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Is Afghanista
Quotes of the Day:
“If a country is lost to communism through propaganda and subversion it is lost to our side as irretrievably as if we had lost it in actual warfare.”
-George Gallup, 1962
A 2020 follow up to the above quote:
"The gray zone isn't new. It's cheap and effective, especially against a military-first national security mindset."
- Matt Armstrong
“It is hard for me to understand a culture that not only hates and fights his brothers but even attacks nature and abuses her period man must love all creation or he will love none of it. Love is something you and I must have. We must have it because our spirit feeds upon it. Without love our self-esteem weakens. Without it our courage fails. Without love we can no longer look out confidently at the world. Instead, we turn inwardly and begin to feed upon our own personalities and little by little we destroy ourselves.”
- Chief Dan George
1. Kim Jong Un Is Putin’s and Xi’s New Best Friend
2. New attendant who closely serves Kim garners attention
3. N. Korea continuing to run uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon site: IAEA
4. Korea: shrimp or safety valve between US, China?
5. Worrying aspects of Inflation Reduction Act (Korean Perspective)
6. Nearly 10 million COVID-19 vaccines may be discarded in Korea
7. China’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear weapons first-use law tipped to be muted
8. North Korea reinstates mask mandate one month after declaring victory over COVID
9. New Normal and New Challenges to the ROK-U.S. Alliance
10. S. Korea's COVID-19 cases bounce back to over 50,000; KDCA warns 'twindemic' risks
11. S. Korea warns N. Korea's nuclear use would lead to regime's 'self-destruction'
12. N. Korea calls for strengthened cooperation among developing countries
13. IAEA's Grossi raises alarm over North's nuclear activities
14. Kaspersky uncovers details about active cyber-espionage campaign
1. Kim Jong Un Is Putin’s and Xi’s New Best Friend
Excerpts:
Two weeks earlier, on Aug. 1, as China celebrated the founding of the People’s Liberation Army, North Korean Defense Minister Ri Yong Gil had sent a message to his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe. According to Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency, “the message stressed that the Korean People’s Army would closely wage strategic and tactic coordinated operations with the [Chinese military].”
The language in both cases was striking. It marked the first time that Pyongyang had used the phrase “strategic and tactical” (emphasis added) cooperation to describe its security relations with Moscow and Beijing.
“We haven’t seen anything like this,” noted one former American intelligence official with long experience following North Korea, who asked for anonymity given the sensitivity of their work. “I am afraid this is a forewarning of what may be coming.”
Now, according to a U.S. intelligence finding, Russia is in the process of buying millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea for its ongoing war in Ukraine. While media coverage of the development has focused on what it means for Moscow’s ability—or inability—to supply its own armed forces, the broader implication is the prospect of enhanced military ties among North Korea, Russia, and China, with potentially significant consequences for security in Northeast Asia.
Kim Jong Un Is Putin’s and Xi’s New Best Friend
Foreign Policy · by Mike Chinoy · September 12, 2022
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Pyongyang has abandoned any rapprochement with Washington.
By Mike Chinoy, a Taipei-based nonresident senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s U.S.-China Institute.
Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping
Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping pose during a meeting in Beijing on Feb. 4. Alexei Druzhinin/Sputnik/AFP via Getty Images
This week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is scheduled to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Uzbekistan. Xi’s trip, which includes both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, will be his first time outside of China’s borders since the COVID-19 pandemic started two and a half years ago—a sign of confidence that his absence won’t mean trouble ahead of the upcoming 20th Party Congress, and perhaps also a convenient excuse for frank words with Putin. The meeting will be their first face-to-face encounter since they declared an “no limits” partnership just before Russia invaded Ukraine, a rhetorical arrangement that has largely backfired for China in the face of global anger and Russian military catastrophes.
But while attention has focused on China’s reaction to the Ukraine war, the partnership has another major security implication: North Korea’s decision to draw closer to both countries as Pyongyang categorically rules out negotiating with Washington over its nuclear weapons program.
On Aug. 15, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un sent a message to Putin to mark the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. Kim hailed what he described as the growing “strategic and tactical cooperation, support and solidarity” between the two nations.
Two weeks earlier, on Aug. 1, as China celebrated the founding of the People’s Liberation Army, North Korean Defense Minister Ri Yong Gil had sent a message to his Chinese counterpart, Wei Fenghe. According to Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency, “the message stressed that the Korean People’s Army would closely wage strategic and tactic coordinated operations with the [Chinese military].”
The language in both cases was striking. It marked the first time that Pyongyang had used the phrase “strategic and tactical” (emphasis added) cooperation to describe its security relations with Moscow and Beijing.
“We haven’t seen anything like this,” noted one former American intelligence official with long experience following North Korea, who asked for anonymity given the sensitivity of their work. “I am afraid this is a forewarning of what may be coming.”
Now, according to a U.S. intelligence finding, Russia is in the process of buying millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea for its ongoing war in Ukraine. While media coverage of the development has focused on what it means for Moscow’s ability—or inability—to supply its own armed forces, the broader implication is the prospect of enhanced military ties among North Korea, Russia, and China, with potentially significant consequences for security in Northeast Asia.
The two statements and the news of the arms supply deal were the latest in a series of North Korean moves to draw even closer to the two countries that were already its best friends. The crucial turning point appears to have been Putin and Xi’s February declaration of the “no limits” partnership.
The declaration highlighted a changing geopolitical landscape, in which Moscow and Beijing appeared more willing than ever to join forces, particularly to challenge the United States, which China increasingly views as a declining power in Asia. For Kim, it was a moment to double down on his already close ties with both nations. In the process, the North Korean leader abandoned altogether what little hope he may have still held of improving relations with the United States.
For all North Korea’s anti-American rhetoric, going back to Kim’s grandfather Kim Il Sung, it had long seen a rapprochement—a deal to trade its nuclear program in return for diplomatic and economic ties—with Washington as a means to reduce the country’s dependence on its two giant neighbors. This dynamic reached a climax with Kim’s two summit meetings with then-U.S. President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019. Now, however, as former State Department Korea expert Evans Revere told me, “With the bromance gone, Kim Jong Un has written the U.S. off.”
North Korea has never acknowledged the possibility of surrendering its nuclear weapons, but the language against such an option has grown stronger in recent months. On Sept. 8, Kim announced that Pyongyang would “never give up nuclear weapons … and there is absolutely no denuclearization, no negotiation, and no bargaining chip to trade in the process.” He also outlined conditions under which North Korea would actually use its weapons and raised the possibility of preemptive use if his regime felt under threat.
This development came after months in which North Korea has gone overboard in its already fulsome support for Moscow and Beijing. It was one of only five nations to vote at the United Nations against a motion condemning the invasion of Ukraine, although many abstained, and its support for Russia has become increasingly vociferous. In July, it became the only nation apart from Russia and Syria to recognize the two so-called republics Russia has created in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
And while the prospect of Pyongyang deploying military personnel to help the Russians in Ukraine still seems far-fetched, officials in the so-called republics and in Moscow have openly speculated about North Korean laborers being sent to help restore facilities damaged in the fighting, a step that would also provide Pyongyang with badly needed income.
