
Why don't we don't we focus on a solution that will achieve the goals such as solving the "Korea question."
Experts call for realistic policy to contain North Korea
The Korea Times · October 14, 2022
gettyimagesbank
Amid few available options, some experts favor arms control deal while others remain skeptical
By Kang Seung-woo
With North Korea's recent show of force unequivocally showing that its nuclear and missile technologies have become a growing threat, an increasing number of experts say it's time to think about a more realistic, attainable goal than denuclearization to deal with the North.
In that respect, an arms control agreement is emerging as a likely option to deter the escalating nuclear threat from North Korea, according to some diplomatic observers, while others disagree because doing so would recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.
When Joe Biden was elected the president of the U.S. in 2020, there were concerns that he would follow in the footsteps of the Barack Obama administration's policy toward North Korea, also known as "strategic patience," given that Biden was Obama's vice president. The strategic patience policy, which meant no engagement with North Korea as long as its leadership persisted with nuclear development and ballistic missile testing, is now taking flak because it actually failed to address the reclusive state's ever-growing nuclear and missile programs.
According to the South Korean and U.S. intelligence authorities, North Korea is fully prepared to conduct a seventh nuclear test.
"Biden's North Korea policy reflects a learning curve from 30 years of failed diplomacy. Although the U.S. and allies repeat the ritual calls for denuclearization, they all realize Kim Jong-un will not give up his nuclear weapons," said Robert Manning, a distinguished senior fellow of the Stimson Center, adding that there is little expectation that Pyongyang will engage.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a professor of international relations at King's College London, said the U.S. has failed in its handling of North Korea's nuclear program dating back to the (Bill) Clinton administration.
"When the Agreed Framework was not implemented after being signed (in 1994), I think that it's too late for the Biden administration to do anything about North Korea's nuclear program," Pacheco Pardo said.
The Agreed Framework was aimed at freezing and replacing North Korea's nuclear power plant program with more nuclear proliferation resistant light water reactor power plants, along with the step-by-step normalization of relations between the U.S. and North Korea.
"So it makes sense to consider shifting policy to arms control, which in my view should have already happened in 2006 when North Korea tested a nuclear device. Back then, North Korea had no real incentive to give up its nuclear program. That is also the case today. So I think that the U.S. and the international community at-large have wasted many years pursuing a goal that was not attainable," Pacheco Pardo added.
Bruce Bennett, a senior international defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, also presented a similar view, saying that the Biden administration has not denuclearized North Korea or even obtained a full or partial nuclear weapon production freeze.
"The Biden administration has allowed the most serious North Korean ballistic missile testing program ever, which while not directly nuclear, is nuclear weapon-related, and done little to deter those tests. And they have not effectively responded against North Korea's increasingly harsh threats of nuclear weapon use and its new nuclear doctrine just announced," Bennett added.
Mentioning the U.S. government's current focus on China and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Bennett said its lack of focus on the North Korea issue may negatively affect the alliance between South Korea and the U.S.
"Unless they assume a proactive approach toward North Korea, giving them more time will not moderate the North Korean nuclear weapon threat and its growth, nor will it stop Kim's effective efforts at undermining U.S. extended deterrence or the U.S.-South Korea alliance," he said.
"The alliance is strong right now, but cracks and fissures are developing."
Pacheco Pardo said it made sense to consider shifting the policy to arms control, which should have already happened in 2006, when North Korea tested a nuclear device.
"Back then, North Korea had no real incentive to give up its nuclear program. That is also the case today. So I think that the U.S. and the international community at-large have wasted many years pursuing a goal that was not attainable," he added.
An arms control deal means curbing North Korea's nuclear development and avoiding the use of its existing weapons, but there are lingering concerns that should the U.S. reach such a deal with the North, it would formally recognize the Stalinist state as a nuclear power ― a status the country has aggressively sought.
Manning said that the arms control deal is highly unlikely, based on history.
"Kim's goal is to be accepted as a de facto nuclear state like Israel or Pakistan. I suspect at some point the North may be interested in an arms control deal, a cap and freeze of their nuclear and missile program ― now that they are close to completing it," Manning said, questioning if the relevant countries are ready to legitimize North Korea as a nuclear state despite all the implications for the NPT and the possibility of a chain of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.
"While it is worth exploring, a credible deal is highly unlikely. Why? The trail of failed deals helps explain why. The 2005 Agreed Statement and the 1994 nuclear deal fell apart amid issues of transparency. The North has refused to give a full statement of what and where their nuclear weapons are. If we don't know how many there are, how can we be sure the program is frozen? Secondly, Pyongyang has refused to accept IAEA full verification and monitoring ―- including challenge inspections. If we can't be sure of verification, how can we know there is a cap and freeze?" he said.
To this end, Manning said he thinks there should be preconditions.
"Any arms control talks need a full declaration of their nuclear inventory and a commitment to allow the IAEA adequate verification and monitoring," he said.
"If Pyongyang agreed to that, then nuclear talks would have a chance of being credible."
Bennett also said that one of the worst mistakes the U.S. could make now would be to reward Kim's misbehavior by recognizing North Korea as a nuclear power.
