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Quotes of the Day:
“Sometimes the things that may or may not be true are the things that a man needs to believe in the most. That people are basically good. That honor, courage, and virtues mean everything. That power and money, money and power mean nothing; that good always triumphs over evil; and I want you to remember this: that love, true love never dies. Doesn't matter if any of this is true or not. You see, a man should believe in these things because these are the things worth believing in.”
- actor Robert Duvall in the film “Second Hand Lions”
“The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate the truth,”
- Garry Kasparov - there would be no game of chess if pawns refused to play…
"If you're going to try, go all the way. There is no other feeling like that. You will be alone with the gods, and the nights will flame with fire. You will ride life straight to perfect laughter. It's the only good fight there is."
- Charles Bukowski
1. ‘Invite Me’: Pope Francis Tells North Korea's Kim Jong Un, Says Will Work for Global Peace
2. Kim Jong-un builds eight new mansions so assassins never know where to find him
3. Guy Sorman supports Korea's decision to relocate presidential office to Yongsan
4. We can choose both the U.S. and China (South Korea)
5. Russian proxy leader in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region calls for North Korea ties
6. South Korea shifts away from China
7. MAGA all over again (ROK criticism of US IRA)
8. Unification minister renews resolve to help enhance North Korean human rights
9. International stability sometimes requires foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions
10. S. Korea's foreign minister arrives in Mongolia on trip to deepen bilateral ties
11. ARTHUR CYR: North Korea’s continuing economic decline
12. S. Korea ranks 9th among nations with trade surpluses with U.S. in H1: data
1. ‘Invite Me’: Pope Francis Tells North Korea's Kim Jong Un, Says Will Work for Global Peace
Will Kim invite him?
‘Invite Me’: Pope Francis Tells North Korea's Kim Jong Un, Says Will Work for Global Peace
news18.com · August 26, 2022
Pope Francis has asked Pyongyang to invite him to North Korea, saying in a televised interview on Friday that he would not turn down a chance to visit and work for peace.
A potential papal visit to the isolated, nuclear-armed country was previously floated in 2018 when Seoul’s former president Moon Jae-in embarked on a round of diplomacy with Pyongyang’s leader Kim Jong Un.
Moon, who is Catholic, said during a summit that Kim told him the pontiff would be “enthusiastically” welcomed.
Pope Francis replied at the time that he would be willing to go if he received an official invitation.
But Pyongyang has largely cut off contact with Seoul following the collapse of a second summit between Kim and then-US president Donald Trump in 2019, which has left talks at a standstill.
“When they invite me — that is to say, please invite me — I won’t say no,” Pope Francis told South Korea’s state broadcaster KBS in an interview that aired Friday.
“The goal is simply fraternity,” he added.
Ties between North and South Korea have been at a frosty low since Seoul inaugurated a hawkish new president, Yoon Suk-yeol, in May.
Yoon offered aid to the North in return for denuclearisation, but Kim’s regime ridiculed the plan.
The North blamed South Korea for its May outbreak of Covid-19 and earlier this month threatened to “wipe out” Seoul’s authorities in retaliation.
North Korea has conducted a record number of weapons tests this year, including firing an intercontinental ballistic missile at full range for the first time since 2017.
‘Work for peace’
The pope has repeatedly urged Koreans on the peninsula to “work for peace.”
“You, the Korean people, have suffered from the war,” he said.
Religious freedom is enshrined in the North’s constitution, but all religious activity is banned outside of state-sanctioned institutions.
In the early 20th century, before the division of the peninsula, Pyongyang was a regional missionary hub with scores of churches and a thriving Christian community that earned it the title “Jerusalem of the East”.
But Kim Il Sung, the North’s late founding leader and the current ruler’s grandfather, viewed Christianity as a threat and eradicated it through executions and labour camps.
The North’s regime has since allowed Catholic organisations to run aid projects, but direct relations with the Vatican are non-existent.
When Pope Francis visited South Korea in 2014, he held a special mass dedicated to the reunification of the two Koreas.
Read the Latest News and Breaking News here
news18.com · August 26, 2022
2. Kim Jong-un builds eight new mansions so assassins never know where to find him
Yes, this is from the UK tabloid the Sun. But if accurate this indicates Kim's reaction to the kill chain and "decapitation" talk that has been bandied about over the past years.
Kim Jong-un builds eight new mansions so assassins never know where to find him
the-sun.com · by Nick Parker · August 27, 2022
KIM Jong-un has built several new mansions so that would-be assassins never know where to find him, experts have revealed.
Eight luxury houses have been detected in the North Korean tyrant’s Ch’angkwangsan compound at the heart of the capital Pyongyang.
1
Credit: AP
The blog North Korea Leadership Watch also identified a new guard block and plots for future mansions.
Chief blogger Michael Madden said the buildings would obstruct a “decapitation strike”.
He added: “This would be an attack from outside the country targeting the leadership along with command and control over its military assets.
“About ten years ago, South Korean forces simulated such an attack — and it sent Pyongyang into a tizzy.”
The compound opposite the ruling party’s offices in Kim’s “forbidden city” is only one of about 13 available to the dictator, his family and close aides across the country.
Mr Madden added: “These departments are some of the most powerful institutions in North Korean political culture as they supervise the work of government, security and military organisations.
