Quotes of the Day:
“When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.”
- Sun Tzu, The Art of War
“The American generals could only think in terms of large armies and huge battles. They believed or hoped that an enemy who chose to hide in jungles and tunnels would quickly be flushed out by American fire-power and then die in open battle.”
- Michael G. Kramer, A Gracious Enemy
“Most of my time is spent in doing as well as I can the work immediately at hand. One hopes that by doing quietly and without parade as solid work as one can when one is occupied, one makes the best contribution possible to one's state.”
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 26 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Paralysis in Moscow: Why Putin persists with established strategy, accepting test of endurance
3. Russia’s “Demonstration Army” Is a Red Flag for U.S. Security Force Assistance
4. Obese Russian general, 67, called up to fight in Ukraine as Putin 'scrapes the barrel'
5. Russia will soon exhaust its combat capabilities, Western assessments predict
6. U.S. Special Forces and CIA Working to Get Ukraine Weapons
7. U.S. Reverses East Asia Withdrawal Plan (from the archives in 1995)
8. Putin's Next Ukraine Disaster: The Russian Army Is Running Out of Ammo
9. Concerns that India is ‘back door’ into Europe for Russian oil
10. Putin's Inner Circle Plotting Coup, Former CIA Official Says: 'It'll Happen All Of A Sudden And He'll Be Dead'
11. Russia's 'Shadow Mobilization' Accelerates With New Ethnic Units From The North Caucasus
12. U.S. Foreign Policy Restraint Doesn't Mean Dumping Ukraine
13. Amid deepening divisions, US no longer seen as beacon of light around the world
14. How drones will transform battlefield medicine – and save lives
15. Five things to watch for at this week’s NATO meeting
16. The Other Big Lessons That the U.S. Army Should Learn From Ukraine
17. Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine by Andrew Milburn
18. Ukraine has the HIMARS and is putting them to use
19. G-7 leaders to commit to Ukraine, US sending anti-air system
20. Here is what foreign-policy experts are discussing ahead of the G7 meeting.
21. G-7 leaders confer with Zelenskyy, prep new aid for Ukraine
22. Japan Is Getting Real on Security After Ukraine
23. Is US playing chicken with China in Taiwan Strait?
24. US steps up airfield construction on Tinian
1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 26 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JUNE 26
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mason Clark, and Grace Mappes
June 26, 4:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted a massive missile strike against the Schevchenkivskyi district of Kyiv on June 26, likely to coincide with the ongoing summit of G7 leaders.[1] This is the first such major strike on Kyiv since late April and is likely a direct response to Western leaders discussing aid to Ukraine at the ongoing G7 summit, much like the previous strikes on April 29 during UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ visit to Kyiv.[2] Ukrainian government sources reported that Russian forces targeted infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi district using X101 missiles fired from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers over the Caspian Sea and noted the Russian attack was an attempt to “show off” their capabilities.[3] Open-source Twitter account GeoConfirmed stated that the strikes targeted the general vicinity of the Artem State Joint-Stock Holding Company, a manufacturer of air-to-air missiles, automated air-guided missile training and maintenance systems, anti-tank guided missiles, and aircraft equipment.[4] GeoConfirmed noted that Russian forces likely fired the missiles from the maximum possible range, which would have interfered with GPS and radar correlation and resulted in the strike hitting civilian infrastructure, and additionally hypothesized some of the missiles may have been fired from Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.[5] Russian forces likely targeted the Artem Plant as a means of posturing against Western military aid to Ukraine during the G7 summit and inflicted additional secondary damage to residential infrastructure.[6]
The Kremlin continues to manipulate Russian legislation to carry out “covert mobilization” to support operations in Ukraine without conducting full mobilization. The Russian State Duma announced plans to review an amendment to the law on military service on June 28 that would allow military officials to offer contracts to young men immediately upon “coming of age” or graduating high school, thus circumventing the need to complete military service as conscripts.[7] Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 25 that the Kremlin is carrying out “covert mobilization” and that due to continuous Russian mobilization efforts, Ukrainian forces cannot wait for the Russians to exhaust their offensive potential before launching counteroffensives.[8] Budanov remarked that the Kremlin has already committed 330,000 personnel to the war, which constitutes over a third of the entirety of the Russian Armed Forces, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin will face substantial domestic and social opposition if he increases this number by carrying out general (as opposed to covert) mobilization, as ISW has previously assessed.
Colonel-General Genady Zhidko, current director of Russia’s Military-Political Directorate, is likely in overall command of Russian forces in Ukraine. Zhidko sat next to and conferred with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu during an inspection of Russian ground forces in Ukraine on June 26, though Zhidko’s nameplate was notably blurred out by the Russian Ministry of Defense and his position has not been officially confirmed, unlike the commanders of Russia's two force groupings in Ukraine that ISW reported on June 26.[9] Conflict Intelligence Team previously reported on May 26 that Zhidko replaced Commander of the Southern Military District Alexander Dvornikov as overall commander in Ukraine, though ISW could not independently verify this change at the time.[10] Reports on June 21 of Dvornikov’s dismissal and Zhidko’s prominent place in Shoigu’s June 26 visit likely confirm this change.
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces conducted a missile strike against Kyiv for the first time since April 29, likely to coincide with the ongoing G7 leadership summit.
- Russian Colonel-General Gennday Zhidko has likely taken over the role of theatre commander of operations in Ukraine.
- Russian forces continued attacks against the southern outskirts of Lysychansk and consolidated control of Severodonetsk and surrounding settlements.
- Russian forces are conducting operations to the east of Bakhmut to maintain control of the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway.
- Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground assaults to the northwest of Slovyansk.
- Russian forces intensified artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions along the Southern Axis.
- Russian occupation authorities are escalating measures to stem Ukrainian partisan activity in occupied areas through increased filtration measures and the abduction of civilians.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
- Subordinate Main Effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts
- Supporting Effort 1—Kharkiv City;
- Supporting Effort 2—Southern Axis;
- Activities in Russian-occupied Areas
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to conduct attacks against the southern outskirts of Lysychansk on June 26. Russian sources claimed that Russian troops are fighting on the territory of the Lysychansk Gelatin Plant, as well as in Bila Hora (directly southeast of Lysychansk) and Privillya (directly northwest of Lysychansk).[11] Russian troops additionally consolidated newly-controlled positions in Severodonetsk, Syrotyne, Voronove, and Borivske and continued to shell Ukrainian forces in and around the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[12] Information regarding the specifics of the tactical situation in Lysychansk will likely become increasingly obfuscated as Russian forces consolidate control of Severodonetsk and continue to extend advances into Lysychansk.
Russian forces continued offensive operations to the east of Bakhmut along the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on June 26.[13] Russian Telegram channel Rybar claimed that Russian forces have established control of the T1302 highway and that Russian operations in this area will likely be increasingly oriented around retaining control of the highway as opposed to interdicting Ukrainian lines of communication.[14] Russian forces fired at Ukrainian positions along the T1302 in Mykolaivka, Berestove, Pokrovske, and Kodema and reportedly conducted ground assaults near Berestove, Bilohorivka, Klynove, and Pokrovkse.[15] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian troops conducted positional battles around Donetsk City in the direction of Kostyantinivka and Niu York, although Ukrainian sources stated that Russian forces took no active actions in this area.[16] Russian forces conducted ground and artillery attacks in southwestern Donetsk Oblast near the Zaporizhia Oblast border in the vicinity of Pavlivka and Yehorivka.[17]
Russian forces continued ground assaults towards Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum but did not make any confirmed advances on June 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attempts to advance in Dolyna, Kurulka, and Mazanivka, all northwest of Slovyansk near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[18] Russian Telegram channel Readkova additionally claimed that Russian troops are fighting around Krasnopillya and Bohorodychne (northwest of Slovyansk) and Prysyhb and Sydorove (directly north of Slovyansk).[19] Russian forces continued to set conditions to resume operations towards Slovyansk from the west of Lyman and shelled Mayaky, about 15 kilometers directly north of Slovyansk.[20]
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued attempts to improve their positions north of Kharkiv City and conducted limited, unsuccessful assaults along contested frontlines in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast on June 26.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack on Dementiivka, a settlement about 20 kilometers directly north of Kharkiv City along the E105 highway that runs into Belgorod.[22] Russian Telegram channel Readkova claimed that Russian forces are additionally fighting north of Kharkiv City in Udy, Tsupivka, and Verkhnii Saltiv.[23] Russian troops conducted artillery and airstrikes against civilian infrastructure and Ukrainian positions in and around Kharkiv City.[24]
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces on the Southern Axis continued defensive operations and targeted Ukrainian positions on June 26.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command both indicated that Russian forces are focusing on preventing Ukrainian troops from regrouping along their southern frontlines.[26] Russian forces once again unsuccessfully attempted to regain a lost position in Potomkyne, in northwestern Kherson Oblast.[27] Russian forces are intensifying artillery attacks against Ukrainian positions, especially along the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border on the western Inhulets riverbank, to repel recent Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian forces have intensified their rate of shelling by 150% and that Russian shelling has almost entirely destroyed the settlements in the Davydiv Brid area along the eastern bank of the Inhulets River.[28] Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes across the southern frontline in various areas of Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts.[29] Russian forces are additionally continuing to fortify their military presence on Snake Island off the coast of Odesa Oblast to extend their control of the southwestern Black Sea.[30]
Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)
Russian occupation authorities are strengthening measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied areas to crack down on the increasing pressure of recent Ukrainian partisan activities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 26 that Russian authorities have intensified filtration measures at checkpoints in occupied areas and are carrying out counterintelligence actions at these checkpoints, likely to identify and target Ukrainian partisans.[31] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally claimed that Russian forces are abducting relatives of Ukrainian soldiers and servicemen in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts.[32] Ukrainian Mayor of Enerhodar Dmytro Orlov similarly stated that Russian forces in Enerhodar are kidnapping and torturing citizens to obtain information on “illegal activity” (presumably partisan affiliations) under duress.[33] Reports of abductions and intensified law enforcement measures on the part of Russian authorities coincide with reports of escalating Ukrainian partisan actions. Ukraine’s Southern Operational command stated that members of Ukrainian resistance in Kherson Oblast are increasingly targeting pro-Russian collaborators, and Ukrainian partisans set a car belonging to the Russian-appointed Head of Education on fire on June 25.[34]
[7] https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/11599-8#bh_hron; https://suspilne dot media/254251-rosian-hocut-prijmati-na-kontraktnu-sluzbu-odrazu-pisla-zakincenna-skoli/
2. Paralysis in Moscow: Why Putin persists with established strategy, accepting test of endurance
From Sir Lawrence Freedman reprinted in the Kyiv Post.
Excerpts:
The West is settling in for the long haul, looking for ways to keep Ukraine supplied with the weapons and ammunition it needs, while adjusting foreign policies to be able to concentrate on the war. The fight can be presented as a conflict between democracy and autocracy. But at its core it is also now about the future of the European security order, and if that means improving relations with autocracies, whether in urging the Saudis to pump more oil or keeping relations with China calm, then so be it.
Which means that the most salient test of endurance is still on the field of battle. When Russia began to suffer setbacks, after the initial offensive in February, the Ministry of Defence moved smartly to recast the operation as being solely about the Donbas. The problems the Russian military have faced over the last couple of months have not so much resulted from Ukrainian counter-offensives as the meagre territorial gains they have achieved for such an enormous effort.
If it is the case that the Ukrainian armed forces are beginning to increase the tempo of their offensive operations then Russian commanders will face a new set of challenges. It may be that their troops will be as tenacious in defence as their Ukrainian counterparts, even as they take heavy blows, but it is as likely that they will not do so with the same conviction. Problems of morale and disaffection may begin to tell. From the start of this war its most important feature has been the asymmetry of motivation. In the end the Ukrainians are fighting because they have no other choice. Russians have the option of going home.
Paralysis in Moscow: Why Putin persists with established strategy, accepting test of endurance - KyivPost - Ukraine's Global Voice
I will do such things- What they are yet, I know not; but they shall be
The terrors of the earth!
– King Lear, Act 2, Scene 4.
Vladimir Putin seeks to convey an indomitable will. Here is a man who has set his course and will stick to it, whatever the obstacles in his way and the costs of overcoming them. It is an image that serves him well. It is now widely assumed in the West that he will not back down in the war with Ukraine and, if things go badly, he will lash out. Such a man must not be provoked.
Yet the image is starting to fray at the edges. Behind all the braggadocio his power is slowly eroding. The symptoms of this are to be found not in a readiness to compromise on the war, which remains absent, but instead in a policy paralysis, pressing on with his established strategy because he can think of nothing better to do.
Putin’s St Petersburg Speech
A good place to start is with the speech he delivered last week, coming in at over 70 minutes, at the annual St Petersburg International Economic Forum. This is intended as an alternative Davos. Putin’s audience was not as substantial as in previous years, with representatives of the Taliban helping making up the numbers. The theme of his address was that, despite facing an American-led ‘economic blitzkrieg’, Russia would emerge even stronger as the rest of the world suffers from inflation and recession.
He described in great detail the measures being taken to protect the economy against this onslaught which would ensure self-sufficiency. ‘We are strong people’, he insisted, ‘and can cope with any challenge. Like our ancestors, we will solve any problem, the entire thousand-year history of our country speaks of this.’
He presented the current conflict as being essentially about Russia standing up to American arrogance – they ‘think of themselves as exceptional. And if they think they’re exceptional, that means everyone else is second class’. This is a theme which provides common ground with China. President Xi sent his own video message along similar lines.
Putin’s assertions of invincible Russian strength were undermined by his speech being delayed for an hour by a disruptive cyberattack, demonstrating that this supposedly favoured Russian instrument of modern conflict can be used against it in an embarrassing way.
Although he boasted about how well the economy will weather the storm, even official forecasts see the economy contracting this year by some 8 percent and unofficial estimates go as high as 15 percent.
One reason why Russia’s economic position is not worse is because of the boost to revenues resulting from the huge rise in oil and gas prices, yet Putin is currently seeking to add to the pressure on the West by cutting gas supplies to EU countries. He will fight the economic war by demonstrating to Europeans that siding with the US will mean that they are committing ‘economic suicide’. At the moment, if there is a punitive option available he is anxious to take it.
With regards to the huge issue of the effects on world food supplies of the blockade of the Black Sea, and the real prospect of famine in many countries, Putin again deflected the blame to US and EU sanctions against Russian fertilizer and grain exports, and the obstacles put in the way of Russian efforts to send exports to those in direst need.
Another perspective was provided in one of the more telling interventions in the forum. Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of the state controlled RT media organisation, who specialises in blood-curdling threats and in making Russians feel cheerful about their prospects by warning how bad it is going to be for everybody else, presented famine as a Russian weapon in the economic war: ‘The famine will start now and they will lift the sanctions and be friends with us, because they will realize that it’s impossible not to be friends with us.’
On the war itself Putin promised that Russia would meet its goals fully: ‘freedom for the Donbas’. As if ignorant of the cruel realities of the war, and the devastation being inflicted on Ukrainian towns and cities, he urged that: ‘ We must not turn those cities and towns that we liberate into a semblance of Stalingrad. This is a natural thing that our military thinks about when organising hostilities.’
Those who urge a peace deal got little comfort from Putin. The Kremlin line is now firmly that Ukraine will have to live with new borders: those areas under Russian occupation are being prepared for annexation.
The only possible concession came when Putin stated that he had no objection to Ukraine joining the EU, because the EU ‘isn’t a military organization.’ This admission is one of those moments equivalent to an alternative ending to Hamlet, when the old King returns from an overseas trip to reveal that the tragedy that has just unfolded was based on an unfortunate misunderstanding.
This whole sorry business began in the summer of 2013 when Putin put the Russophile President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, under intense economic pressure, including cutbacks in energy supplies, to prevent him signing an association agreement with the EU. This pressure succeeded and the agreement was not signed, but the effect was to trigger the Euromaidan movement which eventually led to Yanukovych fleeing the country, Putin annexing Crimea and encouraging the separatist movement in the Donbas.
The admission shows that Putin realises that he must pick his fights carefully. He can’t do much for now about the EU opening negotiations with Ukraine so best not to try. For a similar reason the Kremlin dismissed the moves by Finland and Sweden to join NATO as being irrelevant, despite previous lurid warnings of the terrible fate awaiting those countries should they take such a step (and the assumption by some Western geopoliticians that NATO enlargement is all Putin really cares about). This is another development he can’t do much about and so is inclined to let pass.
Which may be just as well because the challenges keep on coming. One of the most intriguing moments at the forum came when Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the only head of state to join Putin onstage, made it clear that his country would not recognize the ‘quasi-governments’ in the Donbas, as well as those in South Ossetia or Abkhazia (in Georgia) or for that matter Taiwan. ‘If the right to self-determination is to be realized everywhere on the planet, then instead of 193 governments on Earth, there will be 500 or 600 …. Of course, it will be chaos.’ This was not what the audience – or Putin – expected to hear.
This led to the normal warnings that because Kazakhstan has a large Russian-speaking population Russia was bound to take an interest, and if it started to be unfriendly Russia could get very interested indeed.
Simonyan’s husband and fellow propagandist, Tigran Keosayan, had, even before the forum, complained about Kazakhstan’s ‘ingratitude’, after it cancelled a Victory Day parade on 9 May, and suggested that Tokayev ‘look carefully at what is happening in Ukraine.’ (The reference to ingratitude was to the brief Russian-led intervention last January to help put down civil unrest).
Elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, Moldova and Georgia are exploring their own links with the EU (with Georgia’s population apparently more enthusiastic than its government), while Belarus, which is now stuck in an unequal alliance with Russia, has avoided committing forces to the war.
As Tom McTague noted in an essay reflecting on his recent travels in Kyrgyzstan, it is only in Russia that there is any nostalgia for the old Soviet Union, and Putin has not found a way to develop a positive appeal. ‘The question for Russia’, he asked, ‘is, right now, what does it have to attract its former colonies beyond history? It is not rich enough, advanced enough, or ideologically compelling enough. Nor does it show the kind of love that suggests it would preside over a happy family.’
Who looks at Belarus or Crimea let alone the Donbas and thinks there is something there to emulate? Hence the Kremlin’s dependence upon coercion and control. Putin only knows the way of the bully. When an individual, or a state, or any other entity, starts on a path that he doesn’t like all he can do is threaten and if his threats lack credibility than he has to let it pass.
Lithuania and Kaliningrad
This can be seen with the latest flash point in Russia’s conflict with the West. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, home to some 430,000 people, is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland. This was formerly the German Konigsberg, captured by Soviet forces right at the end of World War Two and valued by Moscow for its Baltic port. Because it is home to Russia’s Baltic Fleet it is territory of strategic importance. Its position became exposed when Poland and Lithuania joined NATO.
This vulnerability has now been underlined as the Lithuanian government has blocked deliveries of coal, metals, construction materials and advanced technology through its territory by means of both rail and road. This move is in line with, and does not go beyond, EU sanctions, does not stop the movement of passengers and unsanctioned goods, and does not preclude Russia supplying Kaliningrad by sea.
Dmitry Peskov – the Kremlin spokesman who has spent a lot of his recent career warning other states about one thing or another – has reported that Russia is preparing ‘retaliatory measures’. Putin’s close buddy and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev has vowed that these measures, yet to be determined, ‘will have a serious negative impact on the Lithuanian population.’ It’s not clear what options are available.
