Quotes of the Day:

“Wrong does not cease to be wrong because the majority share in it.”

- Leo Tolstoy

"May we think of freedom, not as the right to do as we please, but as the opportunity to do what is right."

- Peter Marshall

“We fight not for glory, nor for wealth, nor honour but only and alone for freedom which no good man surrenders but with his life.”

- Robert the Bruce

1. Korean War Veterans Memorial Mural Wall Designer Louis Nelson Talks About His Inspiration

2. A New Addition to the Korean War Veterans Memorial Will Be Unveiled on Korean War Armistice Day

3. Exercise puts American troops under South Korean command for first time

4. Rubio, Kaine Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act Advances

5. South Korea willing to back U.S. plan to cap Russian oil price

6. New Construction at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station

7. U.S. Confronts the Reality of North Korea’s Nuclear Program

8. An Appraisal of the Singapore Joint Statement Between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Much Ado About Nothing?

9. How the US should respond if North Korea conducts another nuke test

10. N.K. foreign ministry slams annual U.S. human trafficking report as 'absolute nonsense'

11. Photos of fishermen being dragged back across border spread rapidly in N. Korea

12. N. Korea orders greater oversight of military families near S. Korean border

13. PPP lawmaker claims Moon gov't falsely accused N.K. fishermen of killings

14. Justice ministry found no legal grounds before repatriation of N.K. fishermen in 2019

15. China still appears wary about reopening trade with North Korea

16.  Yellen calls out China trade practices in South Korea visit

17. The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates

1. Korean War Veterans Memorial Mural Wall Designer Louis Nelson Talks About His Inspiration

An important event next week.

Korean War Veterans Memorial Mural Wall Designer Louis Nelson Talks About His Inspiration

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · July 19, 2022

Industrial designer Louis Nelson is an Army veteran, a helicopter pilot and the creative mind behind the Mural Wall at the Korean War Veterans Memorial on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.

Although he's designed everything from skis to the United Nations' Dag Hammarskjold Medal, the subject of memorials is his passion. His new book, "Mosaic: War Monument Mystery," is about his life, experiences and motivations. Central to that is the subject of war memorials, about which he is an expert.

"Memorials are important to a lot of people," Nelson tells Military.com. "It's important to the people who served because it's recognition from the country they served. They can go to the memorial and feel a sense of presence and belonging."

In creating the concept for the Mural Wall, Nelson was free to design anything he wanted. To start, he considered how individuals remember their lost loved ones. For individuals, he considered, one might build a statue, such as the Lincoln Memorial. To remember many people, one would memorialize their names, like the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall does.

There was only one other way he could think of to memorialize important people.

"I thought of my grandmother, and I remember she had a photograph of my cousin who was in military uniform," Nelson recalls. "She had it up on the mantel, and she had another one on her bed stand. He was stationed in Japan and had served in Korea. Of course, the only other way that you remember and honor somebody is, you have a photograph of them. So it just was important for me then that the wall would be a photograph."

The men and women who served in Korea became central to his design for the Mural Wall. The wall features 2,500 actual images of real service members in the Korean War, taken by military photographers and sandblasted in black granite.

It also shows the weapons, equipment and vehicles used in the war. Nelson wanted every branch of service, every job they performed and the tools they used to fight the war to be memorialized forever.

"Some of the faces would be life-size so that you would have eye-to-eye contact. Somehow or another, they would see that this is the face of America that we sent to war," Nelson says. "They look like the kids of today, and I think they will look the same 20 years from now."

Industrial designer Louis Nelson created the Mural Wall at the Korean War Veterans Memorial. (Courtesy of Louis Nelson)

Nelson worked closely with Frank Gaylord, designer of "The Column," 19 figures marching in a patrol, representing members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. When reflected into the wall, there appears to be 38 troops, representing both the 38-month duration of the war, as well as the 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea.

"Nobody told me what to do," Nelson says of his design. "But they told Frank [Gaylord] they wanted 38 figures. That was way too many for the space, so we did 19, thinking we could get the other 19 from the polished mural wall. They are beautifully reflected back."

When the Korean War Veterans Memorial was unveiled in 1995, Korean War veterans thought it was beautiful, too.

"A guy in a suit and tie came running up to me," Nelson says. "Somehow or another, he knew that I designed the mural. He told me that for the first time in his life, he could see it all. He had been there in the war, but he couldn't talk about it. From 1953 to 1995. Through tears, he said he could finally understand what he'd given up his youth for, and he wanted me to know what the mural meant to him."

(U.S. Marine Corps/Cpl. Raquel Barraza)

Nelson reflects on the full story of designing the Korean War Veterans Memorial in his book, because of all his works, it's the one about which he gets the most questions and letters. He also wrote it for another reason, which he explains by quoting one of the last lines of the book.

"The story is not about the Memorial, but it's about the people of the Memorial. Not about the stone and bronze, but about the blood. Not about the moment, but about endurance. Not of yesterday, but of tomorrow. Not of what had happened or why it happened, but how we have changed and grown because of it. For in struggle is growth."

To learn more about designer and Army veteran Louis Nelson, his work and his life, visit his website. His book, "Mosaic: War Monument Mystery," is on bookshelves now.

-- Blake Stilwell can be reached at blake.stilwell@military.com. He can also be found on Twitter @blakestilwell or on Facebook.

Want to Learn More About Military Life?

Whether you're thinking of joining the military, looking for post-military careers or keeping up with military life and benefits, Military.com has you covered. Subscribe to Military.com to have military news, updates and resources delivered directly to your inbox.

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · July 19, 2022

.

2. A New Addition to the Korean War Veterans Memorial Will Be Unveiled on Korean War Armistice Day

An important and historic event next week on Armistice Day that will honor all those who fought and died to include our KATUSA brothers.

A New Addition to the Korean War Veterans Memorial Will Be Unveiled on Korean War Armistice Day

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · July 20, 2022

The Korean War ended in an armistice on July 27, 1953. The National Korean War Veterans Memorial was finished and dedicated 42 years later, on July 27, 1995. That same day, President Bill Clinton signed an amendment to U.S. Code Title 36 declaring July 27 as Korean War Armistice Day.

At the memorial's center are 19 statues of a unit on patrol, collectively known as "The Column," a masterpiece by sculptor Frank Gaylord. It also has a reflective mural wall by industrial designer Louis Nelson, reflecting representative images of those who fought the war.

There is also a United Nations wall, remembering allies who fought alongside the U.S. and South Korea, as well as the Pool of Remembrance.

In 2022, the memorial will receive a new addition, a 380-foot memorial wall listing the names of the 36,574 Americans and approximately 8,000 Korean Augmentation to the United States Army forces (KATUSAs) who were killed during the war.

"Memorials are important to a lot of people," Louis Nelson, Army veteran and designer of the Mural Wall, tells Military.com. "It's important to the people who served because it's recognition from the country they served. They can go to the memorial and feel a sense of presence and belonging.

Industrial designer Louis Nelson created the Mural Wall at the Korean War Veterans Memorial. (Courtesy of Louis Nelson)

"But it's also very important for families. People die, and we're losing our Korean War veterans at an extraordinary rate. Within the next 10 years, the last living veteran will have died, so it becomes important for them to recognize their service."

Nelson didn't take part in the creation of the newest addition, to be unveiled in a ceremony recognizing the 69th anniversary of the end of the Korean War. The Mural Wall he created was designed to represent the faces of those who fought and died to keep South Korea free from communist domination.

"I wanted to honor not just the men and women who served in the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force and Coast Guard, but also the jobs they did there," Nelson says. "Whether they were truck drivers or nurses, lawyers, landing ship operators or tank gunners in such a way so that people who visit could approach them as they would in life.

"Some of the faces would be life-size so that you would have eye-to-eye contact. Somehow or another, they would see that this is the face of America that we sent to war."

Visitors to the National Mall in Washington observe the Korean War Memorial Mural Wall (U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Brian Hamilton)

Nelson appreciates the concept of writing the names of those who were lost in the conflict, such as the design on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall. He says it harks back to a time when the tradition of remembering those who were lost was more personal and local.

"In the early days of the United States, when ships left their ports but didn't return, the names of the people lost were etched into the walls of local churches and other buildings," he says. "There's a long tradition of honoring the service of those who have given their lives with their names."

The latest addition to the Korean War Veterans Memorial will feature the names of American personnel and KATUSA forces who were killed between 1950 and 1953. KATUSA troops were South Korean draftees who served and fought alongside the U.S. 8th Army, filling in wherever there were shortages of American troops.

"There was a desire to list all of the names of the more than 36,000 Americans and 7,000 Koreans who died in the war, but it would take up a lot of space," Nelson says. "They dedicated an area just to the east of the existing memorial and attached it in such a way that it looks like it's grown out of the original design."

The newest addition was designed by Mary Katherine Lanzillotta. She also directed the renovation and restoration of the Donald W. Reynolds Center for American Art and Portraiture, which houses the Smithsonian American Art Museum, the Renwick Gallery and National Portrait Gallery.

"It's a bit different than it was when it originally opened," Nelson says of the Korean War Veterans Memorial. "But they did some maintenance on the original patina and it looks absolutely terrific. I think they did a great job all around."