Read More on The Sun
ESPRESSO YOURSELF
“The Ch'angkwangsan Compound is also close to a number of venues where the North Korean leadership holds national events, as well as Pyongyang's restaurant row.”
Mr Madden said the paranoid despot’s other ploys to dodge his enemies include early morning travel, underground facilities or decoy motorcades.
He added: “If you think he is in one house, well, guess again, he might be in another.”
the-sun.com · by Nick Parker · August 27, 2022
3. Guy Sorman supports Korea's decision to relocate presidential office to Yongsan
Hmmm... I cannot figure out why this guy's opinion is important.
As a reminder, historically Yongsan was always outside the city of Seoul (it is south of the South Gate (Namdaemun). It can only be considered in the center of Seoul because of the growth of Seoul southward and across the Han river. Holistically Yongsan garrison has been the location of foreign occupying forces from the Chinese and Russians, to the Japanese (and not an occupying force) the US. To invoke geographic location and history seems to kind of undermine his arguments.
Excerpt:
"In most democratic countries, the presidential office sits at the heart of the capital like London and Berlin," Sorman explained. "Considering this context, the relocation to Yongsan is not just about architecture. It has a link to world history, too."
Guy Sorman supports Korea's decision to relocate presidential office to Yongsan
The Korea Times · August 28, 2022
French-American columnist Guy Sorman speaks via video call during the 2022 Culture Communication Forum (CCF) held at the Grand Hyatt Seoul in central Seoul, Aug. 25. Courtesy of CICI
CICI organizes forum under theme of 'Space and Culture Communication'
By Dong Sun-hwa
Guy Sorman, a world-renowned scholar and intellectual in economics and philosophy, said it was a positive decision for Korea to relocate the presidential office from Cheong Wa Dae in central Seoul to the defense ministry compound in Seoul's Yongsan District.
The French-American columnist, who was an adviser to then-President Lee Myung-bak in 2010, made the remark during the 2022 Culture Communication Forum (CCF), which took place at the Grand Hyatt Seoul in central Seoul, Aug. 25. The Corea Image Communication Institute organized the forum under the theme of "Space and Culture Communication," inviting experts from around the world to analyze different spaces in Korea and explore the meaning of space in the time of COVID-19.
"In most democratic countries, the presidential office sits at the heart of the capital like London and Berlin," Sorman explained. "Considering this context, the relocation to Yongsan is not just about architecture. It has a link to world history, too."
President Yoon Suk-yeol relocated his office to Yongsan in May shortly after his inauguration, claiming it signaled an end to "imperial presidency" at Cheong Wa Dae, which had been the site of the presidential office for more than seven decades.
Sorman also spoke highly of Cheonggyecheon ― an 11-kilometer-long public recreation space in downtown Seoul ― and Seoul City Hall that was newly restored in 2012.
"Cheonggyecheon is a great example of restoring nature to provide a resting place for Seoul citizens, and Seoul City Hall is a uniquely designed building that gives a snapshot of Korea's democracy through its transparency," he said. "But in the case of Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP) in central Seoul, it does not show the country's tradition or identity."
The 2022 CCF was also joined by French architect Jean-Louis Cohen, a professor of architecture history at the Institute of Fine Arts at New York University; Korean architect Yoo Hyun-joon, a professor of architecture at Hongik University who authored a series of best-selling books such as, "Future of Space" (2021); Designhouse CEO Lee Young-hye and New Zealand Ambassador to Korea Philip Turner.
French architect Jean-Louis Cohen talks with CICI President Choi Jung-wha via video call during the 2022 Culture Communication Forum (CCF) held at the Grand Hyatt Seoul in central Seoul, Aug. 25. Courtesy of CICI
"Space facilitates interaction and communication among people, allowing them to learn about diversity," Cohen said. "Space has evolved in various forms over the past few years and the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically transformed it ... Many predicted that offline space would vanish due to the virus epidemic, but we are actually witnessing its return. For instance, French arts festival 'Avignon Festival' and the 'Morozov Collection' exhibition are having more visitors than ever these days, and the countries in North America and Europe are seeing a surge in the number of tourists. All these facts show the significance of offline space and reflect people's desire for cultural life and communication."
Yoo echoed this sentiment, saying the importance of offline space has increased over time.
"Anyone can take photos and express themselves on their social media accounts today, but this fact has caused social fragmentation," he said. "So the significance of offline space has grown over the time as it is challenging to unite people online."
Lee underscored that there should be more cultural spaces that are accessible to anyone at any time, while Turner compared how people in New Zealand and Korea are utilizing their spaces.
"It seems people in New Zealand, where population density is low and domestic space is relatively large, do most of their activities at home," Turner said. "In contrast, Koreans seem to prefer communicating and working outside … I wonder what changes the metaverse would bring in the days ahead, as it does not limit the number of people in a particular space."
The Korea Times · August 28, 2022
4. We can choose both the U.S. and China (South Korea)
One of the most diplomatic and security minefields to navigate. Given Chinese interference with South Korea sovereignty (three No's demand, economic warfare over THAD, etc) the question is not can but should.
Sunday
August 28, 2022
dictionary + A - A
We can choose both the U.S. and China
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/28/opinion/columns/Korea-China-diplomatic-relations/20220828200533719.html
Chang Se-jeong
The author is an editorial writer for the JoongAng Ilbo.
