Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:


“People almost always invariably arrive at their beliefs not on the basis of proof but on the basis of what they find attractive.” 
- Blaise Pascal

"The urge to save humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to rule it."
- H.L. Mencken

​"The very existence of libraries affords the best evidence ​ that we may yet have hope for the future of man."
- T.S. Eliot



​1. N. Korea plans to send weapons, munitions to Russia in exchange for food: NSC

2. Over 40% of Americans approve of NATO-style nuclear sharing with S. Korea

3. Japanese textbook row threatens diplomatic progress with South Korea, China

4. North Korea publicly executed six-months pregnant mother, carried out human experiments

5. Seoul lifts lid on once-classified N. Korea human rights reports

6. Presidential office says no Blackpink-Lady Gaga joint concert at summit

7. New security adviser feels grave responsibility

8. [Editorial] An umbrella union that went too far

9. [INTERVIEW] North Korean defectors bear brunt of remittance scams

​10. North Korea “Tactical Nuke” Drill: Claims on Command/Control and Hints of A First-ever Silo Launch

​11. ​Treasury Sanctions Arms Dealer Who Attempted to Broker Deals Between North Korea and Russia

12. S. Korea to fully open DMZ hiking trails starting next month

13. Intelligence Collection: “KCTU Labor Union Cadres Entered U.S. Military Bases, Photographed Facilities, and Sent the Pictures to North Korea”

14. Yoon's approval rating falls to 30 pct: poll

​15. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Are a Threat to All Nations

16. North Korean Executions and Torture Alleged in New Report





 1. ​N. Korea plans to send weapons, munitions to Russia in exchange for food: NSC


Excerpt:


"As part of this proposed deal, Russia would receive over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions from Korea. We also understand that Russia is seeking to send a delegation to North Korea and that Russia is offering North Korea food in exchange for munitions," he added.


(2nd LD) N. Korea plans to send weapons, munitions to Russia in exchange for food: NSC | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · March 31, 2023

(ATN: UPDATES with remarks from a Pentagon spokesperson in last 3 paras)

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, March 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is working to send dozens of kinds of weapons and munitions to Russia to be used in the ongoing Russian war against Ukraine, a National Security Council (NSC) official said Thursday.

John Kirby, NSC coordinator for strategic communications, said North Korea seeks to secure food supplies in exchange and that the potential arms deal is being arranged through a Slovakian arms dealer, identified as Ashot Mkrtychev.

"We remain concerned that North Korea will provide further support to Russia's military operations against Ukraine," Kirby told a virtual press briefing, noting that North Korea delivered large quantities of munitions to Russia late last year.

"As part of this proposed deal, Russia would receive over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions from Korea. We also understand that Russia is seeking to send a delegation to North Korea and that Russia is offering North Korea food in exchange for munitions," he added.


John Kirby, National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, is seen speaking during a daily press briefing at the White House in Washington on March 29, 2023 in this captured image. (Yonhap)

The U.S. Department of Treasury said it has imposed sanctions on Mkrtychev for arranging the arms deal between North Korea and Russia.

"Between the end of 2022 and early 2023, Mkrtychev worked with DPRK officials to obtain over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK," the treasury department said in a press release.

DPRK stands for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.

Kirby emphasized that any provision of weapons or munitions to Russia by North Korea would be in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, which prohibit any shipments of weapons to and from the North.

"Any arms deal between North Korea and Russia would directly violate a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions. We've taken note of North Korea's recent statements that they will not provide or sell arms to Russia and we are continuing to monitor this closely," he told the press briefing.

"We are going to continue to identify, expose and counter Russian attempts to acquire military equipment from North Korea or from any other state that is prepared to support its war in Ukraine," he added.


The captured image shows a photo released by the U.S. National Security Council on Jan. 20, 2023, showing a set of Russian railcars traveling between Russia and North Korea on Nov. 18-Nov. 19, 2022 for a suspected delivery of North Korean military equipment to Russia's private military company, the Wagner Group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder, a spokesperson for the Department of Defense, later said there currently was no indication that additional weapons or munitions have been delivered to Russia.

"We have not at this time, beyond which had been previously announced," he said when asked if North Korea was moving or preparing to move additional weapons to Russia.

"But it is, again, something we continue to keep a close eye on," he told a daily press briefing.


Youtube

https://youtu.be/8f2jfs1we6k

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · March 31, 2023



2. Over 40% of Americans approve of NATO-style nuclear sharing with S. Korea


Here is the NATO fact sheet on nuclear sharing arrangements https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/2/pdf/220204-factsheet-nuclear-sharing-arrange.pdf:


Excerpts from the Fact Sheet:


NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements ensure that the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared across the Alliance. The arrangements consist of nuclear capabilities, aircraft and infrastructure provided by a number of NATO countries for the collective defence of all. To guarantee the security of its Allies, the United States has deployed a limited number of B-61 nuclear weapons to certain locations in Europe, which remain under US custody and control in full compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States follows strict procedures to guarantee the safety and security of the weapons stationed in Europe at all times. 

If NATO was to conduct a nuclear mission in a conflict, the B-61 weapons would be carried by certified Allied aircraft, known as dual-capable aircraft (DCA), and supported by conventional forces from across the Alliance. However, a nuclear mission can only be undertaken after explicit political approval is given by NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and authorisation is received from the US President and UK Prime Minister. Within NATO, the NPG provides a forum for consultation, collective decision-making, and political control over all aspects of NATO’s nuclear mission, including nuclear sharing. By design, therefore, NATO’s nuclear sharing is the sharing of the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence mission and the related political responsibilities and decision-making. It is not the sharing of nuclear weapons.


 

Over 40% of Americans approve of NATO-style nuclear sharing with S. Korea

https://www.donga.com/en/home/article/all/20230331/4056877/1

Posted March. 31, 2023 08:11,   

Updated March. 31, 2023 08:11




A recent survey showed that 42.6% of Americans support the idea of “NATO-style nuclear sharing” between South Korea and the United States, which is more than 10 percentage points higher than the 2% who oppose it. The concept of NATA-style nuclear sharing involves the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States in NATO member states, which could be used in joint nuclear attacks using bombers and other means in the event of a contingency.


In commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the ROK-US alliance, the Dong-A Ilbo and the National Veterans Affairs Research Institute commissioned a survey of 1,037 Korean and 1,000 American adults between March 17 and 22 to study the mutual perception of the two countries. According to the survey results, 64% of Americans supported South Korea's nuclear weapons possession, 22.6 percentage points higher than the opposition (41.4%). In contrast, opinions on deploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea were nearly split, with 36.5% in favor and 37% opposed.


Koreans showed much higher levels of support for the same questions than American respondents. The approval rates for South Korea's nuclear weapons possession (64%), NATO-style nuclear sharing (57.5%), and tactical nuclear weapons deployment (56.7%) were all more than twice as high as the opposition.


As the South Korea-U.S. summit approaches at the end of April, it is noteworthy that there is greater support for South Korea's nuclear weapons possession among Americans than opposition. However, the Biden administration has repeatedly emphasized that South Korea's nuclear weapons possession is impossible following President Yoon Suk Yeol's statement in January about the need for the self-possession of nuclear weapons in the event of a worsening North Korean nuclear crisis.


During the summit, the two heads of state are expected to jointly announce measures to strengthen extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) to South Korea. A government source predicted that "the fact that there is support for South Korea's nuclear weapons possession within the U.S. will work in our favor when we demand strengthened extended deterrence measures during the summit."



Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com



3. Japanese textbook row threatens diplomatic progress with South Korea, China


Excerpts:

Japan’s education authorities recently approved 149 textbooks from various publishers for use from next year nationwide. While the text in these materials is not identical, South Korean media quickly seized on passages seen as diminishing wartime atrocities, such as the forced conscription of Koreans into the Imperial Japanese Army.
“For those who were forced to serve in Japan’s military during World War II, a current textbook says Korean men were conscripted as soldiers,” the Yonhap news agency reported “But a new version, endorsed by the ministry, describes them as ‘having participated in’ the military. Another textbook dropped the expression ‘conscription’ itself.”
Other materials also state Japanese claims to the Liancourt Rocks, which lie between the Korean Peninsula and Japan and are controlled by Seoul. The Korean name for the territory is Dokdo, while Japan uses the name Takeshima.


Japanese textbook row threatens diplomatic progress with South Korea, China

The Globe and Mail · by James Griffiths · March 30, 2023

In this file photo taken on March 19, 2019, girls go to school in Tokyo. The South Korean government has lodged an official protest with Tokyo over new elementary school textbooks it claims distort history.CHARLY TRIBALLEAU/AFP/Getty Images

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Just a week after hailing a visit to Japan by Prime Minister Yoon Suk Yeol as a “big success,” the South Korean government has lodged an official protest with Tokyo over new elementary school textbooks it claims distort history.

With China also weighing in, days before an expected trip there by Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, the latest spat is an example of how historical and territorial disputes continue to hamper Tokyo’s efforts to improve ties with its neighbours.

“It is common for Japan to play with words when authorizing textbooks to obscure historical facts, understate and evade its historical responsibility, and thereby deny and misrepresent its history of aggression,” Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said Wednesday, adding Beijing had also lodged a formal complaint.

The day before, Seoul summoned Japan’s deputy ambassador to express “deep regret” over the issue, citing controversial claims about the disputed Dokdo Islands and the use of forced labour during World War II in the new materials.

Japan’s education authorities recently approved 149 textbooks from various publishers for use from next year nationwide. While the text in these materials is not identical, South Korean media quickly seized on passages seen as diminishing wartime atrocities, such as the forced conscription of Koreans into the Imperial Japanese Army.

“For those who were forced to serve in Japan’s military during World War II, a current textbook says Korean men were conscripted as soldiers,” the Yonhap news agency reported “But a new version, endorsed by the ministry, describes them as ‘having participated in’ the military. Another textbook dropped the expression ‘conscription’ itself.”

Other materials also state Japanese claims to the Liancourt Rocks, which lie between the Korean Peninsula and Japan and are controlled by Seoul. The Korean name for the territory is Dokdo, while Japan uses the name Takeshima.