Not a lot of Lithuanian goods travel through Russia these days while the option to cut off gas supplies is negated by the fact that Lithuania stopped taking Russian gas in April, having had the foresight after 2015, when nearly all of its gas supplies were imported from Russia, to have built an off-shore LNG import terminal in the port city of Klaipeda. So Moscow is short of available economic forms of coercion.
The move has been described on Russian TV as tantamount to a declaration of war, but retaliatory military action against a NATO country would be a bold and dangerous step to take simply because of the implementation of sanctions which Moscow insists in general are really no big deal.
Paralysis in Moscow
All this fits in with the gradual erosion of Putin’s authority in Russia along the lines recently outlined by Titania Stanovaya. Russian elites are struggling to come to terms with a war that Putin began without consultation and which he does not know how to end on favourable terms. He is unwilling to take the even greater risks required to secure a military victory (assuming that these could succeed) yet unable to accept anything that would look like a defeat.
Because no one amongst the elite has a clue how to escape this conundrum or, even if they did, has the political courage and opportunity to move against Putin, the odds of him being overthrown in a coup are low. Instead there is paralysis as internal divisions grow along with the consequential problems caused by the war.
Putin, she notes, ‘has created a situation for which he was not prepared and which he doesn’t know how to deal with, while the Russian power system that he himself built is constructed in such a way as to prevent effective decisions from being made collectively and in a balanced way.’
This paralysis is reflected in the conduct of the war. Russian tactics and strategy remain inflexible and predictable. Having identified Severodonetsk as a vital objective, just as Mariupol was before, failure cannot be contemplated, and so all available firepower and manpower has been hurled at it to break the Ukrainian resistance and then prevent the defenders retreating. This has come at a heavy cost for Ukraine and questions have been asked in Kyiv about the wisdom of committing so much of its own military capability to the defence of a city that has acquired strategic relevance only because it seems to matter so much to Moscow.
Yet, the Ukrainian military insist, the effort has been worthwhile: Russian forces have suffered the greater attrition; this defence has delayed advances elsewhere, as Ukraine waits for – and now starts to receive – much needed Western weaponry; and it has diverted Russian capabilities from places where Ukraine is now able to start moving on to the offensive. Evidence of this offensive is seen in Ukrainian advances in the Kherson area.
A Test of Endurance
From the start of this crisis Russia has acted to demonstrate its strength and show why it deserves to be treated at all times like a great power. But its power is limited and Russia is now facing the possibility that it really has bitten off more than it can chew. None of this means an early end to the war. Nor does it mean that things will get easier for Ukraine.
Putin’s default strategy is always to inflict pain even if he can achieve little else. The risk of more reckless action cannot be precluded. Nonetheless we should not assume that Russia is inexhaustible or, just because we cannot pick a winner in the battle at the moment, that the war is destined for a prolonged stalemate.
The political paralysis affects Russia’s military strategy. Putin is unwilling to accept defeat and see what he can extract by way of concessions for an offer to withdraw. Nor does he want to mobilise all of Russian society for the war effort, so the limits on troop numbers will remain, and will affect operations more as those that are lost cannot be replaced and Russian advantages in firepower begin to be eroded. He can propose a cease-fire to allow him to hold the territory already taken but he knows that will be rejected by President Zelensky unless it is accompanied by a promise of withdrawal.
His best hope, in pressing on with his current strategy, is that at some point, preferably quite soon, Ukraine’s Western supporters will tire of the war and its economic costs and urge Kyiv to accept some territorial compromise. Here his problem is that there is also paralysis of a different sort on the Western side. The economic costs are high, but they have already been incurred. The commitment to Ukraine, and to ensuring that Russia does not win its war of conquest, has been made. So long as Ukraine continues to fight, and suffer the costs, then even leaders who think a compromise might at some point be necessary are holding their tongues.
The West is settling in for the long haul, looking for ways to keep Ukraine supplied with the weapons and ammunition it needs, while adjusting foreign policies to be able to concentrate on the war. The fight can be presented as a conflict between democracy and autocracy. But at its core it is also now about the future of the European security order, and if that means improving relations with autocracies, whether in urging the Saudis to pump more oil or keeping relations with China calm, then so be it.
Which means that the most salient test of endurance is still on the field of battle. When Russia began to suffer setbacks, after the initial offensive in February, the Ministry of Defence moved smartly to recast the operation as being solely about the Donbas. The problems the Russian military have faced over the last couple of months have not so much resulted from Ukrainian counter-offensives as the meagre territorial gains they have achieved for such an enormous effort.
If it is the case that the Ukrainian armed forces are beginning to increase the tempo of their offensive operations then Russian commanders will face a new set of challenges. It may be that their troops will be as tenacious in defence as their Ukrainian counterparts, even as they take heavy blows, but it is as likely that they will not do so with the same conviction. Problems of morale and disaffection may begin to tell. From the start of this war its most important feature has been the asymmetry of motivation. In the end the Ukrainians are fighting because they have no other choice. Russians have the option of going home.
Lawrence Freedman is Emeritus Professor of War Studies King’s College London. His next book is: Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (UK Penguin, US OUP)
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Kyiv Post.
Found a spelling error? Let us know – highlight it and press Ctrl + Enter.
3. Russia’s “Demonstration Army” Is a Red Flag for U.S. Security Force Assistance
Very much worth the read from Ben Connable. A fascinating assessment of Russian canine and equestrian extravaganzas (e.g., dog and pony show demonstrations) and their impact on actual warfighting abilities. He also provides a cautionary note for the US. ThoughI I would say proper employment of FID concepts and principles and advising and assisting friends, partners, and allies in their internal defense and development programs to defend themselves can prevent this. But we always have to be careful of the leaders of both the host nation and the country providing assistance demanding "demonstrations."
Russia’s “Demonstration Army” Is a Red Flag for U.S. Security Force Assistance
Editor’s Note: Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine came as a surprise to me and to many observers. Ben Connable of the Atlantic Council argues that one important factor explaining Russia’s failures was the lack of realistic military exercises. Too often, the Russian military tried to script its exercises to assure higher-ups that all was well, and as a result it failed to learn to fight effectively when a real war occurred.
Daniel Byman
***
It wasn’t long into the Ukraine war that military analysts began using the apocryphal Potemkin Village analogy to describe Russia’s military: It consists of hollow forces that look good on parade but can’t fight well. Most recently, top experts on the Russian military from the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), noted that Russia’s thus-far abysmal showing in the Ukraine war—and particularly the lack of effective, dynamic combined-arms warfare capability—stood in sharp contrast to the seemingly orchestral fire and movement on public display in what the Russian Federation calls military exercises.
Were the Russians fooling the West or themselves into believing they could effectively fight a complex modern war? In all likelihood they were doing double duty, fooling everyone except, perhaps, the Ukrainians.
A quick clarification of terms is necessary: An “exercise” is generally an event that puts military forces in a simulated field environment where they test out their skills, practice techniques, and learn to adapt to uncertain circumstances. The best exercises pit military units against live opposition forces, or OPFOR, who are trained to make life as difficult as possible for the exercising unit—sweat hard in peace, bleed less in war. Peacetime “demonstrations,” by contrast, are rehearsed events intended to showcase equipment and firepower for an audience. Sometimes they include nominal OPFOR in what appear to be rehearsed two-sided dances rather than free-form exercises. Russia has described many of these types of military preparations as “exercises” when they were in truth demonstrations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin often attended portions of Kavkaz, Zapad, and other demonstrations in the years before he escalated the Ukraine war. In the tradition of his Soviet predecessors, he expected to be impressed with displays of Russian might and combined arms prowess; at some level, he probably wanted to be fooled into believing his own dezinformatsiya. And he expected dramatic videos of Russian artillery, tanks, planes, and infantry smashing defenseless targets to fool and frighten NATO. (It worked.) Putin’s generals, in turn, found themselves under tremendous pressure to turn these events into spectacles, complete with canned Hollywood-style explosions designed to accentuate the typically dull, smoky impacts of bombs and artillery. And the generals then pushed officers, soldiers, and airmen to ensure the spectacles did not turn into fiascos.
As with any kind of performance, 90 percent of a good show is created in rehearsals. It does not take a trained military eye to see the hard work that went into staging Russia’s recent military demonstrations. Spotless armored vehicles charged forward in perfect formation across flat open plains, firing their weapons in precise syncopation from right to left, crack, crack, crack. Airplanes swooped over in neat display formation—an approach that would be suicidal in combat—firing rockets and dropping bombs to bring the symphony of violence to a frenzied crescendo. It all looked impressive.
But any military person who has ever put on a live-fire combat demonstration knows the real amount of work that goes into a show of violence on this scale. It requires the choreography of a Broadway play, but with deadly consequences for any misstep. Everyone has to move with precise timing and spacing to ensure bullets, bombs, and rockets do not accidentally shred the performers. All it takes is one errant flinch of a trigger finger, one vehicle moving too quickly or too slowly and wandering into the line of fire, one pilot who can’t see through the smoke to find the right target, and the whole show is ruined. In 2014, a Russian armored vehicle in a parade demonstration ran over a soldier, turning the event into an enduring public relations disaster.
The less professional the troops (think: conscripts), the harder it is to pull off a big demonstration without a terrible mistake. Russian conscripts, who usually serve only one year, might spend their entire term preparing for a major demonstration, only to be replaced by new conscripts whose terms of service would be similarly consumed.
Properly executing a multidivision, combined-arms, live-fire demonstration involving at least tens of thousands of people—according to the Russians, in some cases 200,000 to 300,000 people—takes many months of rehearsal, hundreds of thousands of gallons of diesel and aviation fuel, spare parts that may already be in short supply, lots of ammunition, and the full attention of the officers and troops involved. It can take months just to move people and equipment to the exercise grounds. During movement and rehearsal, equipment breaks and wears out, and it all has to be fixed and replaced after the last showtime explosions fade. The resultant vacuum of resources undermines all other training.
This focus on demonstrations also created opportunity costs. Good senior military leaders try to give lower-level commanders as much time as possible each month to train their own units; it is the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who are best positioned to spot issues, sharpen their soldiers’ combat skills, and build unit cohesion. Every week spent preparing for and running demonstrations is a week of far more valuable combat training and team building lost. This wasted time has assuredly contributed to many Russian deaths in Ukraine.
While each Russian military district was on the hook for only one major exercise every four years, units routinely conducted thousands of other, similar events (reportedly 4,800 in 2021 alone) with all the characteristics of a rehearsed demonstration. Putin and his generals called some of these “snap” inspection exercises, giving the impression of a crouched bear ready to pounce at a moment’s notice. Some of these so-called snap events probably involved a few hundred or thousand troops, and others reportedly up to 150,000 troops.
But it is absurd to think that 150,000 or even just 10,000 Russian troops (or any comparable number of Western troops, for that matter) could suddenly, without notice, leap into action to execute perfect large-scale military maneuvers. So many of these so-called snap exercises, too, were almost certainly façades requiring perhaps months of curtained rehearsal. It is easy to see how the high tempo of these collective events might have consumed large segments of the Russian armed forces. As the Swedish FOI team implies, these continual high-profile demonstrations effectively became the Russian military’s raison d’être.
Armies generally fight as they train. War is inherently chaotic and dynamic, demanding extraordinary adaptability. But, in addition to many other failings, the Russians too often trained to march forward in neat formations against an inert enemy. Combat leadership requires hard-won intuition, rapid-fire decision-making, and high-pressure risk-taking. But rather than putting their skills to the test in potentially embarrassing unscripted exercises, Russian generals appear to have found themselves most at home sitting safely in viewing stands watching their troops perform the military equivalent of a dance recital.
Limited operations in Syria and Crimea masked Russia’s failure to translate rote rehearsals into agile combat prowess. In Syria, the Russians deployed about a brigade of security troops who saw little combat, as well as some special operators and mercenaries who supported Syrian government forces and militias. Russian aircraft effectively flew unopposed. Relative to Ukraine—or any other mid-to-large-scale conflict—Russia’s operations in Syria barely constitute a combat operation. In Crimea, Russian special operators and mercenaries seized ground almost without opposition, revealing next to nothing about Russian combined-arms combat power.
The circumstances and type of operation in Ukraine were different. When it came time for Russian soldiers, officers, and generals to adapt—to quickly find expedient solutions to problems like operational fuel shortages and unexpected Ukrainian resistance—they too often hedged, foundered, shut down, or fled. Poorly trained and ill-informed troops found that the basic technical skills they had honed in snap inspections and demonstrations were insufficient for the diverse challenges of war.
Russia’s northern offensive in Ukraine collapsed. The purpose-built Soviet-era myth that Russian forces could or would execute brilliant, Blitzkrieg-like, semi-autonomous deep-penetration operations has been shattered. Now, in the grinding attrition fight in the Donbas, the Russians have reverted to an old Soviet technical approach to warfare: Smash every square inch of ground with artillery, allowing poorly motivated infantry to edge forward ever so slowly at minimal risk. Over time, grinding attrition warfare will reduce Russia’s chances of achieving timely strategic victory and increase destruction, casualties, and economic catastrophe on both sides.
The Russian military’s performance in Ukraine is a damning indictment of its overall combat effectiveness. Unfortunately for the United States and other NATO countries, Russia is not the only country fixated on demonstrations. American and European leaders familiar with security force assistance missions may have experienced at least some discomfort reading this description of Russia’s demonstration army. One could readily replace “Russia” with the names of any number of partner nations.
Since the end of World War II, hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent on security force assistance with the intent of creating adaptable, combat-ready forces to support U.S. and other NATO members’ regional security needs. But how many of these partners have instead produced demonstration forces designed to put on hollow shows of strength? How many have taken on the brittle characteristics the Russians have revealed in Ukraine? How many paper tigers have the United States and its allies helped produce, and what can be done about it?
I personally observed the creation of demonstration-focused armies in the Middle East while serving as a U.S. Marine and while conducting research at the RAND Corporation. Well-intentioned U.S. advisers routinely pushed partner units to develop reliable and self-confident junior officers and noncommissioned officers capable of leading and adapting in the uncertain circumstances of war. But they generally ran into two interdependent problems.
Many generals and political leaders in partner countries had insufficient will to take the risks necessary to develop adaptable forces. These partner leaders were under tremendous pressure to demonstrate return on U.S. and other NATO states’ security force assistance investments. Most of these investments were subject to review, and potentially reduction or cancellation, on a year-to-year basis.
Military and political officials from these patron countries frequently visited to check on progress. Partner leaders I worked with and observed believed that showing their insufficiently adaptable military units struggling through tough, unpredictable exercises risked a loss of support. So instead of taking this risk, they had their troops rehearse and perform rote demonstrations. Many U.S. leaders sat in viewing stands observing these demonstrations, giving their explicit approval to this risk-averse approach. I was aware of several U.S.-funded advanced training courses—including one ostensibly designed to turn out elite troops—that were entirely dedicated to rehearsing graduation demonstrations rather than to more valuable military learning.
Both partner leaders and advisers also struggled against cultural headwinds. Patriarchal cultures—arguably, including Russian culture—that concentrate power and decision-making in the hands of the most senior and influential leaders tend to discourage initiative, decentralization, and adaptability. Tightly controlled praetorian units coup-proof partner states, but generate brittle militaries. In the partner forces I observed, this dynamic contributed to a reluctance to develop junior officers and noncommissioned officers, without whom free-form exercises were more likely to devolve into chaos. Cultural aversion compounded risk aversion, which in turn kept partner forces locked in a perpetual cycle of rote rehearsal and demonstration.
Iraq shows how this debilitating cycle can generate disastrous security force assistance flops. From 2003 through the U.S. military withdrawal at the end of 2011, the United States invested approximately $25 billion building, equipping, and training the Iraqi security forces with the expectation that they would be able to take control of their own security. Through the end of 2007, thousands of Iraqis conducted at least modestly successful, manageable, small-scale operations in units of 10 to 50 troops, supporting the Awakening movement that in turn suppressed the Sunni Arab insurgency. But in their desperate desire to leave Iraq behind (“we have to draw down to win”), senior U.S. leaders pushed their Iraqi counterparts to demonstrate larger-scale operations.
In response, Iraqis put on impressive battalion- and brigade-level combined-arms shows at their new training bases. But then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had begun to corrupt the Iraqi officer corps by inserting favored, fellow Shiite sycophants, often replacing far more experienced and capable leaders and staff officers. Years of U.S.-led efforts to build Iraqi military capability and defense institutions were eroded, masking increasing brittleness in the Iraqi Army and police. Early signs of the brittleness of larger-scale units appeared as early as 2008, when Maliki sent Iraqi brigades charging into Basra to quell a militia uprising. The Iraqis foundered, unready to control their own large-scale operations, requiring U.S. military intervention.
Iraq could put thousands of troops into the field to fight, but its military leaders couldn’t command, control, maneuver, or support those troops without direct U.S. combat assistance. Junior leaders felt untrusted and took little initiative. Iraqi troops had limited skills and were particularly vulnerable in uncertain circumstances. Corruption undermined discipline and the will to fight. In 2014, two years after the last U.S. military forces withdrew from Iraq, the Islamic State smashed through 19 brittle Iraqi Army and police brigades and seized about one-third of the country, forcing U.S. reentry into the war.
Other partner forces across the Middle East and in other areas of the world spend considerable amounts of time and resources on demonstrations. Some of these forces may still be quite competent and ready for combat on a scale relative to their respective security challenges. But in the wake of Russia’s fumbling in Ukraine, the United States and its allies should reconsider what they demand of these partner forces and how they measure return on investment.
Swapping demonstrations for real, hard-test exercises would be a good place to start—even if that means cutting back on lavish VIP visits and exciting propaganda videos and having to deal with uncomfortable cultural challenges. More open-ended force-on-force exercises will not fix all partner problems. But these exercises will help reveal shortcomings that can then be addressed through improved training and more effectively targeted security force assistance. Better to take this sometimes confounding approach in peace than to watch well-rehearsed partners crumple in the chaos of war.
Ben Connable is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, where he teaches a course on human behavior in war. He holds a doctorate in war studies from King’s College London and is the author of "Russia's Limit of Advance" (RAND Corporation, 2020), "Will to Fight: Analyzing, Modeling, and Simulating the Will to Fight of Military Units" (RAND Corporation, 2018), and “Iraqi Army Will to Fight: A Will-to-Fight Case Study With Lessons for Western Security Force Assistance” (RAND Corporation, 2022).
4. Obese Russian general, 67, called up to fight in Ukraine as Putin 'scrapes the barrel'
Scraping the bottom of the barrel for leaders? Or is this key a brilliant strategist? Or is a brutal leader and sycophantic Putin loyalist?
We may laugh and smirk at him at our peril? Or maybe (and hopefully) things are really bad for the Russians.
Obese Russian general, 67, called up to fight in Ukraine as Putin 'scrapes the barrel'
EXCLUSIVE: General Pavel, a veteran of Russia's disastrous war in Afghanistan, is being dragged out of retirement to join the battle in Ukraine. He is said to eat five meals a day washed down with a bottle of vodka
An obese Russian retired general has been sent to fight on the frontlines in Eastern Ukraine because Vladimir Putin is running out of senior officers.
