Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“When men differ in opinion, both sides ought equally to have the advantage of being heard by the public; when Truth and Error have fair play, the former is always an overmatch for the latter.”

- Benjamin Franklin

"If we mean to have heroes, statesmen and philosophers, we should have learned women"

- Abigail Adams

“Character, in the long run, is the decisive factor in the life of an individual and of nations alike.”

- Theodore Roosevelt

1. Experts: Seoul, Tokyo Maintain Ties Despite Possible Japanese Military Expansion

2. FM Park relays Yoon's will to improve Seoul-Tokyo ties in courtesy call on Kishida

3. N. Korea's Supreme Guard Command given lecture detailing Abe's assassination

4. N. Korea concentrates more resources into preparing for nuclear test

5. Daily COVID Cases Surge over 70,000 Overnight

6. N. Korea's new suspected COVID-19 cases fall below 300: state media

7. S. Korea's homegrown KF-21 fighter succeeds in 1st flight test

8. N. Korea celebrates 22nd anniv. of joint cooperation declaration with Russia

9. 4 Ways North Korea Can Counter the F-35

10. Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program

11. Yoon gov't to push for launch of N.K. human rights foundation

12. Lingering tensions in Panmunjom underline uncertainties in inter-Korean ties

13. New envoy for North Korean rights announced by Foreign Ministry

14. Betting all on Biden isn’t wise

15. Is South Korean Nuclear Proliferation Inevitable?

16. North Korean labour could be sent to rebuild Donbas, Russian ambassador says

17. US Disrupts North Korea Ransomware Group, Recovers Nearly Half a Million in Payments

1. Experts: Seoul, Tokyo Maintain Ties Despite Possible Japanese Military Expansion

I am hopeful and optimistic.

Excerpt:

VOA's Korean Service contacted the South Korean Embassy in Washington for comment on how a Japanese constitutional revision would affect Seoul's efforts to improve ties with Tokyo. On Monday, the embassy referred the inquiry to the Foreign Ministry in Seoul, which has yet to respond.

Experts: Seoul, Tokyo Maintain Ties Despite Possible Japanese Military Expansion

July 19, 2022 12:50 PM

Christy Lee

voanews.com

Washington —

As South Korea and Japan agree to improve bilateral ties, experts say the latter's possible constitutional revision allowing military expansion should be in line with the Biden administration's effort to forge a strong Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral front against the threats of China and North Korea.

South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi held talks Monday in Tokyo, agreeing to mend frayed relations stemming from the Japanese colonization of 1910-1945 and to improve their ties to bolster defense against North Korea.

FM Park relays Yoon's will to improve Seoul-Tokyo ties in courtesy call on Kishida | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · July 19, 2022

TOKYO/SEOUL, July 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top diplomat said Tuesday he relayed President Yoon Suk-yeol's verbal message highlighting his will to improve relations with Japan during his courtesy call on Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

In a meeting with reporters, Foreign Minister Park Jin explained the outcomes of the meeting at the premier's official residence in Tokyo, a highlight of his three-day visit to Japan seen as an effort to mend the bilateral ties strained over wartime history and trade.

In his message to Kishida, Yoon said his encounters at a NATO summit in Madrid last month had made him assured he can work together with Kishida as a "trustworthy partner" to develop cooperative bilateral ties.

Yoon also expressed hopes to continue close cooperation with Kishida, and delivered his condolences for late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated during a campaign speech earlier this month.

The Japanese leader carefully listened to Yoon's message and recalled he had "good" talks with Yoon during the NATO summit, voicing expectations for more talks with him down the road, according to Park.

During the 20-minute meeting, the two sides also touched on the thorny issues related to Japan's wartime forced labor and sexual slavery, the minister said.

Park added he expressed his expectations for a summit between Yoon and Kishida to materialize at a mutually convenient time to help foster a new relationship between the two countries.

Their meeting followed Park's bilateral talks with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi the previous day, which focused on ways to restore ties frayed over drawn-out historical rows.

During Monday's meeting, Park and Hayashi agreed on the need for an early settlement over issues related to Koreans who were forced to labor during Japan's 1910-45 colonization of the Korean Peninsula.

In 2018, South Korea's top court ordered Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Inc. and Nippon Steel Corp. to compensate Korean forced labor victims, but the companies refused to pay them, claiming all reparation issues were settled under a 1965 accord aimed at normalizing bilateral diplomatic relations.

Park vowed Seoul's efforts to resolve the forced labor issue before the liquidation of Japanese firms' assets, as South Korea's top court is expected to deliver its final decision on related cases in the coming months.

Seoul's foreign ministry has been collecting opinions from a public-private consultative body launched earlier this month on possible compensation schemes for the Korean forced labor victims.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김은정 · July 19, 2022

3. N. Korea's Supreme Guard Command given lecture detailing Abe's assassination

Must be in the spirit of "Intelligent men learn from their mistakes, and wise men learn from the mistakes of others." Or it is a meeting to put the fear and wrath of the Great, Supreme, and Dear Leader into the hearts of men.

N. Korea's Supreme Guard Command given lecture detailing Abe's assassination - Daily NK

While keeping regular people in the dark, the government appears keen to make top cadres aware of the importance of protecting the life of the nation’s supreme leader

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.07.19 3:00pm

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 19, 2022

A South Korean watching news of Shinzo Abe's assassination on TV in Seoul Station on July 8. (Yonhap)

North Korean authorities subjected the Supreme Guard Command to ideological training following the assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Daily NK has learned. This suggests that North Korea is using Abe’s assassination to bolster its protection of the nation’s supreme leadership.

According to a high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea last Friday, the Supreme Guard Command underwent an emergency ideological training session on the morning of July 9.

The lecture was suddenly held during a previously unscheduled hour before Saturday’s regular criticism session and divulged details about the Abe assassination.

The rush to educate personnel of the Supreme Guard Command about the assassination suggests that Pyongyang is sensitive about potential acts of terrorism against the country’s supreme leader, Kim Jong Un.

During the lecture, North Korean authorities explained in detail how Abe was killed, and called on personnel to “mercilessly crush the schemes of impure elements and become shields to build our fortress walls higher.”

The Supreme Guard Command also carried out unit-level workshops for three days and two nights, from July 9 to July 11.

With the North Korean military beginning its summer exercises from July 1, the Supreme Guard Command also included intensified drills for marksmanship, shooting, readiness inspections and manhunting on top of their existing training regimen, the source added.

Abe’s assassination was also mentioned in a party newspaper read by Central Committee cadres and the top leaders of regional party committees.

Abe’s killing has not been mentioned in the Rodong Sinmun, which ordinary North Koreans read. However, the Chamgo (Reference) Sinmun — a daily paper printed by the Central Committee that publishes articles about international affairs in their original form — reported the killing in detail.

All in all, while the regime has refrained from openly publishing news of the assassination – ostensibly out of fear of giving people an example to emulate – the government appears keen to make top cadres aware of the importance of protecting the life of the nation’s supreme leader.

Cadres who read about Abe’s killing in the Chamgo Sinmun were reportedly shocked that an ordinary citizen could shoot a former prime minister, and expressed concern about what would transpire if something like that happened in North Korea.

On top of making no mention of the killing in media outlets read by the general public, North Korean authorities have yet to publicly express an official position regarding Abe’s assassination.

North Korea designates Japan as a sworn enemy and imperialist state, and in the past employed colorful language to refer to Abe, calling him an “idiot,” “underwit” and “deformed child.” This suggests that Pyongyang is not likely to issue an official statement expressing condolences over Abe’s death or that condemns his killing.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 19, 2022

4. N. Korea concentrates more resources into preparing for nuclear test

Any day now? The time is coming.

Two questions:

What does Kim expect to achieve with this test? Is it only to advance the nuclear program or is this meant to contribute to his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategy? If the latter, what does he expect the response to be? Outrage on the part of the alliance? More words about sanctions enforcement? Another call for action at the UN Security Council that will be vetoed by China and Russia? Does he really expect the alliance to give in, appease him, and provide sanctions relief?

Then what are we to do? The most important thing to do is to one not overreact but instead show him that his political warfare and war fighting strategies will not succeed, the foundation of which is to recognize, understand, expose, and attack his strategy (with information). We need to embark on a comprehensive employment of selected tools from across the instruments of national power. We must continue all readiness and training activities and accelerate them. We must begin to use our offensive cyber capabilities, the proliferation security initiative, counter sanctions evasion activities (e.g., denial of ship-to-ship transfer), and conduct a sophisticated and extensive information and influence activities campaign to separate the elite from the Kim family regime influence te 2d tier leadership, and prepara the Korean people in the north for what comes next, e.g., unification. We must take very action (supported by words, not the other way around) that will demonstrate to Kim that his strategies cannot achieve his objectives.

N. Korea concentrates more resources into preparing for nuclear test - Daily NK

“All preparations have been completed so that a nuclear test can be carried out at any time,” a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.07.19 11:35am

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 19, 2022

The entrance to a tunnel at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. (Joint Press Corps)

North Korea’s 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau, an agency involved in nuclear test-related design and construction, has recently taken over command of a new unit. This development suggests that the country is concentrating even more resources into conducting a seventh and even eighth nuclear test.