The Korean War Veterans Memorial Wall will be unveiled on July 27, 2022. To learn more about the memorial, visit the National Parks Service online or the Korean War Veterans Memorial Foundation.

-- Blake Stilwell can be reached at blake.stilwell@military.com. He can also be found on Twitter @blakestilwell or on Facebook.

Want to Learn More About Military Life?

Whether you're thinking of joining the military, looking for post-military careers or keeping up with military life and benefits, Military.com has you covered. Subscribe to Military.com to have military news, updates and resources delivered directly to your inbox.

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · July 20, 2022

3. Exercise puts American troops under South Korean command for first time

Not quite. Technically, command is always retained by the national government. They are placed under the operational control of the ROK force. But even that is not technically new as anyone who has served in Special Operations knows as US SOF has always been placed under the OPCON of the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task (since renamed after I retired as the Combined Special Operations Component Command CSOCC). But there are many other examples across the components where US forces have been placed under the OPCON of a ROK force. This is the first time it was done at the Korean Combat Training Center for a training exercise there.

Exercise puts American troops under South Korean command for first time

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · July 19, 2022

A U.S. soldier from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, greets a South Korean soldier during an 11-day exercise at the Korean Combat Training Center in Gangwon Province, South Korea. (South Korean army)

CAMP HUMPHREYS, South Korea — Hundreds of U.S. soldiers are under the South Korean army’s operational control for the first time during a brigade-level training exercise in the mountainous northeastern province of Gangwon.

More than 300 U.S. troops are part of an 11-day exercise that began July 11 at the Korea Combat Training Center, South Korea’s primary training area for its ground forces, according to a news release from the South Korean army. The U.S. soldiers are part of the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, out of Fort Bliss, Texas, which deployed in March to South Korea for a nine-month rotation.

Although U.S. troops have drilled at the combat training center in the past, the latest exercise is the first time they are being led by South Korean forces on a brigade level.

The Americans were split into several South Korean combat teams that were pitted against each other in simulated battles. The training included more than 4,300 South Korean soldiers and 100 pieces of heavy equipment, including tanks, attack helicopters, mobile artillery systems and unmanned aerial vehicles, the release said.

Army Capt. Randall Zeegers, a company commander with the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, said the training deepened his knowledge of the surrounding environment and inclement weather. Temperatures during training hovered between 68 and 87 degrees Fahrenheit with humidity around 60%.

“I hope we could grow together with [South Korean] troops through live-environment joint exercises in the future,” Zeegers said in the release.

U.S. soldiers from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division train with their South Korean counterparts during an 11-day exercise at the Korean Combat Training Center in Gangwon Province, South Korea. (South Korean army)

U.S. soldiers from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division train with their South Korean counterparts during an 11-day exercise at the Korean Combat Training Center in Gangwon Province, South Korea. (South Korean army)

South Korean army Capt. Lim So Soo, a company commander, added that he felt “passionate camaraderie” serving alongside U.S. forces, despite having trained “around the clock for four days without sleep,” according to the release.

The U.S. and South Korean presidents reinstated a commitment to hold large-scale field exercises in the near future this year after years of computer or command-post training under previous administrations in both countries. South Korean President Yoon Seok Youl, after his first summit with President Joe Biden in May, said the two agreed to “step up our exercises.”

F-35A Lightning II stealth fighters from both countries combined for a four-day air exercise last week. Around 14 South Korean and 16 U.S. aircraft took part.

Increasingly, Washington and Seoul are releasing details of their joint training efforts. The U.S. and South Korean presidential administrations under Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in downplayed their military ties while negotiating with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to undo his nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. Forces Korea commander Army Gen. Paul LaCamera, during a panel discussion Thursday, welcomed the training between U.S. and South Korean forces.

“As a military commander, I’m going to want to do more training,” he said during the 2022 Asian Leadership Conference hosted by Chosun Ilbo in Seoul. “It’s just plain and simple.”

Increased training by U.S. and South Korean forces follow 17 rounds of missile tests so far this year by North Korea. The regime, which views large-scale U.S.-South Korea military drills as a rehearsal of an invasion, described the ongoing training as “reckless military provocations,” in a statement from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 12.

Stars and Stripes reporter Yoo Kyong Chang contributed to this report.

Stars and Stripes · by David Choi · July 19, 2022

4. Rubio, Kaine Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act Advances

Good news here. Korea remains generally a bipartisan issue which is good for alliance interests and security on the peninsula.

Note the issue of the US Special Envoy. The ROK just named theirs this week (which had also been vacant since 2017). My recommendation remains the same, Greg Scarlatou, the execution director of the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

• Require a report from the administration, within 180 days, on progress towards appointing a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, which has remained vacant since 2017;

Rubio, Kaine Bill to Reauthorize North Korean Human Rights Act Advances

rubio.senate.gov · by Jul 19 2022

The North Korean Human Rights Act was first passed in 2004 following international outcry over the treatment of North Koreans under the regime of Kim Jong-il. Under Jong-il’s successor and son, Kim Jong-un, the human rights crisis has continued to unravel, as the regime limits food supplies, forces its citizens into slave labor, restricts outside media access, and seeks the forceful repatriation of North Korean refugees.

In response, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2022. The bipartisan bill, introduced by U.S. Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Tim Kaine (D-VA), would reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 for five years past its expiration in September 2022.

Senator Rubio led the successful effort to reauthorize the North Korean Human Rights Act in 2018.

• “Authoritarianism always leads to devastation, mass exodus, and suffering, and North Korea is no different. The United States must be unwavering in our support for those who oppose the Kim Regime from within North Korea and abroad. I urge my Senate colleagues to pass this bipartisan legislation quickly to ensure this critical assistance is reauthorized.” — Senator Rubio
• “The North Korean regime continues to deny the most basic rights and freedoms to its people. The passage of this bipartisan legislation out of committee is critical in our fight to protect the dignity of the North Korean people and reaffirm the U.S. commitment to universal human rights. I will keep working with my colleagues to get it across the finish line.” — Senator Kaine

Specifically, the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act would:

• Reauthorize humanitarian assistance, democracy programs and broadcasting until 2027;
• Make technical changes to the bill to reflect the fact that the US Agency for Global Media replaced the Broadcasting Board of Governors;
• Require a report from the administration, within 180 days, on progress towards appointing a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, which has remained vacant since 2017;
• Require the State Department to expand efforts to increase North Korean refugees’ participation in U.S. and South Korean resettlement programs, including placing a refugee coordinator stationed in Asia and providing information on resettlement programs in information disseminated in North Korea;
• Requires the administration to produce a report on humanitarian assistance to the North Korean people; and
• Modify the North Korean Sanctions and Policy Act of 2016 to impose sanctions on foreign officials responsible for forcibly repatriating North Koreans back to North Korea, while exempting U.S. allies South Korea and Japan from this policy.

rubio.senate.gov · by Jul 19 2022

5. South Korea willing to back U.S. plan to cap Russian oil price

South Korea willing to back U.S. plan to cap Russian oil price

Reuters · by Cynthia Kim

SEOUL, July 19 (Reuters) - South Korea on Tuesday said it was willing to support U-S. led plans to impose a price cap on Russia oil, agreeing with Washington's initiatives to limit revenue to Moscow while mitigating global inflation.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and South Korean Finance Minister Choo Kyung-ho also agreed that they could inject liquidity into currency markets if necessary, without elaborating, Korea's finance ministry said in a statement after a bilateral meeting between the two leaders.

Yellen, in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has been championing a price cap on Russian oil and is seeking to build support for the move from key allies including Seoul, in a bid to avert a price spike that could prompt a recession.

South Korea imported about 5% of its crude oil from Russia last year, according to data from Korea National Oil Corporation's Petronet.

No ceiling has been set but a price-cap measure joined by major Russian oil buyers including the European Union could force Moscow to either give up part of their output or sell the balance of its production at the cap.

The two sides have been discussing the issue at least since early July, when they had a teleconference, during which Choo asked for further details on Washington's plans to limit Russia's oil earnings.

Yellen told reporters on Saturday that she had held productive bilateral meetings about the proposed price cap with more than six counterparts on the sidelines of a meeting of Group of 20 finance officials on the Indonesian island of Bali. read more

South Korea's Choo also said the country will closely monitor onshore currency markets and review contingency plans to stabilize the market if needed, as the won was hovering a 13- year low of around 1,300 won per dollar.

Additional reporting by Heekyong Yang in Seoul; Editing by Kirsten Donovan and Bernadette Baum

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Cynthia Kim

6. New Construction at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station

All the imagery is at the link at Beyond Parallel: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/new-construction-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/

New Construction at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station

July 20, 2022, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha and Jennifer Jun

SHARE THIS PAGE

PRINT

Key Findings

• In the four months since Kim Jong-un’s March 2022 inspection of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station and the public announcement of a modernization and development project, the first stages of construction are now actively being pursued.
• Among the activities identified in a July 3, 2022, satellite image are construction of a large rail-served warehouse, excavations at three locations along the east side of the launch station, construction of three worker housing and support compounds in the center, and new activity at two existing support compounds.
• A new modernization and expansion project for the adjacent village of Changya-dong is underway.
• Almost all the existing facilities within the launch station do not show any new activity of significance but are actively maintained.
• If the details reported during Kim Jong-un’s March inspection are accurate, and all the announced tasks are to be accomplished, the ambitious modernization and development project could take a minimum of 1-3 years to partially accomplish and up to 10 years to complete, depending upon the resources committed. If fully completed, it will provide North Korea with a moderately comprehensive complex capable of launching more sophisticated satellite launch vehicles (SLV) derived from emerging intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology.

