Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

"The only way to deal with an unfree world is to become so absolutely free that your very existence is an act of rebellion."
-Albert Camus

"Between stimulus and response there is a space. In that space is our power to choose our response. In our response lies our growth and our freedom."
- Viktor E. Frankl

"Freedom is the right to tell people what they do not want to hear."
- George Orwell


1.  RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 24 (PUTIN'S WAR)
2. Fort Bragg as Fort Liberty? Commission Announces Names to Erase Confederate Ties
3. Special Operations are Deterrence Operations: How United States Special Operations Forces should be used in Strategic Competition
4. Is Russia Ripe for a Coup?
5. Ending the civil war over the future of the US Marine Corps
6. Downsizing the Department of Defense
7. China Is Doing Biden’s Work for Him
8. White Supremacists Sacralize Mass Attackers to Encourage More Violence
9. Book Review - The Wild Fields: A Fight for the Soul of Ukraine | SOF News
10. Trove of damning Xinjiang police files leaked as U.N. rights chief visits China
11. Time 100 Most influential people of 2022
12. Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden Should Find His Inner Truman
13. Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden gets less ambiguous and more strategic
14. Biden’s Real Taiwan Mistake
15. China military needs defence against potential Starlink threat: scientists
16. Why Biden Is Right to End Ambiguity on Taiwan
17. Open-Source Data is Everywhere—Except the Army’s Concept of Information Advantage
18. The Quad Goes to Sea
19. Israeli diplomats told not to meet Taiwan officials to avoid angering China – report
20. Putin Is Going to Lose His War




1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 24 (PUTIN'S WAR)
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MAY 24
May 24, 2022 - Press ISW

Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark
May 24, 7:00 pm ET
Russian forces have likely abandoned efforts to complete a single large encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and are instead attempting to secure smaller encirclements—enabling them to make incremental measured gains. Russian forces are likely attempting to achieve several simultaneous encirclements of small pockets of Ukrainian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts: the broader Severodonetsk area (including Rubizhne and Lysychansk), Bakhmut-Lysychansk, around Zolote (just northeast of Popasna), and around Ukrainian fortifications in Avdiivka. Russian forces have begun steadily advancing efforts in these different encirclements daily but have not achieved any major “breakthroughs” or made major progress towards their stated objectives of securing the Donetsk Oblast borders or seizing all of Donbas. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces only controlled approximately 10 percent of Luhansk Oblast as of May 15 (compared to 30 percent prior to the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022).[1] Russian forces have secured more terrain in the past week than efforts earlier in May. However, they have done so by reducing the scope of their objectives—largely abandoning operations around Izyum and concentrating on key frontline towns: Russian performance remains poor.
Russian forces will additionally likely face protracted urban combat if they successfully encircle Severodonetsk (as well as in other large towns like Bakhmut), which Russian forces have struggled with throughout the war. Russian forces are committing a significant number of their troops, artillery, and aircraft to defeat Ukrainian defenders in Luhansk Oblast and are likely pulling necessary resources from the Izyum axis, defensive positions around Kharkiv City, Donetsk City, and the Zaporizhia area. Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai has previously compared Ukrainian forces in Luhansk Oblast to the previous defenders of Mariupol, which aimed to wear out Russian forces and prevent further offensive operations.[2] The UK Defense Ministry also noted that a Russian victory over Severodonetsk will only worsen Russian logistical issues and extend Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[3] Russian forces are making greater advances in the past week than throughout the rest of May—but these advances remain slow, confined to smaller objectives than the Kremlin intended, and face continued Ukrainian defenses; they do not constitute a major breakthrough.
Senior Kremlin officials are increasingly openly admitting that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is moving slower than anticipated and are grasping for explanations to justify the slow pace. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu claimed that Russian operations in Ukraine are progressing slowly because Russian forces want to afford civilians the opportunity to evacuate, though Russian forces have targeted Ukrainian civilians throughout the war and repeatedly denied Ukrainian attempts to negotiate humanitarian evacuation corridors.[4] Shoigu’s statement is notably his first admission that Russian forces are behind schedule and is the first official statement on the pace of the war since Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that the operation was “dragging” on May 4.[5] Russian milbloggers are criticizing Shoigu’s claimed consideration for civilians and claimed that Soviet troops would not have cared if “Nazi” civilians evacuated, part of the growing Russian nationalist reaction that the Kremlin is not doing enough to win the war in Ukraine.[6] Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Naryshkin stated that the ultimate goal of the Russian offensive is to ensure “Nazism” is “100% eradicated, or it will rear its head in a few years, and in an even uglier form.”[7] Naryshkin and Shoigu’s statements indicate that Russian officials are likely setting conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine in order to justify slower and more measured advances than initially anticipated.
Forcefully mobilized servicemen from the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics continued to protest the Russian and proxy military command. Servicemen of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the 105th Infantry Regiment from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) recorded a video appeal to DNR Head Denis Pushilin wherein they claimed they were mobilized on February 23 and that they have been forced to actively participate in hostilities despite their lack of military experience. The battalion stated that they served on the frontlines in Mariupol and have been redeployed to the territory of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) with only 60% of their original personnel and are now dealing with severe morale issues and physical exhaustion. The battalion notably claimed that the servicemen did not go through routine medical inspection prior to service and that many are suffering from chronic illnesses that should have rendered them ineligible for service. The video appeal is consistent with numerous reports from Ukrainian and Western sources that proxy forces are largely forcibly mobilized, poorly trained, and suffering from declining morale, but is notable due to the willingness of the DNR servicemen to publicly express their discontent.[8]
Key Takeaways
  • Russian forces have likely abandoned efforts to encircle large Ukrainian formations in eastern Ukraine and are instead attempting to secure smaller encirclements and focus on Severodonetsk.
  • This change in the Russian approach is enabling gradual advances—but at the cost of abandoning several intended lines of advance and abandoning the Kremlin’s intended deep encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a controlled withdrawal southwest of Popasna near Bakhmut to protect Ukrainian supply lines against Russian offensives in the southeast of Bakhmut.
  • Russian occupation authorities in Mariupol announced that they will hold war crimes trials against Ukrainian soldiers in Mariupol in a likely effort to strengthen judicial control of the city and support false Kremlin narratives of Ukrainian crimes.
  • Russian forces are attempting to retake Ternova in northern Kharkiv Oblast and seek to stabilize defensive positions near the Russian border against the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
  • Russian forces are forming reserves and deploying S-400 missile systems in northwest Crimea to reinforce the southern axis.
  • Several DNR servicemen openly released a video appeal to DNR leader Denis Pushilin stating they have been forced into combat operations without proper support, indicating increasing demoralization among Russian and proxy forces.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
  • Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
  • Subordinate main effort—Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
  • Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
  • Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
  • Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces did not launch offensive operations south of Izyum on May 24 but continued to reconnoiter Ukrainian positions in the region.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are likely preparing to resume an offensive toward Slovyansk and deployed additional artillery units to southern neighborhoods of Izyum.[10] Izyum City Council Deputy Maxim Strelnik claimed that over 20,000 Russian personnel in what he reported are 25 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) are preparing to resume a large encirclement of Ukrainian troops from the north.[11] ISW cannot independently confirm these Russian troop numbers or their unit structure, and Strelnik may be referencing a Ukrainian General Staff report from April 22 that twenty-five Russian BTGs were operating around Izyum.[12] The Russian units around Izyum are likely heavily degraded and it is highly unlikely Russia is operating twenty-five full strength BTGs (at 800-900 personnel per BTG, this would be 20,000-22,500 personnel in total). Many Russian personnel on this axis are likely in rear areas or not combat effective. Moreover, poor Russian tactics largely nullify the weight of numbers on this front, as Russian forces remain confined to launching narrow attacks down major roads that often do not employ more than a single BTG—at most—at a time.

Russian forces continued to prioritize attacks against Lyman rather than Slovyansk on May 24, likely to support a shallow encirclement of Ukrainian troops northwest of Severodonetsk. Pro-Russian military Telegram channels also noted that Russian and proxy forces have adopted a new strategy abandoning attacks toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove in favor of the Battle for Severodonetsk.[13] ISW previously forecasted that Russian forces would scale down their initial objectives of reaching the Donetsk Oblast border in favor of securing the Luhansk Oblast borders.[14] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin announced that Russian forces began an assault on Lyman but claimed to have only seized the northern half of the settlement.[15] ISW cannot independently confirm Pushilin’s claims. Geolocated social media videos showed that Russian forces heavily bombarded Lyman on May 23, likely in preparation for an assault on the town.
Russian forces launched ground assaults on settlements approximately 20 km southwest of Severodonetsk, but have not reached the city.[16] The UK Defense Ministry noted that Russian advances towards Severodonetsk from Rubizhne and advances from the southwest remain separated by approximately 25 km, and Russian forces may be able to encircle Severodonetsk in the coming days.[17] Russian forces will likely struggle to capture the city itself, however, and Russian assaults on major urban terrain have been unable to quickly take ground throughout the war.
Ukrainian forces likely conducted a controlled withdrawal southwest of Popasna to defend Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Bakhmut against Russian offensives. Russian forces seized Svitlodarsk, approximately 21 km southwest of Popasna, after Ukrainian forces retreated and damaged a bridge and dam over the Myronivskyi Reservoir on May 23.[18] Ukrainian forces previously targeted the reservoir on May 14, likely in preparation for a gradual withdrawal from the area.[19] Russian forces continued to advance just northeast and east of Popasna, with social media footage showing the arrival of reinforcements to support the push toward the Lysychansk and Bakhmut highways.[20] DNR sources also claimed that Russian forces are attempting a shallow encirclement of weakening Ukrainian troops in Avdiivka, but ISW cannot confirm these claims.[21]

Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian and proxy forces continued to “restore” Mariupol on May 24. Troops focused on demining the ruins of the city, the port, and the sea.[22] Head of the Russian National Defense Control Center Colonel-General Mikhail Mizintsev claimed on May 24 that Russian forces will open a humanitarian “green corridor” in the Black Sea to allow the safe exit of foreign ships from the Port of Mariupol on May 25.[23]
Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin stated that the DNR is developing rules and procedures for tribunals in Mariupol to try and punish Ukrainian soldiers for war crimes.[24] Pushilin’s statement notably comes the day after the first Russian soldier was found guilty in a Ukrainian war crimes trial. Mariupol’s occupation administration will likely use such tribunals to enforce their rhetorical agendas and strengthen judicial control over Mariupol and other occupied areas.
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces continued to focus on maintaining and improving their positions north of Kharkiv City on May 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are conducting ground assaults on the outskirts of Ternova, a village recaptured by Ukrainian forces in early May in the far north of Kharkiv Oblast and 5 km from the international border.[25] A Russian Telegram channel claimed that Russian forces have restored control over the entirety of Ternova, and while this claim cannot be confirmed at this time, it indicates that Russian forces are focusing on retaking control of settlements near the border.[26] Russian troops additionally shelled Kharkiv City and its environs.[27] Sentinel satellite imagery from May 24 notably showed a Russian rear base constructed in Belgorod Oblast in early April within 15 km of the Ukrainian border.[28] Russian forces are likely using this and other rear bases to support operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and seek to screen them from Ukrainian shelling.

Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces continued to reinforce their positions on the Southern Axis but did not make any confirmed advances on May 24.[29] Russian troops are reportedly strengthening their grouping in Vasylivka and Kamyanske (both south of Zaporizhzhia City) in preparation for offensives to the north.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops in Crimea are forming reserves and a spokesman for the Odesa Military Administration stated that Russian forces are reportedly deploying S-400 missile systems to northwest Crimea. Russian milblogger Alexander Zhuchkovsky, however, called the situation on the Zaporizhia frontline of the Southern Axis “deplorable,” and indicated that Ukrainian artillery pressure has been effective in slowing Russian troop movements.[31] Zhuchkovsky noted that Zaporizhia Oblast is not a priority for Russian command and much of the Russian grouping in the area is comprised of reservists. His assertion is corroborated by the fact that Russian forces continued to shell Ukrainian positions in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on May 24, but did not engage in any active ground attacks.[32]
Recent Ukrainian partisan actions in Zaporizhia Oblast continue to pressure Russian occupation forces, which are continuing actions to strengthen administrative control of occupied areas.[33] Occupation authorities in Kherson, Berdyansk, and Melitopol stated that both cities will be included in the ruble zone.[34]

Immediate items to watch
  • Russian forces are likely reinforcing their grouping north of Kharkiv City to prevent further advances of the Ukrainian counteroffensive toward the Russian border. Russian forces may commit elements of the 1st Tank Army to Northern Kharkiv in the near future.
  • The Russians will continue efforts to encircle Severodonetsk and Lysychansk at least from the south, possibly by focusing on cutting off the last highway connecting Severodonetsk-Lysychansk with the rest of Ukraine.
  • Russian forces in Mariupol will likely shift their focus to occupational control of the city as the siege of Azovstal has concluded.
  • Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives and settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.
[4] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/5367364
[5] https://www dot kommersant.ru/doc/5340565
[7] https://ria dot ru/20220524/spetsoperatsiya-1790331445.html
[11] https://www dot objectiv.tv/objectively/2022/05/24/v-izyume-sosredotocheno-okolo-20-tysyach-rossijskih-voennyh/
[12] https://news dot liga.net/politics/news/rf-styanula-25-btgr-pod-izyum-sem-pod-harkov-i-pytaetsya-idti-na-donbasse-svodka-genshtaba
[23] https://riafan dot ru/23454938-rossiya_planiruet_otkrit_koridor_k_chernomu_moryu_iz_mariupolya_25_maya
[33] https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/05/24/u-melitopoli-diyi-partyzaniv-vyklykaly-paniku-v-okupaczijnij-administracziyi/; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=718302112750098



2. Fort Bragg as Fort Liberty? Commission Announces Names to Erase Confederate Ties

Disappointing.

One of the social media comments I read was that they named Bragg after a stripper named "Liberty" down on Bragg Blvd.  The commission should have vetted the names with some troops, some regular "Joe's." 

But this "blue ribbon" commission failed to right another wrong with their recommendations. We in the military tout the value of our incredible non-commissioned officer corps as the backbone of the military. Only one of the names honors an NCO, Sgt. William Henry Johnson. While all the other names, other than Liberty, are people worthy of honor, the commission did not do the hard work to really send the message that we truly honor our great NCOs. President Eisenhower, while a great American, is honored in so many other ways throughout our nation. His choice was a "lazy" one. Why not MSG Benavidez? A truly missed opportunity. 