Meanwhile, North Korea vociferously denounced U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan as “unforgivable,” and voiced support for “all the strong, just and legitimate steps taken by the Chinese army and government to resolutely repel the U.S. arbitrariness … and achieve the cause of China’s reunification.”
China and Russia have reciprocated, blocking new U.N. sanctions against North Korea for its continuing missile tests, calling for the lifting of some sanctions already in place, and pledging enhanced economic and security cooperation. For his part, Xi has declared that Beijing is prepared to “develop the China-DPRK relations of friendship and cooperation” under a “new situation,” while Putin, in response to Kim’s Aug. 15 message, said he was ready to “expand comprehensive and constructive bilateral relations.”
News of the North’s arms shipments to Moscow, which would be a violation of U.N. resolutions that ban the country from exporting weapons to or importing them from other nations, provided one indication of what the new rhetorical formulation of “tactical cooperation” may mean in practice. Given North Korea’s long-standing policy of juche, or self-reliance, it is difficult to imagine Pyongyang granting access to its airfields and ports, even to close allies—but, in a sign of how much the geopolitical landscape has changed, knowledgeable observers say that possibility can no longer be completely ruled out.
“Anyone who thinks it’s going to stop at a supply of ammunition needs to have their head examined,” the former U.S. intelligence analyst said. “The North Koreans are up to their necks in this anti-U.S. struggle. That suggests to me it won’t be too much of a step for them to open their territory to Russian military. I’d guess they are already talking about it.”
Certainly Moscow and Beijing have stepped up their own joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific, including flying bombers close to Japan and South Korea during a visit by U.S. President Joe Biden in May, forcing both countries to scramble fighter jets in response. Moreover, in late August, Russian warplanes entered South Korea’s air defense identification zone, leading Seoul to deploy F-16 fighter jets to shadow the Russian aircraft.
Short of that, as Revere pointed out, “it is easy to see North Korea trying to figure out how to attach itself to some kind of Chinese-Russian military exercise or broader strategic cooperation.”
For Pyongyang, such enhanced cooperation could bring immediate and urgently needed benefits, including supplies of food, fuel, spare parts—and possibly even COVID-19 vaccines. As former Pentagon Asia expert Drew Thompson, now at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, observed, the new rhetorical formulation “is completely necessary for the implementation phase of whatever they are agreeing. They need that political framework at the highest levels to accomplish these tasks.”
With Washington seeking to beef up its own alliances in Asia as relations with Moscow and Beijing deteriorate, it is hardly surprising that both countries would seek to enlist North Korea as an even more active strategic asset to challenge the American position in the Pacific. It may not yet be a new “axis of evil,” but it is a worrisome trend in a volatile part of the world.
Mike Chinoy is a Taipei-based nonresident senior fellow at the University of Southern California’s U.S.-China Institute. He is the author of the forthcoming Assignment China: An Oral History of American Journalists in the People’s Republic.
2. New attendant who closely serves Kim garners attention
Enquiring minds want to know: Who is she?
Photo at the link: https://www.donga.com/en/east/article/all/20220913/3631267/1
New attendant who closely serves Kim garners attention
Posted September. 13, 2022 08:07,
Updated September. 13, 2022 08:07
A new attendant who serves North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is getting attention. The female attendant closely served Kim at the Sept. 9 event to celebrate the establishment of the North Korean government, which was held on Thursday. She is a different figure from the attendant who was caught on camera serving Kim at a public event in April.
According to Korean Central Television and other North Korean media, a female attendant served the North Korean leader at an event to celebrate the 74th anniversary of the establishment of the North Korean government, which was held near Mansudae in Pyongyang on Thursday. The female who had half updo and wore a black suit and glasses served Kim, handling his flower bouquet, etc. The attendant also served Kim during his 7th administrative policy speech of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on the same day. She was caught following Kim while holding his briefcase and documents when the North Korean leader was entering the meeting hall. Hyon Song Wol, the Deputy Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, who used to serve this role, stood at the hall entrance and watched the new attendant.
New attendants serving Kim at public events caught attention recently. Another short-haired female appeared at the congress of elementary party secretaries on Feb. 26 and a completion ceremony for Songshin and Songwha streets in Pyongyang in March. They may be performing all or part of the roles of an assistant secretary, which used to be performed by Deputy Department Directors of the Workers' Party of Korea Kim Yo Jong and Hyon Song Wol. The South Korean government is working on identifying them.
Meanwhile, Premier of North Korea Kim Tok Hun, who oversees the country’s economy, seems to have gained stature. As the country’s leader pays close attention to North Korean people’s food, clothing, and shelter issues, Kim Tok Hun’s role has grown. As his name was mentioned first among the members of a standing committee of the Political Bureau at recent public events, including a meeting for unification to prevent disasters and a congress of veterans, some say that he has solidified his status as the country’s second-in-command.
Ji-Sun Choi aurinko@donga.com
3. N. Korea continuing to run uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon site: IAEA
When will the seventh test come?
N. Korea continuing to run uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon site: IAEA | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · September 12, 2022
GENEVA, Sept. 12 (Yonhap) -- The chief of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said Monday there are signs that North Korea is operating the Yongbyon nuclear complex's uranium enrichment facility while carrying out construction work there.
Rafael Grossi, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), made the remarks amid speculation that North Korea appears to be preparing for what would be its first nuclear test since 2017.
"We have observed indications that the reported centrifuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon continues to operate and is now externally complete, expanding the building's available floor space by approximately one-third," Grossi said in a statement to the board of governors.
He said there are indications that the 5MW reactor is operating at the Yongbyon site and intermittent activity at the radiochemical laboratory has been observed.
Grossi also said there are "ongoing indications of activities" at the Kangson complex and Pyongsan uranium mine and concentration plant.
"The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear program is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable," Grossi said, referring to North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
North Korea conducted its sixth and last nuclear test in September 2017. Nuclear talks between the U.S. and North Korea have remained stalled since the 2019 Hanoi summit between the two nations ended without a deal.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · September 12, 2022
4. Korea: shrimp or safety valve between US, China?
Very interesting essay. Some very good analysis. But I disagree with his comments about entrapment and abandonment and the idea that South Korea could be neutral in any conflict between the PRC and the US. The truth is with a security partnership and the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 which calls on both countries to defend the other from threats in the Asia Pacific region, the policy for South Korea is set. But the presence of US forces makes South Korea vulnerable. Also in terms of abandonment, South Korea is not Afghanistan or Iraq. It is too important to the US and to the global economy for the US to abandon it.
On the other hand, good relations between South Korea and the PRC can be good for the ROK/US alliance. While I don't know if it can really serve as a middle man or facilitator, keeping lines of communication open is a good thing for the alliance.
Excerpts:
Therefore, it is vital for South Korean policymakers to take a different approach, no matter how difficult it is. A new approach requires proactivity and creativity. South Korea must mobilize its intellectual capital to craft alternative avenues of ushering the U.S. and China toward a managed competition. With open communication lines with both powers, South Korea is in a rare position to help them compete responsibly within the mutually agreed guardrails. This outcome is much better not only for the U.S. and China, but also for the rest of the world.