Background

As noted in our previous report covering Kim Jong-un’s March 11, 2022, inspection of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, Kim likely issued orders for a modernization and development project of the launch station sometime during late 2019. The first visible signs of this project were noted in March 2020, with the grading of approximately 12.8 kilometers of new roads throughout the launch station (for more details, see the Sohae Satellite Launching Station image map).

In early 2020, certain critical programs such as the Sohae modernization and development program were apparently suspended as the growing COVID-19 crisis caused massive societal disruptions within North Korea. By late 2021, as the crisis was easing, the decision to reinstate the earlier Sohae modernization and development program was apparently made. Kim Jong-un’s public inspection of the launch station and announcement of the modernization and development project followed on March 11, 2022. North Korean media reported that during this visit, Kim “…evaluated the present state of the ground, and advanced the task to modernize it on an expansion basis… He also set forth the task for building some facilities in the launching ground.”1

Among the more specific items mentioned were,

• “Reconstructing on an expansion basis the launching ground zone and the facilities for the general assembly and trial gearing of rocket and for the trial gearing of satellite…
• Establishing extra facilities for the injection and supply of fuel…
• Modernizing parts of the launch control facility and major technical posts on an expansion basis…
• Expanding the capacity of the engine ground jet test site…
• Ensuring the convenience of carrier rocket transport…
• Improving the ecological environment around the launching ground…
• Building a grandstand in the safe zone opposite to the launching ground.”2

Sohae Satellite Launching Stations

An Airbus Neo satellite image collected on July 3, 2022, shows that during the three months since our previous report, a number of small but significant developments have been observed at the launch station, indicating that the modernization and development project has now entered its early construction stage.3 Moving from north to south, the developments observed include the following.

Construction of a large rail-served warehouse approximately 375-meters north of the launch station’s entrance and checkpoint began sometime about June 8, 2022, when rail cars were first observed delivering gravel for the foundation. This is outside the launch station’s security perimeter but within the overall Tongchang-ri restricted area (please see the Sohae Satellite Launching Station image map).

The July 3 image shows that the foundation and interior and exterior walls are partially complete and that construction is continuing, as indicated by the construction equipment present and ongoing grading around the site. A small rail-served warehouse was previously built here between 2015 and 2017 to support work within the launch station but was razed sometime between May 2 and June 4, 2020. Additionally, there is a significant amount of grading and construction materials lying on the ground to the north of the warehouse building itself, suggesting potential additional construction in the near future.

The new rail-served warehouse, construction site, and new building north of the launch station’s main entrance and checkpoint. Grading, construction equipment, and supplies are clearly visible, July 3, 2022. Slide left for Korean. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2022)

Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Opposite the new rail-served warehouse, a small building with a greenhouse and four circular gardens was built sometime between July 17 and August 23, 2020. Given its close proximity to the new warehouse, it is most likely associated with the new warehouse.

7. U.S. Confronts the Reality of North Korea’s Nuclear Program

Well of course the priority has to be deterrence. You must have deterrence until denuclearization can be achieved.

No discussion of South Korea obtaining their own nuclear weapons and how that would impact deterrence (unless I missed it). I was told by a former government official this week that the ROK is coming to the realization that it needs its own deterrence,, there is fear the US is influenced by the argument that it will not trade LA for Seoul, and that article 10 of the NPT justifies ROK withdrawal because the NPT has failed to protect the ROK from the nuclear threat and therefore it must action to protect and defend itself (I have not researched the NPT so I am just repeated the statement made to me). Lastly, according to this former official, there is no fear of the ROK being sanctioned or becoming a "pariah state" and he cited the examples of Pakistan, India, and Israel. One of the many questions he could answer was what will be the ROK concept of employment for its nuclear weapons. What targets and under what conditions would the ROK use nuclear weapons. What makes the ROK think KJU will even be deterred by its own nuclear weapons?

Excerpts:

“It was a symbol of how many people have come to think that North Korea is a deterrence challenge, no longer a nonproliferation or disarmament one,” said Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif., who was at the meeting.

...

Some who attended the meeting said more attention should be paid to Pyongyang.

“The single most likely actor to fire a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future is North Korea,” said Markus Garlauskas, a former national-intelligence officer for North Korea at the ODNI who participated in the meeting.

...

The ability to threaten the U.S. mainland may mean North Korea feels it could use tactical nuclear weapons against South Korea to gain a decisive advantage and face a reduced risk of major retaliation from Washington, which has a treaty obligation to defend the South.

...

Views on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea from those in attendance varied, but for some the broader message of the meeting was clear: While U.S. policy remains aimed at ending the North’s nuclear status, the program is now so far advanced that the priority is preventing its use.

...

Those who attended the Omaha symposium said the discussions didn’t cover suggestions for new ways to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat, and it couldn’t be learned how the meeting might help inform policy makers or the military.

The first day of the event consisted of discussions with private-sector analysts, while the second day was taken up with classified briefings, according to a schedule viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

“The big unresolved question at the end of the meeting was whether Kim Jong Un is deterred from limited nuclear use, or does he think there are real scenarios where he might be able to use a nuclear weapon and get away with it,” said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who attended the event.

U.S. Confronts the Reality of North Korea’s Nuclear Program

U.S. Strategic Command hosted first meeting on Pyongyang’s weapons program; event showed priority is deterrence not disarmament, some participants say

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-confronts-uncomfortable-reality-about-north-koreas-nuclear-program-11658322000?mod=flipboard

By Alastair GaleFollow

July 20, 2022 9:00 am ET

In late May, dozens of U.S. intelligence officials, military officers and security analysts gathered in Omaha, Neb., to assess the escalating nuclear threat from North Korea as the regime develops new tactical nuclear weapons.

The previously unreported event was the first at the headquarters of U.S. Strategic Command, the arm of the Pentagon charged with deterring America’s rivals, to focus solely on North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s nuclear program, according to a spokesman for the organization.

Views on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea from those in attendance varied, but for some the broader message of the meeting was clear: While U.S. policy remains aimed at ending the North’s nuclear status, the program is now so far advanced that the priority is preventing its use.

South Korea Launches First Homegrown Satellite Into Orbit

South Korea Launches First Homegrown Satellite Into Orbit

Play video: South Korea Launches First Homegrown Satellite Into Orbit

South Korea’s domestically built rocket lifted off in late June, successfully placing a 1.3-ton dummy satellite into orbit. The technology could help expand Seoul’s surveillance of North Korea, which has conducted more than a dozen missile tests this year. Photo: Korea Pool/Yonhap via AP

“It was a symbol of how many people have come to think that North Korea is a deterrence challenge, no longer a nonproliferation or disarmament one,” said Jeffrey Lewis, an arms-control expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, Calif., who was at the meeting.

NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP

The 10-Point.

A personal, guided tour to the best scoops and stories every day in The Wall Street Journal.

PREVIEW

SUBSCRIBE

At the meeting, one senior U.S. military official said the likelihood of the North giving up its nuclear weapons anytime soon was “zero percent,” according to another person who took part.

Russia’s thinly veiled nuclear threats in Ukraine and China’s opaque nuclear-weapons buildup are the major concerns of many nuclear strategists. The nuclear threats from Moscow and Beijing are the focus of an annual deterrence conference at Strategic Command.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

How should the U.S. respond to North Korea’s deployment of tactical nuclear weapons? Join the conversation below.

The North Korea meeting on May 23-24 was coordinated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which advises the president on national security, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which provides information on foreign militaries to the U.S. military. The ODNI and DIA didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Some who attended the meeting said more attention should be paid to Pyongyang.

“The single most likely actor to fire a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future is North Korea,” said Markus Garlauskas, a former national-intelligence officer for North Korea at the ODNI who participated in the meeting.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, speaking into a microphone, with President Biden during a visit to a U.S. air base in South Korea earlier this year.

PHOTO: YONHAP NEWS/ZUMA PRESS

The meeting was arranged as North Korea develops so-called tactical nuclear weapons—smaller nuclear weapons intended to be used against targets within a few hundred miles. Recent weapons tests and statements from Pyongyang suggest it is moving to deploy new nuclear-armed, short-range missiles to its front lines, raising the specter that a clash with South Korea could spiral into nuclear conflict.

During the first day of the Omaha meeting, some participants said they feared that Kim Jong Un might launch a small nuclear weapon early in a conflict to try to force Seoul and Washington to back down.

Others said Mr. Kim might use a nuclear weapon if he felt the U.S. and South Korea were about to target him personally.

Recent headlines about North Korea’s nuclear threat have centered on its rapid progress in developing longer-range missiles such as intercontinental-range weapons and other technology that could evade U.S. defenses, such as hypersonic missiles.

The ability to threaten the U.S. mainland may mean North Korea feels it could use tactical nuclear weapons against South Korea to gain a decisive advantage and face a reduced risk of major retaliation from Washington, which has a treaty obligation to defend the South.