According to a high-ranking Daily NK source in North Korea last Friday, North Korean authorities recently placed the First Brigade’s Seventh Regiment under the command of the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau.

The decision to do so was made during last month’s Third Enlarged Meeting of the Eighth Central Military Commission.

The First Brigade’s Seventh Regiment has been under the direct control of the Central Committee. It existed outside the command of the Ministry of Defense, General Staff Department or Supreme Guard Command. Instead, it has long received orders directly from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The First Brigade has usually been tasked with building villas and hospitals connected to the Kim family, while its Seventh Regiment has sometimes handled specialized construction related to nuclear or missile tests.

Meanwhile, the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau, nominally under the Workers’ Party of Korea, is under direct command of the Munitions Industry Department. The bureau is directly involved in the construction of nuclear facilities and the development of uranium mines.

The bureau’s duties are more technically advanced than those of the First Brigade’s Seventh Regiment. The source told Daily NK, however, that the Seventh Regiment enjoys better treatment because it receives its orders directly from Kim Jong Un.

The recent move to put the Central Committee’s own technical construction unit under the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau appears aimed at concentrating personnel and technology into preparations for a nuclear-related test.

In fact, the Seventh Regiment has already been deployed to Punggye-ri, Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province, where preparations are underway for the country’s seventh nuclear test, according to the source.

He explained that the Seventh Regiment’s placement under the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau was due to inefficiencies that arose from the bifurcated command structure while the two units worked together in Punggye-ri.

“The Seventh Regiment was transferred to the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau because it is not the only unit that can take on construction work ordered by the Central Committee,” the source explained.

The sudden decision to place the Seventh Regiment — which used to receive its orders directly from Kim Jong Un — under the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau suggests North Korea’s leadership is keen to move forward with preparations for a nuclear test.

The 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau and Seventh Regiment are now carrying out their duties at the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri. Even though work on Tunnel No. 3 is now complete, the units are now involved in work that the source was unable to specify.

“All preparations have been completed so that a nuclear test can be carried out at any time,” said the source. “But seeing how the 131st Nuclear Guidance Bureau and Seventh Regiment haven’t been withdrawn – and have recently been given more work to do – suggests [the authorities] are preparing for a series of nuclear tests.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 19, 2022

5. Daily COVID Cases Surge over 70,000 Overnight

Daily COVID Cases Surge over 70,000 Overnight

english.chosun.com

July 19, 2022 09:32

New COVID cases shot up to over 70,000 in Korea as new infectious subvariants take hold.

New infections stood at 73,582 as of Tuesday morning, up nearly 50,000 from the previous day and the most in about three months.

Cases have been doubling every week over the past four weeks.

Officials monitor new COVID cases at a district office in Seoul on Tuesday. /Yonhap

The same day a new concerted vaccination drive targeting the over-50s began amid widespread reluctance to have a second booster shot.

The government has shifted its focus to preventing high-risk groups from becoming severely ill or dying as the highly contagious BA.5 subvariant begins to spread.

People wait to get tested for coronavirus in Seoul on Tuesday. /Yonhap

Health authorities warned that numbers could rise to 150,000 to 200,000 cases a day in the second half of this year, while experts put the number at up to 300,000.

But new deaths and severe illness remain low at 12 and 91.

COVID Reinfections to Become the Norm

Korea Reports 1st Case of 'Centaurus' COVID Subvariant

No Fresh Lockdown, Gov't Promises

New Daily COVID Cases Soar Above 30,000

Daily COVID Infections Surge Sharply

Daily COVID Cases Top 10,000 Again

7-Day COVID Self-Isolation in Place for Another 4 Weeks

Nearly All Koreans Have Antibodies Against COVID-19

COVID Infections Cases Fall to New Low

No Major COVID Surge Expected This Summer

COVID Likely to Linger Until Autumn

Korea Lifts Outdoor Mask Mandate

Outdoor Mask Mandate to Be Lifted Next Week

Korea Lifts COVID Restrictions

COVID Travel Advisories Lifted

Most COVID Restrictions to End Next Week

Gov't Mulls Shortening COVID Self-Isolation

Lockdown Eased Further as COVID Becomes Endemic

english.chosun.com

6. N. Korea's new suspected COVID-19 cases fall below 300: state media

The regime knows how to shape the narrative.

(LEAD) N. Korea's new suspected COVID-19 cases fall below 300: state media | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 19, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with more info from 3rd para)

By Yi Wonju

SEOUL, July 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's new suspected COVID-19 cases dropped below 300, according to its state media Tuesday.

More than 250 people showed symptoms of fever over a 24-hour period until 6 p.m. the previous day, the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said, citing data from the state emergency epidemic prevention headquarters.

It did not provide information on whether additional deaths have been reported. As of July 5, the death toll had stood at 74, with the fatality rate at 0.002 percent.

The total number of fever cases since late April came to over 4.77 million as of 6 p.m. Monday, of which 99.98 percent had recovered and at least 590 others are being treated, it added.

The North's daily fever tally has been on a downward trend after peaking at over 392,920 on May 15, three days after it announced a coronavirus outbreak.

The KCNA said the North's antivirus "work system and code of conduct have been further perfected" in each region to "completely defuse the current public health crisis."

"Provincial, city and county people's hospitals enhance the level of medical service and ensure the safety of treatment in close liaison with rapid consultative diagnosis teams organized at central-level hospitals," it said in an English-language report.

It added that emergency medical teams across the country are working to "correctly diagnose" enteric epidemic and other diseases and take swift measures to treat them.

Pyongyang disclosed its first COVID-19 case on May 12 after claiming to be coronavirus-free for over two years and implemented nationwide lockdowns.

In mid-June, the North also reported an outbreak of an "acute enteric epidemic" in South Hwanghae Province near the border with South Korea. It did not specify what the disease was.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 19, 2022

7. S. Korea's homegrown KF-21 fighter succeeds in 1st flight test

But don't forget its KF-16s and KF-15s as well as its F-35s but yes I guess it is time for them to say goodbye to the F-4s and F-5s. Aging may be too kind of a word for them.

Excerpts:

At the Air Force's 3rd Flying Training Wing in Sacheon, about 300 kilometers south of Seoul, the warplane took off, signaling South Korea is on course to join an elite club of seven countries that have locally developed supersonic fighter jets.

The maiden flight under the 8.8 trillion-won (US$6.67 billion) project came as the nation has been pushing to replace its aging fleet of F-4 and F-5 fighters with the high-end jet and bolster its airpower to counter North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

(3rd LD) S. Korea's homegrown KF-21 fighter succeeds in 1st flight test | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · July 19, 2022

(ATTN: ADDS President Yoon's message in paras 7-8)

By Song Sang-ho

SEOUL, July 19 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's homegrown KF-21 fighter successfully carried out its first flight test Tuesday, around 6 1/2 years after its mammoth development project kicked off despite skepticism over technological obstacles, cost effectiveness and other feasibility questions.

At the Air Force's 3rd Flying Training Wing in Sacheon, about 300 kilometers south of Seoul, the warplane took off, signaling South Korea is on course to join an elite club of seven countries that have locally developed supersonic fighter jets.

The maiden flight under the 8.8 trillion-won (US$6.67 billion) project came as the nation has been pushing to replace its aging fleet of F-4 and F-5 fighters with the high-end jet and bolster its airpower to counter North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

"This is the moment when South Korea's capabilities to develop the high-tech 4.5-generation fighter jet came to realization with this first flight," the state Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said in a press release.

"As we got a step closer to the successful development of the homegrown fighter, this symbolizes a new leap in the domestic aviation technology and a rise of the strong high-tech military," it added.

The KF-21 took off at 3:40 p.m. and landed at 4:13 p.m. for the first airborne test, according to DAPA.

President Yoon Suk-yeol touted the success, saying it is "a feat for the country's pursuit of self-defense," his office said.

Yoon also said it "laid the groundwork for our expansion of defense exports," praising those who have participated in the development for their hard work, it added.

The authorities had initially planned to conduct the test in the morning but delayed it by several hours due to weather conditions.

South Korea first envisioned the jet development project in November 2000, when then President Kim Dae-jung unveiled the nation's hope to become an advanced fighter manufacturer by 2015 at a ceremony rolling out the KT-1 indigenous trainer aircraft.

The project took a baby step in November 2002, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff made a long-term plan to develop a high-end fighter whose capabilities go beyond the KF-16 fighter and deliver around 120 units.

But skepticism was still rampant. The two state-run agencies -- the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses and the Korea Development Institute -- concluded in their separate analyses in 2003 and 2007, respectively, that the project was not feasible.

However, the project got much-needed momentum in 2009, when another government-commissioned study by Konkuk University concluded the fighter development scheme was economically feasible.

The government then proceeded with an initial research process from 2011-2012 and decided in 2013 on a detailed plan for the fighter project, including the required operational capabilities and the target deployment period.