However, he said there was a chance that progress can still be made with North Korea by taking an incremental approach to the North Korean nuclear weapon threat, while dropping the use of the strategic ambiguity approach in U.S. deterrent steps.
"The U.S. should threaten North Korea with specific penalties that will be imposed should North Korea continue its missile tests or restart its nuclear tests. These penalties must affect Kim Jong-un personally ― he is the decision maker, and really doesn't care, for example, about sanctions applied to the personnel he uses to support his nuclear weapon development," Bennett said.
"The U.S. needs to have a strategy of escalating penalties to respond appropriately, depending upon how serious any given North Korean provocation is. Moreover, those escalating penalties would threaten Kim with a more serious price to pay if he escalates after early U.S. penalties."
According to him, for example, if the Kim regime continues nuclear weapons production, the U.S. could threaten North Korea with a plan to return some of its tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, which were removed from South Korea in 1991.
Bennett added that the weapons the U.S. could return would be the new B61-12 gravity bombs specifically designed to destroy deep underground facilities where Kim might hide in a conflict. He said that the only tactical nuclear weapons the U.S. has are B61 gravity bombs.
"(The goal would be…) providing Kim with specific carrot and stick packages to incrementally address the North Korean threats," Bennett said.
The Korea Times · October 14, 2022
7. USS Ronald Reagan may have precipitated N. Korean 'tantrum': Seventh Fleet Commander
I disagree with the Admiral. If we had not conducted in the East Sea Kim would still be conducting provocations. The Propaganda and Agitation Department would have found some other reason to blame their actions on. We must never make excuse for Kim actions or appear to be confirming his propaganda.
Excerpts:
"I think that what you saw was after many years of not operating in the Sea of Japan and visiting South Korea for a couple of reasons ... us being in that area, I think, probably precipitated a little bit of his tantrum," Thomas said, apparently referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the recent North Korean provocations.
USS Ronald Reagan may have precipitated N. Korean 'tantrum': Seventh Fleet Commander | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 15, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- The recent naval exercise of South Korea and the United States involving a U.S. aircraft carrier might have somewhat caused North Korea's recent provocations, the commander of U.S. Seventh Fleet said Friday.
Vice Adm. Karl Thomas also said the North's recent missile launches certainly are a concern, but not one that he will prioritize over other bigger issues in the Indo-Pacific region.
"They are on a little campaign right now of launching ballistic missiles and short range ones, and it certainly has all of our attention, U.S. Forces Korea's as well as mine, and actually it's a concern," the commander said in a seminar hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.
North Korea began staging its recent series of ballistic missile launches on Sept. 25 (Seoul time), two days after USS Ronald Reagan arrived in South Korea for a joint naval exercise and one day before the four-day joint naval exercise began.
Pyongyang has since staged seven additional missile tests.
"I think that what you saw was after many years of not operating in the Sea of Japan and visiting South Korea for a couple of reasons ... us being in that area, I think, probably precipitated a little bit of his tantrum," Thomas said, apparently referring to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and the recent North Korean provocations.
North Korea has claimed that the joint military drills between Seoul and Washington had prompted its own military exercises that it said lasted from Sept. 25 to Oct. 9, blaming the allies for its recent missile tests.
Both Seoul and Washington have rejected the North's argument, saying their joint exercises are strictly defensive in nature.
"We reject the notion that our defensive actions to respond to the DPRK threats justifies their escalatory and unlawful behavior," a state department spokesperson told Yonhap News Agency earlier, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Vice Adm. Thomas said the Seventh Fleet has enough resources to address the concern caused by North Korea, but that he may have other more important priorities.
"As far as taking away resources, we always have resources available for us," he said when asked if the North's recent provocations had required additional attention and resources.
"It's a concern but not one that I'm going to prioritize over my bigger concern there," he added.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 15, 2022
8. U.S. calls on N. Korea to cease all provocations and engage in dialogue
I would hate to be a spokesman and have to deliver this same message over and over again.
U.S. calls on N. Korea to cease all provocations and engage in dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 15, 2022
By Byun Duk-kun
WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 (Yonhap) -- A state department spokesperson called on North Korea to cease all provocative actions on Friday, hours after the recalcitrant country fired hundreds of artillery shells into an agreed buffer zone with South Korea.
Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesperson for the department, also urged Pyongyang to engage in dialogue.
"We are aware of those reports and we call on the DPRK to cease all these provocations and these threatening actions," the spokesperson said when asked about North Korea's latest provocation that also included flights by military aircraft near the inter-Korean border.
"We also again condemn the DPRK's recent ballistic missile launches and other provocative action. As I've said previously, these launches are in violation of a number of U.N. Security Council resolutions," Patel added.
DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name.
Pyongyang fired some 200 artillery shells into the buffer zone along the inter-Korean border on Friday (Seoul time), which, according to South Korean officials, violated the 2018 inter-Korean agreement on reducing military tensions.
The country also staged eight ballistic missile tests over the last three weeks.
"But also, I would reiterate again that our position on diplomacy and dialogue remains the same," said Patel.
"Even in the light of these recent developments, we continue to believe our ultimate goal is the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and we continue to remain open to diplomacy and dialogue as a step towards getting there," he added.