This is a tough task. But it is doable if the U.S. and China take heed of their responsibility for the whole of humanity. Without the two working together, existential threats such as weapons of mass destruction and the climate crisis cannot be addressed. South Korea can help the two powers get off the collision course. Then it will cease to be a shrimp and instead can serve as a global safety valve.
Korea: shrimp or safety valve between US, China?
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
By Kim Won-soo
World politics is going through a great upheaval. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the latest manifestation of the growing malaise in big power relations. At its center lies the rising rivalry between the United States and China, the world's two most powerful states and leaders of their respective blocs.
Inevitably, this great upheaval poses great diplomatic challenges to the countries along the geopolitical fault line between the two. The Korean Peninsula is situated squarely on this fault line.
Many foreign policy pundits continue to regard North Korea as the No. 1 challenge for South Korea. North Korea's unbridled nuclear buildup poses an existential threat to South Korea. Pyongyang's self-imposed isolation, further aggravated by international sanctions, has caused devastating hardship for its people, which could have a long-term impact on a unified Korea. These North Korean headaches will be there for many years to come as the country is intent on keeping its nuclear arsenal at any costs.
I believe, however, that the far greater challenge for South Korea is to figure out what to do in the face of the U.S.-China rivalry. The U.S. and China are not only the most powerful states, but also the closest geopolitical neighbors of Korea. As an old proverb says, when either of them sneezes, Korea catches cold.
Then the next logical question is what is the best way forward for South Korea. Simply put, there are three options: pro-U.S., pro-China and neutrality.
The majority view in South Korea is pro-U.S., primarily given its security dependence on the U.S., including extended nuclear deterrence against North Korea. However, it comes with the dual risk of entrapment and abandonment. A situation may arise where South Korea gets dragged into a confrontation between the U.S. and China for reasons other than vital South Korean interests. Or worse, the U.S. may decide not to defend South Korea for reasons beyond Seoul's control. This dual risk lurks in the minds of policymakers and can introduce some degree of ambiguity to the conduct of South Korean diplomacy.
Calculated ambiguity is fine. But ambiguity arising from indecisiveness or lack of thinking is not acceptable, as it contains two fatal flaws of passivity and simplicity. The two flaws together can lead to what I consider the worst outcome: determinism.
Passivity should be avoided as there is still diplomatic space in which South Korea can maneuver. South Korea can try many things to encourage the U.S. and China to find common ground. South Korea can be a proactive facilitator that can help the two think outside the box and start a dialogue on issues of low political difference and high universal consequence.
Simplicity should be avoided as there are a number of gray areas in diplomacy. Depending on the nature of the issue area, South Korea can identify its diplomatic options on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the most pro-U.S. and 10 being the most pro-China. For example, on the security front, it can place itself anywhere between 1 and 3, and on the economic front, between 3 and 5.
The options can be refined further according to the specifics of a sub-issue area. For instance, on security, South Korea's option should vary in accordance with its priority interests. It can be 1 on issues directly related to the Korean Peninsula while 3 on extra-regional issues. South Korea's economic policy can be similarly calibrated. Special care must be given to the growing nexus between security and economy ― what we call economic security.
There may not be much South Korea can do to ease the tensions between the U.S. and China. Many experts consider the rivalry inescapable and almost predestined. This view depicts South Korea as a shrimp sandwiched between two whales and forces it to choose sides for its security. The bottom line is that either way, the outcome is sub-optimal for South Korea. In the event of a clash between the two whales, it will be the first one to get hurt. Passivity and simplicity do not provide South Korea with optimal policy outcomes. South Korea cannot and should not sit idly by only to be swallowed up by its neighbors.
Therefore, it is vital for South Korean policymakers to take a different approach, no matter how difficult it is. A new approach requires proactivity and creativity. South Korea must mobilize its intellectual capital to craft alternative avenues of ushering the U.S. and China toward a managed competition. With open communication lines with both powers, South Korea is in a rare position to help them compete responsibly within the mutually agreed guardrails. This outcome is much better not only for the U.S. and China, but also for the rest of the world.
This is a tough task. But it is doable if the U.S. and China take heed of their responsibility for the whole of humanity. Without the two working together, existential threats such as weapons of mass destruction and the climate crisis cannot be addressed. South Korea can help the two powers get off the collision course. Then it will cease to be a shrimp and instead can serve as a global safety valve.
Kim Won-soo (wsk4321@gmail.com) is the former under secretary-general of the United Nations and high representative for disarmament. As a Korean diplomat, he served as secretary to the ROK president for foreign affairs as well as for international security. He is now the chair of the international advisory board of the Taejae Academy (Future Consensus Institute) and a chair professor of Kyung Hee University.
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
5. Worrying aspects of Inflation Reduction Act (Korean Perspective)
Excerpts;
An important value, which distinguishes democracies from autocracies, is the former's commitment to the rule of law. The flaw in the IRA Act of 2022 is apparently in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) law and the bilateral Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).
...
More than 25 percent of EVs sold in the U.S. market last year were imports from abroad ― Japan, Germany, Korea and Sweden, all major allies of the U.S. In the first half of this year alone, Korea exported no less than 45,000 EVs, more than the whole export volume of last year's. With the "finally assembled within North America" proviso, these imports from abroad will be effectively banned, leading to a serious shortage of EVs in the U.S. market.
Worrying aspects of Inflation Reduction Act
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
By Ahn Ho-young
The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 was signed into law by U.S. President Joe Biden on Aug. 16. The law has a lot of merits. It is believed to help the U.S. to reduce the deficit. It will help to lower prescription drug prices, which are too high by international standards as I experienced through many years of living in the U.S. Furthermore, it will significantly help to promote clean energy.
Many independent groups, including an institution at Princeton University, estimated that the investments made by the law would reduce net emissions 42 percent below 2005 levels, compared to 27 percent under current policies.
All in all, I admire the gigantic efforts made by congressional leaders to pass the law and am happy for the above summarized positive impacts that the law is expected to have for the U.S. However, there is an important flaw in the act which causes serious concern for me. The law provides for up to $7,500 subsidies to the buyers of new electric vehicles (EVs).
The subsidy will of course encourage U.S. consumers to buy EVs and reduce emissions. However, there is a catch to the subsidy: it will be provided only for vehicles "finally assembled within North America." Thus, it will effectively ban the import of EVs manufactured abroad. In my view, this flaw in the law must be taken care of immediately for the following reasons.
First of all, the flaw will seriously undermine U.S. efforts to strengthen relations with its allies. Even during his campaign for the presidency, President Biden declared "the U.S. is back," meaning that the U.S. will return to strengthening relations with allies and working with them to reinforce the rules-based international order.
The declaration was reassuring and part of the reason why the U.S. now enjoys such a high degree of approval rating among the citizens of U.S. allies. No less than 83 percent of Korean citizens answered that the U.S. is a reliable partner in a recent Pew Research opinion poll.
