Quotes of the Day:

“Everything in life can be taken away from you and generally will be at some point. Your wealth vanishes, the latest gadgetry suddenly becomes passé, your allies desert you. But if your mind is armed with the art of war, there is no power that can take that away. In the middle of a crisis, your mind will find its way to the right solution. Having superior strategies at your fingertips will give your maneuvers irresistible force. As Sun-tzu says, “Being unconquerable lies with yourself.”

- Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies Of War

"One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil." 

- Friedrich Nietzsche

"The man who listens to Reason is lost: Reason enslaves all whose minds are not strong enough to master her."

- George Bernard Shaw, "Man and Superman’ (1903) ‘Maxims: Reason’

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2, 2023

2. TikTok Ban Debate Moves From Washington to Main Street

3. Deadly Strike on Russians in Ukraine Exposes Moscow’s Military Failings

4. IntelBrief: Disinformation Trends on the Horizon in 2023

5. Four cyber concerns looming in the new year

6. Russian fury grows over strike that killed dozens of troops in eastern Ukraine

7. Bipartisan military veterans: Congress needs to be serious on national security

8. Ukraine asked U.S. for 100 A-10 Warthogs to fight Russians

9. For the first time, an active-duty female soldier becomes Abrams master gunner

10. Eurasia Group | The Top Risks of 2023

11. Opinion: Confidence in the military erodes as culture wars rage

12. Netanyahu Signals Israel Will Press Syria Strikes

13. Gaza-Based Terrorist Organizations Continue Efforts to Attack Israelis

14. A Taiwan Invasion Would Cost China Dearly

15. Taiwan Prepares

16.  The Case for Taking Crimea

17. Economics key to Japan’s new security strategy

18. Hydrogen hype is rising again—will this time be different?

19. Russia, shaken by Ukrainian strike, said mulling more drones

20. Ukraine Situation Report: Troop Loss Catastrophe In Donetsk Outrages Russia's Military Bloggers

21. The zombification of US national security - Responsible Statecraft

22. On my honor

23. 2023 And The Questions For Asia

24. Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM

25. Ukraine Has Digitized Its Fighting Forces on a Shoestring

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2, 2023

​Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2023

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike attacks against Ukraine on December 31 ­– January 2.
• Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine is likely not generating the Kremlin’s desired information effects among Russia’s nationalists.
• A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 generated significant criticism of Russian military leadership in the Russian information space.
• The Russian MoD is likely attempting to deflect the blame for its poor operational security (OPSEC) onto Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and mobilized personnel.
• Russian sources responded lukewarmly to Russian President Vladmir Putin’s staged New Year’s address, while Russian milbloggers lauded Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s appearances on the frontlines over the New Year’s holidays.
• Russian forces continued to carry out unsuccessful attempts to improve their tactical positions northwest of Svatove after reportedly conducting a tactical pause.
• The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported that Russian forces are continuing to deploy personnel on the Kharkiv-Siversk frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are redeploying along the eastern axis while struggling to maintain their pace of artillery strikes.
• Russian forces attempted limited offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and continued efforts to reinforce defensive structures.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to extend financial promises made to Russian soldiers as Ukrainian officials continue to warn of an impending wave of Russian mobilization.

​

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 2, 2023

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2

George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angela Howard, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 2, 7 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike attacks against Ukraine on December 31 – January 2. Ukraine’s air force reported on January 1 that Ukrainian air defense forces shot down all 45 Russian Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones that Russia fired at Ukraine on New Year's Eve.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesman Yuriy Ignat stated on January 1 that Ukrainian forces used the US-provided NASAMS air defense system to shoot down these drones.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces intercepted all 39 Shahed-136 drones launched against Ukraine between the night of January 1 and 2.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff again reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces shot down all 27 Shahed-136 drones that Russian forces launched against Ukraine on January 2, though it is unclear if this figure includes the previously reported intercepts from the night between January 1 and 2.[4] Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky reiterated on January 1 that Russian forces only have enough cruise missiles to conduct two to three more large-scale missile attacks against Ukraine.[5]

Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine is likely not generating the Kremlin’s desired information effects among Russia’s nationalists. Russian forces conducted a cruise missile strike against an object in Khmelnytskyi Oblast — reportedly a base of the Ukrainian 8th Separate Special Forces Regiment — on December 31.[6] A Russian milblogger stated that the strike, while well-executed and a good information operation, is too little too late.[7] The blogger argued that Russia needed to systematically conduct such strikes earlier on in the war, that the strike should have had follow-up strikes to ensure maximum damage, and that the timing of this strike was inopportune since Ukrainian elements were unlikely to be at the base on New Year’s Eve.[8] The blogger noted that this was not the first time that Russian forces failed to deliver effective strikes due to an absence of secondary strikes and that Russia should generally be more thorough in its destruction.[9]

A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 generated significant criticism of Russian military leadership in the Russian information space. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian precision strike on a Russian manpower and military equipment concentration point in Makiivka destroyed up to 10 pieces of equipment but did not release an official casualty number as of January 2.[10] The Department of Strategic Communications of the Ukrainian Armed Forces stated on January 1 that the strike killed 400 mobilized personnel and injured 300.[11] Geolocated footage published on January 1 also placed the aftermath of the strike at the Vocational School No. 19, fewer than 13km east of the frontline.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged the strike, claiming that four of the six rockets killed 63 Russian servicemen.[13] Samara Oblast Governor Dmitry Azarov confirmed that among the deceased servicemen are residents of the oblast, and some Russian sources claimed that 600 servicemen of a mobilization regiment were in the school building at the time of the strike.[14] Some milbloggers claimed that the death count was about 110, with over 100 wounded personnel.[15]

The Russian MoD is likely attempting to deflect the blame for its poor operational security (OPSEC) onto Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and mobilized forces. DNR law enforcement officials told Russian state wires that the strike occurred when Russian servicemen violated operational security by using personal cell phones, allowing Ukrainian forces to conduct a precision strike at the base.[16] Kremlin-leaning outlets and some milbloggers amplified the claim, stating that Russian forces should not underestimate the Ukrainian ability to exploit poor OPSEC practices on the frontlines and called on the Kremlin to introduce stricter guidelines on cell phone use among servicemen.[17] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselyov amplified milblogger reports that military commanders are demanding the resignation of DNR Head Denis Pushilin.[18] Some DNR public officials have also called for the punishment of the official who had decided to use the school.[19] The Russian MoD may have deliberately relied on the DNR officials to blame OPSEC violations on mobilized servicemen for the attack in an effort to make the DNR the responsible party.

The Russian MoD’s vague acknowledgment of the strike generated criticism towards the Russian military command, however. Wagner-affiliated milbloggers stated that Russian military command had made it easy for the Ukrainian forces to strike several hundred servicemen in one location, calling the DNR explanation of cell phone usage a “lie.”[20] A former Russian officer had also stated that Russian forces stored ammunition in the school’s basement, enabling the devastating strike.[21] Other milbloggers stated that the Russian command witnessed similar strikes throughout the past 11 months but were “criminally negligent” and failed to disperse the Russian forces quartered in Makiivka into smaller groups further in the rear.[22] Several milbloggers referred to a Putin statement about the necessity for the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to take accountability and listen to criticism on December 21 while calling on the Kremlin to punish the commander responsible for the OPSEC failures.[23] Wagner financier and avid critic of the Russian military command, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, offered an uncharacteristic and vague comment about the situation — stating that he could not reveal how Wagner prevents similar OPSEC problems.[24] ISW previously reported on two other instances of mass milblogger criticism: the failed Russian river crossing in Bilohorivka in May 2022 and the botched Russian offensive operation on Pavlivka in October 2022.[25]

Such profound military failures will continue to complicate Putin’s efforts to appease the Russian pro-war community and retain the dominant narrative in the domestic information space. Russian sources claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the military and the Investigative Committee to investigate the incident in Makiivka by January 6.[26] Putin’s inability to address the criticism and fix the flaws in Russia’s military campaign may undermine his credibility as a hands-on war leader.

Russian sources responded lukewarmly to Russian President Vladmir Putin’s staged New Year’s address, while Russian milbloggers lauded Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s appearances on the frontlines over the New Year’s holidays. Several Russian milbloggers amplified social media criticisms that Putin used background actors rather than standing with real soldiers during his address.[27] These criticisms and a chain of Putin’s canceled public appearances and meetings with ordinary citizens may show Putin as out of touch. One pro-Kremlin milblogger acknowledged the debate via an editorial in a popular Russian newspaper in which he vehemently denied that Putin used actors at his speech.[28] Former militant commander and prominent Russian milblogger Igor Girkin drew a direct comparison between Putin and Prigozhin.[29] Girkin posted that he would not comment on Putin’s speech but that Prigozhin decided to fight bureaucracy and corruption and gave a sensational New Year’s speech.[30] Meanwhile, several Russian sources praised Prigozhin for a series of appearances with real Russian soldiers on the frontlines in Ukraine on New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day.[31]

Prigozhin used reporting on deceased Wagner Group mercenaries and his prominence in New Year’s features to continue to push for legal recognition of Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) and to criticize bureaucrats not favorable to Wagner PMC. Prigozhin continues to seek increased legitimization of and state benefits for Wagner forces, although private military companies are illegal in Russia.[32] Prigozhin told a reporter who questioned why Wagner soldiers’ relatives are not receiving the bodies of their deceased soldiers that Wagner forces took care of the dead even on New Year’s while the Russian government, which is supposed to provide death certificates, has “[rested] since the beginning of the war.”[33] Prigozhin accused bureaucrats of desecrating the memory of the dead by treating dead servicemembers as objects in plastic bags.[34] Prigozhin publicly visited a Wagner-specific cemetery and memorial and the main base of the Wagner Group in Krasnodar Krai on January 1.[35] Prighozhin has previously complained that Russian authorities refuse to allow for the burial of Wagner mercenaries in Russian military cemeteries, as ISW has reported.[36]

The Kremlin is likely co-opting some Russian milbloggers who are willing to sell out in exchange for political prestige. Prominent Russian milbloggers Alexander Sladkov and Yevgeniy Poddubny attended the Kremlin primetime New Year’s Eve television show Goluboy Ogonek 2023 in Moscow on December 31.[37] This program airs immediately after Putin’s annual New Year's Eve speech and is attended by Putin and Kremlin political and cultural elites. Sladkov and Poddubny have both criticized the Russian military’s failures in Ukraine. The creators of the prominent Telegram channel Rybar had also stated that they received offers to create an open-source intelligence (OSINT) program to benefit Russian private businesses and force structures.[38] Rybar added that they already gave a lecture at the elite Russian state-run Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and are continuing to work in Putin’s “special military operation” working group.

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian air defenses reportedly intercepted all drones from two consecutive nights of Russian drone strike attacks against Ukraine on December 31 ­– January 2.
• Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine is likely not generating the Kremlin’s desired information effects among Russia’s nationalists.
• A devastating Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a Russian base in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, on December 31 generated significant criticism of Russian military leadership in the Russian information space.
• The Russian MoD is likely attempting to deflect the blame for its poor operational security (OPSEC) onto Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and mobilized personnel.
• Russian sources responded lukewarmly to Russian President Vladmir Putin’s staged New Year’s address, while Russian milbloggers lauded Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s appearances on the frontlines over the New Year’s holidays.
• Russian forces continued to carry out unsuccessful attempts to improve their tactical positions northwest of Svatove after reportedly conducting a tactical pause.
• The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported that Russian forces are continuing to deploy personnel on the Kharkiv-Siversk frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are redeploying along the eastern axis while struggling to maintain their pace of artillery strikes.
• Russian forces attempted limited offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and continued efforts to reinforce defensive structures.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to extend financial promises made to Russian soldiers as Ukrainian officials continue to warn of an impending wave of Russian mobilization.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
• Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued conducting unsuccessful attempts to improve their tactical positions northwest of Svatove on January 1 and 2, after reportedly conducting a tactical pause around the New Year’s holiday. A Russian milblogger claimed that both Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted a tactical pause on New Year's but have likely resumed fighting around January 2.[39] A Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces attacked Stelmakhivka (about 16km northwest of Svatove) on January 2 but did not describe the outcome.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Stelmakhivka.[41] Another Russian source claimed that heavy artillery duels continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and stated that Ukrainian forces are reconnoitering Russian positions in the vicinity of Kyslivka, Pervomaiske, and Vilshana.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued to repel Russian counterattacks around Kreminna on January 1 and 2. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Serhiy Cherevaty reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks on Bilohorivka (approximately 13km southeast of Kreminna), and the Luhansk Oblast Administration reported that Ukrainian forces eliminated a Russian armored group near Ploshchanka (approximately 13km northwest of Kreminna).[43] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces attempted an attack on Ploshchanka but did not specify an outcome.[44] Another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing a large-scale attack near Kreminna and noted that Russian forces are expecting a Ukrainian counteroffensive operation once the ground freezes in the area.[45] The source also added that Ukrainian forces are erecting pontoon crossings southwest of Kreminna and are reconnoitering Russian positions near Dibrova (approximately 6km west of Kreminna), Kreminna, and Bilohorivka. ISW makes no effort to assess the validity of these claims.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a series of HIMARS attacks on Russian rear positions in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Pervomaisk, Chmyrivka (on the eastern outskirts of Starobilsk), Svatove, and Rubizhne in occupied Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS.[46]

The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies, a Ukrainian national security think tank, reported that Russian forces are largely operating Western and Central Military District (WMD and CMD) elements on Kharkiv-Siversk frontline. The center noted that 23 to 28 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the Western and Central Military districts currently cover about 154km of frontline in this sector with a spread of about 5.5km per BTG.[47] The Center identified that WMD elements of 1st Tank Army and its 4th and 47th Tank Divisions; 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th CAA, and the 11th Army Corps (AC) of the Baltic Fleet, CMD elements of the 90th Tank Division, 201st Military Base (the Russian base in Tajikistan), 2nd CAA, and 41st CAA, Northern Military District elements of the 14th AC, Russian airborne elements of the 76th Air Assault Division, 106th Airborne Division, and separate special operations forces of the Airborne Forces are operating in this direction.[48] The report additionally stated that elements of the Donetsk and Luhansk 1st and 2nd Army Corps and Wagner Group elements are also fighting on this frontline. These BTGs are likely not at their normal end strength and are degraded from combat. ISW also notes that the UK MoD reported on November 29 that the Russians are no longer deploying in BTG formations.[49]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are redeploying along the eastern axis while struggling to maintain the pace of artillery strikes. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on January 2 that Russian forces have decreased their rate of shelling from 20–80,000 rounds per day to a maximum of 20,000 per day and are searching for Soviet 122mm and 152mm caliber ammunition stores both domestically and internationally.[50] Cherevaty stated that Russian forces prioritize shelling the Bakhmut and Avdiivka frontline over other areas of the front. The Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies stated on January 1 that two Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment of the 106th Guards Tula Airborne Division arrived near Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, and are expected to operate in the Popasna-Soledar or Popasna-Bakhmut directions.[51] These BTGs are likely degraded and demoralized.

Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka on January 1 and 2 at a low rate of advance. Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin stated that Ukrainian forces have heavily fortified the residential area around Bakhmut so there is a new line of defense “every 10 meters.”[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 1 and 2 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Bakhmut; north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora; northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar, Bilohorivka, Rozdolivka, and Bakhmutske; south of Bakhmut near Ozaryanivka; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka.[53] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces captured a few Ukrainian positions near Klishchiivka, and geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have made marginal advances near the settlement.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1.7km in the Soledar-Bakhmutske area and captured Ukrainian positions northeast of Bakhmut near Pidhorodne, but ISW cannot confirm these claims.[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks southwest of Avdiivka near Opytne and Krasnohorivka on January 2.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing near Marinka and that Russian forces are attempting to advance from the Nevelske, Pervomaiske, and Opytne directions towards Kamianka.[57]

A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian offensive against Vuhledar in southern Donetsk Oblast has "closed,” supporting ISW’s recent assessment that the Russian offensive along the Donetsk Oblast frontline is likely culminating.[58] The milblogger noted that Russian forces conduct daily offensive operations along the entire eastern axis, but that these actions are largely tactical in nature.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks across the southern axis between January 1 and 2. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on January 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to repel Russian attempts to attack Ukrainian positions in Kherson Oblast on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River and force Russian troops to regroup.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 2 that Russian forces conducted a raid on Ukrainian positions in Novopokrovka, Zaporizhia Oblast and that Russian forces entrenched themselves in captured Dorozhnyanka, having advanced through to Myrne (10.5km west of Dorozhnyanka).[60] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) alleged that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in the vicinity of Dorozhnyanka.[61] ISW cannot independently verify these claims. Russian forces continued to shell settlements along the southern axis.[62]

Various sources continued to report that Russian forces are constructing defenses and rebuilding force capacities in Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea. Sentinel satellite imagery shows trench constructions apparently completed by Russian soldiers as of December 29 along the P37 road near Bohdanivka in central Zaporizhia Oblast.[63] Ukraine’s Center for Defense Strategies reported on January 1 that Russian forces are deploying “territorial troops” (formed from mobilized men in light infantry units), endeavoring to restore combat capability to the 205th and 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 49th Army, and deploying a logistics hub and two logistics routes in Crimea and southern Zaporizhia Oblast.[64] Advisor to the Ukrainian Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko similarly stated on January 2 that Russian authorities deployed freshly mobilized soldiers to Urzuf, Donetsk Oblast (4km from the border with Zaporizhia Oblast).[65] Satellite imagery shows that Russian forces expanded the Belbek Air Base in Crimea between June 30, 2022 and January 1, 2023.[66] [67]

Russian forces also continued defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated on January 1 that Russian forces are preparing for defensive operations on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River.[68] Humenyuk reported that Russian forces maintain a significant, unspecified number of forces in the south despite force shortages along the eastern axis and that Russian forces are bringing mobilized reserve forces to the frontlines in Kherson Oblast.[69] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst shared images of Russian forces allegedly conducting river patrols in the swamps south of Kherson City.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 1 that Russian forces are shelling settlements on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City to coerce the local population into evacuating and destabilize the humanitarian situation in Kherson Oblast.[71]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike concentrations of Russian personnel and equipment along the southern axis.[72] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 2 that Ukrainian forces struck Tarasivka, Basan, Polohy, Berdyansk, and Tokmak, killed more than 175 Russian soldiers, and destroyed a Russian ammunition depot and 12 pieces of weapons and military equipment.[73] An OSINT analyst amplified unconfirmed reports from local residents that Ukrainian forces struck the Arabatska Spit in Crimea in the night between January 1 and 2, causing a panic among local authorities.[74]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Some Russians continue to challenge Russian force-generation efforts. A Russian news outlet reported that an unidentified man threw a Molotov cocktail at the gate of a military recruitment center in Moscow on January 1.[75]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to extend financial promises made to Russian soldiers and compound financial burdens placed on the Russian state by Russian force-generation efforts. Putin issued a decree on December 30 extending a November 2 decree that granted a one-time payment of 195,000 rubles (about $2,747) to mobilized men and soldiers who signed a contract after the declaration of partial mobilization to include soldiers called up for service in the Russian National Guard (Rosgvradia) and Rosgvradia soldiers who signed a contract after September 21.[76]

Official Ukrainian sources continue to warn of a coming Russian wave of mobilization, which will apply to residents of Russia and occupied territories in southern Ukraine.[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 2 that although Russian mobilization has never slowed, Russia will strengthen mobilization measures and close Russian borders to isolate the country over an unspecified timeframe.[78] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation authorities in Crimea are checking lists of persons of unspecified citizenship subject to mobilization in 2023.[79]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate the legal and administrative systems of occupied Ukrainian territories to support an effort to govern them as Russian federal subjects. Russian occupation authorities officially banned the use of the Ukrainian hryvnia (Ukraine’s national currency) on January 1 and announced that all transactions throughout occupied territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts must be tendered in the Russian ruble.[80] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 2 that Ukrainians in occupied territories are largely ignoring this ban against the hryvnia.[81] The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated on January 1 that Russian occupation officials will choose a Head of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) as stipulated in the new Constitution of the Luhansk People’s Republic of the Russian Federation that Russian authorities adopted on December 30.[82]

Russian occupation authorities seek to regulate utilities and housing in occupied Ukraine as Russian authorities do in Russia. A Russian source claimed on January 1 that DNR occupation authorities began increasing rates for housing and utility services in DNR territory so to equalize them with the costs in other Russian federal subjects.[83] The source stated that rates in DNR territory are 2–2.5 times lower than those in Russia’s neighboring Rostov Oblast.[84] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated on January 1 that Russian occupation authorities began dispersing utility bills to residents of Mariupol after Russian authorities increased the tariffs.[85]

Russian forces and occupation authorities continued intensifying filtration measures in occupied territories on January 1–2. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 2 that Russian forces blocked civilians from entering or leaving occupied Polovinkine, Luhansk Oblast, to subject residents (whom Russian forces accused of facilitating strikes on Russian positions) to filtration measures.[86] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 1 that Russian forces intensified counterintelligence measures in occupied Lyman Druhyi, Kharkiv Oblast, to identify pro-Ukrainian civilians.[87]

Russian occupation authorities continue to repurpose civilian infrastructure in occupied territories for military use. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 1 that Russian forces are treating wounded Wagner forces at a maternity hospital in Pervomaiske, Luhansk Oblast.[88] The Luhansk Oblast Military Administration stated that Russian forces have placed over 350 wounded Russian servicemen at a previously repurposed civilian hospital in Bilovodsk, Luhansk Oblast as of January 1 — an increase since December 29 when only 100 wounded servicemen were reportedly present at the hospital.[89]

ISW will continue to report daily observed indicators consistent with the current assessed most dangerous course of action (MDCOA): a renewed invasion of northern Ukraine possibly aimed at Kyiv.

ISW’s December 15 MDCOA warning forecast about a potential Russian offensive against northern Ukraine in winter 2023 remains a worst-case scenario within the forecast cone. ISW currently assesses the risk of a Russian invasion of Ukraine from Belarus as low, but possible, and the risk of Belarusian direct involvement as very low. This new section in the daily update is not in itself a forecast or assessment. It lays out the daily observed indicators we are using to refine our assessments and forecasts, which we expect to update regularly. Our assessment that the MDCOA remains unlikely has not changed. We will update this header if the assessment changes.

Observed indicators for the MDCOA in the past 48 hours:

• Nothing significant to report.

Observed ambiguous indicators for MDCOA in the past 48 hours:

• A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative stated on January 2 that Russian forces intend to conduct offensive actions against Ukraine in 2023, but that Ukrainian intelligence does not yet know where Russian forces will attack.[90] The representative stated that Russian forces could attack Ukraine from the north and the east simultaneously and that Ukraine is ready for any scenario.[91]

Observed counter-indicators for the MDCOA in the past 48 hours:

• A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative emphasized on January 2 that Russian forces in Belarus do not have the capability to conduct an attack against northern Ukraine.[92]
• The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 2.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[2] https://chas dot news/news/lupili-yak-z-artilerii-u-zsu-rozpovili-pro-visoku-efektivnist-zrk-nasams

[5] https://gur.gov dot ua/content/rosiia-pochala-zminiuvaty-taktyku-obstriliv-ukrainy.html

[16] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/16733399

[23] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/44131; https://t.me/MedvedevVesti/12620; h... ru/20221221/minoborony-1840283599.html

[28] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27491.5/4701590/

[31]

[37] https://meduza dot io/paragraph/2022/12/31/rossiya-1-nesmotrya-na-voynu-pokazyvaet-goluboy-ogonek-s-uchastiem-voennyh

[43] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7791; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/02/dynamika-vytrachannya-rosiyanamy-boyeprypasiv-dorivnyuye-drugij-svitovij-vijni-sergij-cherevatyj/; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/7773

[47] https://defence dot org.ua/dailybrief/2023-01-01/

[48] https://defence dot org.ua/dailybrief/2023-01-01/

[50] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/02/dynamika-vytrachannya-rosiyanamy-boyeprypasiv-dorivnyuye-drugij-svitovij-vijni-sergij-cherevatyj/

https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1608508884724973574; https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1609284888699588608

https://twitter.com/PaulJawin/status/1608576922933669888; https://t.me/rybar/42439

[58] https://dzen dot ru/a/Y7KDonzmWxp4jB5L; https://t.me/wargonzo/10149; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[59] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/02/sytuacziya-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-skladna-ale-kontrolovana-sylamy-oborony/

[64] https://defence.org dot ua/dailybrief/2023-01-01/

[68] https://suspilne dot media/350350-vijska-rf-na-livomu-berezi-hersonsini-gotuutsa-do-oboroni-gumenuk/

[69] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/01/02/sytuacziya-na-pivdni-ukrayiny-skladna-ale-kontrolovana-sylamy-oborony/; https://suspilne dot media/350350-vijska-rf-na-livomu-berezi-hersonsini-gotuutsa-do-oboroni-gumenuk/

[77] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/02/rosiyany-gotuyut-mobilizacziyu-na-pivdni/; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02T31pBuwVf7b1eUkozB...

[78] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/02/rosiyany-gotuyut-mobilizacziyu-na-pivdni/

[80] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/74205; https://www.gazeta dot ru/business/news/2023/01/01/19403947.shtml

[81] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/02/na-tot-prodovzhuyut-korystuvatys-gryvnyamy-popry-zaboronu-okupantiv/

[86] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2023/01/02/okupanty-vyvezly-polovynu-meshkancziv-odnogo-z-sil-na-luganshhyni/

[90] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/gur-rozpovili-k-mozhe-diyati-rosiya-fronti-1672644037.html

[91] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/gur-rozpovili-k-mozhe-diyati-rosiya-fronti-1672644037.html

[92] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/gur-rozpovili-k-mozhe-diyati-rosiya-fronti-1672644037.html

understandingwar.org

2. TikTok Ban Debate Moves From Washington to Main Street

Will such a deal really protect US national security? And if we ban TikTok altogether how will the public react?

Excerpts:

The Biden administration and TikTok have been conducting closed-door negotiations about how TikTok can continue operating in the U.S. A recent Senate proposal to ban TikTok from government devices passed unanimously, while more than a dozen governors have also recently enacted similar orders at a state level.

The Senate proposal and those governors’ orders, however, have been enacted without substantive public hearings or debate. But in Rapid City—with a population of 76,000, making it South Dakota’s second-largest city after Sioux Falls—discussions over a ban have become a potential election issue.

TikTok Ban Debate Moves From Washington to Main Street

City council in South Dakota weighs measure to ban the ByteDance-owned app from municipal devices, pitting councilors against each other

https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-ban-debate-moves-from-washington-to-main-street-11672612460?mod=hp_lista_pos3

One of the earliest public debates about blacklisting TikTok in the U.S. isn’t taking place in Washington. It is happening in South Dakota’s second-most populous city.

The Rapid City council on Tuesday will consider a proposal to ban TikTok from city-owned devices and networks, and to prohibit city agencies from using the app. Championing the idea is a councilman—and potential mayoral candidate—who calls TikTok a security threat.

Opposing the proposal is a councilwoman who has already announced her mayoral bid. She says Rapid City has bigger problems to solve, such as crime and drugs. She also says there is little evidence that TikTok poses a threat.

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The two sides are squaring off amid a groundswell of moves by federal and state politicians to ban the popular social-media app on government-issued devices. Congress is also considering a bill that would ban TikTok across the country.

At the heart of the issue is TikTok’s owner, Beijing-based ByteDance Ltd. U.S. officials say the Chinese government could order TikTok to collect data on American users or to control what videos Americans view on the app. TikTok has said it would refuse such an order, while Beijing has said U.S. officials are spreading misinformation about TikTok.

The moves are reminiscent of the bans and other restrictions slapped on another Chinese tech giant, Huawei Technologies Co. The Trump and Biden administrations, alleging similar national-security issues, used export controls and diplomacy to effectively ban the cellular-equipment maker in the U.S. and to lobby allied countries to do the same.

The big difference with TikTok? It has more than 100 million American users, many of them young. That popularity threatens to expand the public debate over any moves against the app beyond the national-security issues that ensnared Huawei.

South Dakota Gov. Kristi Noem issued an executive order banning state agencies, employees and contractors from using TikTok on state devices.

PHOTO: MATT GADE/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Biden administration and TikTok have been conducting closed-door negotiations about how TikTok can continue operating in the U.S. A recent Senate proposal to ban TikTok from government devices passed unanimously, while more than a dozen governors have also recently enacted similar orders at a state level.

The Senate proposal and those governors’ orders, however, have been enacted without substantive public hearings or debate. But in Rapid City—with a population of 76,000, making it South Dakota’s second-largest city after Sioux Falls—discussions over a ban have become a potential election issue.

Jason Salamun, the city’s councilman for Ward 3, said his interest in the topic was piqued in September, when South Dakota’s Republican Congressman, Dusty Johnson, introduced the “Block the Tok Act,” which among other things would ban the installation of TikTok from federal devices.

Then in November, South Dakota Gov. Kristi Noem, a Republican, issued an executive order banning state agencies, employees and contractors from using TikTok on state devices. Mr. Salamun said that action inspired him to look into doing something similar for Rapid City. He said he talked to the governor’s staff to better understand the issue and studied warnings from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Jason Salamun, Rapid City’s councilman for Ward 3, has described TikTok as a security threat.

PHOTO: JOSHUA HARRIS

“With these agencies and our Congress and state saying it’s a threat, it’s something we should be having a conversation about,” Mr. Salamun said. “I just think it’s logical.”

Some peers on Rapid City’s 10-person council believe something else is motivating him, too: They believe he wants to run in June’s nonpartisan mayoral election. “It’s an attention grabber,” said Councilman Ritchie Nordstrom. Mr. Salamun, a conservative, said he hasn’t yet decided whether to run for mayor, but that the TikTok proposal is about security, not politics.

As Mr. Salamun tried to drum up support for his proposal, another council member said she didn’t believe it. “I didn’t think he was serious,” said Laura Armstrong, who recently announced her own mayoral bid. She said there are bigger issues the city needs to deal with. “We have an increase in crime,” said Ms. Armstrong, who calls herself a centrist Democrat. “We have an issue with meth.”

She said once she realized the proposal was serious, she researched the potential ramifications. Among the things she found, the city’s exhibition center could lose business because contracts with musicians require the venue to promote gigs via TikTok, she said.

