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Quotes of the Day:
“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, while no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”
- B.H. Liddel-Hart
“When the hour of crisis comes, remember that 40 selected men can shake the world”
-Yasotay (Mongol Warlord)
“If in taking a native den one thinks chiefly of the market that he will establish there on the morrow, one does not take it in the ordinary way.”
- Lyautey: The Colonial Role of the Army, Revue Des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1900
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: August 4, 2022-September 1, 2022
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 1 (Putin's War)
3. China’s Gorbachev phobia
4. New reports detail Russia’s vast ‘filtration’ system for Ukrainians
5. The military’s sexual assault problem is only getting worse
6. Some of the first troops into Afghanistan celebrate victories, lament failures
7. Why Not A Phased Withdrawal From Afghanistan?
8. A Reminder that the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs actually exists
9. A Strategist’s Cast of Characters: The Critical Attributes and Skills of Strategic Decision-Makers
10. Funding the Indo-Pacific Pivot
11. Fort Bragg moves 100 soldiers from mold-plagued barracks, plans to move 1,000 more by month’s end
12. How to Teach Beijing a Lesson in Ukraine
13. Opinion | Ukraine’s counteroffensive is more than just bravado
14. Gorbachev 'Shocked and Bewildered' By Putin’s Ukraine War
15. Blast from the Past: What We Learned by Bringing a Rear-Area Combat Concept from the 1980s to the National Training Center
16. I’m a Ukrainian Soldier, and I’ve Accepted My Death
17. Lukoil chairman Ravil Maganov is the 8th Russian energy executive to die suddenly this year
18. UN report on human rights in Xinjiang is damning for China. But what will its impact be?
19. Marine Hone Future Concepts with Dune Buggies, Liaison Officers, and Many Radios
20. The Army Wants Smarter Sensors To Ease Soldiers’ ‘Cognitive Burden’
21. Philippine-born pretenders pursue QAnon global ‘monarchy’
22. Biden's effort to isolate Russia has a big problem: India
23. In the new offensive in the Ukraine War, can new recruits, high morale and heavy weapons tip the balance?
1. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: August 4, 2022-September 1, 2022
Access the Foreign Policy Tracker here: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/09/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-september/
September 1, 2022 | FDD Tracker: August 4, 2022-September 1, 2022
FDD | Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September
David Adesnik
Senior Fellow and Director of Research
John Hardie
Research Manager and Senior Research Analyst
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · September 1, 2022
Trend Overview
Edited by David Adesnik and John Hardie
Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.
As August drew to a close, Washington and Tehran were nearing a nuclear agreement that imposes even fewer constraints than the 2015 deal with Iran. The White House pushed ahead with the nuclear negotiations even as the Justice Department revealed an Iranian plot to assassinate former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton. Meanwhile, one of Tehran’s Iraqi proxy forces employed Iranian-provided drones to attack U.S. troops in eastern Syria. Tehran also continues to stonewall inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who are investigating the presence of nuclear materials the clerical regime failed to disclose despite a binding obligation to do so under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Biden administration’s determination to ignore Iran’s signs of bad faith suggests the White House may accept a nuclear deal based more on trust than on verification.
Will the Biden administration insist that Tehran address these concerns, or will it press the IAEA to stand down, as the Obama administration did to protect the original nuclear deal in 2015? Will President Joe Biden accept a deal that renders military sites off-limits to inspectors, like the original agreement? Come back next month to see if the White House was able to push the deal over the finish line, and whether the cost of doing so was trusting Tehran to honor its promises.
Trending Positive
CYBER
By RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery and Jiwon Ma
KOREA
By David Maxwell
LATIN AMERICA
By Carrie Filipetti and Emanuele Ottolenghi
Trending Neutral
DEFENSE
By Bradley Bowman
EUROPE
By John Hardie
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
By Richard Goldberg
RUSSIA
By John Hardie
Trending Negative
CHINA
By Craig Singleton
INDO-PACIFIC
By Craig Singleton
ISRAEL
By David May
SUNNI JIHADISM
By Bill Roggio
SYRIA
By David Adesnik
TURKEY
By Sinan Ciddi
Trending Very Negative
GULF
By Hussain Abdul-Hussain
IRAN
By Behnam Ben Taleblu and Richard Goldberg
LEBANON
By Tony Badran
NONPROLIFERATION AND BIODEFENSE
By Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker
2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 1 (Putin's War)
Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 1
understandingwar.org
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Mason Clark
September 1, 11pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his false framing of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine as a defensive operation to protect Russia on September 1. During a meeting with schoolchildren in Kaliningrad, Putin stated that the purpose of the “special military operation” is to eliminate the “anti-Russian enclave” that is forming in Ukraine and is an existential threat to the Russian state.[1] Putin similarly invoked the concept of an “anti-Russia” in his February 24 speech declaring a “special operation” in Ukraine.[2] Putin’s reiteration of an “anti-Russian” entity that must be defeated militarily to defend Russia reaffirms his maximalist intentions for Ukraine and is likely intended to set the information conditions to call for further Russian efforts and force generation going into the fall and winter of this year.
Russian milbloggers continued attempts to claim that Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the south has already failed. Igor Girkin, a Russian nationalist and former commander of militants in the 2014 fighting in Donbas, stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to attack after the “failure of the first attack”—falsely portraying ongoing Ukrainian operations as separate attacks after an initial failure—and reiterated the common Russian narrative that what he claims are Ukraine’s “Western handlers” pushed Ukraine to conduct a counteroffensive.[3] Girkin additionally stated that Ukraine’s Western partners poorly planned for the counteroffensive, underestimated Russian capabilities and assumed Russians are incompetent, and principally accounted for political—not military—considerations.[4] One milblogger stated that Ukraine’s defeat in the south will be the strongest psychological blow to Kyiv and that this failure will have a continued long-term psychological effect on Ukraine’s morale.[5] The Russian milbloggers are increasingly centrally describing Ukrainian attacks as tactless and “suicidal” rushes.[6]
As ISW has reported, military operations on the scale of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive do not succeed or fail in a day or a week.[7] Ukrainians and the West should not fall for Russian information operations portraying the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast as having failed almost instantly or that depict Ukraine as a helpless puppet of Western masters for launching it at this time.
The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has extended the deadline for Russian forces to capture Donetsk Oblast from August 31 to the still highly unlikely target date of September 15, and Russian forces are conducting several redeployments to meet this goal.[8] Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Operational Department Oleksiy Gromov stated that Russian forces are regrouping elements of the Central Military District (CMD) operating in the Luhansk-Donetsk Oblast directions in an effort to increase the number of troops west of Donetsk City.[9] Gromov added that Russian forces deployed two battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the direction of the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline from Belgorod Oblast, which he noted might support resumed Russian offensive operations in Donbas.[10] Gromov stated that Russian military officials are continuing to form the 3rd Army Corps to deploy to Donetsk Oblast, also likely to resume offensive operations in the Donetsk operational area.[11] Gromov noted that it is unclear if all mobilized 3rd Army Corps servicemen have undergone military training.[12] Russian forces also reportedly introduced one BTG each to the Slovyansk and Mykolaiv directions.[13] RFE/RL’s footage also shows that Russian forces are continuing to react to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast by consistently transferring military convoys to southern Ukrainian via the Kerch Strait Bridge.[14] These Russian deployments are likely intended to set conditions for a revised operation to capture Donetsk Oblast, but Russian forces remain highly unlikely to make the progress necessary to capture the Oblast by September 15.
The Kremlin is likely seeking to capitalize on the significance of seizing areas around Donetsk City that have been contested since 2014 to boost the morale of Russian and proxy forces. Russian forces have not been successful in advancing toward Siversk or capturing the E40 highway to Slovyansk-Bakhmut since the fall of Lysychansk and are likely experiencing challenges incentivizing Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) elements to continue fighting to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders.[15] Russian forces had minor territorial gains around Avdiivka, which generated positive chatter among the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) fighters in early August after which the advances stalled west of Donetsk City.[16]
Key Takeaways
- Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistical nodes and key positions throughout Kherson Oblast in support of the ongoing counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.
- Russian milbloggers reiterated claims that Ukrainian forces are fighting along four axes of advance in Western Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk, south and northeast of Bakhmut, and northwest and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian authorities escalated claims that Ukrainian forces are threatening both the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the newly arrived International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) delegation on the territory of the ZNPP.
- The Russian 3rd Army Corps is continuing to form for deployment to Donbas.
- Russian occupation authorities are likely increasingly recognizing their inability to successfully hold sham referenda in occupied areas of Ukraine due to Russian military failures and ongoing Ukrainian resistance in occupied territories.
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Ukrainian military officials reiterated that Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian logistics and reinforcements and maintained operational silence on the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine on September 1. Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Operational Department Oleksiy Gromov stated that Russian losses are currently concentrated due to a series of Ukrainian missile, air, UAV, and artillery strikes on Russian command posts, positions, and ammunition depots between August 29 and August 31.[17]
The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a pontoon bridge over the Inhulets River in Darivka, about 18km northeast of Kherson City and situated on the Kherson City-Nova Kakhovka highway.[18] Ukrainian forces have particularly targeted pontoon crossings since August 29, likely to tactically disrupt Russian forces and support ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations.[19] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also noted that Ukrainian forces struck six ammunition depots in the Bersylavsky and Khersonsky Raions (Districts) in Central Kherson Oblast, and Hennichensky Raion, near the eastern Kherson Oblast-Crimea border.[20] Ukrainian forces also reportedly destroyed command posts of the Russian 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division in unspecified areas.[21] The 331st Regiment previously operated near Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, in February and March and suffered significant losses, and Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces previously struck the unit’s command post south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in Novovoskresenke on August 23.[22] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces struck the 331st Regiment’s command post in Novovoskresenke or another location.
Ukrainian forces likely continued to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and key positions throughout central Kherson Oblast on September 1. Local Ukrainian civilians reported hearing explosions and witnessing active air defense systems in Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka (approximately 12km northeast of Nova Kakhovka), and social media footage showed new Ukrainian strikes against the Antonivsky Bridge.[23] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces shot down Ukrainian AGM-88 HARM missiles over Antonivsky Bridge.[24] A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported that a Ukrainian missile hit an unspecified target in Oleshky (about 9km southeast of Kherson City on the left bank of the Dnipro River), and that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian missile over Kalanchak (about 67km due south of Kherson City).[25] A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published footage of a reported destroyed Russian military base in Shyroka Balka, about 35km west of Kherson City.[26] Geolocated footage also showed the destruction of a Russian military base in the former barracks of the Ukrainian National Guards in Kherson City, likely destroyed during a Ukrainian strike on August 29.[27] Ukrainian Telegram channels have also reported Russian forces transporting more barges to Nova Kakhovka, likely in an attempt to facilitate cross-river transportation in the area.[28]
Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacking in at least four directions in Kherson Oblast, but these claims remain largely unverifiable. Various milbloggers claimed that fighting continued west of Vysokopillya south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, east and northeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, around Snihurivka about 65km east of Mykolaiv City, and north of Kherson City.
Some milbloggers reported that Russian airborne troops repelled Ukrainian attacks on Olhyne, while others noted that Russian forces have “confident control” over the southern halves of Olhyne and Vysokopillya and are engaged in defensive battles south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[29] Ukrainian forces reportedly continued fighting in Arkhanhelske near the Inhulets River in the northernmost part of Kherson Oblast.[30] Some Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces established partial control of Bila Krynytsia (between the Ukrainian bridgehead and Davydiv Brid), while others claimed that Rosgvadia and Russian airborne troops are fighting Ukrainian forces in Davydiv Brid itself.[31] Geolocated footage also showed Russian forces striking Ukrainian military equipment south of Bila Krynytsia.[32] A milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces captured Kostromka (10km southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead) and advanced to the outskirts of Bruskynske on the T2207 highway, while simultaneously attacking Shchaslyve south of Kostromka.[33] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack on Snihurivka, and geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions in the settlement.[34] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained control over Zeleny Hai (approximately 23km north of Kherson City) and noted that Russian forces continued to fire at Ukrainian positions with artillery.[35] Geolocated footage showed Russian artillery shelling Ukrainian forces near Myrne (approximately seven kilometers west of Zeleny Hai), and Russian milbloggers previously stated that Russian forces failed to advance to Myrne on August 31.[36] Geolocated footage also showed a destroyed Ukrainian tank in Liubomyrivka (about 7km north of Zeleny Hai), which corroborates Russian milbloggers’ claims from August 31 of Ukrainian advances in the area.[37] Geolocated footage seemingly shows five Russian soldiers surrendering to Ukrainian forces in Pravdyne (about 35km northwest of Kherson City).[38]
The Russian Defense Ministry claimed it destroyed Ukrainian ammunition depots on the western bank of the Inhulets River.[39] The Kherson Oblast Occupation Police also claimed it neutralized a Ukrainian “terrorist” headquarters in Kherson City.[40]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian Troops in the Cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
- Russian Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack northwest of Slovyansk on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to advance toward Dolyna, 18km northwest of Slovyansk along the E40 highway.[41] Russian forces additionally continued routine shelling, airstrikes, and aerial reconnaissance along the Izyum-Slovyansk line and near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[42] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on September 1 and continued routine artillery strikes on Siversk and surrounding settlements.[43]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to the northeast and south of Bakhmut on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attempted to advance toward Vesela Dolyna (5km southeast of Bakhmut), Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), Soledar (10km northeast of Bakhmut), and Bakhmutske (8km northeast of Bakhmut).[44] Both Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian troops may be escalating operations around Bakhmut, potentially to regain lost positions.[45]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attempted to improve their positions around Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Optyne, which all lie within 15km of the northwestern corner of Donetsk City.[46] Russian forces also continued routine air and artillery strikes along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline.[47]
Russian forces also conducted a limited ground attack southwest of Donetsk City on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian troops attempted to improve their positions around Vodyane, about 35km southwest of Donetsk City and near the road that runs from Vuhledar into Marinka.[48] Russian forces continued routine shelling and airstrikes on Ukrainian positions in the area between Donetsk City and the Zaporizhia Oblast border.[49]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along the Kharkiv City Axis on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued conducting aerial reconnaissance using UAVs near settlements along the frontlines.[50] Russian forces continued using tank, tube, and rocket artillery to shell settlements to the north and northeast of Kharkiv City.[51]
The Russian Defense Ministry (MOD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian offensive near Ruski Tyshky, approximately 20km northeast of Kharkiv City, on September 1. ISW is not able to independently verify this claim, however.
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in Kherson or Zaporizhia Oblasts and continued routine shelling along the line of contact.[52] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces have intensified their airstrikes in Kherson Oblast and remotely mined their positions to defend themselves against Ukrainian advances.[53] Russian forces launched missile strikes against Odesa Oblast and continued to fire MLRS systems and heavy artillery at Nikopol and Kryvyi Rih Raions. Satellite imagery reportedly showed Russian forces moving another S-400 air defense system near Belbek, Crimea.[54] Russian forces are likely continuing to undertake measures to strengthen air defenses in Crimea.
Russian authorities escalated attempts to claim Ukrainian forces threaten both the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and newly arrived International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel on September 1. Ukrainian and Russian sources both confirmed the IAEA observer mission arrived at the plant on September 1. Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of shelling the agreed-upon route of the IAEA team to the ZNPP. Ukrainian government and local sources reported that Russian shelling in Enerhodar forced the ZNPP’s fifth power unit to shut down.[55] The Russian MoD claimed that two Ukrainian sabotage groups of up to 60 people landed on the coast of the Nova Kakhovka reservoir, 3km east of the ZNPP and that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack to capture the plant.[56] It is highly unlikely that a small group of Ukrainian forces launched an unsupported attack to recapture the ZNPP. Russian authorities will likely step up their efforts to portray Ukrainian forces as a danger to the international IAEA observers. Russian authorities will likely step up their efforts to portray Ukrainian forces as a danger to the international IAEA observers.
Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian military authorities continued forming and deploying volunteer units to Ukraine to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine. A local veterans’ organization in Buryatia announced it generated an additional 30 volunteers to fight in Ukraine on September 1.[57] Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Operational Department Oleksiy Gromov stated that Russian military authorities decided to disband the 31st Separate Airborne Assault Brigade and the 22nd Separate Special Purpose Brigade due to significant losses, claiming that less than 20% of personnel in each brigade survived operations in Ukraine.[58] Both brigades fought in battles where Russian forces suffered heavy attrition. Elements of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne Assault Brigade participated in combat operations in Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, and in Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast.[59] Elements of the 22nd Separate Special Purpose brigade fought in Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[60]
CNN amplified two anonymous US officials’ claims on August 31 that Russia is facing “severe” shortages of military personnel in Ukraine and is searching for new ways to generate personnel for battle. The report amplified one unidentified official’s claims that the Russian MoD is attempting to recruit contract service members to compensate for personnel losses by “compelling wounded soldiers to reenter combat, acquiring personnel from private security companies, and paying bonuses to conscripts.”[61] The officials also noted that the US has “credible reporting” that Russia's MOD is “likely to begin” recruiting convicted criminals in Ukraine “in exchange for pardons and financial compensation.”[62]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Ukrainian sources are increasingly reporting that Russian occupation authorities are likely acknowledging their own inability to hold large-scale referenda in occupied Ukrainian territories due to Russian military failures to capture desired territory and the pressure of local resistance within occupied territories. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on September 1 that the Kremlin anticipated holding the entirety of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia Oblasts by the summer of 2022 and that the Russian military’s inability to take control of these territories has undermined the Kremlin’s prospects at staging large-scale referenda across occupied regions.[63] The Resistance Center added that Russian authorities will continue to propagate the concept of large-scale referenda across the information space but that occupation officials fundamentally understand that even staged voting may not occur at all due to the tandem effects of Russian military failings and pressure levied by Ukrainian partisan and civil resistance.[64] ISW has previously assessed that Russian occupation authorities are unlikely to be able to stage sham referenda in occupied regions by the supposed early September deadline.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/01/09/2022/6310b85b9a7947534d713d02?from=newsfeed; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/860317; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2022/09/01/938745-putin-nazval-tselyu-spetsoperatsii-likvidatsiyu-antirossiiskogo-anklava
[2] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/67843
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cGTzKpzO-0&t=1991s; https://poglyad dot tv/gromov-nazvano-noviy-rosiyskiy-dedlayn-dlya-zahoplennya-doneckoyi-oblasti-article
[10]
[11] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/09/1/7365701/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cGTzKpzO-0&t=1991s; https://tsn dot ua/ato/u-genshtabi-povidomili-napryamki-na-yaki-rf-perekidaye-dodatkovi-viyska-i-planuye-posiliti-nastup-2148232.html
[12] https://tsn dot ua/ato/u-genshtabi-povidomili-napryamki-na-yaki-rf-perekidaye-dodatkovi-viyska-i-planuye-posiliti-nastup-2148232.html
[13] https://tsn dot ua/ato/u-genshtabi-povidomili-napryamki-na-yaki-rf-perekidaye-dodatkovi-viyska-i-planuye-posiliti-nastup-2148232.html
[17] https://www dot ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3562593-vijska-rf-zaznaut-najbilsih-vtrat-na-pivdennomu-napramku-genstab.html; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cGTzKpzO-0&t=1991s
[57] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1565330117609472001; https://vk dot com/club2178627?w=wall-2178627_211230
[58] https://www dot pravda.com.ua/news/2022/09/1/7365701/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3cGTzKpzO-0&t=1991s
[59] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/267245612255191; https:/... ru/online/news/4779658/
[63] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/01/v-okupantiv-problemy-z-provedennyam-psevdoreferendumu/
[64] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/09/01/v-okupantiv-problemy-z-provedennyam-psevdoreferendumu/
understandingwar.org
3. China’s Gorbachev phobia
Excerpts:
The party hacks insisted that Gorbachev was primarily responsible for the Soviet collapse, because his ill-conceived reforms weakened the communist party’s grip on power. But scholars with genuine expertise regarding the Soviet Union countered that the fault rested with Gorbachev’s predecessors, particularly Leonid Brezhnev, who ruled the empire from 1964 to 1982. The political stagnation and economic malaise of the Brezhnev era left behind a regime too rotten to be reformed.