North Korea has avoided direct dialogue with the U.S. since late 2019.
bdk@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · October 15, 2022
9. IMF chief downplays possibility in Korea’s financial crisis
I hope she is right and there is not another IMF crisis like 1997.
IMF chief downplays possibility in Korea’s financial crisis
koreaherald.com · by Kim Yon-se · October 14, 2022
By Kim Yon-se
Published : Oct 14, 2022 - 15:56 Updated : Oct 14, 2022 - 16:50
Korea’s Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho (left) shakes hands with International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva during a meeting at the organization’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. on Friday. (Finance Ministry)
SEJONG -- The chief of the International Monetary Fund on Friday dismissed the possibility that South Korea would face a financial crisis, seemingly suggesting that the current economic situation of the nation is different from the 1997 or 2008 crises.
According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the remarks of IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva came during a meeting with Korea’s Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho in Washington.
Georgieva picked the nation's strong fundamentals and a high level in international creditworthiness for factors backing up her downplaying the possibility.
Korea is managing the government debt at a low level, holding sufficient foreign exchange reserves and posting a sound current account balance, she said.
The IMF chief also stressed the importance of credibility in policies, advising that both the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Korea closely communicate with the market.
On the same day, Minister Choo called for US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to continue to pay attention to the Inflation Reduction Act in terms of further talks to resolve conflicts in the global electric vehicle industry.
Korea and some other nations are demanding a revision of the law, saying that the provision on tax benefits for EVs in the IRA discriminates against vehicles assembled outside the US.
Choo, in his meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Finance Minister Mohammed Al-Jadaan, requested bilateral cooperation on sectors including the construction, nuclear reactors and defense-related industries.
Minister Choo, who participated in the gathering of finance ministers and central bank governors of G-20 member nations, is also poised to meet with executives from global credit rating firms later this week.
By Kim Yon-se (kys@heraldcorp.com)
10. Ex-defense minister grilled over 2020 murder at sea
I fear this will not end well.
Thursday
October 13, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Ex-defense minister grilled over 2020 murder at sea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/13/national/politics/Korea-North-Korea-Yellow-Sea/20221013183355667.html
Suh Wook
Former defense minister Suh Wook was questioned by investigators at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office on Thursday over allegations he suppressed evidence related the killing of a South Korean fisheries official by North Korean soldiers in 2020.
Suh is the first ministerial-level official to be brought in for questioning in the case, which the presidential office has accused the preceding administration of bringing to a premature conclusion for political reasons.
Lee Dae-jun, an official from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, disappeared while on duty just south of Yeonpyeong Island near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), which serves as the de facto inter-Korean maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea on Sept. 22, 2020.
The next day, North Korean soldiers found Lee, fatally shot him and burned his body over fear of Covid-19, according to South Korean defense officials. The North did not report a large-scale outbreak of the virus until this past May.
Although the Korea Coast Guard initially said that Lee was killed in the process of defecting to the North to escape a gambling debt, the agency admitted at a June press conference held jointly with the Defense Ministry there was actually no evidence of that.
The reversal prompted Lee’s relatives to file criminal complaints against former security officials they deemed responsible for framing Lee’s death as a botched defection to avoid causing any trouble with Pyongyang.
Suh faces suspicions that he ordered the deletion of information obtained through the military’s surveillance stations near the NLL, thus violating the Military Secret Protection Act.
According to defense and intelligence officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to the JoongAng Ilbo, at least 40 South Korean military intelligence files detailing the events of Lee’s capture and gruesome death, including a total of seven hours of recordings of North Korean military communications, were deleted from the Military Information Management System (MIMS).
Suh’s home was raided by prosecutors in August as part of the probe into several security officials involved in the case.
Although Suh said the North bore full responsibility for Lee’s death when he was defense minister in 2020, he and his ministry were criticized at the time for categorizing the incident as a defection.
At a parliamentary audit hearing on Oct. 7, 2020, Lee told lawmakers the Defense Ministry found evidence suggesting voluntary defection after analyzing intelligence – evidence which it has since admitted did not exist.
The investigation will also look into allegations that Park Jie-won, a former head of the NIS, and his predecessor, Suh Hoon, destroyed intelligence records on the case.
Prosecutors are expected to summon the two former NIS chiefs sometime soon for questioning.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
11. North Korea’s Provocations Push Tensions With the South to Highest in Years
A Surprise, localized attack must be met with a decisive response at the time and the place of the attack.
Excerpts:
In recent days, South Korean officials have warned of a likelihood that North Korea could spring a surprise, localized attack. They have referenced attacks like the one on the border island in 2010 and said they are making preparations to respond.
North Korea has typically decided for itself on the pace of weapons testing or openness to talks. But Pyongyang has often sought to scapegoat conservative Seoul administrations as instigators who can be blamed for Kim regime provocations—even when the bad behavior would have occurred anyway, said Gordon Flake, a Korea specialist at the Perth USAsia Centre, a foreign-policy think tank based at the University of Western Australia.
“It’s not like a different South Korean approach led to a different pace of North Korean tests,” Mr. Flake said. “Despite being extremely solicitous of North Korea, the Moon administration got nothing but disdain and disrespect.”
...