South Korea and China normalized diplomatic relations on Aug. 24, 1992, and the 30th anniversary of the event is being celebrated this year. The two countries have developed significantly over the past three decades. South Korea is an advanced economy. China is chasing the United States economically. The decision made 30 years ago to formally recognize each other was a pragmatic one. Relations must now be redefined in the context of efforts by the United States to protect the supply of key products and materials.
Was the decision to establish diplomatic ties three decades ago a successful one in strategic terms? In the turbulent global order, what should be South Korea’s diplomacy toward China? To discuss these issues, the JoongAng Ilbo interviewed Kim Ha-jung, 75, former ambassador to China. Kim led the negotiations to establish diplomatic relations. He is the longest serving ambassador to China (from October 2001 to March 2008), a former unification minister and author of 13 books.
Q. Please discuss Korea-China relations over the past three decades.
A. Since the diplomatic relations were established in 1992, Presidents Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung and the third-generation leaders of China — such as President Jiang Zemin and Premiers Li Peng and Zhu Rongji — built trust. Bilateral ties advanced rapidly during the first decade. During the second decade, fourth-generation Chinese leaders like President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao maintained good relations with the Roh Moo-hyun government, which maintained Kim Dae-jung’s engagement policy toward North Korea. But after President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2008, inter-Korean relations worsened.
After North Korea conducted the second nuclear test in 2009, the United Nations adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on the North, and the six-party nuclear talks stopped. As inter-Korean relations were completely severed, China appeared to begin a review to recalibrate South Korea-China relations. In 2013, when the Xi Jinping government started, it presented the “China Dream” as a goal and demanded that the United States establish a new relationship between the superpowers. While the U.S. was lukewarm, the Park Geun-hye administration abruptly decided to allow the U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense [Thaad] missile defense system in July, 2016. Beijing fiercely protested the decision to the degree that it was hard for the South Korean people to understand. Subsequently, public sentiment toward China rapidly worsened in South Korea, and the two countries have maintained a tense relationship since.
What were the calculations of South Korea and China at the time of the negotiation for diplomatic relations?
At the time, the Roh Tae-woo government had less than a year left in its term. So the Blue House rushed to conclude the negotiation as soon as possible. China was also in a hurry. In the early 1992, we thought diplomatic establishment with China would be difficult. So we proposed to establish a liaison office if establishing diplomatic ties was difficult. But China said there was no need for that. It wanted to tie a diplomatic knot right away.
At that time, China was under economic sanctions of the West due to the massacre of the Tiananmen Square protesters in 1989. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping was making his southern tour to resume the implementation of his “Reforms and Opening-up” program. China was to hold the 14th Party Congress in October that year to reelect Jiang Zemin as the general secretary. It was crucial for China to establish diplomatic ties with South Korea as soon as possible to deal a blow to Taiwan and create a breakthrough to escape international isolation.
Was normalizing ties a right choice strategically and pragmatically?
It was the right direction because people-to-people exchanges, trade and economic cooperation skyrocketed after normalizing relations with China, which also helped South Korea overcome the Asian foreign currency crisis. If we had not established diplomatic relations with China, Korean peninsula affairs would have been extremely unstable amid the North Korean nuclear crisis, which began in 1993. Whenever tensions arose between the two Koreas, we asked China to play a constructive role to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, and China played its role in its own way. Before the diplomatic establishment, we could not contact China directly, so we communicated through the United States, European countries or Japan. But after the diplomatic establishment, we were able to contact and negotiate with China directly. That alone has tremendous meaning.
What was the decisive moment that changed bilateral relations?
After the Park administration allowed the U.S. deployment of the Thaad system in 2016, China reacted extremely emotionally. It was the first time that China showed an emotional reaction to Korea since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992. That was the decisive moment that worsened the Korean people’s perception of China. South Korean people were shocked by and disappointed with China’s attitudes about Thaad and its claim over kimchi. China’s attitude significantly undermined the positive perception that had built up in South Korea.
In an interview conducted at his home, Kim Ha-jung, former ambassador to China, looked back on the 30 years of the diplomatic relations with China and shared his advice for the future of South Korea’s diplomacy. [CHANG SE-JEONG]
What do you think about the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s decision to normalize the Thaad deployment?
As the Thaad deployment is a security measure for South Korea and the United States to prepare deterrence against North Korean attacks, the government must normalize the operation of the Thaad base in Korea to exercise its sovereignty. You cannot sacrifice your national security just because another country opposes it. At the recent foreign ministerial talks between Seoul and Beijing, China’s response to the issue seemed to have changed a bit. I think the normalization can be pushed forward if Seoul and Washington sufficiently explain the background to Beijing.
Will the people of South Korea and China be able to restore their positive sentiments toward each other?
Most Koreans think they can easily befriend the Chinese. But politically and socially, South Korea and China are completely different countries. While China is a socialist country seeking a Communism path ultimately, Korea is a liberal democracy. Therefore, people’s exchanges will face more challenges in the future. Chinese people younger than 40 are called the “little emperor generation” born after the country adopted a one child policy in 1979. We need to pay special attention to see how they will behave in the international community when they are fueled by nationalism.
China is internationally isolated. Will the Chinese Dream be realized?