Today, judging by China’s official narrative of the Soviet collapse and enduring hostility towards Gorbachev, it’s obvious that the party hacks won the debate. But it is doubtful that China’s leaders have learned the right lesson from history.
China’s Gorbachev phobia | The Strategist
aspistrategist.org.au · by Minxin Pei · September 2, 2022
There was a time when well-meaning, if not wishful-thinking, Westerners thought that ‘China’s Gorbachev’ was the highest compliment they could pay a Chinese leader who looked like a reformer. But when Zhu Rongji, the straight-talking mayor of Shanghai, visited the US in July 1990, and some Americans called him that, the future premier was not amused. ‘I am not China’s Gorbachev’, Zhu reportedly snapped. ‘I am China’s Zhu Rongji.’
We will never know what Zhu, widely admired for implementing key reforms in the 1990s and spearheading China’s successful efforts to join the World Trade Organization, really thought about Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, who died on 30 August. What we do know for certain is that, in the eyes of most leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Gorbachev committed the unforgivable crime of causing the collapse of the Soviet Union.
At the most practical level, the CCP’s vilification of Gorbachev makes little sense. Sino-Soviet relations improved dramatically during his six-year reign. The collapse of the Soviet Union was also a geopolitical boon to China. The lethal threat from the north nearly disappeared overnight, while Central Asia, formerly part of the Soviet space, suddenly opened up, enabling China to project its power there. Most importantly, the end of the Cold War, for which Gorbachev deserves much credit, ushered in three decades of globalisation that made China’s economic rise possible.
The only plausible explanation for the CCP’s antipathy towards the former Soviet leader is its fear that what Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika accomplished in the former Soviet Union—the dissolution of a once-mighty one-party regime—might also happen in China. Chinese rulers do not share Russian President Vladimir Putin’s view that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a ‘major geopolitical catastrophe’ of the 20th century. To them, the fall of the USSR was a major ideological catastrophe that cast a shadow over their own future.
Evidence of the CCP’s lasting vicarious trauma is readily visible even today—more than three decades after Gorbachev sealed the fate of the Soviet empire. In late February, the party’s propagandists began to screen Historical Nihilism and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, a 101-minute documentary that blamed the Soviet Communist Party for failing to enforce strict censorship, particularly regarding history and Western liberal ideas.
Still, the CCP’s obsession with the Soviet collapse seems odd, given the party’s three decades of undeniable success at avoiding a similar fate. The CCP’s most obvious achievement was to gain legitimacy by delivering ever-rising standards of living. It was no coincidence that less than two months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 87-year-old Deng Xiaoping rallied a demoralised party to restart stalled reforms and prioritise economic development over everything else.
Another less well-known, but no less important, success was the CCP’s effort to prevent a Gorbachev-like reformer from rising to the top and dismantling its rule from within. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the party took extreme care in vetting its future leaders. Only officials whose political loyalty was unimpeachable would be entrusted with power.
The party also scored an unexpected propaganda coup when much of the former Soviet Union descended into chaos and economic crisis in the 1990s. By playing up the suffering of ordinary Russians, the party crafted a persuasive message to the Chinese people: putting the economy ahead of democracy is the right path.
Yet, despite the CCP’s impressive achievements in the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, it is still haunted by the legacy of Gorbachev. Some may argue that, as in all dictatorships, the party’s insecurity and paranoia have no cure. But China’s rulers have been determined to prove otherwise.
In the 1990s, the CCP’s top leadership commissioned a series of academic studies exploring the causes of the Soviet collapse. Participants in this intellectual effort included both well-respected scholars and party hacks. While they could agree on many less controversial factors, such as poor economic management, an unwinnable arms race with the United States, imperial overreach and ethno-nationalism in non-Russian republics, they argued fiercely over the role of Gorbachev.
The party hacks insisted that Gorbachev was primarily responsible for the Soviet collapse, because his ill-conceived reforms weakened the communist party’s grip on power. But scholars with genuine expertise regarding the Soviet Union countered that the fault rested with Gorbachev’s predecessors, particularly Leonid Brezhnev, who ruled the empire from 1964 to 1982. The political stagnation and economic malaise of the Brezhnev era left behind a regime too rotten to be reformed.
Today, judging by China’s official narrative of the Soviet collapse and enduring hostility towards Gorbachev, it’s obvious that the party hacks won the debate. But it is doubtful that China’s leaders have learned the right lesson from history.
aspistrategist.org.au · by Minxin Pei · September 2, 2022
4. New reports detail Russia’s vast ‘filtration’ system for Ukrainians
The 95 page Yale report, "System of Filtration: Mapping Russia’s Detention Operations in Donetsk Oblast" is at this link: https://hub.conflictobservatory.org/portal/sharing/rest/content/items/7d1c90eb89d3446f9e708b87b69ad0d8/data
There will need to be Nuremberg Trials after this war to deal with all of Russia's atrocities. (Of course I know that is unlikely to happen).
Excerpts:
In late June, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk put the number of Ukrainians forcibly moved to Russia at 1.2 million, while Russia has said nearly 2.5 million Ukrainian “refugees” had moved to the country.
Still, much remains unknown about the filtration system, including how Russian authorities are using the data they collect and where many who were detained or transferred to Russia have ended up.
“This report is really to serve as a foundation for further investigation, advocacy and hopefully access by the international community to these sites that constitute, to be clear, a human rights emergency,” Raymond sai
New reports detail Russia’s vast ‘filtration’ system for Ukrainians
The Washington Post · by Claire Parker · September 1, 2022
Moscow and its separatist allies in Ukraine have forcibly transferred hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to Russia since the start of the war, according to U.S. officials and human rights investigators, sending many through a vast and punitive “filtration” system that includes detentions, interrogations and mass data collection.
The system operates in Russian-occupied areas and is overseen by the Kremlin, which is using “advanced technology” to gather data on Ukrainian citizens, a State Department official said in a briefing with reporters on Wednesday.
In recent days, two reports — from the New York-based Human Rights Watch and Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab — have shed new light on the scale of the filtration network and its impact on civilians. Both reports say there is evidence the system violates the laws of war.
The forcible transfer or deportation of civilians from occupied territory is prohibited under the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the conduct of armed conflict. Moscow denies allegations it has forcibly relocated residents — instead claiming that Russian forces are “protecting” civilians from Ukrainian troops.
“We do have information that officials from Russia’s presidential administration are overseeing and coordinating these filtration operations,” Emma Gilligan, a senior expert with the State Department’s Office of Global Criminal Justice, told reporters Wednesday.
“We also know that Russia is using advanced technology to facilitate filtration processes, including for the purposes of collecting data on Ukrainian citizens,” she said.
In its report released Thursday, Human Rights Watch described the filtration system in Ukraine as a “mass illegal data collection exercise” with “no legal underpinnings.”
Residents are funneled to registration sites, where they are screened and released or detained. Some Ukrainians have disappeared, according to Human Rights Watch, or were deported to Russia without identification documents.
Ukrainians who go through the system have had their phone contacts downloaded, fingerprints and photographs taken and passport numbers collected, according to the Yale report, which was published last week.
The researchers said they found “with high confidence” that Russian and allied forces in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine have used 21 sites for “filtration operations.”
The sites include registration points, temporary holding facilities, interrogation centers and prisons for long-term detention.
The scale of the filtration system is “significant,” Nathaniel Raymond, executive director of the Humanitarian Research Lab, said at the same briefing with reporters on Wednesday. The lab’s report is part of the Conflict Observatory, a State Department-supported initiative to document Russian war crimes in Ukraine.
One of the locations identified by the report includes a school in Bezimenne, a village east of Mariupol. In May, The Washington Post geolocated video clips showing the school, where men forcibly taken from Mariupol were detained, made to sleep on the floor and threatened with torture and execution, according to a Telegram post accompanying the footage.
Satellite images and videos also verified by The Post in March showed Russian-backed forces building a tent city in the area. Russian authorities described it at the time as a “life-supporting” center for refugees from Mariupol, while Ukrainian leaders accused Russia of taking residents to “filtration camps” against their will.
New #ConflictObservatory report by @HRL_YaleSPH maps a system of filtration facilities to screen Ukrainian civilians, combatants (including potential prisoners of war), and others in Donetsk oblast beginning in March 2022. https://t.co/PkugnPZd8h pic.twitter.com/IhxdwmxUsP
— ObserveConflict (@ObserveConflict) August 25, 2022
According to Human Rights Watch, some Ukrainians traveled to Russia voluntarily, including men who wanted to avoid martial law in Ukraine, which bars most military-age men from leaving the country.
It remains unclear exactly how many Ukrainians have been deported to Russia, or even subjected to the “filtration” screening process. In July, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that Russia had deported 900,000 to 1.6 million Ukrainian citizens — and that many of those “forcibly deported,” including 260,000 children, have ended up in Russia’s Far East.
In late June, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk put the number of Ukrainians forcibly moved to Russia at 1.2 million, while Russia has said nearly 2.5 million Ukrainian “refugees” had moved to the country.
Still, much remains unknown about the filtration system, including how Russian authorities are using the data they collect and where many who were detained or transferred to Russia have ended up.
“This report is really to serve as a foundation for further investigation, advocacy and hopefully access by the international community to these sites that constitute, to be clear, a human rights emergency,” Raymond said.
The Washington Post · by Claire Parker · September 1, 2022
5. The military’s sexual assault problem is only getting worse
We cannot deny this problem exists or bury our heads in the sand. But what can be done?
The military’s sexual assault problem is only getting worse
militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · September 1, 2022
More incidents, less reporting, plummeting confidence in the system to get justice ― those are the takeaways from the Defense Department’s most recent annual sexual assault prevention and response report, released Thursday.
For years, officials have couched increases in sexual assault reports by claiming that survivors are becoming more comfortable with reporting, but for 2021, that math doesn’t bear out.
A survey measuring prevalence of sexual assault, including whether survivors filed reports, lines up neatly with official report counts, showing that not only is unwanted sexual contact rising, but fewer people are opting to report it, and fewer perpetrators are being legally punished.
So this year, officials aren’t couching it anymore: it’s not good. The report estimates that more than 8% of female service members experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2021, the highest rate since the department began counting in 2004. For men, it was the second-highest figure, at 1.5%.
“And what I want to emphasize is, these numbers are extremely disappointing,” Beth Foster, DoD’s director of force resiliency, told Military Times on Wednesday. “They’re tragic, they’re frustrating, but I do believe that we can change this trajectory and I believe that the department has a plan in place to do so.”
There is a bit of nuance in the prevalence estimates since they began in 2006, as they’re based on a department-wide survey. Sixteen years ago, there was one question covering sexual assault. In 2014, that became a series of very specific questions meant to catch multiple types of unwanted contact.
RELATED
17 years on, military sexual assault prevention is ‘early in development’: Pentagon report
Evaluations of 20 installations found that prevention efforts aren't where they need to be.
For 2021, those questions were scaled back somewhat, under guidance that the numerous graphic questions in the list could be putting people off from answering them.
As they have in the past, the extrapolated estimates show that women in the Marine Corps faced the most unwanted sexual contact incidents ― 13.4%, up from 10.7% in 2018 ― and men in the Navy were the most affected ― 2.1%, up from 1% in 2018.
Overall, the department counted 7,260 sexual assault reports in calendar year 2021, out of an estimated 35,900 incidents, for a 20% reporting rate.
That figure has fallen significantly since the last survey in 2018, when the reporting rate was pegged at 30%. The past two surveys mark the first times the reporting rate has dropped since 2012, when it was 11%.
Not surprisingly, confidence in the military’s sexual assault response system has plummeted as well. In 2021, 63% of male troops were confident that their chain of command would “treat them with dignity and respect” after reporting an assault, down from 82% in 2018.
For women, their confidence dropped from 66% to 39% during the same time period.
Prosecutions are also down. In 2013, the services started court-martial proceedings in 71% of the 1,187 cases that ended in discipline, the highest number recorded. Since then, the numbers have fallen steadily, including a drop from 49% in 2018 to 42% in 2021, with 1,974 cases.
At the same time, the number of perpetrators given nonjudicial punishment, or administrative punishment including involuntary separation, has creeped up. In 2013, 12% of cases resulted in administrative action. In 2021 it was 27%. And nonjudicial punishments are up to 31% from 18% in 2013.
Some of that may reflect survivors’ wishes, according to the deputy director of DoD’s Sexual Assault and Prevention Office.
Anecdotally, Nate Galbreath said, that reflects survivors becoming more comfortable with disciplinary options, more often choosing not to participate in a court-martial process, in favor of nonjudicial or administrative punishments for their assailants.
“In other words, people come in and they’re assigned their special victim counsel, and they’re given the full spectrum of what you can do. You can go to court-martial, you can do this, you can do that,” he said. “And by and large, victims have chosen to participate in disciplinary actions where they don’t have to testify. And I don’t have to tell you, nobody likes to go out in front of a court-martial, public forum, and have their judgment or their morals questioned, right?”
Galbreath added that this has been the case with special victims counsel he’s spoken to, but couldn’t say whether survivors might also be shying away from trial because of pressure from their peers or their chain of command.
So what now?
It’s been 17 years since the Pentagon was first ordered to set up its SAPR office, and in that time, resources have tended to be focused on response, in the form of resources for survivors.
The services, in the past few years, have begun to shift their attention toward prevention, as more than a decade of PowerPoint slides and “don’t rape” lectures haven’t sunken in.
“This is really tough, and we’re going to talk through that,” Foster, the force resiliency director, said. “But we’ve got the way forward. We just need to double down on our efforts to get after this.”
RELATED
Pentagon unveils new sexual assault response plan - with a deadline of up to 8 years
The four-part plan will be implemented over the next eight years.
Much of that will include implementing more than 80 recommendations from an independent commission that convened in 2021. While several points cover training and education, there is little detail on what new modalities could make the difference.
There are, however, dozens of initiatives that would strengthen the response side, and perhaps not only give troops confidence that the system will work for them, but whose outcomes might discourage perpetrators.
Those include automatic involuntary discharges for substantiated sexual harassment, independent investigators and prosecutors for sexual assault cases, and professional victim advocates.
Another effort, being undertaken in different ways by the services, is more thorough evaluations of commanders and leaders designed to catch poor judgment or lack of action on sexual assault before they are promoted to higher positions, because research shows that toxic command climates are a breeding ground for harassment and assault.
The review commission also recommended publicizing courts-martial results for sexual assault or harassment, to show both survivors and perpetrators that the chain of command will be transparent.
“And so that is one of the things that each of the judge advocate offices have been tasked to do,” Galbreath said. “And so that information will be available. Whether someone looks or not is another issue, but it will be available.”
About Meghann Myers
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.
6. Some of the first troops into Afghanistan celebrate victories, lament failures
Some of the first troops into Afghanistan celebrate victories, lament failures
foxnews.com · by Michael Lee | Fox News
Video
Afghanistan under Taliban rule threatens the entire world — and not just through terrorism
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This article is part of a Fox News Digital series examining the consequences of the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan one year ago this week.
Americans involved in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan took part in one of the most unique victories in U.S. military history, but some have expressed sadness over the way the war ended nearly 20 years later.
"There was no reason to leave Afghanistan… just like I don't believe there was any reason to leave Iraq at that time," Perry Blackburn, the founder of AFG Free and a former commander with 5th Special Forces group during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, told Fox News Digital.
Blackburn, one of the first veterans of America's longest war, expressed sadness over how the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan concluded, noting the people the U.S. left behind when it departed the country and arguing that American military power could have still helped bring about generational change in Afghanistan.
While the chaotic images from America's slipshod evacuation effort in Kabul a year ago are a fresh memory for many, the picture in Afghanistan was not always so bleak.
COMPASSION OR COWARDICE: WHY ASHRAF GHANI LEFT AFGHANISTAN
Perry Blackburn, founder of AFG Free and a former commander with 5th Special Forces Group, with Special forces teammates and Afghan allies during 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. (Fox News)
The 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was one of the most unique victories in U.S. military history, coming just months after the September 11 terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 people.
Using a small footprint of special operations troops and CIA operatives, U.S. forces began teaming up with friendly Afghan forces less than a month after the terrorist attacks and set out to destroy al-Qaeda and topple the Taliban government.
The mission was perfect for the U.S. Army's Special Forces – best known as Green Berets – who use their language skills and knowledge of local geopolitics to work with native populations and train local forces for combat operations.
"We flew in under the cover of darkness…. everything we've been trained to do… to conduct unconventional warfare," Blackburn told Fox News Digital. "We were able to link up with a warlord and begin to conduct training and operations with friendly forces that were going to be partnered with."
AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL, 1 YEAR LATER: TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF KABUL THAT PRESIDENT BIDEN NEVER SAW COMING
Perry Blackburn, founder of AFG Free and a former commander with 5th Special Forces group during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan (Fox News)
Blackburn, a member of 5th Special Forces group's famed "Horse Soldiers" who were among the first on the ground, characterized the invasion phase of the war in Afghanistan as a resounding success.
"I think it was an overwhelming success… an incredible success," Blackburn said. "What this Special Forces Group was able to do… has never been done in the history of warfare that I've ever seen."
While Blackburn's unit received Hollywood treatment in 2018 with "12 Strong: The Declassified True Story of the Horse Soldiers," he noted that he and his comrades did not think much of their use of horses during the invasion. Adapting to the environment and finding ways to achieve complex objectives are part of the job description for Special Forces troops, something Blackburn believes the Army's elite group of soldiers carried out expertly in the early days of America's longest war.
"I didn't think this whole ‘Horse Soldier’ thing was that big of a deal… it's what we do. We adapt to the environment that we're in to close with the enemy and defeat them," Blackburn said. "The speed and lethality that we had, working with our Air Force partners, is what made us so successful so quickly."
WHITE HOUSE DRAFTS MEMO DEFENDING AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL
Retired Master Sergeant Keith Gamble, who was also a member of the 5th Special Forces Group soldiers making the initial push into Afghanistan, painted a similar story of the invasion's success.
"It was really good… exactly what we train for as Special Forces soldiers," Gamble told Fox News Digital.
Soldiers with 5th Special Forces Group in Afghanistan in 2001. (Fox News)
The retired Green Beret recalled that he was in a classified class on the morning of September 11, 2001, which happened to be covering how to deal with terrorists on an aircraft. Three weeks later, he would be on the ground in Afghanistan, a mission he and his team were eager to carry out after the terrorist attacks.
"Those guys had no clue what just hit them," Gamble said of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. "We basically dropped bombs every single day for a month.… We fought every day and every now and then there was only a little bit of resistance."
FORMER AFGHAN PRESIDENT GIVES REASON FOR FLEEING, SAYS HE WANTS TO RETURN AND 'HELP MY COUNTRY HEAL'
Gamble said that his small team kept a low profile and kept opposing forces guessing about where they would strike next. They traveled in the back of vans, while journalists covering the war attempting to figure out where they were had little luck finding them.
U.S. forces and their Afghan partners rapidly degraded al-Qaeda's ability to operate and toppled the Taliban government less than three months into the war effort, an accomplishment made even more stunning by the small footprint of American forces on the ground.