The city’s fire and police departments use TikTok to recruit, and the Solid Waste department has an official TikTok account, with about 443 followers as of last week. One popular video reminded residents to place yard-waste bags at least 4 feet away from trash containers, because a garbage truck’s mechanical arm can accidentally rip bags open.

Ms. Armstrong said she isn’t convinced TikTok poses a security threat that requires the city council’s intervention. “With lack of evidence, it’s almost like Chicken Little: ‘The sky is falling!’” Ms. Armstrong said at a Dec. 28 meeting of the city council’s legal-and-finance committee, which considered the proposal. She said she was also concerned that banning city agencies from TikTok would make it harder for the government to interact with young people.

That meeting ended with Mr. Salamun winning the first round. The committee voted 3-2 to advance the proposal to the Tuesday council meeting​.​

Write to Stu Woo at Stu.Woo@wsj.com

Appeared in the January 3, 2023, print edition as 'Debate Over TikTok Ban Enters Heartland Politics'.

3. Deadly Strike on Russians in Ukraine Exposes Moscow’s Military Failings

Deadly Strike on Russians in Ukraine Exposes Moscow’s Military Failings

A Ukrainian attack with U.S.-made rockets may have left hundreds of casualties, and pro-war Russians accused their military commanders of repeating fatal errors.

nytimes.com · by Richard Pérez-Peña · January 2, 2023

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In one of their deadliest attacks yet on Russian forces, Ukrainians used American-made rockets to kill dozens — and perhaps hundreds — of Moscow’s troops in a New Year’s Day strike behind the lines, prompting outraged Russian war hawks to accuse their military of lethal incompetence.

The strike by the HIMARS rockets killed 63 Russian soldiers in a building housing them in the occupied city of Makiivka, in eastern Ukraine, the Russian Defense Ministry said on Monday — an unusual admission for a military that has often refused to acknowledge serious losses. A former Russian paramilitary commander in Ukraine, Igor Girkin, wrote on the Telegram app that “many hundreds” were dead and wounded and that many “remained under the rubble.”

Ukrainian military officials said it appeared that “about 400” Russian troops had been killed, though they did not explicitly say that Kyiv was behind the attack.

None of the claims could be independently verified, but even the lowest number would represent one of the worst Russian losses in a single episode in the war, and an embarrassment for President Vladimir V. Putin. He has vowed repeatedly to correct the glaring errors and weaknesses in his armed forces that the war has exposed, and in a New Year’s Eve speech filmed at a military base, Mr. Putin told the families of soldiers killed in the fighting, “I share your pain with all my heart.”

Pro-war Russian bloggers and some government officials said the debacle was caused by the military’s own repeated and costly mistakes, like garrisoning troops in a dense concentration within range of Ukrainian artillery, placing them in the same building as an ammunition depot, and allowing them to use cellphones, whose signals the Ukrainians can use to zero in on their target.

“Our generals are untrainable in principle,” wrote Mr. Girkin, who has used the nom de guerre Igor Strelkov.

Some pro-war lawmakers demanded an investigation, and one of them, Sergei Mironov, leader of a pro-Kremlin party in the Parliament, called for the prosecution of all officials responsible, “whether they wear epaulets or not.”

“Obviously neither intelligence nor counterintelligence or air defense worked properly,” he said.

A family watching President Vladimir V. Putin give a New Year’s Eve to the nation.Credit...Alexander Nemenov/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The attack was “a massive blow,” said a spokesman for the Russian-installed proxy government in the Donetsk region, Daniil Bezsonov. “The enemy inflicted the most serious defeats in this war on us not because of their coolness and talent, but because of our mistakes,” he wrote in a Telegram post.

More than 10 months after an invasion that Russians — and many Ukrainians — thought would produce a quick Russian victory, each side has suffered more than 100,000 killed and wounded, by Western estimates, and the war has become one of attrition, with no evidence of an end in sight.

• A Lethal Start to 2023: Ukrainian forces used U.S.-made rockets to hit a building housing dozens of Russian soldiers in the eastern Donetsk region on New Year’s Day. It was one of the deadliest strikes on Moscow’s troops since the war began.
• Russian Airstrikes: Ten months into the war, Ukraine has turned the tide on the ground, but it can do little to stop Russia’s aerial attacks. For Ukrainians, there are few options but to endure.
• Global Starvation: A global food crisis, one of the farthest-reaching consequences of the war, is worsening as winter sets in and Moscow presses assaults on Ukraine’s infrastructure.
• A New Alliance: The United States is scrambling to stop Iran from producing drones, as officials believe the Middle Eastern nation is building a partnership with Russia.

Some of the heaviest recent fighting has ravaged the Donetsk region, one of four the Kremlin claimed to annex in September even as its troops were losing ground there, giving up towns they had seized earlier in the war. Since then combat in the region has slowed to a bloody slog, as the Ukrainians look for places to press their advantage, while Russians build trenches and fortifications along the front lines and try to capture the city of Bakhmut.

On Monday, Russia launched a flurry of Iranian-made exploding drones at Ukraine, continuing its barrage against cities and civilian infrastructure, especially the power grid. But it appeared that Ukraine's increasingly effective air defenses once again minimized the damage.

The Ukrainian military said on Monday that 22 drones were shot down over Kyiv in the early-morning hours, but at least two loud explosions were heard in the city. Mayor Vitali Klitschko said some energy infrastructure facilities had been damaged, affecting systems that heat buildings. It was not clear if the explosions were caused by drones that evaded air defenses, by drones that were shot down but detonated on hitting the ground, or by air defense missiles.

The Ukraine military said it had shot down all 45 Iranian Shahed drones launched over the weekend, though some cruise missiles penetrated its defenses.

In his nightly video address, President Volodomyr Zelensky warned on Monday, “We have information that Russia is planning a prolonged attack with Shaheds,” aiming to exhaust Ukraine’s defenses and its ability to endure. He said, “Now is the time when everyone involved in the protection of the sky should be especially attentive.”

The deadly attack on Russian forces in Makiivka used the HIMARS rocket artillery to hit a vocational school where troops were housed, Moscow said. The Russian Defense Ministry said that four HIMARS rockets had hit the building, and that two others had been shot down by Russian air defenses.

As pro-war bloggers and officials reacted with fury, video posted on social media showed firefighters amid the ruins of the structure, reduced to smoking piles of rubble. The bloggers have become influential opinion-makers in Russia amid the censorship of mainstream media.

Mr. Girkin, the blogger and former paramilitary commander, wrote that the vocational school in Makiivka had been “almost completely destroyed” because “ammunition stored in the same building” detonated in the strike. The ammunition was stored “without the slightest sign of disguise,” he wrote, adding that similar strikes had occurred earlier this year, albeit with fewer casualties.

Dara Massicot, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, noted that the Russian officials “do not typically provide this type of information after a major loss, which suggests they want to control the narrative on this event.”

Makiivka, adjacent to the city of Donetsk, lies only about 10 miles from the nearest Ukrainian-held territory, the town of Avdiivka to the northwest — well within the roughly 50-mile range of the HIMARS rockets the United States has sent to Ukraine. A U.S. military official declined to comment on the strike.

Since the Biden administration began supplying the weapons system in June, HIMARS has greatly increased the range and precision of the outgunned Ukrainians. They have used it to hit targets far behind the front lines, like the main bridge linking the city of Kherson to Russian-held territory, which contributed to the Russian decision to abandon the city.

Last month, a Ukrainian HIMARS attack destroyed a hotel in the city of Kadiivka, in the Luhansk region northeast of Donetsk. That attack killed members of Kremlin-aligned Wagner paramilitary group who were using the hotel as a base, according to Ukrainian authorities in the region.

The HIMARS system is most effective when used against stationary targets that can be identified in advance and pinpointed, such as ammunition dumps, infrastructure or troop concentrations. The United States has so far supplied Ukraine with at least 20 HIMARS systems, which are made by Lockheed Martin.

Many soldiers who were casualties appeared to be new recruits, recently mobilized in Mr. Putin’s drive to conscript more men into the fighting in Ukraine. One report in Russian state media said that “active use of cellular phones by the newly arrived servicemen” had been a prime reason for the attack, helping Ukrainian forces to pinpoint their location.

Throughout the war, Russian soldiers in Ukraine have spoken on open cellphone lines, often revealing their positions and exposing the disarray in their ranks. Though the continued use of the phones, despite the devastating consequences, exposes a failing by the military command, military bloggers say this explanation shifts the blame onto the victims.

It does not address why Russian commanders housed so many conscripts in an unprotected building within reach of U.S.-made rockets.

“No one is assuming the responsibility for the needless deaths,” one blogger, Anastasia Kashevarova, wrote on Telegram.

Eric Schmitt and Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting.

nytimes.com · by Richard Pérez-Peña · January 2, 2023

4. IntelBrief: Disinformation Trends on the Horizon in 2023

As usual north Korea is not mentioned.​  3 out of 4 of the revisionist/rogue/revolutionary powers are discussed.

IntelBrief: Disinformation Trends on the Horizon in 2023 - The Soufan Center

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · January 3, 2023

January 3, 2023

AP Photo/Bebeto Matthews

Bottom Line Up Front

• Disinformation will continue to evolve in 2023 with several trends worth highlighting, including: Sino-Russian alignment, more state actors seeking to acquire sophisticated disinformation capabilities, and the harnessing of emerging technologies for information manipulation purposes.
• Telegram has emerged as one of the primary platforms used to spread disinformation to myriad online audiences.
• Seeming Sino-Russian alignment in the information manipulation space has geopolitical implications for 2023, given the “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow announced on the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics.
• While Russia, China, and Iran continue to be assessed as the most capable disinformation actors, other states have been seeking to acquire more sophisticated capabilities in recent years.

In 2022, disinformation—the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information—poses an ongoing security risk to governments, societies, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While a myriad of state and non-state actors utilize disinformation for various goals, the state actors most capable of leveraging disinformation campaigns as a foreign policy tool are Russia, China, and Iran. Just as state-backed/aligned disinformation campaigns in 2020 were dominated by COVID-19 pandemic-related topics, the 2022 “disinformation year” can largely be defined by Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. Inevitably, disinformation will continue to evolve in 2023 and beyond, with several trends worth highlighting, including: Sino-Russian alignment, more state actors seeking to acquire sophisticated disinformation capabilities, and the harnessing of emerging technologies for information manipulation purposes.

Narratives about Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine have dominated the disinformation space in 2022. State-backed and aligned actors have attempted to justify the conflict through disinformation, redirecting blame onto the United States specifically, and the West and NATO more broadly, in an attempt to undermine support for Ukraine. This includes Russian state-seeded disinformation narratives directly connected to the war, including the false claims of Russia’s illegal war being launched to “de-Nazify” Ukraine. It also includes tangential disinformation narratives targeting the United States, NATO, and the EU—including falsities aimed to influence opinion about Sweden and Finland’s NATO bid, conspiracy theories placing unsubstantiated blame on the United States for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 sabotage attacks, and disinformation narratives about the responsible parties for the energy crisis in Europe and the global food crisis. While Russia-backed/aligned disinformation networks have utilized traditional social media platforms like Facebook, to peddle these types of narratives, Telegram has emerged as one of the primary platforms used to spread disinformation to myriad online audiences.

2022 has also illustrated Sino-Russian alignment and amplification of disinformation narratives. Of note, the CCP’s primary information manipulation focus in 2022 has been related to domestic or regional issues, such as external and internal messaging on the COVID-19 situation in China, international attention on human rights abuses in Xinjiang (especially in relation to the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing), and issues related to Cross-Strait relations. Still, there has been evidence of CCP-backed/aligned actors amplifying and aligning with Kremlin-backed disinformation narratives. While this trend emerged in 2020, for example peddling falsities about the origins of COVID-19, it has been further crystalized in 2022—especially focused on denigrating the West. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has amplified Kremlin-seeded disinformation campaigns about Ukraine with the goal of denigrating the United States, NATO, and the West. For example, CCP officials and CCP-backed/aligned online networks have amplified false claims about secret biolabs in Ukraine, blamed the United States for the global food crisis, and insinuated that the U.S. is responsible for the Nord Stream 1 and 2 sabotage. Seeming Sino-Russian alignment in the information manipulation space has geopolitical implications for 2023, given the “no limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow announced on the sidelines of the 2022 Winter Olympics.

While Russia, China, and Iran continue to be assessed as the most capable disinformation actors, other states have been seeking to acquire more sophisticated capabilities in recent years. In July 2022, Twitter’s former head of security filed a whistleblower complaint to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, in which he stated that—apart from Russia—he believes that the governments of India and Nigeria tried to influence the platform through having full-time employees hired who would potentially spy on users. This follows the high-profile case unveiled in 2019 of former Twitter employees accused of working on behalf of a Saudi government agent on infiltrating the platform to access information on dissidents—two of them were convicted by a jury in 2022. In 2019, Meta took down a Facebook and Instagram-based network engaging in coordinated inauthentic behavior that originated in the UAE and Egypt. According to Meta’s report, the coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook and Instagram primarily targeted online users in other countries in the Middle East as well as North and East Africa. Indeed, as disinformation campaigns can be used as a relatively cheap and possibly effective tool of influence against another government, political dissidents, or to stoke chaos and confusion for political goals it should be expected that more state actors will seek to increase their capability and effectiveness in this arena. Not all state actors will have the goal to target other states or populations outside of their own borders, but as social media becomes a prominent mode of information and communication we could see other state actors attempting to utilize disinformation for political and geopolitical goals.

State-backed/aligned actors will continue to innovate by circumventing policies aimed at curbing the proliferation of disinformation online. For example, in 2022, the European Union banned Russian state-backed media outlets, including Russia Today and Sputnik. In September 2022, Meta announced that they had disrupted a large Russia-backed network on Facebook, which was impersonating European news outlets to spread pro-Kremlin narratives about the war in Ukraine. While this case illustrates a relatively low-tech capability, innovation in the areas of emerging technology can aid faster and more sophisticated disinformation campaigns. For example, sophisticated AI-powered language models, such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, could be used to generate fake articles, posts, and other text information sources at a much greater speed with a lower probability of error than humans.

thesoufancenter.org · by Mohamed · January 3, 2023

5. Four cyber concerns looming in the new year

Excerpts:

Here are four cyber concerns expected to take priority in 2023.

Threats to critical sectors

Ransomware attacks

Foreign spyware

Labor shortage

Four cyber concerns looming in the new year

BY INES KAGUBARE - 01/02/23 5:58 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3793535-four-cyber-concerns-looming-in-the-new-year/

Cyberattacks have surged in recent years, with the health care system and other critical sectors increasingly coming under digital assault as the threat of malware like ransomware and foreign spyware continues to evolve.

Last year in particular saw officials and lawmakers renew their focus on cybersecurity and seek to secure the country’s critical sectors from rising cyber threats. The issue is expected to continue to take center stage in the coming year, as many of those threats are still escalating while the cyber sector is confronting an ongoing workforce shortage in its efforts to bolster the U.S.’s digital defenses.

Here are four cyber concerns expected to take priority in 2023.

Threats to critical sectors

The financial, energy and health care sectors are all facing a skyrocketing number of hacks. Cyberattacks have robbed companies in those industries of hundreds of millions of dollars, exposed data and even disrupted essential services, as when a ransomware attack forced the Colonial Pipeline to shut down in 2021, causing gas shortages in several states.