Fort Bragg as Fort Liberty? Commission Announces Names to Erase Confederate Ties
Army leaders fighting over glory, not racism, drove the choice of “Liberty,” source says.
defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher
The Army’s Fort Bragg would become Fort Liberty under recommendations released Tuesday by a commission that studied whether military bases with Confederate ties should be renamed. The commission also suggests that eight other bases be renamed for military heroes.
Some Twitter users called the choice of “Fort Liberty” “lazy” and “jingoistic.”
However, a source familiar with the commission’s deliberations told Defense One that the suggested name for the North Carolina base, which is home to Army Special Operations Command, was driven by parochial posturing, not racism. Leaders of various Army units, including some in the special operations community, didn’t want the base to be “named for anyone not from their tribe,” and vetoed some of the candidates. Members of the local community pushed for Liberty, which represents a founding value for both the nation and the Army, according to a press release from the commission.
Congress created the commission in the 2021 Defense Authorization Act as part of an effort to address systemic racism in the military. The panel will share its final report on renaming the nine bases with lawmakers no later than Oct. 1. That report is also expected to include an estimate of the cost of making the changes. The final names were picked from a list of 34,000 suggestions made by the American public, which was whittled down to fewer than 100 finalists. If the recommendations are adopted, some of the bases will make history as the first named for women and Black Americans.
Ty Seidule, vice chair of the naming commission, told reporters that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has the authority to direct base namings. But the next steps, and whether Congress has a say in the decision, are a bit murkier.
One lawmaker is already expected to fight the name changes on Capitol Hill. A robocall supporting Rep. Mo Brooks, R-Ala., in his Senate primary on Tuesday said the congressman will “filibuster this evil nonsense” if he wins the seat, the Washington Post reported, though it did not state what bill or spending proposal he may try to stall. The campaign said it agreed with the call’s message and that Brooks “has been outspoken that we shouldn’t be replacing monuments.”
“The Commission believes Austin has sole authority to approve the names,” the source said. “But if you check DOD's recent communications with Congress, DOD said he doesn't have the authority. So that's the awkwardness."
If it is entirely up to Austin, the new names will likely win easy approval. The defense secretary released a statement saying he was “pleased” to see the recommendations and looked forward to the final report, but made no mention of consulting with lawmakers or seeking further approval from Congress. “Today's announcement highlights the Commission's efforts to propose nine new installation names that reflect the courage, values, sacrifices, and diversity of our military men and women,” he said.
Democrats also quickly praised the recommendations. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., chair of the House Armed Services Committee, said the new base names represent “a new opportunity to foster a more inclusive environment for our service members.”
Rep. Anthony Brown, D-Md., a retired Army officer and member of the House Armed Services Committee, also commended the changes.
“I learned to fly helicopters at Ft. Rucker. I deployed to Iraq from Ft. Bragg, and I earned my jump wings at Ft. Benning. All these bases honored men who wouldn't want me or other Black Americans serving in uniform,” Brown said in a statement. “We cannot ask today’s servicemen and women to defend our country, while housing and training them and their families on installations celebrating those who betrayed our country in order to enslave others and preserve white supremacy.”
Of the nine bases expected to get new names, two are named for Black Americans. Asked why so many bases were renamed for white men, members of the commission said that they had to make difficult decisions because there are so many military heroes and a small number of bases.
“It was a privilege to identify a group of Americans that all Americans can draw inspiration from and that help us move past a time when major American installations were named for people who took up arms against the government,” said Kori Schake, a former Pentagon official and member of the naming commission.
The recommended new base names are:
  • Fort Benning, Ga., to become Fort Moore after Hal Moore, a retired lieutenant general, and Julia Moore. Hal received the Distinguished Service Cross for actions during the Vietnam War; and his wife Julia changed how the military notifies family members of casualties to deliver the news in a more compassionate way.
  • Fort Bragg, N.C., to become Fort Liberty after the founding principles of the nation, and the 82nd Airborne Division’s song that goes “We’re all-American [and] proud to be, for we are the soldiers of liberty.”
  • Fort Gordon, Ga., to become Fort Eisenhower after President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served as supreme commander of the allied expeditionary force in Europe during World War II before becoming president.
  • Fort A.P. Hill, Va., to become Fort Walker after Dr. Mary Walker, who volunteered as a civilian to be a doctor for troops during the Civil War because she was not allowed to join the military as a woman.
  • Fort Hood, Texas, to become Fort Cavazos after Richard Cavazos, a Texan who received the Distinguished Service Cross during the Korean War.
  • Fort Lee, Va., to become Fort Gregg-Adams after two Army logisticians. Arthur Gregg enlisted to work on supply logistics in Germany during World War II, applied to officer candidate school when the military was desegregated, and retired as a lieutenant general. Lt. Col. Charity Adams joined the military after the attack on Pearl Harbor and led a postal battalion in Europe during the war.
  • Fort Pickett, Va., to become Fort Barfoot after 2nd Lt. Van T. Barfoot, who received the Medal of Honor for actions during World War II.
  • Fort Polk, La., to become Fort Johnson for Sgt. William Henry Johnson, who received the Medal of Honor for fighting Germans first with grenades, then with bullets, then with the butt of his rifle before resorting to a knife during World War I.
  • Fort Rucker, Ala., to become Fort Novosel for Chief Warrant Officer 4 Michael Novosel Sr., who earned the Medal of Honor during Vietnam for flying an aircraft through enemy fire to save 29 men.
Kevin Baron contributed to this report.
defenseone.com · by Jacqueline Feldscher



3. Special Operations are Deterrence Operations: How United States Special Operations Forces should be used in Strategic Competition

Special Operations are Deterrence Operations:
How United States Special Operations Forces should be used in Strategic Competition
 
By Tom Hammerle and Mike Pultusker
 
After twenty years of Global War on Terrorism operations, the question of how to effectively employ United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) now, and for the next twenty years in support of national defense priorities has come to the forefront for policy-makers and military leadership. What is SOF’s value proposition in an era of strategic competition? How can SOF continue to shape the environment and remain an important tool in the American strategists’ toolbox?
 
Among the first Americans in Afghanistan after al-Qaeda attacked the United States on 9/11, SOF has continued to be at the vanguard of efforts to counter violent extremism. The relentless pace of SOF operations in a continuous Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze (F3EA) targeting cycle continued for two decades of uninterrupted deployment. In that time, the American national defense community’s understanding of VEO behavior, assessment of risk to the homeland, and advancements in technology have matured so that countering violent extremism is no-longer a deployment-centric task.
 
President Biden’s 2022 National Defense Strategy clearly articulates a continuation of the Trump Administration-initiated migration from the Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Counterterrorism (CT), SOF’s current or at least most recent value proposition, to Strategic Competition against China and Russia. After what the 2018 National Defense Strategy called a “period of strategic atrophy,” it is time to relook at how SOF can effectively contribute to national security priorities. While some SOF are specifically designed to deploy into uncertain environments and circumstances to generate certainty and create options for strategic decision makers, all SOF units contribute to these missions by supporting across cyber, space, information, logistics, technological, financial, and other unconventional competition domains. As the United States looks toward a future with more operations and activities occurring below the level of armed conflict, and more competition in the gray space; Special Operations must be included in the deterrence conversation because SOF will reduce risk or strategic surprise, provide opportunities to create and exploit advantage, deliver decision space.
 
Deterrence – Instilling doubt or fear of consequences
The Joint Chiefs of Staff is clear in its description of deterrence in the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept as “operations [conducted to] convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.” Simply, deterrence is credibly communicating the capability and willingness to influence adversarial decision makers.
 
           Historically, and under the current 2006 definition, SOF has not been seen as a deterrence force in part because deterrence and nuclear deterrence are often used interchangeably. Deterring nuclear attack and deterrence as a concept are somewhat conflated in the American perspective because the United States Armed Forces must work to deter existential threats while they must only compete against adversaries in non-existential threat spaces. Due to unique political and geographic realities, historically the only true existential threat to the United States in the missile age has been from nuclear war – or an attack in the space or cyber domains with catastrophic effects. While terrorism emerged as a very serious concern, it is clear now that Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) are extremely unlikely to be able to seriously disrupt or degrade the U.S. position in the world, nor are these groups likely to gain that capability in next 20 years.
 
Without a constant counter VEO effort, SOF elements now have the mission space to provide their expertise against the deterrence problem. With that in mind, SOF’s role for the next twenty years should be in support of an integrated deterrence plan that spans whole of military and whole of government. Through SOF’s unique size, capabilities, and clout, SOF can have an outsized role in ensuring the United States’ and its Strategic Competitors stay engaged below the level of Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), off of an uncontrolled escalation ladder, and below the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. 
           
Effective deterrence requires capabilities, credibility, and communication. Traditionally, U.S.’ capability has referred to the nuclear triad, while credibility has referred to a capacity to use nuclear weapons (including first strike), and communication has referred to the ability to effectively transmit intent. Looking at these requirements for deterrence, it is obvious that SOF can and should play an integral role in each requirement.
 
Capability - Impose Cost and Deny Benefit
In a Clausewitzian view, deterrence depends on a rational understanding of the value of the object. A would-be aggressor state must be able to weigh the predicted benefit of an attack against the cost that will be incurred. An aggressor can be deterred from attacking if the target state is considered to be capable of mounting a defense strong enough to ensure negative gains or has an ability to conduct a counter-attack that is comprehensive enough to deny the benefit of obtaining the object or impose prohibitive cost. Throughout the Cold War, the United States conducted deterrence through capability; by developing and maintaining a ready nuclear arsenal. The USSR, and all other aggressor states, knew that an attack on the U.S. or those nations which were secured through extended deterrence (i.e. the nuclear umbrella) could mean certain overwhelming nuclear counter-attack.  
    
           In Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia, and throughout the Middle-East SOF elements are developing partnered armed forces’ organic combat capability and instilling an ability to work with the U.S. Armed Forces. Through SOF core activities like Foreign Internal Defense (FID) partnerships in the form of Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Narcotics Training (CNT), Small Unit Exchange (SUE), and other related events, militaries aligned with the United States are deterring aggression from their neighbors by building a defense force, able to mount a defense strong enough to ensure negative gains. JCETs, CNTs, SUEs, are all part of larger partnerships that include foreign military sales and aid programs ranging from small arms to fighter jets and all the U.S.-based training required to support the new capabilities tactically, operationally, and logistically.
 
Beyond the SOF and conventional capabilities gained through FID programs, SOF are also preparing countries most vulnerable to being overrun to conduct Unconventional Warfare from within occupied territory. Most of this type of preparation is classified, for good reason, but building resistance networks further provides a capability that can impose cost to an aggressor. Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese mastermind of the attack on Pearl Harbor, is often (mistakenly) said to have defended his plan to destroy U.S. warships in the Pacific in part by saying that a true attack on the U.S. mainland would be impossible because “behind every blade of grass will be a rifle.” The pre-nuclear age deterrence concept is as valid today as it was then. When it comes to attacking the U.S. and its allies, “We want an adversary to think that behind every rock is an IED and up in every tree is a sniper. That if you were willing to attack this country, you're going to be fighting all the way through. – this means that the cost is too high, militarily but also domestically and internationally,” as General Richard Clarke recently described the concept. SOF has been honing its ability to impose cost or increase a foreign capability using a small footprint since its inception and will continue to do so.
 
           The United States intelligence and defense community readily applies capability in the deterrence discussion to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, it is now time to update the narrative. The United States must bring SOF, and its force-generating capability into the picture when discussing strategic competition. SOF has the correct suite of skills for “encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome”, as stated in the 2006 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept.
 
Credibility - Escalation Overmatch
In addition to capability, deterrence requires that would-be aggressor states understand that targeted states and their allies’ defenses are credible. Any incursion against a state with a capable and credible defense network would have a low probability of success. As the Joint Operating Concept mentions, “Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs.” Since the days of the Office of Strategic Services, SOF has been an unrivaled means of imposing cost.
 
Today, global SOF operations conducted unilaterally and with partner forces re-enforce the American commitment to deterring aggression. Constant overt, low-visibility, and discrete operations throughout the GWOT and continuing today conducted by Direct Action Raid Force elements are testament to a credible, ready force which can impose cost.  
 
Beyond surgical strike, scenario-based war-games and exercises that feature large scale combat operations on land, sea, and air are public showcases of integration between conventional forces and SOF. American and U.S.–led international exercises are designed to train combat and combat support elements alike to conduct operations escalating from steady state operations to full LSCO and Nuclear Warfare missions. Typically beginning with a small or SOF specific problem and working up to conventional forces and eventually strategic forces, these events are designed to force different echelons of international combat power to work together through an escalation ladder. These events also serve to train leaders and decision makers at the national and international level when and how to appropriate force. JCETs, CNTs, SUEs, are routinely conducted as part of larger war games – demonstrating SOF’s ability to readily transition from routine international training events into combat operations in the form of FID, Counter-Insurgency, or Security Force Assistance missions. SOF’s consistent forward presence will further cultivate and enrich relationships through repeated interactions.
 
Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations further add to credibility of partnered and allied deterrence operations in a unique way. SFA missions allow less-capable or less-developed military forces to aid in the defense of a friendly nation beyond what would be organically possible. SFA missions integrate SOF forces among foreign partner forces units to train and then deploy as a part of that foreign force to a third country. For example, in the face of a Russian incursion in Eastern Europe, a smaller lesser-equipped Baltic or Balkan nation could deploy its forces to the afflicted region with SOF attached; maintaining constant access to U.S. assets, funding, intelligence, and mentorship as a fully integrated member of an allied fighting force.
 
           Adding to SOF’s credibility as a deterrent force, a suite of additional skills reduces the ‘avenues of approach’ available to an adversary. Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction are all core SOF activities that credibly frustrate aggression. Much of the post-GWOT interstate competition has taken place in a gray zone of denial and deception activity and information dominance. Within these core activities, SOF has an outsized impact, with a more limited logistics package and working by, with, and through partner and allies to accomplish U.S. objectives. 
 
           As with capability, credibility often mistakenly only refers to the willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the deterrence discussion. A maturing discussion of deterrence should include allied and partner nation credibility below the level of armed conflict. While exercises and similar training events often portray direct conflict, their consistent presence are truly actions below the level of armed conflict. They increase allied and partner nation credibility to deter others from attack while simultaneously improving the United States’ credibility globally, often without the saber-rattling of nuclear weapons.
 
Communication - Encourage Restraint
Communication is essential in deterrence operations between adversaries because only a clear understanding of capabilities and consequences can encourage restraint. Communication is required to convince adversaries not to take actions that threaten U.S. vital interests.
 
Traditionally, the use of declared red linesprivate backchannel discussions, and signed arms control agreements have been used to be as clear as possible about the use of force – even if a level of gamesmanship limits confidence and utility levels of these efforts. On a deeper level, the use of messaging – public statements designed to communicate capability and credibility directly – and signaling – observable action intended to communicate specifics credibly – are equally significant.
 
Communication is also critical to maintaining mutual defense partnerships. The U.S. must continuously prove its commitment to the use force, up to and including the use of nuclear weapons, to affirm friendly international relationships. As former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder recently wrote about, “most people have forgotten that the primary proliferation concern 50 years ago wasn’t about Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran but about U.S. allies such as Germany and Japan… [Counter-Proliferation required an] explicit guarantee from the United States that its nuclear forces would defend their security if needed.” Forward defense relationships must remain an essential feature of U.S. National Security Strategy.
 
The overt forward deployment of SOF working with allies and partner forces in combat and on training missions communicates commitment on a very high level and affords access to information that would otherwise be obscured. A continued forward SOF presence limits the threat posed by a strategic competitor by ensuring that would-be aggressor states consider de-escalation. Partnership commitment is clearly communicated to allies and adversaries alike.
 
While forward deployed, SOF can conduct Special Reconnaissance and related intelligence activities to keep the United States and its allies informed. In an era defined by a gray zone activities, denial and deception operations, and pursuit of information dominance, positioning forces to gather ground truth is invaluable. This information can be used in messaging and signaling efforts to achieve decisive influence over other states’ decision-making. For example, where China may take action planned to be low-visibility in an attempt to gain positional advantage and a fait complete legal justification, appropriately positioned, equipped, and trained SOF and Partner Forces can observe and report – affording the decision space and information overmatch to take disruptive action. 
 
The American intelligence community and its global network of international partnerships is the best in the world at finding, tracking, and measuring things, but is less capable of fully understanding capabilities without context. Trained service members and intelligence officers on the ground are essential for assessing intangibles like moral, command and control, and unit readiness. As the world is witnessing in Ukraine currently, the technical asymmetric advantages of the Russian military have not manifested into a successful campaign. This somewhat surprising development should be attributed to an overestimation of Russian capability and credibility, and a corresponding underestimation of those same attributes in the Ukrainian resistance. 
 
Effective deterrence depends on the state being deterred understanding that it is being deterred. Deterrence through communication using SOF can encourage restraint through a variety of means. SOF’s specific position and relationships allow for credible communication to bargain, compel, deter, and assure other states. Having a SOF element in country allows for another pathway to communicate the intent of the United States. In this vein, SOF can message the leaders of other militaries that are not easily replicated through conventional military leadership and diplomatic channels. Furthermore, SOF’s mere presence is a message and signal to any adversarial nation communicating the capability and credibility of the United States. Adversaries and allies alike understand that by positioning some of its most elite units, the United States has committed at a very high level. Beyond communication, if a strategic competitor used conventional forces, or decided to cross the threshold for nuclear use, small SOF elements are trained to respond to unanticipated aggression and the immediate effects of a tactical nuclear strike.
 
Conclusions
Since the Soviet Union detonated Joe-1, its first nuclear weapon, and the People’s Republic of China completed Project 596  to become the third nuclear state, deterrence has oft been simplified to – the only thing stopping an adversary nation with a nuclear weapon is an ally with a nuclear weapon. That model may not be accurate anymore, and no longer needs to be the case.
 
Deterrence in U.S. policy has traditionally meant nuclear deterrence. It is clear that the deterrence discussion needs to mature beyond the nuclear triad, and SOF has repeatedly shown that a small, competent, and capable force can have an outsized impact. The United States should not leave many of its best and most experienced elements in cyber, space, information, logistics, technological, financial, and direct action on the sideline in this high-stakes era of Strategic Competition. As the drum of rotational deployments to counter terrorism beats more slowly, it is time to re-think how SOF can use its unique attributes to work in the deterrence space to keep our allies assured and our adversaries at bay.
 
* The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army, United States Strategic Command, or United States Special Operations Command. *

About the Author(s)

Major Mike Pultusker is a U.S. Army Strategic Intelligence Officer who has served in the Middle East and Europe as well as strategic level assignments including time on the Joint Staff and at USCENTCOM. Mike is currently assigned to the JIC at USSOCOM, Tampa, FL.
 

Major Tom Hammerle is a U.S. Army Special Forces and Strategic Intelligence Officer with multiple operational deployments to the Middle East and Afghanistan. Tom is currently assigned to the JIOC at USSTRATCOM, Omaha, NE.















4. Is Russia Ripe for a Coup?

If so, are we ready for what follows?