Biden's assurances also encouraged a large number of Korean companies to plan and commit a huge amount of new investments in the U.S. Samsung has declared its plan to invest $17 billion and build its second semiconductor foundry in Texas. Hyundai announced its plan to invest $10 billion and build new EV and battery plants in Georgia. As for SK, it announced investments of no less than $30 billion in semiconductors, batteries and bioproducts.
It is against such a backdrop that the "finally assembled within North America" proviso in the IRA Act removed the level playing field from the foreign suppliers of EVs to the U.S. market. It came as a big shock not only to Hyundai and Kia but also to the whole Korean business community and all Korean citizens. In particular, it is putting the new Yoon government in a very difficult corner.
The Yoon government has put the re-strengthening of the Korea-U.S. alliance at the center of its foreign and security policy. It restored joint military exercises between Korea and the U.S. It strongly supported the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Chip 4 initiatives of President Biden.
These policies of the Yoon government of course encouraged Korean businesses to decide to make new investments in the U.S. The U.S. law to ban the import of EVs from Korea is making many citizens in Korea question the wisdom of Yoon's firm commitment to strengthening the alliance.
Second, the U.S. must practice what it preaches. President Biden rightly points out the growing tension between democracies and autocracies and emphasizes why democracies must renew their commitment to the values underpinning democracies and stick together to defend them.
An important value, which distinguishes democracies from autocracies, is the former's commitment to the rule of law. The flaw in the IRA Act of 2022 is apparently in violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) law and the bilateral Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).
It is in accordance with the KORUS FTA that Korea provides the same amount of subsidy to EVs imported from the U.S. For example, a buyer of a Tesla Model 3 gets a $5,555 subsidy.
Third, the flaw in the IRA will seriously undermine the interests of U.S. consumers. The EV market in the U.S. is booming. Last year, 650,000 EVs were sold in the U.S. This year, it is expected to almost double to 1.2 million cars according to Bloomberg NEF.
More than 25 percent of EVs sold in the U.S. market last year were imports from abroad ― Japan, Germany, Korea and Sweden, all major allies of the U.S. In the first half of this year alone, Korea exported no less than 45,000 EVs, more than the whole export volume of last year's. With the "finally assembled within North America" proviso, these imports from abroad will be effectively banned, leading to a serious shortage of EVs in the U.S. market.
Ahn Ho-young (hyahn78@mofa.or.kr) is chair professor of the University of North Korean Studies. He served as Korean ambassador to the United States and first vice foreign minister.
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
6. Nearly 10 million COVID-19 vaccines may be discarded in Korea
Think of what this might have done for 10 million Koreans in the north.
Nearly 10 million COVID-19 vaccines may be discarded in Korea
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
A person receives his fourth shot of the COVID-19 vaccine at a local clinic in Seongdong District, Seoul, July 18. Korea Times photo by Bae Woo-han
Gov't struggles to handle soon-to-expire doses
By Lee Hyo-jin
Nearly 10 million soon-to-expire COVID-19 vaccine doses are likely to be discarded in Korea amid waning demand, in sharp contrast to the early days of the national vaccination campaign when the country grappled with a scarce supply.
According to the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA), as of Monday, there are a total of 14,208,000 stockpiled vaccine doses. They include 8.3 million doses of the Pfizer vaccine, 2.7 million doses of Moderna, 1.98 million doses of Johnson & Johnson, 671,000 doses of Novavax and 609,000 doses of the SKYCovione, the country's first domestically developed vaccine by SK Bioscience.
Considering that about 100,000 shots are being administered per week, at the current pace, about 10 million doses are likely to go to waste by the end of this year with their expiration dates approaching. The shelf life of COVID-19 vaccines is usually between six months to a year.
The government has already discarded 5.92 million doses as of July, equivalent to about 3.6 percent of the total 145.8 million doses it had procured.
The KDCA is now in the process of canceling or delaying scheduled shipments. In July, it canceled the shipment of 4 million doses of Johnson & Johnson vaccines, as well as 12.6 million doses that were secured through COVAX facility.
Moreover, the government has been donating surplus vaccines to other countries such as Guatemala, Ghana and Mexico since June, as a part of its effort to minimize the number of wasted doses.
Vials containing the COVID-19 vaccines of Moderna, AstraZeneca, Pfizer BioNTech, Johnson & Johnson and Sputnik V vaccines are seen in this photo illustration taken May 2, 2021. Reuters-Yonhap
However, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to find recipient nations due to shrinking demand for the original vaccines amid the spread of new Omicron variants. In some cases, the vaccines are not accepted by recipients due to challenges in stocking and distributing the nearly expired doses.
Local experts, who view that vaccine wastage is inevitable to some extent, called for a more efficient inoculation plan for the rollout of the new bivalent vaccines, which is set to kick off in October.
"Throwing away unused vaccines is a waste of national resources. But ultimately, some amount of vaccine wastage is inevitable due to continuous emergence of new variants. So it doesn't seem appropriate to criticize the government harshly," Chon Eun-mi, a respiratory disease specialist at Ewha Womans University Mokdong Hospital, told The Korea Times, Monday.
She also noted that Korea is not the only country facing these issues. The United States discarded over 82 million doses as of May, while Canada and Germany each disposed of 14.8 million and 3.9 million doses, respectively.
But the authorities should now be more prudent in drawing up inoculation plans for the upcoming bivalent vaccines, said Chon.
Starting next month, the government will roll out booster shots specifically targeting the Omicron variant using updated vaccines developed by Pfizer and Moderna that target both the BA.1 subvariant of Omicron as well as the original strain of the coronavirus.
The Ministry of Food and Drug Safety has also begun reviewing Pfizer's bivalent vaccine that targets the Omicron BA.4 and BA.5 subvariants and original coronavirus strain, which was approved for use in the U.S. by the Food and Drug Administration last month.
"The vaccination program should now target the vulnerable groups, rather than covering the entire population. Plus, the government shouldn't underestimate vaccine hesitancy among people who have already been infected with the virus," said Chon. "And with that in mind, there should be more detailed plans to monitor and minimize potential vaccine wastage."
The Korea Times · September 12, 2022
7. China’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear weapons first-use law tipped to be muted
Excerpts:
According to Yongwook Ryu, East Asian affairs professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, China “recognises the reality of North Korea being a nuclear power”.
However, Beijing would harden its stance only if it believed Pyongyang could use the weapons for offensive strikes, which is not indicated by the new law, Ryu noted.
North Korea is opposed to nuclear wars, the law states, citing a defence policy that aims to protect the country from outside military threats.
Beijing has long supported the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula but has hesitated to push for more sanctions on Pyongyang alongside other world powers.
China said on Monday that its position on the Korean peninsula remained unchanged.
“We will continue to play an active role in promoting the political settlement of [Korean] peninsula issues, from the overall interest of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said.
While the law will not change the status quo in terms of regional security, the North Korean nuclear issue remains challenging and could still pose a threat, according to analysts.
China’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear weapons first-use law tipped to be muted
- Seoul and US react with standard rhetoric as North Korea passes law outlining scenarios for pre-emptive nuclear strikes if attacked
- China will only harden its stance if it sees the possibility of offensive strikes, which is not indicated by the new law, says analyst at NUS
Kawala Xie
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Published: 6:00am, 13 Sep, 2022
By Kawala Xie South China Morning Post5 min
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
China’s reaction to a new North Korean law sanctioning the launch of preventive nuclear strikes will be muted, analysts said, despite Beijing’s support for denuclearisation of the Korea peninsula.