The health care sector in particular has seen a rise in cyberattacks in the last few years, particularly ransomware attacks targeting hospitals in order to gain access to sensitive information like patient data or medical research and technology. Increasing threats to the sector have set off alarm bells in Washington, with Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, warning this fall that cyberattacks could lead to delays in treatment and even patients’ deaths.

Officials have already stepped up their efforts to protect critical sectors from those evolving threats, and have indicated that doing so will remain a top priority this year.

Anne Neuberger, White House deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology, said in October that there’s been a “relentless focus” by the Biden administration on securing such sectors — especially those where disruptions could lead to hazards, such as in hospitals, the oil and gas industry and companies that transport chemicals. 

“Our concerns have evolved to where we’re most concerned about degradation or disruption of critical services,” Neuberger said.

But lawmakers and industry experts have called for federal agencies to further increase their efforts in recent months.

Securing critical infrastructure like the energy and health care sectors plays a key part in mitigating cyber risks, said Josephine Wolff, an associate professor of cybersecurity policy at the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

“All of those are areas where I would say there’s still a lot we could be doing to try and shore up defenses and build in more resilience,” Wolff said. 

In a letter addressed to the Department of Health and Human Services in August, Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) expressed appreciation for moves the Biden administration has taken to respond to cyber threats to the health care sector — but said more action was necessary.

“We remain concerned, however, about the lack of robust and timely sharing of actionable threat information with industry partners and the need to dramatically scale up the Department’s capabilities and resources. With cyber threats growing exponentially, we must prioritize addressing the [health care and public health] sector’s cybersecurity gaps,” they wrote.

Zinet Kemal, a cloud security engineer at Best Buy, said the government should continue to work with industry leaders to identify and address vulnerabilities found in critical sectors as well as to create contingency plans for responding to cyber incidents.

“I think they need to work with the industry to ensure that the systems are protected against cyber threats,” she said.

Ransomware attacks

Recent years have seen an especially dramatic spike in ransomware attacks, particularly targeting the health care and financial sectors.

Last year alone, ransomware groups caused outages in multiple hospital systems, temporarily closed schools in parts of the U.S., carried out multimillion-dollar hacks on a number of companies and drove Costa Rica to declare a state of emergency in May as a barrage of attacks impacted its government services.

Tackling ransomware at home and abroad is also expected to take precedence this year as the U.S. and its allies have come together to counter the heightened threat. In 2021, the Biden administration, along with several other countries, launched its first annual initiative intended to counter ransomware globally. 

In November, the White House held its second International Counter Ransomware Initiative Summit, in which it invited more than 30 countries to discuss steps they can take to curb the rise of ransomware globally.

“Ransomware is a pocketbook issue that impacts thousands of companies and individuals every year globally,” the White House said in a press release.

During the summit, the countries laid out several initiatives, including establishing an international counter-ransomware task force, actively sharing information between the public and private sectors and taking joint steps to stop ransomware actors using the cryptocurrency ecosystem. 

The ransomware task force, which is led by Australia, is expected to become operational in January, CyberScoop reported.

Australia is leading the task force “because they’ve had some very major ransomware attacks,” including one that targeted one of the country’s largest private health insurers, a senior administration official told CyberScoop.

Wolff said while ransomware will certainly remain a hot topic this year, she thinks the U.S. and its allies have to some extent reached their capacity when it comes to addressing the issue, unless other major countries like Russia decide to join in and support the initiative.

“I think what we’re most likely to see with that initiative is countries like the United States and the United Kingdom trying to help countries with less capacity to investigate ransomware and build up their capabilities,” she said.

Foreign spyware

Foreign spyware garnered attention last year following controversy surrounding the embattled Israeli spyware firm NSO Group, which was blacklisted by the Department of Commerce in 2021 for allegedly facilitating unlawful surveillance used against government officials, journalists, dissidents and human rights activists.

Congress has since taken steps to address the allegations. In July, the House Intelligence Committee included a provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act authorizing the director of national intelligence to prohibit the U.S. intelligence community from buying and using foreign spyware. 

The bill would also allow the president to impose sanctions on foreign government officials and firms that target U.S. officials with spyware. The legislation was included in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act and has since become law. 

Advocates against foreign spyware hope more will be done in the future to address the matter as threats continue to evolve.

Mike Sexton, a senior policy adviser for cyber at Third Way’s national security program, said although some actions were taken last year to counter foreign spyware, there’s still a lot more progress to be made.

“I think blacklisting NSO Group in 2021 was really good, but I think it’s important not to rest on our laurels on this,” Sexton said.

Rising cyber threats have brought new urgency to a long-time labor shortage in the industry as both federal agencies and private companies have scrambled to fill key cyber roles.

Labor shortage

The industry has sought to address the shortage by investing in workforce development, and is expected to continue doing so moving forward.

The Department of Homeland Security has said that addressing the shortage is a top priority for the agency. Previously, it tackled the issue in 2021 by conducting a 60–day hiring sprint to hire cybersecurity professionals. Out of the 500 job offers the department sent out, the department was able to hire nearly 300 new cyber workers.

National Cyber Director Chris Inglis, who’s expected to retire in the coming months, has also pushed the government to hire more tech and cyber workers. 

“We have been successful in filling two-thirds of the jobs that have the word cyber and IT in it, and that’s the good news,” Inglis said during a cyber event held in October. 

However, he said there was still a long way to go because at the time, one-third of those jobs were still vacant.

As pandemic wanes, subway cars remain half-empty

California, Nevada face flooding, power outages amid winter storm

Inglis also hosted a cyber workforce and education summit in July, during which participants pledged to improve diversity and inclusion in the cyber field as well as build a national cyber workforce and education strategy. 

Experts said to expect more government funding designed to help with workforce training and educational initiatives, including partnering up with the private sector and universities to increase the pipeline of cyber workers. 

“To address this gap, in the future, I think it’s important for organizations and governments to invest in training and education programs that develop the next generation of cybersecurity professionals,” Kemal said.

TAGS ANNE NEUBERGER CHRIS INGLIS MARK WARNER

6. Russian fury grows over strike that killed dozens of troops in eastern Ukraine

What does Russian accountability look like? (a rhetorical question).

Russian fury grows over strike that killed dozens of troops in eastern Ukraine

Reuters · by Reuters

• Summary
• This content was produced in Russia, where the law restricts coverage of Russian military operations in Ukraine

MOSCOW, Jan 3 (Reuters) - Russian nationalists and some lawmakers have demanded punishment for commanders they accused of ignoring dangers as anger grew over the killing of dozens of Russian soldiers in one of the deadliest strikes of the Ukraine conflict.

In a rare disclosure, Russia's defence ministry said 63 soldiers were killed on New Year's Eve in a fiery blast that destroyed a temporary barracks in a vocational college in Makiivka, twin city of the Russian-occupied regional capital of Donetsk in eastern Ukraine.

Russian critics said the soldiers were being housed alongside an ammunition dump at the site, which the Russian defence ministry said was hit by four rockets fired from U.S.-made HIMARS launchers.

Ukraine and some Russian nationalist bloggers have put the Makiivka death toll in the hundreds, though pro-Russian officials say those estimates are exaggerated.

Rallies to commemorate the dead were held in several Russian cities, including Samara, where some came from, RIA Novosti news gency reported. Mourners laid flowers in the centre of Samara.

"I haven't slept for three days, Samara hasn't slept. We are constantly in touch with the wives of our guys. It's very hard and scary. But we can't be broken. Grief unites ... We will not forgive, and, definitely, victory will be ours," RIA quoted Yekaterina Kolotovkina, a representative of a women's council at an army unit, as telling one of the rallies.

The strike on Makiivka came as Russia was launching what have become nightly waves of drone attacks on Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in his nightly video address that the attacks were aimed at "exhausting our people, our anti-aircraft defences, our energy".

RUSSIAN STRIKES

Ukrainian officials said Russia had on Monday struck Ukraine-controlled parts of the Donetsk region, hitting the village of Yakovlivka, the city of Kramatorsk and destroying an ice rink in the town of Druzhkivka.

The governor of Ukraine's Luhansk region, which along with neighbouring Donetsk forms the industrial Donbas claimed by Moscow, said on Tuesday Ukrainian forces had made steady advances in the direction of Russian-held Svatove and Kreminna.

"(Russian forces) are used to having a complete advantage in both artillery and shells. Now we have reached parity and our artillerymen are shooting better, hitting more ammunition depots and barracks, while firing far fewer shots," Governor Serhiy Haidai told Ukrainian television.

Elsewhere, Ukraine's military General Staff said a Dec. 31 strike on a Russian-held area of the southern Kherson region had killed or injured some 500 Russian troops.

Reuters could not independently confirm the battlefield accounts.

Ukraine's presidential administration said three people had been killed and 10 wounded in Russian strikes over the past 24 hours, two of them in Kherson region and one in Donetsk region.

The governor of Donetsk, Pavlo Kyrylenko, said in a Tuesday morning update for his region that Russian forces had attacked Ukrainian positions overnight along the front line.

[1/19] Workers and emergencies' ministry members remove debris of a destroyed building purported to be a vocational college used as temporary accommodation for Russian soldiers, 63 of whom were killed in a Ukrainian missile strike as stated the previous day by Russia's Defence Ministry, in the course of Russia-Ukraine conflict in Makiivka (Makeyevka), Russian-controlled Ukraine, January 3, 2023. REUTERS/Alexander Ermochenko

Reuters footage showed a team of Ukrainian volunteers known as "Black Tulip" exhuming dead soldiers' bodies near the front line in Donetsk region.

"Whenever you dig up a boy, you live through his nightmare and the horror he went through in his last moment, when he understood that this is the end," said volunteer Oleksii Iukov, 37. "This is very, very difficult because you understand that you're about to tell his family that their close one is gone."

RUSSIAN FURY

Russian military bloggers said the extent of the destruction at Makiivka was a result of storing ammunition in the same building as a barracks, despite commanders knowing it was within range of Ukrainian rockets.

Igor Girkin, a former commander of pro-Russian troops in eastern Ukraine who is now one of the highest-profile Russian nationalist military bloggers, said hundreds had been killed or wounded. Military equipment stored at the site was uncamouflaged, he said.

"What happened in Makiivka is horrible," wrote Archangel Spetznaz Z, a Russian military blogger with more than 700,000 followers on the Telegram messaging app.

"Who came up with the idea to place personnel in large numbers in one building, where even a fool understands that even if they hit with artillery, there will be many wounded or dead?" he wrote. Commanders "couldn't care less", he said.

Ukraine almost never publicly claims responsibility for attacks on Russian-controlled territory in Ukraine and Zelenskiy did not address the Makiivka strike in his nightly speech on Monday.

The fury in Russia extended to lawmakers.

Grigory Karasin, a member of the Russian Senate and former deputy foreign minister, not only demanded vengeance against Ukraine and its NATO supporters but also "an exacting internal analysis".

Sergei Mironov, a legislator and former chairman of the Senate, Russia's upper house, demanded criminal liability for the officials who had "allowed the concentration of military personnel in an unprotected building" and "all the higher authorities who did not provide the proper level of security".

Unverified footage posted online of the aftermath of the blast at the Russian barracks in Makiivka showed a huge building reduced to smoking rubble.

Having suffered defeats on the battlefield in the second half of 2022, Russia resorted to mass air strikes against Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine said on Monday it had shot down all 39 drones Russia had launched in a third night of air strikes on civilian targets in Kyiv and other cities.

Ukrainian officials said their success proved that Russia's tactic in recent months of raining down missiles and drones to knock out Ukraine's energy infrastructure was increasingly failing as Kyiv beefs up its air defences.

Russia denies targeting civilians in what it calls a "special military operation" against its southern neighbour launched on Feb. 24.

Additional reporting by Pavel Polityuk in Kyiv and by other Reuters bureaux; Writing by Michael Perry and Gareth Jones; Editing by Robert Birsel and Nick Macfie

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

7. Bipartisan military veterans: Congress needs to be serious on national security

Will veterans in Congress make a difference?

I do think we need to remember that someone who served in the military for 5-6 years or even 20-30 years does not necessarily make them a national security expert. As the young Congressmen gain experience and develop expertise, their military service can inform their perspectives. But military experience does not equal immediate national security expertise upon entrance to the Capitol Building.

And hopefully they can fend off the influences of the radical left and radical right partisans.

Bipartisan military veterans: Congress needs to be serious on national security 

BY REPS. JARED GOLDEN (D-MAINE) AND DON BACON (R-NEB.), OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 01/02/23 5:30 PM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3795788-bipartisan-military-veterans-congress-needs-to-be-serious-on-national-security/

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is one of the most consequential pieces of legislation that Congress passes each year. It authorizes new funding and policy initiatives for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related activities, charting the course for our national security policy. This year’s NDAA, which the president signed last month, includes a host of important provisions like increasing pay for our servicemembers, enhancing U.S. deterrence initiatives in the Pacific, and supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia.  

While we are pleased that this bill has become law, this is not entirely a good news story. For the second year in a row, the Senate has failed to consider and pass its version of the NDAA, abdicating its responsibility, abandoning regular order, and circumventing a fair and transparent conference process with the House. 

This may sound like a D.C. Beltway problem, but the reality is that this has serious implications for our constituents back home, for servicemembers and their families, and for U.S. national security. For one, the Senate’s failure to do its job makes what is already an opaque process even more convoluted. Without a Senate-passed bill, members of the Senate and House are not appointed as conferees, leaving the bill to be negotiated exclusively by leadership and select staff behind closed doors.  

This procedure also manufactures an 11th-hour authorization for all funding and programs for our entire national security apparatus. It is irresponsible for Congress to wait until the last possible moment to provide for the common defense. It is one of our most basic responsibilities that we are directed to uphold in the first sentence of the Constitution. Our country faces immense challenges across the globe—from an ascendant China to a belligerent Russia to instability in the Middle East. By ensuring “regular order”—and passing the bill on time—we can put the DOD on a better footing to address these threats and provide greater certainty to our servicemembers and their families. 

As members of the House Armed Services Committee and Co-Chairs of the For Country Caucus, a bipartisan group of military veterans in Congress, we worked hard to build a balanced and comprehensive defense authorization package. We are glad many of the provisions we fought to secure reached the final bill: it will establish a Warfighter Brain Health Initiative to align traumatic brain injury policy and programs across the DOD, improve how small businesses navigate government contracting, and strengthen the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC) program so the next generation can learn the value of service. At the same time, however, this bill also omits bipartisan, bicameral provisions that we supported but did not have the chance to defend in conference. 

We’ll be passing on leadership of the For Country Caucus to other members in the 118th Congress–both known for their bipartisanship in Congress and service in uniform. We take pride in what we have been able to accomplish in the three short years since the inception of the caucus. We’re particularly proud that soon Gold Star Families, veterans, and citizens from across the country will be able to come together to visit the Global War on Terrorism Memorial on the National Mall. We fought to secure this provision in the Fiscal Year 2022 NDAA and will remain engaged in its implementation now that it has become law.  

Sixteen members of the For Country Caucus sit on the House Armed Services Committee, and that number may grow next year. This bipartisan group of military veterans will remain focused on productivity and common-sense legislating as part of a transparent process. We urge the Senate to do the same. We owe it to our troops, to their families, and to Americans around the globe who expect Congress to do its job and help keep our nation safe.  