As widely anticipated, the issue of securing key fighter technologies remained a tough challenge.

The South initially sought to secure key technologies for four critical pieces of equipment -- an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system, infrared search and track (IRST) system, electro-optical tracking pod (EO TGP) and radio frequency (RF) jammer -- from the United States.

The U.S.' answer to the request in April 2015 was negative, forcing the South to focus on domestically developing the required technologies.

Despite the technological uncertainties, DAPA signed a fighter development contract with Korea Aerospace Industries Ltd. (KAI), the country's sole aircraft maker, in December 2015.

In the first phase of the project costing 8.1 trillion won, Indonesia participated as a partner under a deal to shoulder 20 percent of the amount. Following the first phase to develop the overall fighter system by 2026, the second phase costing 700 billion won runs through 2028 to conduct armament tests.

Initial skepticism over the project turned into optimism as local defense firms have successfully proceeded with the development of technologies required for the four key pieces of equipment at the core of the fighter's battle operations.

Hanwha Systems Co. has been on track to develop the AESA radar system, with its prototype unveiled in August 2020, four years after the launch of the radar development effort.

The AESA system can detect and track multiple targets simultaneously and extensively, as the beam of radio waves is electronically steered to points in different directions without moving the antenna.

Hanwha Systems has also been in charge of developing the IRST and EO TGP. The IRST system is designed to detect and track objects that give off infrared radiation, while EO TGP is for identifying targets and guiding precision munitions like laser-guided bombs.

LIG Nex1 has been working on developing the fighter's electronic warfare (EW) suite, including the RF jammer designed for the disruption of radio signals.

The 4.5-generation fighter will be equipped with air-to-air missiles, such as the AIM-2000 by Germany-based Diehl and the Meteor by Europe's MBDA.

So far, five KF-21 prototypes have been rolled out for testing purposes with the sixth due out sometime this month. The prototypes are scheduled to conduct a combined 2,000 sorties or more to finish the overall fighter development by 2026.

Other than such testing procedures, the KF-21 project faces other hurdles, such as Indonesia's overdue payments.

From 2026-2028, KAI plans to manufacture the initial units of the KF 21 Block I.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 오석민 · July 19, 2022

8. N. Korea celebrates 22nd anniv. of joint cooperation declaration with Russia

One of the regime's foundational propaganda themes:

"The strategic and tactical cooperation between the two countries is growing stronger in the journey for categorically rejecting the high-handedness, arbitrariness, hegemonic acts of the U.S. and its vassal forces," it added.

N. Korea celebrates 22nd anniv. of joint cooperation declaration with Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · July 19, 2022

SEOUL, July 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea on Tuesday marked the 22nd anniversary of a joint declaration with Russia on bilateral cooperation, casting the two countries' relations as reaching a "new strategic height."

The North's foreign ministry issued the statement on the declaration as Pyongyang has been seen closing ranks with its traditional partner despite Russia's war in Ukraine.

On July 19, 2000, then North Korean leader Kim Jong-il signed the declaration with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a summit in Pyongyang. It affirmed the development of close bilateral cooperation.

"Today, the DPRK-Russia relations are reaching on a new strategic height and entering heyday in its development," the North's foreign ministry said in an English-language post on its website. DPRK stands for the North's official name, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The strategic and tactical cooperation between the two countries is growing stronger in the journey for categorically rejecting the high-handedness, arbitrariness, hegemonic acts of the U.S. and its vassal forces," it added.

Pyongyang has recently touted the traditional ties with Russia that has faced international condemnation and isolation over its invasion of Ukraine.

Last week, the North recognized the independence of the pro-Russian breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, becoming the third country in the world to do so after Russia and Syria.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · July 19, 2022

9. 4 Ways North Korea Can Counter the F-35

I would be surprised if every one of these ways (and many others) have not already been assessed by the F-35 experts.

4 Ways North Korea Can Counter the F-35

North Korea’s air force is certainly not up to the task, so Pyongyang will look to asymmetric alternatives.

thediplomat.com · by A.B. Abrams · July 19, 2022

During the Cold War the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Air Force, the official name of North Korea’s air force, engaged in combat with U.S. naval and air force aircraft on multiple occasions. While the newly formed air arm played a relatively small role in combat preceding the 1953 Korean War armistice, it was particularly active in the 1960s when newly acquired MiG-21 fighters, operational from 1963, were put to effective use at a time of high tensions. This included shooting down a U.S. EC-121 Warning Star aircraft in 1969. North Korean-flown MiG-21s would also engage the U.S. Air Force over Vietnam, forming a large portion of the fleet defending North Vietnamese skies, and went head-to-head with the Israeli Air Force in 1967 and 1973 flying for Syria and Egypt.

Despite rapid modernization of the North Korean fighter fleet in the 1980s, as improved relations with the Soviet Union facilitated purchases of third generation MiG-23 and fourth generation MiG-29 aircraft, efforts would stall after the Soviet collapse in the 1990s and were effectively suspended in the 2000s when the U.N. Security Council placed the country under an arms embargo.

Questions regarding North Korea’s ability to defend itself against modern fighters were highlighted by the first-ever exercises between fifth-generation fighters of South Korea and the United States from July 11-14. The F-35 involved is one of just three fifth-generation fighters in production worldwide alongside the Chinese J-20 and Russian Su-57. The Russian jet is fielded in very limited numbers and still lacks many of the key technologies of its competitors, leaving the F-35 and J-20 effectively in a league of their own.

The U.S. jet’s deployment by both the United States and South Korea represents a great challenge to North Korean defenses due to its ability to carry tactical nuclear warheads and its advanced stealth capabilities, sensor fusion, electronic warfare capabilities, and access to advanced beyond visual range weapons. Official statements from Pyongyang have strongly criticized the growth of the F-35 fleet in South Korea in particular.

To confront the fast growing numbers of F-35s fielded against it, the KPA Air Force today still relies on the MiG-21 as one of its most capable fighters, albeit enhanced MiG-21BiS variants purchased through Kazakhstan, which are complemented by an estimated 60 MiG-23ML/Ps and 40 MiG-29 A/S/UBs. The size of the MiG-29 fleet remains uncertain, as the aircraft were built in North Korea under license from the 1990s. The MiG-29s in KPA service are early fourth-generation variants, and although impressive in their flight performances are still technologically approximately three decades behind the F-35, with the disadvantage of older fighter classes being even greater. The age of the fleet is compounded by issues such as a lack of airborne early warning and control aircraft, absence of modern active radar guided air-to-air missiles, and limited pilot flight time relative to the long hours pilots in adversary fleets enjoy.

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With North Korea’s own fighter fleet seeing its standing relative to its adversaries decline by the year due largely to an inability to make foreign acquisitions, the KPA been forced to adopt asymmetric measures to tackle enemy air power. Accordingly, from the late 2010s North Korea began to field a range of new domestically developed weapons. These have largely focused on tackling assets such as F-35s without needing to engage them in air-to-air combat, as KPA MiG-21s did U.S. fighters in the past. Instead, North Korea seeks to neutralize aircraft on the ground and take airfields out of commission.

The ability to asymmetrically counter the F-35 is expected to be increasingly highly prized as the nuclear-capable strike fighters come closer to becoming fully operational, and as they form a greater proportion of the U.S. and allied fleets. Such capabilities are particularly vital as North Korea and the United States have remained officially at war for over 70 years, and as Washington has on multiple occasions, including in 2016 and 2017, come close to launching large-scale air assaults on its East Asian adversary.

Below, I examine four types of assets North Korea has fielded to counter American and allied air power, and the F-35 in particular.

Rocket Artillery: The KN-25 and KN-09

Artillery has long played a key role in conflict on the Korean Peninsula, with the nature of the terrain and relatively confined distances between KPA forces and those of the U.S. and South Korea allowing such assets to have a significant impact both tactically and strategically. North Korea’s artillery forces str estimated to be among the largest in the world and, complementing the development of a range of tactical ballistic missiles, the capabilities of North Korean rocket artillery systems also improved significantly in the 2010s.

Perhaps the most notable example is the KN-09 system introduced around 2014, which boasted a world leading range of 200 kilometers, according to the South Korean Defense Ministry. That would allow the KN-09 to strike airbases and other targets across much of South Korea. The relatively small size of the Korean Peninsula and unprecedented ranges that modern rocket artillery systems can fire makes suppression of enemy air activities with artillery fire on bases a novel but potentially potent means of countering an advanced air power.

The capabilities of the KN-09 were surpassed by the longer ranged KN-25 system first unveiled in 2019, which broke the KN-09’s record with a range of over 400 km. Although more costly to fire than artillery guns, rocket artillery systems are considerably less costly than ballistic missiles and can lay down firepower in greater quantities, allowing for continued bombardment of key targets. With the KN-25 providing an unrivalled reach across much of South Korea, while its high mobility significantly increases survivability, the asset can potentially seriously complicate efforts to use airfields for fighter operations particularly for higher maintenance aircraft such as F-35s.