Since Deng Xiaoping, China upheld the doctrine of “Keep a low profile and bide your time” in its foreign policy and accomplished rapid economic growth. After Xi took power in 2013 and promoted the China Dream, the West started to become alerted. In 2020, U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo exposed everything China had quietly pushed forward, dealing a diplomatic blow to China by making public its intentions and plans. China was labeled as the NATO’s new threat in its new Strategic Concept announced in June. Over the past decades, China invested heavily to build relations with the West, but they are damaged now. Restoring relations is a crucial task for Beijing. So, it will be hard for China to concentrate all efforts on a hegemony contest against the U.S.
Should South Korea choose the alliance of security and shared values or the alliance of economy and interests?
Many people say South Korea must choose between America and China, but I do not agree. We don’t have to choose. Everybody has friends. We should strengthen the alliance with the U.S., with which we share the values of liberal democracy, while maintaining a close friendship with China, a close neighbor. China is suffering many difficulties in the international community, and no country can relay its message and support better than South Korea. South Korea must seriously think about a way to utilize the changes in the international community to advance South Korea-China relations. There is no need for Seoul to contemplate too deeply about participating in the “Chip 4” alliance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and the Quad. Korea must actively participate in multilateral talks. If something is beneficial for national interest in the long term, it must do it even if it would bring about some damage during the process.
What is your advice to the Yoon administration on foreign strategy?
To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, it must improve relations with China and reinforce cooperation among South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The trilateral cooperation has an important role in particular to check the strained relations between South Korea and Japan. In diplomacy, the president is most important. When the president is humble, wise and insightful, he can be respected by other countries and secure national interest. Career diplomats should be utilized, but the president must hire multifaceted employees beyond school, hometown and blood ties. If the president can do this, South Korea can become a G8 country.
5. Russian proxy leader in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region calls for North Korea ties
Will north Korea send "civilian" construction workers or will they send combat forces as some have speculated?
Russian proxy leader in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region calls for North Korea ties
marketwatch.com · by Associated Press
North Korea last month became one of the few nations in the world to recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, another Russian-backed separatist region in eastern Ukraine, prompting Kyiv to cut off diplomatic ties with Pyongyang.
There are indications North Korea is reviewing plans to send workers for restoration projects in those regions, which could help its economy but run against U.N. Security Council sanctions over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles program.
In his comments sent Monday, Donetsk separatist leader Denis Pushilin expressed hope that his Moscow-backed republic and North Korea could achieve “equally beneficial bilateral cooperation agreeing with the interests” of their people, the North’s official Korean Central News Agency said Wednesday.
Donetsk’s foreign ministry has said its ambassador to Russia, Olga Makeeva, met with North Korean ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol in Moscow on July 29 to discuss economic cooperation. According to the ministry, Sin then said there would be “great potential” for bilateral cooperation in trade and the “field of labor migration” following North Korea’s easing of pandemic border controls.
North Korea is reportedly having similar discussions with Luhansk.
In 2017, Russia backed sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council in response to a North Korean long-range missile test that required member states to repatriate all North Korean workers from their territories within 24 months.
U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price last month criticized Russian suggestions that North Korean workers could be employed for restoration projects in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine, saying that such arrangements would be “an affront to the sovereignty of Ukraine.”
Price was referring to comments by Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora, who told the Tass news agency that North Korean construction workers would potentially provide “very serious help” in rebuilding the Donbas region.
Pushilin’s message to Kim was timed for the Aug. 15 anniversary of the Korean Peninsula’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule at the end of World War II. He congratulated Kim over the anniversary and insisted that the “people of the Donbas region, too, are fighting to regain their freedom and justice of history today just as the Korean people did 77 years ago,” KCNA said.
The report didn’t say whether Kim sent a message to Pushilin in response.
Luhansk and Donetsk together make up the Donbas region, a mostly Russian-speaking region of steel factories, mines and other industries in Ukraine’s east.
Separatists have controlled parts of both provinces since 2014, but Russian President Vladimir Putin recognized their independence only shortly before Russia invaded Ukraine in February. Syria is the only other nation that has recognized their independence.
North Korea has repeatedly blamed the United States for the crisis in Ukraine, saying the West’s “hegemonic policy” justified Russian military actions in Ukraine to protect itself.
Kim has also been exploiting a division in the U.N. Security Council that has deepened over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to accelerate his weapons development as he tries to cement the North as a nuclear power and negotiate a removal of crippling U.S.-led sanctions from a position of strength.
North Korea has test-fired more than 30 missiles in 2022 alone, including its first flight test of an intercontinental ballistic missile in nearly five years. There are also indications the North is restoring tunnels at a nuclear testing site that was last active in 2017 in possible preparations to resume nuclear explosive tests.
marketwatch.com · by Associated Press
6. South Korea shifts away from China
I think the jury is still out on the relationship.
[Robert J. Fouser] South Korea shifts away from China
koreaherald.com · by Robert J. Fouser · August 25, 2022
By Robert J. Fouser
Published : Aug 26, 2022 - 05:31 Updated : Aug 26, 2022 - 05:31
This week marks the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. Diplomatic recognition grew out of South Korea’s push to improve relations with former Eastern Bloc nations in the run-up to the Seoul Summer Olympics in 1988. In the year following the Olympics, communist forces began to collapse in much of Eastern Europe, and South Korea established diplomatic relations with countries there in quick succession. In September 1990, South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which collapsed at the end of 1991. Moving into 1992, China’s turn was next, followed by Vietnam at the end of the year.