The 20 stone general, 67, is now said to be in charge of Russian special forces operating in the region after the unit’s former commander was seriously injured in an artillery strike.
The veteran of Russia ’s disastrous war in Afghanistan is known as General Pavel.
A senior intelligence source last night told the Daily Star Sunday: “Putin is now scraping the barrel.
“Most of his best and battle-hardened senior commanders have been killed or injured fighting in Ukraine so he is resorting to sending second rate officers to the front who don’t last very long.
“He is now dragging generals out of retirement and one of those is General Pavel.
“Putin is like a mafia boss who no one can refuse to obey. If a retired general gets a message from Putin saying mother Russia needs you to fight in Ukraine there is not much you can do. There is now escape from Russia thanks to the sanctions.”
Vladimir Putin is 'scraping the barrel' now (Image: Getty Images)
Read More
Pavel was a soldier for more than 40 years and became a commander of Russia’s special forces but that was 25-years ago when he was younger and fitter..
He is understood to have served in Syria just before retiring from active service five years ago.
Up until recently he was living in a Moscow suburb but is understood to have been ordered to return to active service last month.
The officer is so fat that he has to have his uniform specially made and wears two sets of body armour to cover his substantial girth.
He is understood to require five meals a day washed down with at least a litre of vodka.
Russia is believed to up to 10 generals in the war in Ukraine and as many as 30 senior officers.
Latest estimates also suggest that as many as 30,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action and up to 100,000 have been injured.
Russia has reportedly lost over 4,000 tanks and armoured vehicles, 216 combat aircraft, 183 attack helicopters and 620 drones.
It can also be revealed that intelligence sources believe that Russia is on the verge of running out of precision weapons, such as guided missiles and even artillery rounds.
The source said: “Both Russia and Ukraine are sustaining a lot of casualties and war stocks of ammunition are running at very low rates.
“Russia has also lost a large number of tanks and armoured vehicles and these are complex pieces of equipment which cannot be easily replaced.”
5. Russia will soon exhaust its combat capabilities, Western assessments predict
I hope this assessment is accurate. But do not be misled by the headline. We should not get our hopes up too high. Ukraine still needs our help. A lot of it.
Excerpts:
The Russians still have the advantage over Ukrainian forces, who are suffering, too. Ukrainian officials put the number of their soldiers killed in action at as many as 200 a day. The Ukrainians have also almost entirely run out of the Soviet-era ammunition on which their own weapons systems rely, and they are still in the process of transitioning to Western systems.
But conditions for Ukrainian troops are only likely to improve as more sophisticated Western weapons arrive, while those of Russian forces can be expected to deteriorate as they dig deeper into their stocks of old, outdated equipment, said retired Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. forces in Europe who is now with the Center for European Policy Analysis. At some point in the coming months, the Ukrainians will have received enough Western weaponry that it is likely they will be able to go on the counteroffensive and reverse the tide of the war, he said.
“I remain very optimistic that Ukraine is going to win, and that by the end of this year Russia will be driven back to the Feb. 24 line,” he said, referring to the boundaries of Russian-occupied areas in Crimea and Donbas captured during fighting in 2014 and 2015. “Right now it sucks to be on the receiving end of all this Russian artillery. But my assessment is that things are going to be trending in favor of the Ukrainians in the next few weeks.”
Russia will soon exhaust its combat capabilities, Western assessments predict
Small shifts in territorial control matter less than the overall balance of forces, which analysts say could shift back in favor of Ukraine in the coming months
Updated June 25, 2022 at 8:18 p.m. EDT|Published June 25, 2022 at 3:00 a.m. EDT
The Russian military will soon exhaust its combat capabilities and be forced to bring its offensive in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region to a grinding halt, according to Western intelligence predictions and military experts.
“There will come a time when the tiny advances Russia is making become unsustainable in light of the costs and they will need a significant pause to regenerate capability,” said a senior Western official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive issue.
The assessments come despite continued Russian advances against outgunned Ukrainian forces, including the capture on Friday of the city of Severodonetsk, the biggest urban center taken by Russia in the east since launching the latest Donbas offensive nearly three months ago.
The Russians are now closing in on the adjacent city of Lysychansk, on the opposite bank of the Donets River. The town’s capture would give Russia almost complete control of the Luhansk oblast, one of two oblasts, or provinces, that make up the Donbas region. Control of Donbas is the publicly declared goal of Russia’s “special military operation,” although the multifront invasion launched in February made it clear that Moscow’s original ambitions were far broader.
Capturing Lysychansk presents a challenge because it stands on higher ground and the Donets River impedes Russian advances from the east. So instead, Russian troops appear intent on encircling the city from the west, pressing southeast from Izyum and northeast from Popasna on the western bank of the river.
According to chatter on Russian Telegram channels and Ukraine’s deputy defense minister, Anna Malyar, the Russian military is under pressure to bring all of Luhansk under Russian control by Sunday, perhaps explaining the heightened momentum of the past week.
But the “creeping” advances are dependent almost entirely on the expenditure of vast quantities of ammunition, notably artillery shells, which are being fired at a rate almost no military in the world would be able to sustain for long, said the senior Western official.
Russia, meanwhile, is continuing to suffer heavy losses of equipment and men, calling into question how much longer it can remain on the attack, the official said.
Officials refuse to offer a time frame, but British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, citing intelligence assessments, indicated this week that Russia would be able to continue to fight on only for the “next few months.” After that, “Russia could come to a point when there is no longer any forward momentum because it has exhausted its resources,” he told the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung in an interview.
Russian commentators are also noting the challenges, emphasizing a chronic shortage of manpower. “Russia does not have enough physical strength in the zone of the special military operation in Ukraine … taking into account the almost one thousand kilometer (or more) line of confrontation,” wrote Russian military blogger Yuri Kotyenok on his Telegram account. He estimated that Russia would need 500,000 troops to attain its goals, which would only be possible with a large-scale mobilization, a potentially risky and unpopular move that President Vladimir Putin has so far refrained from undertaking.
The Russian onslaught has already outlasted forecasts that Russia’s offensive capabilities would peak by the summer. Aggressive recruitment of contract soldiers and reservists has helped generate as many as 40,000 to 50,000 troops to replenish those lost or incapacitated in the first weeks of the fighting, according to Ukrainian officials. Russia has been hauling ancient tanks out of storage and away from bases across the vast country to throw onto the front lines in Ukraine.
The Russians still have the advantage over Ukrainian forces, who are suffering, too. Ukrainian officials put the number of their soldiers killed in action at as many as 200 a day. The Ukrainians have also almost entirely run out of the Soviet-era ammunition on which their own weapons systems rely, and they are still in the process of transitioning to Western systems.
But conditions for Ukrainian troops are only likely to improve as more sophisticated Western weapons arrive, while those of Russian forces can be expected to deteriorate as they dig deeper into their stocks of old, outdated equipment, said retired Gen. Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. forces in Europe who is now with the Center for European Policy Analysis. At some point in the coming months, the Ukrainians will have received enough Western weaponry that it is likely they will be able to go on the counteroffensive and reverse the tide of the war, he said.
“I remain very optimistic that Ukraine is going to win, and that by the end of this year Russia will be driven back to the Feb. 24 line,” he said, referring to the boundaries of Russian-occupied areas in Crimea and Donbas captured during fighting in 2014 and 2015. “Right now it sucks to be on the receiving end of all this Russian artillery. But my assessment is that things are going to be trending in favor of the Ukrainians in the next few weeks.”
Already there are indications that the supply of Western weapons is gathering pace. Newly arrived French Caesar howitzers were videoed in action on the battlefield last week, followed this week by German Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, the first of the heavy weapons promised by Germany to be delivered.
On Saturday, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry posted video footage of the American HIMARS systems being fired for the first time on the battlefield. Ukraine had pressed the United States hard to agree to supply the sophisticated multiple rocket launcher, which will enable Ukraine to strike up to 50 miles behind Russian lines.
It is difficult to predict the future because so much isn’t known about the conditions and strength of Ukrainian forces, said Mattia Nelles, a German political analyst who studies Ukraine. The Ukrainians have maintained a high level of operational secrecy, making it hard to know, for example, how many troops they still have in the Lysychansk area or the true rate of casualties, he said.
Another unknown is the extent of Russian artillery stocks, which Western intelligence agencies had initially underestimated, the Western official said. Expecting a short war in which Ukrainian forces quickly folded, the Russians made no effort to ramp up production before the invasion, and although they have presumably now done so, their defense industrial complex does not have the capacity to keep up with the “enormous” rate at which Russia is expending artillery shells, the Western official said. “Their supply is not infinite,” he said.
And although Ukrainian forces are having a tough time right now, they do not appear in danger of collapse, said Michael Kofman, director of Russian studies at the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), speaking to the Silverado Policy Accelerator podcast, Geopolitics Decanted.
The Ukrainians are continuing to harass Russian forces north of the city of Kharkiv and have made limited gains in a small offensive outside the city of Kherson in southern Ukraine, helping divert Russian resources away from the Donbas front.
The minor territorial gains currently being notched by Russia are less significant than the overall balance of power on the battlefield, Kofman said.
“The most significant part of the war isn’t these geographic points, because now it’s a contest of will but also a materiel contest, of who is going to run out of equipment and ammunition and their best units first,” he said. “Both of these forces are likely to get exhausted over the summer, and then there will be an operational pause.”
At that point, assuming sufficient quantities of weaponry and ammunition have arrived, the hope is that Ukraine will be able to go on the counteroffensive and start rolling Russian troops back, Ukrainian officials have said.
If not, both sides will dig in to defend their positions, and a stalemate will ensue, barring the unlikely prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough, the Western official said.
“You’ll have two sides not seeking territorial advantage but on operational pause, focused on resupplying and relieving the front line, at which point you are into a protracted conflict,” he said.
6. U.S. Special Forces and CIA Working to Get Ukraine Weapons
I think the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has more than a little role in getting Ukraine weapons, along with TRANSCOM, and EUCOM.
U.S. Special Forces and CIA Working to Get Ukraine Weapons
Special Operations Task Force Operating To Direct Flow of Weapons in Ukraine – The United States is heading up a 20-nation task force of Special Operations Forces consisting of troops and paramilitary CIA personnel to ensure that the long-range weapons that Ukraine needs are reaching the right people. And, thus far, it seems to be working.
There are widespread reports that US-supplied HIMARS rocket systems are already hitting Russian targets in occupied areas of Ukraine, the Chief of the General Staff has said.
“Artillerymen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine skilfully hit certain targets – military targets of the enemy on our, Ukrainian, territory,” Chief of Ukraine’s General Staff, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, wrote on the Telegram channel app.
About 150 mostly US Special Operations personnel were pulled from Ukraine prior to the war starting in late February. They were there to train Ukrainian troops at a base in western Ukraine. Now they’re conducting training at bases inside Britain, France, and Germany. Some CIA personnel have remained inside of Ukraine, mostly in Kyiv, and are disseminating the intelligence that the US is sharing with Ukraine.
However, other NATO SOF troops, British, French, Canadians, and Lithuanians have remained inside of Ukraine and are conducting training as well as advising the Ukrainian military on the packages of aid that they are receiving from the West.
Earlier on Saturday, the Russians claimed to have killed 80 Polish “mercenaries” in a precision airstrike on the Megatex zinc factory in Konstantinovka located in the eastern Donetsk region.
“Up to 80 Polish mercenaries, 20 armored fighting vehicles, and eight Grad, multiple rocket launchers were destroyed in high-precision weapons strikes” in the Donetsk region, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a released statement.
In a piece by the New York Times, the US 10th Special Forces Group, which had been inside of Ukraine training Kyiv’s SOF personnel, moved its operations to Germany and set up a coalition planning cell to coordinate the training and equipping of Ukraine’s troops. That planning cell has grown to include participants from 20 nations.
From 2015 until early this year when they were withdrawn by the White House, American Green Berets and National Guard instructors trained more than 27,000 Ukrainian soldiers at the Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine outside of the city of Lviv.
The years of training together have vastly improved the Ukrainian SOF fighting capabilities.
“What is an untold story is the international partnership with the special operations forces of a multitude of different countries,” LTG Jonathan P. Braga, the commander of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, told a group of Senators a few months ago in describing the planning cell. “They have absolutely banded together in a much-outsized impact” to support Ukraine’s military and special forces.
The US Air Force and Air National Guard have set up their own task force which is code-named the “Grey Wolf Team” which is advising the Ukrainian Air Force in defending the skies above their country against Russian aggression.
Members of the team spoke with the media from Coffee or Die magazine and explained how the task force is set up and works. “We exist because there’s a bunch of motivated people who want to help out. There’s not another team like this in the Air Force that’s doing the same thing,” said an unnamed Air Force fighter pilot that is part of the task force.
“Knowing their pilots, knowing their aircraft … we decide what we can reasonably ‘onboard’ and execute in order to create effects on the battlefield,” the pilot added.
The US to Send an Additional $450 million in Defense Aid:
Washington has agreed to end another $450 million in military aid to Ukraine Pentagon officials said on Thursday. Just last week the US agreed to send another $1 billion military aid package, which will include additional HIMARS medium-range missile systems.
Kyiv has been consistently asking for more advanced weaponry with longer ranges since the war began. The HIMARS will allow Ukrainian troops to hit the Russians at ranges that they are currently being targeted and puts them on somewhat equal footing although the Russians maintain a huge numerical advantage.
The US has provided more than $6 billion in military aid to Ukraine. The Ukrainians attended 3 weeks of training on the weapons that have been delivered
Riverine Patrol Boats Included in Aid Package:
The US Navy will provide Ukraine with 18 patrol boats as part of additional aid that was announced on Thursday. These patrol boats are used to protect rivers and inland waterways.
An unnamed Defense Department official said that the US was sending two small unit riverine boats that are 35 feet long, six maritime combat boats that are 40 feet long, and 10 medium force protection patrol boats that are 34 feet long.
These have limited ocean-going ability but the Ukrainians were issued vehicle-mounted Harpoon anti-ship missiles to defend their coastline. Just last week, the Ukrainians claimed to have hit and sunk a Russian tugboat using a Harpoon missile that was resupplying Snake Island.
“During the full-scale war in the Black Sea, (anti-ship missiles) were used twice, first the (Ukrainian-made) Neptune, and today, June 17, the Harpoon. Both uses were successful. At the same time, the air defense of Russian ships proved to be entirely ineffective,” the Ukrainian military said in a statement.
Steve Balestrieri is a 1945 National Security Columnist. He has served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer before injuries forced his early separation. In addition to writing for 19fortyfive.com and other military news organizations, he has covered the NFL for PatsFans.com for over 10 years. His work was regularly featured in the Millbury-Sutton Chronicle and Grafton News newspapers in Massachusetts.
7. U.S. Reverses East Asia Withdrawal Plan (from the archives in 1995)
This short 1995 article is very interesting to read some 27 years later. I came across this reading Clint Works' recent report on OPCON transition in Korea. Some fascinating assumptions and analysis from a time long ago. This is very much worth reflecting upon.
U.S. REVERSES EAST ASIA WITHDRAWAL PLAN
The United States has reversed plans to withdraw more military forces from East Asia, deciding to hold U.S. troop levels in the region at about 100,000 and keep at least an Army division and an Air Force combat wing in South Korea, the Pentagon announced yesterday. Concerns about unpredictable North Korean and Chinese intentions in a part of the world that has become increasingly important for U.S. trade and economic interests largely explain the U.S. decision to remain a major military force in the region.
This rationale was presented in a Defense Department report released yesterday and intended to ease anxieties among some Asian allies about U.S. forces possibly abandoning them. The last such report, issued in 1992 in the immediate wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, indicated that U.S. forces in the region would continue to decline through the end of the decade.
The new report argues for a continued strong U.S. military presence in East Asia to protect American interests and foster regional stability.
"To support our commitments in East Asia, we will maintain a force structure that requires approximately 100,000 personnel," the report says, settling on a number roughly equal to the scaled-back U.S. troop level in Europe.
In reducing overall U.S. troop strength by about one-third since the height of the Cold War, the Pentagon has moved from basing large concentrations of American soldiers in Europe and Asia to a strategy centered more on projecting force when necessary from bases in the United States.
But the drawdown in Europe, where more than 400,000 soldiers were stationed, has been more drastic than the cut in East Asia, where 135,000 U.S. soldiers were based in 1990.
The bulk of U.S. forces in East Asia have been located in South Korea and Japan.
"In light of the continuing conventional capability of North Korea, we have permanently halted a previously planned modest drawdown of our troops from South Korea, and are modernizing the American forces there as well as assisting the Republic of Korea in modernizing its forces," the Pentagon report stated.
At the same time, the report reaffirms U.S. plans to "shift from a leading to a supporting role," encouraging South Korea to bolster its own forces and pick up a larger share of regional defense costs. The United States has 37,000 troops in South Korea.
Reaffirming a U.S. commitment to defend Japan, the report says the United States will maintain an Air Force combat wing in the country as well as a Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa. Additionally, an aircraft carrier battle group and amphibious ready group will continue to be deployed in the region, the report says.
On China, the report notes that Beijing's military buildup has generated uncertainty about its plans and urges "greater transparency in China's defense programs, strategy and doctrine."
The Pentagon has expanded contacts with the Chinese military in hopes of establishing a more open relationship. U.S. naval vessels plan to dock in Chinese ports this spring for the first time since Beijing's 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators.
To enhance security and stability arrangements beyond the traditional bilateral agreements that exist between the United States and a number of East Asian countries, the 32-page report calls for the creation of new multilateral institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Earlier efforts by the Clinton administration to promote multilateralism created some anxiety among Asian officials fearful that such talk was simply a cover for a U.S. withdrawal. "While we are indeed stressing the increased importance of multilateral institutions, it's not at the cost of our primary attention to reinforcing the traditional security alliances we have in the region," Joseph Nye, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told reporters at a briefing.
8. Putin's Next Ukraine Disaster: The Russian Army Is Running Out of Ammo
Maybe Ukraine can adopt Muhammad Ali's "rope-a-dope" method and Russia can punch itself out. But I worry that if it does run out of conventional ammunition that Putin will then consider use of WMD.
Putin's Next Ukraine Disaster: The Russian Army Is Running Out of Ammo
Ukraine War Update: Russia Hammers Kyiv Despite Running Low On Ammunition – The Russian military unleashed missile attacks across Ukraine on Saturday, hitting the capital of Kyiv with the heaviest barrage of missiles in weeks. And with the indiscriminate targeting of civilian areas, the strikes hit both an apartment building as well as a kindergarten.
These strikes killed at least one person and wounded six more. Ukrainian firefighters rushed to put out the fire in a nine-story apartment building. “They have pulled out a seven-year-old girl. She is alive. Now they’re trying to rescue her mother,” Kyiv’s Mayor Vitali Klitschko said
“There are people under the rubble,” Klitschko added on the Telegram messaging app. He also stated that several people had been hospitalized. The strikes took place as leaders of the G7 met in Germany to consider whether to levy new sanctions against Moscow.
President Joe Biden condemned the strikes when asked if he had any reaction to the latest attacks by Russia. “Yes, it’s more of their barbarism,” Biden said. Russia conducted the airstrikes from the west, south, and north from Belarus.