This comes after Pyongyang passed a new law outlining scenarios for pre-emptive nuclear strikes if attacked by “hostile forces”, declaring it would not abandon its nuclear weapons programme.
Earlier, addressing the need to maintain a nuclear arsenal, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un accused the US – as the No 1 nuclear power and the first-ever user of atomic weapons – of not just trying to denuclearise the country, but to overthrow his government as well.
However, the newly enshrined first-use policy attracted little more than standard rhetoric from neighbouring South Korea and the US, both party to years of Korean peninsula denuclearisation talks that have stalled since 2019 over Pyongyang’s concessions.
White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the US had no hostile intent and continued to seek diplomacy with North Korea, while the foreign ministry in Seoul said the move would only further strengthen its alliance with Washington.
China, a powerful neighbour and North Korea’s main ally and trade partner, was also likely to take a low-key approach, regional observers said.
“While it does prefer North Korea to eventually denuclearise, Beijing does not want to put additional pressure to force it to do so,” said Zhang Baohui, professor of international affairs at Lingnan University in Hong Kong.
“China’s position is that this would only increase tensions in the Korean peninsula.”
Zhang said he also did not expect the US or the rest of the world to impose more sanctions or other countermeasures on Pyongyang over the new law.
Even if the US were to push for more sanctions at the UN, China would not support it, he said.
03:12
‘A nuclear war cannot be won': UN talks non-proliferation as North Korean test looms
According to Yongwook Ryu, East Asian affairs professor at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, China “recognises the reality of North Korea being a nuclear power”.
However, Beijing would harden its stance only if it believed Pyongyang could use the weapons for offensive strikes, which is not indicated by the new law, Ryu noted.
North Korea is opposed to nuclear wars, the law states, citing a defence policy that aims to protect the country from outside military threats.
Beijing has long supported the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula but has hesitated to push for more sanctions on Pyongyang alongside other world powers.
China said on Monday that its position on the Korean peninsula remained unchanged.
“We will continue to play an active role in promoting the political settlement of [Korean] peninsula issues, from the overall interest of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula,” foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said.
While the law will not change the status quo in terms of regional security, the North Korean nuclear issue remains challenging and could still pose a threat, according to analysts.
“For the coming five years, we will have a very challenging Korean peninsula scenario without open access into North Korea’s society and the regime’s high-ranking elites due to Covid-19 [restrictions],” said Hoo Chiew Ping, senior lecturer in international relations at the National University of Malaysia.
“If no third party offers a neutral platform for dialogue among the Korean peninsula stakeholders, we will see North Korea continue its military build-up and modernise its nuclear arsenal, which will become more threatening than ever, in addition to aligning closely with China and [ex-Soviet ally] Russia for the long run,” she said.
North Korea believed in the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, which was key to its survival, Hoo noted.
And China’s priority here was “to sustain North Korea as a buffer state and support its regime to prevent a societal or regime collapse”, she said.
North Korea’s new nuclear law was passed on Thursday, a day before the country marked the 74th anniversary of its founding.
01:40
North Korea celebrates 74th anniversary as Pyongyang passes new nuclear law
Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to Kim on the occasion, reaffirming the historical friendship between the two countries and praising the Korean leader’s efforts on economic development and fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.
Observers said the new law carried a message for the domestic audience- that the country must be self-reliant, unite against superpowers like the US and use its nuclear capability as a deterrent – as it is roiled by a deep economic crisis caused by the pandemic and sanctions imposed by several countries.
But there is also a message to the US: “We will not be the first to make any concessions. So, if you want to talk to us, you’d better change your approach and policy first,” said Ryu at NUS.
However, he said the US and South Korea would not change their approach to Pyongyang, but continue quiet diplomatic efforts to bring it back to the negotiation table.
In his speech on Thursday, Kim asserted that his country had drawn a line of “no retreat” and would accept no more bargaining over its nuclear policy.
“The position of our state as a nuclear nation has become irreversible,” official news agency KCNA quoted him as saying.
Hoo at the National University of Malaysia said the administration of US President Joe Biden had not shown any credible response on North Korea-related developments due to an overemphasis on China, while South Korea’s ongoing assertive military posture did not assure the North of any forms of engagement, which had led to the enactment of the new law.
Last month, the US and South Korea resumed the Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military drills, their largest in recent years, amid increased missile tests by North Korea.
Pyongyang has carried out 18 missile tests this year, with preparations complete for a major nuclear test that could happen “any time”, according to the South Korean defence ministry.
The test plan was earlier reportedly postponed due to the pandemic and summer flooding. If carried out, it will be North Korea’s first nuclear test since 2017.
Kawala Xie
Kawala joined the Post in 2022 and has worked in both news and tech after graduating from Columbia Journalism School. Previously based in the US and Australia, she has worked for multiple international news outlets including Al Jazeera, SBS Australia and Shenzhen Television. She specialises in Asia affairs, breaking news reporting and video production.
8. North Korea reinstates mask mandate one month after declaring victory over COVID
An admission of failure?
North Korea reinstates mask mandate one month after declaring victory over COVID
rfa.org
Authorities in North Korea have ordered citizens to again wear masks in public just one month after “declaring victory” over COVID-19, sources in the country told RFA.
North Korea had claimed it was entirely virus-free for most of the pandemic. In May 2022, Pyongyang finally admitted that the virus had spread throughout the country after a military parade in April, and authorities declared a “maximum emergency” that included movement restrictions and lockdowns.
The government kept a tally of “fever cases” which reached around 4.8 million people, and state media reported only 75 related deaths. Over the next few months the number of active cases rapidly declined.
On Aug. 10, the country’s leader Kim Jong Un publicly declared victory over the virus and eliminated the maximum emergency restrictions.
Residents are frustrated that they must now wear masks again, even though they’ve been told they won the battle against COVID.
“Starting this month, we must all wear masks in public places again,” a source in the eastern province of South Hamgyong told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.
“Provincial quarantine authorities sent this order, from the Central Committee [of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party] to the residents through neighborhood watch unit meetings,” said the source.
Authorities sent a mask inspection team to the marketplace near the source’s home, he said.
“Residents who did not wear a mask during the intensive crackdown period, or who sold or purchased goods with a mask on their chin without covering their nose and mouth, were caught and fined,” the source said. The fines are 3,000 won (U.S. $0.37) for no mask and 1,000 won ($0.12) for wearing one improperly.
“They said that the coronavirus crisis was over, but in less than one month they are telling us to wear masks again and they are cracking down more harshly,” he said. “The people are complaining that they are trying to take their money with excessive fines.”
The source added that there are still large numbers of people with suspected coronavirus symptoms, so the authorities have also returned to emergency quarantine measures.
In South Pyongan province, north of the capital Pyongyang, the inspection teams have been out in force since the beginning of the month at factories, auditoriums, train stations and other crowded places, a source there told RFA.