The establishment of diplomatic relations allowed for the development of deep economic ties between the two countries. In 1992, the US absorbed 24 percent of South Korean exports, followed by Japan at 15 percent; China was not in the top five. By 2021, China alone accounted for 27 percent, followed by the US at 15 percent, and Vietnam at 10 percent. Japan fell to fifth place, taking only 5 percent of exports.
Beyond exports, various forms of personal exchange also boomed. In 1992, Japan was the No. 1 source of tourists to South Korea, but by the 2010s, China had moved into the No. 1 position, far outpacing Japan. During the same time, Chinese students became the largest group of international students in South Korean universities. Deepening ties between the two countries in the 2000s stimulated a boom in learning Chinese among South Koreans, and Beijing became a popular destination for language students. Meanwhile, a boom in migration of ethnic Koreans from China saw the development of new Chinatowns, such as Daelim-dong in Seoul, in major cities. In China, Koreatowns focusing on the needs of a growing population of South Korean students and businesspeople emerged in major cities.
The boom also created tensions, which worsened toward the end of the 2010s. In the 1990s, South Korean sentiment toward China was largely positive as relations developed rapidly. Beginning in the early 2000s, as China’s economic influence began to grow, South Korea began to perceive China as aggressive. These feelings exploded in 2017 after China restricted tourism in retaliation for South Korea’s deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The flow of tourists resumed in 2018, but the image of China as a bully did not fade away.
Since early 2020, China’s strict COVID-19 quarantine measures have cut the nation off from the rest of world. The extended freeze in tourism and personal exchange has exacerbated the situation because South Koreans see fewer benefits from the relationship. China’s recent display of military might around Taiwan to protest US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit gives more credence to South Korean fears of China’s intentions.
Behind changing views of China are changing views of the United States. Since China’s rapid growth in the 2000s, South Koreans have correctly concluded that the two nations are not just competitors, but rivals. They know that, as long as South Korea maintains a military alliance with the US, the Korean Peninsula plays a strategic role in the rivalry.
For South Koreans with anti-American leanings, weakening the alliance with the US is viewed as a way to reduce great power conflict on the peninsula and, over time, help the cause of reunification. At times in the 1990s and 2000s, this stance has appeared to be in ascendancy, but it never became mainstream and has declined rapidly since the late-2010s.
Instead, rising tensions have caused the mainstream view supporting the alliance with the US to harden. A recent poll in the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper offers insight. In 2015, 73 percent of the respondents believed that China would overtake the US as the leading nation in world, but in 2022, 52 percent believed that the US would retain its dominant position. From 2019 to 2022, the percentage that viewed China as a threat to South Korea grew from 67 percent to 75 percent. These results suggest that the hardening of views comes from not just the perception of a Chinese threat, but also from the belief that US dominance will continue.
The poll also showed growing support for taking the US side in its rivalry with China. Between 2019 and 2022, support for that view grew from 31 percent to 41 percent, while support for a neutral position fell from 66 percent to 57 percent; only 2 percent supported taking China’s side. In recent years, negative views toward China have grown fastest among younger generations, suggesting a continued, if not accelerating, shift toward the US.
By Robert J. Fouser
Robert J. Fouser, a former associate professor of Korean language education at Seoul National University, writes on Korea from Providence, Rhode Island. He can be reached at robertjfouser@gmail.com. -- Ed.
7. MAGA all over again (ROK criticism of US IRA)
Sunday
August 28, 2022
dictionary + A - A
MAGA all over again
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/08/28/opinion/columns/Biden-electric-vehicles-subsidy/20220828200144114.html
Lee Hyun-sang
The author is a columnist of the JoongAng Ilbo.
“I will not disappoint you,” whispered U.S. President Joe Biden to Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Chung Eui-sun in the garden of a five-star hotel on Mount Namsan in Seoul. Three months ago, Biden made that comment in reaction to Chung’s promise to invest $10.5 billion in the United States. Does the U.S. president still remember what he said while patting Chung on the shoulder on a sunny day in May?
After Biden’s signing of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on August 16, U.S. subsidies for Hyundai and Kia electric vehicle (EV) models sold in America vanished. That will certainly deal a heavy blow to Hyundai’s dramatic ascent to the second highest market share for its EVs — nine percent — in the U.S. The principle of “free and fair trade,” the backbone of the U.S.-led global order, was shattered.
Hyundai plans to reduce its weakened price competitiveness by expediting the construction of an EV factory in the state of Georgia. But it is not an easy job given all the requirements — getting permissions from U.S. authorities, rearranging contractors to hasten the construction, and persuading labor unions in Korea to allow it. Even if everything goes well, it will take at least more than two years to build the factory. No one knows if American demand for Hyundai EVs will remain robust until then. The Korea Automotive Industry Alliance (KAIA) expects the signing of the IRA will result in an export reduction in Korean EVs of 100,000 annually.
Bilateral trade conflicts surfaced between the two allies in the past. But this one is really shocking as it erupted when the two countries are reshaping their alliance based on values amid the heated Sino-U.S. contest. Does that mean the allies can share values but not interests? Korea demands special treatment as an “ally for economic security” from the U.S. But that demand can hardly be met, as the U.S. cannot treat Korea different from Europe and Japan. Above all, America wants to rebuild the base for its entire manufacturing sector, including materials, parts and production, within its borders over the long term. It could be wiser for Korea to find some realistic solutions based on reciprocity.