South Korea’s foreign ministry said the textbooks contain “unreasonable claims about Dokdo, which is clearly our own territory historically, geographically, and under international law.”

In response, Japan’s deputy ambassador Naoki Kumagai said the islands were “an inherent part of Japanese territory, both historically and in terms of international law,” according to NHK, a Japanese public broadcaster. “He also dismissed South Korea’s claims on the wartime labor issue.”

Beijing also expressed anger over passages describing Japanese claims to the Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyus in China, a disputed territory in the East China Sea administered by Japan.

While the textbook issue has received little attention in Japan, it dominated South Korean media this week, coming after President Yoon controversially agreed to use domestic funds to settle a forced labour dispute dating back to Japanese colonial rule.

Two Japanese companies — Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries — were ordered by a South Korean court in 2018 to pay reparations to conscripted labourers. Tokyo insists all wartime compensation were settled under a 1965 treaty, and hit Seoul with export controls on key semiconductor materials.

The issue severely damaged relations between the two sides, even as Washington was pushing for greater economic and security co-operation in the face of threats from China and North Korea. Announcing the deal earlier this month, Mr. Yoon said it was a step towards “future-oriented co-operation between South Korea and Japan” that would “preserve freedom, peace and prosperity not only for the two countries, but also for the entire world.”

He followed up with a trip to Tokyo, where he met Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, which both sides described as a major success and step forward in relations.

The textbook dispute could hamper this, ramping up pressure on Mr. Yoon to take a tougher line once again. In an editorial Wednesday, the liberal daily Hankyoreh accused the president of having waved a “white flag” only for this to “backfire immediately.”

One solution could come from co-operation between Japanese and Korean historians, said Nam Sang-gu, a researcher at the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

“For Korea and Japan’s future co-operation, the two countries need to better understand each other,” he told a seminar in Seoul this week. “In that regard, textbooks play a crucial role.”

So far, there is no sign the issue is going away. Opposition lawmakers on Thursday proposed a parliamentary resolution warning “the Japanese government’s distorted perception of history could significantly hurt trust between South Korea and Japan,” and calling for Tokyo to apologize.

On the same day, Seoul ruled out the resumption of seafood imports from Fukushima, the Japanese prefecture that was the site of a nuclear plant meltdown in 2011.

Tokyo has been facing pressure from its neighbours over a decision — supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency — to release more than 1 million tonnes of “treated” water from the disaster zone into the ocean later this year. Some in Japan had hoped improved ties with South Korea would see Seoul drop its objections to the plan, which has been repeatedly denounced by both China and Russia.

With files from the Associated Press

The Globe and Mail · by James Griffiths · March 30, 2023



4. North Korea publicly executed six-months pregnant mother, carried out human experiments


The regime's brutality is just unimaginable.


North Korea publicly executed six-months pregnant mother, carried out human experiments and forced women from 'list of dwarfs' to undergo hysterectomies, human rights report claims

  • Investigation into North Korean rights abuses has been made public for first time
  • Six teenagers were executed and human experiments conducted, report says

By ELENA SALVONI

PUBLISHED: 11:54 EDT, 30 March 2023 | UPDATED: 12:12 EDT, 30 March 2023

Daily Mail · by Elena Salvoni · March 30, 2023

North Korea has committed horrific human rights violations including executing children and pregnant women, carrying out human experiments and forcibly sterilising disabled people, a South Korean report has claimed.

The pariah state has also put citizens to death for being homosexual, for their religion and for trying to flee the country, the report by the South's Ministry of Unification states.

Horrifying testimony also reveals the regime forced nurses to write up 'a list of dwarfs' and conducted hysterectomies on a woman with dwarfism, as well as human experiments.

The extensive 450-page report details egregious human rights abuses in North Korea, including the right to life and liberty, as well as freedom from slavery, torture and other inhumane treatment.

It is based on damning testimony from more than 500 North Koreans who fled from their homeland and was collected from 2017 to 2022.


A North Korean soldier looks out from behind barbed wire at a camp. Deaths and torture regularly occur in detention facilities, a South Korean report has found


A South Korean soldier, left, experiences what it is like to be held in a North Korean cell at the Korean War exhibition in Seoul in 2010

In a move that is sure to infuriate despot Kim Jong-un and his regime, the ministry revealed its yearly report to the public for the first time ever today as it aims to lift the lid on the North's 'gruesome' human rights abuses.

Chilling testimony from today's report states that a six-month pregnant woman was executed by the regime.

The reason for her killing was said to be that a widely circulated video showed her pointing at a portrait of the late Kim Il-sung while dancing in her home.

More disturbing testimony revealed that six teenagers, aged 16 and 17, were executed by shooting.

They were said to have been charged over watching video footage originating from South Korea and smoking opium at a stadium in the city of Wonsan, Kangwon Province.

It also details that the regime carried out human experiments, with officials at the Ministry of Social Security allegedly blackmailing families into letting their relatives become human test subjects under the threat of sending them to prison camps.

Human subjects were reported to have secretly been fed sleeping pills and forcibly taken to a facility called Hospital 83 to undergo various experiments.

Disabled people, particularly those with dwarfism, were also deprived of their human rights and had medical procedures conducted on them against their wills.


Pictured: Inmates at a North Korean prison camp. Rampant state-led rights abuses have taken place in communities, prison camps and elsewhere, the reports states

In 2015, nurses at one hospital were reportedly told to create a 'list of dwarfs' which was then used to prevent people with dwarfism from giving birth.

One woman with dwarfism was allegedly forced to undergo a hysterectomy - a surgical procedure to remove her womb and prevent her from having a child - in 2017.

Rampant state-led rights abuses were said to have taken place in communities, prison camps and elsewhere, including public executions, torture and arbitrary arrests.

Women in detention were subjected to inhumane conditions including torture, forced labor, sexual violence and starvation.

Detention facilities saw deaths and torture occurring regularly and some people were summarily executed after being caught trying to cross the border, the South Korean ministry said.

A total of 11 political prison camps were identified by the Unification Ministry, with five currently in operation.

'North Korean citizens' right to life appears to be greatly threatened,' the ministry said in its report.


In a move that is sure to infuriate despot Kim Jong-un and his regime, the South's Ministry of Unification revealed its yearly report to the public for the first time

'Executions are widely carried out for acts that do not justify the death penalty, including drug crimes, distribution of South Korean videos, and religious and superstitious activities.

The report came as South Korea seeks to highlight its isolated neighbour's failure to improve living conditions while racing to boost its nuclear and missile arsenals.

Seoul began compiling yearly reports on Pyongyang's alleged human rights abuses in 2018 following the enactment of the North Korean Human Rights Acts in 2016.

While the Unification Ministry is required by law to make an annual assessment of the North's human rights situation, this year marks the first time the report has been made public.

The previous South Korean government, headed by liberal-leaning Moon Jae-in, avoided making the reports public due to what it saw as the need to protect the identities of the North Korean defectors who testified.

The country's current president, the more conservative Yoon Suk Yeol, expressed his administration's desire to 'fully expose' the North's 'gruesome human rights violations'.


Starving prisoners line up to face another day of gruelling forced labour in some of the first ever photos to show inmates at a North Korean prison camp (taken in 2021)

President Yoon said the report's publication should better inform the international community of what is going on in the North.

He added that the rogue state deserves 'not a single penny' of economic aid while it pursues its nuclear ambitions.

The approach by Yoon is a distinct departure from that of his liberal predecessor, who faced criticism for his less outspoken position on the North's rights as he sought to improve ties and build rapport with the North's leader.

North Korea has roundly rejected criticism of its rights conditions as part of a plot to overthrow its rulers.

While the South Korean government's findings could not be independently verified, they were in line with UN investigations and reports from non-governmental organisations.

Nearly 34,000 North Koreans have settled in South Korea but the number of defectors has fallen sharply in recent times because of increasingly tight border security.

Daily Mail · by Elena Salvoni · March 30, 2023


5. Seoul lifts lid on once-classified N. Korea human rights reports


Human rights upfront:

The release of the previously-classified reports appears to fall in line with the Yoon government’s continuing efforts to publicly address human rights in North Korea, including the resumption of co-sponsoring for related UN resolutions.
The 445-page extensive report details egregious human rights violations in North Korea, including the right to life and liberty, as well as freedom from slavery, torture and other inhumane treatment. The report was written based on around 1,600 human rights violation cases testified by 508 North Korean defectors who fled their country between 2017 and 2022.


Seoul lifts lid on once-classified N. Korea human rights reports

Based on testimonies from over 500 defectors, report documents shocking human rights abuses in NK

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : Mar 30, 2023 - 17:26      Updated : Mar 30, 2023 - 18:12

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · March 30, 2023

The South Korean government will release a comprehensive report on human rights abuses and violations committed in North Korea, ranging from human experimentation to the public execution of pregnant women, for the first time on Friday.

Since the enactment of the North Korean Human Rights Acts in 2016, the Korean government has published classified state reports on the human rights situation in North Korea. The reports were not open to public for years during the liberal-leaning Moon Jae-in administration which called for the need to protect the identities of the North Korean defectors who testified.

The release of the previously-classified reports appears to fall in line with the Yoon government’s continuing efforts to publicly address human rights in North Korea, including the resumption of co-sponsoring for related UN resolutions.

The 445-page extensive report details egregious human rights violations in North Korea, including the right to life and liberty, as well as freedom from slavery, torture and other inhumane treatment. The report was written based on around 1,600 human rights violation cases testified by 508 North Korean defectors who fled their country between 2017 and 2022.

According to the report, the Kim Jong-un regime has extensively imposed the death penalty for offenses that do not qualify as the most serious crimes in North Korea, including narcotics crimes, the distribution of South Korean entertainment, and participating in religious and superstitious beliefs.

The death penalty was often carried out by firing squad, with most death row convicts not being given a chance to appeal.

“The right to life of North Korean citizens has been greatly threatened. Cases proving arbitrary deprivation of life by state power have been collected,” read the 2023 Report on North Korean Human Rights.