“It’s like the emergency epidemic prevention system is being restarted, just 21 days after the Highest Dignity [declared victory],” the second source said, using an honorific term to refer to Kim Jong Un. “This is because there are still patients with suspected COVID-19 symptoms such as high fever and acute bronchitis.”
“Nevertheless, the authorities are propagating that even though the rest of the world is in chaos due to the relentless spread of the virus, North Korea has succeeded in preventing it,” he said.
“They say South Korea continues to transmit the virus into our territory by applying the malignant virus on their goods, so we have no choice but to adhere to strict quarantine regulations again,” the second source said.
Direct trade between South and North Korea is currently nonexistent and all South Korean goods that end up in the North typically go in through China, with which North Korea has suspended trade due to the coronavirus.
RFA was unable to confirm transmission of the coronavirus to North Korea via imported South Korean goods.
“Residents are criticizing the authorities for strengthening means of control over residents, lying that the COVID-19 crisis has ended, and repeating false propaganda that they are beefing up COVID-19 prevention measures again because of South Korea,” the second source said.
Translated by Leejin J. Chung. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
rfa.org
9. New Normal and New Challenges to the ROK-U.S. Alliance
A warning:
The world is changing and with it, new challenges are arising. These changes are affecting the US and Korean societies. So far on the Korean peninsula, the military relationship has been able to maintain a strong military alliance that was overtly challenged during the Moon administration. Rather than relying on the graces of the US military, the South Koreans must be able to enhance understanding and work to compensate for the potential disconnect that will occur with relocation and change in the command structure. As always, the real threat is not a well-trained enemy but the unexpected element within an alliance that is simmering from within.
New Normal and New Challenges to the ROK-U.S. Alliance
By In-Bum CHUN [Former Lieutenant General , Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command, ROK-SWC]
September 12, 2022
koreaonpoint.org
► On the Korean peninsula, the military relationship between ROK and U.S. has been able to maintain a strong military alliance that was overtly challenged during the Moon administration. Rather than relying on the graces of the US military, the South Koreans must be able to enhance understanding and work to compensate for the potential disconnect that will occur with relocation and change in the command structure.
Many Koreans believe that the best thing that has happened to the Korean people in its three thousand-year histories is its relationship with the United States. Initially, the United States was disinterested in Korea but with the end of the Second World War, US troops found themselves in the Korean peninsula disarming Japanese troops. Finding Korea to be a hopeless place, the US pulled its troops from Korea after just a few years and gave the Soviet and Chinese-backed North Koreans an opportunity to invade South Korea.
The Korean War lasted for three years with the first involvement of the United Nations, led by the United States, and the direct involvement of communist China with the Soviet Union providing arms and supplies thereby becoming a battleground for the Cold War era. An armistice was signed but to this day no formal conclusion of the Korean War has been agreed upon. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship and a cult built around the Kim family with nuclear weapons and no limitations from international norms or laws. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a free and democratic society with liberal values that is economically successful and contributes to regional stability and peace.
On 1 October 1953, the ROK and US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Mutual Defense Treaty between South Korea and the United States had many lasting political, social, and economic effects. South Korea's economy dramatically increased as a result of this relationship. In regard to other US alliances, there has not been a change as dramatic as the increase in South Korea's economic wealth. The Mutual Defense Treaty has acted as the foundation for the rest of the cooperation that has occurred between the Republic of Korea and the United States but especially in the military relationship between Korea and the United States.
After the fighting of the Korean War ended, South Korea was a poor and desperate country with rampant corruption. American aid kept South Korea from faltering but barely. US military bases were a source of money through black markets, prostitution, and even garbage was recycled. Every Korean combat division had American officers advising and providing military assistance. Americans were our new overlords if not kinder than the Japanese. The deployment of Korean troops to Vietnam provided the Korean economy with much-needed revenue and modern weapons like the M16 rifles, M48 tanks, and F5 fighters from the South Korean military. There was no question as to who the big brother was and who the little brother was during these times.
US troops were withdrawn from the frontlines and in 1978 the Combined Forces Command was established with the Combined Field Army, consisting of the US Second infantry division and two Korean Corps, established in 1980. South Korea hosted the 88 Olympic Games and its economy skyrocketed. In 1992, the Combined Field Army was disestablished and in 1994 the Koreans retained Armistice Operational control (OPCON) of its forces. In 1992, a truly liberal government came to power in Korea and the road to liberal democracy was open. The Korean military gradually lost its position in Korean society and could not keep pace with the social changes that engulfed the world with the internet and the handheld cell phone. The high turnover of US forces in Korea exacerbated the situation. Still, the relationship between the Korean and US military in Korea was stable.
The US war in Afghanistan and Iraq preoccupied the United States military and with missed opportunity and tenacity on the part of North Korea, the DPRK survived famine and has successfully developed a nuclear weapons capability. Progressive Korean governments in Korea wanted wartime OPCON of its troops without full knowledge of the overall consequences that such a change might bring to the security arrangement. Additionally, subsequent Korean progressives have wrongly identified the United Nations Command as an impediment to inter-Korean relations. These and other issues are forcing a change in the mil-mil relationship between the Korean military and the US military. In 2022, the Korean people chose a conservative government that has inherited military issues from the previous progressive government and previous conservative governments.
First, is Wartime OPCON. Korean progressives consider this a sovereignty issue while the conservatives rely on the US and believe that the United States will protect Korea at all costs. These views exemplify the misunderstandings that both progressives and conservatives have about wartime OPCON. It is not a sovereignty issue and no country should rely on another to defend itself. However this issue comes to a conclusion, it must be built on mutual understanding and consensus and the ROK and US military must ensure that there is no breach in the security of the Korean peninsula.
In 2022, the ROKUS Combined Forces Command (ROKUS CFC) will relocate to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The initial plan was to relocate CFC with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in Seoul. This would have ensured that the American command leadership was physically located with its Korean counterparts. In 2019 this decision was changed to locate Camp Humphreys. Even with CFC in Seoul, the Korean staff that served there was marginalized by the larger Korean military. Unless there is a conscious effort to empower the Korean staff that works in CFC, who is the link between the US and Korea, the US command will be alienated and disconnected from Korean society and the military.
Korean politicians have neglected the importance of readiness. The training budget for the ROK military is less than 2% of its defense budget. What use are weapons if you don’t know how to use them? A special concern is the inability to conduct live fire training in Korea for both South Korean and US troops. The risk-averse environment created within the Korean society towards its military further disincentivizes the military towards realistic training.
Finally, all militaries focus on fighting and winning on the battlefield. But winning the war is far more important than winning on the battlefield. This is why civil affairs are considered a part of military operations. During peacetime, community relations take an important role as a part of civil affairs. In reality, US and Korean commanders are often preoccupied with “military” matters, and community relations are given lip service or delegated to its local Korean staff. We all know about “winning hearts and minds” and yet the realities are dangerously neglected.
The world is changing and with it, new challenges are arising. These changes are affecting the US and Korean societies. So far on the Korean peninsula, the military relationship has been able to maintain a strong military alliance that was overtly challenged during the Moon administration. Rather than relying on the graces of the US military, the South Koreans must be able to enhance understanding and work to compensate for the potential disconnect that will occur with relocation and change in the command structure. As always, the real threat is not a well-trained enemy but the unexpected element within an alliance that is simmering from within.