Conclusion:

But Russian history and political-science theory do suggest that a coup is perfectly possible. Going by Luttwak’s guidelines, all of the elements for a successful coup are already present in Russia. All that is missing is a core of plotters to assemble the pieces. (It may not be missing at all. According to Ukrainian intelligence, a coup is already being prepared in Moscow.) Perhaps most important, since the plotters would be acting explicitly against Putin and his policies, there is a good chance that they would be motivated to repudiate the mess created by the regime. That would be the best news for everybody.

Is Russia Ripe for a Coup?
19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · May 24, 2022
Is a coup possible in Russia? Several months ago, most analysts would have dismissed the idea as absurd. Today, with the war in Ukraine going badly for Russia and President Vladimir Putin, the question is relevant. It might even be urgent.
Indeed, that question has been supplemented by another: Can a leader who has created such an immense catastrophe for his regime and his country possibly survive?
Informing Our Speculation
Speculation about a possible coup is just that – speculation. Since there is no direct evidence that anyone in Moscow is plotting a coup, the best one can do, as Bellingcat’s Russia specialist Christo Grozev says, is draw conclusions from existing conditions in Russia, and hope they prove to be right.
Russia’s list of ills is long. The country is currently experiencing almost complete political isolation, impending economic collapse, growing material hardship and dissatisfaction, and a looming military defeat. It is also witnessing the galvanization of NATO, which will likely add new members, and the strengthening of the U.S. alliance with Europe.
All of this is happening thanks to Putin, who has succeeded in reducing his country to an underdeveloped third-world state with nukes. It stands to reason that some Russian political and military elites must hope to replace the man who created this mess. That is how angry elites have reacted in other countries with comparable circumstances.
It is also how they have reacted in Russia’s past.
In 1991, Communist hardliners unhappy with perestroika tried, and failed, to remove its architect Mikhail Gorbachev from office. In 1964, Nikita Khrushchev’s comrades pushed him out. In 1917, Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks successfully seized power from the Provisional Government in Petrograd. A few months before that, General Lavr Kornilov failed to oust the government.
Will angry elites repeat history and stage a coup against Putin?
A partial answer to that question can be found in Edward Luttwak’s excellent 1968 book, Coup d’Etat. A Practical Handbook.
Guidelines for Coup Plotters
The book defines a coup as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.”
The author then identifies three pre-conditions of a coup, all of which manifestly hold for Putin’s Russia. First, the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population. Second, the target state must be substantially independent, and the influence of foreign powers in its internal political life must be relatively limited. Finally, the target state must have a political center.
When these conditions are present, as they are in Russia, coups are possible. For a coup to happen, however, its plotters must also control or neutralize the state bureaucracy and its security forces, “while at the same time using [the machinery of state] to impose … control on the country at large.”
Since “the many separate operations of the coup must be carried out almost simultaneously,” Luttwak notes that a large group of people with the requisite training and equipment must be involved. “There will usually be one source of such recruits: the armed forces of the state itself,” by which Luttwak means the army, police, and security services.
The initial group of coup plotters will then have to recruit supporters. They will preferably be able to draw insiders who are alienated from the government and with whom they are friends. Links of family, ethnicity, or clan can be useful, the author specifies.
Planning and timing are key to successful coups. “Information is the greatest asset” of coup plotters. The plotters must know a lot about the defenses of the state, while the state knows little or nothing about the plot. Neutralizing the state’s counter-intelligence services is thus a priority. Leading representatives of a country’s political forces and its government must be arrested. Roads, airports, and communications will have to be controlled to prevent outside forces rushing to the aid of the embattled government. Key buildings must be occupied.
The final step, according to Luttwak, is the “forcible isolation of the ‘hard-core’ loyalist forces.” Once a “satisfactory degree of penetration” of the armed forces and police is achieved, it is time to launch the coup. If one acts too soon or too late, the window of opportunity will close, and the coup will fail.
A Recent History of Russian Coups
The 1991 coup plotters failed miserably. They did not arrest Russian President Boris Yeltsin, seize the parliamentary building, neutralize loyalist armed forces, or take control of communications.
In contrast, Khrushchev’s opponents made sure to have the support of the Communist Party apparatus, the army, and the KGB, and they succeeded.
Likewise, the Bolsheviks meticulously planned their coup in Petrograd by seizing communications centers and key roads, controlling the railroads and the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies, and penetrating the government’s armed forces. Their attempted coup in Moscow did not succeed, however. They failed to neutralize military forces and instead provoked an armed conflict that they won after a few weeks.
General Kornilov bungled his attempted coup even worse than the 1991 conspirators. He simply marched in Petrograd, without securing any support from the significant political players or social forces.
The fact that Russia has experienced four coup attempts since 1917 does not mean that a coup against Putin will necessarily happen, but it does remind us that coups are not unusual in that country. Importantly, a precedent may have already been set: The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence claims that an assassination attempt took place soon after the war began.
A Coup Is Possible
Were Russia’s potential coup plotters to read Luttwak, they would take courage. All three pre-conditions of a coup are present in Russia. There is clear evidence that elements within the military and the intelligence services are dissatisfied with the course of the war against Ukraine, and with Putin’s handling of that war. There is also mounting evidence of soldiers refusing to fight and of Russian men refusing to register with military commissariats.
The military is distracted with the war in Ukraine, while the secret service and counterintelligence are focused on suppressing popular discontent and countering the threat posed by Ukrainian special forces and guerrilla saboteurs.
Since so much power is concentrated in Putin’s hands, removing him is tantamount to seizing the government. (One analyst has suggested that, given Putin’s isolation in a bunker, neutralizing him simply means cutting him off completely from the outside world.) Loyalist political forces in the Duma and the United Russia party are too cowed to stage a pro-Putin rally, while loyalist forces in the provinces are too far away from Moscow to matter immediately.
Coup plotters would have to be disgruntled generals and FSB officers bound by friendship, an esprit de corps, and fear of Russia’s destruction as a result of the war. There is no reason that such individuals could not find a common language and recruit supporters from within their ranks. There is also no reason they could not mobilize important elements of the armed forces and security services based in Moscow.
Putin’s diehard loyalists would obviously put up a fight, as would some elements of Moscow’s population. But given the collapsing economy, the steady count of body bags returning to Russia, the military humiliation in Ukraine, and Russia’s absence of a free press and civil society, pro-coup forces should be able to quell that resistance and win control of the Kremlin.
Naturally, a coup could also fail, for any number of reasons discussed by Luttwak. One false step, one poorly timed move, and the whole endeavor could collapse.
But Russian history and political-science theory do suggest that a coup is perfectly possible. Going by Luttwak’s guidelines, all of the elements for a successful coup are already present in Russia. All that is missing is a core of plotters to assemble the pieces. (It may not be missing at all. According to Ukrainian intelligence, a coup is already being prepared in Moscow.) Perhaps most important, since the plotters would be acting explicitly against Putin and his policies, there is a good chance that they would be motivated to repudiate the mess created by the regime. That would be the best news for everybody.
Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”
19fortyfive.com · by ByAlexander Motyl · May 24, 2022


5. Ending the civil war over the future of the US Marine Corps

I concur with Dave Johnson. We need a strong and relevant Marine Corps.

Excerpts:
And at the heart of the split in the service is this: Berger, right or wrong in his assumptions, didn’t do the outreach that traditionally is expected. Radical change of this profound nature should be debated professionally and thoroughly analyzed, not imposed by fiat. Admittedly, good ideas often die a lingering death in the Pentagon. At some point a service chief has to lead and do what is necessary to move forward quickly. But there is some useful middle ground between decree and obstruction that still needs to be plowed with Force Design 2030.
Berger, although he had listening sessions with several of the dissident generals, apparently ignored their recommendations. Like it or not, these retired officers are part of his constituency and they helped build the magnificent Corps he inherited. Their advice should be carefully considered.
The stakes are extremely high. This is not an inconsequential decision, like the Oct. 2000 decision by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, when he mandated adoption of the black beret throughout the Army and set off a furor. Nor is Force Design 2030 a “New Coke” type of fiasco. Berger’s decision is extremely consequential. He is deciding the future capabilities of an important service to contribute to our national defense, not what kind of headgear Marines will wear or what sodas Americans will like.
Even an old, retired Army colonel like me, although I hate to admit it, realizes that our nation needs a strong and relevant Marine Corps. It is time for the Marine family to have a real sit-down to sort all this out and get the Corps back on track.


Ending the civil war over the future of the US Marine Corps - Breaking Defense
There is a growing split in the Marine Corps community, and it needs to be addressed before it becomes a major rift, writes David E. Johnson of the RAND Corporation.
breakingdefense.com · by David E. Johnson · May 24, 2022
U.S. Marine Corps Gen. David H. Berger, the 38th commandant of the Marine Corps, visits 2d Marine Division on Camp Lejeune, N.C., May 3, 2021. (U.S. Marine Corps Jennifer E. Reyes)
Perhaps no current leader at the Pentagon has stirred up as much passion as Marine commandant Gen. David Berger and his plan to overhaul the Marines, which have been met with significant and at times cutting feedback from retired officers. In this analysis, David E. Johnson of the RAND Corporation calls for peace in the Corps, before it’s too late.
There is a war going on over the future of the Marine Corps.
On one side is Marine Corps commandant Gen. David H. Berger. In opposition is a large, organized group of retired Marine generals. The war is over Berger’s decision to overhaul the Corps to function as an adjunct of the Navy, focused primarily on anti-shipping operations against China.
But if this conflict continues, it threatens to be destructive to the very fabric of the Corps — bad for the Marines and worse for our country. And while both sides feel passionately they are doing what’s best for the service, this conflict needs to be stopped, immediately, before irreparable harm is done.
Berger first announced intentions to reform the Corps in his Commandant’s Guidance [PDF] when he assumed office in July 2019. He also made it clear that addressing force design was his “number one priority.”
The document caused little disruption at the time, given that it was, in Berger’s words, “a road map.” Surely, it was vision statement not an edict, and the actual implementation would be debated rigorously within the Marine Corps family?
Those who thought this was what Berger was about were wrong. The real war kicked off with the publication of Force Design 2030 in March 2020. Berger’s destination became clear, as did the parts of the Marine Corps that were no longer invited on the trip. He set in motion plans for a radical redesign of the Corps to respond to the strategic imperative of the rise in China; a mission for which he was convinced the Marines are unprepared.
Berger dictated that the Corps would “return to our historic role in the maritime littoral.” He also determined that the current Corps had significant capability shortfalls that were needed to execute this mission. To fill these gaps, he mandated that the Corps would discard all its tanks and significantly reduce current hard-to-deploy systems, e.g., field artillery. These legacy systems will be replaced by missile-equipped forces that will take on the Chinese Navy from dispersed, hard-to-find locations.
The Corps is also dramatically reorganizing its existing structure into Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR). They will be a naval formation, organized around an infantry battalion and anti-ship missile batteries.
Berger and his supporters also argue that the reinvented corps can still execute its traditional missions just as effectively as before. If necessary, it will get tanks and other capabilities from the other services. But ultimately, the MLR is not your father’s Marine regiment — and an older generation of Marines are not happy.
Force Design 2030 had an unintended consequence likely not anticipated by the Commandant. It ignited a revolt of many retired generals. Ironically, Berger’s initiatives have been generally greeted with kudos by many defense analysts and policymakers outside the Marine family. They welcome that at least the Marines, as opposed to the other services, are doing something about China.
The View From the Unprecedented Revolt
The dissenters’ gloves came off in a recent series of articles. That a large group of retired Marines have publicly gone against a commandant’s decision is unheard of in the history of the Corps. Marine officers are known, above all, for their loyalty to the Corps. Semper Fidelis — Always Faithful — is more than a motto; it is a way of life.
Perhaps the most noted early salvo from the opposition was the March commentary in The Wall Street Journal by former senator and Marine officer Jim Webb. Its title is the de facto manifesto of the dissenters: “Momentous Changes in the US Marine Corps’ Force Organization Deserve Debate.”
Webb also wrote that the agonizing decision to go public came only “After several unsuccessful attempts by retired senior officers to engage in a quiet dialogue with Gen. Berger” and the commandant not responding to a nonpublic letter of concern signed by 22 retired four-star Marine generals.
That the dissenters believed that they had to take their grievances outside the family shows how seriously they view the issues at hand. Webb captures their angst quite eloquently: “The traditional deference has been replaced by a sense of duty to the Marine Corps and its vital role in our national security.”
Retired Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper also weighed in, writing that Berger’s scheme was “for only one type of conflict, despite pronouncements to the contrary: a naval war with China.” Consequently, he and the other dissenters argue that the Corps will be less capable — if not unable — to execute what it has done so well in the past: global combined arms operations. It will also, he argues, cripple the Corps’ ability to serve as America’s emergency force.
Tim Barrick’s “On Future Wars and the Marine Corps,” written to defend Berger’s moves, actually reveals a number of reasons why the commandant may have encountered such strong resistance to his initiatives. First, Force Design 2030 was developed in two months in a “shroud of secrecy” by “a small group of colonels and generals,” noting that “tough trade off choices were required and a sense of urgency regarding China prevailed.” Second, only the commandant’s alternative was assessed.
These are the central issues for those in dissent: A small group, hand-picked by the commandant, set out to validate Gen. Berger’s single institution-changing idea with no rigorous analysis of alternatives or an opportunity for inclusive dialogue about this momentous decision.
Unfortunately, the tone of the confrontation will likely become even more virulent with an update to Force Design 2030 [PDF] now on the streets.
Therefore, it is time to call a truce.
Both sides have valid points that should serve as the basis for dialogue. Berger’s detractors are reacting to what they perceive as a poorly-conceived quest by the Commandant to be relevant in the pivot to Asia with his almost exclusive focus on a naval conflict with China. And yet, Berger is righty cognizant of the urgent need to tend to the significant challenges China poses to our national security.
There is a critical question that needs to be urgently answered: Is the commandant right to largely reorient his service to support a naval fight China, or is a broader (and admittedly more traditional) approach to the Corps future more appropriate?
And at the heart of the split in the service is this: Berger, right or wrong in his assumptions, didn’t do the outreach that traditionally is expected. Radical change of this profound nature should be debated professionally and thoroughly analyzed, not imposed by fiat. Admittedly, good ideas often die a lingering death in the Pentagon. At some point a service chief has to lead and do what is necessary to move forward quickly. But there is some useful middle ground between decree and obstruction that still needs to be plowed with Force Design 2030.
Berger, although he had listening sessions with several of the dissident generals, apparently ignored their recommendations. Like it or not, these retired officers are part of his constituency and they helped build the magnificent Corps he inherited. Their advice should be carefully considered.
The stakes are extremely high. This is not an inconsequential decision, like the Oct. 2000 decision by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, when he mandated adoption of the black beret throughout the Army and set off a furor. Nor is Force Design 2030 a “New Coke” type of fiasco. Berger’s decision is extremely consequential. He is deciding the future capabilities of an important service to contribute to our national defense, not what kind of headgear Marines will wear or what sodas Americans will like.
Even an old, retired Army colonel like me, although I hate to admit it, realizes that our nation needs a strong and relevant Marine Corps. It is time for the Marine family to have a real sit-down to sort all this out and get the Corps back on track.
David E. Johnson, Ph.D., is a retired Army colonel. He is a principal researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point. From 2012-2014 he founded and directed the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group for General Raymond T. Odierno.

6.  Downsizing the Department of Defense

When has BRAC ever really saved us money? I concur that we should consider divesting some of our spare bedrooms - until we need them again. Should we optimize our size based on current conditions and to save money or should we determine the right size based on how we assess the future threats and the defense needs of our nation. What are we anticipating? 