An immediate countermeasure could include a fixing of the subsidizing system for electric vehicles sold in Korea. Though Korea-made EVs cannot receive any subsidy from America, U.S.-made EVs still can receive a subsidy from Korea. U.S. EVs took 44.8 billion won ($33.4 million) in subsidies from the Korean government in the first half. (Most of the money went to Tesla.) The amount is approximately one tenth of the government’s subsidies for all EVs sold in Korea. Compared to U.S. discrimination against foreign EVs, Korea’s subsidy for foreign models seem quite generous.
Reshoring manufacturing back to America is nothing new. It has continued since the passage of the 2010 Manufacturing Enhancement Act by Barack Obama’s administration. Biden was elected president by criticizing Donald Trump’s “America First” policy, but he was no different. Biden’s trade policy is worse than his predecessor’s. Just four days after his inauguration in 2021, he signed an executive order aimed at forcing the federal government to buy more goods produced in the U.S. The bold Chips and Science Act Biden signed on August 10 is designed to block global chipmakers from manufacturing cutting-edge semiconductors in China in return for hefty subsidies for foreign companies investing in the U.S.
Though the goal of reviving the U.S manufacturing sector was packaged as “national interests,” it boils down to winning votes ahead of the midterm elections in November. In a recent contribution to Foreign Affairs, Biden declared a “foreign policy for the middle class” to stop the de-industrialization of America and create jobs for American workers. In essence, Biden’s “Build Back Better” is no different from Trump’s “Make America Great Again.”
Biden’s signing of the IRA Act reminds us of the plain yet cold truth behind international relations: values give way to national interests. That may be what the Yoon Suk-yeol administration forgot while switching fast to a “values-based alliance” so ardently championed by Biden. Over semiconductors and the Thaad missile defense system, where Korea’s future is at stake, America and China are pressuring Korea to choose between them. The IRA Act could be a confession that the United States will not take responsibility for the results of choices Korea makes. Another concern has surfaced on the foreign and trade policy front of the Yoon administration.
8. Unification minister renews resolve to help enhance North Korean human rights
Human rights upfront approach. Add information and influence activities and a strategic aim of unification and you will have a new bold and audacious plan.
Unification minister renews resolve to help enhance North Korean human rights
The Korea Times · August 26, 2022
This Aug. 19 file photo shows Unification Minister Kwon Young-se speaking to lawmakers at the National Assembly in western Seoul. Korea Times file
South Korea's Unification Minister Kwon Young-se reaffirmed the government's resolve Friday to help enhance the human rights situation in North Korea as he met with the leaders of local civic organizations.
Kwon met Heo Kwang-il, head of the North Korean Human Rights Union, and chiefs of three other groups, and stressed the government's "obligation and will" to deal with the human rights and humanitarian situations in the reclusive country, according to the unification ministry.
The minister also reiterated the government's principle to accept all North Korean defectors, saying his ministry seeks to make institutional and legal improvements to that end and help defectors settle smoothly once they make it here.
The meeting came a day after South Korea held its first interagency government meeting on North Korean human rights policy in over two years.
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has taken a more proactive stance in dealing with the North's rights issues in a shift from the preceding Moon Jae-in administration. (Yonhap)
The Korea Times · August 26, 2022
9. International stability sometimes requires foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions
Interesting argument.
Conclusion:
The paradox of international stability might be that credibility and contradictions are "two sides of a coin." International actors must acquire credibility to implement persuasively less credible aspects of their foreign policy.
International stability sometimes requires foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions
The Korea Times · August 28, 2022
By Lee Jong-eun
In international relations, political actors' ambiguous, inconsistent behaviors are frequent subjects of debates and controversies. To some critics, U.S. President Joe Biden's recent Saudi Arabia visit to request the latter's cooperation in the global energy market contradicted his administration's pledge to counter autocracy and advocate human rights as core foreign policy values.
To other critics, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol's equivocal response toward U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan was inconsistent with Yoon's campaign pledge to be assertive toward China. To other critics, Western Europe's pledge to defend Ukraine from Russia's invasion is undermined by the former's restraint in providing more sophisticated weapons for Ukraine and completely suspending energy imports from Russia.
Often, newly established governments criticize what they portray as their predecessors' ambiguous, contradictory foreign policies, then proclaim that their new foreign policies will be instead clear and principled. Eventually, however, most governments, regardless of their ideological orientation, make decisions that fall short or deviate from their foreign policy pledges.
In South Korea, the Lee Myung-bak government, which criticized its predecessors' engagement policy toward North Korea as wasteful spending, continued to permit the flow of aid to North Korea through the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex. The Moon Jae-in government, which questioned the legality of the 2015 Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement signed by its predecessor, eventually acknowledged the document as an official bilateral agreement.
To be accused of foreign policy inconsistencies and contradictions poses risks for governments. The losses of policy credibility could result in domestic political backlashes and suspensions of international cooperation. However, ambiguities and contradictions are not only common but perhaps necessary attributes of international affairs.
A government which seeks to implement a certain foreign policy will likely face challenges from domestic and external actors opposed to the policy. Against such opposition, the government risks experiencing policy costs that could jeopardize fulfilling other vital foreign policy goals. Should the U.S. pressure countries in the Global South to participate in robust sanctions against Russia, at the risk of alienating these countries to drift away from the West?