With the Ukrainians claiming that Russia is trying to drag Belarus into the war, just a few hours after the airstrikes Russian President Putin promised Belarus that he’d send them missiles that are equipped with nuclear warheads.
Ukraine’s Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate said “missile strikes from the territory of Belarus are a large-scale provocation of the Russian Federation in order to further involve Belarus in the war against Ukraine.”
‘”Russian bombers hit directly from the territory of Belarus. Six Tu-22M3 aircraft were involved, which launched 12 Kh-22 cruise missiles.” The Directorate added that the missiles had been launched from airspace above the district of Petrikov in southern Belarus.
“After launching the missiles, they returned to Shaikovka airfield in Russia. The strike was launched on Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions. This is the first case of an airstrike on Ukraine directly from the territory of Belarus,” the Directorate said.
Ukraine War: Russia Running Low on Missiles and Ammo
The Russian military may soon have to slow down or even stop their offensive in the Donbas of eastern Ukraine due to heavy casualties and a general lack of ammunition, according to Western intelligence military experts.
Despite Russian forces concentrating artillery fire, as well as air and missile strike advances against Ukrainian forces, many analysts believe that Russian forces are running short of ammunition, particularly artillery.
One senior Western official told the Washington Post that the slow Russian advance that finally took Severodonetsk on Friday, when Ukrainian troops withdrew, is dependent on massive artillery strikes that can’t be sustained for long, the way they are burning through ammunition.
Ukraine characterized its pullback from the city as a “tactical withdrawal” to fight from higher ground in Lysychansk on the opposite bank of the Siverskyi Donets river. The Russians claim that they already have troops fighting inside of the city.
One Russian blogger said that manpower shortages are taking a toll on Moscow’s “special military operation and that they’d need upwards of 500,000 troops which they can’t field without a national mobilization, something Putin thus far has not opted to do.”
The Ukrainian deputy defense minister Anna Malyar has said that the Russian military is under pressure to bring all of Luhansk under Russian control by Sunday, perhaps explaining the lack of artillery ammunition.
The Russians, overconfident of their ability to finish the war in days, didn’t ramp up ammunition production. The Ukrainians too, have almost run out of their Soviet-era ammunition from their older weapons.
Steve Balestrieri is a 1945 National Security Columnist. He has served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer before injuries forced his early separation. In addition to writing for 19fortyfive.com and other military news organizations, he has covered the NFL for PatsFans.com for over 10 years. His work was regularly featured in the Millbury-Sutton Chronicle and Grafton News newspapers in Massachusetts.
9. Concerns that India is ‘back door’ into Europe for Russian oil
Excerpts:
“Indian refiners are clearly taking significant volumes of discounted Russian crude and then re-exporting a material proportion of refined product back out of the country,” said the Shore Capital analyst Craig Howie. “Given the obvious strength of petrol and diesel prices, this presumably supports robust refining margins for Indian downstream players. The commercial rationale here is of course understandable, but does seem to run contrary to the west’s clear objective to hamper the Russian economy and war machine.”
Oleg Ustenko, the chief economic adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, is more forthright. He told the Guardian: “We call on countries everywhere to show solidarity with Ukraine by rejecting Russia’s blood oil. But let’s be clear, the British and EU energy, shipping and insurance companies who are helping Putin complete this pivot to new markets out of pure greed are complicit in his war crimes.
“European leaders must get serious about their sanctions regimes and ban not just the import of Russian fossil fuels, but also heavily tax their trade, otherwise the tragedy ongoing in Ukraine will continue and even spread.”
For the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, the trade with Russia remains a political balancing act. While the oil price remains high, and there’s pressure on consumers at the pump, the risk of a western backlash will be weighed against the cost of cheap oil.
Trafigura said it “unconditionally condemns” the war and has “substantially reduced its purchases of Russian crude” . The company said it ceased all trading with Russian organisations prior to EU sanctions introduced last month. Trafigura said it does not have “operational control” of Nayara Energy or Vadinar. Reliance declined to comment.
Concerns that India is ‘back door’ into Europe for Russian oil
Volume of Russian crude bought and then exported by India suggests some of it may end up in European petrol stations
The huge blue and red hull of the SCF Primorye came into port at Vadinar, western Gujarat, India, earlier this month. The 84,000-tonne oil tanker, built in 2009 and sailing under the Liberian flag, had arrived from the port at Ust-Luga, a settlement in Russia near the border with Estonia.
Until 2017, the Vadinar oil refinery was controlled by Essar – the Indian owner of the Stanlow refinery in Ellesmere Port. Since then a consortium including the sanctioned Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft and the commodities trader Trafigura, which holds a 24.5% stake, have owned Nayara Energy, which runs the refinery.
The tanker’s arrival came as India ramped up imports of Russian oil. The Asian nation’s willingness to snap up Russian crude at discounts of up to 30% has undermined efforts from the US, Europe and the UK to deplete Vladimir Putin’s war coffers by curtailing imports. Russia raked in $20bn from oil exports in May, bouncing back to pre-invasion levels. Now, concerns are growing that India is being used as a potential back door into Europe for Russian oil supplies,given the surge in imports.
Before the invasion of Ukraine, India’s imports of Russian oil were negligible due to high freight costs. But recently, imports of Russian oil to India have increased. Vadinar’s owner, Nayara, purchased Russian oil in March – just before international restrictions on its exports were introduced – after a gap of a year, buying about 1.8m barrels from Trafigura, Reuters reported.
The volumes that India has been buying and exporting, however, suggest that some of the refined Russian crude may ultimately be used in Europe’s filling stations. It is not clear where the Russian crude brought into Vadinar on the SCF Primorye will be used. Vadinar’s owner’s declined to comment on the shipment or whether it was shipping Russian oil to Europe.
In May, India imported about 800,000 barrels of oil per day from Russia in Mayand the rating agency Fitch predicts that imports could soon increase further to 1m barrels per day, or 20% of India’s total imports. India, China and the United Arab Emirates have picked up the slack as Russian crude oil imports into the EU fell by 18% in May.
Putin told the Brics (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) business summit this week that “Russian oil supplies to China and India are growing noticeably”.
India’s 1.4 billion-strong population gives it reason to seek cheap supplies. But it’s a dangerous political game. “India is walking a tightrope,” said Alan Gelder, the vice-president of refining, chemicals and oil markets at Wood Mackenzie. “If you take too much, you do not want the west to sanction the rest of your economy.”
The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air said Reliance Industries’ Jamnagar refinery in Gujarat received 27% of its oil from Russia in May, up from 5% in April. The centre said about 20% of exported cargoes from Jamnagar left for the Suez canal, indicating that they were heading to Europe or the US. Shipments were made to France, Italy and the UK. However, there is no evidence that these shipments included Russian oil.
The UK has committed to phasing out Russian oil by the end of the year. Britain did not import any petrol before the war but diesel accounted for 18% of total demand. While trading Russian oil remains legal, the stigma attached to it means some international companies involved in fuel supplies may attempt to mask its origins. Some energy firms rushed to cut shipments from Russia but industry watchers said some drivers in the south-east of England were still likely to be filling up with diesel refined in Russia.
State processors of oil are attempting to secure six-month supply contacts for Russian crude to India, Bloomberg reported this month. The trio of state refiners – Indian Oil Corp, Hindustan Petroleum and Bharat Petroleum – declined to answer questions on whether they were importing Russian oil or exporting it to Europe.
Industry sources said tracking shipments of Russian oil to Europe via India is proving very difficult. “You’ll find that several shipments of crude will arrive at a port from different countries and be blended together. Tracking a hydrocarbon is basically impossible.”
There are several tactics shippers are using to hide the origin of Russian oil, sources said. Financially, paying in Chinese currency – rather than the industry standard dollar – is an option. Yuan-rouble trading volumes have surged 1,067% since February’s invasion of Ukraine. Transfers of oil cargoes from ship-to-ship have also spiked, suggesting oil is being switched from Russian flagged-vessels to other ships. Increasing numbers of vessels have been “going dark” by switching off their automative identification systems as thousands of gallons of the black stuff are transferred on the waves.
A third, more niche option to hide Russian transactions is to cut out using a currency and trade oil directly for other products, such as gold, food or weapons. Iran has previously taken payment from trading partners in gold rather than dollars.
“If a country or oil operator wants to hide the source of crude or oil products, it can very easily do so,” said Ajay Parmar, an oil market analyst at ICIS.
Sign up to the daily Business Today email or follow Guardian Business on Twitter at @BusinessDesk
“Indian refiners are clearly taking significant volumes of discounted Russian crude and then re-exporting a material proportion of refined product back out of the country,” said the Shore Capital analyst Craig Howie. “Given the obvious strength of petrol and diesel prices, this presumably supports robust refining margins for Indian downstream players. The commercial rationale here is of course understandable, but does seem to run contrary to the west’s clear objective to hamper the Russian economy and war machine.”
Oleg Ustenko, the chief economic adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, is more forthright. He told the Guardian: “We call on countries everywhere to show solidarity with Ukraine by rejecting Russia’s blood oil. But let’s be clear, the British and EU energy, shipping and insurance companies who are helping Putin complete this pivot to new markets out of pure greed are complicit in his war crimes.
“European leaders must get serious about their sanctions regimes and ban not just the import of Russian fossil fuels, but also heavily tax their trade, otherwise the tragedy ongoing in Ukraine will continue and even spread.”
For the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, the trade with Russia remains a political balancing act. While the oil price remains high, and there’s pressure on consumers at the pump, the risk of a western backlash will be weighed against the cost of cheap oil.
Trafigura said it “unconditionally condemns” the war and has “substantially reduced its purchases of Russian crude” . The company said it ceased all trading with Russian organisations prior to EU sanctions introduced last month. Trafigura said it does not have “operational control” of Nayara Energy or Vadinar. Reliance declined to comment.
10. Putin's Inner Circle Plotting Coup, Former CIA Official Says: 'It'll Happen All Of A Sudden And He'll Be Dead'
Hmmm... Can it happen?
Putin's Inner Circle Plotting Coup, Former CIA Official Says: 'It'll Happen All Of A Sudden And He'll Be Dead' - Benzinga
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly facing the threat of his trusted lieutenants clandestinely plotting to overthrow him if his Ukraine invasion turns out to be a failure.
Putin's close aides could attempt a coup in a very secretive manner so that they are not caught by the president, former CIA Moscow station chief Daniel Hoffman said, as reported by the Sun.
"It'll happen all of a sudden. And he'll be dead," he said.
The Ukraine invasion, according to the former U.S. intelligence official, may prove to be Putin's undoing. His inner circle could be gearing up for a mutiny to seize control of the conflict, especially Russia is unable to gain the upper hand in the war, he added.
Hoffman named three potential people as likely replacements for Putin if he is toppled. Chief of Putin's Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, director of Russia's secretive intelligence agency Alexander Bortnikov and Defense minister Sergei Shoigu are the three named by the former CIA official. Shoigu is the most probable replacement, given he had an important role in the Ukraine war.
Another former CIA agent, Ronald Marks, reportedly said chaos will ensue if Putin is unseated.
11. Russia's 'Shadow Mobilization' Accelerates With New Ethnic Units From The North Caucasus
Excerpts:
“Russia could come to a point when there is no longer any forward momentum because it has exhausted its resources,” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson told the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung in an interview, citing his country’s intelligence services.
Despite mounting uncertainty over Russian manpower and military equipment, the offers of comparatively high salaries and benefits have been fairly successful in recruiting contract soldiers.
Speaking to RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service, Aigul -- who is identified only by her first name in order to protect against persecution for speaking openly -- said that her husband signed up as a contract soldier and was sent to Ukraine, despite being fully aware of “the absurdity of this particular conflict.”
A native of Tatarstan, Aigul did not disclose the exact salary that her husband was being paid but said that it was above 100,000 rubles, or nearly $2,000 a month, well beyond the average Russian salary.
Her husband asked that his name be withheld and declined to be interviewed, but he did say that he remains disillusioned by the war and asked for a warning to be published to other men contemplating signing a contract to be sent to Ukraine.
“Don't go there if they don't force you,” he said.
Russia's 'Shadow Mobilization' Accelerates With New Ethnic Units From The North Caucasus
June 26, 2022 15:53 GMT
By Yekaterina Bezmenova
RFE/RL's Tatar-Bashkir Service
Reid Standish
Faced with a deepening personnel crisis within its military, Russia is scrambling to find fighters for its war in Ukraine and recruiting heavily from its North Caucasus region to form new units along ethnic lines who are then deployed with minimal training.
Regional officials from Daghestan, Ingushetia, and Kalmykia have announced plans to form rifle companies that are each made up of soldiers from a particular Russian republic. According to reporting by Caucasus.Realities, a regional news outlet of RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service, these national units are formed primarily of contract soldiers who have previous military training and have been targeted by local recruitment drives aimed at pressuring and enticing men of military age to join the war in Ukraine.
“It seems that the governors [of these North Caucasus republics] were instructed to form extra forces in addition to official recruitment through the military registration and enlistment offices,” Sergei Krivenko, director of the Citizen. Army. Law human rights group, told RFE/RL.
Krivenko says that Citizen. Army. Law is monitoring the formation of these units closely but says that much is still not clear about the conditions and circumstances they will all face, including pay and whether they will be officially classified as military personnel within the Defense Ministry or be designated as paramilitary or mercenary units, which could leave them in a legal gray area.
He adds that while the formation of such units is happening across all of Russia at the moment, the North Caucasus is a particular target, with the region home to some of the lowest living standards and salaries in the entire country.
“Conscripts and those who have signed a contract have the status of servicemen within the Russian armed forces,” Krivenko said. “But there is also a second category -- so-called 'volunteers' -- and it is still unclear who guarantees the contract and what legal obligations exist under it.”
Russian human rights groups and lawyers working on military issues have reported that enlistment offices have been calling in reservists for “checks” and “updates of personal information,” and then offering them contracts to go to war in Ukraine.
But such matters are not always so clear-cut, with Citizen. Army. Law saying that some reservists, especially those in the newly formed national units, believed they were signing a contract to serve in the armed forces but were actually classified differently and did not receive the same social benefits and guarantees of pay that are spelled out by law for military personnel.
“The creation of these national units is legal. There are no acts that prohibit their formation if it’s under the purview of the Ministry of Defense,” Krivenko said. “But if these units are being assembled by the authorities ‘to assist’ the Ministry of Defense, then this is illegal, although it appears everyone is turning a blind eye to [the law] now.”
'Shadow Mobilization'
After four months of war, the Kremlin has suffered heavy losses in its invasion of Ukraine but has so far declined to order a general mobilization of draft-age soldiers. Instead, recruiters across Russia have been calling eligible men to promote contract military service and reactivate reservists.
“These efforts represent a form of shadow mobilization. These are piecemeal efforts that allow the Russian military to sustain itself in the war but do not address the fundamental deficit in manpower,” Michael Kofman, director of Russia studies at CNA, a think tank in Virginia, wrote in an analysis at the beginning of June.
Russia is also conducting its spring draft, which seeks to conscript about 130,000 men between the ages of 18-27 by the middle of July.
Men from Chechnya's Akhmat Volunteer Battalion paint graffiti reading "Akhmat Is Power" in Mariupol in April.
Legally, conscripts can’t be sent to battle unless they have at least four months of training, and Moscow has said repeatedly it won’t deploy conscripts to Ukraine, but there have been several confirmed cases of inexperienced soldiers being sent into combat since the Kremlin’s February 24 invasion.
Mikhail Savva, a Russian human rights activist who is part of the official group documenting war crimes in Ukraine, told RFE/RL that the creation of units along ethnic lines is a symptom of the broader personnel crisis facing Russia’s military and that their use could lead to poorly disciplined units in Ukraine, which could cause greater civilian casualties in the war.
“Such formations are poorly controlled and poorly disciplined,” Savva said. “They pose a threat not only to the civilian population of Ukraine but also to other units of the Russian Army.”
Russia has already used military units formed along ethnic lines in the war in Ukraine, with Chechen brigades under the authority of Ramzan Kadyrov, the strongman leader of Chechnya, being part of the Russian invasion.
But the units have also played significant roles in some of the fighting, with Chechen fighters taking up a prominent position within the brutal and costly Russian effort to take the Ukrainian port city of Mariupol.
Denis Sokolov, an expert on the North Caucasus at the Free Russia Foundation, told RFE/RL that the move to create more units along ethnic lines is, in part, an effort to motivate soldiers.
“This is an attempt to tie reputation to the effectiveness of military operations because [many within the Russian forces] do not have the motivation to fight right now,” Sokolov said.
WATCH: Liberated Ukrainians have told the truth behind a propaganda video they were forced to take part in while their village was occupied by pro-Kremlin Chechen fighters.
Embed share
The code has been copied to your clipboard.
width px height px
The URL has been copied to your clipboard
No media source currently available
0:00 0:02:50 0:00
Daghestan, a Russian republic in the North Caucasus with a population of nearly 3 million people, has been a growing source of contract soldiers throughout the war in Ukraine.
Magomed Magomedov, the deputy editor in chief of Chernovik, an independent newspaper based in Daghestan, told RFE/RL that military service has long been seen as a “serious social lift” for many people in the region, providing better salaries and economic mobility than otherwise available.
“Among Daghestani contract servicemen, a very large percentage have a higher education, but after studying they could not find relevant work,” Magomedov said. “In the contract service, the income is slightly above average [for Daghestan]. Of course, [until February], many of these contractors didn’t expect that they would have to participate in a serious military operation.”
In Chechnya, such recruitment efforts have faced some opposition, with human rights groups and bloggers saying that they have received multiple appeals from men of fighting age and their relatives who say that they have been threatened into joining paramilitary groups in the region in order to replenish the ranks.
In one public case, four men who returned from Ukraine complained that they had not been paid their promised salaries and had been thrown into battle without proper equipment or supplies. Magomed Daudov, the speaker of the Chechen parliament, held a televised meeting with the men, where he reprimanded them on camera. Shortly afterward, the four men abandoned their claims.
Uncertainty Ahead
While both Russian and Ukrainian forces are facing high casualties in the intense fighting under way in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, Moscow has so far managed to sustain its offensive capabilities in the grinding war.
According to Ukrainian officials, the Kremlin’s aggressive recruitment of contract soldiers and reservists has helped bring in 40,000 to 50,000 troops to replenish those killed or incapacitated since Russia’s invasion began.
Still, Western intelligence assessments say that the Russian military may soon exhaust its combat capabilities and be forced to bring its Donbas offensive to a halt.
“Russia could come to a point when there is no longer any forward momentum because it has exhausted its resources,” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson told the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung in an interview, citing his country’s intelligence services.
Despite mounting uncertainty over Russian manpower and military equipment, the offers of comparatively high salaries and benefits have been fairly successful in recruiting contract soldiers.
Speaking to RFE/RL’s Tatar-Bashkir Service, Aigul -- who is identified only by her first name in order to protect against persecution for speaking openly -- said that her husband signed up as a contract soldier and was sent to Ukraine, despite being fully aware of “the absurdity of this particular conflict.”
A native of Tatarstan, Aigul did not disclose the exact salary that her husband was being paid but said that it was above 100,000 rubles, or nearly $2,000 a month, well beyond the average Russian salary.