KN-23, KN-24 and Hwasong-8 Tactical Ballistic Missiles

North Korea from 2019 began to test a range of new ballistic missiles with capabilities decades in advance of previous models. According to a report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service, these missiles have the potential to seriously complicate U.S. military operations on the Korean Peninsula. The first to be unveiled, the KN-23, boasted an estimated 700 km range and closely resembled the Russian Iskander system, recently used extensively in Ukraine. It could similarly perform complex maneuvers and followed an irregular trajectory, which combined with its low hypersonic speed made it very difficult to intercept.

The shorter ranged KN-24, loosely resembling the U.S. MGM-140, started testing months later and appeared to be a cheaper, shorter-ranged asset capable of laying down fire in greater volumes. Both missile systems use mobile launchers and have been seen deployed from tracked launch vehicles, allowing them to operate off roads including in forests and mountainous areas where they will be particularly difficult to locate.

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A Congressional Research Service report referred to the KN-23 as an asset that “exemplifies the most notable advance” in the field of tactical weapons, with the missile observed conducting a complex “pull-up” maneuvers intended to confuse enemy air defense systems, while the KN-24 “demonstrates the guidance system and in-flight maneuverability to achieve precision strikes.”

A complementary longer-ranged tactical ballistic missile, the Hwasong-8, first flew in September 2021 and integrated a hypersonic glide vehicle, making it extremely difficult to intercept. With adversary air defense systems not expected to be capable of reliably shooting down such glide vehicles for the foreseeable future, the Hwasong-8 can potentially reliably neutralize airfields across Japan in a war’s opening stages, which would otherwise provide secondary basing options for fighter operations against North Korea.

Air Defense: Pyongae-5 and Enhanced Successor

Following the Soviet collapse, North Korea is not known to have purchased any major new long-range air defense assets, which by the 2000s had brought the security of its airspace into serious question. Despite having very long ranges and powerful sensors, Soviet built S-200 systems totally lacked mobility and were fielded in relatively limited numbers, placing a heavy burden on the even older S-75 systems.

The entry into service in 2017 of the Pyongae-5, otherwise referred to as the KN-06, changed this and provided a modern, mobile, and high-altitude long-range asset widely compared to the Russian S-300, albeit with smaller launch vehicles carrying fewer missiles. It was estimated by some sources that up to 156 transporter erector launchers for the system could be fielded by the KPA. Reliance on such systems mirrors Russia’s own approach to countering NATO and allied air forces, namely fielding air defense networks built around the S-400 to compensate for the relatively small size of its own fighter fleet.

The Pyongae-5 was surpassed in 2020 by a successor using larger launch vehicles and compared by some to the Russian S-400. A test of the system in October 2021 revealed the following results, according to state media: “The remarkable combat performance of the new-type anti-aircraft missile with features of rapid responsiveness and guidance accuracy of missile control system as well as the substantial increase in the distance of downing air targets has been verified.” The test confirmed at least one of the system’s missiles benefitted from twin rudder control and a double impulse flight engine.

These assets are thought to be able to redeploy quickly and field up-to-date sensors and electronic warfare countermeasures, which could seriously complicate F-35 operations in or near North Korean airspace. The systems are expected to gradually replace the older S-75s and S-200s in frontline roles and will be relied on heavily to compensate for the lack of modern fighter aircraft. They are complemented by a growing range of shorter-ranged defense systems, which together form a multi layered network.

HT-16PGJ and Other MANPADS

The Korean People’s Army Ground Force is thought to deploy a higher density of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) among its ground units than almost any other army in the world, with these heavily relied on to compensate for a lack of air power and counter the U.S. military’s heavy emphasis on the same. These include both Soviet-built systems such as those from the Igla and Strela series (the former of which was credited with shooting down a Russian Su-34 strike fighter over Ukraine in early March 2022) as well as more modern domestic platforms such as the HT-16PGJ.

Without radar signatures and with low susceptibility to electronic warfare, when widely integrated with infantry and armor across the country, these handheld surface-to-air missiles can pose a serious threat at low and medium altitudes. While fifth-generation fighters such as the F-35 have reduced head signatures, their improved survivability over fourth-generation jets is primarily against radar guided weapons leading infrared guidance to be widely perceived as the ideal “stealth killer.” The value of extensive use of handheld anti-aircraft weapons has perhaps best been demonstrated in the Russia-Ukraine War by the restrictions on the use of Russian air power imposed by Ukraine’s very widespread use of these assets.

thediplomat.com · by A.B. Abrams · July 19, 2022

10. Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program

We have to attack the regime's all purpose sword.

Mapping Major Milestones in the Evolution of North Korea’s Cyber Program

From 1984 to the present day, North Korea’s offensive cyber program has evolved considerably.

thediplomat.com · by Jason Bartlett · July 18, 2022

Pyongyang has been developing an offensive cyber program for over 35 years through domestic innovation and foreign assistance. During that time, North Korea has undergone major transformations in its cybercrime modus operandi, shifting from disruptive cyberattacks and cyber intrusions primarily targeting South Korean government agencies to hacking banks and cryptocurrency exchanges located both on and off the Korean Peninsula.

While there is a growing amount of research identifying past, present, and potentially future North Korean cyberattacks, there is relatively little investigation into the potential origins of the country’s cyber program. Understanding the evolution of North Korea’s offensive cyber program can provide countries like South Korea and the United States with valuable information that can help improve bilateral cybersecurity strategy, including the joint cyber-working group discussed in the May 2022 U.S.-ROK Summit with Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk Yeol.

Early Domestic Innovation and Foreign Assistance

North Korean society has been inherently linked to the military since the founding of the country in 1945. Beyond its status as an authoritarian state, all North Korean men are required to serve in the military for 10 years. As such, Pyongyang has recruited high-scoring graduates from top technology and computer science universities into the country’s military and intelligence agencies to expand its cyber capabilities and readiness. Two leading computer science universities in North Korea, Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology, share historic ties with the North Korean military and IT sector, as well as foreign exchange programs with foreign universities that have potentially contributed to the expansion of the country’s cyber program. Starting in the mid-1980s, Pyongyang established three institutions that significantly contributed to advancing the country’s offensive cyber program: Mirim College, the Pyongyang Informatics/Information Center, and the Korea Computer Center.

Mirim College (1984-86)

Publicly available information in both Korean and English indicate that Pyongyang established Mirim College between 1984 and 1986 to educate and train “cyber warriors” for the North Korean military and intelligence agencies. Similar to Soviet scientists and engineers contributing to North Korea’s military and nuclear weapons development during the Cold War, Soviet computer science professors traveled to North Korea under a bilateral cooperation agreement to teach at Mirim College. North Korean defectors familiar with Mirim College have indicated that after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korean nationals who had previously studied at Frunze Military Academy, one of most prestigious military educational institutions in the Soviet Union, began to lead computer science and hacking courses at Mirim College. From 2009 to 2020, U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Mirim College has trained roughly 1,300 hackers that are involved in various North Korean intelligence and military operations, contributing to the estimated 6,000 state-sponsored North Korean hackers involved in illicit cyber activity.

According to North Korean defector testimony, Mirim College provides several educational tracks for future state-sponsored hackers including electronic engineering, command automation, programing, technical reconnaissance, and general computer science. A previous graduate of Mirim College who defected in 2007 claimed that while he was personally trained in war game strategy focused on cyber warfare simulations, he also received intensive training in coding languages and finding exploits in common operating systems, including Linux and Windows. Although learning how to detect and exploit vulnerabilities in codes and operating systems is an intrinsic part of advanced computer science learning, North Korea began to weaponize this knowledge to create destructive and evasive malicious codes that would later target foreign agencies, institutions, and nationals.

Pyongyang Informatics/Information Center (1986 – 1991)

The Pyongyang Informatics/Information Center (PIC) has also contributed to North Korea’s cyber capabilities. First established in 1986 and later expanded in 1991 with financial and technical support from pro-North Korean sympathizers in Japan and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), PIC is a major developer of North Korean software, ranging from word processing and embedding software into web applications to creating information firewalls. In 2001, PIC successfully built a firewall system to monitor and control information flows between the global internet and the country’s insular intranet system, known as the Kwangmyong, indicating Pyongyang’s early interest in using this technology to surveil and digitally isolate its population from the outside world.

For decades, North Korea has outlawed the consumption, purchase, and distribution of foreign media, especially American, Japanese, and South Korean media, and violating this law can result in heavy fines, imprisonment, and even execution. As a result, only select members of the North Korean elite, mainly government officials, have relative access to the internet, while the remaining North Koreans with mobile phones or computers only have legal access to the Kwangmyong intranet.

In 2022, the U.S. government flagged PIC and other IT-related North Korean institutions as potential sanctions-busting organizations dispatching North Korea IT workers abroad to illicit earn currency for the regime.