For instance, a man in Ryanggang Province was publicly executed by firing squad for distributing video footage originating from South Korea to several residents after importing the footage from China in 2020.

North Koreans who were secretly selling South Korean products such as high heels and cosmetics in the back alley of a market in the city of Pyongsong in South Pyongan Province were arrested and executed by shooting in 2018.

Minors under the age of 18 and even pregnant women have been executed, according to the testimony of North Korean defectors.

One testimony stated that a six-month pregnant woman was executed because she was seen pointing at a portrait of the late Kim Il-sung with her finger while dancing in her home in a widely circulated video.

Six teenagers aged 16 and 17 were executed by shooting on charges of watching video footage originating from South Korea and smoking opium at a stadium in the city of Wonsan, Kangwon Province.

The report also stated that the Kim Jong-un regime has conducted prohibited experiments on people with physical or intellectual disabilities as well as people suffering from psychiatric conditions including schizophrenia who are unable to provide valid consent for unethical human experiments.

North Korean officials at the Ministry of Social Security also allegedly blackmailed families into letting their family members become human test subjects. If not, they threatened to send the families to prison camps, according to testimonies from defectors. The human subjects were secretly fed sleeping pills by officials and forcibly taken to a facility called Hospital 83 for various experiments.

The report also states that the Kim Jong-un regime deprived disabled people, particularly those with dwarfism, of physical liberty by sterilizing them against their will.

In 2015, nurses at a hospital were instructed to create a “list of dwarfs” to prevent people with dwarfism from giving birth. A woman suffering from dwarfism was forced to undergo a hysterectomy, which is a surgical procedure to remove her womb, in 2017.

South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Young-se said the publication of the report is the outcome of the government’s resolve to make further efforts to "substantially improve North Korea’s human rights situation” in the soon-to-be released report’s preface.

Kwon underscored that the fundamental goal of issuing the report is to accurately understand the human rights situation in North Korea and find practical solutions to address abuses and violations of human rights.

“I hope that the report plays a significant role in bringing about meaningful changes in attitudes and responsible actions by the North Korean authorities,” he stated.



By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · March 30, 2023


6. Presidential office says no Blackpink-Lady Gaga joint concert at summit


Excerpts:

The announcement came amid speculations that Yoon’s security advisor and two secretaries related to diplomacy tendered their resignations due to a protocol blunder ahead of the upcoming summit between South Korea and the US in April.
According to previous reports, US first lady Jill Biden, who has an interest in Korean culture, suggested a joint performance by K-pop girl group Blackpink and American pop star Lady Gaga for a state dinner during the Korea-US summit. However, it appears the proposal was not properly communicated to President Yoon, resulting in the US government reportedly demanding a response from the South Korean government on several occasions due to a lack of feedback from the presidential office.


Presidential office says no Blackpink-Lady Gaga joint concert at summit

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · March 31, 2023

Published : Mar 31, 2023 - 14:01 Updated : Mar 31, 2023 - 14:11

Black Pink (YG Entertainment)

The presidential office announced on Friday that there would not be a joint concert of K-pop girl group Blackpink and American pop star Lady Gaga during President Yoon Suk Yeol's upcoming state visit to the United States.

In a written statement, the office clarified that the performance being reported in the media is not included in the president's official schedule for his visit to the United States. The statement did not provide any further explanation for the decision.

The announcement came amid speculations that Yoon’s security advisor and two secretaries related to diplomacy tendered their resignations due to a protocol blunder ahead of the upcoming summit between South Korea and the US in April.

According to previous reports, US first lady Jill Biden, who has an interest in Korean culture, suggested a joint performance by K-pop girl group Blackpink and American pop star Lady Gaga for a state dinner during the Korea-US summit. However, it appears the proposal was not properly communicated to President Yoon, resulting in the US government reportedly demanding a response from the South Korean government on several occasions due to a lack of feedback from the presidential office.

On Friday, fresh reports came from media outlets that the US suggested that Korea bear the cost for the performance. The cost of this concert is approximated to be around $2 million to $3 million.



By Shin Ji-hye (shinjh@heraldcorp.com)




7. New security adviser feels grave responsibility


Excerpts:

Cho Tae-yong, who was a US ambassador, said he is given the mission of completing the Yoon administration's goal of turning South Korea into a pivotal state.
"I feel a great sense of responsibility to take on the position of the chief of the National Security Office at a critical time," Cho told a reporters' briefing Thursday.
He also stressed the importance of collaboration and unity among members of the presidential office, including the National Security Office.
...
According to the Chosun Ilbo, citing sources from the presidential office, the team omitted the White House's request of holding a joint performance between singer Lady Gaga and South Korean girl group Blackpink at a state dinner for a number of times since January. Yoon, who was briefed only in March, held the team responsible for the delayed response to the White House, it said.
A senior presidential official said on the condition of anonymity he understands that the replacement of Yoon's security adviser came as Cho was seen as "more suitable" to implement "detailed" diplomatic missions and strengthen the alliance between the US and Korea than Kim, who has an academic background.
Announcing his resignation, Kim said on Wednesday that he will be returning to Korea University where he taught before he joined Yoon's presidential campaign.

New security adviser feels grave responsibility

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · March 30, 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's newly appointed national security adviser said he feels a grave responsibility in assuming the role at a critical time, a day after he was appointed to replace Kim Sung-han who stepped down amid rumors of protocol blunders.

Cho Tae-yong, who was a US ambassador, said he is given the mission of completing the Yoon administration's goal of turning South Korea into a pivotal state.

"I feel a great sense of responsibility to take on the position of the chief of the National Security Office at a critical time," Cho told a reporters' briefing Thursday.

He also stressed the importance of collaboration and unity among members of the presidential office, including the National Security Office.

Earlier in the day, Yoon also tapped First Vice Foreign Minister Cho Hyun-dong as the new ambassador to the US. The nominee is a career diplomat who took charge of South Korea's mission to North American countries and handled North Korean nuclear issues for years.

According to a senior official at the Foreign Ministry, Yoon's office will request the US administration's acceptance of Cho promptly, as the president is scheduled for a state visit to the US at the end of next month.

Agrement, a state procedure for receiving a foreign member on a diplomatic mission, takes about four to six weeks, according to reports. The official, expressing confidence in the transition, cited precedent of the US accepting a Korean envoy in two weeks upon request. The official also refuted concerns of an operational vacuum, adding that both the new security adviser and the ambassador nominee to the US have worked closely on Yoon's US trip.

The post of first vice foreign minister remains vacant, amid reports that other high-profile posts in Yoon's security and foreign affairs lineup are also subject to change. Yoon's office said there will be a swift decision on filling the foreign vice minister's position. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Park Jin denied rumors that he would be leaving the post soon to prepare for a general election, and made assurances that he would stay put.

The latest reshuffle in Yoon's security and foreign affairs team came after the security adviser and his team members all tendered resignations.

Consecutive resignations from the team have raised suspicions that they were pressured to step down over repeated protocol gaffes.

According to the Chosun Ilbo, citing sources from the presidential office, the team omitted the White House's request of holding a joint performance between singer Lady Gaga and South Korean girl group Blackpink at a state dinner for a number of times since January. Yoon, who was briefed only in March, held the team responsible for the delayed response to the White House, it said.

A senior presidential official said on the condition of anonymity he understands that the replacement of Yoon's security adviser came as Cho was seen as "more suitable" to implement "detailed" diplomatic missions and strengthen the alliance between the US and Korea than Kim, who has an academic background.

Announcing his resignation, Kim said on Wednesday that he will be returning to Korea University where he taught before he joined Yoon's presidential campaign.

Yoon's office also said professor Park Cheol-hee from Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies was appointed as the head of Korea National Diplomatic Academy. Park replaces Hong Hyun-ik who was appointed by the previous liberal Moon Jae-in administration.



By Shin Ji-hye (shinjh@heraldcorp.com)

koreaherald.com · by Shin Ji-hye · March 30, 2023


8. [Editorial] An umbrella union that went too far


Conclusion:


The findings sound loud alarms. Such acts will only benefit Pyongyang. The leadership of the combative union must keel and apologize for what they did. We urge the National Assembly to reconsider whether the Democratic Party’s movement to rid the NIS of its authority to investigate spying activities for the North was really appropriate.


Wednesday

March 29, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

[Editorial] An umbrella union that went too far

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/29/opinion/editorials/umbrella-union-KCTU-North-Korea/20230329202053404.html?utm_source=pocket_saves


The suspicion that former and current leaders of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) engaged in spying activities for North Korea is shocking. The Suwon District Court issued arrest warrants for four members of the militant umbrella union Tuesday for violating the National Security Act. The court reached the decision after the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the National Office of Investigation jointly raided their offices and residences in January to find evidence of espionage for the North.


Some of the suspicions dumbfound us. They created an underground organization called “jisa,” which can be roughly translated as “patriots.” They sent more than 30 reports to North Korea at the order of the Pyongyang regime for several years. The reports suggest that North Korea ordered them to collect information on power transmission facilities of major infrastructure in South Korea and prepare to paralyze them.


That’s not all. The North Korean regime also ordered them to fan anti-Japanese sentiment among South Koreans, including through burning ceremonies of the Japanese flag, and help the left-wing Progressive Party, as well as support current KCTU head Yang Kyung-soo on both the internal and external fronts. A core member of KCTU is even suspected of entering the U.S. Air Base in Pyeongtaek and Osan in 2021 to take pictures of military facilities and equipment and transferring the information to the North. They include close-up shots of runways and Patriot missile batteries.




President Yoon Suk Yeol inspected the NIS on Feb. 24 following his visit to the Defense Counterintelligence Command of the military two days before. The rare move could reflect the government’s deepening concerns about the spying case for Pyongyang. As the former and current senior members of KCTU were involved in gathering information to help North Korea at home and abroad, it must be sternly punished.