Downsizing the Department of Defense
Saving defense dollars should be a bipartisan concern


By Frederico Bartels -
Tuesday, May 24, 2022

m.washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com
OPINION:
One way that many families deal with increased costs is by downsizing, especially when they become “empty-nesters.” Downsizing makes even more sense when your family hasn’t used that spare bedroom in a long time. The Defense Department has lots of “spare bedrooms” they are not using and cost big money to maintain.
Since 2016, the department has told us they have at least 15% excess military infrastructure. At least three different studies have highlighted the excess and estimate the Pentagon could save about $2 billion dollars a year if allowed to trim its excess properties through the process called base realignment and closure (BRAC).
Those annual $2 billion would be more than enough to cover all the Air Force proposed aircraft divestments for this year, which total 102 aircraft and $1.6 billion. Or they could be used to expand the Navy’s inventories of Standard Missile 6 (one of their core missile systems) and long-range anti-ship missiles, which top their unfunded priorities list.
Under both the Obama and Trump administrations, the Pentagon asked Congress for authorization to conduct a round of BRAC. Congress consistently rebuffed those requests, and so, frustrated, the Pentagon simply gave up asking. The need did not go away, but the Pentagon’s enthusiasm did.
Now, if there is going to be any push toward a new round, it will have to come from Congress. Thankfully, a May 11, 2022, public hearing offered a glimmer of hope that might happen.
Toward the very end of the hearing, the chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Rep. Betty McCollum, closed with: “A new round of BRAC is necessary, and I believe it could save taxpayers billions of dollars, and it could also save the department a lot of time and energy expenditures maintaining something that is not useful to the department anymore.”
Saving defense dollars should be a shared bipartisan concern, and there are indications Ms. McCollum might get some support from her counterpart, ranking member Rep. Ken Calvert. Calvert has also expressed willingness to explore how to conduct a new round of BRAC.
The fact that two members of the House support a BRAC is significant because House members have historically been more resistant to new rounds of base closures since by mere geographic reality they have a higher risk of losing a base than senators. Historically, the current chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Rep. Adam Smith, has also shown willingness to support a new round of BRAC. Now would be a good time to resurrect the issue.
Lawmakers should encounter a friendly reception in the Deputy Defense Secretary’s office. Dr. Kathleen Hicks co-signed an open letter making the case for a new round of BRAC back in 2017. Back then, the group of mostly think tank scholars highlighted that “the military has been forced to allocate resources away from the training and equipping of our soldiers, and toward maintaining unneeded and unwanted infrastructure.” That still holds true today.
BRAC is the best way to holistically assess our military infrastructure against the missions outlined in our national defense strategy. And since the last round of BRAC in 2005, that strategy has changed significantly in response to today’s great power competition. The strategy shift started under President Donald Trump, and President Biden’s interim national security guidance indicates that he supports that change.
Members of Congress have previously been apprehensive of falling into the trap of authorizing another round like the 2005 BRAC (where costs exceeded savings), however, these are problems of legislative design that can be addressed while authorizing a new round. The new round of BRAC should have a narrow mandate and focus on reducing excess infrastructure.
The Pentagon has had unused spare bedrooms for a while now. The Pentagon has 16,000 fewer active troops now than it did in 2005. Put another way, the children are gone and aren’t coming back.
While it makes sense to maintain some extra capacity in case the need arises to scale up our forces, there is no need to maintain over 15% of excess capacity. It’s costly, and the cost keeps rising.
Fiscal Year 2023 would be a great moment to authorize a new round of BRAC. Ms. McCollum and Mr. Calvert are well-positioned to lead the charge to rationalize our defense infrastructure, saving money that can be used to keep our current and future forces best situated and equipped to deal with today’s great power competition.
Let’s hope they succeed.
• Frederico Bartels is the senior policy analyst for defense budgeting in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.
m.washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com

7. China Is Doing Biden’s Work for Him

So if this thesis is accurate (and the Russian one too) should we have a national level strategic influence campaign to shape the narrative and reinforce US values and interests to build and sustain coalitions, partnerships, and alliances? What organization should be responsible for a strategic influence effort and synchronizing or harmonizing the message of the US government? Is that the role of the State department's Global Engagement Center? Is this some Admiral Kirby should be taking on in his new strategic communications role on the National Security Staff?

Of course Bonaparte might counsel us to just keep our mouths closed: "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Conclusion:

This shift—of China’s neighbors opting for tighter ties with America—may progress more and more if Beijing doesn’t change course. Its neighbors would much rather be on good terms with Beijing than bad, and most governments in the region will attempt to balance their relations with both great powers. At the same time, the message to Xi should be loud and clear: As in Europe, where Vladimir Putin’s aggression is uniting the rest of the region against him, so too in Asia is an aggressive China entrenching, not weakening, American power.


China Is Doing Biden’s Work for Him
As in Europe, where Vladimir Putin’s assault is uniting the region against him, so too in Asia is an aggressive Beijing entrenching American power.

By Michael Schuman
The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · May 24, 2022
If President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia—marked as it was by his comments on the defense of Taiwan, announcements on a proposed new regional trade pact, and meetings with leaders who exhibit similar levels of concern about a rising China—has shown the persistence of American global power, it has also revealed something of equal importance: Beijing’s failure to translate economic might into political dominance, even in its own backyard.
Biden today concluded a summit of the leaders of the Quad—a security partnership including Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—who issued a joint statement chockablock with references to promoting democracy, a rules-based global order, and peaceful resolution of disputes. That came a day after Biden announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a partnership with 13 countries as diverse as South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand. Notably absent from all of this was China. Biden’s trip exhibited Washington’s continued ability to rally other nations behind its standard, and in initiatives overtly targeted against the region’s supposedly rising superpower.
The script wasn’t meant to read this way. As China grew in economic importance, its smaller neighbors would, the thinking went, inevitably and inexorably be drawn into its orbit, while U.S. power would correspondingly fade, ushered along by its own political divisions and percolating isolationism. Events of the past decade seemed to prove the assumption: As China acted more assertively in the region, Washington’s efforts to cling to primacy appeared to falter. President Barack Obama’s “pivot” to Asia concluded with a thud when Donald Trump pulled Washington out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership economic pact. (The other 11 members inked the deal anyway.) And Trump, beyond his bellicose and inchoate trade war against China, largely ignored the region, save for a couple of fancy meals with Kim Jong Un.
Meanwhile, Beijing appeared to fill the void. China is at the center of another Asia-wide trade pact, called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which came into effect in January, while its infrastructure-building Belt and Road Initiative has funded railways, ports, and power plants from Pakistan to Laos. Beijing has also muscled aside its rivals in the South China Sea, steadily turning its contested claim to nearly the entire waterway into a fait accompli, and consolidated its hold over disputed territory also claimed by India. As the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan last year, Beijing, having fostered sound relations with the Taliban, seemed poised to become the country’s new patron. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, China also tried to win early plaudits through “vaccine diplomacy,” eagerly shipping its homemade jobs to neighbors. China was winning.
But as China seeks to expand its power, it seems to become more isolated. Biden’s new economic framework has attracted countries across ideological lines (from Communist Vietnam to democratic Australia) and some nations that try to carefully balance the two powers, such as Singapore. Beijing hasn’t weakened American bonds to its chief allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, and Australia. If anything, Washington appears to be drawing more countries to its side of the table, such as India.
All of this exposes the abject failure of Chinese foreign policy. Despite their constant pledges of “peaceful development,” China’s leaders have scared many of the country’s neighbors. New Delhi, historically no fan of Washington, has felt threatened by Chinese hostility over disputed borders. Beijing’s intensifying intimidation of Taiwan—with Chinese jets buzzing dangerously close to the island—has alarmed the region. Politicians in Canberra and Seoul have certainly not forgotten the economic coercion Beijing employed against them to compel changes in their policy. China’s bullying in the South China Sea has irked those with competing maritime claims. The Philippines, a longtime U.S. friend, has been trying in recent years to strengthen ties to China but, frustrated by Chinese shipping crowding into waters claimed by Manila as an exclusive economic zone, a Philippines foreign minister last year tweeted a very undiplomatic “GET THE FUCK OUT!”
Of course, to maintain its influence, Washington will have to follow through on its new initiatives. In that, Biden is already constrained by politics back home. The new economic framework is not a trade pact aimed at reducing tariffs, a sop to grumbling in the U.S. that trade with Asia costs American jobs. The deal’s focus on environmental and labor standards alone, critics contend, will water down its value and appeal. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce found it “disappointing.”
But that misses the geopolitical point. The goal of the framework is to ensure that Washington is “writing the rules” on crucial economic issues such as digital business and climate change, a way to solidify American influence against Beijing’s efforts to refashion the norms of the global system in its own favor. The agreement will also focus on securing supply chains—bad news for China, which has been alienating foreign business with erratic “zero-COVID” shutdownssupport for Moscow in its invasion of Ukraine, and human-rights abuses. The framework just so happens to bring together most of China’s chief Asian competitors when it comes to being a base for production (India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) with the countries that invest in and operate those bases (Japan, South Korea, and the U.S.). That can potentially further encourage international companies to relocate their supply chains out of China. And then there is the sheer symbolic value of Biden rocking into town and attracting leaders from across what is supposed to be China’s home turf into a new economic initiative.
For China, the message is clear: Get a new foreign policy. Beijing seems to believe that its economic weight will eventually compel the rest of the region to flock to its flag. But there is little sign of that happening. South Korea exports far more to China than the U.S., but that didn’t stop its new President Yoon Suk Yeol from hosting Biden on his Asia tour before any summit with Xi Jinping. Nor is China even offering all that much on the economic front these days. Beijing’s longtime policy direction, “reform and opening up,” offered the hope of greater cooperation, and thus profits for foreign investors and other countries. Xi has replaced that with the more insular and nationalistic “self-sufficiency,” a campaign to replace imports with Chinese alternatives.
Beijing will have to woo the world with more than money. Chinese leaders are attempting to promote their own values and norms—of the authoritarian persuasion—on the global stage. That’s won China some support in forums such as the United Nations. But its immediate neighbors seem far more concerned about the threat created by Beijing’s expanding power and aggressive use of it than they are about American finickiness over human rights.
There is little indication, however, that Xi and his foreign-policy team have any intention of softening their stance on key regional issues. Biden’s success may, if anything, prod them to lash out further. A commentary published by Xinhua, China’s official news agency, was quick to deride Biden’s economic framework as a “big scam” based on “sinister intentions” meant to “undermine regional stability,” before complaining about China being left out.
This shift—of China’s neighbors opting for tighter ties with America—may progress more and more if Beijing doesn’t change course. Its neighbors would much rather be on good terms with Beijing than bad, and most governments in the region will attempt to balance their relations with both great powers. At the same time, the message to Xi should be loud and clear: As in Europe, where Vladimir Putin’s aggression is uniting the rest of the region against him, so too in Asia is an aggressive China entrenching, not weakening, American power.
The Atlantic · by Michael Schuman · May 24, 2022

8. White Supremacists Sacralize Mass Attackers to Encourage More Violence

Excerpts:
Manifestos. Attack videos. Racist narratives. The sharing of such artifacts can serve as a powerful motivating factor for future perpetrators. The canonization of mass shooters and amplification of their messages creates an environment where aspiring attackers are increasingly willing to perpetrate violence as a way to honor previous “saints,” attain sainthood themselves, and inspire future attacks.
Some social media companies have tried to minimize the proliferation of this content and prevalence of this ecosystem through various mechanisms, including content moderation and deplatforming individuals and channels glorifying mass shootings. These efforts should continue and should be further improved through innovation, though Gendron’s sacralization despite content moderation efforts is in part testament to the fact that it is difficult to truly suppress any ideas or “information” in the current digital media environment. However, this already tragic situation could grow worse if the violent white supremacist ecosystem expands. The sacralization of attackers described in this article should give us pause about legislation explicitly designed to prevent content moderation, such as the “anti-censorship” bills signed into law in Florida and Texas.
Law enforcement should be aware of and follow these subcultures that are spaces of influence and radicalization. This includes platforms like Discord that have been weaponized by white supremacist extremist groups as a radicalizing tool. Only through understanding and taking seriously the power of this ecosystem to produce individuals like Payton Gendron can we begin to disrupt these repeating cycles of mass attack.

White Supremacists Sacralize Mass Attackers to Encourage More Violence
Only through understanding and taking seriously the power of this online ecosystem to produce individuals like Payton Gendron can we begin to disrupt these repeating cycles of mass attack
The National Interest · by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross · May 24, 2022
Payton Gendron’s gruesome May 14 shooting at a Tops supermarket, in which he claimed ten lives in an attack targeting the black community of Buffalo, New York, is the latest in a string of mass shootings motivated by white supremacy. To understand why we are seeing similar attacks with increasing frequency, it is vital to understand that they are in part a product of a violent extremist ecosystem in which attackers are exalted, canonized as saints, and portrayed as role models across various digital platforms. This sacralization of white supremacist attackers is a powerful motivator for other adherents, encouraging a twisted form of discipleship in which attackers seek to imitate these “saints” in ideology, in the use of violence, and even in attack style.
To motivate others, Gendron released a 180-page manifesto and a digital diary of months of his Discord chats. In the opening of his manifesto, he bemoans “white genocide” and outlines his belief in Great Replacement theory before launching into a series of questions and answers, and outlining his strategy to increase media coverage of attacks and incite future violence through the spread of his ideals. Gendron’s manifesto is evidence of the influence of a memefied online extremist ecosystem that glorifies violent ideologies and celebrates acts of violence, in part through the exchange of racist memes and propaganda. Gendron was radicalized in this swamp and wanted to put on a show for it, wearing a GoPro on his helmet and live streaming the attack on Twitch in order to “increase coverage and spread my beliefs.”
Saint Brenton’s Disciple
The use of a GoPro, providing the appearance of a first-person shooter videogame, is itself a nod to Gendron’s foremost inspiration, Brenton Tarrant, who livestreamed a March 2019 attack that slaughtered fifty-one worshipers at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. The video of Tarrant’s attack and his manifesto have been widely shared across social media platforms. He is one of the most revered white supremacist extremist attackers, regularly referred to by other extremists as “Saint Brenton” or “Saint Tarrant,” and he is depicted in propaganda wearing religious garb and adorned with halos. Tarrant’s canonization in extremist digital communities, and the canonization of other famous attackers such as the Charleston church shooter Dylann Roof, has indeed served as an inspiration for other extremists. Some have expressed their desire to “become as famous as a ‘Saint’” through similar acts of terrorism. Others, like Gendron, emulated the specific tactics employed by “saints” who came before them.
It is not only Tarrant’s use of a GoPro and his live streaming of an attack that Gendron borrowed. Gendron also released a manifesto modeled after Tarrant’s. In many cases, he copied Tarrant’s language, and he also appropriated the question-and-answer format that Tarrant employed. And like Tarrant, Gendron did not intend his attack to be an isolated act of violence. Instead, Gendron explicitly saw it as part of a broader war that could only be advanced by others emulating him, hoping that his attack would “incite violence, retaliation and further divide between the European people and the invaders currently occupying European soil.” This stated motive was copied directly from Tarrant’s manifesto.
An inspiration to other white supremacist attackers today, Tarrant himself was a product of this extremist subculture. Demonstrating the matryoshka doll nature of how white supremacist attackers draw from and influence one another, Tarrant’s manifesto explicitly cites as his inspirations Dylann Roof and Anders Breivik, who killed seventy-seven during sequential attacks on a political office and summer youth camp in.
Thus, inspired by “saints” who preceded him, Tarrant can now claim his own line of disciples. Gendron is not the only mass attacker who views Tarrant as his model, as Tarrant has been claimed as the inspiration for John T. Earnest’s April 2019 attack on the Chabad of Poway synagogue and Patrick Crusius’s August 2019 attack at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas. In addition to his lauding of Tarrant, Gendron also names Roof, Breivik, Earnest, and Crusius as additional sources of inspiration.
The Newest Saint—and His Future Progeny
A full line of “saints,” beginning temporally with Breivik, was thus represented in Gendron’s manifesto. Gendron almost certainly feels confident that it is only a matter of time before Gendron himself is named as a future mass attacker’s inspiration.
Indeed, we can already see the phenomenon of sacralization occurring with Gendron. Within a day of the shooting, Gendron was canonized on various white supremacist Telegram channels. One widely shared statement proclaimed Gendron to be “a new Saint” while noting that “Saint Tarrant continues to make waves.” Gendron’s manifesto and attack video have already been used in propaganda videos as a call to arms for other white supremacist extremists, including in Telegram channels calling for attacks on the 14th of every month to commemorate the monthly anniversary of Gendron’s attack.
Manifestos. Attack videos. Racist narratives. The sharing of such artifacts can serve as a powerful motivating factor for future perpetrators. The canonization of mass shooters and amplification of their messages creates an environment where aspiring attackers are increasingly willing to perpetrate violence as a way to honor previous “saints,” attain sainthood themselves, and inspire future attacks.
Some social media companies have tried to minimize the proliferation of this content and prevalence of this ecosystem through various mechanisms, including content moderation and deplatforming individuals and channels glorifying mass shootings. These efforts should continue and should be further improved through innovation, though Gendron’s sacralization despite content moderation efforts is in part testament to the fact that it is difficult to truly suppress any ideas or “information” in the current digital media environment. However, this already tragic situation could grow worse if the violent white supremacist ecosystem expands. The sacralization of attackers described in this article should give us pause about legislation explicitly designed to prevent content moderation, such as the “anti-censorship” bills signed into law in Florida and Texas.
Law enforcement should be aware of and follow these subcultures that are spaces of influence and radicalization. This includes platforms like Discord that have been weaponized by white supremacist extremist groups as a radicalizing tool. Only through understanding and taking seriously the power of this ecosystem to produce individuals like Payton Gendron can we begin to disrupt these repeating cycles of mass attack.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the chief executive officer of the private firm Valens Global and leads a project on domestic extremism for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
Madison Urban and Matt Chauvin are analysts at Valens Global and support the organization’s work on FDD’s project on domestic extremism.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross · May 24, 2022