Jared Golden and Don Bacon are co-chairs of the For Country Caucus. 

8. Ukraine asked U.S. for 100 A-10 Warthogs to fight Russians

It would be a good test to see them destroy Russian tanks in a high threat environment.

Ukraine asked U.S. for 100 A-10 Warthogs to fight Russians

americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 2, 2023

Early in Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, the defenders asked the U.S. for 100 A-10 “Warthog” attack jets to wipe out tank columns rolling on Kyiv. The request was rejected as “impossible” by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who added that it “made no sense.”

Ukraine asked to borrow a fleet of aging A-10 jets in March amid calls for U.S. forces to enforce a no-fly zone over the country, according to a long Washington Post story about the buildup of American aid over 10 months of full-scale Russian invasion.

The U.S. has steadily amped up support for Ukraine’s defense, most recently with a $45 billion aid package and, for the first time, sophisticated surface-to-air Patriot missiles. But officials from the beginning have balked at sending American jets to shoot down Russians over Ukraine, wary of direct confrontation with a rival power.

The A-10, nicknamed “Warthog,” carries a 30-millimeter Gatling-style gun and other weapons to support ground troops. After a 40-mile convoy of Russian military vehicles stalled on the road to Kyiv at the onset of the invasion, Ukrainian Defense Minister Aleksii Reznikov tried to secure 100 of the jets to crush it.

Ukraine had done its “homework” on the jets and determined that the U.S. had a surplus of them, Reznikov told the Post. But Austin firmly rebuffed the request, saying the dated aircraft would be a “squeaky target” for Russian defenses, Reznikov said.

“This was understandable to me. It was reasonable. I said okay,” Reznikov said, reportedly throwing his hands up.

After the Air Force hinted Ukraine could have some A-10s, one of Reznikov’s own advisers echoed Austin’s assessment to Military.com. The adviser, Yuriy Sak, said the jets would be “a target” and that Ukrainian forces couldn’t support them.

“The A-10 is over 40 years old, bordering on 50 when it comes to design,” retired Air Force lieutenant general Dave Deptula told Insider. “There are more survivable, effective and lethal modern aircraft that can provide the ability the A-10 was able to provide. If the Ukrainians don’t want it, that sends a message.”

The U.S. is now retiring some of its A-10s for the first time in decades, Insider reported.

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americanmilitarynews.com · by Justin Cooper · January 2, 2023

9. For the first time, an active-duty female soldier becomes Abrams master gunner

A great accomplishment.

For the first time, an active-duty female soldier becomes Abrams master gunner

Stars and Stripes · by • · January 2, 2023

Army

Stars and Stripes

Sgt. Cinthia Ramirez, assigned to Avenger Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, earns the title of master gunner. (David Dumas/U.S. Army)

The first female active-duty soldier has graduated from the The M1A2 Abrams Master Gunner Course at Ft. Benning, Ga.

Sgt. Cinthia Ramirez, assigned to Avenger Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, completed the roughly two-month course in December on her second try, according to a news release.

Sgt. Cinthia Ramirez, assigned to Avenger Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, earns the title of master gunner. (David Dumas/U.S. Army)

“Getting into Master Gunner school was so hard, but that just made me even more determined to get in,” Ramirez said in the release. “Everyone kept telling me how hard it was, and I wanted to see for myself just how hard it was — and they were not wrong. I just want people to realize that just because you were never the best soldier or you’ve been in trouble — you can change and turn things around. The mistakes I made as a private will not define who I am as an NCO and a leader.”

A native of Plainview, Texas, Ramirez, now 23, joined the Army at 18 and served as a driver, loader and gunner at Fort Hood. She also served in South Korea in 2019, according to Military Times.

The master gunner advises commanders and is a part of the planning, development, execution and evaluation of all combat and gunnery-related training, according to the release.

Ramirez is the latest soldier to achieve a first for women as the Army works toward gender integration in combat arms. Florida Guardsman Staff Sgt. Jessica Ray became the first female Avenger master gunner in 2011, and in 2020 Staff Sgt. Tiana Trent became the first Black female in that role. Sgt. Shawna Tipton was the first female to graduate from Bradley Master Gunner School in 2020.

Here's the 2nd video of Day of DragonCannes 2, the world's greatest film festival.

This one, from Fort Hood, stars Cinthia Ramirez. "Strength Through Determination" was produced by Daniel Herman.

This is MASTERFUL storytelling...a truly inspiring story of grit and hope! pic.twitter.com/JdpJFCA6MS

— XVIII Airborne Corps (@18airbornecorps) September 21, 2021

Stars and Stripes · by • · January 2, 2023

10. Eurasia Group | The Top Risks of 2023

​Download the 30 page report here: https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/EurasiaGroup_TopRisks2023.pdf​

Eurasia Group | The Top Risks of 2023

eurasiagroup.net

EURASIA GROUP'S TOP RISKS FOR 2023Top Risks is Eurasia Group's annual forecast of the political risks that are most likely to play out over the course of the year. This year's report was published on 3 January 2023.

Download Full Report

Overview

We're (mostly) through the pandemic. Russia has no way to win in Ukraine. The European Union is stronger than ever. NATO rediscovered its reason for being. The G7 is strengthening. Renewables are becoming dirt cheap. American hard power remains unrivaled. Midterms in the United States were decidedly normal … and many of the candidates posing the biggest threat to democracy (especially those who would have had authority over elections) lost their races. Meanwhile, Donald Trump is the weakest he has been since he became president, with a large number of Republicans preparing to take him on for the GOP nomination.

There's got to be a catch.

The big one: A small group of individuals has amassed an extraordinary amount of power, making decisions of profound geopolitical consequence with limited information in opaque environments. On a spectrum of geopolitics with integrated globalization at one extreme, these developments are at the other extreme, and they're driving a disproportionate amount of the uncertainty in the world today.

Our top risks this year are skewed toward these actors and their impact: Rogue Russia, Maximum Xi, Weapons of mass disruption, and Iran in a corner all come from international actors facing severe structural challenges and strong opposition (internal and/or external) in achieving their desired goals, with neither oversight, adequate expert inputs, nor checks and balances constraining their actions.

Dictatorships are stumbling at the same time that they're becoming more consolidated. Vladimir Putin's Russia is too isolated for its leader to attend the G20 summit, facing serious economic and military decline ... while NATO has never looked stronger. Iran, Russia's most important military ally, faces a deeply hostile geopolitical environment alongside the greatest domestic unrest since the 1979 revolution that brought the Islamic Republic to power. China was thoroughly unprepared for its troubles with zero Covid (our #1 risk last year), leading to unprecedented demonstrations ... and a sudden turnaround of President Xi Jinping's policy, ending restrictions two years after the Americans and Europeans. Their trajectories are, to varying degrees, increasingly unsustainable.

More broadly, progress in human development has been thrown into reverse by a global pandemic, a land war in Europe, a massive inflationary shock, and mounting climate catastrophe. After decades of globalization pushing unprecedented global growth and the emergence of a robust global middle class, we are now seeing a majority of the world's 8 billion people fare worse, not better, in education levels, life expectancy, economic well-being, and safety and security. The headwinds for human development will grow in 2023.

American leadership is a double-edged sword. One year into Russia's failed war, the United States has only gained as the world's sole global military leader. Core allies clearly recognize their reliance on the United States for national security, broadly defined. America's comparative economic power is stronger coming out of the pandemic and through the Russia war than after the global financial crisis in 2008. Whispering in Europe has gotten louder that the global position of the United States is benefiting from the war, while the Europeans and Japan face deindustrialization and a permanent end to the peace dividend. China, too, faces massive economic challenges, much greater than other major countries. Its economy is still expected to surpass that of the United States in GDP by 2030, but there is a growing chance it never does. And if it does, this does not herald a Chinese century as China's population halves by 2100. If any major middle-income country is truly outperforming in the coming decades, it's the world's soon-to-be third largest economy (and its largest democracy), India.

But in terms of leading by example, it's a radically different story for the United States. In 1989, the US was the world's leading exporter of democracy. Today, it is the leading exporter of tools that undermine democracy—the result of algorithms and social media platforms that rip at the fabric of civil society while maximizing profit, creating unprecedented political division, disruption, and dysfunction. That trend is accelerating fast—not driven by governments but by a small collection of individuals with little understanding of the social and political impact of their actions.

Is the tech centibillionaire a bigger threat to global instability than Putin or Xi? It's unclear but the right question to ask and a critical challenge for the world's democracies, highlighting the vulnerability of representative political institutions and the growing allure of state control and surveillance. As we showed with the J Curve back in 2006, open societies were the most stable, in part because technology strengthened them and weakened authoritarian regimes. In 2023, less than two decades later, the opposite is true.

It's not the end of democracy (nor of NATO or the West). But we remain in the depths of a geopolitical recession, with the risks this year the most dangerous we've encountered in the 25 years since we started Eurasia Group.

And now, our top risks.

1. Rogue Russia

A humiliated Russia will turn from global player into the world's most dangerous rogue state, posing a serious security threat to Europe, the United States, and beyond.

Read the risk

2. Maximum Xi

Xi Jinping emerged from China's 20th Party Congress in October 2022 with a grip on power unrivaled since Mao Zedong.

read the risk

3. Weapons of mass disruption

New technologies will be a gift to autocrats bent on undermining democracy abroad and stifling dissent at home.

read the risk

4. Inflation shockwaves

Rising interest rates and global recession will raise the risk of emerging-market crises.

read the risk

5. Iran in a corner

The chance of regime collapse is low, but it's higher than at any point in the past four decades.

read the risk

6. Energy crunch

Higher oil prices will also increase frictions between OPEC+ and the United States.

Read the risk

7. Arrested global development

Women and girls will suffer the most, losing hard-earned rights, opportunities, and security.

Read the risk

8. Divided States of America

There is a continuing risk of political violence in the US, even as some who participated in the Capitol riots go to prison.

read the risk

9. Tik Tok boom

Gen Z has both the ability and the motivation to organize online to reshape corporate and public policy, making life harder for multinationals everywhere and disrupting politics with the click of a button.

Read the risk

10. Water stress

This year, water stress will become a global and systemic challenge...while governments will still treat it as a temporary crisis.

Read the risk

Red Herrings

Cracks in support for Ukraine. EU political dysfunction. Taiwan crisis. Tech tit-for-tat. 2023 Red Herrings.

Read the RED HERRINGS

conclusion

We try not to think too hard about writing a report on where the world is going (put it that way, and it feels like a daunting task). But it's not about prediction. You start with where the world is, really is, and to the extent that you get that assessment right, it constrains more outcomes than any crystal ball ever could. In many ways, Top Risks is about the art of what's not possible.

We learn as much about ourselves as the world in the process. What biases are we holding on to that need to be challenged? What are the things we think we know that aren't really so? And what would make us wrong?

We hope we've addressed these issues—we've certainly tried! As always, we'll be keeping the Top Risks on our homepage all year, so we can keep ourselves honest … and then come back in December and see how we've done.

In the meantime, a heartfelt thanks for your support for the 25 years since we started Eurasia Group. It's a milestone that makes us stop for a moment. Yes, we're older, if not wiser (though it helps that we were children when we founded this thing). We're definitely more grateful.

Our very best wishes for our year ahead.

Ian and Cliff

Download Full Report

eurasiagroup.net

11. Opinion: Confidence in the military erodes as culture wars rage

A war that cannot be won: culture war.

In my opinion those who "fight" culture wars (from the radical left or radical right) seem to have no respect for the dignity of the "other." 

Opinion: Confidence in the military erodes as culture wars rage

From accusations of woke-ism to military leaders being too political, confidence in the military is eroding — and that's not good for anyone

BY CARL FORSLING | PUBLISHED JAN 2, 2023 12:35 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Carl Forsling · January 2, 2023

Confidence in the military has eroded after taking hits from both the political left and right for being too politicized.

Perhaps no one is more symbolic of this than Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley. He was appointed by President Trump in 2019 and came under fire from liberals soon after. Most famously, in 2020, he was criticized for accompanying Trump through a Lafayette Square recently cleared of Black Lives Matter protestors for a photo at nearby St. John’s Church. But it only took a few months after that for Milley to make himself a scapegoat of the right ever since he took a firm stand against coups and detailed his personal reading list to senators.

Milley is a 64-year-old man who has served in the military for 42 years. It’s safe to say his political views never changed much in the course of his chairmanship, yet both the left and right have come after him. The military as a whole finds itself in the same dilemma.

U.S. Army Gen. Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speaks to international reporters during a visit to Latvia on March 5, 2022. U.S. Army photo illustration by Maj. Robert Fellingham.

The Ronald Reagan Institute recently published a study about the attitudes of American people toward the US military, which has long been one of the most highly regarded institutions in the US. This study shows a calamitous decline in confidence. Less than half, 48% of recipients, have “a great deal of confidence” in the military. That’s down from 70% five years ago. Lest one blame that on the current administration, confidence in the military is actually up a tick from 2021. Before that, it was in free fall.

Tied for first place in factors decreasing confidence was “Military leadership becoming overly politicized.” Right behind that was, ”… ’woke’ practices undermining military effectiveness.” With polarization increasing in American politics and civil unrest a growing problem, civilian authorities have to be confident the military will both obey lawful orders impartially and also not become a political actor itself. In a democracy, violation of either of those norms is the road to ruin.

This is one of those situations where perception is nearly as important as reality. Even if the military as an institution is apolitical, if civilian leaders don’t trust it due to their own misconceptions or for political expedience, it will not be employed effectively.

That’s why many countries throughout history and even today have multiple militaries, with one more closely associated with the national leader, as insurance against coups. Examples are the Roman Praetorian Guard and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Having another military to defend against your military is no way to run a railroad.

As the Reagan Institute study makes clear, the legitimacy of the military is in doubt more than at any time in living memory. A big part of the change is that now both the left and right take issue with the military. If parties are taken as proxies for “left” and “right,” the two sides are almost the same. 47 percent of Democrats and 51 percent of Republicans had a “great deal of confidence” in the military.

In the years following Vietnam, it was almost taken as a given that the political left was the side that took issue with the military. The anti-war “hippie” is an enduring fixture in popular culture.

In recent years, though, it’s been the political right with trust issues. Just in the past year, Republican confidence in the military decreased by 7 percent. In particular, the main problem they see in the military is “wokeness.” 47 percent of Republicans gave wokeness as a reason for greatly decreasing their confidence in the military.

Right-wing commentators like Tucker Carlson say, “…we realized if the woke generals treat us like they’ve treated the Taliban, we’ll be fine.” Republican politicians like Tommy Tuberville say, “…the president sought to cut defense spending, his administration injected a leftist socialist agenda into our ranks.” Former President Trump says, “You see these generals lately on television? They are woke…Our military will be incapable of fighting and incapable of taking orders.”

This right-wing criticism differs from that of earlier left-wing criticism because it’s much more about what the military is, vice what it does. In years past, the left criticized the military for alleged war crimes during the Vietnam War or detainee torture in Iraq. Those are largely discrete acts that can be proved or disproved. To the extent they’re proven, misdeeds can be punished or corrective action taken.