This expansion in Pyongyang’s cyber capabilities to create an intranet with a functional firewall to track and block digital flows of outside information entering the country was highly significant for two main reasons: it likely contributed to North Korean developing hacking intrusion skills and to national aspirations of digital authoritarianism. In addition to blocking outside data flows, this firewall was also designed to prevent external hacking, which likely required Pyongyang to develop hacking techniques and tools to test the system’s resiliency. North Korea would later apply these capabilities to future cyberattacks on foreign targets.

Korea Computer Center (1990)

The Korea Computer Center (KCC) plays an important role in supporting North Korean IT contract workers abroad to illicitly generate currency for Pyongyang. In addition to collaborating with PIC and other state-sponsored institutions on software development projects, including the creation of the Kwangmyeong, KCC is responsible for evading global sanctions on the country that prohibit the employment of North Korean laborers abroad for illicit earning currency for Pyongyang.

KCC continued to expand during the late 1990s as former North Korean leader Kim Jong Il allegedly declared 1999 as the “Year of Science,” emphasizing the importance of software development over hardware. This was likely a reference to the country’s inability to acquire modern-day hardware technology, such as computers, due to economic sanctions and export controls. On January 27, 1999, the North Korea-state sponsored media agency the Korean Central Network Agency (KCNA) reported that the KCC has developed “comprehensive computing technology including software development and production process control using Windows 95 & NT, Mac OS 7 & 5, and others,” and “uses programming languages such as C, Visual Basic, Java, and Power Builder,” adding that it has employed around 800 people for research and development. These technological developments directly coincide with the reported hacking education offered at Mirim College, signaling a national effort to rapidly improve offensive cyber capabilities through software development.

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A year later, the KCNA publicly attributed the work of the KCC to helping advance the interest of the North Korean Communist Party in an article commemorating the 10th anniversary of the KCC. In 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury would designate the KCC pursuant to the DPRK3 sanctions program, specific for illicit cyber activities, for circumventing U.S. and U.N. sanctions on behalf of Pyongyang through offering IT services abroad in countries including China, Syria, India, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates. This discovery ultimately revealed the role of KCC in procuring foreign currency for Pyongyang through offering overseas IT work services in clear violations of U.S. and U.N. economic sanctions.

The Sunshine Policy (Late 1990s to Early 2000s)

The Sunshine Policy marked unprecedented levels of engagement and cooperative efforts between North and South Korea, including academic and technical exchanges regarding information and communications technology (ICT) and computer science. From 1998 to 2008, South Korea abandoned its former defensive approach to Pyongyang and pursued “flexible reciprocity,” meaning that Seoul would offer economic and political concessions without North Korea having to meet any specific conditions in the hopes of eventual behavioral change.

Although the policy was ultimately a failure, as North Korea resumed its nuclear weapons development program in secret, both South Korea and the United States did achieve superficial diplomatic victories with North Korea. Examples include the 2000-inter-Korean summit between then-South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and then-Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il, and the 2003 Six-Party Talks featuring prominent political leaders from North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States discussing possible ways to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. However, Pyongyang’s inability to resist exploiting the good faith of other nations led to its secret development of enriched uranium while the South Korean government and private companies provided billion of U.S. dollars’ worth of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Under new presidential leadership in 2010, the South Korean Ministry of Unification (MOU) noted the failure of the Sunshine Policy, citing its inability to change North Korean aggression and aspirations to further develop ballistic and nuclear weapons.

The Sunshine Policy included numerous educational and technical exchanges between North and South Korea. In 2003, leading South Korean computer scientists and IT professors traveled to Pyongyang to offer ICT-related training and coursework to North Korean graduate students at universities such as Kim Chaek University and Kim Il Sung University, which are affiliated with the now-sanctioned KCC and civil-military fusion efforts. While Seoul’s intent was to marry “South Korea’s outstanding IT expertise with North Korea’s remarkable labor force to share and develop cutting-edge technology together,” the sheer level of illicit cyber operations conducted against South Korean cyber infrastructure and technology just several years after these educational exchanges occurred indicates the need for further research into the actual applications of the knowledge obtained during this period.

In addition to economic and humanitarian aid, other foreign institutions, including U.S. universities, provided technical support and training to North Korean students. Starting in 2002, U.S. university professors and North Korean computer science scholars engaged in more than 10 joint training programs in both New York and Pyongyang. This was the first, and only, official educational partnership between a U.S. and North Korean university. Participants from Syracuse University and the Kim Chaek University of Technology, as well as the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the United Nations, published a joint report outlining the goals and outcomes of the partnership, including training on computer language tools and developing the first digital library in North Korea at Kim Chaek University.

Although the lessons allegedly comprised of all open-source data material, the report mentioned interaction with PIC, which raises concerns over the potential misuse of information in subsequent years. Data that is publicly available to the world outside of North Korea cannot be equated to the restricted access to data inside North Korea during the early 2000s. As North Korea has now become a major cyber adversary to the United States, South Korea, and many other nations, any previous exchange of information or technology that could have supported Pyongyang’s early development of offensive cyber capabilities requires warrants further investigation.

Continued Academic and Technical Support From Beijing and Moscow

Beijing has directly supported Pyongyang’s illicit cyber operations through blatantly evading sanctions on behalf of North Korea. During the 2000s, North Korean cyber operatives reportedly used hotels in northeast China, such as the Chilbosan Hotel, to illicitly earn funds for Pyongyang through providing IT-services to foreign customers. During this time, North Korean actors also conducted overseas cyber operations using Chinese internet service providers while Pyongyang was expanding its domestic capabilities.

This trend has continued into the modern day as Pyongyang has sent North Korean hackers abroad to China to moonlight as IT workers or other professions at Chinese-North Korean front companies while conducting state-sponsored illicit cyber activities. The most famous example would be Park Jin Hyok, a North Korean cyber operative affiliated with the Lazarus Group, a leading North Korea-state sponsored hacking agency under the direction of the country’s primary intelligence service, the Reconnaissance General Bureau. The FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice have attributed several destructive and disruptive North Korean cyber operations to Park over the years, like the 2014 Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, the 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist, and the 2017 WannaCry 2.0 ransomware attack. Both the U.S. government and the U.N. have claimed that China and Russia continue to employ North Korean laborers in violation of international sanctions, including the hiring of North Korean IT workers who illicitly procure funds for the regime and could also contribute to offensive cyber operations like Park.

Beijing has also continued to pursue academic partnerships related to computer science and technology with North Korean universities. Dating back to 1988, Chinese universities like the Harbin Institute of Technology have maintained and renewed official exchange agreements with leading computer science universities in North Korea, including with Kim Chaek University of Technology and Kim Il Sung University in 2013. Moscow and Beijing have also provided industrial support to North Korea. Over the years, Chinese and Russian telecommunication companies as well as those from Thailand and Egypt have provided internet connection lines and service providers to North Korea. For example in 2017, Russian telecommunications company TransTeleCom and China’s Unicom handled roughly 60 and 40 percent of North Korea’s internet traffic, respectively. As a result, telecommunication assistance from foreign countries has likely expanded North Korea’s offensive cyber capabilities, which it continues to leverage within its illicit cyber operations targeting South Korea, Japan, the United States, and other countries.

Modern Day

Following the collapse of the Sunshine Policy in the late 2000s, Pyongyang began to launch disruptive and destructive cyberattacks against South Korean government agencies, websites, and military infrastructure. Despite its status as a pariah state, North Korea is acutely aware of growing trends within the global financial system and is identifying creative ways to evade economic sanctions. The expansion of U.S. and U.N. sanctions on North Korea during the mid-2010s coinciding with the rising popularity of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency coins, likely contributing to Pyongyang’s shift toward targeting financial institutions, including banks and cryptocurrency exchanges. Since 2016, North Korea has successfully implemented a range of cyber intrusion and currency extortion tactics specifically effective against financial institutions, including spear phishing campaigns laced with malware like ransomware, bank drops, and denial of service (DDoS), and supply chain attacks.

Current North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has transformed North Korea into the greatest state-sponsored cyber threat to the global financial services sector. While Kim has been unsuccessful in securing U.S. and U.N. sanctions relief, his hackers have been able to procure more than $1 billion worth of stolen cryptocurrency for Pyongyang from 2021 to June 2022. In order for Seoul and Washington to craft an effective, long-lasting cybersecurity strategy against this major financial threat, both national governments need to have a deeper understanding of the origins and facilitators of North Korean illicit cyber activity.

thediplomat.com · by Jason Bartlett · July 18, 2022

11. Yoon gov't to push for launch of N.K. human rights foundation

This is a very positive development. We had dinner last night with a former government official who described the potential for the organization. It seems the Yoon administration is really going to take a human rights upfront approach.

We also learned yesterday when we visited National Assemblyman Ji Seong Ho that the Yoon administration appointed a new Human Rights ambassador for north Korea. Like the US, Korea has not had one since 2017. Neither the Trump administration nor the Biden administration has complied with US law to appoint a US ambassador for north Korean human rights. Now that Korea has appointed theirs I hope we will do the same. My nomination remains Greg Scarlatoiu, the Executive Director of the US Committee for Human Right in North Korea (HRNK) and a great American. There is no one more qualified: a fluent Korean Speaker, well known in the north Korea escapee community and at the UN and throughout Europe for his extensive human rights work, educated at the graduate level in Korea and the US. And of course he knows what living under a totalitarian regime is like having survived under the communist dictatorship in Romania. The Biden administration would do well appointing him as the US Ambassador human rights.