Soured ties between the two Koreas are unlikely to affect the tenor of any future nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea watchers say. During his time in office, Mr. Moon had seen himself as an intermediary between the U.S. and North Korea, proposing talks between the two countries’ leaders.
Mr. Yoon has put forth what he called an audacious plan including food aid and economic assistance should North Korea show commitment to denuclearize. But Pyongyang has ridiculed Seoul’s attempt to improve ties, calling Mr. Yoon’s proposal the “height of absurdity.”
Should North Korea turn back to diplomacy, its deteriorating relationship with South Korea wouldn’t likely imperil the process all that much, since Pyongyang prefers to deal directly with Washington, said Oh Joon, a former South Korean ambassador to the United Nations.
North Korea’s viewpoint, he added: “It’s not South Korea’s business.”
North Korea’s Provocations Push Tensions With the South to Highest in Years
Pyongyang, Seoul have increased military drills, threats as Kim Jong Un regime turns to ‘old playbook’
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-koreas-provocations-push-tensions-with-the-south-to-highest-in-years-11665748167?utm_source=pocket_mylist
By Dasl YoonFollow
and Timothy W. MartinFollow
Oct. 14, 2022 7:49 am ET
SEOUL—Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have escalated to their highest level in years, with the two countries engaging in tit-for-tat military exercises, trading barbs and hardening a diplomatic stalemate.
Since conservative South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May, North Korea’s weapons launches have been met with an equal show of force, including missile drills and jet fighters. The two Koreas have blamed each other for worsening ties. Both sides are threatening to beef up their military powers.
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“North Korea uses damaged ties with South Korea to justify weapons development, to then win greater concessions in future negotiations with the U.S.” said Kim Yong-hyun, a North Korean studies professor at Dongguk University in Seoul. “It’s an old playbook.”
North Korea flew jets near the inter-Korean border on Thursday evening and fired artillery shots and a ballistic missile early Friday. South Korea, in turn, mobilized its jet fighters and imposed unilateral sanctions for the first time since December 2017.
Then Friday evening, North Korea fired around 80 artillery shots off its east coast into the sea and around 200 gunfire shots were heard, Seoul’s military said.
Last week, South Korea and the U.S. carried out missile drills in response to North Korea’s launch over Japan. Under the Yoon administration, South Korea has expanded joint military drills with the U.S. and Japan and sped up plans to set up the “Kill Chain” system designed to launch pre-emptive strikes against the North.
What’s Next After North Korea’s Latest Barrage of Weapon Tests
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During a holiday filled with fireworks and celebrations, North Korean state media released photos showing Kim Jong Un supervising drills simulating nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea. The images hint at what could be next for the regime’s negotiations with the West. Photo Composite: Emily Siu
In July, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un threatened to annihilate South Korea’s military. This week, Pyongyang’s state media reported that Mr. Kim oversaw recent military drills that simulated tactical nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea. The Kim regime has blamed Washington and Seoul for hostile policies, including the joint military drills. The conservative South Korean administration’s emphasis on a strengthened deterrence posture gives North Korea more excuses to conduct provocations, Pyongyang watchers say.
North Korea’s testing spree and preparations for a potential seventh nuclear test are reminiscent of its 2017 weapons provocations. Soon after then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office, North Korea conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile launch and a hydrogen bomb test. After receiving threats of “total destruction” and “fire and fury” from then-President Donald Trump, Mr. Kim abruptly entered diplomatic talks with the U.S. and South Korea.
By January 2018, Mr. Kim declared his nuclear arsenal complete and turned to dialogue with Seoul and Washington. “For North Korea advancing their weapons program is essential to have some leverage in talks that eventually follow provocations,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former South Korean National Security Council official.
The five inter-Korean summits to date—including three between Messrs. Moon and Kim—have occurred under pro-engagement South Korean presidencies. Many of the most violent clashes between the two countries in recent decades have unfolded while conservative South Korean leaders, who back a harder line toward Pyongyang, were in charge.
Inter-Korean relations sank to a low point in 2010 under the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration. North Korea carried out two surprise military attacks against the South, with the shelling of a border island killing four and the sinking of a naval ship killing dozens.
People watched the news at a station in Seoul on Friday after North Korea conducted a middle-of-the-night weapons launch.
PHOTO: JEON HEON-KYUN/SHUTTERSTOCK
The presidency of Park Geun-hye, a conservative who was elected in 2012, featured tense moments with the North over a land-mine explosion and Pyongyang’s shelling of a South Korean military unit near a front line in 2015. High-level talks helped cool military tensions. But in 2016, Ms. Park closed an inter-Korean industrial complex following North Korean provocations and committed to install a U.S. antimissile system designed to thwart the Kim regime’s nuclear threat.
In recent days, South Korean officials have warned of a likelihood that North Korea could spring a surprise, localized attack. They have referenced attacks like the one on the border island in 2010 and said they are making preparations to respond.
North Korea has typically decided for itself on the pace of weapons testing or openness to talks. But Pyongyang has often sought to scapegoat conservative Seoul administrations as instigators who can be blamed for Kim regime provocations—even when the bad behavior would have occurred anyway, said Gordon Flake, a Korea specialist at the Perth USAsia Centre, a foreign-policy think tank based at the University of Western Australia.