Should South Korea pursue a trilateral security alliance with the U.S. and Japan at the risk of its economic partnership with China? While some hardliners advocate that certain foreign policy objectives are more important than all others, the geopolitical reality is that governments are often compelled to balance competing foreign policy interests and objectives.
There is a valid criticism that unrealistic foreign policy objectives are the cause for states' "hypocritical" policy behaviors. For example, the goal of nuclear nonproliferation has been criticized for forcing the international community to deny recognition to de facto nuclear weapons states like India, Pakistan and Israel. Disavowing costly, unattainable foreign policy goals might be the easiest way to reduce the need for policy ambiguities and contradictions.
Unfortunately, domestic and international constraints often prevent countries from disavowing long-held foreign policy goals. For example, the U.S. is unlikely to abandon formally the goal of denuclearizing North Korea or dismiss the importance of international democracy and human rights promotion.
Subsequently, how countries could signal a commitment to foreign policy goals without experiencing undue costs remain an unavoidable policy challenge. Despite risks and criticisms, policy ambiguities and contradictions display governments' endeavors to bridge the gap between stated policy goals and policy constraints.
The governments might hedge support for a policy goal with an undefined level of commitment to test the expected costs. U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan but not formally support Taiwan's independence; South Korea's participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), but reservation toward membership in the Quad are examples of policy deliberations that might appear to some critics as strategic ambiguities.
The governments might also attempt to offset foreign policy costs through countermeasures. The recent killing of Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri by the U.S. military might appear to contradict the U.S. strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it could also be the Biden administration's attempt to balance the excessive decline of the U.S.' security commitment in the Middle East region.
Some analysts warn that ambiguities and contradictions create geopolitical uncertainties threatening international stability. The mixed signaling of the West's security commitment to Ukraine might have motivated Russia's "special military operations." Similar security crises could occur in East Asia if the U.S. and its allies do not convey strategic clarity. However, in geopolitical disputes where actors have incompatible goals and interests, policy ambiguities might also serve as creative solutions that avert crises and maintain international stability.
A carefully crafted ambiguity permits international actors to achieve mutual "face-saving" consensus by blurring the costs of compromise. "Informal reciprocity" and "tacit compliance" might be less costly for international actors to abide by than explicit concessions. Drawing from the Korean proverb, "give a disease then give a medicine," international actors might alternate aggressive and conciliatory policy behaviors to adjust strategic balance in their geopolitical interactions. Fluctuations of foreign policy behavior could then have a positive role in deterring international disputes from severely deteriorating or rigidly remaining in gridlock.
Do foreign policy ambiguities and contradictions undermine the stability of the "rules-based international order?" Or do they provide nuances that preserve international stability threatened by conflict over rules and principles? Both are possible outcomes. The key difference between actors who use ambiguities and contradictions to reinforce international stability and actors who fail might be that the former carry credibility that permits the latitude of "cutting some slack" in making exceptions to their professed policy goals and principles.
The paradox of international stability might be that credibility and contradictions are "two sides of a coin." International actors must acquire credibility to implement persuasively less credible aspects of their foreign policy.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Air Force intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.
The Korea Times · August 28, 2022
10. S. Korea's foreign minister arrives in Mongolia on trip to deepen bilateral ties
I have learned at some recent conferences that Mongolia has the potential to play an important "middleman" world in the region.
S. Korea's foreign minister arrives in Mongolia on trip to deepen bilateral ties
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · August 28, 2022
ULAANBAATAR/SEOUL -- South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin arrived in Mongolia on Sunday for talks with his Mongolian counterpart on bilateral relations, and regional and global issues.
His trip -- the first visit to Mongolia by a South Korean foreign minister on a bilateral basis since 2014 -- comes as the country has recently gained keen attention for its rich resources amid international efforts to secure global supply chains.
Shortly after arriving in Ulaanbaatar, Park visited a commemorative park honoring South Korean independence fighter Lee Tae-joon, who opened a hospital there in the 1910s to fight infectious diseases and backed Korea's struggle against Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule.
Established in 2001, the park has become a symbol of friendship between the two nations.
"It is an opportunity to inscribe deep in my heart the noble sprit of Lee who sacrificed himself for his home country's independence and served Mongolian people with medical expertise based on his philanthropic spirit," Park said.
"Inheriting that spirit, South Korea will prioritize national interests and make efforts to become a global pivotal state contributing to world freedom, peace and prosperity," he added.
Later in the day, he met with Mongolian scholars and experts to discuss a series of issues concerning Northeast Asia.
Before departing for Mongolia, Park said his trip is aimed at deepening "practical" bilateral cooperation in the areas of economic security, and strengthening solidarity between the two nations sharing "universal values."
"We would like to deepen cooperation with Mongolia, one of the world's top 10 resource-rich nations, for stabilizing and diversifying supply chains," Park told reporters.
Park added he plans to deliver President Yoon Suk-yeol's handwritten letter, wishing for the development of bilateral relations, to Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa.
On Monday, Park is set to hold talks with his counterpart, Batmunkh Battsetseg, to discuss bilateral relations and other issues of mutual concern.
During his stay that runs through Tuesday, Park also plans to pay courtesy calls on the Mongolian president and other political leaders, according to his office. (Yonhap)
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · August 28, 2022
11. ARTHUR CYR: North Korea’s continuing economic decline
Excerpts:
Belligerence remains the default Pyongyang position. On June 5, North Korea launched eight short-range missiles, the most ever in one day. The next day, South Korea and the United States launched the same number of missiles. North Korea also has tested a missile capable of reaching the United States.