Capt. Chris “Chowdah” Hill, commanding officer of the USS Arlington (LPD 24), answers questions during training on extremism within the ranks, March 9, 2021. Arlington is underway in the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John D. Bellino/Released.

The wokeness complaint, though, is almost impossible to address, because it’s a condition vice an action. Prominent conservatives then find evidence of this underlying condition. Recently, Donald Trump Jr. and others have touted a figure of “6 million man-hours” devoted to wokeness training in the military. That sounds like a lot, but 5.4 million of those were the roughly two hours per member spent on counter-extremism training.

The assertion is that servicemembers could be using that time learning how to fight wars, implying if those two hours were given back to the units, they’d be spent practicing eye gouges or fast-roping out of helicopters. I know from experience that I spent way over two hours a year in the military being told to wear sunscreen and hydrate before every Memorial Day. It’s almost certain that even if the training schedule was adjusted to the specifications demanded, the military would still be considered too woke. When someone wants to find an issue, they’ll find an issue — even giving female troops uniforms that fit is considered “woke.”

What can change this? The first solution is not up to the military. Politicians and commentators need to rebuild earlier norms about discussing the military. This doesn’t mean not criticizing the military. It means keeping criticism as apolitical as possible. If someone has a problem with the content of unit training, then address the inefficient use of training instead of making accusations with politically charged catchphrases like “wokism.” Just like any relationship, addressing the problem behavior vice making an insult is essential to preserving civility. “I think you should mow the lawn instead of sleeping in today” is far more useful than “You’re a lazy bum.”

But the military also needs to improve its communication skills. The military’s communication, both inside and outside the military, is often clumsy and not suited for today’s media environment. It is so out of touch that it alienates both left and right — witness it being simultaneously hammered from the left for not talking enough about sexual assault and from the right for talking about it too much.

The key is to consistently address issues in terms of combat effectiveness, e.g. “We can’t fight effectively if a quarter of our personnel fears being assaulted by their own side.” Consistency and brevity in messaging are essential in a heavily-edited, internet-based media environment. Lengthy explanations will never be aired or shared and go straight into the collective memory hole.

The 82nd Airborne Division’s Color Guard and All-American Chorus perform before the Carolina Panthers vs. Atlanta Falcons game at Bank of America Stadium in Charlotte, N.C., Nov 10, 2022. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Emely Opio-Wright.

Lastly, our country’s “every servicemember is a hero” culture means that every veteran involved in politics, from private to general, on both left and right, highlights that service. While a politician’s resume is important, the prominence of military experience disproportionate to its relevance politicizes the military more every time it’s done.

From former senior officers publishing political open letters to campaigning solely on their military experience to famous generals appearing at conspiracy theorist events, it’s all bad for the perception of the military as an apolitical institution. Former military, especially general officers and flag officers, need to be careful when leveraging their experience politically. Statutory prohibitions against running for office for some number of years should be considered, especially for senior officers.

Whatever our other differences, everyone should realize that weakening the military via ongoing culture wars to further a political feud is not in the best interest of the country. If our politicians and pundits don’t get their acts together, they, like the famous apocryphal commander in Vietnam, might “destroy the village in order to save it.”

The latest on Task & Purpose

• All alone, together: The emotional essence of Christmas at war
• ‘We make it fun’ — Inside an Air Force Christmas at 30,000 feet over war-torn Iraq
• Christmas in, Christmas out: A holiday deployment story
• The complicated truth about the famous ‘Christmas Truce’ of World War I
• What it’s like to spend Christmas in combat, according to US military veterans

taskandpurpose.com · by Carl Forsling · January 2, 2023

12. Netanyahu Signals Israel Will Press Syria Strikes

Netanyahu Signals Israel Will Press Syria Strikes

fdd.org · January 2, 2023

Latest Developments

Syria said Israel attacked Damascus International Airport today, briefly putting the site out of service. According to preliminary media reports, the target was a position run by the Quds Force, the foreign operations arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Syrian military said a second predawn Israeli strike killed at least two of its personnel south of Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly promised to push back against Tehran’s regional belligerence and nuclear advances.

Expert Analysis

“Almost a decade has passed since Israel began its ‘campaign between wars’ in Syria, whose pace of airstrikes — according to IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kohavi — has increased from once in every four months at the outset to once per week today. Syrian airports have increasingly been targeted — a reflection of their increasing use by Iran for unloading advanced weaponry destined for terror groups on Israel’s border and Hezbollah in Lebanon. That Damascus International Airport appears to have resumed some operations within eight hours of Monday’s strike is a testament to Israeli precision in carrying out the strike.” — Mark Dubowitz, FDD Chief Executive

“Despite Russia’s Ukraine invasion, in Syria, at least, the rules between Jerusalem and Moscow seem to be holding: Israel carries out strikes against Iranian targets without encountering Russian resistance, presumably with some advance warning to avoid unplanned clashes or casualties. This serves Israeli interests and can be expected to weigh on Netanyahu’s mind against considering any dramatic Israeli policy shift in the Ukraine crisis.” — David Adesnik, FDD Senior Fellow and Director of Research

The ‘Campaign Between Wars’

The Israeli operations — which Israel did not immediately confirm or comment on — appeared to be the first in its so-called “campaign between wars” since Netanyahu returned to power last week. Tehran has exploited the decade-long civil war in Syria to entrench itself militarily in the country and to deliver large quantities of advanced weaponry to the Hezbollah terrorist group in Lebanon. In October 2022, Israeli military officials asserted that Israel had destroyed 90 percent of Iranian military infrastructure in Syria over the course of recent years.

The Russia-Syria Nexus

The Israeli operations follow a December 22 phone call between Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which the Israeli leader, according to a statement from his office, said he was “determined to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and to halt its attempts to establish a military base on [Israel’s] northern border.” As Damascus’ big-power ally during the Syrian civil war, the Russians maintain air defenses in the Arab country as well as a military deconfliction mechanism with Israel.

Related Analysis

“The Quiet War between Israel and Iran,” by Jonathan Schanzer

“Breaking Precedent, Israel Provides Details of Syria Air Strike,” FDD Flash Brief

“Israel Reveals Iranian Missile Production Sites in Syria,” FDD Flash Brief

fdd.org · January 2, 2023

13. Gaza-Based Terrorist Organizations Continue Efforts to Attack Israelis

Gaza-Based Terrorist Organizations Continue Efforts to Attack Israelis

fdd.org · December 30, 2022

Latest Developments

The Shin Bet stated on Monday that it prevented a “significant terror attack” earlier in December. The Shin Bet, also known as the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) and Shabak, reported that Israeli forces arrested four Palestinians in the West Bank, confiscating an explosive device disguised as a fire extinguisher that the terrorists planned to detonate in an unspecified Israeli city. According to ISA, the group was taking orders from two Gaza-based terror organizations working together — the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

Expert Analysis

“The Palestinian Authority has been on life support for many years. Its failure to collect taxes, violent crackdowns against political activists, and widespread corruption have been growing. In this vacuum, Palestinian terrorist organizations have enjoyed greater freedom of action.” — Joe Truzman, Research Analyst at FDD’s Long War Journal

The Popular Resistance Committees and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

The PRC, founded in 2000 as an offshoot of Fatah, is the third-largest Palestinian terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip. The PRC has claimed credit for more than a hundred attacks against Israelis and Americans. For example, on October 16, 2003, the PRC planted a roadside bomb that struck a U.S. diplomatic vehicle in Beit Lahiya, Gaza, killing three Americans and injuring one. Despite the numerous attacks claimed by the group, the latest plot is the first time the PRC has activated a cell in the West Bank.

Like the PRC, the Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, established in 2000, is active in Gaza and the West Bank. It represents one of the largest terrorist organizations in the West Bank, and has significantly contributed to the uptick in violence in the territory since last May. Since its inception, it has claimed dozens of attacks, including suicide bombings against Israeli civilians. Washington designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2002.

A Growing Threat from Gaza

The foiled attack is not the first time this year that the Shin Bet has busted a terror cell in the West Bank taking orders from Gaza. In October, the agency arrested a Hamas cell in the West Bank — directed and funded by a Hamas militant in Gaza — that was reportedly planning to commit shooting attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians. A month earlier, the Shin Bet arrested a Hamas terror cell directed from Gaza that shot at an Israeli vehicle in the northern West Bank.

A Concerted Effort by Terrorist Groups

The uptick in violence that has occurred over the last year and a half is a concerted effort by Palestinian terrorist groups to destabilize the West Bank and undermine the Palestinian Authority. These developments warrant close attention, as the operation of key Gaza-based militant groups in the West Bank is a relatively new phenomenon, suggesting that opponents of the Palestinian Authority feel newly emboldened to advance their drive for power.

Related Analysis

“The U.S. Should Sanction Gaza’s Popular Resistance Committees,” by Joe Truzman

“Taming West Bank Chaos Remains a Challenge for Israel,” FDD Flash Brief

fdd.org · December 30, 2022

14. A Taiwan Invasion Would Cost China Dearly

It will cost everyone dearly.

Conclusion:

To be sure, nations go to war and take other military actions despite obvious economic drawbacks. Economists at the turn of the nineteenth century infamously dismissed the possibility of a European war because of the continent’s extreme economic integration would make war extremely costly. World War I showed the fault in that analysis. Especially when questions of sovereignty are involved and still more when they involve the hyper-sensitivities of China’s leadership, economic considerations may well be dismissed. But they are huge and should factor into Beijing’s calculations. For economic reasons alone, Beijing would do well to continue with past practices: claim sovereignty but resist forcing the matter and perhaps occasionally make dramatic demonstrations.

A Taiwan Invasion Would Cost China Dearly

Forbes · by Milton Ezrati · January 2, 2023

... [+]AFP via Getty Images

Beijing has criticized Japan’s defense buildup as well as Taiwan’s decision to extend conscription. Never mind that Japan is reacting to Chinese belligerence (as well as North Korea’s) and Taiwan is reacting to Beijing’s outright threats of invasion or isolation. Some suggest that these moves by Japan and Taiwan might prompt China to move against Taiwan sooner, so as to strike before the potential opposition can build up its fighting abilities. From this side of the Pacific, it is all but impossible to assesses the probabilities. What goes on inside Beijing’s forbidden city is, as ever, inscrutable. But one thing China’s leadership knows or should know is this: the economics of a move against Taiwan is not good. An invasion or blockade would cost China’s already beleaguered economy dearly. Economics, of course, can never tell the whole story, and often takes a back seat to geopolitics and national pride. But to the extent that anyone in Beijing is listening, the economics makes a strong case for the moderation.

A first economic consideration is how much more important Taiwan has become to the Chinese economy. Taiwanese buying in China has increased some 87 percent during the past five years. That is an average of 13.3 percent a year, a faster rate than most measures of bilateral trade anywhere in the world. At the same time, China has become increasingly dependent on Taiwanese products. Chinese imports from Taiwan have increased some 71 percent over the past five years. That is an average of 11.3 percent a year.

More critical is the nature of China’s purchases from Taiwan. Some 64 percent of them are electrical machinery products, mostly semiconductors. This trade is vital to China, which at last measure could only produce some 10-15 percent of its silicon chip needs domestically. Taiwan, in fact, accounts for some 63 percent of the global contract manufacture of microchips, the lion’s share from a single company, TSMC. Taiwan accounts for some 92 percent of much sought-after miniature integrated circuits, those of less than 10 nanometers.

An invasion or blockade would bring the loss of all this. That is especially true of TSMC’s operation. Asked if China, after invasion, could simply take over the firm’s facilities, TSMC’s Chairman Mark Liu explained that because the company depends for parts, software, and diagnostics on real-time connections in Japan, Europe, and the United States, the place would become completely inoperable in the hands of the People’s Liberation Army. Nor is it clear that China in the event of an invasion would have use of Taiwan-based production operations in China, including the Apple supplier, Foxconn.

Aside from such direct Taiwanese-Chinese links, China’s relatively brief military exercises did a lot to point up the more general cost (to China and the world) of an invasion or a blockade. Those exercises interrupted all shipping in an area of ocean that averages some 240 ships a day. A Chinese blockade, much less an invasion, especially if contested by the United States, would stop all this shipping for an extended time and in so doing cripple China’s major ports of Shanghai, Delian, and Tianjin. The Taiwan Strait is a major conduit for all North Asia shipping to the rest of the world and the most direct route from South China to North America. It is estimated that just under half the world’s container ships passed through the strait during the last seven months, and 88 percent of the largest of these ships. Tankers carrying 1 million barrels of oil a day pass though that narrow body of water. World trade would suffer, China’s especially.

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To be sure, nations go to war and take other military actions despite obvious economic drawbacks. Economists at the turn of the nineteenth century infamously dismissed the possibility of a European war because of the continent’s extreme economic integration would make war extremely costly. World War I showed the fault in that analysis. Especially when questions of sovereignty are involved and still more when they involve the hyper-sensitivities of China’s leadership, economic considerations may well be dismissed. But they are huge and should factor into Beijing’s calculations. For economic reasons alone, Beijing would do well to continue with past practices: claim sovereignty but resist forcing the matter and perhaps occasionally make dramatic demonstrations.

Forbes · by Milton Ezrati · January 2, 2023​

15. Taiwan Prepares

Excerpt:

So, China would have nothing to gain but everything to lose. An attack on Taiwan would also galvanise international support for Taiwan. That would be detrimental to China’s interests. Taiwan’s President Tsai has not loosened her guard.

Taiwan Prepares - The Statesman

If China becomes adventurous and militarily attacks Taiwan, the US most likely would intervene as broader geopolitical considerations are involved. If such a situation unfolds it would cause incalculable damage to China’s military, economy and civilian infrastructure, and result in China’s total isolation from the global economy and international organisations. So, China would have nothing to gain but everything to lose.

Rajaram Panda | New Delhi | January 2, 2023 2:47 pm

thestatesman.com · by SNS · January 2, 2023

Tension is building up in the Taiwan Straits following China’s increasing military activities with the sole intention to intimidate the island nation, which it claims as its breakaway province and wants to annex, if necessary, by use of force. In its latest reported incursion on 25 December, China sent 71 warplanes, including fighter jets, to Taiwan’s air defence identification zone to intimidate the island.

Of these aircraft, 43 crossed the Taiwan Strait’s median line, an unofficial buffer between the two sides that lies within the defence zone. This constituted Beijing’s largest recent military activity within a 24-hour period. The intention of the drills was to manipulate public opinion in Taiwan.

China justified the drills as a resolute response to the current US-Taiwan provocation without specifying what the provocation was. China probably was referring to US President Joe Biden signing into law the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 2023, which contained Taiwan-friendly provisions.

The US sincerely feels that the Chinese activity shall destabilise the situation, risk miscalculation and undermine regional peace and stability. It therefore endorses President Tsai Ingwen’s decision to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability, which is in line with its longstanding commitments and consistent with its ‘One China”’ policy.

China’s argument on the provocation was flawed as the drills were held in international waters, where China is free to engage in such activities. Other countries conduct freedom of navigation passages of the Tai[1]wan Strait and the South China Sea. For example, the US and South Korea regularly perform drills in international waters and airspace near North Korea.

The reason not to put too much importance on the Chinese drills is because the public opinion in Taiwan is rarely affected by such drills. The Taiwanese people have grown used to these and do not take them seriously. Does this then mean only political posturing? The answer can be both Yes and No as it is not easy to decipher what Beijing has in mind despite frequent sabre​ ​rattling.