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“It’s not like a different South Korean approach led to a different pace of North Korean tests,” Mr. Flake said. “Despite being extremely solicitous of North Korea, the Moon administration got nothing but disdain and disrespect.”
In recent months, the Kim regime has reiterated it has no intention of returning to talks with Seoul and Washington. It also conducted more than two dozen missile tests in 2022, a record number for a single year.
Ruling party lawmakers in Seoul have called on the Yoon administration to terminate an inter-Korean military agreement if North Korea conducts another nuclear test. Under the September 2018 accord, the two Koreas agreed to cease hostile activities against each other, such as military drills near the border.
South Korean soldiers gather during a drill in the Philippines.
PHOTO: FRANCIS R MALASIG/SHUTTERSTOCK
But North Korea’s artillery shots that began Thursday night had violated the agreement, said South Korean officials, including Mr. Yoon. South Korea sent a notice to the North through a military hotline urging Pyongyang to abide by the agreement, according to Seoul’s Defense Ministry.
Soured ties between the two Koreas are unlikely to affect the tenor of any future nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea watchers say. During his time in office, Mr. Moon had seen himself as an intermediary between the U.S. and North Korea, proposing talks between the two countries’ leaders.
Mr. Yoon has put forth what he called an audacious plan including food aid and economic assistance should North Korea show commitment to denuclearize. But Pyongyang has ridiculed Seoul’s attempt to improve ties, calling Mr. Yoon’s proposal the “height of absurdity.”
Should North Korea turn back to diplomacy, its deteriorating relationship with South Korea wouldn’t likely imperil the process all that much, since Pyongyang prefers to deal directly with Washington, said Oh Joon, a former South Korean ambassador to the United Nations.
North Korea’s viewpoint, he added: “It’s not South Korea’s business.”
Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com and Timothy W. Martin at Timothy.Martin@wsj.com
12. US Air Force takes flak in new Korean War film
This is the key point:
And a chunk of the nuance – North Korea’s virtual helplessness under the US bomb storm – is germane today. While it does not excuse the relentless dictatorship of the Kims, it does explain their paranoia, and their focus on the endless acquisition of ever more powerful arms, at ruinous cost to their nation.
US Air Force takes flak in new Korean War film
The horrors of US bombing are grimly captured in the latest work to challenge the ‘good vs evil’ narrative of the Korean War
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · October 14, 2022
SEOUL – At a time when Russian missiles are thundering down upon Ukraine and North Korean missiles are hurtling through Asian skies, a searing new documentary captures the demonic impact of an air campaign upon those at ground zero.
In this story, however, it is Americans who are the villains.
The feature Scorched Earth, which premiered last week at the Busan International Film Festival, was shown on Thursday to foreign correspondents in Seoul. The 90-minute work covers the US tactical air campaign in South Korea, and its strategic bombing of North Korea, during the 1950-53 Korean War.
It is grim and wrenching – but arguably necessary – viewing.
With North Korea’s apparently endless missile tests elevating tensions across the region, a reminder of what happens when leaders choose kinetic solutions is timely. For many, of course, it will not be a reminder: The biblical destruction and bloody carnage of the “Forgotten War” is simply unknown.
Scorched Earth is the latest in a line of English-language works that have, since the 1980s, shifted the historiographical terrain of the war. What was once a simplistic “defense against Communist invasion” narrative has become increasingly nuanced.
And a chunk of the nuance – North Korea’s virtual helplessness under the US bomb storm – is germane today. While it does not excuse the relentless dictatorship of the Kims, it does explain their paranoia, and their focus on the endless acquisition of ever more powerful arms, at ruinous cost to their nation.
A ‘clean’ image of the bombing war: US B-29s unload their munitions through clouds above North Korea. The staggering devastation that rained down upon a country that, for the most part, had minimal air defenses is widely believed to have compelled the massive militarization of today’s North Korea. Image: Wikimedia Commons
Blood red clouds
Visually, Scorched Earth combines archive newsreels and gun camera footage from aircraft with still photographs and scans of declassified US documents.
Fighter bombers skim over rice paddies and hills, strafing villages; strategic bombers unload over North Korean cities. Strikes with machine-gun fire, high explosives and napalm are captured. Targets disintegrate.
Images show files of refugees in the snow, the rubble of bombed cities, the detritus of shattered villages. Dead lie in ditches; a mutilated corpse is entangled in the ruins of a home.
Audibly, the film offers a sinister, droning soundtrack. And in an especially emotive gut punch, the testimonies of survivors are read by voice actors. Children talk of burying dead parents in city parks, of skies blackened for days, of civilians using pitchforks to sift corpses from wreckage.
The Korean War saw the first widespread use of a particularly nasty incendiary. Blending naphtha as its combustible element and palm oil to gel it, napalm burned at eight times the heat of boiling water and stuck to everything it touched. Rolling down like lava, instead of blowing upward like explosive, napalm canisters – dubbed “hell bombs” by media – proved effective against a dug-in enemy.
But they had diabolical effects on Korean thatched/wooden structures: Entire villages flared up. One interviewee who survived a bombing recalled the appalling aftermath.