North Korea tested what it claimed to be a tactical guided weapon in April.

PHOTO: STR/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

“If there is a conflict that’s escalating, North Korea could very easily believe that limited tactical nuclear use would not lead to the regime’s destruction but would actually be key to ensuring regime survival,” said Mr. Garlauskas, who is now a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, a think tank based in Washington, D.C.

At a ruling party congress early last year, Mr. Kim called for the development of tactical nuclear weapons as part of a five-year defense development plan. In April this year, he oversaw what state media called the test of a new type of tactical guided weapon capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

Then in June, Mr. Kim discussed assigning new duties to front-line units of the military at a meeting of generals. Analysts interpreted that to mean North Korea was moving to deploy tactical nuclear weapons.

Although they release far less energy than many of the hundreds of intercontinental-range nuclear weapons the U.S. and Russia have aimed at each other, tactical nuclear weapons include devices more powerful than the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945.

For years, the challenge of the Kim family regime’s nuclear program has been largely viewed by U.S. policy makers as a task of constraining its growth and preventing proliferation of nuclear material and technology to other actors, such as Iran and terrorist groups.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attending a military meeting in June.

PHOTO: KCNA/VIA REUTERS

Through economic pressure and dialogue, the U.S. and other nations sought to slow or dial back Pyongyang’s nuclear development.

The North has already tested more missiles this year than in any other full calendar year, and is on the cusp of a seventh nuclear test, according to U.S. and South Korean government officials. Analysts say that a relatively small nuclear detonation could indicate that North Korea tested a nuclear device for tactical missiles.

Those who attended the Omaha symposium said the discussions didn’t cover suggestions for new ways to deter North Korea’s nuclear threat, and it couldn’t be learned how the meeting might help inform policy makers or the military.

The first day of the event consisted of discussions with private-sector analysts, while the second day was taken up with classified briefings, according to a schedule viewed by The Wall Street Journal.

“The big unresolved question at the end of the meeting was whether Kim Jong Un is deterred from limited nuclear use, or does he think there are real scenarios where he might be able to use a nuclear weapon and get away with it,” said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who attended the event.

U.S. and South Korea jet fighters flying in formation during a joint drill last month.

PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS

Write to Alastair Gale at alastair.gale@wsj.com

8. An Appraisal of the Singapore Joint Statement Between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Much Ado About Nothing?

Conclusion:

Against the foregoing backdrop, to address the ongoing problem of North Korean disequilibrium and associated dangers on the Korean peninsula, Seoul may wish to consider designing a nuclear weapon regime of its own in due course. This will of course require South Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT regime following the procedural requirements thereunder and the folding of the United States’ nuclear umbrella when it comes to the RoK, once such program has been duly implemented. It is speculated such a nuclear RoK program can be pursued successfully with some strings attached, in close consultation with the United States and other member states concerned.

An Appraisal of the Singapore Joint Statement Between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Much Ado About Nothing?

opiniojuris.org · July 18, 2022

[Joseph Cho is a South Korea-based lawyer, qualified in New York as well as in England and Wales.]

“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States…and as I said they will be met with fire, fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.”

President Donald J. Trump, 2017

Introduction

In 2002, President George W. Bush identified North Korea as part of a tripartite group of “axis of evil” along with Iraq and Iran, which challenged “the international order with terror and weapons of mass destruction.” In fact, in the same year North Korea admitted having a “major clandestine nuclear-weapons development program” in place and has since been steadily expanding their nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities for twenty years. In the meantime, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 which it had signed off as a non-nuclear state in 1985. In June, 2018, a promising breakthrough came when President Donald J. Trump met with Chairman Kim Jung Eun of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in Singapore for a summit. The Singapore Summit was a historic event in that President Trump was the first sitting United States president to meet a North Korean head of state face-to-face. Another element that made this Summit noteworthy was a joint statement signed by President Trump and Chairman Kim (Joint Statement). Based on the premise that “the establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world,” the Joint Statement calls for “transformed bilateral relations, building of an eventual peace regime, complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and recovery of U.S. soldier remains from the North” (emphasis added). While the Trump administration touted the Joint Statement for halting menacing DPRK missile tests thereby stalling further nuclear threats from North Korea, critics called it “a recycled pledge from previous statements of this type that have gone nowhere” and “a decidedly underwhelming document, consisting largely of generalities and platitudes.”

It has been nearly four years since the Singapore Summit. The purpose of this blog is to assess how the Joint Statement has been implemented to date. This analysis merits attention in that, albeit relatively weak in details, the Joint Statement is a statement of principles from the Singapore Summit that can guide both the United States and the DPRK in terms of navigating through and following up on the commitments contained therein the most notable being complete and verifiable “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” As will be analyzed in what follows, this blog will note that the Joint Statement is considered a failure for now, which may trigger South Korea to adopt a nuclear arms program in due course, given the clear and present danger of ongoing threats of aggression from the DPRK.

Provocations and Negotiations

The DPRK constitution describes the country as a nuclear state. Kim Jong Un, who came to the helm in 2011, conducted, following the inauguration of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States in January, 2017, a total of five major missile tests between February, 2017 and November, 2017 involving medium-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These military tests provoked the United States almost to the point of launching military strikes against the DPRK in the event of the latter’s nuclear attacks. Through a dedicated intermediary role by President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), however, President Trump and Chairman Kim met in Singapore for the first ever face-to-face bilateral summit between the two countries.

In the meantime, the DPRK is yet to demonstrate any conspicuous signs of dismantling its nuclear programs pursuant to the Joint Statement. Given this reluctance and persistent inattention on the part of the DPRK, it is envisaged that the following options may be on the table when it comes to bringing the Joint Statement to a recognizable form of fruition. First, the United States may consider inducing Kim Jong Un to abide by the Joint Statement largely through diplomatic channels. Such civilized pressure tactic may work best when implemented in tandem with ongoing full-scale economic sanctions aimed against the target state. Second, the United States may assume that the tools of diplomacy would go only so far and are bound to falter at the end of the day when it comes to denuclearizing the DPRK, which has track records of reneging on its past disarmament commitments including in the context of multilateral talks. Since, in the process, the DPRK is likely to further advance its nuclear capabilities and to hone to perfection the existing stockpiles of nuclear warheads, it may be in the United States’ interests to contemplate exercising military options including preemptive strikes to bring North Korea into compliance with the Joint Statement. Third, based on the assumption that fully denuclearizing the DPRK is neither a viable option nor a strategy with promising payoffs down the line, the United State may consider recognizing the DPRK as a de facto nuclear state and attempt to craft a good enough deal based on such tacit recognition. Based on an acknowledgement to that effect, the DPRK may join the ranks of India, Pakistan, and Israel, de facto nuclear weapon states that are not formally recognized under the NPT. This type of deal may involve arms control whereby Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenals are regulated, rather than eradicated, with, hopefully, an ongoing system of inspection and monitoring for compliance in place.

Path to Maximum Pressure

The path the Trump administration opted for in furtherance of the Joint Statement was that of complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization (COVID) of the DPRK. As the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo affirmed amidst rumors about Chairman Kim’s deteriorating health and whereabouts, Washington made a commitment to complete denuclearization, “regardless of what transpires inside of North Korea with respect to their leadership.” This United States policy is presumably based on a cautiously rosy forecast that, in the face of ongoing multinational COVID endeavors spearheaded by the United States against the Kim regime, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un may, voluntarily or otherwise, embrace COVID and eventually surrender the regime’s nuclear arsenal. Interestingly, the concept of COVID can be tracked back to as early as 2006. Hence, in October, 2006, John Bolton, who then served as the 25th United States Ambassador to the United Nations (UN), stated before a UN council that the United States “would impose strict demands on the DPRK not to conduct further nuclear tests or launch ballistic missiles… as well as to abandon all weapons of mass destruction programmes, whether nuclear, chemical or biological, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” (emphasis added). What constitutes COVID and how or whether COVID may be validly enforced in the DPRK may be a subject of debates both in theory and practice. At a minimum, however, COVID would require the presence of competent U.S. and international inspectors including those from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inside the country to verify progress of what is sought to be thorough denuclearization. In this regard, whether the term “firm and unwavering” commitment to denuclearization from the Joint Statement is in effect synonymous with COVID remains to be seen; there is, however, a school of thought that the term represents a face-saving compromise and in effect connotes “a definite commitment” on the part of Kim Jong Un to implement fully verifiable process of nuclear disarmament by the DPRK.

Unfortunately, there is no discernible indication that the North Korean regime is following up on the text or tenor of the Joint Statement. On the contrary, in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, North Korea’s U.N. Ambassador Kim Song remarked that being situated in the geopolitical environment where “cutting-edge military hardware, including stealth fighters, continue to be introduced into the Korean peninsula and nuclear strike means of all kinds are directly aimed at the DPRK”, the DPRK has attained “the reliable and effective war deterrent for self-defense” to firmly defend the “peace and security of the Korean peninsula and the region.” Based on these and other pertinent data, it is predicted that North Korea may well present credible threats to the mainland United States soon, with land-based, nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), among others, under their belt.