AUTHORS
Lt. Gen. Chun In Bum graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He commanded the ROK Special Forces and retired in 2016 with the rank of Lieutenant General. Gen. Chun studied at the US Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk VA and the US Army War College, Carlisle PA where he received a Masters Degree in Military Strategy. He also has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Kyungnam University, Korea. He was a fellow with the Brookings institution, USKI at SAIS and the Sam-Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech Univ. Gen. Chun served at all levels of command in combat units with thirteen months on the Eastern mountains of the Korean DMZ. He also deployed to Irag in 2004 and has extensive experience in combined operations to include serving as the Senior Member for the UN Military Armistice Commission. He is the most highly decorated Korean officer since the Vietnam war with a US Bronze Star, three US Legion of Merits and the only Korean to receive the USSOCOM Medal. Lt. Gen Chun also has numerous Korean citations.
Currently, he serves as the Senior Vice president of the both Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Korea Chapter and the US Air and Space Forces Association (AFA) MIG Alley Chapter and is on the Advisory board for the National Bureau of Asian Research as well as a Senior Contributor for the Asia Society Korea. He is a military analyst and has an active Youtube channel where he uploads videos on ROK military and other security issues for a general audience.
koreaonpoint.org
10. S. Korea's COVID-19 cases bounce back to over 50,000; KDCA warns 'twindemic' risks
This is probably a result of increased testing after Chuseok.
(LEAD) S. Korea's COVID-19 cases bounce back to over 50,000; KDCA warns 'twindemic' risks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 강재은 · September 13, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with additional info in the last four paras; ADDS photo)
SEOUL, Sept. 13 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new COVID-19 cases bounced back to surpass 50,000 on Tuesday after reporting a steady decline last week.
The country reported 57,309 new COVID-19 infections, including 272 cases from overseas, bringing the total caseload to 24,099,134, the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency (KDCA) said.
Tuesday's tally is up by more than 20,000 from 36,938 a day earlier. Daily infections have slowed after peaking at around 180,000 in mid-August in the latest virus resurgence.
The country added 35 COVID-19 deaths, raising the death toll to 27,533. The fatality rate stood at 0.11 percent.
The number of critically ill patients stood at 547, down by 6 from the previous day.
Health authorities said new infection numbers have been on a decline for the past week and continue the downward trend for the time being.
But the government warned of a possible "twindemic" -- a simultaneous outbreak of COVID-19 and the seasonal influenza -- as early as this fall amid an unusual spike in the number of flu patients since July this year.
The public health agency said 4.7 among 1,000 patients who visited the hospital from Aug. 23 to Sept. 3 showed influenza-like symptoms. The figure is the highest for the same seven-day period in the last five years.
The KDCA said it is considering introducing a polymerase chain reaction test that can detect both COVID-19 and the flu at the same time.
fairydust@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 강재은 · September 13, 2022
11. S. Korea warns N. Korea's nuclear use would lead to regime's 'self-destruction'
Is something being foreshadowed here? Will Ms. Flournoy be the next SECDEF?
Excerpts:
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup met Michele Flournoy, the chair of the Washington-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS)'s board of directors, to discuss the two countries' alliance and North Korean threats, according to his ministry.
Noting the North has hinted at its intention to use nuclear weapons, Lee called the security situation here "very grave," and stressed that the allies are maintaining a firm combined defense posture to counter the threats.
He added that there would be "substantive" discussions between Seoul and Washington about strengthening their defense posture during the EDSCG session later this week.
Lee and Flournoy, who served as under secretary of defense for policy from 2009 to 2012, agreed to work together in the process of the two countries' partnership developing into a global comprehensive strategic alliance, the ministry said.
(2nd LD) S. Korea warns N. Korea's nuclear use would lead to regime's 'self-destruction' | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · September 13, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with minister's meeting with former Pentagon official in last 4 paras)
SEOUL, Sept. 13 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense ministry warned Tuesday that North Korea's attempt to use nuclear weapons would lead to its regime's "self-destruction," responding to Pyongyang's recent codification of an apparently assertive nuclear policy.
Col. Moon Hong-sik, the ministry's deputy spokesperson, issued the warning after the North promulgated a law on its nuclear policy on Thursday last week that hinted at the possibility of the regime launching a preemptive nuclear strike in a contingency.
"We warn that should North Korea attempt to use nuclear arms, it would face the overwhelming response from the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and its regime would enter a path of self-destruction," Moon told a regular press briefing.
Moon added the North's nuclear policy move would further strengthen the alliance's capabilities to deter and respond to the security threats, deepen its international isolation and aggravate the suffering of ordinary North Koreans.
In addition, he highlighted the South's "firm" resolve to push for the North's "complete" denuclearization and its focus on strengthening the credibility of the U.S.' extended deterrence to make the North unable to use its nuclear arms.
Extended deterrence refers to America's stated commitment to mobilizing the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear options, to defend its ally.
The North's announcement on the nuclear policy codification came as the allies are preparing to hold a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) in Washington, D.C., on Friday for the first time since 2018.
The EDSCG, a gathering of the two countries' vice-ministerial defense and diplomatic officials, has not been held since its second and last session in January 2018, when the then liberal Moon Jae-in administration pushed for an initiative to promote inter-Korean rapprochement.
On Friday, the North's official Korean Central News Agency reported the law on its nuclear policy was promulgated.
The law stipulated that in case the command and control system over the country's nuclear forces is put in danger due to an attack, a nuclear strike will be launched "automatically and immediately."
The North's nuclear policy is expected to be part of discussions between the South and the U.S. that have been working on updating their joint wartime contingency plans to reflect the North's evolving military threats, observers said.
"I would like to say that the efforts to update wartime operational plans are ongoing at this point," Moon said of the plans that the allies agreed to update during their defense ministerial talks in December last year.
Meanwhile, Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup met Michele Flournoy, the chair of the Washington-based Center for a New American Security (CNAS)'s board of directors, to discuss the two countries' alliance and North Korean threats, according to his ministry.
Noting the North has hinted at its intention to use nuclear weapons, Lee called the security situation here "very grave," and stressed that the allies are maintaining a firm combined defense posture to counter the threats.
He added that there would be "substantive" discussions between Seoul and Washington about strengthening their defense posture during the EDSCG session later this week.
Lee and Flournoy, who served as under secretary of defense for policy from 2009 to 2012, agreed to work together in the process of the two countries' partnership developing into a global comprehensive strategic alliance, the ministry said.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · September 13, 2022
12. N. Korea calls for strengthened cooperation among developing countries
I think north Korea would like to see the return of the non-aligned movement.
N. Korea calls for strengthened cooperation among developing countries | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · September 13, 2022
SEOUL, Sept. 13 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Tuesday called for increased cooperation among developing countries in order to scrap what it claims to be an "old and unfair" international economic order devised by the U.S. and the West.
The North made the call in a note posted on the website of its foreign ministry, marking the U.N. Day for South-South cooperation on Sept. 12 meant to underline the importance of cooperation among people and countries in the global South.