“The bodies were scorched black – unspeakable! There was not a single person left, only maggots squirming,” she said. “Something was dripping from the ceiling on to my arm – someone’s corpse was hanging up there, too.”
-This post-strike photo taken west of the Naktong River near Waegwan in South Korea shows where US B29 heavy bombers made a mass strike on August 16, 1950. Note the density of the bombing pattern, with craters from the 500-pound bombs after 99 planes bombed an area of about 5.5 by 12 kilometers, unloading more than 3,400 bombs. Image: Wikimedia Commons/ Air and Space Museum
The film places special focus on two dynamics. The first is the plight of refugees fleeing the fighting.
In the early days of the war, the infiltration of US lines by Communist partisans and disguised North Korean troops generated horrifically disproportionate results. Subsequently, US and later other allied contingents in the UN Command would use fire to disperse approaching refugees.
A printed US Air Force (USAF) order, shown onscreen, reads, “The army has requested that we strafe all refugee parties approaching our positions.”
The second dynamic is the “scorched earth” retreat of winter 1950-51. Then, Chinese forces, in a shock counteroffensive, drove UN Command forces from North Korea.
As they withdrew, UN troops laid waste the land, to leave nothing for the enemy. One veteran, speaking to this writer, compared it to the climax of a 007 film: As the hero escapes, amid gunfire and explosions, the sets collapse around him.
The USAF was a key arm in the war, flying 1,040,708 sorties. Over the South, the US enjoyed total air superiority. Over the North, a narrow strip of sky along the Chinese border – “MiG Alley,” in contemporary US parlance – was defended by Chinese, North Korean and Russian jet fighters, while a Soviet anti-aircraft division secretly deployed to the city of Shinuiju to cover the Yalu River crossing points.
Otherwise, the country’s air defenses were minimal. As a result, US pilots had to beware of ground fire, but otherwise had virtually free rein through most of the peninsula’s skies. And they had few incentives to learn about their victims below.
‘We never learned much about our bombing targets – just a name and its latitude,” said one crewman on a B-29 heavy bomber. “It was all just North Korean property we were destroying.”
Coming so soon after World War II, the bombing and strafing of civilians, and the generation of mass collateral damage in Korea, were not considered crimes against humanity. Yet the same airman did wonder if he and his fellows – who carried out dike-destruction missions – were committing war crimes.
US dive bombers unleash rocket attacks into Seoul during the battle for the city in September 1950. This watercolor was painted from life by Kim Song-hwan, a young newspaper artist, who would, postwar become Korea’s most famed cartoonist, ‘Gobau.’ Image: Courtesy Kim Song-hwan
The unknown war
The film’s director is activist South Korean auteur Lee Mi-young, whose previous works focused on the plights of miners. She had always wondered about the war – specifically about the traumas her grandmother experienced, which were never discussed.
However, she was inspired to make Scorched Earth while studying in Canada in 2017.
That year, North Korean missile and nuclear tests, and a war of words between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then-US president Donald Trump, raised fears that the Korean War might reignite. When Canadians asked her why North Korea hated the US so much, she realized she did not know, and began research.
Most of what Lee uncovered – from Australian, South Korean and US archives – in the documentary was in fact known at the time, thanks to the published work of Western journalists.
Contemporary accounts include pilots vomiting in their cockpits upon their return from missions, and the nightmarish madness of after-dark “intruder” raids into the North, where everything that moved – even livestock – was gunned down.
Likewise, UN prisoners of war, many of whom walked the length of North Korea – from their point of capture to POW camps in the country’s China border – told of the apocalyptic destruction after returning home. Urban North Korea was flattened.
Yet while the demonic nature of the Korean War – which spiraled from a murderous civil war into an all-consuming total war pitting two world blocs against each other – is known to specialists, the public are ignorant.
“News about these bombings were reported and told, but are not known to most,” Lee said. “So in that sense, I use the words ‘unknown’ or ‘forgotten.’”
US fighter-bombers strike targetrs in typically rugged Korean terrain. Tremendous collateral damage was caused by tactical air strikes. Image: Wikimedia Commons
The changing war
While the war remains cloaked in propaganda in North Korea, many of its harshest realities were also cloaked in the South. During Seoul’s period of authoritarian rule, between 1961 and 1987, criticism of the US, and its wartime actions, was out of bounds.
Likewise, the motivations of the approximately 700,000 North Koreans who fled south were never examined. Were they heading for freedom? Escaping Communist retaliation? Or abandoning homes destroyed amid the scorched-earth devastation?
Lee reckons the third reason.
“We know a lot of North Korean refugees who came south, but the reason they came south was not taught to us,” she said. “When this film was released in Busan, the children of survivors who migrated from the North said the pieces of the puzzles are fitting together. The missing pieces are in this film.”
Today, South Koreans on the left and the right hold very different views of the war, and its conduct. It is not just Koreans. In the English-language historiography of the war, Scorched Earth continues a revisionist trend.
Early US narratives of the war became entrenched in the patriotic 1950s, then Korea was overshadowed in the popular mind by color TV coverage of the war in Vietnam, from 1965-1975. Only in the 1980s did more critical narratives emerge, sparking heated debates on the war’s origins and conduct.