Efforts of the U.S. Government for DPRK Denuclearization

Since the Singapore Summit, the United States was not merely talking the talk of denuclearization, but walking the walk of denuclearization in the form of commercial and economic sanctions in support of COVID efforts. These sanctions are in addition to a series of sanctions resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, which consists of a total of fifteen members including the United States, since 2006 in response to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile activities. In the meantime, ongoing global sanctions have yet to lead to the DPRK’s denuclearization. This is in large part to the DPRK’s uncanny capabilities to penetrate global financial networks while evading sanctions with outside help. It is also because the effectiveness of UN sanctions has been undermined by certain countries’ failure to enforce them.

Analysis and Conclusion

It appears that the aim of a peace regime coupled with complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, envisaged under the Joint Statement is all but a shattered visage at this point, as the statement did ultimately nothing in terms of rolling back the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. This point is buttressed by the fact that North Korea has accelerated and ramped up munitions tests this year including the testings of a banned intercontinental ballistic missile followed by a submarine-launched ballistic missile. It is also reported that the DPRK regime is now gearing up for a test of nuclear weapons technology at a designated facility in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, amidst North Korea’s name-callings with President Biden, it appears that while acknowledging the Singapore Statement in a joint statement with the ROK in early 2021, the Biden administration’s North Korea policy will be involving a “calibrated, practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK, ” even though what such policy will actually entail remains to be seen.

In the meantime, in November, 2017, the Pentagon assessed that “(t)he only way to ‘locate and destroy — with complete certainty — all components of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs’ is through a ground invasion,” which may in turn trigger the DPRK’s military reaction, possibly with a nuclear weapon or two, against Seoul, South Korea. Seoul, which is the capital of the ROK and located only 23 km (or about 35 miles) away from the border with North Korea, is home to almost ten million people. In light of such a specter of a nuclear catastrophe, staging a military maneuver against North Korea to implement the country’s denuclearization is not considered a prudent move.

Against the foregoing backdrop, to address the ongoing problem of North Korean disequilibrium and associated dangers on the Korean peninsula, Seoul may wish to consider designing a nuclear weapon regime of its own in due course. This will of course require South Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT regime following the procedural requirements thereunder and the folding of the United States’ nuclear umbrella when it comes to the RoK, once such program has been duly implemented. It is speculated such a nuclear RoK program can be pursued successfully with some strings attached, in close consultation with the United States and other member states concerned.

opiniojuris.org · July 18, 2022

9. How the US should respond if North Korea conducts another nuke test

I do agree we need a strategy that is more than just denuclearization. But I don't think an end of war declaration will have any positive impact on Kim Jong Un nor will any actions that appear to confirm that his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are working.

How the US should respond if North Korea conducts another nuke test - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Jessica J. Lee · July 19, 2022

North Korea

How the US should respond if North Korea conducts another nuke test

Washington needs to look beyond the nuclear threat to work toward a sustainable peace on the peninsula.

July 19, 2022

Written by

Jessica J. Lee

How the US should respond if North Korea conducts another nuke test

Much of the recent news about North Korea has centered on the likelihood of a seventh nuclear test. Relatively little attention has been placed on the immediate and long-term goals of the United States on the Korean Peninsula — a part of the world that is technically still in a state of war seven decades after the Korean War broke out.

A new report by the Quincy Institute titled “Active Denial: A Roadmap to a More Effective, Stabilizing, and Sustainable U.S. Defense Strategy in Asia,” offers policy recommendations to advance peace on the Korean Peninsula and curb the cycle of provocation and punishment that has defined U.S.-North Korea relations over the past three decades, while South Korea has been a junior partner to the United States.

Warnings by senior U.S. officials about a potential nuclear test have grown in recent weeks. The last time Pyongyang tested a nuclear weapon was in September 2017, following several satellite and ICBM tests that were conducted earlier that year.

On June 7, two days after North Korea launched eight ballistic missiles, U.S. Special Representative to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sung Kim noted that in addition to launching an unprecedented number of ballistic missiles in 2022, North Korean officials have hinted at the testing of tactical nuclear weapons, which are harder to detect than strategic weapons due to their smaller size. Ambassador Kim also warned that North Korea is preparing to conduct a nuclear test.

On June 13, Secretary of State Antony Blinken held a joint press conference with his Republic of Korea counterpart Park Jin. Secretary Blinken stated that the United States knows that the North Koreans have “done preparations for…a [nuclear] test” and that the American government is “extremely vigilant” about that possibility, as well as consulting with allies on how best to respond to such an action.

The same day, national security adviser Jake Sullivan echoed Blinken’s assessment while also noting that Washington has communicated its concerns to Beijing. Sullivan did not mention how the Chinese side responded, nor did he offer new insights that were gleaned from that conversation about the way forward.

On one hand, the focus on North Korea’s seemingly imminent nuclear test makes sense given its ability to undermine support for diplomacy. But over-emphasizing the nuclear threat fosters deterrence-centric solutions, as opposed to considering the broader regional context and underlying sources of North Korea’s desire to build nuclear weapons. Treating North Korea mainly as a security threat rather than as a political and diplomatic issue also overlooks steps that the United States could take to reduce potential for military confrontation between nuclear-armed countries.

The Quincy report “Active Denial”offers a case for how allies like South Korea can support a more sustainable U.S. defense posture in the region that serves the U.S.-ROK alliance’s interest in a more stable Korean Peninsula and reduces the possibility of conflict. It calls for greater U.S. support in building peace on the Korean Peninsula and in limiting further nuclear proliferation. It recommends Washington engage in sustained diplomacy with Pyongyang in order to advance long-term peace in the region. The report also suggests adjustments in the U.S. military presence in South Korea and in the U.S.–ROK alliance division of labor. For example, it recommends permanently rebasing one of the two U.S. air wings currently stationed in South Korea to elsewhere in the Asia–Pacific, given its vulnerability to attack by chemical weapons and missiles from North Korea and the relative ease with which it can be flown back to South Korea as needed.

The report also stresses the need for the U.S.–ROK alliance to find a balance between effective deterrence and movement toward conflict resolution and peacebuilding vis-a-vis North Korea. To get there, Seoul should play a leading role in creative and multi-level diplomacy with Pyongyang, with the United States playing a supporting role conducive to inter-Korean reconciliation. As South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Young-se noted at a conference hosted by Korea Institute for National Unification last week, the Yoon administration will seek a “pragmatic approach” on North Korea through a “virtuous cycle, such as denuclearization of North Korea and the development of inter-Korean relations.” Washington’s support for such a strategy will be pivotal for its success.

Over the long-term, Washington should also be open to the possibility of not just normalization of relations but to a cooperative relationship with Pyongyang as part of closing the chapter of the Korean War and stemming the growing arms race between the two Koreas. In exchange for security guarantees, North Korea will need to take concrete, verifiable steps to declare facilities that manufacture and deliver nuclear weapons, as well as to move toward dismantling nuclear facilities.

Rather than equate ending the Korean War with a unilateral withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Korea, Washington should think of the peace and denuclearization process in phases, based on mutual cooperation in tension reduction and denuclearization. Ultimately, an “action-for-action” diplomatic process, as Sullivan recently called it, is preferable to the status quo of holding negotiation hostage to Pyongyang’s voluntary nuclear weapons disarmament.

A U.S. strategy on Asia based on realistic expectations and diligence in accountability on all sides will be critical for making tangible progress with North Korea, with South Korea playing a leadership role in shaping the peninsula’s future.

Written by

Jessica J. Lee

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Jessica J. Lee · July 19, 2022

10. N.K. foreign ministry slams annual U.S. human trafficking report as 'absolute nonsense'

It is not nonsense to the Koreans who have escaped from the north who have suffered this horrendous abuse.

N.K. foreign ministry slams annual U.S. human trafficking report as 'absolute nonsense' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 20, 2022

SEOUL, July 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea denounced the United States on Wednesday for the release of an updated human trafficking report, calling the move "absolute nonsense."

In an article posted on its website, Pyongyang's foreign ministry slammed the State Department's publication of the 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report, which kept the country in Tier 3, the lowest category, for the 20th straight year.

It argued that the U.S. should place itself "on the operating table first" before meddling in other country's affairs and hiding its own "ills."

"That the U.S., which still follows its nasty human trafficking history, issues the 'Trafficking in Persons Report' every year and assesses the 'human trafficking situation' of other countries at its will is absolute nonsense and an insult to the human rights," the article read.

It added that human trafficking is an "incurable disease" that has been in place in the U.S. for hundreds of years ever since its founding and still remains rampant across the country.

The article pointed out the recent deaths of around 50 immigrants in a shipping container in the suburbs of San Antonio, Texas, and noted that 12.5 million Africans were forced into slavery from 1525 to 1866.

North Korea holds an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 persons in political prison camps, according to the annual report released Tuesday.

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · July 20, 2022

11.  Photos of fishermen being dragged back across border spread rapidly in N. Korea

Yes, this certainly undermines ROK credibility among Koreans in the north. This could be a eral boon for the regime's efforts to stop escapes. Why would an escapee risk being forcibly repatriated though they already risk that in China.