The closest Taiwan and China came to war was several decades ago in the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui accepted an invitation to deliver a speech at Cornell University in the US. China at the time fired missiles near Taiwan, but backed off when the US sent aircraft carrier groups to the region.

Though China has acquired more military muscle since then, it is still not a match to the US might. It is aware that the US would be inevitably involved in any Taiwan-China military conflict, if it occurs, and that it cannot win a conflict that involves the US.

If China becomes adventurous and militarily attacks Taiwan, the US most likely would intervene as broader geopolitical considerations are involved. If such a situation unfolds it would cause incalculable dam[1]age to China’s military, economy and civilian infrastructure, and result in China’s total isolation from the global economy and international organisations.

So, China would have nothing to gain but everything to lose. An attack on Taiwan would also galvanise international support for Taiwan. That would be detrimental to China’s interests. Taiwan’s President Tsai has not loosened her guard.

On 27 December, she announced that compulsory military service will be extended from four months to one year, effective from 1 January 2024, to strengthen Taiwan’s combat readiness against potential Chinese attacks. In order to allay public disapproval, Tsai announced an increase in the monthly salary so that the basic daily expenses of the recruits are taken care of.

The decision is expected to affect conscripts who are born on 1 January 2005 and after. The announcement was not sudden but reached after months of discussion. Tsai also took a clue from Ukraine’s wholesale mobilisation to ward off a Russian invasion and decided to return to longer training periods for conscripts. Tsai’s decision on conscription is not new.

It dates back to 1949 when the Republic of China government relocated to Taiwan following the Chinese Civil War. At the end of the 20th century, all Taiwanese men aged 18 and over had to serve two to three years in the military as part of the country’s conscription system. After 2000, conscription was gradually reduced, limiting it to one year in 2008.

During the long Kuomintang administration under President Ma Ying-jeou which governed from 2008 to 2016, the government turned the nation’s military into a mainly voluntary force, with conscripts serving in support roles, serving military training only for four months starting in 2013.

Tsai would face many hurdles in the reintroduction of conscription as implementing the programme could be challenging given Taiwan’s lack of officers to train conscripts and lack of resources and facilities needed to expand training regimens.

The plan would entail universities to develop ways to make curricula more flexible so that conscripts can finish service while studying. Tsai justified the decision as difficult but inevitable as Taiwan’s survival is involved. Tsai is also looking to bolster Taiwan’s reservist system and would consider implementing a militia system.

Cognizant of the looming threat from China, Tsai strongly feels that Taiwan must prepare for war, and ensure that it can fight to prevent war or end it if one begins. The standard courses envisaged would focus on discipline, equipment maintenance, basic training and stress training, while physical training would include basic fitness, grenade throwing and a 500-metre obstacle course.

Physical training would incorporate science-based learning for health management and muscle-building. The arms training section would increase the number of shots fired from 104 to 160 to ensure that recruits know the differences between weapons and how firing positions affect accuracy.

Combat training is to focus on combat techniques, field medicine and what to do in the event of a biological or nuclear disaster, while the training regimen for recruits is to include marches, camp setting and other skills.

The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) supported Tsai’s decision on extended conscription, saying that it underscores Taiwan’s commitment to self-defence and strengthens deterrence. The US also said Chinese drills near Taiwan, regardless of scale, have no impact on its support for Taiwan.

Viewed in the larger geopolitical context, it would be naive to think that the US would waver from its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and its “One China” policy, while at the same time lauding Taiwan’s resolve to maintain sufficient self-defence capability

thestatesman.com · by SNS · January 2, 2023

16. The Case for Taking Crimea

Excerpts:

Although the West uniformly, and rightly, condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it effectively accepted Moscow’s act. The only tangible response that the United States and Europe could muster was a sanctions regime with countless loopholes, allowing the Russian economy to keep growing. Indeed, even the sanctioning states continued to expand their business ties to Moscow, including by increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is therefore little wonder that the Kremlin felt emboldened to invade the rest of Ukraine. Russia is bent on taking land and increasing its sphere of influence so it can restore its empire. When Moscow senses weakness, it jumps. This is why Kyiv cannot bargain away Crimea for peace, as some Western analysts have suggested. Doing so would further reward and incentivize Putin’s aggression. Additionally, such a deal would not be effective. As long as Putin runs Russia’s government, the Kremlin will never settle for a peace agreement in which Ukraine “just” gives up Crimea. It wants and will keep fighting for more. Indeed, should the West display indecision or hesitation in supporting Ukraine’s goals in Crimea, Russia will try to capitalize on the dithering by working to fracture the states supporting Kyiv.

As a result, Kyiv and its allies must press on, battling until it can make Moscow hand over Crimea via negotiations or until Ukraine has forcibly pried the peninsula from Moscow’s grasp. Doing so is the only way to inflict the kind of major defeat Russia must experience if it is to abandon its imperial ambitions and start abiding by international norms and laws. The United States and Europe should understand that they, too, will benefit from a total Ukrainian victory. It could mark the permanent end of Russian aggression, breathing new life into the liberal world order.

Liberating Crimea would also set an important historical precedent for the wider world. If Ukraine does not retake Crimea—if Russia gets away with annexation—other states will become more likely to wage wars of conquest. They will move to occupy their neighbor’s territory, reasoning that they can get away with certain kinds of land grabs. Winning in Crimea, then, is essential to preventing future conflicts and thwarting a return to conquest.

The Case for Taking Crimea

Why Ukraine Can—and Should—Liberate the Province

By Andriy Zagorodnyuk

January 2, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · January 2, 2023

For Ukrainians, 2022 was a year of both tragedy and historic achievements. Russia invaded Ukraine in February with nearly 190,000 troops, inflicting untold destruction and killing tens of thousands of people. But within a few weeks, the Ukrainian military managed to stall the offensive. Then, it began forcing the Russians back. Since August, Ukrainian troops have recaptured more than half the territory Russia had seized, upending Moscow’s hopes of success. To try to demonstrate some gains, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that he had annexed four Ukrainian provinces—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—at the end of September. But it was for naught. Russia had full control over none of the provinces when Putin made his announcement, and his forces have lost even more ground since then.

Yet Russia still controls one Ukrainian province: Crimea. In 2014, Russia seized the peninsula in a remarkable breach of international law. Putin actively exploits a narrative that claims Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine, carried out by the Soviet Union in 1954, was “erroneous.” In taking the peninsula, Putin believes he has both corrected what he called a “mistake” and improved Russia’s international position, restoring his country to great-power status.

But those premises are false. Crimea has a rich and unique history; it has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial. It became a rightful part of independent Ukraine after a 1991 nationwide referendum in which Ukrainians—including a majority of Crimean residents—voted for independence from the Soviet Union. It is easy to understand why Crimeans wanted out. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, whereas Ukraine was en route to becoming a pluralistic democracy. Moscow’s current rule has revitalized many of the Soviet Union’s dictatorial practices in Crimea, including oppressing minorities and subjecting citizens to a state media that peddles propaganda. Moscow turned the area into a giant, menacing garrison, which it then used to invade Ukraine. As long as the peninsula remains in the Kremlin’s hands, Ukraine—and Ukrainians—cannot be free of Russian aggression.

Western states are united in their belief that the 2014 annexation of Crimea was, and is, unacceptable. But the United States and its partners have been squeamish about endorsing any plans that would return Crimea to Ukraine. Many Western policymakers have suggested that Kyiv could not succeed in a military campaign for the province. In November, for instance, Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Ukraine’s odds of kicking the Russians out of Crimea were “not high.” Other analysts believe that reintegrating Crimeans into Ukraine might prove too tricky or that an attack on Crimea would prompt nuclear retaliation. Better, they suggest, that Ukraine not fight for the peninsula. Some even say that Kyiv should offer it up in exchange for peace.

The West’s fears are not entirely unfounded. Russia has had eight years to absorb Crimea and has built up a significant military presence in the peninsula. Crimea also has at least 700,000 Russian residents who moved in after 2014 (out of a population of 2.4 million): a fact that will complicate any reintegration effort. The world can never rule out the chance that Russia will use nuclear weapons, especially when it is governed by Putin. These are all good reasons why Ukraine should be careful in how it goes about freeing Crimea.

But they are not reasons for Ukraine to abandon the peninsula altogether. And there are plenty of reasons why Crimea must be returned. Russia’s military footprint, for example, is actually a reason to fight for Crimea, since a battle over the territory would seriously degrade Russia’s ability to wage war and terrorize Ukraine and other states. The other concerns about Ukraine’s ability to retake the peninsula and nuclear attacks are all at least somewhat overblown. After consecutive months of battlefield success, it is clear that Ukraine has the capacity to liberate Crimea. Although some Crimeans may want to remain part of Russia, many more of them would be happy to escape the Kremlin’s grasp. And Putin’s nuclear threats are likely just bluster. He did, after all, promise to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, only to back down. Ukraine should therefore plan to liberate Crimea—and the West should plan to help.

CRIMEA IS UKRAINE

One of Russia’s key narratives, pushed by Moscow for decades and repeated by many international observers, is that Crimea has a special historical connection with Russia. It is true that the Sevastopol has long been a Russian naval base and that its southern coast is home to many nineteenth-century Russian aristocratic palaces. Most of the peninsula’s people speak Russian. As a result, Putin has reasoned that in taking back Crimea, he corrected a historical error.

But Crimean history is much richer and more diverse than this narrative suggests. The peninsula became a part of Russia only after the country invaded it, in 1783; it has been ruled by multiple empires over the course of the last millennium. Crimea has thousands of unique landmarks with no connection to Russia, and it is home to many ethnic groups. Russia’s version of Crimea’s past is cherrypicked, and its justification for the occupation rests on the ridiculous assumption that past possession and linguistics give one state the right to a neighbor’s land. The United Kingdom ruled Ireland for centuries, and under London’s governance, English became the island’s most widely spoken language. But that does not mean the United Kingdom would be justified in seizing it.

An honest evaluation of history makes clear that Crimea should be part of Ukraine, not Russia. It is legally recognized and accepted as Ukrainian territory by the entire world—including, until 2014, by Russia. Crimea has been governed by Kyiv for 60 of the past 70 years, and so most of its residents know it first and foremost as a Ukrainian peninsula. During the course of that time, the region went from being economically depressed to solidly middle class, thanks to Ukrainian water supplies, energy supplies, and—after Ukrainian independence—a boom in tourist activity. Putin may be right that millions of Russians have an affinity for the territory, but so do millions of Ukrainians—because they have either visited it or lived there. There is a reason that an overwhelming majority of United Nations General Assembly members strongly condemned Crimea’s annexation and deemed it invalid.

Crimea has not been a part of Russia since time immemorial.

Russia will never permit a real referendum on the peninsula’s future, and so it is impossible to know exactly how Crimeans themselves feel today. One poll, conducted in 2019 by the Levada Center, showed that a majority of the peninsula’s residents wanted Crimea to be part of Russia. But it is difficult to trust any polls done in a totalitarian state and Russia has criminalized opposition to Crimea’s annexation. Polled Crimeans could have been afraid of admitting that they would rather be part of Ukraine. And there are many reasons to think that a free and fair vote on Crimea’s status today would yield the same results as the one held in 1991. Such a referendum would, for starters, have to include the over 100,000 Crimean residents that Russia intimidated, harassed, and even physically assaulted until they left the peninsula. A lot of these people were made to sell their property at a loss and abandon their businesses. (Most of the territory’s large Ukrainian companies and utilities also lost their assets.) These Crimean émigrés would almost certainly opt for Ukrainian governance, giving the pro-Kyiv faction a solid starting base. Many of the peninsula’s remaining residents would also vote for Ukraine, as might some new arrivals who would prefer to live in a liberal state. Crimean residents have certainly complained about how Russia treats the peninsula’s environment, as well as the economic disruptions created by sanctions.

Ukrainian liberation would prove particularly popular among—and meaningful to—hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars: a group that has been especially persecuted by Moscow. Unlike the Russians, they have inhabited the peninsula since the early medieval era. For centuries, Crimean Tatars even had their own state on the landmass. Crimea is their only homeland. But under Soviet and Russian rule, they have been violently persecuted. In 1944, for example, they were forcibly deported, allowed to return only in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union was about to collapse. Under Putin’s rule, they have been pressed to leave again. Those who have stayed are frequently forbidden from working, arrested without cause, and detained without being accused of wrongdoing. Some have been kidnapped. Some of their cultural monuments are being dismantled. They deserve an end to Russia’s totalitarian rule.

SAFE, NOT SORRY

Ukraine must retake Crimea for reasons that go beyond justice. Russia has turned Crimea into a large military base, which it used to launch its sweeping invasion. This use of the peninsula is why Russia had much more success fighting in Ukraine’s south than in its north. Russia continues to use the Crimea-stationed Black Sea Fleet and the peninsula’s air bases to launch drone and missile attacks. This belligerence makes it clear that Ukraine cannot be safe or rebuild its economy until Crimea is out of Russian hands, and so Kyiv will not stop fighting until it regains the province.

Russian control of Crimea is not just a security risk for Ukraine. Moscow’s hold on the peninsula endangers the whole world. From Crimea, Russia projects power across both Europe and the Middle East, threatening the safety of many other states. By occupying the peninsula, Russia has gained authority in both the Black Sea and the Azov Sea, the latter of which Russian troops now completely surround. Controlling both bodies of water has been Putin’s goal for years: the two seas are a massive shipping route for all kinds of products on the Eurasian continent. By occupying Crimea, Russia can control access to many of the seas’ ports and passages, giving it power over vast supplies of many commodities, including coal, iron ore, various industrial products, and grain from Ukraine. (The Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol lost most of their traffic after Russia started restricting access to the Azov Sea in 2018.)

To see why Russia’s power over the peninsula is so dangerous to the rest of the world, consider the ongoing food security crisis—which was prompted by Russia’s invasion. Without Crimea, Russia would not have been able to threaten shipping in the Black and Azov Seas since the vast majority of these sea lanes fall outside Russia’s exclusive economic zone. Moscow certainly would not be able to use Ukrainian territorial waters and ports to project power. But by occupying Crimea, Russia came to dominate these seas and their ports.

Occupying Crimea has also given Russia more control over the world’s energy supplies. The Black Sea is home to many resources, including significant natural gas deposits that Ukraine was once prepared to tap. In fact, just before Russia began occupying Crimea, Exxon Mobil signed a memo with Kyiv to drill for $6 billion worth of the sea’s natural gas deposits—one of many companies working with Ukraine to access these assets. Had the projects gone through, Europe’s energy map would have been forever transformed, and the continent could more easily have weaned itself from Russian energy. But when Moscow sent troops into Crimea in 2014, the companies all canceled their projects. As long as the province and other areas of the Black Sea remain in Russia’s hands, business will not come back.

WORDS AND DEEDS

So how would Ukraine liberate Crimea? Ideally, it would be done through diplomacy. Putin will never consider peacefully parting with the peninsula, but if he is booted from office, his successors may have a different calculus. They will inherit a severely sanctioned country with a dramatically weakened military. They will still be fighting Ukraine’s more talented armed forces—and therefore staring down more defeats. Finally, they will be facing international litigation, initiated by Ukraine, that demands hundreds of billions of dollars in damages. Moscow will likely lose in court, and Western states will make the government pay by simply transferring Russia’s frozen assets to Kyiv. Faced with such a situation, the Kremlin might offer to return Crimea as part of a deal that prevents Russia from going into bankruptcy and prevents the domestic unrest that would arise with any economic chaos.