When it was launched in November 1995, the KCTU declared to “secure labor conditions to maintain human integrity, grab basic labor rights, eradicate undemocratic practices in worksites, eliminate industrial disasters and realize gender equality.” It also pledged a “fierce struggle to advance the independent and democratic unification of the divided land.” Since then, the union has been devoted to North-friendly activities under the banner of realizing the unification of the two Koreas.


The findings sound loud alarms. Such acts will only benefit Pyongyang. The leadership of the combative union must keel and apologize for what they did. We urge the National Assembly to reconsider whether the Democratic Party’s movement to rid the NIS of its authority to investigate spying activities for the North was really appropriate.


9. [INTERVIEW] North Korean defectors bear brunt of remittance scams


[INTERVIEW] North Korean defectors bear brunt of remittance scams

The Korea Times · March 31, 2023

Seo Jae-pyeong, head of the Association for North Korean Defectors, speaks during an interview with The Korea Times on Monday at a library in Songpa District, Seoul. Korea Times photo by Kang Hyun-kyungThis is the third in a series of interviews with North Korean defectors and their assimilation into South Korea―ED.

Older North Korean defectors are predominantly conservative, yet some young people leaning toward liberals, says activist

By Kang Hyun-kyung

"Finally, we are here."

That is what many North Korean defectors say when they arrive in Incheon International Airport after hiding in China for several years. Tasting freedom, they heave a sigh of relief because they no longer have to live in fear of getting caught by the Chinese security authorities and being sent back to the North.

But that sense of relief is short-lived as their days in the South unfold.

Most of them left behind impoverished family members back home. The defectors say they feel an overwhelming sense of sadness and guilt whenever they think of their parents, siblings and other loved ones who are struggling to make ends meet in the North.



The escapees work hard and try to save as much money as they can to send back home to help their family members escape hunger.


The pandemic, however, has complicated remittance transfers. Also, their acts of filial piety are abused by fraudulent brokers.


Cases of remittance fraud have increased as the pandemic created a loophole that allows brokers to cheat their clients, according to the leader of a Seoul-based non-profit group established to help the resettlement of North Korean defectors.

"Remittance transfers to the North Korean cities located along the border with China, such as Musan, Hoeryung and Hyesan, have gone smoothly as usual," Seo Jae-pyeong, the president of the Association for North Korean Defectors, said during a recent Korea Times interview. "But cases of fraud were reported by defectors who had sent money to their family living in inland cities and counties located far from the border regions."


He said various types of scams were reported. False receipts are one of the most common types of fraud that frustrate the defectors.


"Some brokers tell the defectors that the money was handed over to their family members without presenting hard evidence, while some fabricate receipts. The hardest part is that there is no way for the defectors in the South to make sure whether the money reached their family."


Seo posted a pop-up notice on his organization's website to warn fellow defectors of the remittance scams to help raise awareness of the newest types of fraud.

Sending money back home to North Korea is a high-risk business for everyone involved.


Since the pandemic, it has become almost impossible for defectors to make sure if the money was delivered to their families. Brokers and recipients in the North face grave consequences if they are caught by North Korean authorities.


Remittance transfers usually involve three brokers ― one living in South Korea, another in China and another in the North. Brokers used to take 30 percent of the money sent to the North as commission. But after the pandemic, Seo said the rate for brokers was raised to 50 percent, as money transfers have become even riskier and more daunting than ever before due to the North's lockdown.


Once the money is delivered, brokers arrange a video call between a defector in South Korea and their family in the North using a smuggled Chinese smartphone. The video chats are available only in the China-North Korea border regions as the phones can use international networks.


If a recipient lives in an inland area of North Korea, the broker in the North takes the family member all the way to the border region to arrange the phone call.

COVID-19, however, changed everything.


Due to North Korea's lockdown, family members living in inland areas are not allowed to travel all the way to the border regions for video confirmation on a smuggled Chinese cell phone.


"Some brokers take advantage of the loophole," said Seo. "They fabricate receipts. Some hand over a smaller amount of money than what was due and force them to sign a receipt."


An annual survey conducted by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, in collaboration with North Korea Social Research (NKSR), paints a rough picture of the scale of inter-Korean remittances. The 2022 survey, released on October 21, 2022, found that 17.8 percent of North Korean defectors sent remittances back home 1.5 times per year. The average amount of money sent each time is 4.09 million won ($3,075). A total of 208 million won ($160,000) was sent to the North by the defectors, an increase of 35 million won from the previous year.

A total of 399 North Korean defectors in the South were surveyed between September 19 and October 2, last year, and it has a margin of error of plus or minus 5 percentage points.


Seo Jae-pyeong, the president of Association for North Korean Defectors / Korea Times photo by Kang Hyun-kyung


Older defectors pitted against liberal politicians


Seo witnessed a lot of changes that took place in the North Korean defectors' community since he and his wife arrived in South Korea in 2001 with their son. One of the striking changes he has experienced so far is the diversification of the ideological spectrum of defectors.

"I feel that nearly 30 percent of younger North Korean defectors are liberal or liberal leaning," he said, mentioning his conversations with the younger defectors in their 20s, mostly university students or recent graduates, during an outreach program his organization had prepared several years ago. "It was the time when President Park Geun-hye was in office. They were very critical of the conservative Park government."


In a democratic society, Seo said it's natural for people to have different views and ideas about certain issues. But he added that he was surprised because they were so outspoken even though some of their views were based on factual errors.


He said politically liberal younger defectors are not the result of a generational shift, but a reflection of liberal college education in the South.


"I think they are influenced by education in South Korea. They go to college here and are affected by their classmates and faculty members who have diverse views about given political events," he said.


Most of the older North Korean defectors are stalwart conservatives. They risked their lives to escape from the communist country, as they are sick and tired of the North Korean regime's mismanagement of the economy, which led to chronic food shortages and consequently resulted in the suffering of the North Korean people.

The older generation's political orientation has been partially reinforced by the liberal South Korean government's stance on North Korea.



The North Korean defectors community was impacted by changes in political leadership, particularly when a liberal government replaces a conservative government.


In South Korea, liberal politicians have tried to engage the North to improve inter-Korean relations. They appear to believe that North Korean defectors and their criticism of the North Korean regime are an impediment to their endeavors to seek dialogue with Pyongyang.


Seo said his organization had to downsize programs during the Moon Jae-in government, because funding from the state was suspended during his five-year tenure.


He said his organization had to be self-sustained, adding that small donors, who offered 10,000 to 20,000 won per month, helped his organization survive during those years.


"During the Moon government, there was no budget cut or suspension of allowances for the defectors," he said. "But their policy for the minorities, like the North Korean defectors, failed because they didn't do anything to encourage society to become inclusive."



The Korea Times · March 31, 2023



10. North Korea “Tactical Nuke” Drill: Claims on Command/Control and Hints of A First-ever Silo Launch



North Korea “Tactical Nuke” Drill: Claims on Command/Control and Hints of A First-ever Silo Launch

https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-tactical-nuke-drill-claims-on-command-control-and-hints-of-a-first-ever-silo-launch/


North Korean media reported that the country recently conducted a “combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack by the units for the operation of tactical nukes” on March 18-19. Coverage of the drill included new details about the North’s nuclear command and control system, which sound similar to those used in the US and USSR/Russia. While none of these details can be verified from open sources, they seem within North Korea’s capacity, given its 40+ years of experience with missiles and its apparent access to substantial Russian and Chinese missile technology.

As part of the drill, the North launched a KN-23 solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Associated photos suggested the missile was launched from a silo rather than a road-mobile launcher, which would be the first time North Korea demonstrated silo basing. Subsequent imagery analysis in 38 North calls into question whether there is an actual silo at the launch location and judges the missile more likely used a road-mobile launcher. Regardless, this launch highlighted the possibility of silo basing in the future.

Adding silo-deployed missiles to the North’s longstanding road-mobile missile force may have some economic advantages, but the vulnerability and operational downsides of the former are highly likely to limit their proportion of Pyongyang’s overall missile deployments. This, in turn, limits the downsides to the alliance of any silo-based North Korean missiles.

In announcing the drill, North Korea was clearly trying to send a strong deterrent message to the US and South Korea. It also wanted to emphasize that it has a “fast, strict, highly reliable and safe system” of nuclear command and control and to underscore the capability and credibility of its “tactical nuke” threat to South Korea.

“Tactical Nuke” Counterattack Drill and Command/Control

On March 20, North Korean press announced that a “combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack by the units for the operation of tactical nukes” took place over the previous two days, culminating in a launch on March 19 of a “tactical ballistic missile” that was “tipped with a test warhead simulating a nuclear warhead.” The missile reportedly flew to a range of 800 kilometers (km) (consistent with Japanese and South Korean reports) and “accurately exploded at 800 meters above the target waters.” Accompanying photographs and still photos on North Korean TV depicted the launch and early boost phase of a KN-23 solid-propellant SRBM, which had previously flown 800 km in October 2022. (The photographs also suggested the missile may have been launched from a silo, which will be discussed in the next section.)

The press announcement referred to various elements of a nuclear command-and-control system sounding similar to systems used in the US and USSR/Russia. These included:

  • a “combined unit chief in charge of commanding all the tactical nuclear operation units” with “missile units and sub-units under his command on the east and west fronts”;
  • a “nuclear strike control system”;
  • an “operation system for the command and management over the tactical nuclear force,” apparently including “operation procedures for implementing different nuclear attack plans,” an “order of handling nuclear weapons” (possibly related to mating a nuclear warhead to a missile), and “relevant action procedures”;
  • a “launch approval system,” apparently including “procedures of issuing and receiving an order of nuclear attack” and “final nuclear attack order authentication”; and
  • “technical and mechanical devices” apparently governing nuclear weapons control (possibly including Permissive Action Links [PALs] or some other means of preventing unauthorized arming or launch), including “nuclear explosion control devices and detonators fitted in the [mock] nuclear warhead.”