Photos of fishermen being dragged back across border spread rapidly in N. Korea - Daily NK

Some North Koreans expressed outrage when they heard that the South Korean government had forcibly repatriated the North Korean fishermen, a source told Daily NK

By Lee Chae Un - 2022.07.20 4:00pm

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · July 20, 2022

North Korean fishermen being taken back across the inter-Korean border in November 2019. (Ministry of Unification)

The news that the South Korean Ministry of Unification released 10 photos of North Korean fishermen being dragged back across the inter-Korean border in November 2019 is rapidly spreading inside North Korea, particularly in areas along the border with China.

A source in North Hamgyong Province told Daily NK on Monday that news of the repatriation has become the talk of the town in Hoeryong, Chongjin and other major cities in the province.

“Nobody cannot hide their shock that [the fishermen] were forcibly repatriated by the South Korean government,” he said.

Barred from accessing outside information, North Koreans were generally unaware of exactly what happened during the November 2019 incident. All they heard was rumors that “two people who tried to abscond to South Korea died after they were caught by a patrol boat,” the source said.

However, the source told Daily NK that with the incident becoming an issue in South Korea, word is rapidly spreading inside North Korea that the fishermen made it to South Korea, but were then forced to return to the North.

Many North Koreans are responding to the news with shock. The source said some North Koreans expressed outrage when they heard that the South Korean government had forcibly repatriated the North Korean fishermen.

According to the source, some North Koreans said that people “risk death when they leave here [North Korea] for China or South Korea,” and that forcibly repatriating people who had risked so much “was to drag them to their deaths.”

“While I could understand if they were sent back after being caught in China, it’s unimaginable that people who made it to South Korea would be sent back,” said the source. “Moreover, they say they went [South Korea] after killing 16 people, but such a thing is unheard of here.

“No matter how bad a person might be here, I’ve never heard of somebody who killed dozens of people,” he claimed, adding, “People here are kind natured, even if they have unrefined personalities and use rough language. Moreover, when [the fishermen] went to the South, they must have gone looking for hope and freedom, so how surprised they must have been when they were forcibly repatriated.”

Another Daily NK source said that North Koreans who go to South Korea “have great expectations regarding the South Korean government.”

“That people who went with such expectations were sent back again here [to North Korea] is unbelievable,” she said.

“How their world must have come crashing down when they were forced to return,” the source continued, adding, “Wouldn’t the South Korean government have been aware that they would die if they were sent back?”

She said that North Koreans endure even amid extreme hardships “because they believe a better world will come,” but that the forced repatriation “disappointed the people waiting for such a better world.”

The source added that she believes North Koreans who had been preparing to defect may now reconsider their plans based on news of the incident.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Un · July 20, 2022

12. N. Korea orders greater oversight of military families near S. Korean border

This is an indicator that leaflets do make into the military and civilians particularly in the front line area and they are at least picked up (and hopefully read - and reports such as the one by George Hutcinson at HRNK do reveal that they are read by the military in particular: https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf). 

N. Korea orders greater oversight of military families near S. Korean border - Daily NK

The authorities claim that an item originating from South Korea helped lead to the spread of COVID-19 in Pyongyang

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · July 20, 2022

FILE PHOTO: A woman in Wonsan, Kangwon Province, rides her bike past propaganda signs promoting the protection of forests. (Daily NK)

The North Korean military’s General Political Bureau is currently carrying out inspections following a recent order given by leader Kim Jong Un for the family guidance sections of the political departments of front line units to be placed under greater oversight.

A source in the North Korean military told Daily NK on Monday that this order and the subsequent inspections began with a coronavirus-related report that was drafted by the State Emergency Anti-epidemic Command.

The main thrust of the report was as follows: The child of a soldier in the Second Division of I Corps (Kumgang County, Kangwon Province) picked up an item originating from South Korea near the border and handed it over to a soldier who often visited their house. Then an officer who had contact with the soldier went to Pyongyang on an assignment, causing an outbreak of COVID-19 there.

In response to this incident, the State Emergency Anti-epidemic Command proposed a full inspection of the family guidance sections of units responsible for overseeing military families on the grounds that the dangerous consequences of slack discipline among military families in the border region should not be disregarded.

On July 11, following an order by Kim Jong Un, the General Political Bureau launched sweeping inspections of the family guidance sections of the political departments of all army corps, navy squadrons, and air force units on the front lines.

“The supreme commander of the armed forces [Kim Jong Un] placed the blame for [the spread] of the infectious disease – referred to as a ‘national catastrophe’ – on the psychological state and complacent attitude of those who failed to promptly report items from South Korea, and demonstrated his concern [about the matter] by ordering that such matters not be overlooked,” the source said.

The source further reported that staff from the main departments at the General Political Bureau — including the family guidance department, organization department, propaganda department, youth activities department, general affairs department, and the party life guidance department — were assigned to carry out these inspections.

The General Political Bureau believes the heads of political departments in front line units of the army, navy, and air force bear full responsibility for this matter and has instructed them to submit to inspections along with the head of the family guidance section in their units, the source continued.

“The Second Division of the I Corps is under scrutiny in this extensive set of inspections. The General Political Bureau is probing the system set up to report on South Korean items at family guidance sections in units on the front lines and the implementation of working-level political programs during the fight against the pandemic. It intends to include any irregularities within the report ordered by the supreme commander of the armed forces,” the source added.

This development has placed members of I Corps — and in particular, the family guidance section of its Second Division — in a state of extreme anxiety.

Rumors are swirling among the families of local soldiers that the child and their family have been taken to an unknown location. It is also widely assumed that the head of the family guidance section in the Second Division will be sacked and disciplined with hard labor.

The General Political Bureau’s inspection of all family guidance sections in front line units of the army, navy, and air force will continue through the end of July, the source said.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · July 20, 2022

13. PPP lawmaker claims Moon gov't falsely accused N.K. fishermen of killings

I was present in a meeting with another national assembly member and a group of escapees from the north. The escapees gave detailed explanations on how squid fishing works and why these two could not have killed the 16 people at night on a squid fishing boat. They also argued among themselves about the fate of the two fishermen in the north though the consensus is that they met certain death upon return, just a question of was it sooner rather than later.

(LEAD) PPP lawmaker claims Moon gov't falsely accused N.K. fishermen of killings | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · July 20, 2022

(LEAD: UPDATES with main opposition party leader's remarks in last three paras)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, July 20 (Yonhap) -- A lawmaker of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) claimed Wednesday that the preceding Moon Jae-in administration falsely accused two North Korean fishermen of killing 16 fellow crew members before repatriating them in 2019.

The alleged killings were the main reason behind the Moon administration's decision to send the North Koreans back to their homeland, where they could face harsh punishment, even though they had expressed a desire to defect to South Korea.

Rep. Han Ki-ho, who leads a PPP task force on national security incidents involving the previous administration, claimed that the North Koreans had actually planned to help 16 people from five households in the North's northeastern city of Kimchaek flee to South Korea.

"The two were set to guide the 16 people to the South on a fishing vessel but fled when they realized they were being arrested," Han said during a task force meeting at the National Assembly, citing accounts from a North Korean defectors he did not identify.

Han claimed that North Korea fabricated the alleged killings and lied to South Korea in an attempt to get the two repatriated. The Moon administration must have known what really had happened, but still went ahead and deported them, the lawmaker claimed.

Han, who claimed to have obtained the testimony through a resident of Kimchaek, said there were rumors of the deported fishermen being shot to death less than three days after they were repatriated.

The five families -- who had family members who had already defected to the South -- have also gone missing, according to the lawmaker.

The main opposition Democratic Party (DP) firmly dismissed the claim.

"Does this even make sense? I don't know where they are headed," Woo Sang-ho, the DP's interim leader, told reporters, criticizing the ruling party.

"Who will confess to having killed 16 people without actually doing it? How could the two fishermen's testimonies have coincided when they were questioned separately? I hope they speak with some rationality."

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · July 20, 2022

14.  Justice ministry found no legal grounds before repatriation of N.K. fishermen in 2019

Due process and rule of law. Democratic South Korea - fix yourself to reinforce the strength of your democracy. This is an opportunity to strengthen democracy.

Justice ministry found no legal grounds before repatriation of N.K. fishermen in 2019 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · July 20, 2022

SEOUL, July 20 (Yonhap) -- Just before South Korea repatriated two North Korean fishermen in 2019, the justice ministry reviewed its legality and found no legal grounds to send them back to North Korea, the ministry said Wednesday.

The revelation is expected to further fuel criticism that the previous administration of President Moon Jae-in deported the North Koreans even though it knew there was no legal ground to do so after they expressed a desire to defect to South Korea.

The Moon government said at the time that it decided to repatriate the North Koreans because they had admitted to killing 16 fellow crew members and their expression of a desire to defect to the South was deemed insincere.

"Around noon on Nov. 7, 2019, the justice ministry was asked by Cheong Wa Dae to conduct a legality review in connection with the repatriation of the North Korean fishermen," the ministry said of the then presidential office.

The ministry said it concluded at that time that there were no legal grounds to deport the North Koreans even though they were legally ineligible for government protections as criminals. It also determined it was hard to deport them under the Immigration Act that is only applicable to foreigners.

Despite the findings, the then ministry told Cheong Wa Dae it was unavoidable to deport the North Koreans.

Former National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong, who served under the Moon government, said Sunday the government decided to carry out the deportation after consultations with relevant government ministries.