Yoon gov't to push for launch of N.K. human rights foundation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · July 19, 2022

SEOUL, July 19 (Yonhap) -- The government of President Yoon Suk-yeol will actively push for the launch of a North Korean human rights foundation in line with the law, the presidential spokesperson said Tuesday.

The North Korean Human Rights Foundation was meant to be established to help enact the North Korean Human Rights Act that passed through the National Assembly in 2016, Kang In-sun told reporters.

"It hasn't been able to launch as the previous administration showed a passive attitude and the National Assembly did not recommend members of the foundation's board," Kang said. "The Yoon government plans to actively push for the launch of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation."

Last week, senior presidential secretary for political affairs Lee Jin-bok met with the acting chief of the ruling People Power Party and asked for his cooperation in quickly launching the foundation.

"The North Korean Human Rights Act is becoming a law in name only and the international community is continuing to raise an issue about it," Kang said, adding the Yoon administration plans to strongly urge the ruling and opposition parties to recommend board members as soon as they reach an agreement on the formation of parliamentary committees.

"If necessary, we're considering appointing the government's share of personnel first," she said.

Yoon approved the appointment of Lee Shin-hwa, a political science professor at Korea University, as the new envoy for North Korean human rights at a Cabinet meeting earlier in the day, filling a post that has been left vacant since September 2017.

"We believe this is a clear demonstration of the Yoon Suk-yeol government's will to take a leading role in improving North Korea's human rights situation in cooperation with the international community," Kang said.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · July 19, 2022

12. Lingering tensions in Panmunjom underline uncertainties in inter-Korean ties

Lingering tensions in Panmunjom underline uncertainties in inter-Korean ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 19, 2022

By Yi Wonju

PAJU/SEOUL, July 19 (Joint Press Corps-Yonhap) -- About four years ago, the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom was brimming with renewed hopes for peace, as a rare summit between the two Koreas took place there, diluting its image of cross-border tension, albeit temporarily.

But such hopes appeared to be fading amid COVID-19 and uncertainties in inter-Korean ties, as reporters on Tuesday's media tour saw North Korean troops wary of cross-border contact and unruly weeds seeming like a sign of Seoul's hitherto unfruitful peace endeavors.

Reporters were invited to Panmunjom and other parts of the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas, as public tours there resumed after a six-month hiatus on eased COVID-19 restrictions.

Panmunjom was a highlight of the media event, as it was where then South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held their first summit in April 2018 and where they joined then U.S. President Donald Trump for a historic three-way encounter in June 2019.

The mood of peace at the site was hardly felt, as the North has staged a series of provocative acts, like missile launches, this year, with current South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol taking a tough stance on its saber-rattling.

Unlike in the past when the prying eyes of North Korean troops kept track of people south of the Military Demarcation Line, none were seen outdoors, a change since the outbreak of the pandemic, according to Lt. Col Griff Hofman, an International Political and Military Affairs Officer at the U.N. Command (UNC).

If necessary, North Korean troops come out, wearing full protective clothing, he said.

For over two years, North Korean personnel were only spotted looking out from the balcony of Panmungak, a North Korea-controlled building, taking pictures, or watching the South Korean side of Panmunjom through binoculars.

Overgrown plants and grass on the North's side, largely kept well-trimmed before the pandemic, also indicated they have been keeping the area unattended -- a reminder of inter-Korean ties that have been stalled for years amid a deadlock in nuclear talks between Washington and Pyongyang.

Before reaching the Panmunjom area, reporters stopped by a guard post, from which the indistinct sight of Kaesong, the North's border village, came into view.

That sight marked yet another sobering reminder of where inter-Korean relations lie at this point.

The inter-Korean industrial complex there, once a key symbol of bilateral rapprochement, was suspended in February 2016. Kaesong is also home to a joint liaison office that the North blew up in 2020 in anger over the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets across the border

During the tour, another sight that caught reporters' attention was the ongoing reconstruction of a bridge used as a venue for talks between Moon and Kim during their 2018 summit there.

The bridge was originally established to connect the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission camp -- an entity to preserve the armistice that halted the 1950-53 Korean War -- to Conference Row in the Joint Security Area (JSA).

But ahead of the inter-Korean summit in April 2018, a T-section was added there to enable the outdoor conversation between the two.

Reporters also paid keen attention to the border line, through which South Korean authorities forcibly repatriated two North Korean fishermen against their will in November 2019.

The repatriation is now at the center of a political controversy as the Yoon administration revisited it amid criticism the Moon administration failed to go through due legal procedures for the protection of the North Koreans, though they were suspects in a murder case.

The UNC did not mention the case during the tour as reporters approached the blue T2 building, near which the repatriation took place, as seen in video footage recently released by the unification ministry.

The JSA is an area that is intended for inter-Korean dialogue but is also a place where the risk of danger always exists, Hofman told reporters, as the tour came to an end.

Tours to the program will be held daily at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday, with up to 40 people per tour.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 19, 2022

13. New envoy for North Korean rights announced by Foreign Ministry

Good news.

Tuesday

July 19, 2022

New envoy for North Korean rights announced by Foreign Ministry

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/07/19/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-human-rights/20220719153522126.html

Lee Shin-hwa [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

Lee Shin-hwa will be the new envoy for North Korean human rights, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Tuesday. The position has been left vacant for five years during the Moon Jae-in administration.

Lee, currently a professor of political science at Korea University, will fill the post of the nation's human rights envoy and will be in charge of international cooperation for the promotion of human rights in North Korea.

Lee has written extensively on North Korea and international cooperation, and has previously served as a special advisor to former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Rwandan Independent Inquiry, chair’s advisor of the East Asian Vision Group, and was an Advisory Group member of Peacebuilding Fund.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it will continue to cooperate with the international community to improve the human rights of and humanitarian situation in North Korea.

The North Korean Human Rights Act, which came into effect in 2016, states that the South Korean government may appoint a North Korean human rights ambassador to promote human rights in North Korea.

Previously, Lee Jung-hoon, professor of international studies at Yonsei University, was appointed as the first North Korean human rights envoy in September 2016 and served for one year. The position has since been left vacant.

The exact date of when Lee will start her duties has not yet been disclosed.

BY LIM JEONG-WON [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]

14. Betting all on Biden isn’t wise

Administrations come and go. Is Korea betting on Biden or betting on the Alliance? I think the latter, which must be the case for the long term security of the ROK.

Tuesday

July 19, 2022

Betting all on Biden isn’t wise

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/07/19/opinion/columns/Yoon-Sukyeol-Biden-Trump/20220719194505768.html

Nam Jeong-ho

The author is a columnist of the JoongAng Ilbo.

What is the worst security threats facing the Yoon Suk-yeol administration? Many say North Korea’s miniaturization of nuclear weapons and Japan’s reviving militarism. But the biggest security risk — although the public has not paid great attention to this matter yet — will be the downfall of U.S. President Joe Biden and resurgence of his predecessor, Donald Trump.

President Yoon’s security policy is based on a strong Korea-U.S. alliance. His first national security pledge was restoring the Korea-U.S. combined defense posture and a strengthening of extended deterrence against North Korean nuclear weapons. Naturally, that was the focus of Yoon’s summit with Biden in May. Therefore, experts in Seoul and Washington are busy devising plans to bolster the alliance, particularly a strengthening of the extended deterrence. Among the suggestions are Korea’s participation in the United States drawing up its nuclear operation plan; activation of consultation group to bolster extended deterrence; and advanced installation of infrastructure to deploy tactical nuclear weapons.

Of course, distrust exists about extended deterrence. Feelings of insecurity have grown after observers said that the North’s imminent nuclear test — the seventh of its kind — will relate to the miniaturization of its nuclear bombs. There is a risk that North Korea will use tactical nuclear weapons against the South Korea while threatening America to use its intercontinental ballistic missiles to attack the U.S. mainland. That is if Kim Jong-un makes a misjudgment that he will still be able to avoid the destruction of his regime.

Joseph Nye, a renowned political scientist, said that the existence of 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea guarantees the reliability of extended deterrence. If North Korea uses tactical nukes in South Korea, many Americans will be sacrificed and the U.S. will destroy North Korea, so the North won’t use this option, he said. It is very clear logic. But it has a critical flaw. He is saying South Korea should not worry about the U.S. Forces Korea. But what will happen if the troops are no longer here?

Trump, during his term, demanded more money from South Korea to keep the U.S. troops here. He threatened to withdraw the troops unless Seoul paid more. He also demanded that Seoul pay for the expenses of deploying bombers to the Korean Peninsula. After Biden took office early last year, many Koreans welcomed him, with an expectation that his gentlemanly attitude and respect for an ally would help Korea-U.S. relations be better.