9. Book Review - The Wild Fields: A Fight for the Soul of Ukraine | SOF News


Book Review - The Wild Fields: A Fight for the Soul of Ukraine | SOF News
sof.news · by SOF News · May 24, 2022

A recently published novel, The Wild Fields: A Fight for the Soul of Ukraine, provides the story of a man struggling to live a peaceful life and keep his family safe in the battle-weary Donbas region of Ukraine. The story takes place about five years after the Euromaiden revolution of 2014, the Russian invasion of Crimea, and the establishment of two ‘breakaway republics’ by Russian-supported separatists in the Donbas region adjacent to Russia’s border.
Paval Koval and his family reside in the town of Zolote (Google maps) in eastern Ukraine. They live in an apartment building within sight of the ‘line of conflict’; the series of trenches and strongpoints between the Ukrainian army and the separatists. Paval, in his 50s, is a butcher in the local town. The story is about the struggle he has in making the right decisions for himself and his family. Should he take sides in the conflict? Would his family be safer in Odesa, Dnipro, or a location in Ukraine further west? The villagers of Zolote are fearful of an invasion by Russia to ‘come to the aid’ of the separatists. Like Paval, they wonder if they should leave their lifelong homes for safer communities further west.
Paval has been successful in avoiding entanglement in the Donbas conflict and believes his family is relatively safe; but he recognizes things could change quickly. Paval has seen war before, having served with the Soviet army in Afghanistan. He knows he does not want to experience combat again but events beyond his control are bringing him closer to the conflict. He finds himself becoming more and more involved in the intrigue and clandestine nature of the fight between the opposing sides.
This book by Paul D. LeFavor provides a historical background to the current conflict and Ukraine’s struggle to forge an independent path between the West and Russia. It is informative about the Donbas region and why it is so contested by both sides in the conflict. The nature of long war between the pro-Russian insurgents and the pro-Ukrainian counterinsurgents along the ‘line of conflict’ is highlighted in this novel.
The Russians suffered a significant defeat with their failure to capture Kyiv and topple the current government of Ukraine in the opening months of the invasion of early 2022. It has withdrawn its military forces around Kyiv and the northern part of Ukraine and re-positioned them in the Donbas region – where this novel’s story takes place. The Wild Fields is an informative read that sheds light on the years-long conflict in the Donbas region. This timely novel was published on February 15, 2022, just days before the Russians launched their invasion of Ukraine.
The author weaves an interesting account of life in war-torn Zolote. A map of the Donbas region and the town of Zolote is provided in the beginning of the book. This is a good read for those following the Ukraine War and who wish to understand more about the long-running conflict in the Donbas region.
**********
The Wild Fields: A Fight for the Soul of Ukraine, by Paul D. LeFavor, Blacksmith Publishing, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 2022, 274 pages. Paul is a retired Special Forces Master Sergeant who served in several overseas conflicts and continues to provide training to special operations forces as a contractor.
The book is available in paperback and Kindle on Amazon.
sof.news · by SOF News · May 24, 2022


10. Trove of damning Xinjiang police files leaked as U.N. rights chief visits China

Kudos to the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation for releasing these files prior to the UN High Commissioner's trip to China. The files can be access at their website here: https://victimsofcommunism.org/

Of course she should not be carrying these files with her (or anyone in her traveling party) as they might be subject to Chinese laws and retribution if they have such files in any of their devices.

Trove of damning Xinjiang police files leaked as U.N. rights chief visits China
By Lily Kuo and 
Updated May 25, 2022 at 4:31 a.m. EDT|Published May 24, 2022 at 8:55 a.m. EDT
The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · May 24, 2022
A cache of leaked documents detailing draconian surveillance and reeducation practices in Xinjiang has shed fresh light of the scale of Beijing’s multiyear crackdown on ethnic Uyghurs in the region and cast a shadow over a highly orchestrated six-day trip to China by the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, Michelle Bachelet.
The files include thousands of mug shots of detainees held in a network of camps in Xinjiang, the youngest a 14-year-old girl, as well as details of police security protocols that describe the use of batons and assault rifles, methods of physically subduing detainees, and a shoot-to-kill policy for anyone trying to escape.
The trove of documents and images — published on Tuesday by Washington-based Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation and a consortium of media including the BBC and USA Today — dates back to 2018 and includes policy notices and meeting notes that detail growing paranoia among Xinjiang officials over the ethnic Muslim Uyghur population and the formation of plans to carry out the mass detention program.
They dispute Beijing’s claims that people willingly attended the reeducation facilities. They also add to a growing body of witness accountspublic records and satellite imagery, and visits to the region by diplomats and journalists that have revealed the use of forced labor, the separation of children from their parents, repressed birthrates of Uyghur residents, and mass detentions in both “reeducation” camps and formal prisons since 2017.
“The significance of this is that we have unprecedented evidence on every level,” said Adrian Zenz, a senior fellow at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation who obtained and compiled the leaked information. “It’s now beyond any reasonable doubt what is going on there and the nature of the camps and the scale of the internment.”
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin strongly criticized the release of the documents and called it “the latest example of the anti-China forces’ smearing of Xinjiang.”
In a separate peer-reviewed research paper published by Zenz in the Journal of the European Association for Chinese Studies on Tuesday, he detailed findings from a leaked database that indicated around 12 percent of adults, over 22,000 people, were likely detained in detention facilities or prisons between 2017 and 2018 in a single county called Konasheher in Xinjiang’s southwest. Zenz did not reveal the source for the information, but said it came from hacked police computers inside Xinjiang.
Bachelet, who began a six-day visit this week on the invitation of Beijing, will go to Kashgar and Urumqi in Xinjiang, according to China’s Foreign Ministry, and her trip will be conducted within a “closed loop” as part of coronavirus protection measures, a model used during the Beijing Winter Olympics in which only approved individuals are allowed in. No media members will be traveling with Bachelet.
Critics of her visit say the tour — the first by a U.N. human rights chief since 2005 — is at risk of becoming little more than a propaganda coup for the Chinese government. Beijing has repeatedly denied accusations of committing cultural genocide against its minority Uyghur residents in Xinjiang, where an estimated 1 million to 2 million residents have been incarcerated, according to rights researchers.
Bachelet spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping by video conference Wednesday, stating afterward that it was an opportunity to “discuss directly human rights issues and concerns in China and the world.”
“For development, peace [and] security to be sustainable … human rights, justice and inclusion for all, without exception, have to be at their core,” she said, according to her office’s Facebook page.
According to a summary released by China’s Foreign Ministry, Xi emphasized Beijing’s oft-repeated interpretation of universal human rights as being “gauged by whether the interests of its people are upheld, and whether they enjoy a growing sense of fulfillment, happiness and security.”
“When it comes to human rights issues, there is no such thing as a flawless utopia. Countries do not need patronizing lecturers, still less should human rights issues be politicized and used … as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” he said.
On the second day of her mission to China to look into human rights violations in Xinjiang, Bachelet posed for photos with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who gave her a book by the nation’s leader: “Excerpts from Xi Jinping on Respecting and Protecting Human Rights,” saying he hoped the trip would “help enhance understanding … and clarify misinformation.”
Beijing has previously said that such a trip would not constitute an investigation into rights abuse claims, which it calls “the lie of the century.”
Guess what book Wang Yi presented to OHCHR High Commissioner Bachelet?

XI JINPING ON RESPECTING AND PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS pic.twitter.com/xThgI9UPMV
— Caoli 曹利 (@Cao_Li_CHN) May 23, 2022
Citing the newly leaked files on Tuesday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss called on China to allow Bachelet the freedom to investigate the claims. “If such access is not forthcoming, the visit will only serve to highlight China’s attempts to hide the truth of its actions in Xinjiang,” she said.
State Department spokesman Ned Price said Friday that the United States was “deeply concerned” about Bachelet’s visit and had “no expectation” that she would be given the access needed for an accurate assessment of the human rights environment in Xinjiang.
Rights groups are not optimistic about the long-awaited trip, either, which comes after more than three years of negotiations. Chinese authorities regularly block or intimidate journalists traveling in Xinjiang while also organizing highly choreographed visits by dignitaries and media outlets from friendly countries.
Areas of Xinjiang, including the cities Bachelet is set to visit, have undergone localized demolitions and remodeling, replacing sections of old city infrastructure with themed tourism villages that contrast sharply with other parts of the region.
“We don’t expect much from this visit. Ms. Bachelet will not be able to see much, or speak to Uyghurs in a free and secure environment, because of the fear of reprisals after the team leaves,” said Zumretay Arkin, spokeswoman for the World Uyghur Congress. “We believe that in this context, the visit will do more harm than good.”
The leaked files provide rare glimpses inside active reeducation centers during the height of the campaign in 2018. Images show Uyghur detainees shackled during interrogation and groups of Uyghur men and women during reeducation sessions overseen by uniformed police officers. Some of the thousands of mug shots of the Uyghur detainees appear to show them crying or in distress.
When asked whether Bachelet would be able to visit detention centers and “reeducation” camps — centers that Chinese authorities claim are vocational training schools — China’s Foreign Ministry said it “rejects political manipulation.” Ahead of Bachelet’s visit, state media outlets have run articles headlined: “Xinjiang, the most successful human rights story.”
Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said Tuesday that U.S. and British calls for unfettered access were an attempt to “sabotage” the trip.
“It seems that the United States and the United Kingdom and other countries don’t care about the truth at all, but want to use the visit of the high commissioner for human rights to hype the so-called ‘Xinjiang issue’ and smear China,” he said.
Rights groups also point to the fact that Bachelet’s office has yet to release a landmark report on Xinjiang despite having said in December 2021 that the document would be “released soon.”
Zenz said the timing of the document trove was not originally designed to coincide with Bachelet’s visit to China, but said he hopes the new findings influence the outcome of the trip. Bachelet has yet to comment on the files.
Some rights advocates say that the visit is still important for raising awareness and that judgment should be reserved until after the trip is completed.
“We should give her the benefit of the doubt and look at what comes out of the visit. Even if she doesn’t get unfettered access, if she’s clear about what happened and is able to highlight the machinery of these visits that the Chinese government has implemented for years, it’s already a contribution,” said Christelle Genoud, former human security adviser at the Embassy of Switzerland in Beijing and a research associate at King’s College London.
Uyghur scholar and activist Abduweli Ayup, based in Norway, said that if Bachelet’s visit even marginally improves conditions for residents in a prison or detention centers, it will be worthwhile.
“The people there might have better treatment for at least one day. So it’s important,” said Abduweli, whose sister was sentenced to 12 years in prison during the crackdown. He is among many Uyghurs living abroad who are calling on Bachelet to help verify the whereabouts of missing relatives.
“If she can tell me she’s alive, I’ll be happy,” he said.
The Washington Post · by Lily Kuo · May 24, 2022

11. Time 100 Most influential people of 2022

Time 100 Most influential people of 2022


An interesting list. Also I do not recall this from past lists, but many of the authors of the short articles are influencers themselves.

Artists
Innovators
Titans
Leaders
Icons
Pioneers

12. Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden Should Find His Inner Truman

The conservative Bret Stephens from the NY Times supports Biden's strategic clarity. He also makes the case for increased weapons sales and increased defense spending.

I thought he was going to make the case that Biden should deal with his White House advisors who keep trying to walk back his statements (unless that is a deliberate plan)

As an aside I saw this sarcastic tweet:

(@Nicholas Miller) Tweeted: Technically the Biden administration is strengthening the policy of strategic ambiguity by introducing ambiguity about whether the strategic ambiguity policy is actually ambiguous. 


In regards to his advisros walling back his comments:

Perhaps the advisors are not listening to him as I think he has now made similar statements three times. Why were they taken by surprise? Perhaps they are borrowing tactics learned from Trump’s advisors who would either walk back or just not implement actions based on Trump statements. Trump made policy changes off the cuff (e.g., 2018 Singapore summit and cancelling a major Korea-US exercise with national security community coordination or consultation with our Allie’s.). It is an interesting double standard. Biden makes gaffes but Trump made policy and his advisors selectively ignored directives from his public statements.

In this situation there seem to be some similarities between Biden and Trump and their advisors. 

That said, who are we really fooling with our strategic ambiguity? I get all the diplomatic nuance but perhaps Biden is correcting his strategic error in Ukraine by taking the deployment of the US military and establishment of a no fly zone off the table. And the “strategic ambiguity” of the Obama and Trump administrations by only providing non-lethal or limited lethal aid did not prevent Putin’s aggression. Some could argue that these actions or lack thereof were interpreted by Putin as a green light to do as he pleased.

We live in interesting times. 
Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden Should Find His Inner Truman
The New York Times · by Bret Stephens · May 24, 2022
Bret Stephens
On Taiwan, Biden Should Find His Inner Truman
May 24, 2022

Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
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Opinion Columnist
The White House insists that President Biden did not break with longstanding policy when, at a news conference in Tokyo on Monday with the prime minister of Japan, he flatly answered “yes” to the question, “Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?”
Don’t believe the diplomatic spin that there’s nothing to see here. Don’t believe, either, that the president didn’t know what he was doing. What Biden said is dramatic — as well as prudent, necessary and strategically astute. He is demonstrating a sense of history, a sense of the moment and a sense that, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, new rules apply.
American policy toward Taiwan for the past 43 years has been chiefly governed by two core, if somewhat ambiguous, agreements. The first, the One China policy, which Biden reaffirmed in Tokyo, is the basis for Washington’s diplomatic recognition of Beijing as the sole legal government of China.
The second, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, is the basis for our continued ties to Taiwan as a self-governing entity. But unlike the treaties the U.S. maintains with Japan and South Korea, the act does not oblige American forces to come to the island’s defense in the event of an attack — only that we will provide Taiwan with the weapons it needs to defend itself.
Former presidents, including Donald Trump, have hinted that the United States would fight for Taiwan but have otherwise remained studiedly vague on the question. That may have once served Washington’s strategic purposes, at least when relations with Beijing were warming or stable.
But Xi Jinping has changed the rules of the game.
He did so in Beijing by setting himself up as leader for life. He did so in Hong Kong by doing away with the “one country, two systems” formula and crushing pro-democracy protests. He did so by flouting the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling against China’s outrageous claims to possess most of the South China Sea. He did so through a policy of industrial-scale theft of U.S. intellectual property and government data. He did so through a policy of Covid-19 stonewalling and misinformation. He did so with pledges of friendship to Russia that reassured Vladimir Putin that he could invade Ukraine with relative impunity.
And he’s changed the rules of the game through some of the most aggressive military provocations against Taiwan in decades. Countries that spoil for fights tend to get them.
All the more so after the chaotic U.S. retreat from Afghanistan threatened to turn into a global rout. Chinese propaganda organs began speaking of the “Afghan effect.” An editorial last summer in Beijing’s Global Times warned that “Washington’s arms are way too long, so Beijing and Moscow should cut them short in places where Washington shows its arrogance and parades its abilities.”
What, then, should Biden have done? Stick to the diplomatic formulas of a now-dead status quo?
This is not the first time Biden has suggested the United States would fight for Taiwan, but the last time he said something along similar lines, it was treated as a classic Biden gaffe by the press. Now it should be clear he means it. In Tokyo he stressed that an invasion of Taiwan would be a catastrophe on a par with Ukraine — and that he’d be willing to go much further to stop it.
This is a good way of not repeating Dean Acheson’s infamous 1950 mistake of excluding South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter in Asia, which invited North Korea’s invasion later that year. It’s also a good way of not repeating Biden’s own mistakes in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine that gave Putin too many reasons to doubt the strength of Washington’s commitments to Kyiv.
It’s also a good basis for a more open military relationship with Taiwan. Last year The Wall Street Journal broke the news that a few dozen U.S. Special Operations troops and Marines were in Taiwan, secretly training their island counterparts. That contingent should grow.
So should U.S. sales of the kinds of smaller weapon systems — Stingers, Javelins, Switchblades — that have foiled the Russians in Ukraine and that are hard to target and easy to disperse. Beijing will call such steps provocations, but it’s mere deterrence. The point is to raise the costs of an invasion beyond anything even a headstrong chauvinist like Xi is willing to pay.
Two more items. First, Taiwan’s defense budget, in relation both to its robust economy and the military threat it faces, remains scandalously low, despite recent growth. The Biden administration should stress to Taipei that the American public’s appetite to help our allies militarily is directly proportionate to their willingness to help themselves.
Second, U.S. defense spending, despite nominal increases, is also too low in the teeth of inflation, with a Navy that continues to shrink in a world far more dangerous in this decade than it was in the last. Biden may have wanted to model his presidency on F.D.R.’s and the New Deal. History may give him no choice but to model it on Truman’s and containment. There are worse precedents.
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The New York Times · by Bret Stephens · May 24, 2022


13. Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden gets less ambiguous and more strategic

The Washington Post editorial board seems to support strategic clarity.