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 박보람 · July 20, 2022

15. China still appears wary about reopening trade with North Korea

No surprise given China's zero COVID policy. But this certainly prolongs the suffering of the Korean people due to the impact on the markets.

China still appears wary about reopening trade with North Korea - Daily NK

China is strictly controlling illegal contacts or transactions with North Koreans because Beijing is worried about importing COVID-19 from North Korea, a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2022.07.20 1:55pm

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 20, 2022

A marker delineating the border between China and North Korea (Wikimedia Commons)

Previously locked down Chinese cities are gradually coming back to life as COVID-19 numbers decrease, but Chinese authorities have yet to reopen trade with North Korea.

Although North Korea is making a show of confidence, claiming that the coronavirus situation in the country has “completely stabilized,” the Chinese government is tightly controlling trade with the North due to concern about the state of the pandemic in the country.

According to a Daily NK source in China on Monday, as coronavirus cases decrease, factories and restaurants are reopening in regions of China that border North Korea, including Liaoning and Jilin provinces. With highways, railways, ports and other inter-regional transportation links soon set to reopen as normal, the movement of goods and people within China is expected to improve.

However, in contrast to moves to relax domestic disease control measures, the Chinese government has yet to begin easing controls and inspections regarding trade with North Korea. In regions that border North Korea, Chinese authorities are reportedly cracking down hard on Chinese people directly contacting or doing business with North Koreans.

The source told Daily NK that the Chinese government is levying fines of at least RMB 300,000 (around USD 44,450) on people caught smuggling with North Koreans, a measure that has helped prevent Chinese traders from readily dealing with their North Korean counterparts.

On the other hand, North Korean trade officials are making more requests for imports from Chinese traders. With North Korean authorities recently allowing certain North Korean trading companies to participate in or expand existing trade with China, these companies appear to be responding by increasingly asking for items to import.

Daily NK reported earlier this month that North Korean authorities — in the course of completing efforts to merge or close underperforming trading companies — recently decided to expand trading opportunities for certain larger trading companies on the condition that they assume the debts of the smaller companies they absorb.

North Korean trading companies are reportedly asking their Chinese counterparts for fertilizer and other agricultural supplies, steel products and car parts, among other items.

Interestingly, many North Korean trading companies are also asking for powdered milk for children. The source said while North Korea has the capacity to produce powdered milk on its own and is in fact doing so, it cannot produce much of it, so the authorities appear to be trying to make up for shortfalls with imports.

North Korean trade officials are also asking for soybean oil and seasonings, prices of which have shot through the roof in North Korean markets since the closure of the China-North Korea border.

However, Chinese business entities cannot freely engage in direct trade with North Korea in regions along the border due to the Chinese government’s tight controls. Currently, most exports to North Korea from China enter the country by sea through the port of Nampo, with many ships reportedly departing from the Chinese ports of Shanghai or Dalian.

The Chinese government’s continued tight controls on both official bilateral trade and smuggling is most likely due to concerns regarding North Korea’s COVID-19 situation.

North Korean authorities are currently claiming a steadily falling number of new fever cases. Rodong Sinmun recently displayed confidence in the country’s quarantine efforts, running an article on July 11 claiming that the nationwide quarantine situation had entered a “completely stable phase.”

However, the Chinese government appears to have little faith in North Korea’s pronouncements. The source told Daily NK that China is strictly controlling illegal contacts or transactions with North Koreans because Beijing is worried about importing COVID-19 from North Korea.

“In some parts of Sinuiju close to China there are over 50 fever cases emerging everyday,” said the source. “[China] has worked hard to bring coronavirus cases to zero, so it would be a big problem [for the Chinese] if infections re-emerged because of North Korea.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · July 20, 2022

16. Yellen calls out China trade practices in South Korea visit

Yellen calls out China trade practices in South Korea visit

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen says the U.S. and South Korea should deepen their trade ties to avoid letting other countries use their market positions to unfair advantage

ByFATIMA HUSSEIN and HYUNG-JIN KIM Associated Press

July 19, 2022, 12:45 PM

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

SEOUL, South Korea -- Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Tuesday the U.S. and South Korea should deepen their trade ties to avoid letting other countries use their market positions to unfair advantage — calling out China by name.

“We cannot allow countries like China to use their market position in key raw materials, technologies, or products to disrupt our economy or exercise unwanted geopolitical leverage,” Yellen said in remarks at an LG Group-run research and development complex in Seoul.

LG, one of the biggest business groups in South Korea, in April announced plans to build a $1.4 billion battery plant in Queen Creek, Arizona.

Yellen represented the U.S. at the Group of 20 finance minister meetings on Indonesia’s resort island of Bali and made stops in Tokyo and Seoul. She did not visit, but held a call with China’s vice premier in charge of trade in early July.

Yellen has been a critic of China’s economic relationship with Moscow — urging the Asian superpower to use its “special relationship with Russia” to persuade it to end its invasion of Ukraine.

China “has directed significant resources to seek a dominant position in the manufacturing of certain advanced technologies, including semiconductors, while employing a range of unfair trade practices to achieve this position," she said.

Citing “the unfair Chinese practices that damage our national security interests,” Yellen called on countries to engage in what she called “friend-shoring,” to lower economic risks for participating economies.

Friend-shoring, which Yellen has brought up in several speeches, refers to countries with shared values agreeing to trade practices that encourage manufacturing and reducing risks to supply chains.

“The purpose is to lower risks for our economy and theirs,” Yellen said. “In doing so, we can help to insulate both American and Korean households from the price increases in disruptions caused by geopolitical and economic risks and facilitate our businesses access to vital inputs and products from medicine to semiconductors to electric vehicle batteries.”

She also again pushed for a price cap on Russian oil exports, saying Russia is now threatening to spark a global food crisis by blocking ports in Ukraine after its invasion of the country caused energy prices to surge.

“All responsible countries must unite in opposition to this war and work together to end it swiftly,” Yellen said. “And that’s why the United States and other responsible allies and partners are seeking to reduce Russia’s revenue to wage its war without causing a necessary volatility in global energy markets.”

The global economy has been ravaged by the impacts of the war in Ukraine and shutdowns caused by COVID-19. Skyrocketing energy costs and high inflation have touched every part of the globe.

The Indo-Pacific region is seeing this play out in Sri Lanka, which is struggling through the island nation’s worst economic crisis.

Later Tuesday, Yellen is to meet top South Korean officials including President Yoon Suk Yeol as she wraps up her first trip as treasury secretary to the Indo-Pacific region.

——

Hussein reported from Washington.

17. The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates

It would be something for both South Korea and Japan to go nuclear.

But I think the "trade LA for Seoul" argument is BS. It is just not that simple. And LA will not be any better protected if we remove the nuclear umbrella and take our troops out of Northeast Asia. It might not get nuked right away but the entire US will suffer economically much more than it is now because of Ukraine if war breaks out on the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates

South Korea and Japan can decide their own destinies.

By Robert E. Kelly, a professor of political science at Pusan National University.

Foreign Policy · by Robert E. Kelly · July 15, 2022

A February poll found that 71 percent of South Koreans wanted their country to have nuclear weapons. Another in May found 70.2 percent supported indigenous nuclearization, with 63.6 percent in support even if that violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The drivers, unsurprisingly, are North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and China’s growing belligerence. These factors impact the Japanese nuclearization debate too, though interest there is noticeably lower. The United States has long opposed South Korean/Japanese counter-nuclearization. But in the light of the Ukraine war, Washington should not hegemonically dictate the outcome of its allies’ WMD debates.

NATO anxiety over possible Russian WMDs in the Ukraine war illustrates potential limits on U.S. counter-escalation when facing a nuclearized opponent. Western pundits have been quite candid that Russian nuclear weapons were the reason for rejecting the no-fly zone sought by Kyiv. Chinese and, especially, North Korean WMDs might play a similar blocking or limiting role in East Asian contingencies.

Importantly, U.S. guarantees to South Korea and Japan are formalized as treaty, whereas NATO is not similarly committed to Ukraine. But during the Cold War, Britain and France were incredulous enough that the United States would sacrifice “New York for Paris” that they built their own nuclear weapons despite formal U.S. guarantees. That same logic is at work in East Asia today. The United States will not sacrifice “Los Angeles for Seoul.”

China, with its relatively restrained nuclear rhetoric, is less the issue here than North Korea, which regularly and flamboyantly invokes its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang is not going to reform, will march relentlessly toward more and better WMDs, and is building its doctrine around their use, including possible tactical deployments.

Alternatives to direct South Korean/Japanese nuclear deterrence of North Korean WMDs are soft. Extended nuclear deterrence is weakly credible if it means nuked U.S. cities to defend South Korea or Japan. Missile defense does not work well enough to provide a roof against as many weapons North Korea appears to be building. China will not take serious action to stop Pyongyang. A negotiated deal—the best solution and hence discussed at length below—might control Pyongyang’s programs somewhat via missile or warhead limits or inspector access. But North Korea seems unwilling to negotiate seriously, is an untrustworthy counterparty, is unlikely to cut enough to relieve the existential threat its WMDs now pose to South Korea and Japan, and would demand exorbitant counter-concessions as payment.