Biden pleased the Korean people by prompting stronger Korea-U.S. relations. And the Yoon administration responded by participating in Biden’s policy of containing China. The Korean business community supported the policy by making massive investments in America. Relations between the two countries have rarely been as good as these days.

But Biden’s popularity is taking, and it seems impossible for him to get reelected in two years. By imposing premature sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine, Biden caused global oil prices to skyrocket. As a result, prices in the U.S. soared over 9 percent, causing the worst inflation ever. His approval rating plunged to the low 30 percent level. If things stay this way, there is no way for Biden to win a second term.

In contrast, the chances are not slim for Trump to win the next election. According to a recent New York Time’s poll on the support ratings of the Republican presidential candidates, Trump scored 49 percent, nearly double the support rate of 25 percent scored by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, who was ranked second.

Furthermore, the Federal Reserve is pushing interest rates higher to fight inflation. If economic recession continues until the 2024 presidential election, the Democratic Party will lose.

What will happen if Trump takes office again? Based on his previous remarks, he will likely try to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea and weaken the extended deterrence. Even if someone other than Trump comes to power, it is difficult to say for sure that he or she will fully support the extended deterrence strategy like Biden.

So the Yoon administration should not go all-in with the Biden administration, which could disappear in two years. It will be wise to take into account the possibility that Trump may take office again. National security shaken by who becomes president of the U.S. is not desirable. That is why we must think about various ways to accomplish true self-defense, including nuclear development on our own.

15. Is South Korean Nuclear Proliferation Inevitable?

After our meeting with a former government official last evening I am becoming more and more convinced that South Korea will go nuclear for many reasons.

Is South Korean Nuclear Proliferation Inevitable?

Seoul’s nuclearization is only a matter of when. The alliance should be ready to adopt this new idea before it is too late

The National Interest · by Daehan Lee · July 18, 2022

North Korea abandoned its previously pledged moratorium on nuclear tests or long-range missile launches this year, even announcing a nuclear first-use doctrine, implying its nuclear arsenal is for offensive purposes against Washington and Seoul. As North Korea now clarifies that its nuclear weapons are not explicitly defense weapons, five things have become very clear. First, North Korea is capable of nuclear strikes. Second, the Kim Jong-un regime will never be willing to denuclearize. Third, South Korean liberals’ appeasement policies, which benchmarked the Sunshine Policy, have failed. Fourth, the Korean Peninsula is facing its worst security crisis in decades. And finally, a nuclear arsenal is a cost-efficient deterrent that overwhelms other weapon systems.

If this regional security trend continues, the most important and highly likely possibilities are that Pyongyang, a nuclear-armed regime that is not internationally recognized as a nuclear power, will continue to ignore non-nuclear South Korea and that Seoul will suffer if it operates under the false hope that it will be protected by U.S. extended deterrence. Even though South Korea has become one of the leading economic and military powers, the country cannot escape from worsening inter-Korean relations as long as it pursues the unrealistic goal of having military superiority over a nuclear-armed regime.

South Korea has been developing three offensive and defensive strategies: Kill Chain for preemptive strikes; Korean Air Missile Defense (KAMD) for ballistic missile interception; and Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) for the elimination of the North Korean leadership. All of these strategies were mentioned by newly-elected President Suk-yeol Yoon, who believes those three systems under his new Strategic Command would overwhelm Kim’s nuclear-tipped missiles. Given its neighbor’s increasing military power, however, Seoul’s strategic focus on conventional forces is neither desirable nor cost-efficient to deter North Korea and China, especially as Pyongyang is expected to forward-deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the near future. It is reasonable to doubt whether sticking to conventional weapons to protect itself from nuclear missiles serves Seoul’s best security interests.

In case of a security crisis, North Korea would be strongly tempted to use nuclear weapons in order to compromise Seoul’s superiority in conventional firepower. Of course, U.S. forces will retaliate in return, as agreed on in the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, but it runs the risk of being trapped by the classic principle of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Pyongyang could hold the U.S. mainland and Americans hostage by threatening to strike U.S. population centers, leading to a chaotic outcome on the Korean Peninsula. Facing the enemy’s nuclear arsenal right above its head, conventionally-armed Seoul will be left with no options if the United States decides not to uphold its nuclear guarantees due to the expected damage from such threats or for political reasons.

Many South Koreans do not believe that Washington is willing to sacrifice innocent Americans as a cost of waging a war with far away North Korea. These were the very doubts the United Kingdom and France had before they went nuclear themselves. More importantly, the United States never created an equivalent of the nuclear planning group that Washington provides for NATO’s nuclear sharing strategy against Russia, only providing its East Asian allies with the show of power through its strategic assets.

It is quite normal that allies are not able to have full trust in the nuclear umbrella that they have never seen unfolded in war. This is the focal point with which non-nuclear-armed allies have had fundamental questions. America’s willingness to actively engage in intertwined Korean security affairs has gradually weakened since it withdrew tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula in 1991, now providing South Korea and Japan with conventional weapons and missile defense systems like bombers and aircraft carriers as guaranteed extended deterrence. Notwithstanding such a show of power, the North Korean regime did not even flinch. Pyongyang dauntlessly chose to expedite its nuclearization, delivering a message that extended deterrence is not as effective as we expected.

Taking a firm stand against Kim Jong-un’s nuclear threat requires flawless dependence on the alliance’s nuclear umbrella, but the concerns and doubts about U.S. extended deterrence have not been addressed, especially now that North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) could now reach the U.S. mainland.

China and Russia are not reliable enough to expect meaningful change from them, as they acquiesced to the North Korean nuclear problem and do not have a red line regarding Kim’s nuclear arsenal. It can be said that they are one step away from acknowledging North Korea as a de facto nuclear state—having given several green lights to nuclear tests and ICBM launches—because they perceive North Korea as a buffer zone to check the United States in the region.

The worst is that the two nuclear powers might grant immunity to Pyongyang's reportedly upcoming seventh nuclear test. Amidst the clash between the United States and the China-Russia bloc, Beijing and Moscow are predicted to veto any UN Security Council resolution to sanction North Korea. Importantly, China believes the time to dissuade North Korean nuclearization through military means has already passed. In this case, the long-standing non-proliferation principle of Washington would become less convincing, and the U.S. government would rather feel more need to arm its East Asian allies with nuclear weapons.

In the end, there is no choice but to face nuclear bombs with something equivalent. Kim’s family in Pyongyang has already given South Korea such justifications. Ironically, the inter-Korean nuclear balance collapsed after the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula fell apart. That year, the United States withdrew all tactical nuclear weapons from South Korean territory, just as Pyongyang started its nuclear program. Since then, Kim Jong-un has resumed nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. As North Korea violated all articles of the Inter-Korean Agreements of 1991 and the Joint Declaration, the denuclearization principle of the Korean Peninsula has already become an obsolete echo. The dead statement is no longer alive just because only one side respects it. South Korea and the United States should point out that North Korea completely broke it, and its program is no longer reversible. This will consolidate South Korea’s position to prepare for its own nuclear security strategy.

Unlike the point of view that South Korea will follow the precedent of sanctioned North Korea if it chooses to develop nuclear weapons, the two Koreas are totally different cases, as Seoul’s nuclear armament would be ignited by the possibility of nuclear use by North Korea. South Korea is under the imminent threat of Pyongyang’s atomic bombs, which have been illegally developed. As an exemplary country that has fully respected the international non-proliferation regime, therefore, South Korea should naturally have a right to protect itself and its American ally from northern threats.

It is not an issue for South Korea to leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as the treaty gives members the right to withdraw if they decide extraordinary events have jeopardized their supreme interests. North Korea’s illegal nuclear acquisition and threats to its neighboring states obviously fall under the defined “extraordinary events,” thus supporting the interpretation that Seoul’s nuclear program would be a rational and proportional response for the protection of its core security interests.

All members of the eastern bloc (Russia, China, and North Korea) possess nuclear arsenals, but the United States is the only nuclear-armed state in the Western bloc of East Asia. South Korea’s nuclearization will contribute to the balance of this uneven playground. Otherwise, the imbalance of nuclear forces will lead to the failure of U.S. Asian security policy, as both Pyongyang and Beijing enhance their nuclear capabilities without pause while Asian allies that only rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella refrain from going nuclear.

Washington should move forward together with Seoul to pursue regional strategic stability and prevent the worst scenario through South Korea’s nuclear armament. The White House does not seem to be ignorant of this, and there will be an inevitable situation where the United States will have to propose nuclear development to allied states in Asia. If Seoul chooses to accept the proposal, the United States should back it up by focusing on the Chinese and North Korean nuclear programs. As arguments for the necessity of allies acquiring nuclear bombs gain traction in the United States, South Korea’s nuclearization would be more indispensable for American interests.

It will still be difficult to find the political determination and persuade the United States, but the option of going nuclear is easier than the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and the majority of Korean citizens are favorable to such a national initiative. A Chicago Council on Global Affairs public opinion poll released this year shows that 71 percent of Korean citizens favor acquiring independent nuclear weapons.