Excerpt:

We don’t pretend to know why Mr. Biden made his comment. What we will say is that it’s not cause for a crisis. To the contrary, there might be a benefit. Mr. Biden did not so much end strategic ambiguity as modify it. Between his repeated allusions to a U.S. duty to defend Taiwan — Monday’s was the third such since August — and his staff’s repeated denials that the president’s words mean quite what they seem to mean, Beijing has new reasons to think long and hard before sending its armed forces across the Taiwan Strait. Yet the People’s Republic of China cannot quite accuse the United States of violating the understandings forged in Nixon’s time because, technically, it hasn’t.

Opinion | On Taiwan, Biden gets less ambiguous and more strategic
The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · May 23, 2022
President Biden raised eyebrows Monday by seeming to confirm that the United States would intervene militarily to protect Taiwan from Chinese attack. During a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Tokyo, Mr. Biden answered “yes” to a reporter who asked whether, in contrast to the president’s having refrained from sending U.S. troops to help Ukraine fight Russia, he would be “willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan, if it comes to that?” Mr. Biden elaborated: “That’s the commitment we made.”
That isn’t strictly true: For a half-century, since President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to Communist China, the United States has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan, which includes a recognition of Beijing as the sole legitimate Chinese government, a commitment to help Taiwan defend itself with American-made weaponry — and vagueness about what else the U.S. might or might not do. There is no formal mutual defense treaty such as the ones the United States has with South Korea and Japan.
And so Mr. Biden’s seeming declaration of such a “commitment” sent White House aides scrambling to clarify a remark critics were quick to call a “gaffe.” In a statement, the White House recast Mr. Biden’s comment as a simple reiteration of the long-standing U.S. policy, which “has not changed.” But neither China, which warned against “causing grave damage to bilateral relations,” nor Taiwan, which expressed "gratitude” for Mr. Biden’s “rock-solid commitment to Taiwan,” appeared to buy it.
We don’t pretend to know why Mr. Biden made his comment. What we will say is that it’s not cause for a crisis. To the contrary, there might be a benefit. Mr. Biden did not so much end strategic ambiguity as modify it. Between his repeated allusions to a U.S. duty to defend Taiwan — Monday’s was the third such since August — and his staff’s repeated denials that the president’s words mean quite what they seem to mean, Beijing has new reasons to think long and hard before sending its armed forces across the Taiwan Strait. Yet the People’s Republic of China cannot quite accuse the United States of violating the understandings forged in Nixon’s time because, technically, it hasn’t.
Certainly, the president was correct Monday when he said, apropos of a potential Chinese repeat of Russia’s aggression against a pro-Western neighbor, that "the idea that [Taiwan] can be taken by force, just taken by force, it’s just not appropriate. It would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine. And so it’s a burden that is even stronger.”
If there’s a flaw in Mr. Biden’s approach to countering China, it’s the vagueness of the plan for regional commercial integration he’s offering — the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. It is no substitute for the market-opening Trans-Pacific Partnership that was negotiated by President Barack Obama and then abandoned by President Donald Trump. Mr. Biden has China guessing about U.S. intentions toward Taiwan. Maximizing Beijing’s worries, however, would require much more robust economic engagement with East Asia, India and Australia.
The Washington Post · by Editorial Board · May 23, 2022


14. Biden’s Real Taiwan Mistake


The Wall Street Journal's criticism:
The problem is that no one can be sure what the U.S. policy now is. The constant White House walk-backs of the President’s statements undermine his personal credibility with allies and adversaries. We’d support more clarity in defense of Taiwan, but it ought to be announced in more considered fashion—with support lined up at home and abroad.
Biden’s Real Taiwan Mistake
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
The big blunder is not including the island democracy in the new Indo-Pacific economic framework.
May 23, 2022 6:40 pm ET

President Joe Biden attends an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity launch event in Tokyo on May 23.
Photo: JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS

The press is saying President Biden blundered Monday in committing the U.S. to defend Taiwan, but after three similar statements in the last year maybe he means it. The arguably much bigger mistake is his decision not to include Taiwan in the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that the Administration launched on Monday.

Asked by a reporter if the U.S. would defend Taiwan militarily against China, Mr. Biden answered with a blunt “yes.” He went on to say that, “We agree with the One China policy. We signed onto it and all the attendant agreements made from there. But the idea that it could be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not—it’s just not appropriate. It will dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine.”
That wasn’t a model of clarity, but it sounded like a change in policy from the “strategic ambiguity” toward the defense of Taiwan that has long been U.S. policy. Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, Washington committed to arming the island democracy to defend itself but was unclear about whether the American forces would join the fight.
And, as they often do, the ever-nimble White House communications shop quickly told the press that Mr. Biden hadn’t meant to suggest a policy shift. The President is a master of the verbal muddle, but perhaps he is doing this intentionally. Knowing the U.S. is likely to intervene—and if it does, that the U.K., Australia and Japan are likely to join—may give Chinese President Xi Jinping some pause about the costs of an invasion.
The problem is that no one can be sure what the U.S. policy now is. The constant White House walk-backs of the President’s statements undermine his personal credibility with allies and adversaries. We’d support more clarity in defense of Taiwan, but it ought to be announced in more considered fashion—with support lined up at home and abroad.
It would also require a larger and more rapid plan to arm Taiwan and build up U.S. defenses. One lesson of the Ukraine war is not to wait until the invasion begins to start sending enough weapons. Send them now to make deterrence more credible.
China has built its military to be able to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses with an amphibious and aerial invasion. But it has also built a force to prevent the U.S. from rapidly reinforcing Taiwan with air and naval assets. China has a long-range missile force that could cripple U.S. bases and airfields in the region. Those missiles would also attack U.S. warships, including aircraft carriers, if they move within range to deploy U.S. fighters to defend the island.
Mr. Biden’s budget sets the Navy on a path to shrink to 280 ships in 2027 from 298 today even as China greatly expands its fleet. A credible defense of Taiwan and U.S. territories and allies in Asia is going to require a much bigger military budget.
***
All of which makes it odd that Taiwan wasn’t included in the 13-nation Indo-Pacific Economic Framework the President rolled out on Monday. The new platform is clearly intended to counter China’s rising economic influence. It includes Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand and much of Southeast Asia.
The exclusion of Taiwan makes no sense if you’re trying to show the U.S. commitment to the region. Taiwan is an economic powerhouse whose participation would enhance any trade or supply-chain agreements.
Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, ducked a question on why Taiwan was excluded. He said the U.S. plans “to pursue a deeper bilateral engagement with Taiwan on trade and economic matters in the coming days and weeks.” This would be welcome, but it’s still no reason to exclude Taipei from this new economic community.
The framework is also disappointing in its overall lack of ambition. It includes no reduction in tariffs or trade barriers, which would help the world economy. The White House says the deal is “intended to advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness and competitiveness of our economies.” At least it included “growth” with the mumbo-jumbo.
The framework’s generality underscores the U.S. mistake in abandoning the Pacific trade pact that Barack Obama negotiated. Donald Trump walked away from it, but Mr. Biden has been unwilling to re-enter the accord that went ahead without the U.S. That blunder has let China set the rules of trade for Asia with its own regional pact.
At least the new framework is an attempt to get back in the Pacific mix on matters other than defense and security. But it still has a long way to go to restore U.S. economic leadership in the world’s fastest-growing region.
Copyright ©2022 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the May 24, 2022, print edition.


15. China military needs defence against potential Starlink threat: scientists


Information is an existential threat to all authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes.

China military needs defence against potential Starlink threat: scientists
  • Researchers call for development of anti-satellite capabilities including ability to track, monitor and disable each craft
  • The Starlink platform with its thousands of satellites is believed to be indestructible

Stephen Chen in Beijing
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Published: 12:00pm, 25 May, 2022
By Stephen Chen South China Morning Post4 min

The unprecedented scale, complexity and flexibility of Starlink would force the Chinese military to develop new anti-satellite capabilities, according to researchers in China. Photo: Shutterstock
Chinese military researchers say the country needs to be able to disable or destroy SpaceX’s Starlink satellites if they threaten national security.
According to a paper published last month, China needs to develop anti-satellite capabilities, including a surveillance system with unprecedented scale and sensitivity to track and monitor every Starlink satellite.
The study was led by Ren Yuanzhen, a researcher with the Beijing Institute of Tracking and Telecommunications under the PLA’s Strategic Support Force. Co-authors included several senior scientists in China’s defence industry.
Ren and his colleagues could not immediately be reached for comment and it is uncertain to what extent their view represents an official stance of the Chinese military or government.
“A combination of soft and hard kill methods should be adopted to make some Starlink satellites lose their functions and destroy the constellation’s operating system,” said the paper, published in domestic peer-reviewed journal Modern Defence Technology.
Starlink is the most ambitious satellite communication project ever, providing broadband internet services to commercial and military users around the globe.
SpaceX founder Elon Musk has enjoyed huge popularity in China as a role model for innovation. But criticism of Musk and his companies increased significantly after two Starlink satellites approached dangerously close to the Chinese space station last year.
Ren estimated that US military drones and stealth fighter jets could increase their data transmission speed by more than 100 times with a Starlink connection.
SpaceX has signed a contract with the US Defence Department to develop new technology based on the Starlink platform, including sensitive instruments able to detect and track hypersonic weapons travelling at five times the speed of sound, or even faster in the Earth’s atmosphere.
Starlink satellites are also equipped with ion thrusters that allow them to change orbits rapidly for an offensive move against high value targets in space, according to Ren’s team.
With more than 2,300 satellites – and counting – in orbit, Starlink is generally believed to be indestructible because the system can maintain proper functioning after losing some satellites.
The unprecedented scale, complexity and flexibility of Starlink would force the Chinese military to develop new anti-satellite capabilities, according to Ren and his colleagues.
For instance, it would be possible for satellites carrying military payloads to be launched amid a batch of Starlink’s commercial craft, they suggested.
The Chinese military therefore needed to upgrade its existing space surveillance systems to obtain super-sharp images of these small satellites for experts to identify unusual features, they said.
China claims it has already developed numerous ground-based laser imaging devices that can photograph orbiting satellites at a millimetre-resolution, but in addition to optical and radar imaging, the country also needs to be able to intercept signals from each Starlink satellite to detect any potential threat, according to Ren.
He said China had also showed its ability to destroy a satellite with a missile, but this method could produce a large amount of space debris, and the cost would be too high against a system consisting of many small, relatively low-cost satellites.
“The Starlink constellation constitutes a decentralised system. The confrontation is not about individual satellites, but the whole system. This requires some low-cost, high-efficiency measures,” said the researchers without elaborating on the methods of attack.
According to openly available information, China has been developing numerous alternative anti-satellite technologies, including microwaves that can jam communications or burn electronic components.
Chinese scientists have also developed lasers for blinding or damaging satellites, nano-sats that can be launched in huge numbers to cripple bigger satellites, and cyber weapons to hack into the satellite communication network.
SpaceX did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
A Beijing-based space scientist who asked not to be named because of the issue’s sensitivity, said the paper could be the first open call for an attack on Starlink from China.
01:46
China to send rocket on collision course with asteroid to knock it into safer orbit
It was not entirely a surprise, considering the growing tension between China and the United States, he said. “But the mainstream opinion, as far as I know, is that our countermeasures should be constructive. That means building our own internet satellite networks.”
China has launched a similar project known as Xing Wang – StarNet – to provide internet access on a global scale.
The StarNet system will have only a few hundred satellites, but will achieve high performance by connecting with other Chinese satellites to form a high-speed, powerful and resilient information infrastructure with cutting-edge technology such as laser communication and AI, according to Chinese space authorities.
Stephen Chen investigates major research projects in China, a new power house of scientific and technological innovation. He has worked for the Post since 2006. He is an alumnus of Shantou University, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and the Semester at Sea programme which he attended with a full scholarship from the Seawise Foundation.


16. Why Biden Is Right to End Ambiguity on Taiwan

Seems to be a growing consensus for strategic clarity.

Conclusion:

Biden’s aides are right, in a way, that he has not changed anything. As Biden said, the commitment was there before him. Now it’s just more visible than it used to be. His words in Tokyo were not a gaffe, not a blurt. They were a restatement of a message that needed to be heard, delivered at an opportune time.



Why Biden Is Right to End Ambiguity on Taiwan
It was no gaffe when the president said the U.S. would defend the island against China, but good policy.
The Atlantic · by David Frum · May 24, 2022
“White House Walks Back Biden Taiwan Defense Claim for Third Time in Nine Months” was the patronizing headline the New York Post applied to its report on President Joe Biden’s Taiwan comments at a regional summit in Tokyo. The story line was preset: semi-senile president blurts unscripted comment, is corrected by his staff minders.
But if you reread Biden’s repeated comments on Taiwan, you see a policy that is clear, considered, and consistent.
In August 2021, ABC’s George Stephanopoulos asked Biden whether withdrawal from Afghanistan might embolden China against Taiwan. Biden replied:
There’s a fundamental difference between—between Taiwan, South Korea, NATO. We are in a situation where they are in—entities we’ve made agreements with based on not a civil war they’re having on that island or in South Korea, but on an agreement where they have a unity government that, in fact, is trying to keep bad guys from doin’ bad things to them.
We have made—kept every commitment. We made a sacred commitment to Article Five that if in fact anyone were to invade or take action against our NATO allies, we would respond. Same with Japan, same with South Korea, same with—Taiwan. It’s not even comparable to talk about that.
In October, Biden restated his commitment even more forcefully and clearly, this time at a CNN town hall moderated by Anderson Cooper. An audience member asked, “China just tested a hypersonic missile. What will you do to keep up with them militarily? And can you vow to protect Taiwan?”
Biden answered:
Yes and yes. We are—militarily, China, Russia, and the rest of the world knows we have the most powerful military in the history of the world. Don’t worry about whether we’re going to—they’re going to be more powerful. What you do have to worry about is whether or not they’re going to engage in activities that will put them in a position where there—they may make a serious mistake.
And so, I have had—I have spoken and spent more time with Xi Jinping than any other world leader has. That’s why you have—you know, you hear people saying, “Biden wants to start a new Cold War with China.” I don’t want a Cold War with China. I just want to make China understand that we are not going to step back. We are not going to change any of our views.
Anderson Cooper then intervened to clarify: “So, are you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if—”
Biden: Yes.
Cooper: China attacked?
Biden: Yes, we have a commitment to do that.
Now, in May 2022, Biden has repeated the pledge. At a news conference Monday in Tokyo, Nancy Cordes, of CBS News, asked, “You didn’t want to get involved in the Ukraine conflict militarily for obvious reasons. Are you willing to get involved militarily to defend Taiwan if it comes to that?” Biden answered, “Yes.”
Cordes followed up: “You are?” Biden answered: “That’s the commitment we made.”
Not only the Biden-skeptical New York Post but other media organizations, too, have treated these words as an unintended mess that he’d need to “untangle,” as the CBS anchor John Dickerson phrased it. But if there is a tangle, it’s not Biden’s fault.
U.S. policy toward Taiwan is often described as “strategic ambiguity,” usually understood as “The U.S. will defend Taiwan but won’t say so.” But behind this U.S. ambiguity has stood a prior Chinese ambiguity. China’s version of strategic ambiguity simultaneously:
  1. proclaimed Beijing’s theoretical sovereignty over Taiwan, but
  2. refrained from overt actions to assert that sovereignty.
In return for that ambiguous Chinese policy, Taiwan would refrain from challenging China’s sovereignty claims and the U.S. would refrain from any formal commitment to Taiwan’s security.
Under the rule of Xi Jinping, China has progressively reneged on the second half of its strategic ambiguity. China has ordered bigger and bigger incursions into Taiwan’s air-defense zone. China has the means to mount a naval blockade of the island. It has mounted sustained and aggressive cyberattacks. Throughout, Chinese leaders have growled explicit threats of armed force. Taiwanese officials describe the present situation as the most dangerous of the past 40 years.
So Biden is not leading this particular diplomatic two-step. Biden is not really initiating anything at all. As China jettisons its prior strategic ambiguity, so Biden has been pushed away from American strategic ambiguity. As Chinese threats of aggression have become more explicit, so, too, have U.S. promises of defense become more explicit.
Biden was also pushed and pulled by two other factors. Donald Trump, in his presidency, also walked away from “strategic ambiguity” over Taiwan—but, in his case, toward outright abandonment of Taiwan. “Taiwan is like two feet from China. We are eight thousand miles away. If they invade, there isn’t a fucking thing we can do about it.” Those words were uttered by Trump in private, according to a book by the Washington Post reporter Josh Rogin. But Biden had to worry that Trump communicated his feelings to Xi in their private conversations. If so, the credibility of the American commitment needed to be reaffirmed by Trump’s successor.
In another theater, the Russian invasion of Ukraine raised fresh questions about U.S. intentions. Ukraine was not a formal U.S. ally before the Russian invasion. The U.S. accordingly provided Ukraine with weapons and supplies to defend itself, but did not intervene directly. That careful delineation—no U.S. forces for non-ally Ukraine—had to raise questions within the Chinese leadership about whether the U.S. might follow a similar policy toward Taiwan, also not formally a U.S. ally. Biden may have felt it urgent to dispel any doubts on that score.
“Strategic ambiguity” was a policy initiated by President Jimmy Carter to assure China of respect while protecting Taiwan from invasion. It worked for a long time. But there was no guarantee that it would work forever. President Biden had good reason to worry that the four-decades-old policy was losing its effectiveness in the face of rising Chinese assertiveness. New times may call for new measures to keep the old peace.
For all portrayals of Biden as decrepit and doddering, it’s worth observing that he launched his new approach at an ingeniously propitious moment. For China, with its people restive under COVID lockdown, its economy slumping toward zero growth and possibly outright recession, its authoritarian partner in Moscow entrapped in a losing war, this is about as shaky a moment as any since Xi assumed power nearly a decade ago. Biden laid down his new rules at a moment of unusual vulnerability for China. By the time the Chinese have a better opportunity to act, the more explicit U.S. policy will have become a settled fact.
Biden’s aides are right, in a way, that he has not changed anything. As Biden said, the commitment was there before him. Now it’s just more visible than it used to be. His words in Tokyo were not a gaffe, not a blurt. They were a restatement of a message that needed to be heard, delivered at an opportune time.
The Atlantic · by David Frum · May 24, 2022



17. Open-Source Data is Everywhere—Except the Army’s Concept of Information Advantage

Strategic influence through information advantage.