Her husband asked that his name be withheld and declined to be interviewed, but he did say that he remains disillusioned by the war and asked for a warning to be published to other men contemplating signing a contract to be sent to Ukraine.
“Don't go there if they don't force you,” he said.
12. U.S. Foreign Policy Restraint Doesn't Mean Dumping Ukraine
Excerpts:
Ukraine is obviously not yet another Western quagmire. The US and the West are not directly engaged in the conflict. The costs we are carrying are primarily economic – aid transfers to Ukraine and the economic disruption costs of the war. But as the wealthiest state in world politics, surely the West has the resources to carry such minor pain for the valuable strategic goal of frustrating
Putin’s increasingly imperial behavior.
Indeed, supporting proxies rather than fighting directly is the very definition of restraint when the use of force is unavoidable. Proxies promote US/Western goals without directly involving NATO in conflict. Indeed, the West supported a proxy war against the Soviet Union forty years ago, in the 1980s, and it did not escalate into a nuclear exchange.
In short, the costs of this conflict to the West are low, and its strategic value of it is middling, if not high. And we are prudently engaged only as a proxy, not as a direct belligerent. That should clear the bar of a more restrained, but not isolationist, foreign policy.
U.S. Foreign Policy Restraint Doesn't Mean Dumping Ukraine
As the war on terror went off the rails in the last two decades, calls for the US to show greater restraint in its foreign policy grew. One hears such language regularly now from both US political parties. Crucially, however, greater caution in US foreign policy need not translate into abandoning Ukraine to be slowly taken apart by Russia. Greater ‘realism’ in US – and Western – foreign policy is not the same thing as cynicism. There is a clear prudential case for helping Ukraine.
Greater Restraint
By now the case for greater restraint in US foreign policy is well understood. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the sole superpower, far ahead of any potential rivals. While the administration of President Bill Clinton did not fully grasp just how distinct the US had become, the next administration of President George W. Bush did. And in the wake of the 9/11 terror strike, it launched a massive effort to re-make the Middle East, something only a state with the extraordinary leverage the US had would even contemplate. This led to exorbitant claims fifteen years that the US was an ‘empire.’
But the war on terror was beyond even America’s reach. Massive hard power advantages did not translate well into the soft power skills to re-make states. By the election of Barack Obama as president, American opinion was already turning against ‘stupid wars’ or ‘forever wars’. When Donald Trump took over the Republican party in 2015-16, he changed the internationalist consensus of America’s ‘national security’ party toward ‘America First.’ There is now wide agreement that the US should do less abroad, particularly that it should husband its resources for the looming challenge of rising China.
Restraint Does Not Mean Isolationism; It Means Prudence
Applied to Ukraine, this framework need not mean the abandonment of Ukraine or forcing it into concessions. Since Henry Kissinger argued a few weeks ago that the US should bully Ukraine into concessions to end the war, this argument has spread. Russia is too important; the possibility of nuclear war is too great; the global costs of rising food or fuel prices are too great.
– Treating Russian ‘importance’ as some kind of blank check for bad behavior asking for Putin to do this again. That is not caution but recklessness.
– Nuclear escalation is highly unlikely (if Putin were afraid of a war with NATO, he would not be grinding up his army in the Donbas) and are being used up as an excuse for stop support for Ukraine.
– Complaints about rising costs are just decadent. Russia is operating death squads in Ukraine, but the West cannot handle gas at $5/gallon?
Behind this, though is the notion that the US and West should not over-extend, that prudence in foreign policy means letting Ukraine deal with Russia alone, much as it means abandoning Taiwan to China.
But restraint need not mean isolationism. Exercising greater prudence does not mean automatically damning US military action. There will be times when the US will engage, or even fight, just as there will be times when it should withdraw or retrench. Caution in foreign policy means ranking US objectives and showing care in the means used.
By that standard, both Iraq and Afghanistan were, indeed, unnecessary wars. The course of those countries was not that important to the United States, and the heavy American footprint in fractured societies pulled the US into unwinnable quagmires (which the US should have learned from the Vietnam war).
Ukraine is not this; it is not a direct American intervention, and the war’s importance, as a direct challenge by Russia to the post-Cold War settlement, is vastly more important than the war on terror.
Proxy Wars are Not Wars of Intervention
Ukraine is obviously not yet another Western quagmire. The US and the West are not directly engaged in the conflict. The costs we are carrying are primarily economic – aid transfers to Ukraine and the economic disruption costs of the war. But as the wealthiest state in world politics, surely the West has the resources to carry such minor pain for the valuable strategic goal of frustrating Putin’s increasingly imperial behavior.
Indeed, supporting proxies rather than fighting directly is the very definition of restraint when the use of force is unavoidable. Proxies promote US/Western goals without directly involving NATO in conflict. Indeed, the West supported a proxy war against the Soviet Union forty years ago, in the 1980s, and it did not escalate into a nuclear exchange.
In short, the costs of this conflict to the West are low, and its strategic value of it is middling, if not high. And we are prudently engaged only as a proxy, not as a direct belligerent. That should clear the bar of a more restrained, but not isolationist, foreign policy.
Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; website) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.
13. Amid deepening divisions, US no longer seen as beacon of light around the world
The irony is that those who tout American exceptionalism and being the city on the hill are doing the most damage to the perception.
Excerpts:
The headline, in my view, is that America’s internal divisions over race, policy and politics are visible to many around the world. As the famous saying goes, “You can run, but you can’t hide.”
Nor should we. America needs other countries and other countries need us.
But as a beacon of light for democracies, we are a bit dimmed. Our cracks and fissures are showing, and that does not bode well for competing in the world and certainly not for making arguments in favor of democracy over authoritarianism.
We need to find ways to address our divisions and pull ourselves together. The Pew survey is a warning light that our engine needs to be checked — and fast.
Amid deepening divisions, US no longer seen as beacon of light around the world
BY TARA D. SONENSHINE, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 06/26/22 12:00 PM ET
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
The Hill · by Brad Dress · June 26, 2022
People care about their image, how others perceive them. So do nations.
Every nation extends its values and interests onto the world stage, generating public opinion. How citizens and governments respond to a nation (positively or negatively) can impact that nation’s power and influence, both real and perceived. That, in turn, affects policy and people — how we live within the global community. In short, what others think of you matters.
Into that complex public opinion vortex comes a new report from Pew Research Center, which has been measuring international attitudes for decades. The findings of this new Pew survey on international perceptions of the United States, Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) include critical data for all of us, especially Americans.
Pew’s data were collected from February of this year through the third week of May — a critical window when things were changing across the globe.
On Feb. 24, Russia began a full-scale military assault on Ukraine leading to a massive refugee and humanitarian crisis and an urgent need for military equipment and troops from the West.
President Biden had just entered his second year in office, having endured a painful evacuation of American troops from Afghanistan in August. The COVID-19 pandemic, with its deep divisions over masks and vaccines, was still raging.
Jan. 6was barely in the rearview mirror and divisive congressional hearings would be underway by spring. Against that backdrop, how did America fare?
First, the good news: International public opinion of the United States remains positive in the 18 developed countries surveyed, according to the report. Most global citizens say that the U.S. is a reliable partner, and ratings for President Biden are mostly positive. NATO’s image is positive and improving even among countries such as Sweden, which is not (yet) a member.
Unsurprisingly, the view of Russia, which we have blamed for the troubles in Europe, is negative and falling. In 10 countries, 10 percent or less of those polled expressed a favorable opinion of Russia. Positive views of Russian President Vladimir Putin are in single digits in more than half of the nations polled.
And our strategic competitor China is not held in high regard. Chinese President Xi Jinping gets mostly low ratings, except among people in Singapore and Malaysia.
But there is a corollary to the story about America, and the devil is in the details:
Over the past couple of years, advanced nations have found reason to be very concerned about the health of American democracy. In 2021, more than half of people in most nations surveyed said democracy in the U.S. “used to be a good example for other nations to follow” but no longer is. Large majorities in nearly all nations polled believe that there are strong conflicts in America among supporters of different political parties.
And although Biden is still well-liked around the world, his approval ratings have slipped since 2021, with confidence in his leadership dropping significantly in 13 countries —falling 20 percentage points or more in Italy, Greece, Spain, Singapore and France. (Biden’s drop is bigger that what Obama experienced in his second year.) Some of that drop may reflect disappointment over the way the U.S. evacuated from Afghanistan, how we handled COVID-19 and the U.S. economy.
It should be noted that America received historically low international ratings during President Trump’s tenure, and global attitudes toward Trump were overwhelmingly negative.
Within the United States, Trump divided Republicans and Democrats more than any incoming president in the previous 30 years — a gap that only grew after he took office, according to earlier Pew reports.
What’s the takeaway from this new survey, and what can we do about it?
The headline, in my view, is that America’s internal divisions over race, policy and politics are visible to many around the world. As the famous saying goes, “You can run, but you can’t hide.”
Nor should we. America needs other countries and other countries need us.
But as a beacon of light for democracies, we are a bit dimmed. Our cracks and fissures are showing, and that does not bode well for competing in the world and certainly not for making arguments in favor of democracy over authoritarianism.
We need to find ways to address our divisions and pull ourselves together. The Pew survey is a warning light that our engine needs to be checked — and fast.
Tara D. Sonenshine is the Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice in Public Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
The Hill · by Brad Dress · June 26, 2022
14. How drones will transform battlefield medicine – and save lives
How drones will transform battlefield medicine – and save lives
by Janet A. Aker
MHS Communications
June 27, 2022
Drones carrying fresh blood products to wounded troops on the front lines may be critical for military medicine in a conflict against a "near-peer" adversary. (Photo: Shutterstock)
by Janet A. Aker
MHS Communications
June 27, 2022
Blood loss or “bleeding out” is the leading cause of preventable death on the battlefield, military health experts say.
So one of the best ways to save lives during combat operations is to provide blood products to forward deployed medics and corpsmen as soon as possible.
During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, getting the needed blood products to injured warfighters was typically not a major challenge when the U.S. military controlled the skies and maintained a nearby network of medical facilities.
“We were pretty reliant on medevac 'dust off' to deliver our blood,” said Air Force Col. (Dr.) Stacy Shackelford, chief of the Joint Trauma System.
However, in future conflicts against a “near-peer” adversary, Shackelford said, that could be far more difficult. Injured troops may have to remain at the frontlines for days while needing blood transfusions or other major medical care.
The solution: Drones may become essential to combat medicine.
“I think it's going to come down to drone delivery of blood by some type of unmanned vehicle that can fly in and drop off more blood or more bullets, whatever is needed,” Shackelford said.
Resupply by Drones
“We think that drone resupply of blood and immediate-need medical products are really just around the corner,” said Dr. Adam Meledeo, a research scientist for coagulation and blood research at the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas.
“There are multiple off-the-shelf solutions that are being considered,” and DHA is funding a number of other innovations to optimize the ability to provide drones in the battle space, Meledeo said.
Yet using drones to resupply blood and other medical supplies will be challenging.
“There’s obviously trade-offs between some of these different platforms, such as making sure that we have a vehicle that's fast, and somewhat stealthy…and has a very large battery that will be able to keep it airborne for a much longer period of time if it needs to loiter somewhere in anticipation of there being a problem,” Meledeo said.
“There's also been some talk of outfitting some of our combat hardware drones that are already in use with alternative payloads that would be able to supply blood, medical supplies and really just about anything, such as MRE’s, ammunition, and water” to frontline medics or service members caring for wounded soldiers, he explained.
Blood Resupply
“The primary issue with blood resupply is that it has to be maintained at specific temperatures, as do a number of pharmaceuticals including certain pain medications, and antibiotics,” Meledeo said.
“The biggest technological hurdles right now are being able to maintain those temperatures inside those drone payloads very consistently, at a variety of altitudes, and a variety of different ambient conditions for potentially lengthy periods of time, without drawing too much power away from the system itself.”
The Marines Corps used drones for resupply during an exercise in Australia. Drones have also been used in Rwanda and Uganda to transport medical supplies to rural areas across mountain ranges and in bad weather, Meledeo said.
“I think that we're going to get there much faster than we had initially anticipated,” he said.
The use of drones for future near-peer conflicts is starting to filter down into the operational forces as a potential solution in the near term, he noted.
Wounded Warrior Evacuation
“In the long term, there are a number of lines of effort, such as involving drones for the extraction of patients,” Meledeo said.
U.S. partner countries are examining some of these platforms that can evacuate a patient rapidly without risking other personnel in potentially contested airspace, he added.
How does one transport casualties stealthily?
“Part of it is marking the vehicles appropriately with standard medical nomenclature. That gives you the Geneva Convention protection. But, obviously, we go up against certain enemies that will not care about that at all,” he explained.
Artificial Intelligence
Stealth technology continues to improve. When it comes to drones, “it may be just a matter of keeping the drones low to the ground, and that they're being piloted by an artificial intelligence system,” Meledeo explained.
“So, hopefully, AI will be faster to react than a human would be. But even still, I think there are a lot of concerns about” the use of drones to extract wounded warfighters.
“The long-term goal…is to actually have some sort of robotics onboard these drones that would be doing medical care to the patient during transport,” he said.
DARPA AI Initiative
A new Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiative called “The In the Moment Program” aims to ultimately give AI systems the same complex, rapid decision-making capabilities as military medical staff and trauma surgeons who are in the field of battle based on algorithms of care and decision-making capabilities.
One example is smart tourniquets that will be able to detect whether they need to be released. Other automatically guided solutions include IV placement or catheter placement, Meledeo said.
“It sounds like science fiction. It is still a little bit science fiction, but it's not as far off as it may sound,” he said.
“At least on a rudimentary level, the community is already pursuing a lot of automated solutions or artificial intelligence-derived solutions for automation of different medical processes.”
This research is underway but there’s no timeline on this concept.
“Hopefully, we'll be able to get some confident results from some of these different technologies that are going to be packaged together in this system and enable the drones to then not only resupply at the point of injury, but also actually take care of the transportation and the management of patients during that transportation.”
15. Five things to watch for at this week’s NATO meeting
The five:
A show of support for Ukraine
Turkey’s battle over Finland and Sweden’s membership bids
Eyeing the China threat
Nations to upgrade force commitments
Focus on defense spending
Five things to watch for at this week’s NATO meeting
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · June 26, 2022
President Biden will convene with allies this week at a NATO summit in Madrid, which is expected to focus on the security alliance projecting its unity and coordination amid Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The meeting, which follows the Group of Seven summit in Germany, is expected to cover a hosts of issues beyond the Russian war, including the bids by Finland and Sweden to join the organization.
Here are five things to watch for at the NATO meeting.
A show of support for Ukraine
Russia’s war in Ukraine has entered its fourth month and NATO leaders are expected to make showing their support for Ukraine a top priority.
This is a top priority for Biden, who has put support for Ukraine front-and-center to his agenda.
“He’s going into a NATO Summit where the alliance has truly never been more unified,” said John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications.
Biden, on his visit to Poland in March, touted that Putin has not been able to divide NATO and has consistently stressed that the most important thing is for the U.S. and allies to stay coordinated. He also reinforced his commitment to the collective defense principle of NATO’s Article 5, which states that an attack against one NATO apply is an attack against all.
Ukrainian President Zelensky will virtually address the NATO meeting. Biden said a visit to Ukraine is unlikely on this trip.
Zelensky’s address will “give the leaders an opportunity to hear from him directly and will also enable NATO Allies to showcase their continued resolve to support Ukraine as it defends itself,” a senior administration official said.
Turkey’s battle over Finland and Sweden’s membership bids
Finland and Sweden have applied for NATO membership but the Nordic countries are held up in talks with Turkey, which has opposed the bids due to support from those two governments toward Kurdish groups that Turkey considers to be terrorist organizations.
Turkey can essentially veto Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, since all members must agree to taking on new states.
It’s not clear if Biden, who has voiced his support for Finland and Sweden, will meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the issue. Senior administration officials, when asked about a meeting, have pointed to opportunities for leaders to meet on the margins of the summit even if there are no scheduled meetings.
Daniel Fried, former U.S. ambassador to Poland and an expert at the Atlantic Council, argued that Biden should become more directly involved in addressing the disagreements with Erdogan.
“Biden should be hands on with this one,” Fried said.
Turkey has indicated that it does not see the summit as a deadline in deciding whether to accept the Nordic countries. With Turkey maintaining its opposition to their membership, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg hasn’t provided a timeline on when Finland and Sweden might officially join.
Rose Gottemoeller, a former deputy secretary general of NATO, predicted it would take at least a year for the two countries to join the alliance if Turkey drops its objections. The legislative bodies in each NATO member state must offer approval.
In Congress, there has been bipartisan agreement over the Finland and Sweden bids, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee easily passed a resolution earlier this month pressing NATO to quickly admit them.
Eyeing the China threat
Leaders at the NATO Summit are expected to endorse a new strategic concept – the first since 2010 – which for the first time will explicitly address challenges posed by China.
Kirby on Thursday told reporters that the strategic concept builds on months of conversations about the threat that China poses to international security.
“I think it’s a reflection of our allies’ equal concerns over the effect of Chinese economic practices, use of forced labor, intellectual theft, and coercive aggressive behavior not just in the region but elsewhere around the world. That they believe it’s important to factor China into the new strategic concept,” he said.
The White House has also highlighted that leaders from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea are participating in the summit for the first time this year.
While Russia is the most immediate threat to the alliance, China is considered a multifaceted and longer-term threat. The alliance is expected to discuss economic and cyber threats emanating from China as well as security in the Indo Pacific.
Biden administration officials have insisted that they continue to be focused on China even while addressing the war in Ukraine.
“Instead of distracting us from the Indo-Pacific and China, the president’s leadership with respect to supporting Ukraine has actually galvanized leaders in that region and effectively linked out efforts in Europe and in Asia and those Asian countries that will be participating in the NATO summit, I think speak volumes about that fact,” Kirby said.
Still, experts say that the U.S. is inevitably having to split its attention between security in Europe and Asia.
“The United States is in more of a balancing act,” said Gottemoeller.
Nations to upgrade force commitments
NATO members are expected to make good on commitments to increase force posture to bolster defense of allies during Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Biden administration officials said the new plans will help strengthen NATO and deter Russian aggression at a critical moment.
“The President has been very clear in the context of the Ukraine crisis that NATO would defend every inch of NATO territory,” a senior administration official said on a call with reporters.
Fried said there will be particular discussions about bulking up NATO’s presence in the Baltic states and Poland, which are close neighbors to Ukraine.
“What the Ukraine war shows us is that Russia could attack but it also shows us that it is possible to defend the Baltics,” he said, noting that the Russian forces have performed below expectations. “There’s an argument that NATO ought to up its eastern deployments to brigade strengths.”
Focus on defense spending
Talk of upping defense spending has been a contentious topic for the alliance, particularly during the previous administration when former President Trump pressured countries to spend more on defense to meet NATO’s target that each member state dedicates 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense spending.
The war in Ukraine has caused nations to commit to spending more on their defense, most notably Germany, which pledged earlier this year to spend above 2 percent GDP after years of lagging below that level.
“All along in this crisis, the NATO countries have been pledging more for defense spending,” said Gottemoeller. “I think all of them are going to be looking at their defense budgets.”
Gottemoeller said she wouldn’t be surprised if there is a recommitment to the 2 percent pledge or concrete pledges on further defense spending.