This is the most detail revealed by North Korea related to nuclear command and control. Its claims of using a mock nuclear warhead, detonating that warhead at an 800-meter burst height, and having a command-and-control system with these specific attributes cannot be verified from open sources. However, all of them are reasonable for the North to possess and plausible in light of Pyongyang’s 40+ years of experience with missiles and its apparent access to substantial Russian and Chinese missile technologies. The ability to detonate a nuclear warhead at a given altitude allows the attacker to optimize the desired effects on ground targets for a given nuclear yield. Altitude control also is desirable for some types of conventional and chemical/biological warheads, such as those using submunitions.

More important than the technical aspects of the March 20 statement are the political ones. North Korea clearly is trying to demonstrate what the statement calls its “tougher will to make an actual war response and send a stronger warning to the enemy” and that it has a “fast, strict, highly reliable and safe system” of nuclear command and control as befits the “fact that it is a nuclear weapons state.” The North also is continuing to underscore the capability and credibility of its “tactical nuke” threat to South Korea, building on the messaging from its February 8 military parade and its October 2022 commentary on last year’s missile activities.

Potential Silo-launched KN-23

The photos associated with the March 19 launch show the missile beginning to rise above a hilltop and its exhaust flame rising on either side of the missile in a V-shape rather than in a single plume extending below the missile. This exhaust pattern is typical of a launch from an underground silo rather than from the road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) used in most KN-23 land launches. However, North Korea has not previously launched any of its ballistic missiles from a silo. (It also is not known to have launched KN-23s from a stationary launch stand equipped with a diverter/flame-splitter, which could also account for the V-shaped plume.)

Commercial satellite imagery of the launch area described in the North Korean statement and seen in the photos revealed a circular excavation resembling a silo opening on a hilltop, surrounded by a rectangular clearing served by a recently built road. Initial assessments regarded this as “a rudimentary engineering prototype missile silo” rather than the more substantial, hardened type of silo used by the US, USSR/Russia and China.[1]

Subsequent analysis in 38 North, however, questions whether the circular excavation is a silo and judges the launch more likely occurred from a TEL in the rectangular clearing surrounding the silo. This analysis makes a compelling case that the “silo” may only be one meter deep (the KN-23 is some 7.5 meters long). The alternative possibility considered in the analysis—that the apparent “bottom” of the silo actually is the “top” of a missile canister within a deeper silo—seems unlikely given the short amount of time available to have excavated a deep enough shaft in the rock base of the hilltop (about 18 days between the observed beginning of the circular excavation and the launch). Moreover, the KN-23 apparently has not used a launch canister before, and there has been no previous open-source evidence, such as canister handling equipment or ejection testing, linking this launch mode to the KN-23. The pattern of debris at the site in post-launch imagery is consistent with either a launch either from the silo or a nearby TEL.

Interestingly, the North Koreans did not announce the launch mode (atypical if a new silo mode had been used), did not show it in any of the released photos, did not release video footage of the launch, and covered the “silo” after launch with a square cover previously located to the side of the excavation. It is unclear whether the photos showing a V-shaped launch plume that fed the silo assessment were the result of a silo or launch-stand launch, if they resulted from some sort of unknown obstruction in the exhaust of a standard TEL launch, or if the photos had been altered by the North Koreans.

The initial assessment of a silo having been used led to the consideration of a wide range of potential implications.[2] Even if this KN-23 launch did not come from a silo, North Korea could decide to use silo basing at any point in the future. Therefore, these potential implications remain worth keeping in mind.

  • Launching the KN-23 from a silo would be in character with the North’s use of this missile in a variety of basing modes, including TEL, railcarsubmarine and a probable submersible platform lowered onto a lakebed. Pyongyang has gone out of its way to signal that it has a diverse missile force with multiple basing modes that can survive any attempts at “decapitation” or “preemption.” It likewise probably relishes the implication that many more missiles might be hidden around than its adversaries are aware of. Indeed, that might account for it releasing a photo suggesting a silo launch while not yet providing any further substantiation.
  • As in the case of most of these other basing modes, however, silo basing makes less sense for SRBMs like the KN-23, which are relatively easy to move via TELs based on widely available truck chassis, than for larger, heavier missiles that are harder to move on wheeled vehicles using more exotic truck chassis. Silos are highly vulnerable to detection and attack regardless of the missile type and, thus, are unlikely to be seen by North Korea as a preferable basing mode.
  • Silos do have the advantage of being cost-effective to operate and maintain once built, and even construction could be relatively inexpensive if the North decided to deploy missiles in “rudimentary” silos without the hardening and other infrastructure used by other countries. (It is not clear how long noncanisterized missiles could remain viable in such silos or what the maintenance costs of such deployments would be.) Using silos also makes credible the addition of decoy silos to confuse opponents about force size and location and cause them to waste weapons on worthless targets.
  • The potential use of silos also highlights the possibility of yet further basing modes in the future for the KN-23 or other missiles, as was subsequently demonstrated when the North unveiled a “nuclear underwater attack drone” on March 24 (which will be the subject of a future article in 38 North). Prior to that unveiling, analysts were placing their bets on the next basing mode being an air-launched KN-23 akin to Russia’s use of the similar Iskander SRBM with a MiG-31 fighter in the Kinzhal system.[3]

The most disturbing possible implication identified by analysts keys off of the fact that missiles deployed in silos are easier to keep ready for launch at all times and provide no visual clues of an impending launch.[4] If North Korea deployed large numbers of SRBMs like the KN-23 in silos, these analysts posit, it would be easier for Pyongyang to launch a surprise or “preemptive” attack on South Korea—and the allies would be under pressure to preempt (or pre-preempt) these missiles before they could be silo-launched, in turn further increasing the pressure on North Korea to “use them or lose them.”

However, this scenario is highly unrealistic, as it depends on North Korea deciding to deploy a large proportion of its SRBMs or other missiles in silos. But Pyongyang has already been deploying scores of road-mobile SRBM launchers and hundreds of associated missiles for many years and continues such deployments with both SRBMs and longer-range systems. Any silo deployments would almost certainly augment rather than supplant this large extant mobile missile force—particularly because the North clearly has long recognized the vulnerability and other wartime operational downsides of fixed-based missiles compared to mobile ones. This would be especially true for nuclear-armed missiles, which North Korea would want to preserve from attack during a period of conventional conflict that is highly likely to precede any nuclear use. If TEL chassis are hard to come by, rail-mobile deployment provides a cost-effective alternative to silos with greater survivability.

We do not know if the March 19 KN-23 launch came from a silo, but that appears unlikely. Although adding silo-deployed missiles to the North’s longstanding road-mobile missile force may have some economic advantages, the vulnerability and operational downsides of silo-based missiles are highly likely to limit their proportion of Pyongyang’s overall missile deployments. This, in turn, is likely to limit the downsides to the alliance of any silo-based North Korean missiles.

  1. [1]
  2. See CSIS Korea Chair. Twitter Post, March 20, 2023, 4:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/CSISKoreaChair/status/1637916125408239617; and Open Nuclear Network. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 8:02 a.m., https://twitter.com/OpenNuclear/status/1638149148972298240.
  3. [2]
  4. For example, see Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 2:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1638243890468884480; Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:24 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1637611067051331585; Scott LaFoy. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:44 p.m., https://twitter.com/wslafoy/status/1637615993173180418; Open Nuclear Network. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 8:02 a.m., https://twitter.com/OpenNuclear/status/1638149148972298240; and Michael Duitsmann. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 9:47 p.m., https://twitter.com/DuitsmanMS/status/1637632021139959808.
  5. [3]
  6. For example, see Nathan J Hunt. Twitter Post, March 20, 2023, 12:28 a.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1637672344373145601; and Missile Defense Project, “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified March 19, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal.
  7. [4]
  8. See Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s new silo-based missile raises risk of prompt preemptive strikes,” NK Pro, March 21, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-new-silo-based-missile-raises-risk-of-prompt-preemptive-strikes; and Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:24 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1637611067051331585.


11. North Korea “Tactical Nuke” Drill: Claims on Command/Control and Hints of A First-ever Silo Launch


North Korea “Tactical Nuke” Drill: Claims on Command/Control and Hints of A First-ever Silo Launch

https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-tactical-nuke-drill-claims-on-command-control-and-hints-of-a-first-ever-silo-launch/


North Korean media reported that the country recently conducted a “combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack by the units for the operation of tactical nukes” on March 18-19. Coverage of the drill included new details about the North’s nuclear command and control system, which sound similar to those used in the US and USSR/Russia. While none of these details can be verified from open sources, they seem within North Korea’s capacity, given its 40+ years of experience with missiles and its apparent access to substantial Russian and Chinese missile technology.

As part of the drill, the North launched a KN-23 solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). Associated photos suggested the missile was launched from a silo rather than a road-mobile launcher, which would be the first time North Korea demonstrated silo basing. Subsequent imagery analysis in 38 North calls into question whether there is an actual silo at the launch location and judges the missile more likely used a road-mobile launcher. Regardless, this launch highlighted the possibility of silo basing in the future.

Adding silo-deployed missiles to the North’s longstanding road-mobile missile force may have some economic advantages, but the vulnerability and operational downsides of the former are highly likely to limit their proportion of Pyongyang’s overall missile deployments. This, in turn, limits the downsides to the alliance of any silo-based North Korean missiles.

In announcing the drill, North Korea was clearly trying to send a strong deterrent message to the US and South Korea. It also wanted to emphasize that it has a “fast, strict, highly reliable and safe system” of nuclear command and control and to underscore the capability and credibility of its “tactical nuke” threat to South Korea.

“Tactical Nuke” Counterattack Drill and Command/Control

On March 20, North Korean press announced that a “combined tactical drill simulating a nuclear counterattack by the units for the operation of tactical nukes” took place over the previous two days, culminating in a launch on March 19 of a “tactical ballistic missile” that was “tipped with a test warhead simulating a nuclear warhead.” The missile reportedly flew to a range of 800 kilometers (km) (consistent with Japanese and South Korean reports) and “accurately exploded at 800 meters above the target waters.” Accompanying photographs and still photos on North Korean TV depicted the launch and early boost phase of a KN-23 solid-propellant SRBM, which had previously flown 800 km in October 2022. (The photographs also suggested the missile may have been launched from a silo, which will be discussed in the next section.)