"In the past, the socio-economic growth and progress in the developing countries were hindered considerably by the old international economic order devised by the U.S. and the West to serve their interests," the English-language post read. "Strengthening South-South cooperation is the way out for the developing countries to abolish the old and unfair international economic order and to cast off political and economic yoke of the U.S. and the West."
"Our Republic, as in the past so in the future, will make every effort to further strengthen the friendly and cooperative relations with all the developing countries across the world," it added.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · September 13, 2022
13. IAEA's Grossi raises alarm over North's nuclear activities
Tuesday
September 13, 2022
dictionary + A - A
IAEA's Grossi raises alarm over North's nuclear activities
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/09/13/national/northKorea/Korea-IAEA-North-Korea/20220913175954493.html
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi addresses a news conference during an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, Austria on Tuesday. [REUTERS]
The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressed alarm over signs that North Korea is conducting uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and continuing construction work on two tunnels at its Punggye-ri nuclear testing site.
In an opening address to a session of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, Austria on Monday, Director General Rafael Grossi said there are continuing indications that the 5-megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in North Pyongan Province is currently in operation.
The IAEA reported in August last year that the reactor had been restarted.
Brossi also noted intermittent activity at a radiochemical laboratory consistent with possible waste treatment or maintenance activities.
Yongbyon’s 5-megawatt reactor has long been the focal point of international diplomatic efforts to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. The reactor is believed to be the regime’s sole source of spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing and is capable of producing six kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods per year.
Grossi informed the session that the agency believes the expansion of the centrifuge enrichment facility at Yongbyon is complete, increasing the building’s available floor space by approximately one-third.
He noted signs that Tunnel No. 3 at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in mountainous North Hamgyong Province has been reopened and is prepared for a test.
According to Grossi, the agency has also very recently observed renewed work on the road leading to Tunnel No. 4 and called the site’s reopening “deeply troubling.”
The restoration of both tunnels at Punggye-ri raises the specter of more than one nuclear test.
Satellite photography of Punggye-ri taken within the past year shows North Korea has worked to restore access to the underground test site, which was ostensibly demolished in May 2018, when North Korea detonated all four tunnels in a much-publicized event witnessed by foreign media allowed into the country.
“The continuation of the DPRK’s nuclear program is a clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable,” Grossi said, referring to the North by the acronym for its official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The IAEA chief called upon Pyongyang “to comply fully with its obligations under relevant [United Nations] Security Council resolutions” and allow IAEA inspectors back into the country.
Pyongyang expelled the agency’s inspectors from Yongbyon in 2009 and has since refused IAEA inspections, forcing the watchdog to monitor the regime’s nuclear activities through open source information and satellite imagery.
Since 2006, the Security Council has passed nine resolutions sanctioning or condemning North Korea for its missile and nuclear weapons program.
The sanctions target not only the North’s ability to trade weapons, military equipment, and technology, but also its main metal, agricultural and labor exports as well as the import of luxury goods and oil.
But the most recent attempt to sanction North Korea for a series of missile tests that began early this year failed after China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-drafted resolution in May that targeted tobacco and oil imports into North Korea.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
14. Kaspersky uncovers details about active cyber-espionage campaign
Kaspersky uncovers details about active cyber-espionage campaign
itbrief.co.nz · by Catherine Knowles
Nearly 10 years since Kaspersky experts unmasked an active cyber-espionage campaign primarily targeting South Korean think-tanks, the state-sponsored group known as Kimsuky continues to show prolific updating of tools and tactics.
Kaspersky's senior expert revealed more of his findings, including the possibility of this Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) threat actor expanding its operations with its abundant capabilities.
Kimsuky, also known as Thallium, Black Banshee and Velvet Chollima, has been in Kaspersky's radar since 2013 and it is known to update its tools very quickly to hide its infrastructure and make it harder for security researchers and auto-analysis systems to acquire payloads.
Seongsu Park, Lead Security Researcher for Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) at Kaspersky, found that the notorious group has continuously configured multi-stage command and control servers (C2) with various commercial hosting services located around the world.
A command and control server is a server that helps a threat actor control their malware and send malicious commands to its members, regulate spyware, send payload, and more.
Park says, “From less than 100 C2 servers in 2019, Kimsuky now has 603 malicious command centres as of July this year which clearly suggests that the threat actor is posed to launch more attacks, possibly beyond the Korean peninsula.
"Its history suggests that government agencies, diplomatic entities, media, and even cryptocurrency businesses in APAC should be on high alert against this stealthy threat."
The skyrocketing number of C2 servers is part of Kimsuky’s continuous operations in APAC and beyond. In early 2022, Kaspersky’s team of experts observed another wave of attacks targeting journalists and diplomatic and academic entities in South Korea.
Dubbed as the GoldDragon cluster, the threat actor initiated the infection chain by sending a spearphishing email containing a macro-embedded Word document. Various examples of different Word documents used for this new attack were uncovered, each showing different decoy contents related to geopolitical issues in the Korean Peninsula.
Further analysis allowed Park to discover server-side scripts related to the GoldDragon cluster, which allowed the experts to map the group's C2 operation.
The actor sends a spear-phishing email to the potential victim to download additional documents. If the victim clicks the link, it results in a connection to the first stage C2 server, with an email address as parameter.
The first stage C2 server verifies the incoming email address parameter is an expected one and delivers the malicious document if it's in the target list. The first stage script also forwards the victim's IP address to the next stage server.
When the fetched document is opened, it connects to the second C2 server. The corresponding script on the second C2 server checks the IP address forwarded from the first stage server to check if it's an expected request from the same victim.
Using this IP validation scheme, the actor verifies whether the incoming request is from the victim or not. On top of that, the operator relies on several other processes to carefully deliver the next payload such as checking OS type and predefined user-agent strings.
Park says, “Another notable technique Kimsuky utilises is the use of verification process of the client to confirm its relevant victim they want to compromise. Kaspersky experts even saw contents of decoy documents having various topics including the agenda of the 2022 Asian Leadership Conference, a form of honorarium request, and an Australian diplomats curriculum vitae.
"We've seen that the Kimsuky group continuously evolves malware infection schemes and adopts novel techniques to hinder analysis. The difficulty in tracking this group is that it's tough to acquire a full-infection chain. As we can see from this research, most recently, threat actors adopt victim verification methodology in their command and control servers.
"Despite the difficulty of getting server-side objects, if we analyse an attacker's server and malware from the victims side, we can fully understand how the threat actors operate their infrastructure and what kind of techniques they employ."
To protect systems and networks from Kimsuky's clandestine tactics and techniques, Kaspersky experts suggest:
- Full-context based defence is the key
- Hit-and-run style defence never works
- To understand the full-context of threats, it is advised to have services that provide in-depth and real-time reports and analysis
- Diversify defence points
- Cooperation with other industry
- Each sector has different sets of strength and expertise
- Cooperation is essential to understand multidimension of cyber threats in turn allowing better strategies against them
itbrief.co.nz · by Catherine Knowles
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
n's Long Civil War Really Over?
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