A senior administration official said the U.S. expects the “upward trajectory” of defense spending over the last seven years to continue and accelerate and would work to make sure the alliance is well-resourced.
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · June 26, 2022
16. The Other Big Lessons That the U.S. Army Should Learn From Ukraine
Lessons:
Europe Over Asia
No Place to Hide
Rotary Wing at Risk
Exercise to Reality
Double Down on Security Force Assistance
Excerpts:
The war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conventional conflict of the 21st century, with two relatively advanced militaries facing each other on the battlefield. Military observers around the world are watching closely, and drawing a host of preliminary lessons for those trying to understand the character of current and future wars. As David Johnson has rightly noted, the U.S. military cannot simply assume that it would do better than the Russian military if their roles were reversed. He also argues that the war in Ukraine gives the Army “the same opportunity for introspection” as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which caused the Army to completely overhaul its warfighting doctrine. But as he pointedly observes, the Army may fail to grasp this unique preview of future war and simply find lessons in Ukraine that buttress its current thinking.
To take advantage of this opportunity, Army leaders need to go beyond the broad lessons that Wormuth discussed last month. They need to rigorously reexamine the ways in which the service trains, organizes, and equips its soldiers, and must be willing to change the Army’s trajectory wherever necessary. They cannot afford to miss the lessons of this terrible modern war, so that the Army is as prepared as possible for the challenges that it will face in the future.
The Other Big Lessons That the U.S. Army Should Learn From Ukraine - War on the Rocks
The war in Ukraine is the first major land war between two modern militaries equipped with advanced conventional weapons in decades. Its emerging lessons could fundamentally upend our understanding of conflicts that are primarily fought on land, and thus dramatically reshape the future of the U.S. Army. But the U.S. Army risks missing the most important lessons from the conflict, or, even worse, learning the wrong lessons entirely. The key lessons that could threaten its evolving new doctrine and expensive investments could too easily be abandoned or ignored, leaving the Army unprepared for the future battlefield.
At the end of May, Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth publicly identified several key lessons that her service is learning from the war in Ukraine. Russian battlefield failures, she argued, affirmed the critical importance of leadership, training, discipline, and effective logistics during protracted conflicts. She also stressed that the Army needs to reduce electronic signals, especially from cell phones; defend against advanced drones; and maintain munitions stockpiles and the defense industrial base.
These are all worthy lessons, some of which we’ve written about before. But they do not go far enough in examining the ways in which this unexpected conventional war in Europe challenges some of the Army’s deeply embedded assumptions about future war. The fighting in Ukraine has revealed at least five additional lessons that the U.S. Army must learn in order to adequately prepare for future battlefields. The Army needs to prioritize Europe over Asia; recognize that it may not be able to hide on future battlefields; accept that its helicopters may not be survivable in future high-intensity conflicts; exercise how it will continue to fight in the face of heavy battlefield losses; and sustain and expand its security force assistance capabilities.
Europe Over Asia
For the past several years, the Army has spent untold energy on justifying its relevance in a potential war with China. Without question, the Army would provide essential support for any war in the Pacific, including theater logistics and engineering, air and missile defense, and potentially long-range fires. But its new concept of multi-domain operations emphasizes offensive operations, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Yet as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has noted, the Indo-Pacific is primarily an air and maritime theater, which necessarily limits the Army’s ability to employ its ground maneuver forces there. Moreover, many observers now suggest that the defense is becoming the dominant form of warfare, challenging the Army’s long preoccupation with the offense. Furthermore, Russia’s naked aggression against Ukraine reminds us that Europe is also a vital U.S. national interest and that the continental European theater is dominated by the threat of land wars. The Army must embrace its vital role deterring future Russian threats to Europe and, if necessary, fighting to defend America’s NATO allies.
One of the most notable strategic consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has been the decision by Finland and Sweden to jettison their long-standing traditions of neutrality and to apply to join NATO. Though Turkish objections are delaying (and could ultimately block) their entry, the United States has reportedly offered security assurances to both countries, lest Russia seek to punish them before they are covered by NATO’s Article 5 collective defense provision. This will require the Army to shift priorities quickly and focus on helping deter and defend against the Russian threat along these newly expanded borders.
Protecting Sweden will largely fall to the U.S. and allied navies, as the Baltic Sea becomes what some have called a “NATO lake.” But Finland shares a jagged 800-mile land border with Russia, which nearly triples the length of land borders with Russia that the United States and NATO must now protect from direct aggression. Finland has fairly robust military capabilities (including the ability to surge to a force of 900,000 troops in an emergency), and has prepared to meet a Russian threat for decades. Those threats, however, have increased substantially, which will require closer mutual cooperation. Finland (like Sweden) has participated in NATO activities and operations for years, but the U.S. Army can learn a great deal from its Finnish counterparts, especially about cold-weather operations. It can also improve interoperability and crisis-response mechanisms with Finland — through increased combined training and exercises, sustained security force assistance, and possibly even a rotational presence of Army combat forces. The Army’s new Alaska-based division could also contribute to such efforts. Finally, the Army should consider formally linking the Alaska National Guard with Finland’s military through the State Partnership Program (discussed below) to ensure long-term continuity in military cooperation and to further improve Army readiness for Arctic warfare.
No Place to Hide
Since February 24, Russian forces in Ukraine have become bright butterflies pinned to the world’s display board. The explosion of open-source intelligence — the vast array of social-media posts, smartphone photos, commercial drone videos, and cheap commercial satellite imagery — has revealed the precise locations of Russian military forces in ways that are unprecedented in the annals of warfare. Ukrainian soldiers and civilians are using cell-phone videos, social media, and a wide range of private networks to report on Russian movements. Anyone with a smartphone or a laptop can now follow real-time information about Ukrainian attacks on Russian troop movements.
A transparent battlefield poses immense challenges for the U.S. Army. For decades, the Army has been organized around massive, hard-to-conceal military formations that include tanks as well as infantry combat and fighting vehicles. These formations closely resemble the types of units the Russians are employing in Ukraine. Moreover, advanced sensors can increasingly penetrate the cover of darkness, which would strip away a major battlefield advantage that the United States has enjoyed for decades. And this problem will only intensify in the future, as the rapidly expanding use of artificial intelligence to track and target subtle patterns of military movements promises even more deadly detectability.
Furthermore, the intricate web of U.S. reinforcements and logistics extending from the United States and nearby friendly bases is also becoming dangerously transparent. Army units rely heavily on complex logistics that flow through overseas staging bases and are delivered by long transport convoys, often involving unsecured commercial supply chains. These vast networks will all become visible to America’s most capable adversaries — and if they can be seen, they can be targeted. In fact, a determined adversary might find that it is both easier and more effective to render U.S. Army units inoperable by destroying these vital logistics pipelines instead of targeting fighting units directly.
The future transparency of this expansive web of support should be nothing short of terrifying to U.S. military planners. The ability to achieve surprise, to protect one’s logistics, and to conceal the force from persistent detection is evaporating. These factors have staggering implications for future Army doctrine, organizations, and platforms. And as we have heard from some of those who serve there, these growing vulnerabilities are rarely incorporated realistically into Army exercises, especially at the combat training centers, because they are simply too disruptive. That needs to change.
Rotary Wing at Risk
Since Vietnam, the Army has relied heavily on its extensive fleet of more than 3,500 helicopters to provide battlefield mobility, reconnaissance, supporting fires, and resupply for its soldiers. But it has been reliably able to do so mostly because its opponents have often lacked an air force, been unable to muster any real air defenses, and were largely incapable of effectively attacking U.S. helicopter bases. Moreover, on the rare occasions when adversaries fielded an air force, the U.S. Air Force quickly achieved unchallenged air supremacy over the battlefield. As a result, the Army has been able to rely on helicopters for a wide range of operations, including close air support, large-scale troop assaults, and reliable resupply deliveries.
No longer. Few, if any, of those permissive conditions exist today in Ukraine, and even fewer will likely exist in future high-intensity conflicts. Both sides have suffered enormous helicopter losses so far — with the Russians alone believed to have lost more than 170 helicopters to date. That compares with fewer than the 75 U.S. helicopters lost in combat during two decades of fighting Iraq and Afghanistan — far less deadly conflicts where the enemy had no air force and virtually no shoulder-fired missiles, much less swarms of lethal drones or advanced air defenses.
The currents of modern warfare are rapidly turning against the Army’s most important type of aircraft, and one of its most expensive modernization priorities. The Army must prepare to operate on a future battlefield where helicopters may be unable to fly and survive — or, at best, can only be used sparingly owing to the extensive supporting efforts that will be required to protect them from attack. It needs to invest more heavily in expendable drones and loitering munitions for reconnaissance, surveillance, and close air support missions, and rely more extensively on survivable Air Force and Navy jets. Cargo may need to be delivered by expendable supply drones, or be dispatched by crewed or robotic ground vehicles. And instead of flying to targets deep in the enemy’s rear, troops may need to maneuver in more survivable armored vehicles, or infiltrate with dispersed light infantry forces on foot. The considerable resources that the Army is investing in its future rotary wing fleet would be far better spent on developing many of these unmanned and alternative capabilities.
Exercise to Reality
Russian and Ukrainian forces have both sustained crippling losses of units, equipment, and personnel during the past four months, and will likely continue to do so until the war ends. Staggering losses of troops and materiel will be an unavoidable characteristic of any future high-intensity conflict. That means that the Army must figure out how to weather steep losses in soldiers, aircraft, and armored vehicles of all types while continuing to fight effectively. The U.S. military actively prepared for this eventuality during the Cold War, since a massive Soviet invasion of Western Europe would have inevitably caused enormous attrition. But the plans and skills required to adapt and effectively continue to fight in such a grim situation eroded quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and were never required in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Though Army leaders have acknowledged the need to rebuild this resilience in the force, very little concrete progress has been made. Back in 2016, we argued that the Army needed to practice how to rebuild units after devastating casualties, and improve the resilience of those who must continue fighting in such challenging conditions. Yet it took until last year for the Army to publish its first new doctrine on this topic since 1992, and we’ve been told that major exercises involve little if any practice operationalizing these techniques. We also argued that the Army should practice standing up entirely new units, reinvigorate the Individual Ready Reserve, and build an Army mobilization plan that would enable it to expand rapidly if necessary. As the war in Ukraine settles into a long war of attrition, it will continue to be a sobering reminder that the Army must be able to fight and win in future wars with potentially crippling losses.
Double Down on Security Force Assistance
One of the clear success stories in Ukraine is the degree to which the U.S. military has helped strengthen the Ukrainian military since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In an effort that largely went unnoticed by the media and most military observers alike, a wide range of U.S. forces has quietly rotated in and out of Ukraine to train its military. These efforts have included training in both conventional and unconventional tactics, in using advanced U.S. weaponry, and in professionalizing its officer and NCO corps.
Though regular U.S. Army units and special operations forces have been involved in this training, the unsung hero of the Ukrainian training effort is a little-known National Guard initiative called the State Partnership Program. Since its inception in 1993, the program has created lasting partnerships between the National Guard of a U.S. state and over 80 foreign countries. The partners conduct a wide range of security cooperation activities together, and since the Guard personnel do not transfer to new units every couple of years like active troops do, the partners are able to deepen their cooperation and trust over decades. Ukraine and California have been partners since the program’s inception, and have intensified their cooperation since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The chief of the California National Guard, Maj. Gen. David Baldwin, has been working with Ukrainian forces for decades, and started helping them prepare for a potential invasion several weeks before it occurred. His phone started ringing immediately after the invasion started, as senior Ukrainian senior leaders started asking for help, and he has been in daily contact with his Ukrainian counterparts ever since. The value of such enduring contacts and relationships of trust in both directions during this war has proven priceless.
For the U.S. Army, this notable success reaffirms the Army’s investments in its security force assistance capabilities, including the relatively new security force assistance brigades. The assistance provided to Ukraine can serve as a model for how to help U.S. partners prepare to fight against adversaries that the United States may not want to fight directly because of the risks of escalation (especially against nuclear powers). The reasons why President Joe Biden has chosen not to intervene directly in the Ukrainian conflict might replay themselves in a wide range of future contingencies, up to and including Taiwan. The successes of its security force assistance programs in Ukraine should energize the Army to continue resourcing and expanding these efforts with critical partners around the world.
The war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conventional conflict of the 21st century, with two relatively advanced militaries facing each other on the battlefield. Military observers around the world are watching closely, and drawing a host of preliminary lessons for those trying to understand the character of current and future wars. As David Johnson has rightly noted, the U.S. military cannot simply assume that it would do better than the Russian military if their roles were reversed. He also argues that the war in Ukraine gives the Army “the same opportunity for introspection” as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which caused the Army to completely overhaul its warfighting doctrine. But as he pointedly observes, the Army may fail to grasp this unique preview of future war and simply find lessons in Ukraine that buttress its current thinking.
To take advantage of this opportunity, Army leaders need to go beyond the broad lessons that Wormuth discussed last month. They need to rigorously reexamine the ways in which the service trains, organizes, and equips its soldiers, and must be willing to change the Army’s trajectory wherever necessary. They cannot afford to miss the lessons of this terrible modern war, so that the Army is as prepared as possible for the challenges that it will face in the future.
Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.) and Dr. Nora Bensahel are visiting professors of strategic studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and senior fellows at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. They are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears regularly. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.
17. Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine by Andrew Milburn
Excerpts:
How Does This End?
If senior Ukrainian officers are to be believed, the war will not end with a ceasefire while Russian boots are on Ukrainian soil. They are determined not only to remove Putin’s gains since the beginning of the war in February, but also to recover areas of the Donbas that have been under de facto Russian control since 2014. Crimea, some Ukrainians admit, may prove to be a bridge too far, but many are determined that the threshold for Ukrainian victory must also include this region, the annexation of which eight years ago sparked the current period of enmity between the two countries.
The problem lies in squaring the wellspring of Ukrainian resolve with the military’s limited resources. Ukraine needs weapon systems that will give it a real edge over its adversary and help staunch the flow of casualties. Without this edge, no amount of determination and courage will be enough to avoid a prolonged war of attrition, and such a contest will favor the side with the greatest numbers. For Ukraine, the darkest days may be yet to come.
Time Is Not on Kyiv’s Side: Training, Weapons, and Attrition in Ukraine - Modern War Institute
The battalion commander shrugged helplessly when we advised him that five days was a completely inadequate amount of time in which to train his soldiers. “This is all we have—they are needed on the front,” he replied with grim finality. A few days later, on a separate course that we were running for his medics, half of our class disappeared on the second day. “We have had casualties,” was the only explanation we received. Even in units that fall within the Ukrainian special operations command, most soldiers are sent to the front line with very little training. In one such unit, we estimated that just 20 percent had even fired a weapon before heading to combat.
On May 3, the Ukrainian parliament passed a law that allows territorial defense units—the country’s home guard—to be deployed to combat outside their home regions. These units are manned by local volunteers who typically have received very little preparation. We were soon swamped by requests for training courses. In the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, a town hall meeting to explain the new policy to local territorial defense volunteers was disrupted by wives alarmed at the prospect of their part-time soldier husbands deploying to the front.
Each anecdote by itself a data point, but together they tell a story that belies the relentless optimism that has pervaded Ukrainian representation of the war from the outset. After four months of grinding attrition, the Ukrainian army is facing a manpower shortage.
Every day in the current fighting, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said earlier this month, around sixty to one hundred Ukrainian soldiers are killed and another five hundred wounded in combat. A more recent New York Times article puts that figure much higher—at one hundred to two hundred deaths a day. To put that in context, during the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, one of the bloodiest periods of the war, US deaths were roughly two hundred a week—and among a force almost twice the size of the Ukrainian army.
Aside from Zelenskyy’s admission, the Ukrainian government has been largely reticent about releasing casualty figures and Western governments have offered few of their own assessments, but grim reports from the front line indicate that Ukrainian casualties are high—and perhaps in the long term unsustainable. “My friend’s son is in a company with just thirty soldiers left,” down from the 120 personnel typically in a company, one senior Ukrainian officer told me.
Every day last week, while evacuating civilians from areas in the east under bombardment by the Russians, as we drove to the front we passed a succession of ambulances going the other way. As they passed, my interpreter read aloud the signs displayed on their front bumpers: “three times 300s” or “four times 200s,” using the Ukrainian military terms for wounded and dead. By the end of the week, the figures in their aggregate, for just one section of the front we observed, seemed staggeringly high.
Of course, the Russians continue to take even higher casualties, but with their vastly greater pool of manpower, it is unlikely that these losses will have a significant impact—at least not in the short term.
And as news of the war slides from prominence in the news cycle, the way it is being fought has changed significantly. Ukraine’s troops now face a Russian force that has shifted strategy from the hasty, single-axis attacks that characterized the early weeks of the war. Now there are no more attempts at pincer movements but instead slow but inexorable advances, preceded by massive artillery bombardments—a few kilometers every day all along the front from Izyum in the north to Zaporizhzhia in the south, tightening the noose on a fragile Ukrainian salient protecting the road network that links Kyiv to the east.
In between artillery barrages, the Russians probe Ukrainian lines with small packets of armored vehicles accompanied by infantry and supported by vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns. All the while, artillery shells are launched at regular intervals in the general direction of Ukrainian forces and along their supply routes, a technique known in the US military as harassment and interdiction fire. The Russians are also practicing movement to contact—a form of reconnaissance in which the idea is to identify Ukrainian positions by drawing fire, thus enabling Russian artillery to pound new targets with precision.
Optimism in the Kremlin?
The Russian army now occupies an area comprising one-fifth of Ukraine’s total land mass—far more than it did at the outset of the war. President Vladimir Putin’s overall objective remains opaque. The low threshold for declaring victory is likely to be annexation of the entire Donbas region, a goal that Putin has almost accomplished, but with a recent resurgence in Russian confidence, that may not be enough to satisfy him.
Credible reports from Meduza, a Russian-language news site based in Latvia, indicate that Kyiv is back in the crosshairs and that there is now renewed support within the Kremlin for another onslaught on the capital. And there are reports of renewed military activity on the Russian side of the border to the north, the most likely origin of an assault on the capital. Our contacts with the Ukrainian military intelligence directorate tell us that Russian reconnaissance troops and private military contractors have been spotted on the Ukrainian side of the border. These may be indications of another attack on the capital, but a ground attack still appears unlikely. Taking Kyiv would involve a massive effort—probably more resources than Russia has at hand without resorting to general mobilization. But Putin has other options.
An advance to within artillery range would be sufficient to inflict severe punishment on the city, especially if combined with a determined effort to undermine Kyiv’s air defense system. “I have advised my wife that it is not safe to return to Kyiv,” one senior officer told me the other day. While those in the know are worried about this prospect, it’s hard to see any reflection of concern in the city itself. Every day, packed trains and buses return more of the population to their homes, and the capital is again a bustling city, with no resemblance to the ghost town it became in the early days of the war. Sirens still wail throughout the day but are universally ignored. Ironically, the impressive performance to date by Ukraine’s air defense system may have lulled the population into a false sense of security. But every air defense system, no matter how modern, is susceptible to a determined and well-planned effort to penetrate it, and Ukraine’s outdated S-300 is no exception.