In 1981, US historian Bruce Cumings published The Origins of the Korean War, which called into question responsibility for the conflict by focusing on prewar struggles in the South. It also focused on the murderousness of the US-allied Seoul regime.
The book received a rapturous reception in leftist circles, and though some of its assertions were shot down after Soviet archives were opened to historians during the Boris Yeltsin administration, it remains a landmark.
In 1987, one of the Anglosphere’s most eminent military historians, Max Hastings, published The Korean War. A well-distributed, popular work, it offered sobering accounts of the war’s brutalities – including the ruthless racism of some participants.
In 2011, the book The Bridge at Nogun-ri investigated a massacre of civilians hiding under a bridge by US troops in the war’s early days. It won a Pulitzer for its authorial team, Associated Press journalist Choe Sang-hoon, Charles Hanley and Margaret Mendoza.
Scorched Earth continues this tradition, and looks set to generate similar controversies.
Still, one question it cannot answer is the number of war dead, though its estimate – 3 million – is at the high end. And historians may well question the film’s contention that there were higher per capita deaths in Korea than in World War II – during which Poland and the USSR suffered colossal casualties as a result of genocide, as well as battle – or the far longer war in Vietnam.
Because of the non-disclosure of North Korea’s casualties, and to the mass population movements of hundreds of thousands, perhaps more than a million, that took place during the war – in both directions, albeit largely North-South – it is impossible to conduct an accurate body count.
Still, some credible figures exist that relate to the bombing of North Korea. Moscow’s ambassador to Pyongyang, who oversaw Soviet and Eastern European field ambulances and hospitals in North Korea, offered the relatively precise – and immense – number of 282,000 civilian dead from bombings.
Regardless of exactitudes, the war was an epic tragedy – the final act of which has not yet played out. Given the centrality of Northeast Asia to the global economy, the Korean Peninsula bears watching.
Yet if you live in the US, don’t expect Scorched Earth to appear on your local TV network any time soon.
Civilian refugees in northeastern Korea wait in desperate hope of seaborne ecacuation to the South in December 1950. It is questionable how many of these hundreds of thousands of refugees were fleeing their homes, and how many were fleeing the destruction of their country. Image: State Library of Victoria
The unseen war
The doyen of US activist filmmakers – who called the film “hypnotic … stunning” – consulted to Lee during the post-production.
“Oliver Stone helped me connect with Hollywood people,” Lee said. “But they were not very comfortable with this film.”
Her plan is to take the film to America’s Sundance Festival, while seeking specialist distribution companies. Another plan is to stream the film, though no platform has yet been decided upon. Further information will be released on the film’s website.
Lee plans two further documentaries. While Scorched Earth is a macro view of US bombing, her next efforts will be micro stories, told in detail from the perspectives of the victims of two separate incidents.
While her work will likely be challenging viewing for those in the US, South Korea and elsewhere who are strong proponents of the US role in the war, Lee makes no apologies.
“The people victimized did not fall victim because of their ideology or because they were right or left,” she said. “The bombing was unconditional.”
The film covers events from more than seven decades ago, and military technologies and practices have changed – as have media attitudes. Today’s US Air Force is trammeled by critical media oversight and more restrictive rules of engagement than pertained in either Korea or Vietnam.
Napalm has been withdrawn from the USAF arsenal, and US aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are equipped with more precise targeting systems than was the case in the 1950s or ’60s. Indeed, Lee’s final scene shows drone operators taking out targets in the “war on terror.”
Yet “collateral damage” still happens – and Lee insists Scorched Earth has contemporary resonance.
“The Korean War … has shaped Korean society and the terrain of Northeast Asia as a whole,” she said. “It made me wonder why it is rude to talk about such a huge event. It’s a collective mental trauma.”
Asia Times’ Northeast Asia editor Andrew Salmon is also the author of the Korean War history Scorched Earth, Black Snow (2011). Follow him on Twitter @ASalmonSeoul.
Australian troops – the UN Command’s rearguard – withdraw through the scorched-earth devastation of North Korea in winter 1950. Image: State Library of Victoria
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · October 14, 2022
asiatimes.com · by Andrew Salmon · October 14, 2022
13. North Korea preps for nuclear war
Excerpts:
The biggest danger in the months and years ahead, argues Kazianis, is that as the North Korean economy stagnates under the weight of sanctions while its nuclear know-how improves, Kim will decide to sell nuclear secrets and missile technology to the highest bidder, as it has done with missile designs for Iran.
“Team Biden understands that it will never be able to get the Kim family to give up its nukes and the best it will get is arms control — something that won't be politically acceptable and an outcome hawkish Republicans and even many Democrats would attack him for as weakness,” Kazianis said. “But while arms control may be a bitter pill to swallow, that is certainly better than seeing Pyongyang help other rogue states get weapons of mass destruction.”
How about Plan B? Solve the "Korea question."
North Korea preps for nuclear war
Washington Examiner · October 14, 2022
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un is sporting a new look while pursuing an old goal — being recognized and feared as a full-fledged nuclear threat.
Photos released from the official Korean Central News Agency show Kim dressed uncharacteristically in a white tunic shirt and a wide-brimmed safari-style hat. He was said to be personally “guiding” military drills that simulated the use of “tactical nuclear” weapons designed to “hit and wipe out” targets in South Korea.