Perry Blackburn, founder of AFG Free and a former commander with 5th Special Forces group, trains an Afghan fighter during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan (Fox News)
Taliban leadership and fighters began to flee into the mountains, blend with the local population and seek refuge in neighboring Pakistan. They would eventually regroup and mount an insurgency that led to America's longest military conflict.
The U.S. involvement in that conflict came to an abrupt end last year, with the scenes of the American withdrawal still leaving a bad taste in the mouths of the troops first into the country over two decades ago.
HOW SIGNIFICANT IS RESISTANCE TO THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN?
"I think if we would have stayed with a small footprint, we wouldn't have the problems we have now," Blackburn said. "We would not have the issue with leaving American citizens behind, with what America's ideals are when it comes to its citizens. We showed the world that were willing to betray our citizens."
The former Green Beret believes that a smaller footprint of American military could have stayed behind and helped secure the country, if not to bring about the generational change America had promised, then at the very least to help secure the exit of American citizens and Afghan allies who helped the U.S. war effort.
Blackburn also expressed remorse for the loved ones of Americans who lost their lives in Afghanistan and wondered how they must have felt during the final days of the war.
Retired Master Sergeant Keith Gamble with 5th Special Forces group during 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. (Fox News)
"I can't imagine, as a parent, watching what that looked like last August in Afghanistan, when your son or daughter was killed there for a cause, then you watched that happen," Blackburn said. "For me, there's no other description other than our government betrayed the ideals of what we as Americans and a military fights force are about."
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Gamble, who returned to Afghanistan in 2018 and then again as a contractor in 2020, said he saw the warning signs that the Afghan military would collapse without American support. He argued that the U.S. should have kept control of Bagram Air Base and slowly evacuated people from the country. However, he noted that closing the base and opting for a rapid drawdown led to almost certain disaster.
"For the last 20 years, we were working with tons of people over there and they're still there," Gamble said. "They are basically hiding for their lives right now because once the Taliban get a hold of them… they're dead.
"I feel bad that we basically just left them," he continued. "We said we were going to help them and then we just bounced."
Michael Lee is a writer at Fox News. Follow him on Twitter @UAMichaelLee
foxnews.com · by Michael Lee | Fox News
7. Why Not A Phased Withdrawal From Afghanistan?
My snarky comment is that it was a phased withdrawal. Just in one phase. (apologies for sarcasm)
Bill Roggio offers some alternate scenarios that should have been considered.
Why Not A Phased Withdrawal From Afghanistan?
19fortyfive.com · by Bill Roggio · September 1, 2022
One year after the Biden administration’s chaotic exit from Afghanistan, the results are undeniable. The country has become a haven for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The Taliban is as oppressive today as it was during its iron-fisted rule prior to 9/11. The world is also less safe.
It didn’t have to be this way. In April 2021, when President Biden announced his plan for Afghanistan, he gave us a false choice: the U.S. either had to ramp up forces to battle the Taliban or abide by President Trump’s disastrous agreement with the Taliban and immediately leave. Biden never considered a phased withdrawal that would’ve given the U.S.-backed government in Kabul sufficient time to reorganize its defenses and fall back to a perimeter its troops could hold rather than pretending to govern the entire country.
Ultimately, Biden chose an immediate withdrawal, hoping the Kabul government would survive long enough to become someone else’s problem. He ignored numerous warnings that Kabul would fall within weeks of an American departure.
As forecasted, the Taliban seized upon the hasty pullout of U.S. forces – and immediately went on the offensive in the three and a half months between Biden’s announcement of withdrawal and the moment the last U.S. soldier departed Kabul.
The Taliban’s offensive was swift and effective. By the end of July, the Taliban controlled or contested three-quarters of the country. Kabul fell on Aug. 15, 2021. By the time the last soldier’s boots were on a plane outbound on August 30, 2021, only Panjshir, the last bastion of anti-Taliban forces, remained. Panjshir fell less than two weeks later.
After nearly 20 years of fighting, the Taliban had something it couldn’t dream of before 9/11 – a country fully under its control, with billions of dollars in U.S. weapons, and much more in munitions, fuel, military and police bases, and functioning government institutions.
Biden was determined to leave Afghanistan, consequences be damned. The false choice he offered – withdrawal or renewed U.S. commitment – ensured that the former was chosen. The American public and much of the U.S. political class tired of the so-called ‘endless’ wars and sought to disengage from Afghanistan and other terrorist hotspots.
Still, Afghanistan didn’t have to become what it is today. A phased withdrawal would’ve given a fighting chance to Afghans who didn’t want to succumb to the harsh rule of the Taliban.
This option was never considered because it wouldn’t have been pretty. It would have required the Afghan government to make painful choices about which swathes of the country would be left to the Taliban so that the remainder would become defensible.
What would a phased withdrawal have looked like? First, after a two-decade presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, Afghan decision makers were never convinced the U.S. would leave. The U.S. needed to make clear this was, in fact, going to happen, but it would be done in a manner that would give the Afghan government and military an opportunity to reorient to fight the Taliban on its own. The Afghans needed to regroup, and the U.S. needed to give them that time.
The Afghan people needed a wartime leader who could make hard choices and a government that was responsive to local needs. The former warlords, who were largely excluded from the government and left sitting on the sidelines as the Taliban rampaged, needed to be brought back into the fold to shore up support.
The Afghan military needed to restructure to wean itself from U.S. combat support technology and fight without the complicated weapons systems that required American maintenance.
Additionally, the Afghan government and military needed to make the difficult decision of what it could – and more importantly – could not defend. When Biden announced the withdrawal, much of the south and east were under effective Taliban control or heavily contested. Without a U.S. presence, the Afghans needed to pull back, defend Kabul and surrounding provinces, and retake key districts in the north and northwest.
Image: U.S. Army Flickr.
This choice would have effectively created a Northern Alliance 2.0, where Afghans who resisted Taliban rule carved out territory and battled the terror group.
This would be by no means an optimal solution, and there are no assurances it would have succeeded. It would have required patience and an ongoing U.S. commitment. But it was a solution that could have precluded the complete and swift collapse of the country to the butchers of the Taliban.
Not only would a Northern Alliance 2.0 outcome have benefited all Afghans who sought to avoid oppressive Taliban rule, but it would also have given the U.S. a foothold to monitor and target threats inside Afghanistan. The presence of Ayman al Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s leader, in Kabul just one month ago is a reminder that the Taliban-Al Qaeda alliance is alive and well, and the terror group’s top-tier leaders are being provided safe harbor there.
The strike that killed Zawahiri took months to plan and execute and by all accounts, was a difficult endeavor given the challenges of time and distance that are inherent in over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations. A Northern Alliance 2.0 would have allowed the U.S. to base CIA, special forces, drones, and other aircraft needed to effectively monitor terror groups in Afghanistan and strike swiftly when needed.
The Biden administration never offered this option. It was all or nothing. America’s national security is now suffering, and the Afghan people have nothing.
Bill Roggio is a senior fellow at FDD and editor of FDD’s Long War Journal, which provides original reporting and analysis of the Global War on Terror from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, Iran, and beyond. He is also president of the nonprofit media company Public Multimedia Inc.
19fortyfive.com · by Bill Roggio · September 1, 2022
8. A Reminder that the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs actually exists
The regular reminder from Matt Armstrong.
Please go to the link to view the graphic of the excel spreadsheet on the history of the Under Secretary position. https://mountainrunner.us/2022/08/whither-r-2/
As a nation, if we want to be serious about political warfare, information and influence activities, information warfare, etc, we should have an aggressive and fully functional Office of Public Diplomacy (among other positions throughout the interagency).
Excerpt:
One could argue this office is no longer necessary, but I have not seen one discussion around the need to continue or discontinue this office, substantive or otherwise. One would think the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, whose very job is to provide oversight and advocacy over “public diplomacy” might opine on this topic. It might at least raise a flag of concern or a nod of support, but as far as I have seen, they have nearly assiduously avoided this glaringly obvious situation. (There are three current members of the commission: one was appointed in 2011 and whose term expired in 2013; another was appointed in 2011, reappointed in 2015, and whose term expired in 2018; and the third was first appointed well before 2011, was reappointed, and whose term also expired in 2018.)
A Reminder that the position of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs actually exists
AUGUST 31, 2022
mountainrunner.us · by View all posts by Matt Armstrong
Since 2011, I have been tracking the ridiculously short tenures of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. By the way, the average tenure is 517 days, and the median tenure is 477 days. I also tracked how often the office was empty, which was equally if not more critical since senior positions can be stressful and some churn might be expected. For example, in December 2011 when my staff at the Advisory Commission for Public Diplomacy and I first looked at the Under Secretary turnover, for the six Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs since 1999, there had been five Under Secretaries for Political Affairs in the same period. However, as of December 2011, the political affairs office lacked a confirmed appointment to the office 5% of the time, a stark difference from the public diplomacy office being empty 30% of the time. What follows is far less commentary than, say, my June 2021 post reminding people the office was empty.
Today, there has not been a confirmed appointment to the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs over 44% of the days since the position was first occupied in October 1999. Imagine in the corporate world if a division president was absent nearly seven months of every year. I’ll leave aside that each new Under Secretary brings a new concept of how the office should be run, which led to a now largely forgotten (because fewer now care?) parlor game of wondering how the new Under Secretary would redefine “public diplomacy.”
Below is a current snapshot of my Excel spreadsheet for this office:
Another measure of importance is how soon the position was filled. This is not an absolute measure, of course, but it is suggestive. In the Bush Administration, 254 days before the first Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was confirmed. There were four Under Secretaries during the eight years of the administration and an overall vacancy rate of 37%. In the Obama Administration, the first confirmed appointment happened 124 days in. The Obama Administration had three Under Secretaries and a vacancy rate of 22%. Distorting things is the Trump Administration, which did appoint an Under Secretary 316 days in, though he only lasted 100 days, resulting in a 93% vacancy rate for that administration.
The Biden Administration has yet to nominate an Under Secretary, though considering the consolidation of the (absent) Under Secretaries operational elements to create the Bureau of Global Public Affairs, I’m personally at a loss to understand what substantive role the Under Secretary would have should one get appointed. I heard a rumor a long time ago that someone would “soon” be announced, but I’m not sure who would want this job. Surely they would put significant criteria as they hopefully would learn from the shortcomings and handicapping of past Under Secretaries.
One could argue this office is no longer necessary, but I have not seen one discussion around the need to continue or discontinue this office, substantive or otherwise. One would think the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, whose very job is to provide oversight and advocacy over “public diplomacy” might opine on this topic. It might at least raise a flag of concern or a nod of support, but as far as I have seen, they have nearly assiduously avoided this glaringly obvious situation. (There are three current members of the commission: one was appointed in 2011 and whose term expired in 2013; another was appointed in 2011, reappointed in 2015, and whose term expired in 2018; and the third was first appointed well before 2011, was reappointed, and whose term also expired in 2018.)
mountainrunner.us · by View all posts by Matt Armstrong
9. A Strategist’s Cast of Characters: The Critical Attributes and Skills of Strategic Decision-Makers
A thoughtful (and thought provoking and interesting) essay worthy of reflection. (and why we still need to read the classics - but if you do not have time to read them all I recommend Charles Hill's book on Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order which offers a good overview of the classics and beyond as applied to grand strategy)
Conclusion:
Gaddis recommends that “if you turn your ideas into animals, they’ll achieve immortality.”[47] The attributes and abilities of a strategic decision-maker lend themselves well to such characterization, not as animals, but as part of three particular mythical embodiments. First, the Greek Muses Melpomene and Thalia, representing the opposites of tragedy and comedy, remind strategic decision-makers of the importance of appropriately balancing tensions. Second, the two faces of the Roman God Janus represent the strategic decision-makers’ requirement to properly draw lessons from the past and make forecasts regarding the future. Those historical analogies and future predictions can drive better informed decisions. Contemplation and discernment, attributes of the many headed cherubim, are critical to strategic decision-makers. They must be able to recognize cognitive biases and use tools and frameworks to judge well and avoid the downfalls of those biases. Finally, strategic decision-makers should seek to uphold the attributes of Lady Justice by impartially balancing evidence and taking action to ensure the achievement of justice. Strategic decision-makers must embody these characters, embrace their attributes, and utilize their abilities to build a successful strategy.
A Strategist’s Cast of Characters: The Critical Attributes and Skills of Strategic Decision-Makers
thestrategybridge.org · September 2, 2022
Earlier this year, The Strategy Bridge asked civilian and military students around the world to participate in our sixth annual student writing contest on the subject of strategy.
Now, we are pleased to present one of the Third Place winners from Roni Yadlin, a recent graduate of the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School.
Since the day when Thespis made dramatic history and first took to the stage as a character in a play, the ancient Greeks used theatrical productions to provide social commentary, impart lessons, and inspire action. These publicly funded events helped the audience understand their history and role in society. The Greek use of drama imbued a tragic sensibility in the citizenry, warned them of dangers facing their community, reminded them of their responsibility to the collective and helped them develop national strategy.[1]
A key tool in these dramas was symbolic characterization in which the characters on stage represented moral concepts and imparted desired lessons. Greek drama was itself embodied in the masks representing Melpomene, the Muse of tragedy, and Thalia, the Muse of comedy. This concept of characterization also provides an allegorical framework through which to consider some of the critical characteristics and skills necessary for strategists. Strategists need to have the ability to reconcile and balance opposing tensions, as represented by Thalia and Melpomene, engage in both reflection of the past and anticipation of the future like the Roman God Janus, emulate the contemplation and discernment of Judeo-Christian cherubim, and seek the aims of the embodiment of Lady Justice.
Melopmene, Ny Carlsberg Glyptothek, Copenhagen (Wolfgang Sauber/Wikimedia)
Originating in ancient Greece, the smiling and crying faces of Thalia and Melpomene still symbolize drama today. These characters, embodying comedy and tragedy, represent opposites in life and the tensions between them. Although strategic decision-makers are concerned with issues extending far beyond drama, they must know how to balance the tensions they encounter.
Roman statue of Muse Thalia, Spanish Royal Collection (Ana Belén Cantero Paz/Wikimedia)
Intelligence, according to F. Scott Fitzgerald and quoted by John Lewis Gaddis, is “the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function.”[2] This concept of holding two ideas simultaneously, whether they are directly opposing or not, represents the need for strategic decision-makers to balance. Strategy is a complex process that comprises a number of elements in a world where chance, uncertainty and ambiguity are ever-present.[3] The complexity inherent in strategic challenges presents decision-makers with conflicting priorities and concerns. Strategic success requires the ability to maintain equilibrium between those competing imperatives.
There are many avenues through which strategists can develop the skills required to adequately balance tensions. Carl von Clausewitz argues military leaders can gain their requisite knowledge and skills through reflection, study, thought, and experience.[4] St. Augustine frames his teachings as checklists that provide recommendations, rather than prescriptions.[5] This kind of framework allows those who use it to react to changing circumstances and become comfortable with contradictions.
Strategic decision-makers must balance the tensions inherent in their own minds. They also need to resolve the structural tensions within the strategic decision-making landscape. Because strategy is the “alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities,” strategists need to be able to balance competing goals and requirements.[6]
Determining priorities among the various aspirations and appropriately managing all the tools of national power is an exercise in balancing tensions.[7] Additional tensions arise from the opposing desires and motivations of individuals within the decision-making apparatus. Each participant in the decision-making structure, be they individual or a collective, has their own goals, objectives, and motivations.
Consequently, strategic decision-makers must balance these often-conflicting priorities to reach a single choice. These decisions will likely be the product of the pulling and hauling of political bargaining and not match the desire of any particular player.[8] President Barack Obama’s decision to intervene in Libya, albeit in a limited and restricted role, demonstrated one such instance of political decision-making. Differing recommendations, as well as potential political and financial costs, led to a compromise that did not entirely reflect the desires of any particular party, but it was ultimately a successful strategic intervention.[9] Because of the complexity inherent in strategic choices, the ability to balance both individual and group tensions, to include those that are in direct opposition to each other, is a critical requirement for strategic decision-makers.
Thalia and Melpomene are two different characters who represent opposing tensions. By contrast, the Roman god Janus is a single character with two faces, one looking forward and the other backward. Strategic decision-makers must similarly look both forward and back; they need the ability to appropriately reflect on the past and forecast the future. Strategists routinely look to historical analogy when confronted with difficult situations, but they often learn the wrong lessons and thus make bad decisions.[10]
A Roman coin depicting Janus (Britannica)
Analogies provide useful shortcuts, but they obscure aspects of the present that may differ from the past.[11] When considering American intervention in Vietnam, President Lyndon Johnson drew connections to the 1938 Munich negotiations and the Korean War to inform his decision-making. These events did not, however, accurately mirror the current situation and instead the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu may have been a more appropriate historical analogy.[12]
Hindsight can contaminate judgment and decision-making.[13] When looking backwards, decision-makers are prone to outcome bias and may judge past choices not on the quality of the decision but on the desirability of the outcome. This is evident in the belief that officials in the George W. Bush administration should have anticipated and prevented the attacks of September 1. Because of the emotional desire to have avoided the trauma of the attack, hindsight caused observers to point to intelligence reports prior to the event as overwhelming evidence of its impending occurrence.[14]
Strategic decision-makers need to temper the lessons they draw from history with an understanding of the pitfalls of analogizing. To do so, Yeun Foong Khong recommends using analogies whose lessons appear more ambiguous. This forces decision-makers to augment their answers elsewhere and seek several relevant past occurrences, rather than rely solely on a single historical instance.[15] Colin Gray suggests that historical analogies are useful to strategists so long as they approach their analysis of the past on different levels.[16] By considering the analogy at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, and garnering specific conclusions from each strata, decision-makers can avoid some of the traps of misapplying historical analogy.
In addition to historical analogies, strategists can use their own experiences to ground their strategies in lessons from the past. This can also be fraught with difficulty. Firsthand experiences often exercise too great an influence on a person’s predispositions. The impact a past event had on a decision-maker will influence the likelihood that they attempt to apply that event to their current situation. If, for example, the event was particularly traumatic or brought the individual significant attention, it will weigh heavier in their mind.[17] Firsthand experiences also contribute to the illusion of familiarity. Familiarity is confused with truth such that personal experiences bias expectations and lessons learned.[18]
French officer David Galula was successful in his counterinsurgency efforts in the Greater Kabylia district of Algeria. However, this success proved detrimental when he tried to apply the same tactics and strategy to the Bordj Menaiel sector.[19] His previous successes blinded him, and this made him unable to recognize differences between the two regions and fail to see how those differences would impact the utility and effectiveness of the strategy.
Despite the risks inherent in learning from experience, there are still significant benefits to using the past to make strategic decisions. J.F.C Fuller argues that all knowledge is derived from experience and that through observation and reflection, that knowledge can drive a decision. Without experience, strategists cannot develop the reason required to make decisions and formulate strategy.[20] Emile Simpson defines strategy as a dialogue between theory and experience. Simpson asserts that effective strategy requires balance between those factors.[21] Examining the past, through both historical analogy and personal experience, provides strategists context to apply to and frame their decision-making.