Excerpt:
To achieve information advantage, the Army needs to give commanders the tools necessary to assess the operational risks of open-source data, social media, and related information technologies. The Army has longstanding doctrine for assessing operational risks; however, the traditional risk management framework is intentionally broad, leaving commanders without clear guidance or terminology for identifying, assessing, and making risk decisions in the information environment. As the Army develops its information advantage doctrine, it should simultaneously develop a dedicated data risk management framework to enable modern commanders to achieve information advantage. In its current form, information advantage perpetuates an antiquated notion that operating environments are (or can be) geographically bound—as the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted, kinetic actions may be limited to a geographic area, but informational risks are global. A dedicated data risk management framework would be a guide for commanders to continually and methodically assess the evolving information environment, to identify and address conceptual gaps, and to achieve their informational and operational goals. As the information environment emerges as the main effort in competition and conflict, the Army must adapt and provide its commanders with the right concepts, doctrine, and resources to succeed in a world characterized by the ubiquity of open-source data.

Open-Source Data is Everywhere—Except the Army’s Concept of Information Advantage - Modern War Institute
Maggie Smith and Nick Starck | 05.24.22
mwi.usma.edu · by Maggie Smith · May 24, 2022
Editor’s note: This article is part of the series “Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century.” The series endeavors to present expert commentary on diverse issues surrounding US competitive strategy and irregular warfare with peer and near-peer competitors in the physical, cyber, and information spaces. The series is part of the Competition in Cyberspace Project (C2P), a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and the Modern War Institute. Read all articles in the series here.
Special thanks to series editors Capt. Maggie Smith, PhD, C2P director, and Dr. Barnett S. Koven.
Three months ago, as Russia invaded Ukraine, the world watched as Twitter exploded with real-time data, reporting, and analysis of the unfolding conflict. It quickly became clear that the war presented analysts with an unprecedented amount of rich, open-source data on military movements, troop location, shelling damage, weapon types, and more. Ukraine has been quick to capitalize on Russia’s poor data protection and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has become Ukraine’s most potent weapon because of his ability to use data and information and Russia’s inability to protect it.
For the US Army, a key takeaway from the Ukrainian conflict so far should be the extent to which our modern-day habits are trackable, traceable, and predictable. Open-source data presents modern militaries, especially wealthy high-tech ones, with a very uncomfortable truth: militaries are exposed because their troops are connected. Currently, the US legal and regulatory systems do not, and cannot, protect the average citizen—and therefore, the average US service member—from risks associated with the ubiquitous open-source data produced by our surveillance economy. From a national security perspective, the accumulation of open-source data on people—their habits, their likes and dislikes, their exercise routines, and more—and its potential to impact the military’s ability to fulfill its man, train, and equip mandate from Congress is deeply concerning. Also alarming is the amount of information our adversaries can glean about US strategic interests from tracking US military activity on any number of apps, like Flightradar24, which includes US military reconnaissance platforms such as the unmanned RQ-4 Global Hawk, the RC-135V Rivet Joint, and others among the aircraft it tracks, and Strava, the fitness tracking app. Ultimately, you can intuit quite a bit about where our forces may be heading, where military planners are focusing their efforts, and where the next conflict is likely to occur if you simply track where Rivet Joints are conducting sorties and service members are working out. And for the Army specifically, the existing and emerging doctrine fails to account for the surveillance economy and its open-source data, leaving a gaping hole in our competitive strategy.
Information Advantage: What Is It?
Presently, the Army is developing its doctrine for its newest term of operational art: information advantage. Information drives friendly, neutral, and adversary actors at all levels and across all domains of warfare. Information advantage is a condition of relative advantage that enables a more complete operational picture and leads to decision dominance—the sensing, understanding, deciding, and acting faster and more effectively than the adversary. Gaining the initiative and maintaining a position of relative advantage over the information environment—regardless of where we find ourselves on the conflict continuum—largely depends on a commander’s ability to achieve an information advantage over a defined target audience or adversarial decision maker in a specific context or timeframe. Complementary to information advantage is the employment of information and other capabilities as weapons, designed to shape friendly, neutral, and adversarial perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Ultimately, the ability to shape perception and achieve victory in modern conflict and competition is heavily dependent on trust—trust in data, among team and unit members, in leaders, in doctrine, in equipment, and in capabilities.
To achieve information advantage, the Army conceives of five, interrelated core tasks— what have been described as “information advantage activities.” Commanders must: 1) enable decision making; 2) protect friendly information; 3) inform and educate domestic audiences (a task conducted in accordance with laws and focused on public affairs office activities); 4) inform and influence international audiences; and 5) conduct information warfare. In theory, information advantage activities are synchronized through the operations process, integrated across the Army’s six warfighting functions—command and control, intelligence, protection, movement and maneuver, fires, and sustainment—and employed using all available military capabilities. After distilling the Army’s rhetoric, information advantage requires commanders to prioritize persistent sensing, ongoing analysis, cyclical assessments, and a willingness to continuously update assumptions to ensure they maintain a dynamic situational awareness of the environment—in competition and conflict. Ultimately, the Army anticipates that victory in future warfare, and in the current era of persistent engagement, will come down to who can gain the most by effectively employing information to their advantage.
The National Security Risk
Instead of gunfire or artillery explosions, some of the first signs that Russia was invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, came from Twitter. For example, Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, an expert in arms control and nonproliferation, compiled open-source data from the traffic layer of Google Maps and shared the Russian troop movements he identified, essentially in real time, on Twitter. According to Google Maps, he Tweeted, “there is a ‘traffic jam’ at 3:15 in the morning on the road from Belgorod, Russia to the Ukrainian border”—exactly the spot where vehicles, equipment. and manpower had massed the previous day. “Someone’s on the move,” Dr. Lewis concluded, and he was right. As the Ukrainian conflict escalated, individual researchers and organizations continued to collect and analyze open-source data—also defined as publicly available information by DoD—from social media platforms, commercial satellites, and public databases. Their analysis and reporting have emerged as a critical resource on the conflict, providing combatants and observers with incredible insight and minute-by-minute assessments of what is happening on the ground.
However, the ability to track ongoing military operations through open-source data is not new—in 2016 Bellingcat released a report that used open source data to document the full scale of the Russian artillery attacks against Ukraine in the summer of 2014. In fact, using open-source data is the new normal. And various US government agencies, including the Department of Defense, rely on open-source data for intelligence and procure data through contracts with data brokers. In response, civil society and privacy watchdogs around the world have voiced concern, highlighting the risks to personal privacy associated with government-led data collection, aggregation, and use. The likely result is new legislation, like the proposed Fourth Amendment is Not For Sale Act and others.
However, the use of open-source data and large scale, legal data collection efforts frequently pose less obvious national security risks. China, for example, aggressively collects data—legally and illegally—to support its domestic and international goals. A major threat to US citizen data is China’s Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), which has grown into one the world’s largest genomic companies after working on the Human Genome Project. BGI developed a prenatal genetic test, in collaboration with the Chinese military, that is sold and used globally. However, in addition to providing prospective parents with important genetic information, the DNA specimens are also amassed into a vast bank of genomic data that China is using to conduct large-scale studies of population traits. More than eight million women have taken BGI’s prenatal tests globally, and China has their DNA and location data stored locally in mainland China. BGI also developed a COVID-19 test and offered to set up testing laboratories in several US states at the start of the pandemic. Mike Orlando, head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, identified the BGI offers as a national security risk, “citing concerns about how China might use personal data collected on Americans.” Even when done legally, DNA collection by Chinese companies should be understood as part of China’s comprehensive effort to collect records and data.
On the other hand, data also creates risk for the governments that aggressively pursue it. Experts are increasingly identifying the ways that open-source data can be used to expose government activity (e.g., military maneuvers, resource allocation, travel, or policy activity) and how the ever-growing pools of open-source data generated by modern societies pose a national security risk. But we lack precision in how we describe the sources, mechanisms, and outcomes of open-source data risks, preventing the development of a coherent mitigation strategy tailored to the national security context. Without a common understanding of risk, civilian and military leaders are unable to make informed and consistent decisions about open-source data, leading to strategic missteps and tactical knee-jerk reactions—like embedding code in the Free Application for Student Aid website that sends user information back to Facebook (the code has since been removed) or banning service members from using geolocation features on devices in deployed areas (e.g., fitness trackers).
What Is Information Advantage Missing?
The piece missing from the Army’s information advantage framework is an awareness of how the persistent aggregation of open-source data in the surveillance economy impacts the Army’s ability to achieve information advantage. Because the American public is subject to the surveillance economy, US service members are, too. George Washington famously emphasized that “when we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen” as a cautious reminder that soldiers are citizens first. Since service members live alongside and among the general population, service members and veterans are not only susceptible to the same targeted marketing the average citizen experiences, but are actually the target of additional foreign manipulation and surveillance efforts. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines access social media platforms and online services just as civilians do. They also purchase items online, apply for credit cards online, do their taxes with online tax preparation tools, and surf the web just like their civilian counterparts. But unlike the civilian neighbors they barbeque with, they also fight the nations’ wars. Open-source data is produced continuously by all service members as they go about their digitally connected lives alongside their civilian counterparts, making the surveillance economy an integral part of the information environment that commanders need to consider as they conduct information advantage activities.
The military is beginning to understand the potential risks presented by open-source data, particularly in combat situations, partly because examples of how open-source data can expose military information abound—from troop location tracking on Tinder to tracking stolen AirPods to SIM cards revealing Russian troop locations in Ukraine. Of course, these known cases fit neatly within traditional operational security risks and are scenarios that senior military leaders can relate to—especially when open-source data is directly contributing to deaths on the battlefield or to the identification of war criminals. However, having a tactical appreciation of the open-source data risks during periods of declared conflict is not enough to achieve information advantage—the risks to military operations are present well before any decision to go to war is made, and persist after conventional conflict ends. In fact, the risks are a constant factor in the current competition environment, making any ex post facto restrictions, regulations, or rules placed on deployment behavior inadequate and misguided. Changes need to happen at home, well before the deployment cycle begins. Failing to consider garrison operations and the ways that soldiers interact with the surveillance economy as part of the information environment that commanders need to consider for information advantage is a failure to understand when and where the vulnerabilities and threats to the force begin and a failure to account for our modern, digitally connected, human behavior.
The “So What” of Open-Source Data
For multi-domain operations, the Army frames the operating environment as including human, physical, and informational aspects. To be effective across the competition continuum, the Army proposes positioning formations and capabilities forward, so that information advantage activities are integrated into security cooperation efforts and crisis action planning on behalf of theater commanders. To coordinate information advantage activities in an area of conflict, the Army identifies that preparation must begin in competition, or when forces develop the intelligence to identify specific vulnerabilities and then gain or prepare to request the required authorities, and train to use national-level capabilities. The overall goal is operational convergence with formations postured to degrade, disrupt, or destroy adversary capabilities, while defending those of friendly forces. However, what this framework does not consider is the intersection of the human, physical, and informational aspects, or the risks to day-to-day garrison operations from open-source data.
Ultimately, the risks of open-source data are not an individual’s problem, but an Army problem. For example, fake accounts on Facebook for US Army general officers are numerous, and in some cases, fail to violate Facebook’s terms of service and can therefore, remain active. Even LinkedIn is rife with fake profiles attempting to make connections with users in targeted marketing campaigns. Additionally, fake social media accounts managed by Russia have already mobilized the American public in connection with divisive issues, making fake accounts for authoritative figures, like US Army generals, especially concerning. From a national security perspective, open-source data enables foreign manipulation efforts that target the US military and veteran populations through the use of “misleading and divisive questions about the U.S. government’s military and veteran policies to further amplify and exploit the existing frustrations.” The relative ease with which anyone can purchase open-source data means that soldier data is already being used to target service members for products, media, or other services and presently, there is nothing preventing our adversaries from using open-source data to target them as well.
To achieve information advantage, the Army needs to give commanders the tools necessary to assess the operational risks of open-source data, social media, and related information technologies. The Army has longstanding doctrine for assessing operational risks; however, the traditional risk management framework is intentionally broad, leaving commanders without clear guidance or terminology for identifying, assessing, and making risk decisions in the information environment. As the Army develops its information advantage doctrine, it should simultaneously develop a dedicated data risk management framework to enable modern commanders to achieve information advantage. In its current form, information advantage perpetuates an antiquated notion that operating environments are (or can be) geographically bound—as the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted, kinetic actions may be limited to a geographic area, but informational risks are global. A dedicated data risk management framework would be a guide for commanders to continually and methodically assess the evolving information environment, to identify and address conceptual gaps, and to achieve their informational and operational goals. As the information environment emerges as the main effort in competition and conflict, the Army must adapt and provide its commanders with the right concepts, doctrine, and resources to succeed in a world characterized by the ubiquity of open-source data.
Captain Maggie Smith, PhD, is a US Army cyber officer currently assigned to the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy where she is a scientific researcher, an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences, and an affiliated faculty of the Modern War Institute. She is also the coeditor of this series and director of the Competition in Cyberspace Project.
Captain Nick Starck is a US Army cyber officer currently assigned as a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute. His research focuses on information warfare and data privacy.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Sgt. Dustin D. Biven, US Army
mwi.usma.edu · by Maggie Smith · May 24, 2022


18. The Quad Goes to Sea

Conclusion:

This maritime domain awareness initiative therefore combines public goods provision with the Quad’s natural strengths: security cooperation and capacity building. The United States, Japan, Australia, and India are four of the Indo-Pacific’s leading maritime powers. It is only natural that they would help the region develop greater maritime domain awareness capabilities. That this will highlight China’s illicit activities in the waters of many regional states is certainly a benefit from a strategic standpoint, but it is also an economic boon for the Indo-Pacific’s smallest players the most.
The Quad Goes to Sea - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Zack Cooper · May 24, 2022
The biggest announcement from President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia may be the one that got the least attention. The Quad, a grouping consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, has just announced a maritime domain awareness partnership that will provide a new stream of data from commercial satellites to countries across the Indo-Pacific. This is a substantial addition to the Quad’s agenda and one of its most promising initiatives to date. Critically, it satisfies the desire of most regional partners for the Quad to provide public goods and address the needs of smaller states in and the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands. If properly executed, this effort could be a flagship project for demonstrating the Quad’s value to regional countries.
Today, regional states monitor maritime activity mainly through legacy technologies from the last century: coastal radars, aerial and surface patrols, and broadcasts from automatic identification system (AIS) transponders whose primary purpose is vessel tracking for collision avoidance, not detecting illicit behavior. Some states also require licensed fishing ships to be equipped with vessel monitoring system (VMS) transponders. Both systems relay identifying data, position, course, and speed by sending signals from transceivers on ships to nearby vessels and receiving stations, both on shore and in space.
But AIS is only legally mandated on vessels over 300 tons operating in international waters. And VMS adoption is uneven. Most ships, including fishing boats, across the world’s oceans are under no obligation to operate either system. And even those that do can easily turn off or spoof the systems if they want to engage in illicit activity. That leaves regional law enforcement and navies reliant on coastal radar, which drops off rapidly farther from shore, or planes and ships, which are expensive and highly inefficient ways to monitor the vast waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Maritime domain awareness in the region therefore remains patchy and enforcement resembles a game of whack-a-mole in which badly outnumbered and overworked patrol vessels attempt to catch illicit operators.
Thankfully, space-based systems are beginning to present 21st-century solutions to these problems. In addition to space-based AIS and VMS receivers, many commercial satellites carry electro-optical as well as synthetic aperture radar sensors to image the planet’s surface. The price of satellite data is plummeting as companies move from relying primarily on large and expensive satellites in geosynchronous orbit to constellations of small and cheap satellites in low-earth orbit. Despite the rapidly diminishing costs of space-based remote sensing, collection at the scale necessary for persistent monitoring of vast exclusive economic zones is still too expensive for most developing states in the Indo-Pacific.
As in so many fields, the problem of maritime domain awareness is now as much about data processing capacity as data collection. There is too much remote sensing data available through both government and commercial providers for manual analysis. Automation and machine learning are necessary to rapidly flag suspicious behavior from diverse data sources, task more detailed remote sensing collection to identify illicit actors and get that information to relevant agencies for tracking and potential interdiction. This is particularly challenging for countries that lack the systems necessary to efficiently process and distribute the resulting data.
The greatest hurdle to effective use of remote sensing data for maritime domain awareness remains scale. The Indian and Pacific Oceans are vast — too large to effectively patrol by air or sea, too expensive to image consistently by satellite. The problem for imaging satellites is the inverse relationship between resolution and aperture. Sensors, whether in the electro-optical or radar bands, that provide enough detail about a vessel to be useful in identification also collect over a relatively small area at a time. In other words, cameras must be focused on a small area to get the highest resolution images. That makes persistent monitoring of empty oceans by imaging satellites prohibitively expensive.
The best solution is what the industry refers to as “tipping and cueing” — using a sensor that can cover a large geographic area with lower fidelity for an initial collection, and then following up with a higher-resolution sensor to check on any suspicious activity. Satellites that track radio frequency data are a promising option for that first pass, and for some purposes collect sufficient data all by themselves. That is because almost every ship on the ocean sends out radio signals. Even illicit actors that may turn off or spoof AIS are still likely to be using very high frequency radios, X-band radars, and other systems. And with the right sensors, a satellite can collect and geolocate those signals over a relatively wide area.
One leading commercial operator on that front is U.S.-based HawkEye360, whose data the Quad members plan to purchase and share with partners across the region. This will be used to determine illicit actors’ patterns of behavior, task other satellites, and allow for more effective patrol and interdiction operations. The Quad will also help process and rapidly distribute this data through existing channels. These includes the U.S. Navy’s SeaVision platform, which is used by nearly every partner in the region, as well as India’s Indian Ocean Region Information Fusion Centre, Singapore’s Information Fusion Centre, the Australia-sponsored Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu, and the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency’s Regional Fisheries Surveillance Center in the Solomon Islands. This effort addresses a real need across Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and the Pacific Islands.
For several years, countries in Southeast Asia in particular have been asking the Quad to deliver public goods for them. The Quad vaccine initiative was welcomed but has been too slowly implemented. The same is true of the Quad’s commitment to regional infrastructure. And efforts to focus on supply chain security have bypassed much of the rest of the region. Questions have therefore been raised about the Quad’s ability to deliver value for neighbors in the Indo-Pacific.
Dhruva Jaishankar and Tanvi Madan have recently noted that “the Quad must develop a more robust security agenda if it seeks to sustain itself — and the region — in the coming years.” Indeed, the Quad is best positioned to deliver on security, which is the area in which the United States, Japan, Australia, and India have most in common. But focusing on security also tends to make much of the region nervous, especially when it means pushing back against China. But the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness smartly addresses several regional concerns. Illegal fishing takes away a vital source of food and income from people across the Indo-Pacific. Smuggling threatens law enforcement efforts across the region. And illicit activities by China’s maritime militia in the South China Sea undermine regional security.
This maritime domain awareness initiative therefore combines public goods provision with the Quad’s natural strengths: security cooperation and capacity building. The United States, Japan, Australia, and India are four of the Indo-Pacific’s leading maritime powers. It is only natural that they would help the region develop greater maritime domain awareness capabilities. That this will highlight China’s illicit activities in the waters of many regional states is certainly a benefit from a strategic standpoint, but it is also an economic boon for the Indo-Pacific’s smallest players the most.
Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and co-director of the Alliance for Securing Democracy. He also teaches at Princeton University and co-hosts the Net Assessment podcast.
Gregory Poling directs the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he is also a senior fellow.
warontherocks.com · by Zack Cooper · May 24, 2022


19. Israeli diplomats told not to meet Taiwan officials to avoid angering China – report


Israeli diplomats told not to meet Taiwan officials to avoid angering China – report
timesofisrael.com · by Tobias Siegal 24 May 2022, 12:36 pm Edit
Chinese President Xi Jinping raises his glass and proposes a toast during the welcome banquet for visiting leaders attending the Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People, April 26, 2019. (Nicolas Asfouri/Pool Photo via AP)
In an apparent attempt to avoid a diplomatic flare-ups with China, Israel’s Foreign Ministry has reportedly instructed its representatives around the world to refrain from inviting Taiwanese diplomats to official events or participating in events organized by Taiwanese representatives.
Specifically, an urgent message sent out by senior diplomatic official Hagai Shagrir warned Israeli diplomats against inviting their Taiwanese counterparts to events recently held as part of Israel’s 74th Independence Day or attending events surrounding Taiwan’s Independence Day that is celebrated in October, the Kan public broadcaster reported Monday.
Citing the widely circulating letter, the report noted the sensitivity surrounding China and Taiwan, which Beijing claims is a rogue province, and the increasing concern that the Communist mainland could take military action against the democratic East Asian island.
China has stepped up its military provocations against Taiwan in recent years, aimed at intimidating it into accepting Beijing’s demands that it unify with the mainland. In October last year, for example, the Chinese Air Force conducted 150 flights over Taiwan within a few days in a show of force.
The Israeli document clarified that representatives should not hold official meetings with Taiwanese diplomats in public or in Israeli embassies or any other official facilities.
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The Kan report cited a diplomatic official who said the document did not constitute a change to Israel’s official policy but was instead meant as a clarification of existing directives.
In this undated file photo released by the Taiwan Ministry of Defense, a Chinese PLA J-16 fighter jet flies in an undisclosed location (Taiwan Ministry of Defense via AP, File)
The document also noted the growing tensions between China and the United States.
Officially, Israel and the United States do not recognize Taiwan’s independence. Still, both countries have maintained a positive relationship with Taiwan.
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In fact, US President Joe Biden said on Monday that the US would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan. The obligation to protect Taiwan, Biden said, is “even stronger” after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Biden’s comments marked one of the most forceful US presidential statements in support of self-governing in decades and are likely to draw a sharp response from Beijing.
A White House official said, however, that Biden’s comments did not reflect a policy shift.
Biden said it is his “expectation” that China would not try to seize Taiwan by force, but he said that assessment “depends upon just how strong the world makes clear that that kind of action is going to result in long-term disapprobation by the rest of the community.”
He added that deterring China from attacking Taiwan was one reason it’s important that Russian President Vladimir Putin “pay a dear price for his barbarism in Ukraine,” lest China and other nations get the idea that such action is acceptable.
Israel has tried to maintain strong political and economic ties with China, while not angering the US, its closest ally.
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US President Joe Biden speaks during a news conference with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Akasaka Palace, May 23, 2022, in Tokyo. (AP Photo/Evan Vucci)
Data published by Israel’s National Bureau of Statistics in January indicated that in 2021 China became Israel’s largest source of imports, surpassing even the United States.
Earlier this year, Israel and China held a joint committee on innovation cooperation, led by Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and China’s Vice President Wang Qishan. The committee agreed to a three-year plan to regulate cooperation and government-to-government dialogue between the countries through 2024.
While gradually strengthening ties with Beijing, the Israeli government has also notified the Biden administration that it will keep the White House in the loop regarding significant deals it strikes with China and is prepared to reexamine such agreements if the US raises opposition.
Foreign Minister Yair Lapid (second from left) speaks at the Fifth Israel-China Joint Committee on Innovation meeting, January 24, 2022. (MFA)
Israel’s cautious approach, reflected in the letter sent out to its missions worldwide, follows a diplomatic incident from last month that involved suspicion of China planting spying devices in travel mugs given by the Chinese embassy in Israel to several Israeli ministers.
However, the suspicions proved groundless, with the Shin Bet later announcing that there was nothing untoward in the mug or others like it sent to Israeli officials.
The incident was picked up by Israeli media, however, drawing criticism from the Chinese embassy, which slammed the “baseless rumors” and said they had “a severe impact as they aim to drive a wedge between China and Israel, tarnish China’s image and seriously mislead the public.”
AP and Times of Israel Staff contributed to this report.
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timesofisrael.com · by Tobias Siegal 24 May 2022, 12:36 pm Edit

20. Putin Is Going to Lose His War

Are Ukraine, NATO, and the US ready for success?

Excerpts:
Whatever the outcome, the West must begin to plan for the collapse as well as the reinforcement of Putin’s regime. If Putin reinforces his power, Western policy needs to act correspondingly. Its sanctions on Russia need to be maintained until all Russian troops have left Ukraine. While the West should offer Ukraine substantial material support for its reconstruction, sanctions on Russia should be maintained until Russia has agreed to make reparations for the horrendous damage it has caused to Ukraine. Future flows of Russian émigrés are likely to exceed the millions currently streaming out of Ukraine.
If Putin loses power, however, Russia’s future looks much more hopeful. A time of disarray would be to be expected, but if Russia eventually achieves a decent democratic regime, the West should stand up and deliver a proper Marshall Plan, as it did not do in 1991. Hopefully, a preceding Western reconstruction of Ukraine can serve as a master plan.

Putin Is Going to Lose His War
And the World Should Prepare for Instability in Russia
May 26, 2022
Foreign Affairs · by Anders Åslund · May 25, 2022
Russian President Vladimir Putin could hardly have used his May 9 Victory Day address, an annual holiday marking the Nazis’ surrender to the Soviets, to declare victory in his military campaign against Ukraine. Neither did he use the occasion to declare a general mobilization, as some analysts had predicted. Instead, speaking from a podium in Moscow's Red Square, Putin sounded like a sore loser, whining that NATO’s threats had “forced” him to act preemptively in the Donbas.
Three months after launching his ill-conceived invasion of Ukraine, it seems increasingly likely that Putin’s bid to liberate the Donbas from Kyiv will be remembered as one of the most spectacular failures in contemporary military history. Russian troops lost the battle for Kyiv within the first month of the conflict and are now struggling to make any headway in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile, they continue to suffer devastating losses: by May 16, according to Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense, Ukrainian forces had killed more than 28,000 Russian soldiers. The question now is whether the national humiliation Russia faces more closely resembles the 1905 Russo-Japanese war, which marked the beginning of the end of the Tsarist era, or Josef Stalin’s failed attempt to seize Finland in the Winter War of 1939-1940.
CRIPPLING GRAFT
Systemic corruption has hobbled Russia’s ability to fight a war successfully. Since 2013, for example, Putin has awarded at least $3.2 billion in military procurement contracts to his friend Yevgeny Prigozhin—who has provided Russian troops with such meager food supplies that they have resorted to looting grocery stores simply to feed themselves. Cheap, poorly-made Chinese tires have been blamed for slowing the advance of Russian military convoys. According to reports by Ukraine’s anti-corruption agency, one contractor supplied Russian troops with what were advertised as bulletproof vests but which turned out to be filled with cardboard instead of armored plates.
Ukraine’s military, by contrast, has exceeded all expectations. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians have volunteered to defend their motherland. Thanks to the eight-year war in the Donbas, tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have combat experience, and many have benefited from U.S. and British training. Ukraine’s Western-made anti-tank weapons and Stinger anti-aircraft systems have proved highly effective, and its Western allies are stepping up supplies of arms and military equipment.
After Russia's invasion on February 24, the United States and its allies quickly imposed sanctions to choke off Russia’s economy. Western sanctions no longer aim to deter Russia but to weaken the Russian economy and reduce its ability to pursue wars. Critically, Western sanctions are now targeted against major Russian state banks. The G-7 froze the Russian Central Bank’s international currency reserves and removed many Russian banks from SWIFT, the international messaging system for interbank transactions. In response, the Russian government is regulating the economy ever more, further damaging Putin’s war effort. In a single day, Putin wiped out most of the economic gains Russia had made since 1991.
SHIFTING TIDES
The tide of Putin’s war in Ukraine is increasingly shifting against Russia, and it will almost certainly end in a devastating Russian defeat. This would not be the first time Moscow has launched an ambitious military adventure in search of additional territory, only to find itself outmatched and humiliated.

One parallel that comes to mind is the Winter War of 1939-40, a campaign on the sidelines of World War II, in which Stalin himself decided to invade Finland and establish his own Finnish government. The Red Army failed to make any headway against the small but brave Finnish army, and it suffered horrendous losses. But the parallels end there. When the effort failed, Stalin let professional generals take over the command, giving the Soviet army’s chief of staff, Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov, full authority over operations in the Finnish theater. After three months, Stalin settled for a peace treaty with limited gains at an enormous price. Putin, by contrast, has not relinquished command to his generals. On the contrary, he has reinforced his control of detail, and Ukrainian leaders are not prepared to give up any land lost after February 23.
The more plausible parallel is the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. Its origin was imperial rivalry. Russia sought a warm-water port on the Pacific Ocean, colliding with Japan’s imperial ambitions. The war started off poorly for Russia, but Tsar Nicholas II insisted on fighting on, while the hope of victory dissipated. Even so, he continued the war to preserve the dignity of Russia by averting a “humiliating peace.” But Russians were humiliated by the defeat and rose against Tsar Nicholas II, extracting a more liberal regime.
ECONOMIC WOES
Today, Russia is facing not just a humiliating defeat but also a horrendous economic collapse, for which Putin bears full responsibility. Russia’s official predictions are an 8-12 percent decline in GDP, but it might become twice as large. In August 1998, after six days of a far less severe financial crisis, Russian President Boris Yeltsin dismissed his government. Putin, by contrast, has not allowed anyone in his government to resign, compelling everybody to be with him until the bitter end. Needless to say, fear appears to prevail among the Russian government elite.
The conventional wisdom is that Putin’s Praetorian Guard, the Presidential Protection Service, is so strong, well paid, and loyal to Putin that it will protect him against any coup attempt. However, the cost of Putin’s continued leadership to Russian society is so great that it would be surprising if no group would mobilize against him. Sudden ample leaks from the otherwise secretive intelligence community suggest an elevated degree of interagency rivalry. Even if Russia continues to censor news of the war and the scope of its loss in Ukraine, the truth will eventually become obvious. During a decade of war in Afghanistan, 15,000 Soviet soldiers were killed, a failure that contributed to the collapse of communist rule, but more Russian soldiers than that were killed in the first two months of fighting in Ukraine.
Russia’s domestic environment looks explosive at every level. Plausible rumors are spreading about arrests and sacking of top security officials; at least seven top Russian businessmen have reportedly committed suicide after first having killed their families, making these appear like executions. Social unrest has not been widespread in recent years, but it does occur, and the level of anticipated decline in output and living standards has not been recorded since the early 1990s. A natural popular reaction would be widespread social unrest, which would aggravate the tensions among the security services.
Russia’s domestic environment looks explosive at every level.
Eventually Russia’s Security Council could oust Putin. This body meets once a week, but in the last two years it has only convened in person once, on February 21, when Putin demanded approval of his war against Ukraine. They met in one of the big halls in the Kremlin at a distance of many meters from Putin. Initially, Putin’s reticence to meet with his colleagues was attributed to his extreme fear of the coronavirus, but now he appears most of all scared of his collaborators, as indicated by his predilection for sitting at the end of a long table.

The Security Council has replaced the Politburo as the highest decision-making body, but it enjoys no popular authority. If the Security Council were to take over, Russia might once again see a collapse of political power, as in the coup attempt in August 1991, and power could end up in the street. A couple of years of unpredictable disorder might ensue. The alternative would be that Putin succeeds in mobilizing his secret police and transforms Russia into a new North Korea, which would be much worse. It is difficult to discern any middle road in this dramatic situation.
Whatever the outcome, the West must begin to plan for the collapse as well as the reinforcement of Putin’s regime. If Putin reinforces his power, Western policy needs to act correspondingly. Its sanctions on Russia need to be maintained until all Russian troops have left Ukraine. While the West should offer Ukraine substantial material support for its reconstruction, sanctions on Russia should be maintained until Russia has agreed to make reparations for the horrendous damage it has caused to Ukraine. Future flows of Russian émigrés are likely to exceed the millions currently streaming out of Ukraine.
If Putin loses power, however, Russia’s future looks much more hopeful. A time of disarray would be to be expected, but if Russia eventually achieves a decent democratic regime, the West should stand up and deliver a proper Marshall Plan, as it did not do in 1991. Hopefully, a preceding Western reconstruction of Ukraine can serve as a master plan.

Foreign Affairs · by Anders Åslund · May 25, 2022





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David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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