A War of Endurance
Some might say that this commentary paints an overly gloomy picture for Ukraine—that game-changing weapons are on their way, and these will be enough to turn the tide. It is true that the US-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), already operating in Ukraine, is a formidable weapon and a welcome improvement on the Ukrainians’ over-used Soviet howitzers and even the recently supplied M777 lightweight 155-millimeter howitzer, whose deficiencies I have written about recently. Even lacking the long-range Army Tactical Missile System, HIMARS can bring accurate fires to bear at ranges exceeding forty miles within minutes of receiving data.
It will be weeks, however, before HIMARS is fielded in sufficient quantity to have a significant effect—maybe too late to reverse the Russian advance. The logistical exigencies of getting more into theater and then bringing Ukrainian artillery personnel to Germany or Poland for training stand in the way. Meanwhile the hemorrhage of casualties continues. And even when fielded, the HIMARS will not have the same effect for the Ukrainians as when employed by the US military, because of a shortfall in Ukrainian task organization. The tactical units we trained lacked forward observers, personnel trained to locate and report targets in a manner that can be rapidly transferred into firing data. The extremely centralized execution of artillery fire in the Ukrainian army makes for some effective fires for effect, such as the recent one that struck several Russian generals, but is not very responsive to the needs of frontline units.
The lack of forward observers may put the Ukrainians at a significant disadvantage, but the Ukrainians have on their side a strong affinity for drones and an intuitive understanding of their value in modern war. I have written previously of the requirement for long-range strike drones, loitering munitions with longer range and heavier payload than the Switchblade, and drones that can be used to deliver logistics. If Washington does provide strike drones, such as the MQ-1 Predator or even its longer-range successor, the MQ-9 Reaper, these platforms will doubtless come with the proviso that they must not be used to strike targets in Russia itself. Since launching such strikes is undoubtedly part of their plan, the Ukrainian military will have to look elsewhere for platforms that can be used for cross-border strikes on Russian reinforcements, supply chains, and infrastructure.
How Does This End?
If senior Ukrainian officers are to be believed, the war will not end with a ceasefire while Russian boots are on Ukrainian soil. They are determined not only to remove Putin’s gains since the beginning of the war in February, but also to recover areas of the Donbas that have been under de facto Russian control since 2014. Crimea, some Ukrainians admit, may prove to be a bridge too far, but many are determined that the threshold for Ukrainian victory must also include this region, the annexation of which eight years ago sparked the current period of enmity between the two countries.
The problem lies in squaring the wellspring of Ukrainian resolve with the military’s limited resources. Ukraine needs weapon systems that will give it a real edge over its adversary and help staunch the flow of casualties. Without this edge, no amount of determination and courage will be enough to avoid a prolonged war of attrition, and such a contest will favor the side with the greatest numbers. For Ukraine, the darkest days may be yet to come.
Andrew Milburn retired from the Marine Corps as a colonel in 2019 after a thirty-one-year career. His last position in uniform was as deputy commander of Special Operations Command Central, and prior to that, commanding officer of the Marine Raider Regiment and Combined Special Operations Task Force–Iraq. He is the chief executive officer of the Mozart Group, an LLC training and equipping Ukrainian frontline units.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
18. Ukraine has the HIMARS and is putting them to use
But they need more.
Ukraine has the HIMARS and is putting them to use
Missile system is “in good hands,” Ukraine says as it shares video of the rocket system being fired, set to The X-Files theme song.
SHARE
Ukraine isn’t waiting to put its new weapons to the test. On Saturday the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense shared a video showing troops firing the new M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, which can launch multiple rockets. Ukraine claims that the weapons are hitting targets, “military targets of the enemy,” AKA Russian forces.
The two-minute video was shared with the caption “These weapons are in the good hands, dear Americans! To be continued.” It is, for reasons entirely unclear, set to the iconic theme music from “The X-Files.” The HIMARS, much like the truth, are out there.
First official footage of HIMARS at battlefields in Ukraine!
These weapons are in the good hands, dear Americans!
To be continued.
— Defence of Ukraine (@DefenceU) June 25, 2022
Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov tweeted on June 23 that the HIMARS were in Ukraine, and apparently already in use, sharing a photo of the weapons system firing on a presumably enemy target.
Bizarre musical choice by Ukraine aside, the use of the HIMARS signals a new turn in the war. The weapons were just delivered to Ukraine this month. Russia’s invasion has dragged on for months and although the fighting has now recently been focused on the country’s eastern regions, the artillery war has escalated. American-provided howitzers are being used in heavy shelling operations between Ukrainian and Russian troops in the Luhansk region, but Russian forces scored a major victory this weekend, taking the city of Severodonetsk. Much of the city was reduced to rubble due to the fighting. Although the capture of Severodonetsk gives Russia control of most of Luhansk, Ukraine still controls several strategic sites in the region.
Russia also stepped up its rocket strikes on Ukraine, including firing missiles at the capital of Kyiv for the first time in several weeks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky himself pleaded with other nations to supply his country with air defense systems to help counter the Russian strikes. He also called the fall of Severodonetsk “emotionally” difficult for the nation.
Ukraine is hoping the new weapons like HIMARS can help reverse fortunes in the war. The weapons systems are some of the most advanced that the United States and other allies have supplied to Ukraine. Their tactical advantage comes from their mobility – a HIMARS system can fire its six rockets, relocate its position, reload and then repeat throughout a combat operation. They can fire at a range of up to 43 miles away. The United States previously promised that the HIMARS would not be used to target territory across the Russian border. The New York Times reported this weekend that a network of special operators from multiple nations are working with Ukraine to direct the flow of new arms to the nation’s troops, as well as provide training when needed.
This weekend Russia itself shared images of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu apparently arriving by helicopter into Ukraine to meet with troops in the invading force. It is unclear when the visit actually happened, or if it was indeed inside Ukraine.
The latest on Task & Purpose
19. G-7 leaders to commit to Ukraine, US sending anti-air system
Must not lose interest.
G-7 leaders to commit to Ukraine, US sending anti-air system
AP · by ZEKE MILLER and GEIR MOULSON · June 27, 2022
ELMAU, Germany (AP) — The Group of Seven economic powers are set to commit themselves to supporting Ukraine in the long haul, with the U.S. preparing to announce the purchase of an advanced surface-to-air missile system for Kyiv, as leaders meet in the German Alps and confer by video link with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The G-7 leaders will begin Monday’s session of their three-day summit with a focus on Ukraine. Later, they will be joined by the leaders of five democratic emerging economies — India, Indonesia, South Africa, Senegal and Argentina — for a discussion on climate change, energy and other issues.
President Joe Biden said Russian President Vladimir Putin “has been counting on, from the beginning, that somehow NATO and the G-7 would splinter, but we haven’t and we’re not going to.” Britain’s Boris Johnson warned the leaders not to give in to “fatigue.”
ADVERTISEMENT
On Monday, they have the opportunity to demonstrate that unity to Zelenskyy and reaffirm their commitment to supporting Kyiv financially and otherwise.
Biden is set to announce that the U.S. is providing an advanced surface-to-air missile system to Ukraine, as well as additional artillery support, according to a person familiar with the matter, in the latest assistance meant to help the country defend against Russia’s bloody invasion.
The U.S. is purchasing NASAMS, a Norwegian-developed anti-aircraft system, to provide medium- to long-range defense, according to the person, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. NASAMS is the same system used by the U.S. to protect the sensitive airspace around the White House and U.S. Capitol in Washington.
Additional aid includes more ammunition for Ukrainian artillery, as well as counter-battery radars, to support its efforts against the Russian assault in the Donbas, the person said.
Biden hopes to use his trip to Europe to proclaim the unity of the coalition pressing to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as much as he is urging allies to do even more — seeking to counter doubts about its endurance as the war grinds into its fifth month.
The summit’s host, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, said last week that he wants to discuss the outlines of a “Marshall plan for Ukraine” with his G-7 counterparts, referring to the U.S.-sponsored plan that helped revive European economies after World War II.
With the war still in progress and destruction mounting by the day, it’s unlikely to be a detailed plan at this stage. Scholz has said that “rebuilding Ukraine will be a task for generations.”
The G-7 already is committed to help finance Ukraine’s immediate needs. Finance ministers from the group last month agreed to provide $19.8 billion in economic aid to help Kyiv keep basic services functioning and prevent tight finances from hindering its defense against Russian forces.
ADVERTISEMENT
A senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations between the G-7 leaders, said the U.S. and Europe are aligned in their aims for a negotiated end to the conflict, even if their roles sometimes appear different.
Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron have tried to facilitate that through active conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zelenskyy, while also supplying weapons to Ukraine. The U.S. has largely cut off significant talks with Russia and aims to bolster Ukraine’s battlefield capacity as much as possible so that its eventual position at the negotiating table is stronger.
The endurance of the tough sanctions on Russia may ultimately come down to whether the G-7 and other leaders can identify ways to ease energy supply issues and skyrocketing prices once winter hits, as they seek to disengage from Russian sources of fuel.
The G-7 meeting is sandwiched between a European Union summit last week that agreed to give Ukraine the status of a candidate for membership — kicking off a process that is likely to take years with no guarantee of success — and a summit of NATO leaders starting Tuesday in Madrid.
ADVERTISEMENT
The leaders of the G-7 — the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Canada and Japan — may hope to make some progress in bringing their counterparts from their five guest countries closer to Western views on sanctions against Russia.
Scholz also is eager to win over such countries for his idea of a “climate club” for nations that want to speed ahead when it comes to tackling the issue.
___
Moulson reported from Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.
___
AP · by ZEKE MILLER and GEIR MOULSON · June 27, 2022
20. Here is what foreign-policy experts are discussing ahead of the G7 meeting.
Here is what foreign-policy experts are discussing ahead of the G7 meeting.
Send any friend a story
As a subscriber, you have 10 gift articles to give each month. Anyone can read what you share.
President Emmanuel Macron of France, second from left; Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany, center; and Prime Minister Mario Draghi of Italy, right, in Kyiv on June 16.Credit...Viacheslav Ratynskyi/Reuters
By
June 26, 2022
Before Russia invaded Ukraine, this year’s Group of 7 summit was supposed to provide an opportunity to change gears from typical geopolitics and finance, and focus on the future. The top themes were meant to be climate, public health amid the coronavirus pandemic and equity around the globe.
Instead, most analysts expect that the conference will be “Ukraine, Ukraine and then some more Ukraine,” as Sudha David-Wilp of the German Marshall Fund, a public policy think tank, put it.
The war has also changed the major topics that observers hope to see addressed. Here are some of the top questions from foreign policy experts in Germany and elsewhere.
Can Western leaders hold out against Russia for the long haul?
Although European and American leaders have largely managed to speak with one voice on the war, experts say Moscow is hoping that cracks will emerge as the energy crisis worsens and economic problems like runaway inflation begin to bite.
G7 leaders “need to send a message that they can handle these concurrent crises,” said Thorsten Benner of the Global Public Policy Institute. “And they need to convince countries outside the traditional ‘West’ that they mean it, that they will provide for global food security.”
Not all of that needs to happen publicly, however.
“They need to have an internal discussion about the potential for runaway inflation, for gas cuts this winter,” Mr. Benner said.
Can Western nations formulate a vision for the war’s end?
Europe and the United States have stressed that Ukraine, not foreign leaders, will determine how the war with Russia ends. Even as they provide more sophisticated weaponry, they have insisted that NATO powers cannot be drawn into the conflict, in part for fear of a nuclear standoff with Russia.
Beyond that, the objectives often look blurry.
Germany and France have hinted at wanting to move toward negotiations, only to back away from that and voice full-throated support for Kyiv’s victory during a visit with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine this month. And the United States has poured in weapons but has also signaled that it agrees on not risking escalation.
A U.S.-supplied M777 howitzer firing at Russian positions in the Donetsk region of Ukraine on Tuesday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Foreign-policy analysts say G7 leaders should discuss what specifically they hope to achieve, and how — and articulate that to Ukraine and the public.
“That will be a main theme — the question: How will this war end? And is there a Western position?” said Ulrich Speck, a foreign-policy analyst in Berlin. “Certainly, it will be always up to the Ukrainians to decide. But I think it would not be honest to say that the West has no position on that — or that individual countries don’t have them.”
Can the G7 become a broader forum for democratic alliances?
Among Western leaders, faith in international forums like the United Nations as a way to create diplomatic alliances and mediate conflict has diminished — in part because of the standstill created by the veto powers of Russia and China on one side and the United States and its allies on the other.
Given Germany’s ambitions to use the G7 summit to discuss more equitable geopolitical relationships, analysts wonder whether it could leverage its presidency of the G7 this year to try to create a broader democratic alliance beyond wealthy nations.
“This idea that we could have the richest of the rich countries meeting amongst themselves and making decisions about the future direction of the world economy is from a different century,” said Lutz Weischer of Germanwatch, an advocacy group for global equity.
Are G7 nations at risk of setting aside climate ambitions?
Many climate analysts worry that Western leaders are backsliding on their commitments, partly because of increased lobbying by the fossil fuel industry.
Lindsay Stringer, a York University professor and co-chairwoman of the environmental task force for Think7, a group of think tanks offering proposals for the summit, is looking for concrete measures — in particular, whether the G7 will offer more funding for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects.
“We’re way behind where we’re supposed to be,” she said.
21. G-7 leaders confer with Zelenskyy, prep new aid for Ukraine
G-7 leaders confer with Zelenskyy, prep new aid for Ukraine
AP · by ZEKE MILLER, DARLENE SUPERVILLE and GEIR MOULSON · June 27, 2022
ELMAU, Germany (AP) — Leading economic powers conferred by video link with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Monday as they underscored their commitment to Ukraine for the long haul with plans to pursue a price cap on Russian oil, raise tariffs on Russian goods and impose other new sanctions.
In addition, the U.S. was preparing to announce the purchase of an advanced surface-to-air missile system for Kyiv to help Ukraine fight back against Vladimir Putin’s aggression.
The new aid and efforts to exact punishment on Moscow from the Group of Seven leaders come as a Zelenskyy has openly worried that the West has become fatigued by the cost of a war that is contributing to soaring energy costs and price hikes on essential goods around the globe.
Leaders were finalizing the deal to seek a price cap during their three-day G-7 summit in the German Alps. The details of how a price cap would work, as well as its impact on the Russian economy, were to be resolved by the G-7 finance ministers in the coming weeks and months, according to a senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to preview the announcements from the summit.
ADVERTISEMENT
The largest democratic economies will also commit to raising tariffs on Russian imports to their countries, with the U.S. announcing new tariffs on 570 categories of goods, as well as use of sanctions to target Russia’s defense supply chains that support its effort to rearm during the war.
Biden is expected to announce the U.S, is purchasing NASAMS, a Norwegian-developed anti-aircraft system, to provide medium- to long-range defense, according to the person familiar with the matter, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. NASAMS is the same system used by the U.S. to protect the sensitive airspace around the White House and U.S. Capitol in Washington.
Additional aid includes more ammunition for Ukrainian artillery, as well as counter-battery radars, to support its efforts against the Russian assault in the Donbas, the person said. Biden is also announcing a $7.5 billion commitment to help Ukraine’s government meet its expenses, as part of a drawdown of the $40 billion military and economic aid package he signed into law last month.
The G-7 leaders began Monday’s session of their three-day summit with a focus on Ukraine. Later, they will be joined by the leaders of five democratic emerging economies — India, Indonesia, South Africa, Senegal and Argentina — for a discussion on climate change, energy and other issues.
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the summit’s host, said that the G-7 countries’ policies on Ukraine are “very much aligned,” and that they see the need to be both tough and cautions.
Scholz said after meeting Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on Monday that “we are taking tough decisions, that we are also cautious, that we will help ... Ukraine as much as possible but that we also avoid that there will be a big conflict between Russia and NATO.”
ADVERTISEMENT
He added that “this is what is of essence -- to be tough and thinking about the necessities of the time we are living in.”
Biden said Sunday that Russian President Vladimir Putin “has been counting on, from the beginning, that somehow NATO and the G-7 would splinter, but we haven’t and we’re not going to.”
Biden hopes to use his trip to Europe to proclaim the unity of the coalition pressing to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine as much as he is urging allies to do even more — seeking to counter doubts about its endurance as the war grinds into its fifth month.
The summit’s host, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, said last week that he wants to discuss the outlines of a “Marshall plan for Ukraine” with his G-7 counterparts, referring to the U.S.-sponsored plan that helped revive European economies after World War II.
With the war still in progress and destruction mounting by the day, it’s unlikely to be a detailed plan at this stage. Scholz has said that “rebuilding Ukraine will be a task for generations.”
The G-7 already is committed to help finance Ukraine’s immediate needs. Finance ministers from the group last month agreed to provide $19.8 billion in economic aid to help Kyiv keep basic services functioning and prevent tight finances from hindering its defense against Russian forces.
ADVERTISEMENT
A senior U.S. administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss private conversations between the G-7 leaders, said the U.S. and Europe are aligned in their aims for a negotiated end to the conflict, even if their roles sometimes appear different.
Scholz and French President Emmanuel Macron have tried to facilitate that through active conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zelenskyy, while also supplying weapons to Ukraine. The U.S. has largely cut off significant talks with Russia and aims to bolster Ukraine’s battlefield capacity as much as possible so that its eventual position at the negotiating table is stronger.
The endurance of the tough sanctions on Russia may ultimately come down to whether the G-7 and other leaders can identify ways to ease energy supply issues and skyrocketing prices once winter hits, as they seek to disengage from Russian sources of fuel.
The G-7 meeting is sandwiched between a European Union summit last week that agreed to give Ukraine the status of a candidate for membership — kicking off a process that is likely to take years with no guarantee of success — and a summit of NATO leaders starting Tuesday in Madrid.
ADVERTISEMENT
The leaders of the G-7 — the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Canada and Japan — may hope to make some progress in bringing their counterparts from their five guest countries closer to Western views on sanctions against Russia.
Scholz also is eager to win over such countries for his idea of a “climate club” for nations that want to speed ahead when it comes to tackling the issue.
___
Moulson reported from Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.
___
AP · by ZEKE MILLER, DARLENE SUPERVILLE and GEIR MOULSON · June 27, 2022
22. Japan Is Getting Real on Security After Ukraine
Excerpts:
And, ironically for a country taking on the Chinese Communist Party, Japan’s ability to implement policy also benefits from its long-term perspective, due in no small part to the stability of Liberal Democratic Party rule after World War II. It is one of the paradoxes of Japan that while it promotes democracy and has an independent judiciary, free speech, and elections, it nevertheless has ended up a de facto one-party state for all but a handful of years—albeit a democratic one. Much of this is because of a cautious approach to rule where there is a clear need to obtain “understanding” before implementing a new policy.
As heir to this tradition, Kishida often calls himself a good listener, and that appears to be working with the voters. His cabinet’s approval ratings are around 60 percent in various media surveys, with more than 70 percent approving of his tougher policies on Russia and China. He’s equally popular with allies—especially in Australia and the United States.
Kishida’s next task is to win support for increased defense spending, which trails other big nations at around 1 percent of annual GDP (well below the NATO target of double that level). “Even if the United States and Japan work closely together, we cannot keep competing with China,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “Therefore, we are trying to draw new partners into this coalition, including India and Australia. If we can increase our defense budget, we may not be able to outdo China, but we may be able to compete with China fairly effectively.”