In addition to appropriately interpreting the past, strategists must also make reasonable and useful predictions about the future. There are pitfalls in this endeavor as well, some of which are related to the difficulties of understanding the past. Because it is easy to construct plausible narratives about what has previously happened, individuals develop the illusion that they understand the past. This gives them overconfidence in their ability to predict the future.[22]
In addition to heuristic biases, strategists must grapple with the presence of chance and uncertainty when making their predictions about the future. Clausewitz considers uncertainty and chance two of the elements that make up the climate of war and includes chances in his trinity. Because of the presence of uncertainty and chance, guesswork and luck become a significant part of war and strategy.[23] Additionally, the presence of chance precludes strategists from controlling circumstances enough to ensure they can achieve their desired effects.[24]
The German parachute assault on the Maleme airfield on Crete suffered from several setbacks related to chance. First, excessive dust from the propellers of the aircraft prior to takeoff disrupted the planned spacing of the aircraft and drops. Additionally, the tow-rope of the glider flown by the operational commander General Wilhem Sussmann snapped, and he crashed to his death. Finally, the Germans had little control over their parachutes and thus many of them landed in water, drowning nearly immediately. Chance so completely impacted the effectiveness of the parachute assault that Adolf Hitler refused to approve another parachute operation for the remainder of the war.[25]
Despite the inherent difficulties, strategy nonetheless requires prediction. Decision-makers can employ several tools and frameworks to make reasonable and useful predictions. Khong recommends mitigating the dangers by subjecting predictions to a test.[26] One such test might be a “premortem” wherein decision-makers conduct a thought experiment arguing that their forecasts and plans have failed. Attempting to trace the reasons for the failure can provide decision-makers a check on their prescriptions and inspire improvements.[27] Another predictive framework involves using strategic foresight to imagine multiple futures. In this type of planning, which Herman Kahn used to contemplate nuclear strategy, decision-makers imagine a set of plausible futures and then build strategies that could be useful across a range of those futures.[28]
Having several frameworks for prediction can help provide better projections that may be more resilient to the inevitable uncertainty and chance. These projections then inform policy decisions that, when accurate, can bring strategic success. China’s Premier Deng Xiaoping chose to invade Vietnam in part because he predicted the Soviet Union would refrain from attacking China in response. Deng anticipated that moving troops away from other theaters would go against Moscow’s strategic interests and thus the Soviet Union would not pose a risk to Chinese action. This accurate forecast informed Deng’s decision-making and allowed Beijing to achieve its strategic objectives.[29]
While some strategies have a specific timeframe with which to bookend a prediction, when it comes to national objectives, strategy never ends. Everett Dolman characterizes strategy as a plan for attaining a continuing advantage and considers it an unending process seeking continuation rather than culmination.[30] This means that strategists’ foresight must have an infinite horizon. However, because of uncertainty, the future is unlikely to play out as predicted.
Therefore, strategists need to implement feedback into their strategic processes to continually adjust their plans as reality diverges from their prediction. Despite the difficulty and risk inherent in both historical analogy and future predictions, strategic decision-makers must embody Janus’s ability to look backwards and forwards to appropriately apply historical analogy and experience to their predictions for the future. This dual perspective will help them make better informed strategic decisions.
Engraved illustration of the "chariot vision" of the Biblical book of Ezekiel. (Matthäus Merian/Wikimedia)
While Janus has two faces on a single head, the Judeo-Christian cherubim, heavenly creatures described in the book of Ezekiel, each have four heads.[31] These creatures represent the highest levels of contemplation and discernment, two related attributes that are also critical to strategic decision-makers.[32] Contemplation, or considering something deeply and thoughtfully, is necessary when grappling with the difficult challenges that strategists face.
Competing priorities, limited resources and the presence of uncertainty combine to create difficult strategic problems that require contemplation. Because contemplation is a cognitive act, it is subject to cognitive biases like the tendency to address difficult questions by oversimplifying them and answering a related, but easier, question.[33] Throughout the war in Vietnam, the United States military failed to make meaningful progress towards their objectives. Rather than reevaluate their strategy and consider what changes might be necessary to achieve their political aims, the military instead focused on easy metrics of body counts, missions flown, and bombs dropped.[34] The inclination to simplify is understandable because the world is complex and strategic decision-making is difficult. However, these cognitive shortcuts sacrifice methodological rigor; strategic decision-makers cannot afford to take shortcuts and instead need to engage in contemplative thinking to address the challenging questions they face.
Like contemplation, strategic decision-makers need discernment, or the ability to judge well, so that they can reconcile the attainment of possibly unlimited ends with necessarily limited means.[35] Strategists must know how to appropriately limit the desired objectives and how to properly allocate the available capabilities. Knowing the difference between respecting constraints and denying their existence is fundamental in strategy; in fact, successful strategy rests on that ability.
President Abraham Lincoln held his objective of maintaining the Union constant, but was able to recognize shifts in his available means. Lincoln chose to curtail certain civil liberties and Constitutional protections but was not willing to suspend the Presidential election. He kept his options within the appropriate physical, emotional and moral tolerances of the time and was able to recognize and adapt as those tolerances changed.[36] In contrast, President Woodrow Wilson was unable to reconcile his means and his ends following the First World War. The goals of his Fourteen Points far exceeded the abilities of American foreign policy officials tasked with negotiating its implementation.[37] Wilson lacked the cherubim’s skill of discernment required to align his objectives and capabilities and thus achieve his strategic goals.
While the cherubim’s multiple heads allow for the wide ranging vision necessary for contemplation and discernment, strategic decision-makers must also seek the aims of a character usually depicted as blind: Lady Justice. John Lewis Gaddis argues justice should be a goal for strategic decision-makers, defining history as a search for justice through order.[38] Strategists must aim for justice both in the ends they seek and the means by which they seek them.
Statue of Lady Justice in Frankfurt, Germany (Pablo Pola Damonte/Flikr)
The just war theory of jus ad bellum is not only relevant in the direct lead-up to armed conflict. It is also pertinent long before, and independent of, the use of force. As such, jus ad bellum should guide strategists as they make decisions in times of peace.[39] Strategy should seek the common good, which loosely equates to a combination of peace, justice, and order. Other aspects of proper strategy include human life, physical security, honor, dignity, and material, moral, economic and spiritual well-being.[40] Strategists should seek to achieve these elements alongside their political objectives. B.H. Liddell Hart argues the objective of war should be a better state of peace and that strategists should consider their desired state of peace as they conduct war.[41] These ideas should drive and guide decision-makers, particularly as they consider foreign policy interactions.
Lady Justice carries a set of scales with which she balances evidence in order to render judgment and make decisions. While strategists do not necessarily balance evidence, they do need to consider a wide range of other factors when making strategy. As previously discussed, they must balance priorities, resources, and tools to achieve their aims. Additionally, strategic decision-makers often have to balance short term goals with their ultimate long-term objective, driving the choice between action and prudence. Lincoln made such a strategic choice in the timing of the Emancipation Proclamation. By understanding that many of the slave-holding Union states might defect if he freed the enslaved population too early in the war, Lincoln delayed the decision.[42] This choice required him to balance justice and expediency. He understood, as Clausewitz argued, that individual aspects of war, and by extension strategy, cannot be considered in isolation from their overall purpose. Lincoln did not allow his quest for justice in freeing the slaves to impact his overall objective of preserving the Union.[43]
As Lady Justice balances the evidence in front of her to render judgment and make decisions, she wears a blindfold. This lack of sight represents her impartiality and ability to consider evidence without regard to the status or power of either side. Strategic decision-makers must similarly be able to impartially approach their strategic challenges and put aside personal biases. Individual policymakers and political operatives are likely to have their own personal and group preferences based on the organization of which they are a member, the position they hold within that organization, and their own personal views. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue that individuals involved in decision-making will usually make recommendations that reflect his or her own preferences.[44] The final decision-maker needs to consider all the preferences of these individuals but, like Lady Justice, should do so impartially and without bias or preferential treatment.
In addition to the scales, Lady Justice carries a sword, underscoring the fact that, when she finds someone guilty, retribution may be a part of achieving justice. This desire to seek justice impelled the Obama administration to intervene in Libya and protect the values of human rights, the rule of law, and constitutional government.[45] Proponents of intervention understood that allowing Muammar Qaddafi to continue killing Libyan civilians would amount to a failure to uphold the international community’s moral responsibility to protect innocents.[46] Strategic decision-makers must compare the costs of going to war with the harm of failing to intervene and make decisions guided by justice and the common good.
Gaddis recommends that “if you turn your ideas into animals, they’ll achieve immortality.”[47] The attributes and abilities of a strategic decision-maker lend themselves well to such characterization, not as animals, but as part of three particular mythical embodiments. First, the Greek Muses Melpomene and Thalia, representing the opposites of tragedy and comedy, remind strategic decision-makers of the importance of appropriately balancing tensions. Second, the two faces of the Roman God Janus represent the strategic decision-makers’ requirement to properly draw lessons from the past and make forecasts regarding the future. Those historical analogies and future predictions can drive better informed decisions. Contemplation and discernment, attributes of the many headed cherubim, are critical to strategic decision-makers. They must be able to recognize cognitive biases and use tools and frameworks to judge well and avoid the downfalls of those biases. Finally, strategic decision-makers should seek to uphold the attributes of Lady Justice by impartially balancing evidence and taking action to ensure the achievement of justice. Strategic decision-makers must embody these characters, embrace their attributes, and utilize their abilities to build a successful strategy.
Roni Yadlin is an officer in the United States Air Force. She recently graduated from the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and is currently a PhD candidate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School. This article reflects her own views and are not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Air Force.
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Header Image: Tragic Comic masks of Ancient Greek theatre represented in the Hadrian's Villa mosaic. (Wikimedia)
Notes:
[1] John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, (New York City: Penguin Books, 2018), 62.
[2] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 14.
[3] Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking,” National War College Review 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 113.
[4] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 146.
[5] John Mark Mattox, Saint Augustine and the Theory of Just War, (London: Continuum Books, 2006), 48-49.
[6] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 21.
[7] Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of Grand Strategy,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018): 49.
[8] Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, (New York City: Longman, 1999), 255-256.
[9] Christopher Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention, (New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 65.
[10] Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 65.
[11] Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 220.
[12] Khong, Analogies at War, 97, 155, 179.
[13] Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 10.
[14] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, (New York City: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 203-204.
[15] Khong, Analogies at War, 263.
[16] Colin Gray, Strategy and Defense Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 90.
[17] Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, 239, 249.
[18] Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 62.
[19] David Galula, Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), ix, 216.
[20] J.F.C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, (Berkshire, UK: Books Express Publishing, 2012), 39, 94.
[21] Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 239-240.
[22] Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 218.
[23] Clausewitz, On War, 103, 89, 86.
[24] Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” 16.
[25] Antony Beevor, Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, (London: John Murray, 2011), 106-107, xix.
[26] Khong, Analogies at War, 247.
[27] Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 264.
[28] J. Peter Scolbic, “Learning from the Future: How to Make Robust Strategy in Times of Deep Uncertainty,” Harvard Business Review (July-August 2020): 40, 42, 47.
[29] Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 51, 121.
[30] Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 6, 4.
[31] Ez 1:5-6 ESV.
[32] David Kick, Angels and Angelology in the Middle Ages, (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1998), 60.
[33] Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 12.
[34] James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War, (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 1997), 73.
[35] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 21.
[36] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 249.
[37] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 271.
[38] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 116.
[39] James G. Murphy, War’s Ends: Human Rights, International Order, and the Ethics of Peace, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 5.
[40] Murphy, War’s Ends, 18, 192.
[41] B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, (New York City, Penguin Books: 1991), 368.
[42] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 238-39.
[43] Clausewitz, On War, 87.
[44] Allison & Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 256.
[45] Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, xv.
[46] Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi, 52.
[47] Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 6.
thestrategybridge.org · September 2, 2022
10. Funding the Indo-Pacific Pivot
Money talks, BS walks.
Excerpts;
If the budget for each of these accounts stays flat with inflation — or worse, declines — then U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has a case to make for receiving a larger share of each account. But this will still leave other Geographic Combatant Commands struggling for the money they need to compete with China’s growing influence. Due to Beijing’s global ambitions and reach, each of the Geographic Combatant Commands has a legitimate claim in each of these funding categories. Even if the budget for each account is increased in real terms — thereby raising the funding across theaters overall — Congress should still consider where each additional dollar will have the greatest impact.
As Congress looks to conference — the annual effort to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act — two House provisions will be critical for determining how to treat these accounts and should be maintained in the final bill. Section 1201 requires enhanced reporting on where and how dollars within several of these accounts are allocated. This also itemizes the activities they support — such as the estimated execution costs to complete all Section 345 Department of Defense training activities. I also supported section 1305, which directs U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to submit an annual report on opportunities to enhance defense cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities. Both reports will deliver critical information to Congress as policymakers seek to determine the adequacy of funding for these accounts and where improvements can be made.
The results of these reports should inform two decisions from lawmakers. First, we should commit to delivering consistent real funding increases for accounts that directly improve the ability of the United States to leverage and deepen relationships with partners and allies around the world. Second, we should ensure that such funding increases are distributed appropriately between theaters and prioritize the Indo-Pacific. America’s international partners remain one of its greatest strengths. We in Congress should ensure that we are using all the tools available to us to deepen our work with other nations to secure a more peaceful, prosperous, and stable future.
Funding the Indo-Pacific Pivot - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Rep. Rob Wittman · September 2, 2022
In recent years, lawmakers on the Armed Services Committees in Congress have attempted to work with Republican and Democratic administrations to strengthen the posture of the United States military in the Indo-Pacific and confront the challenge posed by China. Yet U.S. efforts to truly align resources accordingly have been frustrated since President Barack Obama’s administration first acknowledged that a shift was required.
Most analyses of this “say-do gap” in U.S. defense policy rightly point to inadequate investments in military equipment or mismatched regional force allocations. However, focusing on other defense budget categories can help better target investment toward the Indo-Pacific theater. Specific funding accounts within the defense budget reflect a snapshot of how the Department of Defense distributes resources across the Geographic Combatant Commands to strengthen relationships with regional partners. Within these accounts, funding shifts to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command came surprisingly late in the 2010s and early 2020s, if they materialized at all. Unfortunately, such delays have consequences — the United States cannot surge trust and relies heavily on friendships with Indo-Pacific nations to uphold its interests in the region.
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To address this, I recently requested that the annual Department of Defense budget documents submitted to Congress provide separate, region-specific funding exhibits for security cooperation programs across the U.S. military. The United States is balancing higher resource demands in Europe with efforts to reassure Indo-Pacific partners that U.S. regional commitments remain strong. At this critical juncture, policymakers should understand how different types of defense dollars are distributed between theaters. This will facilitate informed spending decisions, and enable America to strengthen its alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
Counting Where It Counts
The first area lawmakers should be paying closer attention to is the International Security Cooperation Programs. This account funds “activities aimed at building partner capacity to address shared national security challenges and operate in tandem with or in lieu of U.S. forces.” Specifically, it includes funding for institutional capacity building, train-and-equip programs, and the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.
Established by the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 114-92, Sec. 1263), the Maritime Security Initiative was originally created as a five-year program to address regional security concerns in the Indo-Pacific and specifically in countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
In its FY2019 budget request, the Department of Defense also started reporting on the contents of a new account through Section 333 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. This covers a range of activities like military intelligence operations and maritime and border security operations. While consolidation of these previously distinct authorities under Section 333 has had some drawbacks — such as increased competition between Geographic Combatant Commands for relevant activity funding — it has also provided a new avenue of analysis for how U.S. security cooperation funding is distributed.
Figure 1
International Security Cooperation Accounts Program funds broken down by Global Combatant Command. Source: Congressional Research Service.
For the past three years, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has received between roughly 21-26 percent of annual International Security Cooperation Programs funding, measured against all other Geographic Combatant Commands and related global program support costs. A substantial and noticeable increase occurred between FY2019 and FY2020 when U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s share of jumped from 16 percent to 26 percent, before hitting 21 percent in FY2021. That is an important improvement. The overall International Security Cooperation Programs account only increased by $29 million in nominal terms in FY2020, for example, but U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s share of the pot jumped over $100 million. While encouraging, Washington should be concerned that policymakers have been discussing a pivot to the Indo-Pacific since at least 2011, yet only saw real resource shifts beginning in FY2016 with the establishment of the Maritime Security Initiative and again four years later in FY2020. Lurching steps are better than nothing, but they reflect reactive attempts at urgency, not the sustained attention over time that U.S. partners should expect.
The second area lawmakers should focus on is the Regional Defense Fellowship Program, covered by Section 345. This authorizes funding for training and educational opportunities for senior and mid-level defense and security officials in partner nations. It is crucial for building relationships and strengthening the ability of partner militaries to respond to threats within their own borders.
Figure 2
Regional Defense Fellowship Program funds broken down by Global Combatant Command. Source: Congressional Research Service.
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s share of this Section 345 funding hovers between 11-15 percent of all recipients — once again including the other Geographic Combatant Commands (Figure 2). Generally, special attention for Section 345 funding is given to Mongolia, Taiwan, and Thailand in the Indo-Pacific theater. Unlike International Security Cooperation Programs funding, no notable funding shifts to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command are present between administrations or fiscal years.
The Pentagon’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disasters, and Civic Aid funding also does not reflect significant funding realignments to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command over the past four years (Figure 3). This funding supports U.S. military participation in collaborative engagements with partner nations to build their capacity to respond to humanitarian disasters and public health challenges, thereby reducing their reliance on foreign relief. Such funding advances military-to-civilian programs that complement military-to-military security cooperation efforts. During U.S. foreign disaster relief efforts, this funding underpins the military capabilities that are delivered as part of the overall U.S. response, including logistics and transportation as well as search and rescue. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s share of such funding has hovered between 17-19 percent of the overall account since FY2019.
Figure 3
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funding broken down by Global Combatant Command. Source: Congressional Research Service.
The Risk of Unfulfilled Potential
The most salient questions for the future of the Indo-Pacific deal with pacing and timing. The types of interoperability and partner capacity-building efforts that these accounts support help the United States to secure its position as the reliable partner of choice for Indo-Pacific nations and their militaries. China is well prepared to fill any gaps left by the United States, as recently demonstrated by Beijing sending fighter jets to participate in a joint exercise with Thailand. Underfunding these accounts incentivizes U.S. adversaries to gain stronger and larger footholds worldwide.
If the budget for each of these accounts stays flat with inflation — or worse, declines — then U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has a case to make for receiving a larger share of each account. But this will still leave other Geographic Combatant Commands struggling for the money they need to compete with China’s growing influence. Due to Beijing’s global ambitions and reach, each of the Geographic Combatant Commands has a legitimate claim in each of these funding categories. Even if the budget for each account is increased in real terms — thereby raising the funding across theaters overall — Congress should still consider where each additional dollar will have the greatest impact.
As Congress looks to conference — the annual effort to reconcile the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act — two House provisions will be critical for determining how to treat these accounts and should be maintained in the final bill. Section 1201 requires enhanced reporting on where and how dollars within several of these accounts are allocated. This also itemizes the activities they support — such as the estimated execution costs to complete all Section 345 Department of Defense training activities. I also supported section 1305, which directs U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to submit an annual report on opportunities to enhance defense cooperation with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, including mutual visits, exercises, training, and equipment opportunities. Both reports will deliver critical information to Congress as policymakers seek to determine the adequacy of funding for these accounts and where improvements can be made.
The results of these reports should inform two decisions from lawmakers. First, we should commit to delivering consistent real funding increases for accounts that directly improve the ability of the United States to leverage and deepen relationships with partners and allies around the world. Second, we should ensure that such funding increases are distributed appropriately between theaters and prioritize the Indo-Pacific. America’s international partners remain one of its greatest strengths. We in Congress should ensure that we are using all the tools available to us to deepen our work with other nations to secure a more peaceful, prosperous, and stable future.
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Rep. Rob Wittman represents Virginia’s 1st district in Congress. He is the Vice Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee, Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, and member of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee.
U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Christopher W. England
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Rep. Rob Wittman · September 2, 2022
11. Fort Bragg moves 100 soldiers from mold-plagued barracks, plans to move 1,000 more by month’s end
Will the long term health effects be treated by the VA? I hope every one of these soldiers has it documented in their medical records that they lived in mold infected barracks. I must defer to medical professionals, but I would think all their future respiratory ailments might be linked to their experiences in the barracks.