Despite this public support for nuclear armament, the North’s leadership looks down on Seoul by taking advantage of its nuclear weapons and the acquired connivance of China and Russia, well aware that South Korea is not firmly determined to acquire the United States’ approval for nuclearization. Both the United States and South Korea should understand that extended deterrence is merely a stopgap measure at this moment and that it could have been effective only if North Korea had not initiated a nuclear program or it remained in the early stages.

The United States needs to reconsider its general nuclear policy towards key allies from the view of security interests, not just from political and non-proliferation perspectives. The eastern bloc recognizes the influence of the United States in Northeast Asia, not to mention East Asian U.S. allies’ recognition of the strategic importance of the U.S. presence. Thus, there is no need for the White House to be wary of its regional influence diminishing after nuclearization; officials should rather closely discuss how to protect common security interests.

Seoul’s nuclearization overlaps with America’s strategic interests in managing North Korean risks and deterring China. The rise of South Korea as a forefront nuclear-armed power, possibly followed by Japan, would drive China to the corner, forcing Xi Jinping to act on Pyongyang’s nukes. It is China that would be afraid of this situation most. As long as Seoul’s atomic bombs are expected to meet the future needs of American Indo-Pacific strategy, the White House would propose or accept it.

A South Korean nuclear program can bring a change to regional dynamics. A close neighbor’s new nuclear arsenal will lead Pyongyang to believe that the United States is a lower security threat, making the U.S. mainland safer. It is also possible that the nuclear balance of terror might result in an inter-Korean moratorium and nuclear arms control talks to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons, as we observed during the Cold War.

Multipolarity limits a single state’s ability to respond to a coalition of a few nuclear-armed challengers against the established order. That is why support from friendly nuclear states in each region is necessary more than ever, just like the United Kingdom, Israel, and India respectively contribute to Washington’s regional influence. Northeast Asia still doesn’t have weapons yet, but it would be wise to pave the way for key allies to do the same for the common goal of deterring China and North Korea. This will also upgrade the bond of solidarity between key alliances.

Alliances are maintained by reciprocal interests. A nuclearized South Korea would serve Washington’s Indo-Pacific policy, countering both China and North Korea as a responsible linchpin ally and sharing the burden in East Asia.

It is time for Washington and Seoul to break away from the delusion that they can curb North Korea’s nuclear program or deter the rise of the Chinese military with allies’ conventional arms. The question that Charles de Gaulle raised about the United States’ willingness to risk New York for Paris is still alive and more valid in Northeast Asia than anywhere else. Seoul’s nuclearization is only a matter of when. The alliance should be ready to adopt this new idea before it is too late.

Daehan Lee is a political and security affairs researcher regularly writing for Defense News and Naval News. He previously worked for the U.S. and Belgian embassies in Seoul, the People Power Party, and election camps. Lee also served as a translator for the Republic of Korea Navy. His interests are Asia-Pacific security, (non)proliferation, defense acquisition, South Korean politics, and foreign policy.

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Daehan Lee · July 18, 2022

16. North Korean labour could be sent to rebuild Donbas, Russian ambassador says

I am sure they will be able to build some great statues of Kim and Putin as well as some skyscrapers where the elevators and water cannot reach the top floors.

North Korean labour could be sent to rebuild Donbas, Russian ambassador says

Alexander Matsegora tells Russian newspaper there are ‘a lot of opportunities’ for economic cooperation, despite UN sanctions

The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · July 19, 2022

North Korea could send workers to two Russian-controlled territories in eastern Ukraine, according to Russia’s ambassador in Pyongyang – a move that would pose a challenge to international sanctions against the North’s nuclear weapons programme.

According to NK News, a Seoul-based website, ambassador Alexander Matsegora said North Korean workers could help rebuild the war-shattered infrastructure in the self-proclaimed people’s republics in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Matsegora said there were potentially “a lot of opportunities” for economic cooperation between the North and the self-proclaimed republics in Ukraine’s Donbas region, despite UN sanctions.

‘They have come to destroy us’: Ukrainians on the frontline in Donbas

He told the Russian newspaper Izvestia in an interview, according to NK News, that “highly qualified and hard-working Korean builders, who are capable of working in the most difficult conditions, could help us restore our social, infrastructure and industrial facilities”.

His comments come days after North Korea became one of only a few countries to recognise the two territories, accusing the Ukrainian government of being part of Washington’s “hostile” stance towards Pyongyang.

The North’s foreign ministry said: “Ukraine has no the right to raise issue or dispute our legitimate exercise of sovereignty after committing an act that severely lacks fairness and justice between nations by actively joining the US unjust and illegal hostile policy in the past.”

In response, a furious Ukraine cut off diplomatic ties with North Korea and accused it of undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Ukrainian foreign minster, Dmytro Kuleba, said Russia’s appeal to North Korea for support showed that Moscow had “no more allies in the world, except for countries that depend on it financially and politically”.

Ukraine had already suspended its political and economic contact with North Korea as part of UN-led sanctions aimed at pressuring Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

North Korea has traditionally earned much-needed foreign currency by sending its citizens to work overseas. Under UN-sanctions they were supposed to have been repatriated by the end of 2019, but significant numbers of North Korean labourers have reportedly continued to work in Russia and China, as well as in Laos and Vietnam, after the deadline.

Matsegora left open the possibility for another showdown with the UN over sanctions after he suggested that North Korean factories and power stations built during the Soviet era could use equipment built in the Donbas region, where Moscow-backed forces have been fighting Ukraine since 2014.

This would contravene a UN ban, imposed in late 2017, on North Korea acquiring industrial machinery, electronic equipment and other items.

Matsegora acknowledged that sanctions could frustrate attempts to establish a trade link between the republics and North Korea, but said economic ties were “absolutely justified”, NK News said.

Go Myong-hyun, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, was quoted by NK News as saying that economic cooperation would confirm that Russia – a permanent member of the UN security council that has imposed sanctions on the North – had become a rogue state.

“Once Russia violates the very sanctions it had authorised, the security council would be critically undermined,” Go said.

The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · July 19, 2022

17. US Disrupts North Korea Ransomware Group, Recovers Nearly Half a Million in Payments

US Disrupts North Korea Ransomware Group, Recovers Nearly Half a Million in Payments

voanews.com

East Asia

July 19, 2022 2:54 PM

Masood Farivar

Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco said July 19, 2022, that FBI and Justice Department recently disrupted the activities of a hacking group sponsored by the North Korean government and that targeted U.S. hospitals with ransomware.

US Disrupts North Korea Ransomware Group, Recovers Nearly Half a Million in Payments

U.S. law enforcement authorities have disrupted a group of North Korean hackers, recovering nearly half a million dollars in ransom payments it received from a Kansas hospital, a Colorado health care provider and other victims, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco said on Tuesday.

Using a previously unknown type of malware known as “Maui,” the North Korea state-sponsored cybercriminals encrypted the Kansas hospital’s servers in May 2021, demanding ransom in exchange for regaining access to its critical computer networks, Monaco said at a cybersecurity conference in New York

“In that moment, the hospital’s leadership faced an impossible choice: Give in to the ransom demand or cripple the ability of doctors and nurses to provide critical care,” Monaco said, without revealing the hospital’s name.

To regain the use of its computers and equipment, the hospital paid $100,000 in Bitcoins but also alerted the FBI, allowing federal investigators to trace the payment throughout the cryptocurrency ledger known as blockchain and identifying China-based money launderers that helped North Korean cybercriminals “cash out” ransom payments.

Through its investigation, the FBI then found the Colorado hospital had paid $120,000 in Bitcoins into one of the North Korean group's seized cryptocurrency accounts after being hacked by the hackers.

Monaco said the Justice Department is returning the stolen funds to the victims. The operation took place several weeks ago, she said.

The disclosure came after the FBI, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Treasury Department cautioned U.S. medical providers about the Maui ransomware earlier this month, warning victims that paying ransom would violate U.S. sanctions against North Korea.

Monaco praised the hospital for alerting the FBI.

“What flowed from that virtuous decision was the recovery of their ransom payment, the recovery of ransoms paid by previously unknown victims, (and) the identification of a previously unidentified ransomware strain,” she said.

In a ransomware attack, hackers lock a company’s data, offering keys to unlock the files in exchange for a large sum of money.

In recent years, ransomware attacks have grown in frequency, with cybercriminals attacking schools, hospitals and local governments, among other victims.

To combat the growing threat, the Justice Department last year launched the Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force and the National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team.

The FBI has long encouraged victims of ransomware to alert authorities instead of caving into cybercriminals’ demands. But a recent survey found that nearly half of organizations targeted in a ransomware attack last year made a payment to regain their data.

Even so, reporting a ransomware attack allows the FBI the opportunity to recover funds.

Last year after Colonial Pipeline paid hackers $4.4 million to regain access to critical data following a ransomware attack, the FBI recovered almost half of the payment.

voanews.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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Editor, Small Wars Journal

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