Japan Is Getting Real on Security After Ukraine
A flurry of moves is positioning Tokyo at the center of anti-China alliances.
(From left) Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi
(From left) Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the Quad Fellowship Founding Celebration event in Tokyo on May 24. Yuichi Yamazaki/Getty Images
TOKYO—Next week, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will become the first Japanese leader ever to take part in a NATO summit meeting. His attendance in Madrid after the annual meeting of the G-7 countries caps a whirlwind of diplomatic and security-related events that have put the country at the forefront of a coalition that is designed in everything but name to rein in China.
Kishida, a compromise choice in ruling party elections last September, initially looked like he might be another short-termer, like every Japanese prime minister since 2006 save for Shinzo Abe. But Kishida has hit the ground running. He successfully captained the summit of the Quad nations of the United States, India, Australia, and Japan, getting the results he wanted from U.S. President Joe Biden and keeping the headstrong Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the fold. He has shored up relations with Southeast Asia, with trips to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand and the keynote address at the annual IISS Shangri-La conference on security in Singapore. In a high-profile European visit in May, he highlighted Japan’s sanctions on Russia, met with the leaders of Germany and Italy, and teed up a new defense pact with Britain. All the while he was signing up support for a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” Japan’s catchphrase for keeping China from making good on its ambitious claims to ownership of the islands, and their associated maritime zones, in the South China and East China seas.
“Japan will work together with other nations and take actions with resolute determination so that we would not be sending out the wrong message to the international community; so that using force to unilaterally change the status quo shall never be repeated,” Kishida said in a London speech in May as part of his global travels. The subject was ostensibly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but the wording made clear that he also had the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, where Japan has long-standing ties, in mind.
“Things are going well on the geopolitical front for Japan. It’s fascinating to see Japan becoming a mainstream strategic partner for a lot of countries,” said Corey Wallace, a specialist in Japanese foreign policy at Kanagawa University in Yokohama, Japan.
Kishida’s success in active lobbying for what he likes to call “realism diplomacy for a new era” has been helped by the fact that he is a known figure on the global stage after his five years as foreign minister in the Abe administration, the longest anyone has held that office in the post-World War II era. “He knows the important people and he knows how Japan is viewed,” Wallace said.
But Kishida has gotten a boost from a pretty large dose of good luck, especially in his timing. Ukraine, missteps by China on severe COVID-19 lockdowns amid an already weakening economy, plus a global supply chain crisis have all helped in bolstering Japan’s policies.
In some respects, Kishida’s policies are nothing new, and much of the credit (or blame) for starting Japan down the road of a higher regional security profile goes to the more openly nationalistic Abe, who originally promoted a free and open Indo-Pacific in a meeting with African leaders in 2016. Freed from the strictures of office, Abe has since become more direct in his public speeches, saying in December 2021 that an attack on Taiwan by China would represent a danger to Japan, and more recently urging the U.S. to end the policy of “strategic ambiguity” over whether it would intervene militarily in such a situation.
While Abe has sounded the alarm bell, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that sent it ringing at full volume. Ever since the invasion, there has been a wealth of commentaries over what this could mean for China and Taiwan, leading to the not very helpful conclusion that it makes an invasion by Beijing either more likely or less likely. But Taiwan aside, Russia’s invasion, after years of territorial aggrandizement, has put renewed attention on China’s encroachments at sea. Reefs that have been turned into small islands over the past nine years are now openly militarized, in sharp contrast to Beijing’s initial promises. Oil exploration rigs are popping up in disputed waters, and a virtual fleet of fishing boats have become a surrogate navy.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has also embarked on an ill-considered program of aggressive diplomatic PR. These so-called wolf warriors state, on Twitter and in official meetings, that actions by Beijing are invariably perfect and anyone who opposes any action is a tool of Washington or a hapless stooge. This aggressive tone is reminiscent of the Cold War days of Radio Moscow or the manic tone of official media in North Korea (where there is no other kind). This might play well at home, but on the global stage it has alienated audiences who might otherwise be sympathetic. It’s also a sign of geographical weakness; like a company boasting of its solvency, a power that declares itself to be great probably isn’t.
That said, China is certainly not toothless, and it has backed up its displeasure with direct and costly action to its neighbors in recent years. When South Korea decided to deploy advanced U.S. THAAD missiles in 2016, Beijing imposed economic sanctions at an estimated cost of more than $7 billion to the export-dependent South Korean economy. (China accounts for over 25 percent of South Korean exports.) Similarly, China came up with a laundry list of complaints against Australia on everything from the South China Sea to “an unfriendly or antagonistic report on China by media.” It imposed various trade restrictions on Australian beef, wine, and other products, although it exempted the iron ore needed by China’s steel plants.
But the risk of any similar action against Japan today seems low. A nation that previously seemed to be making inroads around the world is now playing defense on numerous fronts. China cannot be pleased that more nations are signing up for the free and open Indo-Pacific idea being promoted by Kishida. Even the somewhat vague U.S. program for economic cooperation in Asia, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, was quickly signed onto by 13 nations after its launch in late May.
Domestically, Xi is facing increasingly serious economic headwinds, caused in part by the continued problems for the global supply chain as well as a zero-COVID policy that seems politically irreversible for the near future. It’s hardly the best of times to pick a trade war with the country that supplies many of the most sophisticated industrial inputs, ranging from complex machine tools to the chemicals needed to make smartphone panels.
Another strong point for Japan has been its ability to counter Chinese influence in the increasingly prosperous nations of Southeast Asia. With the calling card of offering the biggest market in the world for many products, China has undoubtedly made inroads, but it cannot rest on its laurels. Japan, an early player as such economies as Indonesia and Thailand began to grow, has kept a consistent and patient policy of engagement. This has angered human rights activists who see Japan as promoting democracy and freedom in theory but continuing to do business with the authoritarian governments in countries such as Myanmar and Cambodia. It can be argued that this is the only way to stop the countries from sliding even further toward China, but this does little to put actions behind Japan’s verbal commitment to democracy. As Stephen M. Walt argued recently in Foreign Policy, realism in foreign affairs seldom wins plaudits.
But the approach comes in handy when you need friends. According to one U.S. official, Japan’s high level of respect among Southeast Asian nations was a critical factor in getting them on board for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. A 2020 survey of 1,032 foreign-policy and business leaders in Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries found Japan was the most trusted nation in Asia at 67 percent. China garnered 17 percent.
And, ironically for a country taking on the Chinese Communist Party, Japan’s ability to implement policy also benefits from its long-term perspective, due in no small part to the stability of Liberal Democratic Party rule after World War II. It is one of the paradoxes of Japan that while it promotes democracy and has an independent judiciary, free speech, and elections, it nevertheless has ended up a de facto one-party state for all but a handful of years—albeit a democratic one. Much of this is because of a cautious approach to rule where there is a clear need to obtain “understanding” before implementing a new policy.
As heir to this tradition, Kishida often calls himself a good listener, and that appears to be working with the voters. His cabinet’s approval ratings are around 60 percent in various media surveys, with more than 70 percent approving of his tougher policies on Russia and China. He’s equally popular with allies—especially in Australia and the United States.
Kishida’s next task is to win support for increased defense spending, which trails other big nations at around 1 percent of annual GDP (well below the NATO target of double that level). “Even if the United States and Japan work closely together, we cannot keep competing with China,” said Narushige Michishita, a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. “Therefore, we are trying to draw new partners into this coalition, including India and Australia. If we can increase our defense budget, we may not be able to outdo China, but we may be able to compete with China fairly effectively.”
William Sposato is a Tokyo-based journalist who has been a contributor to Foreign Policy since 2015. He has been following Japan’s politics and economics for more than 20 years, working at Reuters and the Wall Street Journal. He is also the co-author of a 2021 book on the Carlos Ghosn affair and its impact on Japan.
23. Is US playing chicken with China in Taiwan Strait?
Excerpts:
The sovereignty question
Aside from the legal and military issues, the dispute impinges on political issues. Indeed, it raises the issue of the status of Taiwan. If Taiwan is part of China as the “one-China policy” stipulates, then the entire Strait is under China’s jurisdiction. The one-China policy recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, but only acknowledges, and does not endorse, the PRC position that Taiwan is part of China.
If the US is implying by its statements and actions that Taiwan is not part of China and has separate jurisdiction and regimes governing its claimed portion of the Strait, then this challenges China’s sovereignty claim to Taiwan.
Although China cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign warships and warplanes, that does not mean the US should purposely provoke it with its actions. Indeed, just because a country can do something, it does not necessarily mean it should do it.
Consider the US reaction if China were repeatedly to undertake such activities in the US EEZ off its west or east coast or in the Gulf of Mexico. While it may not legally object, it surely would consider this provocative, monitor them closely, even harass the assets undertaking the activities and plan “countermeasures” in the event of an attack.
In short, China is right that the Taiwan Strait is not “international waters.” But foreign warships and warplanes have the right to pass through it – provided they pay “due regard” to China’s rights and duties.
What will be the next US move in this game of legal chicken? The next phase of this “dispute” may focus on conflicting interpretations of “due regard.” Will the US send warships or warplanes through the Strait that in China’s view do not pay “due regard”? If so, like the US, China may demonstrate its legal position with action.
Is US playing chicken with China in Taiwan Strait?
Aside from the legal and military aspects, the dispute impinges on political issues
Last Friday, a US Navy Poseidon P-8A intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft flew through the Taiwan Strait. This seemingly routine event was anything but.
Indeed, it appears to have been the latest US gambit in its dispute with China over the legal regime governing such passages – and thus their conflicting views of the relevant “international order.”
In an unusual “in your face” statement, the US Indo-Pacific Command proclaimed that the flight was a demonstration of the United States’ “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.” It said the plane transited the Taiwan Strait in “international airspace” and that “the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows including within the Taiwan Strait” (emphasis added).
The flight and statement were apparently in response to China’s assertion that it had jurisdiction over the Strait. China responded to the US action expressing “firm opposition to the US’s deliberate act to disrupt the regional situation and undermine peace and security across the Strait.” It added that its military was on “high alert at all times to resolutely safeguard national sovereignty.”
What’s the beef?
The US maintains, “The Taiwan Strait is an international waterway, meaning that the Taiwan Strait is an area where high-seas freedoms, including freedom of navigation and overflight, are guaranteed under international law.”
China’s Foreign Ministry said China “has sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait” and says it is “a false claim when certain countries call the Taiwan Strait ‘international waters.'”
So who is right?
The foundation of the international order in the oceans, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, does not mention “international waters” or “international waterways.” Moreover the US is not a party to UNCLOS and thus has little credibility or legitimacy in interpreting any of its provisions to its advantage.
China is correct in terms of the jurisdictional status of the Strait. There is no such legal entity as international waters. This is a creation of the US Navy to connote to its commanders waters in which they have “freedom of navigation.”
The actual legal regimes governing the Strait are “territorial sea,” “contiguous zone” and “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ).
From its opposite coastal baselines situated a maximum of 120 nautical miles from each other, the Taiwan Strait is composed of 12nm territorial seas in and over which the coastal state has sovereignty, a further 12nm of contiguous zones in which the coastal state has the right to prevent and punish infringements of its customs, sanitary, fiscal, and immigration regulations.
Because the Strait is not more than 200nm wide, the rest is EEZ in which the coastal state –China – has sovereign rights regarding management of the resources and the environment. There are no high seas in the Strait.
The issue for the US is whether or not foreign warships and warplanes have the right of “freedom of navigation.” According to UNCLOS, normal passage of warships and warplanes through the Taiwan Strait is legal. However, as a non-party to UNCLOS, its rights are unclear. Nevertheless, customary law supports such passage.
However, according to UNCLOS it depends on what the US warships and warplanes are doing during their passage. They have the obligation to pay “due regard” to the rights and duties of the coastal state.
If it or a warship or warplane is undertaking cyber or electronic warfare (EW), this may be viewed as a threat or use of force – not allowed by the UN Charter, let alone UNCLOS.
Indeed, the US views some cyber and EW attacks this way. It has agreed to a new clause in the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Security Treaty that gives “cyberattacks the same weight” as missile or bomb attacks or physical invasions. So if the cyber and EW activities of a warplane or warship in the EEZ constitute an “attack,” then that is illegal.
Particularly relevant are active SIGINT (signals intelligence) activities conducted from aircraft and ships, some of which are deliberately provocative, intending to generate programmed responses. Other SIGINT activities intercept naval radar and emitters, enabling them to locate, identify and track (and thus plan electronic or missile attacks against) surface ships and submarines.
Still others may interfere with communication and computer systems, including those regarding drones. China thinks that some such activities are not consonant with the due regard and peaceful purposes provisions of UNCLOS.
Marine scientific research in an EEZ is subject to the prior consent of the coastal state. If the warship or warplane is deploying information collection devices – including drones – they may be subject to this prior-consent regime.
The US may argue that it is undertaking military or hydrographic surveys and they are not subject to the prior-consent regime. But UNCLOS provides that “the deployment and use of any type of scientific research equipment” shall be subject to the consent regime.
Simple naval passage and even maneuvers are part of the freedom of navigation. But China may argue that extended tests of weapons, such as laying of depth charges, launching torpedoes, live-fire exercises or the covert laying of arms within an EEZ violate the duty to pay “due regard” to the rights and duties of the coastal state, especially their duty to protect the environment including its fish and mammals.
Moreover, the legality of military maneuvers and missile exercises that temporarily prevent other states from using part of their EEZ remains unresolved.
The Convention provides that in cases where it does not specifically attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal or other states within an EEZ, any dispute between states parties should be resolved on the basis of equity, and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
So the question may become: Which is more equitable or more valuable to the international community, the right to spy, “prepare the battlefield” and intimidate (gunboat diplomacy), or the right to ban such activities in one’s EEZ?
The sovereignty question
Aside from the legal and military issues, the dispute impinges on political issues. Indeed, it raises the issue of the status of Taiwan. If Taiwan is part of China as the “one-China policy” stipulates, then the entire Strait is under China’s jurisdiction. The one-China policy recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, but only acknowledges, and does not endorse, the PRC position that Taiwan is part of China.
If the US is implying by its statements and actions that Taiwan is not part of China and has separate jurisdiction and regimes governing its claimed portion of the Strait, then this challenges China’s sovereignty claim to Taiwan.
Although China cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign warships and warplanes, that does not mean the US should purposely provoke it with its actions. Indeed, just because a country can do something, it does not necessarily mean it should do it.
Consider the US reaction if China were repeatedly to undertake such activities in the US EEZ off its west or east coast or in the Gulf of Mexico. While it may not legally object, it surely would consider this provocative, monitor them closely, even harass the assets undertaking the activities and plan “countermeasures” in the event of an attack.
In short, China is right that the Taiwan Strait is not “international waters.” But foreign warships and warplanes have the right to pass through it – provided they pay “due regard” to China’s rights and duties.
What will be the next US move in this game of legal chicken? The next phase of this “dispute” may focus on conflicting interpretations of “due regard.” Will the US send warships or warplanes through the Strait that in China’s view do not pay “due regard”? If so, like the US, China may demonstrate its legal position with action.
24. US steps up airfield construction on Tinian
US steps up airfield construction on Tinian
Concern about Guam’s vulnerability to a missile attack from China or North Korea may have prompted backup effort
The US has initiated major construction on Tinian, ostensibly to serve as a backup facility should its naval and air facilities on nearby Guam be put out of action for any reason. Growing concerns about Guam’s vulnerability to a missile attack from China or North Korea may have prompted this significant construction effort.
Tinian and its sister islands Guam and Saipan were crucial US staging areas during World War II. Tinian was also the staging area for the B-29 bombers that dropped the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Satellite images obtained by The Drive this month show land-clearing work northeast of Tinian International Airport, with past satellite imagery suggesting that work on that site had begun in May.
This month’s new construction with the Tinian Divert Airfield project, which includes plans for a new aircraft taxiway and parking apron totaling US$162 million and a projected completion date of October 2025.
A divert airfield is for emergency landings or when a primary or redeployment airfield is not needed or useable for operations. Such an airfield has the minimum level of equipment and capability.
“These military construction projects that we break ground on today represent the first of several capital investments in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,” said Captain Tim Liberatore, commanding officer of Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) Marianas.
Brigadier-General Jeremy Sloane, commander of the 36th Wing, explained the importance of Tinian’s new facilities, saying, “Its airfield, roadway, port, and pipeline improvements will provide vital strategic, operational, and exercise capabilities for the US forces and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”
According to a 2016 Stars and Stripes article, Tinian’s infrastructure will support 12 tanker aircraft and all support personnel needed for diverting operations. Also, regular exercises will take place at the airfield for up to eight weeks each year.
Plans to strengthen US presence on Tinian were floated in the early 2010s, starting with environmental impact assessments of military construction activities on Saipan, Tinian and Rota.
In December 2016, the US Air Force formally decided to select Tinian International Airport as a backup facility to Guam in case the latter is unavailable because of a natural disaster or enemy attack.
In May 2019, the Commonwealth Ports Authority, the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands government, and the US Department of Defense finalized and signed a 40-year lease agreement worth $21.9 million for the USAF’s divert airfield on Tinian.
In addition, US military exercises in and around the island underscore its strategic importance. This month, the US conducted a joint forces field training exercise on Saipan and Tinian.
Activities in and around Tinian included maritime operations at Tinian Harbor, logistical hub staging activities at the San Jose Port, refueling supply point operation at the Tinian West Field, and cargo airdrop delivery systems on North Tinian Drop Zone.
In 2019, the US also conducted Exercise Resilient Typhoon, which involved US military aircraft concentrated at Guam, separating via a dispersal, recovering, and resuming operations at airfields in Guam, Tinian, Saipan, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau.
US construction efforts on Tinian are part of a larger $20 billion effort to disperse troops and advanced weaponry more fully across the Pacific, build up missile defense systems, and create a network of joint training ranges to push back against an increasingly assertive China.
Such systems would require support naval, air, space and cyber assets, including long-range radar capabilities, and would operate dispersed along with small islands and archipelagos throughout the Western Pacific.
Guam remains the focal point of US power projection in the Western Pacific, and its strategic importance continues to grow amid belligerent threats from China and North Korea.
The US military strategy in the Pacific assumes that Guam will always be available as a staging area. However, the US faces a disadvantage in the Western Pacific, as its facilities in the region consist of a small number of large, isolated, and in effect undefended sites located on a handful of islands, all within the range of Chinese and North Korean missiles.
In 2016, China fielded its DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), a road-mobile, nuclear-capable weapon with a range of 4,000 kilometers, making it the first Chinese missile that can hit Guam. In addition, China could use its H-6K strategic bombers to attack Guam using air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The country released images showing an H-6K launching ALCMs at a target that resembles Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.
The US also has plans to deploy land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles in the Pacific as part of its dispersed operations doctrine. However, US Pacific allies such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia may not be willing to host these controversial weapons for political, economic and security reasons.
As a result, Tinian may become an alternative launch site for US land-based Tomahawks, alongside other US territories in the Pacific.
Thus, in the event of a great power conflict between the US and China in the Pacific, Tinian and its sister islands Guam and Saipan will undoubtedly play a central role in US operations.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