Fort Bragg moves 100 soldiers from mold-plagued barracks, plans to move 1,000 more by month’s end
Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · September 1, 2022
Nearly 1,200 soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., are being relocated from barracks deemed unsafe because of mold growth in rooms. However, mold is also growing in rooms of the buildings to which they are being relocated, according to soldiers. (Photo provided by a soldier at Fort Bragg)
Fort Bragg moved 104 soldiers from condemned barracks buildings on the North Carolina Army post this week as it methodically moves more than 1,000 troops from the quarters deemed unsafe by the service last month, officials said Thursday.
The Army has now moved about 204 soldiers out of uninhabitable barracks in the installation’s Smoke Bomb Hill area since top leaders Aug. 4 first announced they’d found about a dozen buildings no longer met standards for heating, ventilation and air conditioning, according to a Fort Bragg statement Thursday. Fort Bragg leaders said they still plan to move the remaining about 1,000 soldiers in those barracks to new quarters by the end of September.
“The safe relocation of our soldiers is our No. 1 priority, and it will continue to be until every soldier residing in untenable barracks on Smoke Bomb Hill moves,” said Command Sgt. Maj. T.J. Holland, the senior enlisted leader for Fort Bragg and the 18th Airborne Corps. “Our soldiers deserve the best and their housing must be clean, safe, secure, and functional; that is our responsibility.”
In addition to moving soldiers during the last week, leaders also OK’d 206 impacted soldiers to find privatized housing either on- or off-base since Aug. 25, according to the Fort Bragg statement. Another 166 soldiers were expected to soon be approved to live in private housing, the statement said.
Senior Fort Bragg leaders in recent days said soldiers who were living in rooms deemed unhealthy had already been moved, and those awaiting a new barracks rooms or private housing were living in quarters that were safe to inhabit. They said the effort to move troops would take time.
“This relocation is being done deliberately to ensure proper spaces are available for our soldiers that meet our health and safety standards,” the Thursday statement read.
Nearly 1,200 soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., are being relocated from barracks deemed unsafe because of mold growth in rooms. However, mold is also growing in rooms of the buildings to which they are being relocated, according to soldiers. (Photo provided by a soldier at Fort Bragg)
Nonetheless, Fort Bragg soldiers have reported mold in some of the barracks into which troops relocated from Smoke Bomb Hill are being moved.
Army Maj. Gen. Brian Mennes, the 18th Airborne Corps’ deputy commander, said last week installation officials were aware of mold issues in other barracks on post and making it their top priority to address those issues.
Mennes and other installation leaders told reporters last week they had less than two dozen open reports of mold issues in barracks rooms at Fort Bragg. Col. John Wilcox, Fort Bragg’s garrison commander, said when mold complaints are filed mold remediation teams are “immediately dispensed.”
“There are certain things that they do to either remediate not only the mold itself, but the … root cause of that mold,” Wilcox said. “Because, as we know, mold just doesn't grow by itself, it has to have the right environment to grow.
“My team is getting after it to the best of their ability.”
Stars and Stripes · by Corey Dickstein · September 1, 2022
12. How to Teach Beijing a Lesson in Ukraine
Excerpts:
There are four key factors Xi and the CCP are considering as they watch developments in Ukraine. The first is the resilience of the targeted state.
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The second factor is the invading force’s capability.
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The third factor is regional states’ reaction to the aggression
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The fourth factor being weighed is what economic punishment for an invasion might be imposed on the aggressor.
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Thus, how hard Russia is hit with the West’s punitive economic tools will influence how China moves forward. Already, one Chinese think tank, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, is declaring that Putin is not only beating sanctions, but he is also massively profiting from his war in the face of sanctions due to the spike in oil prices. Economics matters to the CCP. Getting rich allows Beijing to engage in its massive armament buildup and fund its Belt and Road Initiative.
Accordingly, the United States and the West more broadly must move beyond the current half-measure sanctions on Russia. That means full sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank and the full removal of all Russian transactions from the SWIFT international payment messaging system. It is time to defund Putin’s war machine and send a strong message to Xi: The West can and will decouple its economies from dictatorships when they invade their neighbors.
In the short term, the United States can show resolve, help the Ukrainians resist, and potentially save the Taiwanese people from invasion by supplying Taiwan with effective armaments now and by severely punishing Russia with the full measure of Western economic might.
How to Teach Beijing a Lesson in Ukraine
Foreign Policy · by Robert C. O’Brien · September 1, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
What China learns from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will inform its decision-making on Taiwan.
By Robert C. O’Brien, a former U.S. national security advisor who served from 2019 to 2021.
A mural depicting a female saint-like figure holding a Javelin missile is shown on the side of an apartment block.
A mural titled “Saint Javelin” dedicated to the British portable surface-to-air Javelin missile is unveiled on the side of an apartment block in Kyiv, Ukraine, on May 25. Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
The world is becoming more dangerous. Russia’s war on Ukraine is entering its seventh month, while China has become increasingly aggressive toward Taiwan, with recent large military exercises around the island and the regular crossing by fighter jets of the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait. The lessons the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) learns from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine will inform Beijing’s decision-making on Taiwan.
What could be called the Davos view that China is “communist in name only” is fading. In its place, an understanding of the strength of both ethnonationalist and Marxist-Leninist conviction among the Chinese leadership is taking hold. It was once common to believe that China would be transformed into a more liberal polity if the United States kept making concessions and continued to ignore its unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, and genocide—just the opposite has occurred. China has become steadily more authoritarian and more aggressive, especially over the past decade. The United States is now paying a price for its past naivete and tendency toward appeasement of Beijing.
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly embraced a “no limits” partnership on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there have been worries that Beijing would seize the moment to invade and annex Taiwan. Although the prospects of an immediate invasion are slim, with China distracted at home by economic crisis and the run-up to the critical 20th Party Congress, the threat remains.
The world is becoming more dangerous. Russia’s war on Ukraine is entering its seventh month, while China has become increasingly aggressive toward Taiwan, with recent large military exercises around the island and the regular crossing by fighter jets of the median line that divides the Taiwan Strait. The lessons the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) learns from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine will inform Beijing’s decision-making on Taiwan.
What could be called the Davos view that China is “communist in name only” is fading. In its place, an understanding of the strength of both ethnonationalist and Marxist-Leninist conviction among the Chinese leadership is taking hold. It was once common to believe that China would be transformed into a more liberal polity if the United States kept making concessions and continued to ignore its unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, and genocide—just the opposite has occurred. China has become steadily more authoritarian and more aggressive, especially over the past decade. The United States is now paying a price for its past naivete and tendency toward appeasement of Beijing.
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly embraced a “no limits” partnership on the eve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there have been worries that Beijing would seize the moment to invade and annex Taiwan. Although the prospects of an immediate invasion are slim, with China distracted at home by economic crisis and the run-up to the critical 20th Party Congress, the threat remains.
There are four key factors Xi and the CCP are considering as they watch developments in Ukraine. The first is the resilience of the targeted state. Russia has seen that the invasion of a modern nation-state is hard. Putin’s inability to win a quick victory in Ukraine demonstrates that a smaller country might prevail in combat with sufficient supplies and morale. To deter or defeat an invasion, Taiwan should become a well-bristled porcupine so as not to appear appetizing to China. Ukraine’s success can be leveraged into deterrence against China.
Taiwan, with Western assistance, must immediately add to its arsenal key weapons systems, including the Naval Strike Missile, an anti-ship weapon that can launch from sea or land and has a range of 100 nautical miles. If mounted on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, these missiles would be very effective for shoot-and-scoot missions. In addition, the Quickstrike air-dropped sea mine or other advanced sea mine technology from the United States, if deployed in quantity, could wreak havoc on an amphibious force. The now-famous Javelin anti-tank missile would be very useful in dealing with Chinese armor once on shore. The Stinger anti-aircraft missile presents a real danger to China’s rotary wing fleet. Finally, the Anduril Anvil anti-drone area defense system would also be effective against the Chinese military’s anticipated wide use of small drones. These weapons are not complex platforms. As we have seen in Ukraine, where the use of Javelin and Stinger missiles has been quite effective, such platforms, when deployed in sufficient quantities, can devastate a better-equipped invading force.
There have been numerous calls for Taiwan to lengthen the current term of compulsory military service from the current term of four months to one year, or longer. While the debate continues over whether and how to do this in such a way that does not break Taiwan’s economy, there are ways Taiwan can improve its military reserve in the immediate term, given the urgency of the times, perhaps by organizing the “shooting clubs” now popular in the Baltic states and Poland to familiarize their people with firearm use and safety in combat. Such an effort is easier to undertake, and thus far more effective, when done well before a shooting war starts.
The second factor is the invading force’s capability. Russia’s military has proved far weaker than analysts expected, especially in combined arms and maneuver operations. This realization must have jolted Xi. The Chinese and Russian militaries train together and conduct joint military exercises. China also has purchased or developed domestic versions of Russian military equipment that are not performing as advertised.
Unlike Russia, which has been engaged in decades of continuous wars in Chechnya, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, and Libya, China’s last armed conflict was in 1979 against Vietnam. China has been relying on its more experienced partner, Russia, to train its forces for combat in massive joint exercises largely run through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation over the past several years. It thought it was getting state-of-the-art practice. Right now, those Russian tactics, techniques, procedures, and order of battle do not look particularly good, and there are serious worries about the quality of Russian kit.
. NATO’s rapid expansion after the invasion of Ukraine has been a game-changer. China was shaken and took note. It called Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO a return to a “Cold War mentality.” Putin invaded Ukraine expecting to drive a wedge into the alliance. But instead of splitting Germany, Italy, and Hungary from the historic Western allies—the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France—NATO gained two new members, and Russia gained over 800 miles of additional front with NATO.
NATO expansion is a serious concern for China, which regularly denounces any attempt at security multilateralism among its neighbors, especially when prompted by Washington. Even if successful, an invasion of Taiwan could prompt further security alliances in the region rather than delivering a calamitous blow to U.S. power in Asia. Of course, an unsuccessful attack would be even more devastating to Chinese ambitions.
While it remains a largely rhetorical body, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, could prove a model for such alliances. While the prospect of a military alliance with famously neutral India is unlikely, the United States already has security agreements with the other two Quad members, Japan and Australia. Both Tokyo and Canberra are upping their cooperation with each other. South Korea’s new President Yoon Suk-yeol recently expressed interest in joining the Quad if invited, while other U.S. allies and partners such as the Philippines could potentially join. There are even rumblings that France and the United Kingdom may seek admittance to the club, following the AUKUS trilateral deal. For Beijing, Finland and Sweden joining NATO is a bad omen for what could happen in Asia if China takes military action against Taiwan.
The fourth factor being weighed is what economic punishment for an invasion might be imposed on the aggressor. This factor is problematic for the West given the Ukraine crisis, and the United States must remedy it swiftly. The evolution and implementation of economic sanctions being levied against Russia in response to its war of aggression have been slow and ineffective.
There is some evidence that internal Chinese propaganda is downplaying the sanctions in an effort to discredit the West. China may still care about potential secondary sanctions affecting Chinese companies, but real fear arises only if China’s massive oil and gas deals with Russia are targeted by Western sanctions. So far nothing on this front has occurred. Europe continues, more than six months into the war, to pump roughly 1 billion euros per day into the Russian economy via its fuel purchases.
Xi cannot afford to be hit with comprehensive sanctions by both Europe and the United States in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Although the CCP is implementing policies aimed at making China more self-reliant, it is not prepared to completely decouple from the West.
Thus, how hard Russia is hit with the West’s punitive economic tools will influence how China moves forward. Already, one Chinese think tank, the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, is declaring that Putin is not only beating sanctions, but he is also massively profiting from his war in the face of sanctions due to the spike in oil prices. Economics matters to the CCP. Getting rich allows Beijing to engage in its massive armament buildup and fund its Belt and Road Initiative.
Accordingly, the United States and the West more broadly must move beyond the current half-measure sanctions on Russia. That means full sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank and the full removal of all Russian transactions from the SWIFT international payment messaging system. It is time to defund Putin’s war machine and send a strong message to Xi: The West can and will decouple its economies from dictatorships when they invade their neighbors.
In the short term, the United States can show resolve, help the Ukrainians resist, and potentially save the Taiwanese people from invasion by supplying Taiwan with effective armaments now and by severely punishing Russia with the full measure of Western economic might.
Alex Gray, former U.S. National Security Council chief of staff, and Allison Hooker, former U.S. National Security Council senior director for Asian affairs, also contributed to this essay.
Robert C. O’Brien is a former U.S. national security advisor who served from 2019 to 2021. Twitter: @robertcobrien
13. Opinion | Ukraine’s counteroffensive is more than just bravado
Excerpts:
This guerrilla war has produced a grim body count among pro-Russian officials in the occupied areas. In the past few weeks, pro-Russian officials have been killed or injured by car bombs, roadside bombs, poison and shotguns.
As Russia has struggled with Ukraine’s fierce resistance, it has increasingly turned to mercenaries from a private army known as the Wagner Group. Their corpses are easy to recognize on the battlefield because they wear distinctive “Grim Reaper” badges with the slogan “Death is our business — and business is good,” and “I don’t believe in anything. I’m here for the violence.”
That grotesque, cynical brutality captured the spirit of Putin’s war. But after six months, the assault has stalled, and for Russia the business of death doesn’t look so good.
Opinion | Ukraine’s counteroffensive is more than just bravado
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · August 31, 2022
“We will oust them to our border,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky proclaimed about Russian troops in a speech Monday, marking Ukraine’s Independence Day. “It is time for the Russian military to flee.”
As Ukraine mounts a new counteroffensive in the southern part of the country, Zelensky’s bravado risks setting expectations too high. In truth, Ukraine probably won’t liberate its territory this year, or even next. Still, as Ukrainian forces push toward the Black Sea coast, Zelensky is delivering a defiant response to President Vladimir Putin’s claim that Ukraine is not a real country. Not only can Ukraine survive, it also can regain some of its occupied land.
The best defense is a good offense, as military strategists have argued for centuries. And if Ukraine’s drive toward the coast succeeds, it will restore the country’s economic viability by relieving pressure on its port city of Odessa. Moreover, it could threaten Russia’s occupation of Crimea by cutting into the land bridge that connects to the Russian-controlled Donbas region in the east.
Ukrainian and U.S. officials won’t talk about details of the assault plan. As Zelensky said in his speech, “You won’t hear specifics from any truly responsible person.” But it’s clear from public sources that the Ukrainians are trying to push Russian forces back from the Dnieper River, toward Kherson, and pressing toward Zaporizhzhia, east of Crimea, toward the Sea of Azov. Other thrusts in different parts of the country are likely, too.
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Ukraine’s opportunity now is that U.S.-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and other precision weapons have allowed the Ukrainian military to target Russian rear headquarters, ammunitions dumps, bridges and other transport nodes. The days when the Russians could sit back near the border and lob missiles at Ukrainian cities are over. “The target set is command and control nodes,” explains one U.S. official. “The Russians are struggling in a big way.”
The Russian military is disoriented because of the pounding they’ve received, U.S. officials believe. Analysts estimate that Russia has lost thousands of officers, including hundreds of colonels and dozens of generals. The relentless attacks have forced Russian commanders to keep moving headquarters posts, adding to their command and logistical problems.
Ukraine’s other big advantage in this new phase of the war is the “partisan” campaign behind the lines against the Russian occupiers. U.S. military commanders warned their Russian counterparts to expect this brutal irregular warfare, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russian officials didn’t listen, and now they’re facing attacks they don’t see coming and can’t root out, despite all their firepower. Every Ukrainian with a cellphone is an artillery spotter or intelligence collector.
This partisan campaign, like the HIMARS precision fire, is a product of U.S. planning and training of Ukrainian forces. Since 2014, U.S. Special Operations forces have been teaching the Ukrainians how to fight an occupying army — using special units like the ones that were so effective against al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters.
Gen. Richard Clarke, who is retiring this week as head of U.S. Special Operations Command, explained in an interview how the United States built up its Ukrainian special operations forces (SOF) counterparts in anticipation of a coming campaign against Russian invaders.
“What we did, starting in 2014, was set the conditions,” Clarke recalled. “When the Russians invaded in February, we’d been working with Ukrainian SOF for seven years. With our assistance, they built the capacity, so they grew and they grew in numbers, but more importantly, they built capability,” in both combat assaults and information operations.
To prepare to repel the Russian invasion, each Ukrainian SOF brigade last year created and trained a “resistance company” recruited from the local population in areas such as Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and the Donbas that were likely to be Russian targets. As a result, Clarke said, “If you’re a Russian soldier today, your head must be on a swivel because you don’t know where the threat is. They can’t look at any Ukrainian and know if that person is an enemy.”
This guerrilla war has produced a grim body count among pro-Russian officials in the occupied areas. In the past few weeks, pro-Russian officials have been killed or injured by car bombs, roadside bombs, poison and shotguns.
As Russia has struggled with Ukraine’s fierce resistance, it has increasingly turned to mercenaries from a private army known as the Wagner Group. Their corpses are easy to recognize on the battlefield because they wear distinctive “Grim Reaper” badges with the slogan “Death is our business — and business is good,” and “I don’t believe in anything. I’m here for the violence.”
That grotesque, cynical brutality captured the spirit of Putin’s war. But after six months, the assault has stalled, and for Russia the business of death doesn’t look so good.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · August 31, 2022
14. Gorbachev 'Shocked and Bewildered' By Putin’s Ukraine War
Gorbachev 'Shocked and Bewildered' By Putin’s Ukraine War
19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · September 1, 2022
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union and a reformist who is widely considered to be responsible for the normalization of relations between Russia and the West, died aged 91 on August 30 – and according to a former high-level Soviet interpreter, he died “bewildered” by Putin’s aggression in Ukraine.
Speaking to Reuters on Thursday, Pavel Palazhchenko described how the late Soviet leader was “shocked and bewildered” over the conflict in the months before he died and was left “psychologically crushed” by the worsening relations between Kyiv and Moscow over the last few years.
Palazhchenko, who worked with Gorbachev for 37 years, described a conversation with the former Russian leader just a few weeks ago over the phone.
“It’s not just the (special military) operation that started on Feb. 24, but the entire evolution of relations between Russia and Ukraine over the past years that was really, really a big blow to him. It really crushed him emotionally and psychologically,” the former Soviet interpreter said.
“It was very obvious to us in our conversations with him that he was shocked and bewildered by what was happening (after Russian troops entered Ukraine in February) for all kinds of reasons. He believed not just in the closeness of the Russian and Ukrainian people, he believed that those two nations were intermingled.”
Palazchenko also recognized that the former Soviet leader’s views were hypocritical, given that he maintained his belief in the Soviet Union but would not have used violent means to achieve it.
Putin Won’t Attend Funeral
Probably unsurprisingly, the Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not attend the funeral of the former Russian leader, which is due to take place on Saturday. Speaking to reporters on Thursday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that the president could not attend the funeral owing to a schedule conflict.
“We know that the general farewell ceremony will take place on September 3, the funeral, but, unfortunately, the president’s work schedule will not allow it to be done on September 3, so he decided to do it today,” Peskov said, referencing Putin’s decision to visit the Central Clinical Hospital to pay his respects on Tuesday.
Photograph of President Reagan and Vice-President Bush meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev on Governor’s Island… – NARA – 198595 (1)
Putin visited the hospital where Gorbachev died On Tuesday and laid flowers at his coffin.
Peskov also revealed that while Gorbachev’s funeral would have some “elements” of a state funeral, including a guard of honor, we will not be given a full state funeral.