As argued in previous columns, basic realities of North Korea are unchanging. First, for many years Pyongyang has been inconsistent, often erratically. In 2013, the regime declared a “state of war” with South Korea and abruptly abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. Yet, accommodating moves followed. President Donald Trump conducted highly publicized meetings with Kim Jong-un, but nothing was achieved.
Second, we must emphasize defense of South Korea, within wider Asia security. The Biden administration is doing precisely this with extensive Asia trips this year of President Biden and Defense Secretary Austin.
Third, we should emphasize coordination with other nations. In 2017, Japan reenergized fitful security discussions, including Australia, India and the United States. Dubbed the Quad, this security dialogue is important.
South Korea’s substantial investment in and trade with China grows, while North Korea remains a costly dependent, though ideologically important. China President Xi Jinping visited Seoul in 2014. He finally visited North Korea in 2019.
ARTHUR CYR: North Korea’s continuing economic decline
Predictably, North Korea has rejected an offer from the South Korea government of economic aid in return for nuclear disarmament. South Korea’s new President Yoon Suk-yeol initially made the suggestion during his inauguration in May. On Aug. 15, he advanced the proposal in a speech.
In a switch from customary practice, North Korea leader Kim Jong-un did not reply. Rather, his sister Kim Yo-jong, also a senior party official in the government, on Aug. 19 rejected the offer.
She was careful to include a personal insult of Yoon, standard practice for Pyongyang. However, the fact that she appeared in place of her brother will greatly fuel rumors that he suffers from serious health problems. President Yoon’s proposal nonetheless is an important gesture, especially since his government generally takes a hardline approach toward North Korea.
Undeniable is the reality that North Korea is in desperate economic difficulty. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought the nation’s long-apparent economic deterioration to a crisis point. Trade and wider interchange with China has contracted, while long-term economic sanctions under the United Nations slowly strangle commerce.
Belligerence remains the default Pyongyang position. On June 5, North Korea launched eight short-range missiles, the most ever in one day. The next day, South Korea and the United States launched the same number of missiles. North Korea also has tested a missile capable of reaching the United States.
As argued in previous columns, basic realities of North Korea are unchanging. First, for many years Pyongyang has been inconsistent, often erratically. In 2013, the regime declared a “state of war” with South Korea and abruptly abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. Yet, accommodating moves followed. President Donald Trump conducted highly publicized meetings with Kim Jong-un, but nothing was achieved.
Second, we must emphasize defense of South Korea, within wider Asia security. The Biden administration is doing precisely this with extensive Asia trips this year of President Biden and Defense Secretary Austin.
Third, we should emphasize coordination with other nations. In 2017, Japan reenergized fitful security discussions, including Australia, India and the United States. Dubbed the Quad, this security dialogue is important.
South Korea’s substantial investment in and trade with China grows, while North Korea remains a costly dependent, though ideologically important. China President Xi Jinping visited Seoul in 2014. He finally visited North Korea in 2019.
China’s foreign policy reflects self-interest, and traditional caution regarding military force. North Korea is a drain, and over time a source of growing well-founded anxiety.
The brutal Korean War of 1950 to 1953 is essential background. President Harry Truman decided to support the United Nations’ defense against Pyongyang’s invasion of South Korea.
President Dwight Eisenhower quickly achieved an armistice in the Korean War. A crucial factor was devastating unrestrained bombing of North Korea. Pyongyang’s hostility today reflects this frightening history.
Democratic change culminated with election in 1998 of President Kim Dae-jung, heroic opponent of dictatorship. In 2000, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. During the earlier dictatorship, Kim survived imprisonment and at least one attempt to kill him. Periodic turmoil since 1998 has reinforced South Korea democracy.
U.S. leaders should emphasize collaboration with allies, underscore commitment, and continue encouraging South Korea leadership. The Biden administration is returning to traditional, very strong emphasis on working with our principal allies, including closer military cooperation.
Powerful comprehensive ties with South Korea from the Korean War, greatly reinforced during the Vietnam War, are a lynchpin.
Arthur I. Cyr is Clausen Distinguished Professor at Carthage College and author of “After the Cold War” (NYU Press and Macmillan). Readers can wrote to him at acyr@carthage.edu.
12. S. Korea ranks 9th among nations with trade surpluses with U.S. in H1: data
S. Korea ranks 9th among nations with trade surpluses with U.S. in H1: data | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · August 28, 2022
SEOUL, Aug. 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea was ranked ninth among countries with trade surpluses with the United States in the first half of the year, as Asia's fourth-largest economy recorded strong on-year growth in shipments to the U.S. during the period, U.S. government data showed Sunday.
According to the Department of Commerce, South Korea's trade surplus with the U.S. during the January-June period amounted to US$21.67 billion, up 86.9 percent from a year ago.
The trade surplus grew as South Korean shipments to the U.S. during the period increased 25.9 percent while its imports from America went up only 4.8 percent.
For the period, South Korea's standing among trade surplus nations with the U.S. climbed five notches from a year ago to ninth place. The nation was ranked 14th a year ago.
China ranked first in terms of trade surplus nations with the U.S., followed by Mexico and Vietnam in second and third place, respectively. Canada, Japan and Ireland came in fourth, fifth and sixth, respectively.
odissy@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 장동우 · August 28, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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