This poor option set is already forcing “thinking the unthinkable” discussions in the region. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has suggested preemptive strikes on North Korean missile sites in a crisis, and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the region. The sheer precarity of South Korean and Japanese exposure to a nuclearized/missile Orwellian tyranny—which will be evident yet again this year if Pyongyang tests another nuclear weapon as predicted—will make it increasingly awkward for the United States to hegemonically insist that Seoul, and Tokyo even, may not investigate all security options.

Worse, U.S. resistance to allied nuclearization assumes a traditional American internationalism that is no longer assured. One of the United States’ two parties increasingly disdains alliances and admires authoritarianism. If former U.S. President Donald Trump—or a similar Trumpist—retakes the U.S. presidency in 2024, American opposition to East Asian allies’ nuclearization will decline dramatically—if only because the United States will no longer care what they do. As president, Trump was more interested in personal relationships with regional autocrats like Chinese President Xi Jinping or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un than with traditional U.S. partners. He notoriously “fell in love” with Kim and signaled a desire to “blow up” the US-ROK alliance if re-elected. He also hinted at breaking the 1951 U.S.-Japan security treaty. . So, there is a reasonable chance that South Korea will nuclearize after 2024 regardless of what the Americans think. U.S. abandonment of South Korea would also push the Japanese nuclearization discussion to the right.

This would not be the first time the United States has tacitly accepted another country’s nuclearization. Ostensibly, the United States has supported the NPT for decades. In practice though, Washington tolerates at least five other states—Britain, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan—being unwilling to build down their stockpiles. Using the vague standard implied by these examples—friendship with the United States; reasonable state capacity; and at least theoretically, democratic rule—South Korea and Japan more than clear the bar for what is effectively a U.S. NPT exemption.

Judged by U.S. behavior toward NPT contravention, the NPT is better understood as a U.S. effort to prevent unfriendly or hostile states from nuclearizing rather than as a blanket, “Global Zero” commitment to fewer nuclear weapons in the world. The United States does not pressure friendly nuclear weapons states, including itself, to meet NPT requirements. It gave up sanctioning India and Pakistan’s violation after just three years. Applying this more honest standard of U.S. interests to arms control, the NPT is of questionable utility in East Asia.

China, Russia, and North Korea already possess nuclear weapons and show no signs of building down. So there is no regional nuclearization cascade for South Korea or Japan to provoke, because it has already happened. . And Taiwanese nuclearization is unlikely, as Taiwanese elites are quite aware that their nuclearization would provoke China.

Next, there is an under-discussed NPT downside: It provokes the alliance-debilitating, “New York for Paris” debates mentioned above. If U.S. allies do not nuclearize and must rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence, then they will inevitably question whether the United States will use those weapons in their defense if that might incur a retaliatory nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland. The answer to that question is almost certainly no, as then-French President Charles de Gaulle realized 61 years ago. The easiest way to reduce this bitter, alliance-undermining dissension is to let U.S. allies self-insure via indigenous nuclearization.

Finally, South Korean/Japanese nuclearization could serve shared regional interests by providing supplemental, local deterrence (as British and French nukes did during the Cold War) and by improving alliance burden-sharing. Further, the threat of South Korean/Japanese nuclearization might finally prompt Pyongyang and Beijing to take North Korean denuclearization negotiations seriously. Should South Korea and Japan respect the NPT and Global Zero plan while China, Russia, and North Korea do as they will, the effective outcome is unilateral disarmament. This is politically and strategically infeasible; we regrettably live in a world of persistent nuclear armament.

Global Zero advocates, such as political scientist Scott Sagan, worry about the transactional issues of WMD possession because they are uniquely dangerous weapons. Indeed, theft, loss, rogue scientists, and so on are legitimate fears. But they are no more resonant with South Korea or Japan than with any other nuclear weapons state. Indeed, as liberal democracies with robust state capacities and preexisting, well-managed nuclear energy programs, they will likely be quite responsible, as Britain and France have been.

No one seriously believes Seoul or Tokyo will launch an out-of-the-blue, nuclear-first strike on an opponent; set up something like the A.Q. Khan proliferation network; sell WMDs to terrorists or other rogues; put Homer Simpson in charge of nuclear safety; or be so sloppy as to require something like the Nunn-Lugar program. Even Pakistan and India have been better with their arsenals than the panic of the late 1990s suggested. Even dictatorships have been cautious about these issues. And as democracies with a history of foreign-policy restraint, democratic peace theory suggests they would be good stewards, certainly better than East Asia’s autocratic nuclear powers.

There is generalized anxiety about a regional arms race, which South Korean/Japanese nuclearization might exacerbate. Perhaps, but as noted above, there is no local cascade to be sparked because it has already occurred. China, Russia, and North Korea have all moved first. China and Russia have established nuclear arsenals and no intention of complying with the build-down imperative. Russia’s growing rhetorical invocation of its nuclear weapons is a disturbing evolution. North Korea repeatedly agreed, non-bindingly since 1992, to avoid nuclear weapons—only to exit the NPT and keep building. It now has intercontinental ballistic missiles and several dozen nuclear warheads.

Ostensibly, South Korea and Japan are not competing in this race—but only because they outsource their nuclear deterrence to the United States. Extended deterrence does not remove the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance on WMDs from the East Asian security discussion. It only means they are not located in-theater. That may have value in keeping China from building more WMDs (although it is already doing so) or Russia from playing the nuclear card in the region as it does in Europe. But it is not stopping North Korea. And that is the core issue—always and again.

North Korea will not sign a deal that reduces its arsenal enough to reduce the strategic threat that brought Yoon to float preemption earlier this year. Even if Pyongyang signed a deal—and did not cheat—it would never cut deeply enough to obviate the existential threat it now poses to Japan and South Korea. Nuclear weapons are an excellent deterrent for North Korea, and tactically, they help equalize the conventional military competition with the South and the United States, where Pyongyang lags behind. Complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization is fantasy.

The negotiations between Kim, Trump, and previous South Korean President Moon Jae-in strongly suggest this. From 2018 to 2020, North Korea had the best chance in its history to capture a balance-positive deal with South Korea and the United States. Revealingly, Kim passed it up, even though the constellation of forces was nearly ideal for Pyongyang in two, overlapping dovish presidencies in the North’s primary opponents.

With Trump, Pyongyang had the best U.S. president ever for its interests. Trump loathed South Korea. He knew little about Korean history, nuclear weapons, or ballistic missiles; according to former Trump National Security Advisor John Bolton, Trump did not even prepare for his summits with Kim. Trump did not care about the U.S. position in East Asia and disliked U.S. allies generally. He desperately wanted to sign a peace deal with Kim to win a Nobel Peace Prize and help his reelection bid while Moon came from a South Korean left that has often been eager to engage with Pyongyang.

It is hard to imagine better counterparties to whom Kim might have made some genuine concessions with to receive large counter-concessions. Instead, Kim’s one serious offer to Trump, at Hanoi in 2019, was very unbalanced. Kim offered to shutter one aging nuclear plant for full sanctions removal. Even Trump realized this was a bad deal, and talks collapsed.

Finally, a South Korean/Japanese nuclearization discussion indicates a seriousness about their own security, which is long overdue. Cheap-riding and strategy immaturity among U.S. allies are long-established problems. This is glaringly obvious in Europe now, where local U.S. allies, much more impacted by the Ukraine war, are nonetheless buck-passing leadership of the response to America. The United States should discourage this if it is to finally achieve a more restrained, less sprawling foreign policy, a less gargantuan defense budget, greater focus on China, fewer forever war interventions, and so on.

If allied democracies want nuclear weapons, if their foreign-policy elites and voters decide to take this step, then the United States should accept that this is their choice. As a liberal alliance leader, the United States should not tell its partners what to do nor what they may even debate. South Korean/Japanese interest in WMDs is defensive, in good faith, and follows decades of restraint; it is obviously not offensively intended. The United States should want its allies to take greater responsibility, develop deep national security doctrines, spend more, stop turning to America for foreign-policy direction, and so on. Indeed, Yoon recognizes that in the very title of his Foreign Affairs article for the 2022 South Korean presidential election: “South Korea Needs to Step Up.” Precisely.

Allied cheap-riding is bad for the United States at home too. Militarized hegemony is deeply toxic to U.S. domestic politics. The American national security state is too large and intrusive. American policing has become militarized, and the culture fetishes soldiers and military violence in a manner unique and disturbing for a republic. Greater allied burden-sharing has long been a goal of U.S. foreign policy, and it would be good for U.S. republican values at home if America did less abroad. There is no reason why greater allied strategic responsibility should not include WMDs if well-governed democratic allies so choose.

No one wants more nuclearization if avoidable. The decision is momentous, and I do not endorse it. Ideally, arms control with North Korea would alleviate some risk, as would missile defense, while extended deterrence and Chinese resistance could encourage North Korea to slow down.

But these options are all poor and getting worse. The United States will not fight a nuclear war solely for its allies, a point which American analysts should be honest with even if U.S. officials dance around it. Direct South Korean/Japanese deterrence is increasingly a better option than these alternatives, and the United States should at least allow its allies to debate the issue without strong-arming them.

Foreign Policy · by Robert E. Kelly · July 15, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

VIDEO "WHEREBY" Link: https://whereby.com/david-maxwell

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com