US DISPATCHES AIRCRAFT CARRIER TO WATERS OFF SOUTH KOREA AS TENSIONS RISE OVER NORTH'S MISSILE LAUNCHES
Kim’s new sartorial swagger, in which he eschews his conservative black suits in favor of a more varied wardrobe, seems to reflect his recent proclivity for provocative missile tests. Kim does so apparently feeling unconstrained by world opinion.
After several years of a self-declared moratorium on testing ballistic missiles, banned under numerous U.N. resolutions, North Korea, officially named the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has unleashed a frenzy of missiles this year. That included a test of its intermediate-range Hwasong-12 missile, which soared over Japan and triggered a brief panic as attack warning sirens blared.
“Pyongyang clearly feels emboldened. The DPRK has launched 39 ballistic missiles this year alone, which far surpasses its previous record of 25,” said U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly this month. Thomas-Greenfield noted that Russia and China have blocked every effort to hold North Korea accountable.
“The DPRK has enjoyed blanket protection from two members of this Council. These two members have gone out of their way to justify the DPRK’s repeated provocations and block every attempt to update the sanctions regime,” said Thomas-Greenfield. “In short, two permanent members of the Security Council have enabled Kim Jong Un."
Harry Kazianis, a Korea expert and president and CEO of the Rogue States Project, also cited Russia and China as impediments to thwarting North Korea's nuclear ambitions.
"North Korea is going all in on missile tests now as the timing may never get any better. Kim Jong Un understands that he can test any missile or nuclear weapon he wants and there will be little to no penalty,” Kazianis told the Washington Examiner. “Russia or China will not be open to any sort of new sanctions or even enforcing existing sanctions as both nations are at odds with Washington and have no incentive to help.”
The unclassified version of the Biden administration’s long-delayed National Security Strategy, just released this month, contains a single line on North Korea. The document continues to cling to the desperate hope that the North might, at some point, be willing to negotiate in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.
“We will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while strengthening extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and missile threats,” the strategy reads.
One thing is clear. After a brief unproductive bromance with former President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019, Kim no longer has the slightest interest in discussing any agreement that would require giving up his modest, but growing, nuclear arsenal.
“We’ve called on the DPRK to refrain from further provocations and engage in a sustained and substantive dialogue,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said this month.
“Unfortunately, the DPRK’s response has been to launch more missiles,” Blinken admitted.
Kim, with his new focus on so-called tactical nukes, seems to have taken a page out of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s playbook, threatening the South with so-called low-yield weapons that are less powerful and, in theory, more usable in a war that would stop short of destroying the entire Korean Peninsula.
It’s not clear if North Korea actually possesses the technology to build a nuclear warhead small enough to be carried by its growing arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles, but its claims are increasing by the day.
In its latest drill, the North described a scenario straight out of a James Bond movie — launching a missile from an underwater silo in an innocuous-looking reservoir.
“The drill was aimed at confirming the order of taking tactical nuclear warheads out and transporting them," read an account published by the state-run KCNA, and "checking the reliability of ... launching capabilities of the ballistic missile at the underwater silos.”
An English translation by the media monitoring group KCNAWatch added: “The tactical ballistic missile flew in the air above the set target in the air of the East Sea of Korea along the appointed orbit, and the reliability of warhead exploding was clearly proved at the set altitude.”
What the United States is bracing for next is another underground nuclear test by North Korea, which would be the regime's seventh overall and the first since 2017. This test could also involve a smaller tactical weapon.
With nothing stopping Kim, and with the diplomatic track seemingly hopelessly stalled, President Joe Biden's administration seems willing to rely on a strategy of deterrence while hoping for the best.
“We are willing to sit down with Kim Jong Un without preconditions to find a diplomatic way forward here to denuclearize his capabilities, to denuclearize the peninsula. And we're serious about that,” said John Kirby, the spokesman for the National Security Council, in an Oct. 9 interview with ABC News. “But because he hasn't answered any of those entreaties, we have to make sure we have the military capabilities ready in case it should come to conflict, which, of course, nobody wants to see that happen.”
Kazianis of the Rogue States Project looked toward the next presidential administration, whenever it comes into power.
“For Biden, North Korea is the nuclear hot potato that he will be more than happy to hand off to the next president either in 2025 or 2029, as [his administration] see the issue as one that can't be solved without getting damaged politically,” Kazianis said. “And that means Pyongyang will be happy to keep building more and more nuclear weapons and missiles.”
CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER
The biggest danger in the months and years ahead, argues Kazianis, is that as the North Korean economy stagnates under the weight of sanctions while its nuclear know-how improves, Kim will decide to sell nuclear secrets and missile technology to the highest bidder, as it has done with missile designs for Iran.
“Team Biden understands that it will never be able to get the Kim family to give up its nukes and the best it will get is arms control — something that won't be politically acceptable and an outcome hawkish Republicans and even many Democrats would attack him for as weakness,” Kazianis said. “But while arms control may be a bitter pill to swallow, that is certainly better than seeing Pyongyang help other rogue states get weapons of mass destruction.”
Washington Examiner · October 14, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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