Jack Buckby is a British author, counter-extremism researcher, and journalist based in New York. Reporting on the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., he works to analyze and understand left-wing and right-wing radicalization, and reports on Western governments’ approaches to the pressing issues of today. His books and research papers explore these themes and propose pragmatic solutions to our increasingly polarized society.
19fortyfive.com · by Jack Buckby · September 1, 2022
15. Blast from the Past: What We Learned by Bringing a Rear-Area Combat Concept from the 1980s to the National Training Center
Our national training centers are national treasures.
Not all our doctrine is anachronistic and obsolete especially as we prepare for the possibility of large scale combat operations (LSCO).
Excerpts:
To paraphrase journalist Malcolm Muggeridge, new things are old things happening to new people.
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Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for the National Training Center and other combat training centers, incorporating the use of a tactical combat force into scenario design provides a fourth maneuver battalion the opportunity to participate in the world-class training that only these training installations can offer. This is particularly relevant for a National Guard battalion that has reduced manning or is not sourced for a deployment. The tactical combat force mission may appear simplistic, but it still exercises a battalion’s systems and processes and requires commanders to maneuver their forces in a deliberately challenging training environment.
As the Army continues to optimize its training at the combat training centers to prepare units for large-scale combat operations, more refined tactics associated with fighting as a tactical combat force will emerge. Ultimately, the force package a brigade is able to commit as a tactical combat force will shape how it fights. There are many ways to employ a unit in this role, and only time will tell how it is incorporated into future operational designs. Army force design updates associated with large-scale combat operations should account for the tactical combat force requirement, especially in the penetration divisions because of their extended logistical requirements and the lack of a tactical combat force in the current protection brigade design. Our hope is that the hard lessons learned during Task Force Paxton’s National Training Center rotation will spur conversation and provide future combat training center rotations a good starting point for planning and resourcing their version of the tactical combat force.
Blast from the Past: What We Learned by Bringing a Rear-Area Combat Concept from the 1980s to the National Training Center - Modern War Institute
Gordon R. Kinneer and Eric B. Ponzek | 09.02.22
mwi.usma.edu · by Gordon R. Kinneer · September 2, 2022
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It was a brutally hot out—106 degrees—as Private First Class Myles Baney sat under his camo net, scanning his sector. As he looked toward the horizon through the wavy heat lines in his binoculars, he noticed two vehicles that seemed out of place. Watching this pair of odd-looking vehicles, he sensed something wasn’t right. Without even realizing it, weeks of training suddenly kicked in, and he was quickly getting his Javelin into operation. In the span of five minutes, Baney would destroy three enemy vehicles, singlehandedly sparing the brigade support battalion, the rear logistical headquarters for the brigade, from almost certain destruction. Baney and his unit were part of a larger force tasked with protecting the brigade rear area, and for the soldiers in the logistical rear of the brigade, they sure were glad he and his fellow soldiers were at the right place, at the right time.
To paraphrase journalist Malcolm Muggeridge, new things are old things happening to new people. This was the case in the 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s recent rotation at the National Training Center, during which the brigade was tasked to organize a tactical combat force in support of the exercise scenario. Responsibility for this mission was assigned to a task force—Task Force Paxton—and its experience during the rotation offers important lessons for the Army as it prepares for the future battlefield.
The tactical combat force concept has fallen out of the Army’s lexicon in recent years, but with the flood of lessons learned from Ukraine, it is suddenly relevant again. The concept has its roots in AirLand Battle doctrine from the 1980s. In the days of AirLand Battle, the tactical combat force (in the 1982 Field Manual 100-5, Operations, it was referred to simply as the “combat force”) was designated to defeat a threats categorized as Level III, the most potent threat anticipated in rear areas. A Level I threat consists of a small enemy force that can be defeated by typical units operating in the logistical rear of a large unit. A Level II threat generally consists of enemy special operations teams, long-range reconnaissance teams, and partially attrited combat units. A Level III threat is an enemy force that is beyond the defense capability of the typical units operating in the rear area and any local reserve or response force. During the development of AirLand Battle, doctrine writers analyzed the tactics of Warsaw Pact maneuver formations and realized NATO defenses in the rear area lacked the capability to counter a Level III threat. Thus, the tactical combat force was born.
As the Army reorients from a focus on counterinsurgency operations to large-scale combat operations, the need to address the Level III threat has returned. The war in Ukraine has illuminated the need to address security in the rear area. Commanders must now ensure their rear area combat forces have the capability to rapidly deploy a lethal combat element, in a sometimes vast area of operations, to defeat a potential armor or mechanized threat that seeks to disrupt their logistical operations. Because of the area that must be covered, the tactical combat force needs to be highly mobile and lethal enough to destroy a Level III threat. Having that criteria in mind, Task Force Paxton was able to task organize into small, mobile teams to rapidly maneuver and counter any Level III threat as it emerged in the brigade’s rear area.
Task Force Paxton at the National Training Center
While not a typical task for a brigade’s National Training Center rotation, adding the tactical combat force mission set enabled a training repetition for an additional battalion. Most frequently, if a brigade has an undermanned battalion, its manpower might be redistributed to round out other battalions and the brigade staff. Assigning OPFOR (opposing force) elements to act as a Level III threat fundamentally changed how the brigade, the brigade support battalion, and the brigade engineer battalion accounted for security requirements in the rear area. Task Force Paxton deployed to the National Training Center as a battalion (2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment) with reduced manning. The task force deployed without the battalion’s scouts and mortar platoon, and fielded a reduced battalion headquarters and headquarters company, the forward support company, and a rifle company with its headquarters and two platoons. While light in terms of combat power, the task force was organized into multiple combat and logistical elements to accomplish its tactical combat force mission. These streamlined formations were capable of covering enemy key avenues of approach as the brigade maneuvered out of the logistical support area, through the open desert, and ultimately westward toward the urban centers of Razish and Ujen. Like units during most National Training Center rotations, Task Force Paxton quickly discovered what did and did not work, and constantly refined its task organization in order to defeat the enemy, an OPFOR element named “Desert Rat.”
Task Force Paxton emphasized the importance of operating dismounted Javelin teams to counter an armored formation. Because of the relatively small elements, command and control from the main command post was focused on tracking the fight and sharing information up to the brigade main command post and laterally to adjacent units. Tactical movement and maneuver was largely left to the Arrow Company commander and his platoon leaders, with guidance and direction provided by the battalion commander as needed. This also shaped how the main command post and the combat trains command post, which coordinated sustainment operations, were established. Because of the highly mobile nature of the tactical combat force, and the size of the maneuver elements, the battalion staff focused on shortening the normally labor-intensive military decision-making process. Specifically, the staff utilized the rapid decision-making and synchronization process, which shortens planning because much of the information related to the terrain and enemy is already known and was unlikely to change.
During execution of the tactical combat force mission, Task Force Paxton’s scheme of maneuver remained largely unchanged. The initial concept was to fight as small, dismounted teams occupying observation posts supported by a Stryker infantry carrier vehicle. Two observation posts would be supported by one Stryker vehicle. The intent was for observation posts to detect and engage the enemy and pull the Stryker vehicle forward out of its hide position, and then to send it back to a hide site that mutually supported both observation posts once the threat was eliminated. The Stryker vehicle was utilized in a multitude of ways: as a method to sustain the observation posts, a nonstandard casualty evacuation platform, a communication relay platform, and a mounted weapons platform. Task Force Paxton had one short-range air defense Stinger team that protected the main command post and could be repositioned to one of the observation posts based on the enemy air threat.
During the initial phase of the operation the Level III threat, Desert Rat, penetrated deep into the brigade’s rear area. Fortunately, as described above, it was stopped by an intrepid soldier who destroyed two enemy armored vehicles and one enemy tank in less than ten minutes before they could mount an attack on the brigade support battalion. In subsequent phases, Desert Rat was able to use terrain to its advantage, slip by an observation post, and conduct effective strikes against the rear area units. While the initial success could be celebrated, these subsequent setbacks afforded Task Force Paxton the opportunity to continue to refine its tactics and mount an effective fight for the remainder of the exercise.
Sustaining multiple observation post locations across the brigade’s large rear area was accomplished using a logistics release point model, where the sustainment units would link up with the soldiers manning the observation points, at a mutually optimal location, and replenish with needed supplies. Task Force Paxton’s main sustainment node, the combat trains command post (CTCP), coordinated the resupply conducted at the logistics release points and conducted field maintenance at the CTCP, cutting down the distance to be covered if the observation posts to get a vehicle fixed if needed. The Arrow Company supply sergeant was located at the field trains command post and shaped the makeup of logistics packages based on the logistics status of the observation posts. At the observation post locations, the supporting Stryker vehicle was sent back to the nearest logistics release point to receive resupply and then ferry supplies to the observation posts. Because the observation posts were dispersed across the tactical combat force battlespace, a modified system of tailgate resupply, in which items are rapidly moved from one transport vehicle to another at the logistic release point, provided the adequate logistical support to sustain the unit. These resupply convoys were often the most likely to inadvertently encounter the Desert Rat element as it executed its logistics package mission. Because of this, a Javelin team was sometimes added to the convoy as it resupplied the observation posts.
What We Learned
Five primary lessons emerged from execution of the tactical combat force mission during the rotation at the National Training Center. The first was that adjacent unit coordination between the tactical combat force, brigade support battalion, brigade engineer battalion, and brigade main command post is vital to having a clear friendly common operating picture during operations. Frequent communication proved to be extraordinarily important. At the battalion main command post the staff needed to be friendly unit–focused, rather than enemy unit–focused. Map graphics used by the commander and his staff needed to focus more attention on depicting the locations of friendly units than enemy units because of the need to understand what was transiting the rear area. Knowing what was coming and going in and out of the rear area was critical to avoid fratricide and to understand what friendly units could come into contact with the enemy along any route.
Second, Task Force Paxton lacked the ability to effectively combine arms as the tactical combat force without indirect fires. Without its mortar platoon and because it has low priority for the brigade’s artillery assets, it could not engage the enemy at a distance. Ensuring there were no friendly units operating in the location where the observation posts were about to call in an artillery strike is complex in the rear area, due simply to the amount of friendly elements moving within the tactical combat force’s area of operations. Graphics that are universally known to all units fighting on the battlefield, as well as fire support coordination measures, must be coordinated across the brigade in order to provide the tactical combat force accurate and timely fires when the enemy is located. Again because of the low priority of fires for the tactical combat force and the location of the artillery positions, the unit’s own mortar systems are the best indirect fires asset for any tactical combat force commander.
Third, the brigade must clearly delineate who is responsible for what in the rear area. In order for the tactical combat force to be successful, the brigade must specify responsibility for the various security tasks required in the rear area to avoid duplication of effort and squandering combat power. During the National Training Center rotation, it became apparent that assigning the tactical combat force sole responsibility for countering the Level III threat and tasking the brigade engineer battalion with countering the Level I and II threats allows each element to more effectively utilize its combat power. The attached military police units assigned to the brigade engineer battalion are more than capable of defeating the Level I and II threats, whereas they would become quickly overwhelmed when attempting to destroy a Level III threat. Conversely, if the tactical combat force has to account for all three levels of threat, its response to the appearance of armor or mechanized forces in the rear area will not be effective.
Fourth, the tactical combat force main command post must be lean, agile, and rapidly deployable. Use of camouflage netting and vehicle-mounted communication systems in place of tents enabled Task Force Paxton to rapidly shift its main command post as needed. The task force could not rely on computer systems to create digital products and execute briefings due to the time required for setup. Instead, a hybrid battle-tracking solution was established combining analog tools—paper maps with plastic overlays—and digital tools like Joint Battle Command–Platform. Operations order briefings were largely done in person over terrain models and over the radio when necessary. Once the battle rhythm was established and setup and tear-down of the main command post was executed a few times, Task Force Paxton was able—even with intense weather and over many miles on difficult terrain—to occupy a new main command post location and establish effective communications with its higher headquarters and its own units in about an hour.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for the National Training Center and other combat training centers, incorporating the use of a tactical combat force into scenario design provides a fourth maneuver battalion the opportunity to participate in the world-class training that only these training installations can offer. This is particularly relevant for a National Guard battalion that has reduced manning or is not sourced for a deployment. The tactical combat force mission may appear simplistic, but it still exercises a battalion’s systems and processes and requires commanders to maneuver their forces in a deliberately challenging training environment.
As the Army continues to optimize its training at the combat training centers to prepare units for large-scale combat operations, more refined tactics associated with fighting as a tactical combat force will emerge. Ultimately, the force package a brigade is able to commit as a tactical combat force will shape how it fights. There are many ways to employ a unit in this role, and only time will tell how it is incorporated into future operational designs. Army force design updates associated with large-scale combat operations should account for the tactical combat force requirement, especially in the penetration divisions because of their extended logistical requirements and the lack of a tactical combat force in the current protection brigade design. Our hope is that the hard lessons learned during Task Force Paxton’s National Training Center rotation will spur conversation and provide future combat training center rotations a good starting point for planning and resourcing their version of the tactical combat force.
Lieutenant Colonel Gordon R. Kinneer currently serves as the state mobilization and readiness officer for the Pennsylvania Army National Guard. He has held various staff and command positions within the 56th SBCT and recently completed a tour as the bilateral affairs officer at the Office of Defense Cooperation, US Embassy Vilnius, Lithuania. He is slated to assume command of 1-104th Cavalry, 2IBCT, 28ID on October 1, 2022.
Lieutenant Colonel Eric B. Ponzek is the commander of 2-112th Infantry (Paxton), 56th SBCT. His last assignment was as the 28ID battle major and he executed the last 56th SBCT National Training Center rotation in 2018 as the S-3 for 1-111th IN (Associator), 56th SBCT. He has held various command and staff positions throughout 56th SBCT.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Lt. Col. Gordon R. Kinneer, Pennsylvania Army National Guard
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mwi.usma.edu · by Gordon R. Kinneer · September 2, 2022
16. I’m a Ukrainian Soldier, and I’ve Accepted My Death
A powerful essay.
Excerpts:
To quote Kurt Vonnegut, even if wars didn’t keep coming like glaciers, there would still be plain old death. But encounters with death could be very different. We want to believe that we and our beloved ones, the modern people of the 21st century, no longer have to die from medieval barbaric torture, epidemics or detention in concentration camps. That’s part of what we’re fighting for: the right not only to a dignified life but also to a dignified death.
Let us, the people of Ukraine, wish ourselves a good death — in our own beds, for example, when the time comes. And not when Russian missiles hit our houses at dawn.
I’m a Ukrainian Soldier, and I’ve Accepted My Death
nytimes.com · August 30, 2022
A mass burial in Bucha, Ukraine, this month.Credit...Lynsey Addario for The New York Times
IVANKIV, Ukraine — Recently, one of the companies in our battalion returned from a mission in eastern Ukraine. When we saw our comrades a month earlier, they were smiling and cheerful. Now they don’t even talk to one another, never take off their bulletproof vests and don’t smile at all. Their eyes are empty and dark like dry wells. These fighters lost a third of their personnel, and one of them said that he would rather be dead because now he is afraid to live.
I used to think I had seen enough deaths in my life. I served on the front line in the Donbas for almost a year in 2015 and ’16, and I witnessed numerous tragedies. But in those days the scale of losses was completely different, at least where I was. Each death was carefully fixed, investigations were conducted, we knew most of the names of the killed soldiers, and their portraits were published on social networks.
This is another kind of war, and the losses are, without exaggeration, catastrophic. We no longer know the names of all the dead: There are dozens of them every day. Ukrainians constantly mourn those lost; there are rows of closed coffins in the central squares of relatively calm cities across the country. Closed coffins are the terrible reality of this cruel, bloody and seemingly endless war.
I, too, have my dead. In the course of the conflict, I’ve learned of the deaths of various friends and acquaintances, people I had worked with or people I’d never met in person but with whom I maintained friendships on social networks. Not all these people were professional soldiers, but many could not help but take up arms when Russia invaded Ukraine.
I read obituaries on Facebook every day. I see familiar names and think that these people should continue writing reports and books, working in scientific institutes, treating animals, teaching students, raising children, baking bread and selling air-conditioners. Instead they go to the front, get wounded, develop severe PTSD and die.
One of the biggest recent blows for me was the death of the journalist Oleksandr Makhov. He already had some military experience, and knowing his fearlessness and courage, I followed him attentively online. I used to visit his Facebook page and was happy to see new posts: They showed he was alive. I focused on his life as if it were a beacon in a stormy sea. But then Oleksandr was killed, and everything fell apart. One by one, I got the news about the deaths of those I knew.
I forbade myself to believe that I and the people I love or like will survive. It is hard to exist in this state, yet accepting the possibility of one’s own death is necessary for every soldier. I started thinking about it back in 2014 when, not yet holding a weapon in my hands, I already sensed that one day I would be able to wield one — and so it proved. In the 10 months I spent on the front line near Popasna, in the Luhansk region, I thought often about death. I could feel its quiet steps and calm breathing next to me. But something told me no, not this time.
Now, who knows? Currently my service takes place on the northern border, where I patrol part of the Chernobyl exclusion zone. It is safer here than in the east or south, although the proximity of the autocratic Belarusian leader takes a psychological toll. Our unit’s task is to prevent a repeat of the events of March, when the northern part of the Kyiv region was occupied and the enemy shelled the outskirts of the capital with artillery.
I’m ready to get into any hot spot. There is no fear. There is no silent horror, as there was in the beginning, when my wife and son were hiding in the hallway of our Kyiv apartment trying to somehow calm down or even fall asleep amid the excruciating howling of air alarms and explosions. There is sadness, of course: More than anything in the world, I just want to be with my wife, who is still in Kyiv with my son. I want to live with them, not die somewhere on the front line. But I have accepted the possibility of my death as an almost accomplished fact. Crossing this Rubicon has calmed me down, made me braver, stronger, more balanced. So it must be for those who consciously tread the path of war.
The deaths of civilians, especially children, are a completely different matter. And no, I don’t mean that the life of a civilian is more valuable than the life of a military person. But it is a little more difficult to be prepared for the death of an ordinary Ukrainian who was going about her life and was suddenly killed by Russian roulette. It is also impossible to be prepared for brutal tortures, mass graves, mutilated children, bodies buried in the courtyards of apartment buildings, and missile attacks on residential areas, theaters, museums, kindergartens and hospitals.
How to prepare yourself for the thought that the mother of two children who hid in a basement for a month slowly died before their eyes? How to accept the death of a 6-year-old girl who died of dehydration under the ruins of her house? How should we react to the fact that some people in the country, as in occupied Mariupol, are forced to eat pigeons and drink water from puddles at the risk of catching cholera?
To quote Kurt Vonnegut, even if wars didn’t keep coming like glaciers, there would still be plain old death. But encounters with death could be very different. We want to believe that we and our beloved ones, the modern people of the 21st century, no longer have to die from medieval barbaric torture, epidemics or detention in concentration camps. That’s part of what we’re fighting for: the right not only to a dignified life but also to a dignified death.
Let us, the people of Ukraine, wish ourselves a good death — in our own beds, for example, when the time comes. And not when Russian missiles hit our houses at dawn.
Artem Chekh is a soldier, a writer and the author of “Absolute Zero.”
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
nytimes.com · August 30, 2022
17. Lukoil chairman Ravil Maganov is the 8th Russian energy executive to die suddenly this year
So how do you "fall" out of a hospital window?
Lukoil chairman Ravil Maganov is the 8th Russian energy executive to die suddenly this year
KEY POINTS
- Ravil Maganov, chairman of the Russian oil giant Lukoil, died Thursday after falling out of the window of the capital’s Central Clinical Hospital, according to the Russian state-sponsored news outlet Interfax.
- Maganov’s untimely death appears to mark the eighth time this year that a Russian energy executive has died suddenly under unusual circumstances.
- The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request from CNBC for an official statement.