The press announcement referred to various elements of a nuclear command-and-control system sounding similar to systems used in the US and USSR/Russia. These included:

  • a “combined unit chief in charge of commanding all the tactical nuclear operation units” with “missile units and sub-units under his command on the east and west fronts”;
  • a “nuclear strike control system”;
  • an “operation system for the command and management over the tactical nuclear force,” apparently including “operation procedures for implementing different nuclear attack plans,” an “order of handling nuclear weapons” (possibly related to mating a nuclear warhead to a missile), and “relevant action procedures”;
  • a “launch approval system,” apparently including “procedures of issuing and receiving an order of nuclear attack” and “final nuclear attack order authentication”; and
  • “technical and mechanical devices” apparently governing nuclear weapons control (possibly including Permissive Action Links [PALs] or some other means of preventing unauthorized arming or launch), including “nuclear explosion control devices and detonators fitted in the [mock] nuclear warhead.”

This is the most detail revealed by North Korea related to nuclear command and control. Its claims of using a mock nuclear warhead, detonating that warhead at an 800-meter burst height, and having a command-and-control system with these specific attributes cannot be verified from open sources. However, all of them are reasonable for the North to possess and plausible in light of Pyongyang’s 40+ years of experience with missiles and its apparent access to substantial Russian and Chinese missile technologies. The ability to detonate a nuclear warhead at a given altitude allows the attacker to optimize the desired effects on ground targets for a given nuclear yield. Altitude control also is desirable for some types of conventional and chemical/biological warheads, such as those using submunitions.

More important than the technical aspects of the March 20 statement are the political ones. North Korea clearly is trying to demonstrate what the statement calls its “tougher will to make an actual war response and send a stronger warning to the enemy” and that it has a “fast, strict, highly reliable and safe system” of nuclear command and control as befits the “fact that it is a nuclear weapons state.” The North also is continuing to underscore the capability and credibility of its “tactical nuke” threat to South Korea, building on the messaging from its February 8 military parade and its October 2022 commentary on last year’s missile activities.

Potential Silo-launched KN-23

The photos associated with the March 19 launch show the missile beginning to rise above a hilltop and its exhaust flame rising on either side of the missile in a V-shape rather than in a single plume extending below the missile. This exhaust pattern is typical of a launch from an underground silo rather than from the road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) used in most KN-23 land launches. However, North Korea has not previously launched any of its ballistic missiles from a silo. (It also is not known to have launched KN-23s from a stationary launch stand equipped with a diverter/flame-splitter, which could also account for the V-shaped plume.)

Commercial satellite imagery of the launch area described in the North Korean statement and seen in the photos revealed a circular excavation resembling a silo opening on a hilltop, surrounded by a rectangular clearing served by a recently built road. Initial assessments regarded this as “a rudimentary engineering prototype missile silo” rather than the more substantial, hardened type of silo used by the US, USSR/Russia and China.[1]

Subsequent analysis in 38 North, however, questions whether the circular excavation is a silo and judges the launch more likely occurred from a TEL in the rectangular clearing surrounding the silo. This analysis makes a compelling case that the “silo” may only be one meter deep (the KN-23 is some 7.5 meters long). The alternative possibility considered in the analysis—that the apparent “bottom” of the silo actually is the “top” of a missile canister within a deeper silo—seems unlikely given the short amount of time available to have excavated a deep enough shaft in the rock base of the hilltop (about 18 days between the observed beginning of the circular excavation and the launch). Moreover, the KN-23 apparently has not used a launch canister before, and there has been no previous open-source evidence, such as canister handling equipment or ejection testing, linking this launch mode to the KN-23. The pattern of debris at the site in post-launch imagery is consistent with either a launch either from the silo or a nearby TEL.

Interestingly, the North Koreans did not announce the launch mode (atypical if a new silo mode had been used), did not show it in any of the released photos, did not release video footage of the launch, and covered the “silo” after launch with a square cover previously located to the side of the excavation. It is unclear whether the photos showing a V-shaped launch plume that fed the silo assessment were the result of a silo or launch-stand launch, if they resulted from some sort of unknown obstruction in the exhaust of a standard TEL launch, or if the photos had been altered by the North Koreans.

The initial assessment of a silo having been used led to the consideration of a wide range of potential implications.[2] Even if this KN-23 launch did not come from a silo, North Korea could decide to use silo basing at any point in the future. Therefore, these potential implications remain worth keeping in mind.

  • Launching the KN-23 from a silo would be in character with the North’s use of this missile in a variety of basing modes, including TEL, railcarsubmarine and a probable submersible platform lowered onto a lakebed. Pyongyang has gone out of its way to signal that it has a diverse missile force with multiple basing modes that can survive any attempts at “decapitation” or “preemption.” It likewise probably relishes the implication that many more missiles might be hidden around than its adversaries are aware of. Indeed, that might account for it releasing a photo suggesting a silo launch while not yet providing any further substantiation.
  • As in the case of most of these other basing modes, however, silo basing makes less sense for SRBMs like the KN-23, which are relatively easy to move via TELs based on widely available truck chassis, than for larger, heavier missiles that are harder to move on wheeled vehicles using more exotic truck chassis. Silos are highly vulnerable to detection and attack regardless of the missile type and, thus, are unlikely to be seen by North Korea as a preferable basing mode.
  • Silos do have the advantage of being cost-effective to operate and maintain once built, and even construction could be relatively inexpensive if the North decided to deploy missiles in “rudimentary” silos without the hardening and other infrastructure used by other countries. (It is not clear how long noncanisterized missiles could remain viable in such silos or what the maintenance costs of such deployments would be.) Using silos also makes credible the addition of decoy silos to confuse opponents about force size and location and cause them to waste weapons on worthless targets.
  • The potential use of silos also highlights the possibility of yet further basing modes in the future for the KN-23 or other missiles, as was subsequently demonstrated when the North unveiled a “nuclear underwater attack drone” on March 24 (which will be the subject of a future article in 38 North). Prior to that unveiling, analysts were placing their bets on the next basing mode being an air-launched KN-23 akin to Russia’s use of the similar Iskander SRBM with a MiG-31 fighter in the Kinzhal system.[3]

The most disturbing possible implication identified by analysts keys off of the fact that missiles deployed in silos are easier to keep ready for launch at all times and provide no visual clues of an impending launch.[4] If North Korea deployed large numbers of SRBMs like the KN-23 in silos, these analysts posit, it would be easier for Pyongyang to launch a surprise or “preemptive” attack on South Korea—and the allies would be under pressure to preempt (or pre-preempt) these missiles before they could be silo-launched, in turn further increasing the pressure on North Korea to “use them or lose them.”

However, this scenario is highly unrealistic, as it depends on North Korea deciding to deploy a large proportion of its SRBMs or other missiles in silos. But Pyongyang has already been deploying scores of road-mobile SRBM launchers and hundreds of associated missiles for many years and continues such deployments with both SRBMs and longer-range systems. Any silo deployments would almost certainly augment rather than supplant this large extant mobile missile force—particularly because the North clearly has long recognized the vulnerability and other wartime operational downsides of fixed-based missiles compared to mobile ones. This would be especially true for nuclear-armed missiles, which North Korea would want to preserve from attack during a period of conventional conflict that is highly likely to precede any nuclear use. If TEL chassis are hard to come by, rail-mobile deployment provides a cost-effective alternative to silos with greater survivability.

We do not know if the March 19 KN-23 launch came from a silo, but that appears unlikely. Although adding silo-deployed missiles to the North’s longstanding road-mobile missile force may have some economic advantages, the vulnerability and operational downsides of silo-based missiles are highly likely to limit their proportion of Pyongyang’s overall missile deployments. This, in turn, is likely to limit the downsides to the alliance of any silo-based North Korean missiles.

  1. [1]
  2. See CSIS Korea Chair. Twitter Post, March 20, 2023, 4:36 p.m., https://twitter.com/CSISKoreaChair/status/1637916125408239617; and Open Nuclear Network. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 8:02 a.m., https://twitter.com/OpenNuclear/status/1638149148972298240.
  3. [2]
  4. For example, see Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 2:19 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1638243890468884480; Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:24 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1637611067051331585; Scott LaFoy. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:44 p.m., https://twitter.com/wslafoy/status/1637615993173180418; Open Nuclear Network. Twitter Post, March 21, 2023, 8:02 a.m., https://twitter.com/OpenNuclear/status/1638149148972298240; and Michael Duitsmann. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 9:47 p.m., https://twitter.com/DuitsmanMS/status/1637632021139959808.
  5. [3]
  6. For example, see Nathan J Hunt. Twitter Post, March 20, 2023, 12:28 a.m., https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1637672344373145601; and Missile Defense Project, “Kh-47M2 Kinzhal,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, last modified March 19, 2022, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal.
  7. [4]
  8. See Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s new silo-based missile raises risk of prompt preemptive strikes,” NK Pro, March 21, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-new-silo-based-missile-raises-risk-of-prompt-preemptive-strikes; and Decker Eveleth. Twitter Post, March 19, 2023, 8:24 p.m., https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1637611067051331585.

11. Treasury Sanctions Arms Dealer Who Attempted to Broker Deals Between North Korea and Russia




Treasury Sanctions Arms Dealer Who Attempted to Broker Deals Between North Korea and Russia

A new class of “merchants of death” may be emerging from the Russian war on Ukraine

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker


Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomes North Korean leader Kim Jong Un prior to their talks at the Far Eastern Federal University campus on Russky island in the far-eastern Russian port of Vladivostok on April 25, 2019. Photo by ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Get all our news and commentary in your inbox at 6 a.m. ET.

Threats

A new class of “merchants of death” may be emerging from the Russian war on Ukraine

|

March 30, 2023 07:20 PM ET


By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

March 30, 2023 07:20 PM ET

The Kremlin’s war on Ukraine has led Russia to seek weapons and supplies from a variety of sources under increasingly isolated conditions. That’s giving rise to opportunists in the mold of infamous and recently-freed arms dealer Viktor Bout. On Thursday, the Treasury Department issued sanctions against another such opportunist: Slovokian citizen Ashot Mkrtychev.

Mkrtychev is accused of trying to forge an arms deal between Russia and North Korea between the end of 2022 and early 2023.

“With the support of Russian officials, Mr. Mkrtychev has been attempting to broker a secret arms agreement between Russia and North Korea. As part of this proposed deal, Russia would receive over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions from Pyongyang,” National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told reporters Thursday.

Russia was also trying to send a delegation to North Korea, and was offering food to North Korea “in exchange for munitions,” he said, adding that “Any arms deal between North Korea and Russia would directly violate a series of UN Security Council resolutions.”

According to the statement from the Treasury Department, “Mkrtychev’s negotiations with {North Korean] and Russian officials detailed mutually beneficial cooperation” between the two countries, including payments and “barter arrangements. He confirmed Russia’s readiness to receive military equipment from the DPRK with senior Russian officials.”

The material included “commercial aircraft, raw materials and commodities to be sent to North Korea,” Kirby said. “We know that he worked with a Russian individual to locate commercial aircraft that was suitable for delivery to North Korea. And we know that he provided senior Russian officials with a list of goods that North Korea was interested in acquiring from Russia both via barter and financial payments.”

In the statement, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said Russia “has lost over 9,000 pieces of heavy military equipment since the start of the war, and thanks in part to multilateral sanctions and export controls, Putin has become increasingly desperate to replace them…Schemes like the arms deal pursued by this individual show that Putin is turning to suppliers of last resort like Iran and the DPRK.”

Mkrtychev’s efforts were separate from the artillery shells North Korea was sending to Russia, said Kirby.



12. S. Korea to fully open DMZ hiking trails starting next month


Tread lightly and be careful where you step.



S. Korea to fully open DMZ hiking trails starting next month | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 심선아 · March 31, 2023

By Shim Sun-ah

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- The government said Friday all 11 peace-themed hiking trails along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas will be open to the public starting April 21.

The trails are located in 10 cities or counties bordering the DMZ -- Ganghwa, Gimpo, Goyang, Paju, Yeoncheon, Cheorwon, Hwacheon, Yanggu, Inje and Goseong (which has two different trails).

The DMZ, measuring about 250 kilometers long and 4 km wide, is one of the world's most heavily fortified borders, with the rival Koreas technically in a state of conflict, as the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

The program offers a unique opportunity for tourists to reflect on the meaning of freedom and peace while learning about the ecological, cultural and historical values of the area from experienced guides.


This file photo, taken in September 2022, shows participants walking on a peace-themed hiking trail along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Paju, 28 kilometers northwest of Seoul. (Yonhap)

Each course is composed of sections where participants can travel either on foot or by car. While most of the sections are traveled by vehicle for the safety of participants and protection of wildlife, some sections are designed only for walking to allow participants to fully immerse themselves in the experience, according to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.

The government opened three hiking routes in Paju, Goseong, and Cheorwon on a trial basis in April 2019, but had to temporarily close them due to an outbreak of African swine fever and the COVID-19 pandemic. Five new routes were added in November 2021, but the entire program was soon closed again for the protection of migratory birds and to prevent the spread of the pandemic. However, the Yeoncheon and Inje routes were completed last year, and now all 11 trails will be accessible to the public beginning next month.

Online reservations for the tours will be available from Friday on the DMZ Peace Road website (www.dmzwalk.com) run by the Korea Tourism Organization, according to the ministry.

sshim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 심선아 · March 31, 2023


13. Intelligence Collection: “KCTU Labor Union Cadres Entered U.S. Military Bases, Photographed Facilities, and Sent the Pictures to North Korea”


What is old as new again. I remember a north Korea spy in 1996 or 1997 who was passing as a professor from the Philippines who was arrested for faxing information about the stationing of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Apache helicopters) to Camp Humphreys. He was arrested for faxing Stars and Stripes articles to his handlers in Beijing. The irony is that every day we would provide copies of the Stars and Stripes to the north Korean duty officer at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom.



Intelligence Collection: “KCTU Labor Union Cadres Entered U.S. Military Bases, Photographed Facilities, and Sent the Pictures to North Korea”

 PUBLISHED DATEMARCH 29, 2023 LAST MODIFIED DATEMARCH 29, 2023 AUTHOR_


 COMMENTS: 0


https://eastasiaresearch.org/2023/03/29/intelligence-collection-kctu-labor-union-cadres-entered-u-s-military-bases-photographed-facilities-and-sent-the-pictures-to-north-korea/?utm_source=pocket_saves



2023-3-29, Dong-A Ilbo [TRANSLATION]

It was revealed on March 28, 2023 that Mr. A, the Director of Organization of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU, MinNoChong), who was arrested on March 27 for violating the National Security Law, entered the U.S. military bases in Pyeongtaek and Osan, Gyeonggi Province, in 2021, toured military facilities, and even took photographs. He is also accused of forwarding these photos to North Korea.

[Note: The Director of Organization at KCTU is Suk Kwon-ho (석권호). For more on the North Korea-directed Spy Rings in South Korea, see herehere, and here.]

KCTU demonstrations placard: “Destroy South Korea-U.S. Alliance” 2022-8-13, Seoul

According to compiled Dong-A Ilbo news reports, Mr. A is accused of taking photographs of major facilities and equipment [and weapons] at the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) base (Camp Humphreys) in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, around February 2021 (for the purpose of violating the National Security Act).

Around the same time, Mr. A toured and photographed Osan Air Base in Gyeonggi Province, which is jointly operated by the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, investigations reveal. Public security authorities, including the National Intelligence Service and the police, believe he took close-up shots of not only the exterior of military facilities but also key facilities and equipment such as runways, hangars, and Patriot missile batteries.

It is understood that Mr. A transmitted the photographs to an operative of the Cultural Exchange Bureau (문화교류국) (formerly Bureau 225), North Korea’s agency for conducting operations against South Korea. It is said that the photos were sent mainly through the “Cyber Dvock” method, which shared foreign email IDs and accounts.

The authorities assess that Mr. A took photographs of the USFK bases and sent them to North Korea on North Korea’s orders. The fact that he received an order from a North Korean agent in early 2019 to “collect data on national security facilities in the southern part of Gyeonggi” has already been confirmed through search and seizures by the authorities.

[Note: He also received orders from North Korea to “collect relevant secret data, such as the Blue House, the military bases near Pyongtaek, thermal power plants, and LNG storage facilities to prepared for a contingency.”]

[Truncated]

Source:  https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20230328/118566401/1

14. Yoon's approval rating falls to 30 pct: poll




Not unexpected especially after his efforts with Japan.


Yoon's approval rating falls to 30 pct: poll | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · March 31, 2023

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol's approval rating fell to a four-month low of 30 percent, a poll showed Friday.

In the poll of 1,000 adults conducted by Gallup Korea from Tuesday to Thursday, the positive assessment of Yoon's performance declined 4 percentage points from the previous week. It marked the lowest level since the figure reached 30 percent in the fourth week of November.

Yoon's disapproval rating rose 2 percentage points from a week earlier to 60 percent.

Diplomacy was the most mentioned factor in making both positive and negative assessments of Yoon's performance.

Among those who made positive assessments, 12 percent mentioned diplomacy, followed by 9 percent who mentioned his response to labor unions and an improvement in ties with Japan, respectively.

Some 41 percent in total mentioned diplomacy, ties with Japan and the issue of compensating Korean victims of Japan's wartime forced labors as reasons they made negative assessments.

The favorability ratings for the ruling People Power Party and the main opposition Democratic Party were tied at 33 percent, the poll showed.

The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 3.1 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.


President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a dinner meeting with the chiefs of South Korea's overseas diplomatic missions at the former presidential complex, Cheong Wa Dae, in Seoul on March 27, 2023, in this photo released by the presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이민지 · March 31, 2023




15. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Are a Threat to All Nations



Excerpts:


North Korea is a dangerous nuclear weapons state, with significant domestic economic issues: food scarcity, dearth of medicines and therapeutics, and a backward health care system.

The nuclear and humanitarian situation in North Korea requires immediate attention. ...
...
Currently, for the U.S., South Korea and Japan, the dialogue with North Korea has ceased. China and Russia have a close and allied relationship with North Korea, and one would hope, at least for China, that they would encourage North Korea to return to talks with the U.S. or with the nations of a reconstituted Six Party Talks. Hopefully, that could be the beginning of a process to get North Korea to halt further nuclear and missile tests, in exchange for sanctions relief and the beginning of a process that will take many years for complete and verifiable denuclearization, in exchange for a path to normal relations and the infusion of foreign direct investments into North Korea for economic development purposes. Any resumed dialogue with North Korea should and must include a discussion of human rights and the need for North Korea to make substantial progress on the dire human rights situation in the North. The Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Joint Statement dealing with North Korea said: “China and Russia call on relevant parties to actively respond to China and Russia’s joint efforts to promote peace talks and play a constructive role in this process.”

Indeed, this is the time for China to work with the U.S. on the North Korea issue; to show to the world that this — and hopefully other issues of mutual concern — can lead to greater security in East Asia and the world.



North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Are a Threat to All Nations

thecipherbrief.com


March 29th, 2023 by Joseph DeTrani, |


Ambassador Joseph DeTrani is former Special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea and the U.S. Representative to the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as former CIA director of East Asia Operations. He also served as the Associate Director of National Intelligence and Mission Manager for North Korea and the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center, while also serving as a Special Adviser to the Director of National Intelligence. He currently serves on the Board of Managers at Sandia National Laboratories. The views expressed represent those of the author.

View all articles by Joseph DeTrani

OPINION — The Joint Statement of the Xi Jinping – Vladimir Putin summit expressed concern about the situation on the Korean Peninsula. That was an understatement. North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are a threat to the region and the world. And China and Russia are doing nothing to address this nuclear threat.