CNBC · by Christina Wilkie · September 1, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin stands next to First Executive Vice President of oil producer Lukoil Ravil Maganov after decorating him with the Order of Alexander Nevsky during an awarding ceremony at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, November 21, 2019.
Mikhail Klimentyev | Kremlin | Sputnik | via Reuters
WASHINGTON — The death of Ravil Maganov, chairman of the Russian oil giant Lukoil, at a hospital in Moscow on Thursday appears to mark the eighth time this year that a Russian energy executive has died suddenly and under unusual circumstances.
Maganov died after falling out of the window of the capital's Central Clinical Hospital, according to the Russian state-sponsored news outlet Interfax. The circumstances of Maganov's death were confirmed by Reuters, citing two anonymous sources. The oil firm, and its chairman, had been critical of the Ukraine war, expressing disapproval in a statement on March 3.
But Lukoil, the company that Maganov helped to build, said the 67 year old had "passed away following a serious illness" in a press statement. The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request from CNBC for an official statement.
The circumstances surrounding Maganov's sudden death have drawn international attention, in part, because seven other top Russian energy executives have been victims of untimely deaths since January, according to reports by Russian and international news agencies.
Below is a list of these cases, in chronological order.
- In late January, Leonid Shulman, a top executive at the Russian natural gas giant Gazprom, was found dead in the bathroom of a cottage in the village of Leninsky. The Russian media group RBC reported his death, but did not cite a cause.
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On Feb. 25, another Gazprom executive, Alexander Tyulakov, was found dead in the same village as Shulman, this time in a garage. According to the Russian media outlet Novaya Gazeta, investigators found a note near Tyulakov's body.
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On Feb. 28, three days after Tyulakov died, a Russian oil and gas billionaire living in England, Mikhail Watford, was found hanged in the garage of his country estate. At the time, investigators reportedly said Watford's death was "unexplained," but did not appear suspicious.
- On April 18, a former vice president of Gazprombank, Vladislav Avayev, was found dead in his Moscow apartment, alongside his wife and daughter, who also died. Authorities treated the case as a murder-suicide, Radio Free Europe reported at the time. Gazprombank is Russia's third largest bank and has close ties to the energy sector.
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On April 19, a former deputy chairman of Novatek, Russia's largest liquefied natural gas producer, was found dead in a vacation home in Spain. Like Avayev in Moscow, Sergei Protosenya was found with his wife and daughter, who were also deceased. And like Avayev, police investigating the scene said they believed it was a murder-suicide, a theory that Avayev's surviving son has publicly rejected.
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In May, the body of billionaire and former Lukoil executive Alexander Subbotin was discovered in the basement of a country house in the Moscow region. The room where Subbotin died was allegedly used for "Jamaican voodoo rituals," the Russian state media outlet TASS reported, quoting local authorities.
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In July, Yury Voronov, the CEO and founder of a shipping contractor that services Gazprom's Arctic projects was found dead of an apparent gunshot wound in a swimming pool at his home in Leninsky, the same elite St. Petersburg gated community where Shulman and Tyulakov died earlier in the year.
CNBC · by Christina Wilkie · September 1, 2022
18. UN report on human rights in Xinjiang is damning for China. But what will its impact be?
I am not optimistic.
UN report on human rights in Xinjiang is damning for China. But what will its impact be?
CNN · by Analysis by Simone McCarthy, CNN
A version of this story appeared in CNN's Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country's rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.
Hong Kong (CNN)For Adila Yarmuhammad, the release of a damning new report from the United Nations' top human rights official on the treatment of Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang brought relief, and sadness.
The Australian-born 22-year-old, whose family comes from the region in the northwest of China, woke up Thursday to a flurry of WhatsApp messages about the report from other young Uyghurs worldwide.
"Everyone is relieved that something like a report came out ... (but) the sense of relief doesn't come with complete relief," said Yarmuhammad, a leader in an Australian Uyghur youth group.
"I feel even more upset, because we knew. Deep down we always knew that these things were happening, these things were very real to us. A lot of our community members had firsthand experiences. A lot of our family members have firsthand experiences."
Adila Yarmuhammad attends a 2018 protest at the UN in Geneva.
For years, members of the Uyghur diaspora and rights groups have pushed for a strong response within the UN system to repeated allegations of major human rights abuses in Xinjiang. But member countries have not voted to establish a probe into the claims, which China has regularly pushed back against with firm denials.
Read More
The report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was based on a years-long assessment of those allegations and made a strong statement: China has committed "serious human rights violations" against Uyghur and other predominately Muslim groups, which may amount to "crimes against humanity."
"It's a long-awaited recognition of the Uyghurs' unimaginable suffering from the most authoritative voice on human rights in the world," said human rights lawyer Rayhan Asat, whose brother, jailed Uyghur entrepreneur Ekpar Asat, has been held in Xinjiang since 2016.
"No government is above scrutiny and immune from accountability. Despite China's efforts to destroy or defang it, this report from the UN body is an honest indictment of China's crimes against humanity," said Asat, who lives in the United States.
China has repeatedly denied accusations of human rights abuses in the region, and on Wednesday decried the UN report as "based on the disinformation and lies fabricated by anti-China forces."
There are also stark questions about what impact the report will have on the ground within China and on Beijing, where Chinese leader Xi Jinping -- under whom policies in Xinjiang were rolled out and who has strove to cement China's role on the global stage -- is expected to break tradition and step into a third term next month.
Uncertain steps
Many Uyghur and human rights groups have rallied around the report, calling for it to be a wake-up call to galvanize support for action within the UN -- where the General Assembly and Human Rights Council both come into session in less than two weeks.
"Governments should waste no time establishing an independent investigation and taking all measures necessary to advance accountability and provide Uyghurs and others the justice they are entitled," John Fisher, global advocacy deputy director at Human Rights Watch, said in a statement Thursday.
Washington also called for follow-up, with US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield saying it would be "critical that the full Human Rights Council membership have an opportunity to formally discuss the findings of this report as soon as possible and that the perpetrators of these atrocities are held accountable."
A security guard watches from a tower around a detention facility in Yarkent County in northwestern China's Xinjiang region on March 21, 2021.
Before its publication, advocates had said they hoped a strong report could encourage more countries, like those in the Human Rights Council, to come forward in support of accountability for China, and spark a push for action from within other UN agencies.
But actions taken within the UN depend on the will of member states, such as those in the Human Rights Council, which must vote to establish mechanisms like formal human rights probes -- and China holds significant sway.
The report itself is not on the current agenda for the Human Rights Council's upcoming session, according to its website. It is also not slated on the UN Security Council agenda and would "probably not be discussed" in September, its president for the month Nicolas de Rivière of France said Thursday.
Even if states in the Human Rights Council were ultimately to vote for formal investigation on the heels of the report, it has no power to compel China to allow UN investigators to enter its borders. Complying with other recommendations in the report -- such as the release of arbitrarily detained people and clarification of the whereabouts of missing individuals -- would be at Beijing's discretion.
And China has already made its stance on that clear.
"The suggestions the reports made are completely based on false information, made up out of political purpose, thus China rightfully rejects it," Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin said at a regular press briefing Thursday, when asked whether China would take action on recommendations made.
Impact in China
It is clear that China is concerned about the implications of the report.
Its diplomats have repeatedly voiced opposition to its release, and have already issued multiple statements condemning it, including a 131-page rebuttal to the High Commissioner.
"The so-called assessment is an illegal document and a perverse product of the US and some other Western forces' coercive diplomacy," a spokesperson of the Permanent Mission of China to the UN said Thursday.
But it remains to be seen if the report or ensuing international pressure will have an impact on the ground in Xinjiang, where academics and advocates allege the oppression goes on, though it is now being absorbed into the prison system and transformed into a forced labor apparatus and a culture of surveillance.
The UN report also pointed to indications of coercive labor, a shift toward formal incarcerations, and "invasive" surveillance in Xinjiang, and said it could not verify Chinese claims that its system of so-called "vocational education and training centers" there were closed.
Within China's heavily censored domestic media environment, there has largely been silence, with state media not covering the report's release for domestic audiences.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping gives a virtual address to the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 21, 2021 in New York.
The report, "at the minimum" is embarrassing for China on the international stage, especially right before the Party Congress, according to Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Washington-based think tank Stimson Center, referring to the upcoming political event where Xi is expected to assume his third term.
"China could deny the legality of all reports from Western countries and media on Xinjiang as biased. But now it is the UN, with all its credibility and legitimacy, saying the same thing. Beijing is backed to a corner on this, and there is very little it could say to refute," she said.
The report creates a "negative blow" to China's international image and could cast a shadow over Xi's speech if he addresses the UN General Assembly this month, Sun said, but it will not necessarily affect the basic position of countries that have already chosen not to oppose China on this issue in the UN.
And it's "concrete impact on the ground remains to be seen," she added.
For the communities of those directly affected, who are thinking about loved ones in the region, those questions are stark, and immediate.
"At the end of the day, we are still relieved and we are satisfied that a report like this has come to light and it does shine a light on China and it helps us in our fight for human rights," said Yarmuhammad in Australia. "But there's always a sinking feeling that it's not going to help."
CNN's Hilary Whiteman, Nectar Gan and Jennifer Hansler contributed to this report.
CNN · by Analysis by Simone McCarthy, CNN
19. Marine Hone Future Concepts with Dune Buggies, Liaison Officers, and Many Radios
This sounds something like the Race to the Swift concept (especially the many radios apart). It had an impact on me when I read it in the 1980s. Especially Simpkin's comments about the most powerful person on the battlefield will be the soldier who can communicate long distances, control aircraft and fires, and operate and survive behind enemy lines.
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare – October 1, 1985
by Richard E. Simpkin
https://www.amazon.com/Race-Swift-Thoughts-Twenty-First-Century/dp/1857531353
RACE TO THE SWIFT: Thoughts On Twenty First Century Warfare
https://mca-marines.org/blog/gazette/race-to-the-swift-thoughts-on-twenty-first-century-warfare/
RACE TO THE SWIFT: APPLICATIONS IN 21st CENTURY WARFARE
(DUSTY SHELVES)
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/race-to-the-swift/
Marine Hone Future Concepts with Dune Buggies, Liaison Officers, and Many Radios
The giant RIMPAC exercise helped the Corps test their newest type of agile unit within a multinational force.
defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney
MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII—For one senior leader in the Pacific, the changes coming to the way Marines fight were acutely demonstrated by the small teams zipping around in Polaris ATVs during a recent exercise.
Brig. Gen. Joseph Clearfield, the deputy commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, recalled how years ago he had to move around in Humvees or amphibious assault vehicles, and stop to put up a 30-foot antenna whenever he wanted to talk to the rest of his unit.
The commander of MAGTF-7’s battalion landing team “is running all around Oahu right now with four [ultra-light tactical vehicles], so these little dune buggies with four Marines each, and he's able to communicate on the move and do and have better capability than I did in 11, 12 years ago,” Clearfield said at the bi-annual Rim of the Pacific exercise, or RIMPAC, in July.
The Marines are experimenting with a new way of operating in the Pacific: with agile teams that carry radar and weapons to confront enemies from the sea, land, and air.
These changes in the Pacific, and across the service, are being brought about by the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 plan. The service formed a new type of unit on Hawaii—the Marine Littoral Regiment—to execute missions from sea denial to operations far ashore—with particular applicability to the first island chain in the western Pacific—with systems and equipment that are typically seen at higher echelons. Marines are also contributing to the concepts of expeditionary advanced base operations, or EABO, and stand-in forces and figuring out how they apply to Pacific operations.
While Marines have long been expected to be one of the first military forces to arrive at a crisis, the stand-in forces concept aims to have them in place before any trouble starts: working with allies, monitoring for threats, and reacting when necessary.
The Marines already have what they consider stand-in forces in the Pacific, including in Japan, Hawaii, and a newer base in Guam that will be the new home of some 5,000 Marines moving from Okinawa.
RIMPAC was just the latest opportunity for Marines to put their redesign, concepts, and training to the test.
“So it's this idea of the stand-in force, and it's this littoral maneuver. We spend a lot of time on that,” Clearfield said. “How we're going to littorally maneuver the stand-in force around the archipelagos in the first island chain, and RIMPAC helps us with this.”
3rd MLR
One of the newest elements is the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment. Stood up in March, the unit is intended to operate forward in contested areas, gathering and sharing information for the joint force and contributing firepower.
The 3rd MLR now has three battalions, for anti-air, combat logistics, and combat. This fall, the combat team will add a medium missile battery firing the Naval Strike Missile with the Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, according to Col. Tim Brady, who leads the regiment.
“We were taking these capabilities that normally traditionally resided up at the three- and two-star level, and we brought them down to a singular O-6 command…to then be able to operate forward inside the enemy's weapons engagement zone,” Brady said in July. “Be light, maneuverable, able to persist, hard to target by the enemy as a part of just one unit of the stand-in force.”
This year’s RIMPAC was the second major exercise the 3rd MLR has participated in and the first with all its subordinate battalions, giving these Marines the opportunity to demonstrate their multi-domain abilities to the more than two dozen international militaries.
“For the scenario itself and RIMPAC, we are tasked to conduct expeditionary advanced base operations for specifically two reasons,” he said. “One is to be able to provide sea control and sea denial in support of a carrier strike group, maritime choke point transit. And the second is to be able to conduct EABO and provide all-domain effects and long range precision fires to support both an amphibious assault as well as other maritime maneuver.”
The unit is also using RIMPAC to learn what they are capable of now and in the future, Brady said.
“We employ and are capable of C5ISRT and yes, we have Group 1 and Group 2 small [unmanned aircraft systems], as well as a multitude of other capabilities where we can both actively and passively pull and share information and targeting information,” Brady said. “So we can gain and maintain that target ourselves, as well as share that information and or pull that information from somebody else, acquire the target, and then pass it on to somebody if necessary.”
During RIMPAC, Marines from 3rd MLR established several expeditionary advanced bases around Hawaii, including communications systems to link to other units and to their higher headquarters, Combined Task Force 176. The Marines had to figure out how all the participating militaries could see and share information, according to Maj. Brent Logan, a communications officer with 3rd MLR.
“RIMPAC is that opportunity to get on the ground with them with their actual operator, figure out how we can connect all of these systems together in the most efficient fashion, so that we can accomplish kill chains and kill webs in a quick as fashion as possible, while still adhering to, you know, all of the important procedures and rules of engagement that we follow when executing these things,” Logan said in July.
The exercise’s huge scale meant they “basically employed almost our whole team to set up linkages with all of our partners,” Logan said. “Even though we're a regiment, our communications architecture almost looks like a division's worth of communication systems, just because we're operating out of multiple expeditionary advanced bases.”
Having to set up, take down, and move their combat operations centers during the exercise helped Logan’s Marines find ways to reduce the size of their physical footprint.
“The big takeaway that we learned is that we can improve, we can get faster and better and smaller, and still be able to communicate to the same capacity and capability that we can with a larger footprint, which is very, very encouraging,” he said.
MAGTF-7
The Marines operating around Hawaii in the Polaris “dune buggies” were part of MAGTF-7, under the command of Lt. Col. Jason Copeland. About 300 of them came from California on the USS Essex as part of an amphibious ready group, joining up with hundreds of other Marines from nine other countries including Mexico and Sri Lanka.
When they arrived in Hawaii, “we spread out to different training areas to do the integration that needs to happen,” Copeland said. “So our focus has been some of the operations in urban terrain, knowing that the cities and landscape of some of the littoral areas you're going to have an urban population in there.”
They also worked live-fire training, which Copeland said was hard because RIMPAC participants brought various levels of experience.
“For example, the Tongans have not shot live fire since 2012. Ten years is a long time. And a lot of the forces have not done it in a firing-and-moving scenario to where they're actually going forward after an adversary,” he said in July.
But Copeland said his Marines also learned from the visiting forces.
“The Mexican forces have a totally different mission set for their military than we would see, so we learn a lot from them as far as how to do some internal collections and sniper training, which we do a lot of as well, because of their mission set with with the cartels and everything that they're usually focused on. So it's been great for us to see the different perspectives.”
Lessons
One of the most interesting experiments of RIMPAC, Clearfield said, was coordinating MAGTF-7, which was conducting an amphibious assault, and 3rd MLR, which was already ashore.
For Copeland, the main lesson was what it takes to work with different militaries, especially having the right leadership in the right spot. He said exchanging liaison officers between U.S. and foreign units—was of “extreme value” because it fosters understanding and sharing information, especially military terminology. The challenge, he said, is that U.S. units are not built to pull an officer out of his or her job to go liaise.
Brady at 3rd MLR said he focused on “understanding the people, processes, and systems to quickly close kill webs is extremely important. And we've refined those tactics, techniques and procedures to do it more quickly during RIMPAC 22.”
February 2023 will bring the first exercise built specifically for littoral regiment training in the Marine Corps’ service-level training exercise series, Brady said. Then in the fall, Marine Corps Forces Pacific will have their “force design implementation capstone demonstration of a multitude of capabilities,” said.
3rd MLR will reach initial operating capability at some point during the fiscal year, with a goal of reaching full operational capability in 2025, he said.
defenseone.com · by Caitlin M. Kenney
20. The Army Wants Smarter Sensors To Ease Soldiers’ ‘Cognitive Burden’
Starship Trooper - Long live "MI" - the mobile infantryman.
Excerpts:
“Instead of multiple systems with separate infrastructures, separate security implementations, and unique mechanisms to exchange data, these converged capabilities leverage common environments and services resulting in significant improvements in timeliness, clarity and precision. In addition—ISTT will be accessible from any workstation that has access to the CPCE server where it is hosted—no longer will units need intel-specific hardware to access these capabilities,” the spokesperson wrote via email.
The app will be tested throughout fiscal year 2023 and fielded once that’s complete. The firm-fixed price contract extends to 2027.
The Army Wants Smarter Sensors To Ease Soldiers’ ‘Cognitive Burden’
New intelligence and electronic-warfare tools aim to help commanders get data faster.
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
AUGUSTA, Ga.—The Army wants to make sure commanders and soldiers get vital sensor data in near real-time. So the service’s shop for intelligence and electronic warfare is focusing on developing tools to do that without trawling through a morass of information.
In the past, Army senior leaders weren’t very concerned about electronic warfare, according to Mark Kitz, who leads the Army’s Program Executive Office Intelligence Electronic Warfare and Sensors. But that’s changing, in part due to world events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
“So one of the things we've learned not just in this conflict, but over the last five years, is that electronic warfare is an enabler and our enemies, and our capabilities, are going to have to be able to function and work in a contested environment,” Kitz told Defense One at the AFCEA TechNet Augusta conference. “And so in order to understand that environment, we've got to have a collection and standoff capability to characterize that environment.”
The PEO covers “all things electronic warfare” including air, ground, and long-range sensing capabilities—all of which can support kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
Among Kitz’s top priorities are developing prototypes for long-range sensing as well as “smart sensors that can offload some of the cognitive burden that we have on our analysts.”Those sensors would be able to aggregate data and deliver “smart suggestions” or “hypotheses or answers in that data.”
“Data becomes key to what we do, right,” Kitz said. “We're using that data to deliver effects, whether that's a sensor-to-shooter, whether that’s sensor-to-an-intel analyst or electronic warfare analyst.”
But there’s still the question of how to use that sensor data to deliver a specific effect for a soldier. To do that, Kitz said the PEO is investing in “standoff collection and standoff effects” and building “prototype solutions that can help our Army operate in a congested spectrum environment.”
One of those tools is the aerial Multi-Domain Sensing System capability, or MDSS, which is designed to deliver data to analysts from nodes that are hundreds of kilometers away. It is intended to help soldiers understand far-off environments.