On March 15, North Korea successfully launched a road mobile Hwasong-17 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), reportedly capable of reaching distances as far as 15,000 kilometers. It is the largest road mobile ICBM in the world. This was the second ICBM launched by North Korea in 2023. North Korea also recently launched two cruise missiles from a submarine platform and numerous short range and hypersonic missiles. In 2023, North Korea launched 14 ballistic missiles, quickly catching up to the close to 100 missiles launched in 2022. As North Korea displays its ballistic missile prowess, what we’re not seeing is the incessant production of nuclear weapons. Conservative reported estimates credit North Korea with between 40 and 60 nuclear weapons; a recent Rand report said North Korea could have almost 250 nuclear weapons by 2027.

Also of concern is North Korea’s new preemptive use policy for nuclear weapons. If there is an imminent or perceived imminent attack on its leadership or command and control, North Korea will use its nuclear weapons pursuant to its first-use nuclear doctrine. Indeed, North Korea’s recent “nuclear counterattack exercise’, during the U.S. – South Korea “Freedom Shield” annual joint military exercise, was a statement from the North that they are prepared and willing to use tactical nuclear weapons against targets in South Korea.

The domestic situation in North Korea is bleak. Food and medicine are in short supply, with concern that people will die of starvation, as was the case in the 1990s when over one million people died of starvation. In Hyesan province, there were reported demonstrations – something rare in North Korea’s police state – demanding food. The North’s three-year lockdown due to Covid-19, the scarcity of fertilizer and bad weather, compounded with Pyongyang’s unhelpful decision to close many private markets all contributed to an estimated crop of 4.5 metric tons, way below the minimum of 5.7 million metric tones needed for food survival purposes.

On the go? Listen to the Open Source Report Podcast for your rundown of the biggest national security stories of the day. Listen wherever you subscribe to podcasts.

North Korea is a dangerous nuclear weapons state, with significant domestic economic issues: food scarcity, dearth of medicines and therapeutics, and a backward health care system.

The nuclear and humanitarian situation in North Korea requires immediate attention. The U.S. had thirty years of negotiations with North Korea, all to no avail. In fact, the situation has progressively worsened. The Agreed Framework in 1994 attempted to address the nuclear issue with North Korea, but discovery of North Korea’s clandestine Highly Enriched Uranium program for nuclear weapons put an end to the Agreement in 2002. The Six Party Talks with North Korea, hosted by China, produced a seminal Joint Statement in September 2005 that committed North Korea to complete and verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and programs, in exchange for security assurances, economic development assistance and the provision of two Light Water Reactors, for civilian energy, when North Korea returned to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. The Six Party Talks – the U.S., South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia – ended in 2009, after some progress in dismantling the North’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor, when the North would not permit nuclear monitors to leave Yongbyon to inspect non-declared suspected nuclear sites.

After the June 2018 Singapore Summit and the failed February 2019 Hanoi Sumit between former President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, the situation with North Korea is more dangerous now than ever before. The possibility of accidental conflict, using tactical nuclear weapons, should be apparent to all. And morally, for the 25 million people in North Korea, helping with food and medicine must be an immediate imperative.

Currently, for the U.S., South Korea and Japan, the dialogue with North Korea has ceased. China and Russia have a close and allied relationship with North Korea, and one would hope, at least for China, that they would encourage North Korea to return to talks with the U.S. or with the nations of a reconstituted Six Party Talks. Hopefully, that could be the beginning of a process to get North Korea to halt further nuclear and missile tests, in exchange for sanctions relief and the beginning of a process that will take many years for complete and verifiable denuclearization, in exchange for a path to normal relations and the infusion of foreign direct investments into North Korea for economic development purposes. Any resumed dialogue with North Korea should and must include a discussion of human rights and the need for North Korea to make substantial progress on the dire human rights situation in the North. The Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Joint Statement dealing with North Korea said: “China and Russia call on relevant parties to actively respond to China and Russia’s joint efforts to promote peace talks and play a constructive role in this process.”

Indeed, this is the time for China to work with the U.S. on the North Korea issue; to show to the world that this — and hopefully other issues of mutual concern — can lead to greater security in East Asia and the world.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief or any government agency or department.

Have a perspective to share based on your experience in the national security field? Send it to [email protected] for publication consideration.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief


16. North Korean Executions and Torture Alleged in New Report


A human rights upfront approach is a threat to Kim Jong Un.


Excerpts:


Earlier this month, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S. for organizing a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Pyongyang’s human-rights violations, calling it the most intensive expression of hostile policy toward Pyongyang. North Korea said its human-rights violations were “nonexistent” and accused the U.S. of trying to bring down the regime. The U.S. and the international community’s criticism is nothing more than “politically motivated hostile means for tarnishing the image” of North Korea, the Foreign Ministry said.
...
Mr. Yoon said he hopes North Korea’s human-rights violations are widely publicized during the Summit for Democracy hosted by the U.S. and during the continuing U.N. Human Rights Council session.
“Disclosing the reality of North Korea’s human-rights situation is important to national security as well because it shows where the legitimacy of a state can be found,” Mr. Yoon said at the Tuesday cabinet meeting.



North Korean Executions and Torture Alleged in New Report

South Korea releases 450-page document as President Yoon Suk Yeol adds pressure on Pyongyang over rights abuses

By Dasl YoonFollow

March 30, 2023 12:27 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korean-executions-and-torture-alleged-in-new-report-d5e94c98


SEOUL—South Korea released a new report detailing allegations of executions and torture in North Korea as President Yoon Suk Yeol attempts to put more pressure on Pyongyang over its human-rights record.

The accounts in the report released Thursday include allegations that six teenagers were executed by firing squad in 2015 for watching South Korean videos and using opium; a pregnant woman was executed in 2017 for pointing her finger at a portrait of the country’s founder, Kim Il Sung; and the leaders of an underground church were executed in 2019.

The South Korean government has been drafting an annual report on North Korea’s human-rights record since 2018, but the former Moon Jae-in administration had classified the reports, citing the need to protect the privacy of the defectors who were interviewed to assemble them.

“The reality of the appalling human-rights violations against the North Korean people must be fully revealed to the international community,” Mr. Yoon said at a cabinet meeting Tuesday, according to a presidential spokesman.

North Korea didn’t immediately comment on the report. The regime has denied that it is committing rights abuses and has lashed out at critics, saying they are attempting to challenge the country’s sovereignty.

The 450-page report included interviews with more than 500 North Korean defectors who escaped the country between 2017 and 2022 and detailed widespread violations, including public executions and incidents of torture, in one of the world’s most repressive and isolated regimes. The defectors weren’t identified in the report.

While many of the violations covered in the report have been previously documented in United Nations reports and elsewhere, it contained new and extreme examples of those violations and presented a fuller picture of the systematic abuses North Korea has carried out for decades. International organizations have been largely powerless to prevent the abuses within North Korea because of the regime’s tight controls over outside intervention.

“Things have only become worse and the report helps defectors realize they can be heard,” said Seo Jae-pyong, a North Korean defector who heads an activist group based in Seoul.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has used the coronavirus pandemic as an excuse to further isolate the population by increasing surveillance at the border and monitoring family members of defectors, said Mr. Seo. He said even movement between cities has been restricted in the past few years.

Defections dropped during the pandemic. Just 67 defectors arrived in South Korea last year. Before the pandemic, more than 1,000 defectors crossed the border and made it to South Korea every year. Since 2020, North Korea has ordered border guards to shoot people trying to cross the border, the report said. Most of the defectors interviewed for the report escaped from 2017 through to 2019. Of the defectors interviewed, just nine had fled last year.


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un presides over one of the world’s most repressive and isolated regimes.

PHOTO: LEE JIN-MAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The report described 11 camps, including five currently operating, where it said political prisoners have been subjected to forced labor, beatings, sexual violence and starvation. Prisoners are sometimes tortured by being put into fixed positions or forced to watch executions, with the aim of instilling fear, the report said. Defectors interviewed for the report said family members had died in the prison camps without receiving treatment for frostbite or malnutrition. Some defectors said they witnessed mentally disabled people being subject to medical experiments at hospitals without their consent, the report said.

North Korean defectors said their houses or cellphones could be searched by authorities at any time. People are often detained or imprisoned without a fair trial. Female inmates have faced genital examinations during strip searches, while rapes and forced abortions also took place, the report said.

Mr. Kim has intensified the regime’s suppression of foreign content and speech and expanded efforts to keep influences from South Korea from reaching people in North Korea, according to defectors interviewed by The Wall Street Journal and South Korean officials.

In 2020, the regime imposed a new “anti-reactionary thought” law that calls for punishing and imprisoning people who get caught in possession of South Korean media. Even dressing or speaking like South Koreans, by using terms and clothing styles common there, has been prohibited. Those distributing South Korean media can face the death penalty, Seoul’s spy agency said. North Koreans have faced severe punishment, such as being sent to prison, for possessing or distributing South Korean content, Mr. Seo said.

Earlier this month, North Korea’s Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S. for organizing a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Pyongyang’s human-rights violations, calling it the most intensive expression of hostile policy toward Pyongyang. North Korea said its human-rights violations were “nonexistent” and accused the U.S. of trying to bring down the regime. The U.S. and the international community’s criticism is nothing more than “politically motivated hostile means for tarnishing the image” of North Korea, the Foreign Ministry said.

Mr. Moon, the left-leaning former South Korean president who favored engagement with Pyongyang and met with Mr. Kim three times, largely refrained from condemning North Korea’s human-rights violations. But Mr. Yoon, who took office last May, has taken a more confrontational approach to Pyongyang. He has challenged the North on human rights and vowed to punish the regime for its provocative weapons testing. On Tuesday, Mr. Yoon said not a single penny should be given to North Korea as long as it continues to develop nuclear weapons.

Mr. Yoon said he hopes North Korea’s human-rights violations are widely publicized during the Summit for Democracy hosted by the U.S. and during the continuing U.N. Human Rights Council session.

“Disclosing the reality of North Korea’s human-rights situation is important to national security as well because it shows where the legitimacy of a state can be found,” Mr. Yoon said at the Tuesday cabinet meeting.

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the March 31, 2023, print edition as 'Killings, Torture Alleged in Report on Pyongyang'.









​​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com



De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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