Then there’s the Terrestrial Layer System that does similar long-range sensing from the ground.
The Army announced two contracts for its Terrestrial Layer System Echelons Above Brigade in mid-August. The selected companies, General Dynamics Mission Systems and Lockheed Martin, will deliver Phase 1 prototypes for the contract valued at $163 million across the entire project.
The Terrestrial Layer System also has a Brigade Combat Team component and together they are part of the Army’s effort to lean in on electronic warfare capabilities.
Willie Utroska, the PEO’s deputy project manager for EW and cyber, called them “brother and sister programs” that will feed into the Army’s plans for multi-domain operations in the next decade through a tool that can visualize radio waves and “allows the commander to plan, control and manage that electromagnetic spectrum.”
“From a cyber perspective on EW and SIGINT, we're developing our platforms to allow [radio frequency] delivery of cyber effects,” Utroska told Defense One. “So over the radio waves, they can use our platforms to deliver cyber effects. The Commander, if he has to do a non lethal or non kinetic effect, it can either be electrical electronic warfare effect, or it could be a cyber effect.”
The Terrestrial Layer System programs will be the first integrated SIGINT, EW, and cyber platforms that will provide those effects, he said.
Utroska said the PEO will deliver prototypes over the next year for its Terrestrial Layer System Brigade Combat Team, and also work to incorporate artificial intelligence into signals processing that will “lower the cognitive load on soldiers” when using EW equipment.
Utroska said the Army will also begin linking its electronic warfare assets to networks as it rebuilds its capacity, which is a first and part of the service’s unified network plan. The TLS-BCT will go first, followed by the TLS-EAB, and an air-based system called the Multifunction Electronic Warfare Air Large pod, which delivers offensive EW capabilities and long-range sensing.
“As we look at Capability Set 23, we will start networking our EW assets,” Utroska said. “That network is going to be important for us to get data from sensors to the commander quicker, and then allows us to process that to support non kinetic effects, non-lethal effects, and delivering [radio frequency] cyber offense as well.”
The unified network, he said, will help “get the commander information quicker, near-real time, so the commander can make those decisions.” While the EW planning tool is expected to be foundational for making sense of sensor data.
“Our software tool, EW PMT—electronic warfare planning and management tool—resides in the command post computing environment. So our platforms reside in the sensor computing environment. So when you look at the whole common operating environment, our platforms and our products are across those,” Utroska said. “But setting those standards at the different computing environments will allow us to be interoperable and be and be agile when we develop these systems.”
One of those efforts is the Intelligence Support to Targeting, or ISTT, application, which the Army awarded in an almost $23.5 million to a contract to CyOne. This application is meant to digitally support Army fires and intel by synchronizing high payoff target-related data and then notifying users of on the battlefield to help with damage assessments, target intelligence package production, and “the ability to nominate vetted targets across the” command post computing environment, an Army PEO spokesperson told Defense One.
“Instead of multiple systems with separate infrastructures, separate security implementations, and unique mechanisms to exchange data, these converged capabilities leverage common environments and services resulting in significant improvements in timeliness, clarity and precision. In addition—ISTT will be accessible from any workstation that has access to the CPCE server where it is hosted—no longer will units need intel-specific hardware to access these capabilities,” the spokesperson wrote via email.
The app will be tested throughout fiscal year 2023 and fielded once that’s complete. The firm-fixed price contract extends to 2027.
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
21. Philippine-born pretenders pursue QAnon global ‘monarchy’
Oh no! Someone has to be having a good laugh about how they created this conspiracy theory as a joke and it has taken on a life of its own among certain segments of populations. It would be funny if it were not so dangerous. Someday this will be a case study in influence operations.
Philippine-born pretenders pursue QAnon global ‘monarchy’
Both the self-proclaimed ‘Queen of Canada’ and her choice for ‘King of the US’ are said to be Filipino immigrants
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · August 31, 2022
Following up a report that the self-crowned “Queen of Canada” is expanding her QAnon-inspired movement into the United States, Asia Times has noticed that Romana Didulo’s newly anointed “King of the US” claims to be – like Didula – a Philippines-born immigrant.
“I am a naturalized US citizen from Maharlika,” “His Majesty” King David J Carlson is quoted as saying in an introduction on the group’s Telegram social media page. The self-description is quoted on a Reddit page devoted to watching advocates of the “sovereign citizen” movement – under whose principles Didulo has aroused her Canadian “subjects” to stop paying taxes and utility bills.
Maharlika is the name given to a supposed pre-colonial kingdom alleged to have ruled over what are now the Philippines, Brunei, South Borneo, Hawaii, the Spratly Islands and Sabah. Fact-checkers have found no evidence that the purported dynasty of rulers with the family name Tallano ever existed.
Asia Times has also located a Facebook page under Carlson’s name (the profile picture is of a child) and another under the name of Sarah Carlson, his wife and purported queen of the US. The Carlsons say they are residents of Phoenix, Arizona.
A real estate development company under the Carlsons’ name has advertised that it specializes in dealings with “royal families.”
From the Facebook page of David J. Carlson, Phoenix, Arizona. The page also features pronouncements by ‘Queen’ Raomana Dikdulo.
One of the most recent postings on David Carlson’s Facebook page is a Shopify brochure for their “Kingdom of America” organization.
Indications from Facebook are that David Carlson is in his 50s; his wife is in her 30s. They’re enthusiastic parents, typically Facebook to that extent. He says he attended Bellingham High School in Bellingham, Washington state, as a member of the class of 1983, and also studied at Arizona State University.
The royal couple are gun enthusiasts devoted to ex-US president Donald Trump. Their pages are bedecked with military symbolism. His Facebook page appears to have been cleansed, quite recently, of politically related content including videos with titles such as “Why the Military is in charge, for good.”
Titles remain, even though the content has been removed, and it appears Carlson in true QAnon fashion is a fan of wild conspiracy theorists unconnected with reality – such as Judy Byington, who reports “news” of events that never happened and “messages” received from the late John F Kennedy Jr, who is long dead but whom QAnon adherents expect to show up alive and run as Trump’s 2024 vice presidential sidekick.
“King” David Carlson and child. Photo: Facebook
David Carlson did not respond to a list of questions Asia Times sent to him via Facebook Messenger. The questions included some asking for his views on QAnon and the “sovereign citizens” movement.
Christine Sarteschi, an associate professor of social work and criminology at Chatham University in Pennsylvania who watches the “Queen” and related movements, had reported earlier for The Conversation that many of the followers are seeing their water and power cut off and facing liens against their homes.
“Didulo is deceiving her followers,” Sarteschi writes. “Her decrees are hurting them. Nothing she suggests is legal or true. Her followers are hurt, but they are not blameless. They are drawn to her because of greed. They want something for nothing. She promises them free money, no bills, no taxes and all they have to do is believe.”
In her latest article, Sarteschi adds that, on the instructions of the “queen”:
Some of her disciples recently attempted to arrest police officers in southern Ontario. The plan was then to turn the police over to the military to be tried as war criminals. If convicted of crimes against humanity, the police officers would be executed, according to Didulo. Instead, her followers were arrested and charged with assaulting police officers.
A roadside speech by the “Queen.” Photo: Christine Sarteschi / Twitter
‘Clinton cartel’
In her new article, Sarteschi details some of the moves to expand the Didula empire abroad:
“King Carlson” claims to be Commander-in-chief” of the “United States Armed Forces Civilian Command.” He claims he was awarded this position after a failed coup attempt “by the Clinton cartel” to overthrow the election of Donald Trump. The military then stepped in and made sure that Donald Trump actually took office. The military then allegedly showed its gratitude by making him king of America and commander-in-chief. He offers no evidence to support his contention.
If the Carlsons and Didulo have their way, they would install a “benevolent monarchy” under natural law or God’s law. Didulo’s 79 royal decrees would become law. As “civilian white hats” (a QAnon reference to freedom fighters), the people would become “sovereign free beings,” guided by “sovereign principles.”
Which brings us back to the Filipino angle. Why are we learning that today’s two top world figures are both Philippines-born naturalized North Americans? The reason is unavailable now. We may just have to keep watching Judy Byington until she consults with JFK Jr to find the answer.
asiatimes.com · by Bradley K. Martin · August 31, 2022
22. Biden's effort to isolate Russia has a big problem: India
Biden's effort to isolate Russia has a big problem: India
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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi (L) with President Biden at a Quad summit in Tokyo. Photo: Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty
Two global powers are undercutting Western efforts to isolate Russia and deplete the Kremlin coffers as they scale up purchases of Russian oil and join Russia this week in major military exercises.
Why it matters: One of those countries is China, which has moved closer to Moscow amid its confrontation with the U.S. The other, though, is India — one of Washington's most valued partners, which has taken a neutral position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
How it happened: The EU was by far the top destination for Russian oil prior to February's invasion of Ukraine, but EU countries have cut back their purchases and plan to end nearly all imports of Russian oil by year's end.
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Even still, Russia's oil revenues are on track to jump by 38% this year, per Reuters. Asked about that projection this week, a White House spokesperson said it had made clear to countries that this is no time for "business as usual with Russia."
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For China and India, it's been far beyond business as usual — they've both dramatically increased their purchases. India accounted for less than 1% of Russia's oil exports prior to the invasion, but was up to 13% by July, helping to offset Russia's lost market share in Europe.
Yes, but: That's due not to politics, but price. Prices from the Gulf have been sky-high, Russia is selling at a discount, and India is trying to keep inflation down and recover economically from the pandemic, Tanvi Madan of Brookings tells Axios.
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Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has called it an "obligation and moral duty" to get the lowest-possible energy prices for Indian consumers. Russia, meanwhile, has praised India for resisting Western pressure.
What to watch: To stop Russia from benefiting from the high oil prices that its invasion helped create, the White House wants to put a price cap on Russian oil. G7 finance ministers will discuss that proposal on Friday.
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For it to be effective, they'll need India on board. U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo visited New Delhi last week and said he'd had "a very constructive conversation" with Indian officials on the cap.
- India has thus far been noncommittal. It stands to benefit from lower prices, but will be wary of provoking Moscow — particularly considering its military's overwhelming reliance on Russian arms.
Zoom out: The long-standing military relationship between India and Russia is on display this week at the Vostok war games in Russia's far east, which will also include China and several other countries.
- India's troops will be "full-fledged" participants, not just observers, a source briefed on the matter tells Axios. The source noted that India has taken part in similar exercises in the past but doesn't "always publicize it."
- Asked about India's participation, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the U.S. "has concerns about any country exercising with Russia while Russia wages an unprovoked, brutal war against Ukraine."
Between the lines: She avoided any direct criticism of India and dodged a follow-up as to whether the U.S. has pressured India to stop helping Russia, as it has pressured China.
- The Biden administration recognizes that India's long-standing relationship with Russia won't fade away overnight, and while it's trying to help New Delhi diversify its arms supply away from Russia, the U.S. priority is deepening coordination in the Indo-Pacific, Madan says.
The bottom line: India is too important to the U.S. strategy toward one top rival, China, to push back too hard as it undermines U.S. policy toward the other.
23. In the new offensive in the Ukraine War, can new recruits, high morale and heavy weapons tip the balance?
In the new offensive in the Ukraine War, can new recruits, high morale and heavy weapons tip the balance?
A former deputy minister of defense in Ukraine tells Grid why she has high hopes for a new counteroffensive.
Joshua Keating
Global Security Reporter
September 2, 2022
grid.news · by Joshua Keating
The war in Ukraine appears to be at another turning point. The early weeks of the conflict were defined by Russian forces’ failed attempt to take the capital, Kyiv, and overthrow the Ukrainian government. Then the fighting shifted to the eastern Donbas region, where Russia made slow, bloody but significant progress in taking Ukrainian territory and cities thanks to its overwhelming advantage in artillery and equipment. Now, with the arrival of more and more advanced weaponry from the U.S. and Europe, most notably High Mobility Advanced Rocket Systems (HIMARS), the Ukrainians are going on the attack, striking Russian logistics targets well behind the front lines and, this week, formally announcing the start of a long-anticipated counteroffensive in the south of the country. Early Western military assessments suggest this offensive is making progress, though it’s early to say anything definitive.
Still, Ukraine’s offensive against heavily fortified Russian positions carries significant risks, and looming behind it is the question of whether the West’s support for the Ukrainian resistance will outlast Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination for victory. And this week’s visit by U.N. inspectors to the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is a reminder that despite the enormous losses already suffered in Ukraine, there may still be major calamities to come.
To get a better understanding of this phase of the conflict, Grid spoke with Alina Frolova, who served as Ukraine’s deputy minister of defense from 2019 to 2020 and is today deputy chair of the Kyiv-based think tank Centre for Defence Strategies.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
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Grid: This week, Ukraine formally announced the start of offensive operations in the south, around the region of Kherson. What do you see as realistic goals of this offensive? Is it to actually retake this territory or just to degrade Russia’s capabilities?
Alina Frolova: Well, I think that there are a mixture of targets. First of all, it’s to retake the territories. The south is quite critical for the Ukrainian economy and critical for access to the sea. And with this, we can also isolate the Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnieper River. This is the only point where they crossed the river and where they’ve tried to fix their position for further developments.
And, of course, this is the first big counteroffensive the Ukrainians have done. For us, it’s very important to demonstrate to Ukrainian citizens and to foreign decision-makers that Ukraine is capable of doing this. Everyone understands there can be different levels of success, but we need to demonstrate these capabilities because that will really influence the weapons supply and delivery.
And last, it also took some Russian forces away from other areas of the country.
G: So what are the major challenges associated with Ukrainian forces now going on offense after all these months of primarily defense? What can we expect to be different about this type of fighting?
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AF: I can’t give you details, but obviously this is the first counteroffensive of this size since the war began eight years ago. It was started on a very symbolic date for Ukrainians because of what happened eight years ago. [On Aug. 29, 2014, hundreds of Ukrainian troops were killed by Russian and separatist forces while retreating through a “humanitarian corridor” near the city of Ilovaisk.]
Obviously, with any offensive or counteroffensive, there’s always more losses and more risk.
If you look at the pictures, the Kherson region is just fields. There are no trees, no forest, nowhere to make a good position. That’s why the counterattack to the south was possible only after you controlled the sky, only because of the work of the HIMARS and the work to destroy their capabilities on the Black Sea and their air defense.
G: You mentioned Russian troops being moved to the south from other parts of the country. What is the situation right now in the Donbas compared to the heavy fighting we saw there just a few weeks ago?
AF: We cannot compare it with a few months ago. This month, Russia hasn’t had any substantial advancements, maybe a few villages. A few months ago, we had very hard prevailing pressure from artillery. There was a daily routine, daily massive shelling of our front lines. Now, the whole situation is different. We at least have an equilibrium with artillery because of the weapons we’ve received. Since the HIMARS have been starting to work, they have a shortage of munitions, and it’s halted their offensive.
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Now, a substantial part of their personnel is young and not professional military. It looks like they’re just bringing in new people who aren’t qualified to do the mission.
G: Right, there’s been a lot of focus on Russia’s heavy troop losses and its difficulty replenishing troops. But obviously, Ukraine has taken very heavy losses as well. Are Ukrainian forces also facing issues with manpower shortages?
AF: We don’t have such problems. From the point of view of manpower, we’ve never had a problem because high morale and motivation brings a lot of new people. We still have lines at recruitment points. Not all people who want to go to the army or armed forces are even in the reserves yet. The fact that [the military] haven’t announced any new campaigns to recruit, I think that shows they don’t have issues with personnel.
As for arms and equipment, the situation just one month ago was much worse. Now we have more and more intense arrival of foreign assistance and we have a clear prognosis of what will arrive and when it will arrive. It’s become more and more systematic. I still, frankly, don’t think we can expect to have the same numbers as Russia in terms of weapons and equipment.
The biggest concern for now is still ammunition. It’s quite heavily used. The delivery and production of ammunition is the principal point for now.
G: There’s been some discussion about the Ukrainian military’s ability to absorb some of these larger NATO weapons systems and the time it takes to train personnel to both operate and maintain them. Is that something that’s still an issue?
AF: I think that everyone sees now that there is no difficulty of terms of operation. This is what we hear from all the partners. They were expecting it to take months of training, but it’s taken one or two weeks. I think that motivation plays a huge role here. I would say we even have some examples of the adaptation of the NATO weapons to Ukrainian realities. For example, there are missiles that are not applicable for the type of jets we have but have been adapted. So I haven’t heard of any problem with operation.
In terms of service and maintenance, I don’t know the real situation from the field, but I do expect it could be a problematic issue. We now have what the military calls a “zoo”: multiple types of weapons and equipment from different countries, and all of them require a different approach to service. So, it’s a challenge obviously.
G: Another topic that’s getting a lot of discussion is what’s going to happen to the level of international support for Ukraine this winter when the energy situation could become really dire in Western Europe. Are you worried about Ukraine being able to keep its backers motivated in this fight?
AF: I sometimes think that Russia is doing more on this than us! They’ve been working to disconnect Europe from their supplies. From what I see, if you have already a very strong political decision, it’s something that cannot be changed. This train is already moving at quite high speed. So of course, the [energy crisis] will probably influence the popularity or motivations of some politicians in Europe. And it could cause crisis inside some countries. But it doesn’t seem like it will be as critical as we thought some months ago. The latest reports from the EU is that they’ve actually filled 80 percent of their gas storage. That’s likely enough already to pass through the winter. It seems like [European energy independence] is going much faster than was expected before because there was a recognition of the problem and a political decision was made.
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G: U.N. inspectors this week are visiting the Russian-occupied nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia. What is your assessment of the risks to the Ukrainian population from an accident at that plant, and what impact is it having on military operations in the area?
AF: Obviously, military operations on our side are not possible. We won’t shoot at the power plant. We’re not crazy. That makes everything more complicated because they are hiding vehicles and equipment there.
The reports which have come in from Zaporizhzhia station are extremely concerning. There’s torture of the personnel there, and disappearances.
Frankly, I don’t know how the [U.N.] mission can influence this. People who are under the guns, I don’t think they will be able to speak about the real situation, and the Russians won’t show what’s really happening. We need to take every chance we have, but I don’t think we should have high expectations for this mission.
G: Are you still concerned about Russia making another push to take Kyiv or a return to the more ambitious war aims it had early in the conflict?
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AF: I don’t think they have a capability to do so. It’s an absolutely different situation now. They don’t have enough forces, their forces are not capable, they have a lack of equipment. They still try to send diversion groups and they still use the territory of Belarus for missile strikes. Right now that’s a much bigger danger than another offensive.
G: In the past few weeks, we’ve seen an increasing number of strikes on Russian military targets in Crimea and President [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy recently reiterated that Ukraine’s goal is to restore Ukrainian control there. Given how long the Russians have been in control of Crimea and how fortified their forces are there, is that really a realistic goal?
AF: The discussions about “shall we speak about Crimea” or “shall we not speak about Crimea” have stopped. For many years, we have had a kind of suspended situation where many European players have said, “OK, let’s talk about the Donbas, but put aside Crimea because the issue is too complicated.” Or they would say that we can speak only about diplomatic ways of solving the Crimea issue. Now everyone understands that the release of Crimea will only be the result of military operations. Maybe it won’t be direct military operations on Crimea. But now what we have are [Ukrainian] subversion groups and some attacks which are not confirmed whether they are missiles or something else.
I think that Crimea will be released after all the rest of continental Ukraine is released. But before this will happen, a lot of actions need to be taken. And it’s still a question of if Putin will still be in power at this moment. If he is, it will be difficult.
I’m sure it’s something that our military and our general staff are planning for, but it’s not the first priority right now.
Thanks to Alicia Benjamin for copy editing this article.
grid.news · by Joshua Keating
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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