But Ukraine cannot count on a change in leadership in Russia. It also cannot bank on Russia’s next leaders being ready for peace. Kyiv, then, needs to retain a military option, and it must start preparing to win such a fight.

Although not easy, Ukraine has the capability to retake Crimea—a fact the West is starting to acknowledge. According to NBC News, in December, a Biden administration official told Congress that Kyiv would be able to liberate the peninsula. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, said that Ukraine has a chance to free Crimea by the end of this coming summer.

The most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia.

There is a military justification for these projections. By the time Ukrainian forces are ready to move on the peninsula, most Russian capabilities will be severely damaged. Russia’s surviving soldiers will be exhausted, and the country’s stockpile of precision missiles will be depleted. Its naval bases, air bases, and resupply routes to Crimea will have been damaged by Ukrainian attacks. Because Crimea is connected to the Eurasian continent only by a narrow, vulnerable isthmus and a bridge, once Ukrainian troops enter the region, the remaining Russian forces will be trapped (making Russian military sites even more vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes). And for all its significance, the Crimean Peninsula is ultimately just land: something the Ukrainian military has been very successful at reclaiming.

Of course, Ukraine will have to consider the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet, a keystone of Crimea’s Russian military presence. It is a force for which Ukraine has no real equivalent. But although Ukraine’s small navy does not measure up against Russia’s, the Black Sea Fleet is not the obstacle it might seem. The fleet has an assault capacity of roughly 20 old ships, all of which are so vulnerable to strikes that Russia has hidden them away from the Ukrainian coastline. But Ukraine can still acquire and produce enough unmanned vehicles and missile systems to destroy them. And the fleet is smaller than it was at the start of the war thanks to Ukrainian attacks. Ukraine succeeded, for instance, in sinking the fleet’s flagship. The Ukrainians will not have trouble further chipping away at the Russian navy in forthcoming months, at least to a point where the navy cannot effectively stop them. Ukraine, after all, has a good track record of getting around the Black Sea Fleet. If the Russian navy could not defend the Black Sea’s Snake Island, which is less than 0.1 square miles, it is hard to imagine how it would stop Ukraine from crossing the isthmus.

Ultimately, the most challenging part of a campaign for Crimea may not be outfoxing Russia. It could be winning over locals who back Moscow. Despite all of the Kremlin’s abuses, Crimea is home to far more Putin supporters than are other parts of Ukraine, especially given that the population has had an influx of Russian residents and has experienced years of nonstop Russian propaganda. It would be dangerous for Kyiv to assume that Ukraine’s military will be welcomed there as it was in Kherson. Ukraine will need to substantially research what policies it should adopt, including with regard to finance, banking, and law enforcement. It must also figure out how to provide restitution to the many Crimeans who were stripped of their jobs and property by the Russian government. It will need to rework the peninsula’s state services—particularly for education, which has been conducted for years using a Russian curriculum based in propaganda. Critically, it must ensure that residents who support Russia’s dictatorship will not want to destabilize the peninsula, and it must guarantee that law-abiding citizens have a balanced, fair, and democratic government.

STAND YOUR GROUND

Although the West uniformly, and rightly, condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it effectively accepted Moscow’s act. The only tangible response that the United States and Europe could muster was a sanctions regime with countless loopholes, allowing the Russian economy to keep growing. Indeed, even the sanctioning states continued to expand their business ties to Moscow, including by increasing their dependence on Russian energy exports.

It is therefore little wonder that the Kremlin felt emboldened to invade the rest of Ukraine. Russia is bent on taking land and increasing its sphere of influence so it can restore its empire. When Moscow senses weakness, it jumps. This is why Kyiv cannot bargain away Crimea for peace, as some Western analysts have suggested. Doing so would further reward and incentivize Putin’s aggression. Additionally, such a deal would not be effective. As long as Putin runs Russia’s government, the Kremlin will never settle for a peace agreement in which Ukraine “just” gives up Crimea. It wants and will keep fighting for more. Indeed, should the West display indecision or hesitation in supporting Ukraine’s goals in Crimea, Russia will try to capitalize on the dithering by working to fracture the states supporting Kyiv.

As a result, Kyiv and its allies must press on, battling until it can make Moscow hand over Crimea via negotiations or until Ukraine has forcibly pried the peninsula from Moscow’s grasp. Doing so is the only way to inflict the kind of major defeat Russia must experience if it is to abandon its imperial ambitions and start abiding by international norms and laws. The United States and Europe should understand that they, too, will benefit from a total Ukrainian victory. It could mark the permanent end of Russian aggression, breathing new life into the liberal world order.

Liberating Crimea would also set an important historical precedent for the wider world. If Ukraine does not retake Crimea—if Russia gets away with annexation—other states will become more likely to wage wars of conquest. They will move to occupy their neighbor’s territory, reasoning that they can get away with certain kinds of land grabs. Winning in Crimea, then, is essential to preventing future conflicts and thwarting a return to conquest.

• ANDRIY ZAGORODNYUK is Chair of the Centre for Defence Strategies. From 2019 to 2020, he was Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Foreign Affairs · by Andriy Zagorodnyuk · January 2, 2023

17. Economics key to Japan’s new security strategy

Excerpts:

All these factors suggest that international cooperation has become more important than ever. No single country can enhance the resilience of supply chains, develop emerging technologies and respond to hybrid threats without the help of others.

Competition must also be managed through diplomatic measures such as enhancing transparency, confidence-building and crisis management. Today’s comprehensive security should be considered from both competitive and cooperative perspectives.

It is high time that Japan considered its comprehensive security strategy with other like-minded partners, rather than on its own.

Economics key to Japan’s new security strategy

Russian reduction of energy exports and Western sanctions show importance of ‘weaponization of interdependence’​ ​

asiatimes.com · by Tomohiko Satake · January 3, 2023

Economic security, or keizai anpo, continues to loom large in the Japanese strategic debate. Since 2019, the Japanese government has rapidly put in place new positions, organizations and bills related to economic security.

According to Takayuki Kobayashi, former minister for economic security, the term refers to securing “the Japanese state and national interest through economic measures.”

To achieve this objective, the Japanese parliament passed the Economic Security Promotion Act in 2022 to strengthen supply chain resilience, protect critical infrastructure, develop emerging technologies and prevent technology outflow.

There’s a history to this

It is not the first time that Japan has recognized the economy as an integral part of its security. In the mid-1970s, Japanese politicians, intellectuals and businesspeople began to discuss the need for ‘comprehensive security’ (sogo anzen hosho) that included economic, food and energy security.

A 1980 report published by an advisory board to the Masayoshi Ohira government (the Ohira Report) advocated a “comprehensive security strategy” promoting Japanese security by various measures in multiple domains.

While the report never underestimated the importance of military roles, it acknowledged the importance of other areas – such as economic, food and energy security – and recommended that Japan should enhance its security by coordinating policies across different areas and means.

The 1980 report reflected dynamic changes occurring in the international security environment after the early 1970s. The 1973 and 1978 oil shocks and high inflation led Tokyo to recognize that security could be jeopardized by non-military threats. To secure energy resources, it became imperative to review Japan’s overdependence on the Middle East and diversify its energy supply chains.

The Ohira Report also addressed the decline of US primacy and Japan’s growing desire for autonomous economic growth. With “the termination of clear American supremacy in both military and economic spheres,” the report argued the world would enter an era of “peace maintained by shared responsibilities.” In such an environment, Japan should enhance its self-help efforts and contribute to the strengthening and the maintenance of the system.

The US-Japan security alliance maintains peace through shared responsibilities. Image: Twitter

The evolution of comprehensive security also reflects deeper changes in the nature of power politics during the 1970s. As Kyoto University Professor Hiroshi Nakanishi points out, “the diversification and the complication of power politics” promoted the multi-polarization of international relations.

As demonstrated by the US defeat in the Vietnam War, economic relations and psychological factors came to play an important role in power politics alongside military capability.

According to Nakanishi, these diversified and complex power politics also blurred the boundaries between “high politics” associated with ideology, governance and military strategy, and “low politics” concerned with the economy, energy supply and social affairs.

In an environment characterized by what Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane termed “complex interdependence,” Japan was forced to adopt a more autonomous and comprehensive foreign security posture that could deal with a broader range of challenges.

The more things change …

The conditions identified above – Japan’s energy crisis, the decline of US primacy and the complication and diversification of power politics – have become even more prominent in today’s security environment.

During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union’s GDP was less than 25% of US GDP. In 2022, China’s GDP amounts to nearly 75% of US GDP. After the 1972 Sino-US rapprochement, Washington was able to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict and maintain a pivotal position. Today, however, China is increasingly aligned with Russia, challenging the US-led order.

The rise of the emerging states, the development of military and information technology and the promotion of interdependence have created a highly diversified and more complex security environment compared with the 1970s.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its nuclear brinkmanship show that traditional power politics has not become a thing of the past. At the same time, Ukraine’s surprising resistance against Russia suggests how non-military or non-kinetic factors, such as national morale, information warfare and cyber-defense, play increasingly important roles in determining war outcomes.

Both Russia’s reduction of energy supplies and the West’s sanctions against Moscow also demonstrate that the “weaponization of interdependence” may be no less important than conventional warfare.

Japan has been responding to this complex security environment. Although in the Cold War era the Soviet Union was the primary source of external threat, Japan now faces threats on three fronts: China, North Korea and an increasingly belligerent Russia.

The largest China Coast Guard vessel yet, equipped with a 76mm gun, was caught navigating the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa prefecture in November 2022. Photo: 11th Regional Japan Coast Guard Headquarters

In addition to the deployment of its well-known gray-zone tactics, China has already overtaken Japan in terms of the material capabilities of its economy and military and in some areas of newly emerging technologies.

To make up for its disadvantage in material resources, Japan has attempted to integrate resources and capabilities across different areas and domains. Japan’s pursuit of economic security and its adoption of the “multi-domain defense force” concept demonstrates the strong crisis mentality of Japanese policymakers in an increasingly contested, diversified and complex security environment.

The dilemma

The problem is that pursuing economic security could restrict free economic activities, which may weaken interdependence and exacerbate global political divisions.

While the Economic Security Promotion Act stresses the compatibility between economic security and free cooperation, it remains unclear how the government can achieve such a delicate balancing act.

Unlike in the 1970s and ’80s, Japan’s global position in terms of material resources has declined due to long-term economic stagnation and an aging population. While it is important for Japan to pursue a more autonomous posture in defense and economic security, this path also has its inherent limitations.

All these factors suggest that international cooperation has become more important than ever. No single country can enhance the resilience of supply chains, develop emerging technologies and respond to hybrid threats without the help of others.

Competition must also be managed through diplomatic measures such as enhancing transparency, confidence-building and crisis management. Today’s comprehensive security should be considered from both competitive and cooperative perspectives.

It is high time that Japan considered its comprehensive security strategy with other like-minded partners, rather than on its own.

Tomohiko Satake is a research fellow at the National Institute of Defense Studies, Japan.

This article, republished with permission, was first published by East Asia Forum, which is based out of the Crawford School of Public Policy within the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University.

The article appears in the most recent edition of East Asia Forum Quarterly, ‘Comprehensive Regional Security’, Vol 14, No 4, and was also published by the EAF Newsletter.

asiatimes.com · by Tomohiko Satake · January 3, 2023

18. Hydrogen hype is rising again—will this time be different?

Hydrogen hype is rising again—will this time be different?

Investors have been excited, and disappointed, before

By Vijay Vaitheeswaran: Global energy and climate innovation editor, The Economist, New York

The Economist

GUZZLERS OF FIZZY drinks in Brisbane could be helping to tackle climate change in 2023. By the end of the year, the vehicle delivering those sugary beverages may no longer spout climate-warming gases. PepsiCo Australia, the local arm of the world’s biggest purveyor of snacks and drinks, will test a new sort of lorry powered not by a dirty diesel engine but by fuel cells, devices that convert hydrogen to electricity while emitting only water vapour.

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Enthusiasts are bubbling with excitement as a swirl of geopolitical and energy trends has put the spotlight once again on hydrogen, a clean fuel that can be made from a variety of primary energy sources. Hydrogen has seen previous false dawns. Two decades ago European and Japanese carmakers wasted billions chasing the dream of fuel-cell passenger cars. But governments and investors are betting that this time will be different.

One reason is growing interest in using hydrogen to replace fossil fuels in heavy industries, such as steel-making. That would help reduce carbon emissions—and could also boost energy security by reducing dependency on natural gas, the price of which has soared in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Environmentalists love that “green” hydrogen can be made with renewable energy in electrolysers—devices that use electricity to split water into oxygen and hydrogen. This has sparked a global rush to manufacture them, with around 600 proposed projects, about half of them in Europe. But Big Oil is keen on hydrogen too, because “blue” hydrogen can be made in a cleanish way from natural gas, if methane leaks are minimised and resulting carbon emissions are captured and sequestered.

Just how durable this latest wave of enthusiasm for hydrogen will prove to be should become clear in 2023. A global recession could slash funding for novel technologies as companies cut capital expenditure and investors grow risk-averse. Supply-chain disruptions could also spoil things. They have already forced ITM Power, a pioneering British firm, to roll back plans to scale up its production of electrolysers. And as countries respond to the energy shock they may prioritise security of supply, from dirty sources such as coal, over new technologies that can help tackle climate change.

The biggest force pushing hydrogen forward will be government money in America

One telltale sign will be how many of those electrolyser projects actually go ahead. Andy Marsh, chief executive of America’s Plug Power, a pace-setter in the industry, predicts that global electrolyser sales will shoot up from almost zero a few years ago to $15bn in 2023. Bernd Heid of McKinsey, a consultancy, believes the first gigawatt-scale green-hydrogen project will get the go-ahead next year. BloombergNEF (BNEF), a research firm, reckons electrolyser shipments will rise from 1GW now to 2.4-3.8GW in 2023, mostly in Asia.

But there is much enthusiasm about green hydrogen in Europe too. “Europe has been pregnant with a lot of projects but will finally give birth in 2023,” says Daryl Wilson of the Hydrogen Council, an industry body. He expects the regulatory uncertainty that has held back many of those projects to be cleared up. Mr Heid predicts that Europe will conduct the first global auction for hydrogen supply and demand, and that the European Commission will set up a European Hydrogen Bank in 2023.

Perhaps, but as that BNEF forecast suggests, Asia will be worth watching, too. China is currently the biggest manufacturer of electrolysers, and the firm predicts that scaling up production will help it cut costs by 30% by 2025. India has unveiled policies to promote its own green-hydrogen industry. That is prompting Western firms to try to manufacture electrolysers and make hydrogen there. India’s Greenko, a renewables firm, thinks its joint venture with Belgium’s John Cockerill, an electrolyser giant, will produce the world’s lowest-cost ammonia (a fuel derived from hydrogen) by the end of 2023. homiHydrogen, an Indian startup, plans to make electrolysers that are “98% Indian-made” by that time.

But the biggest force pushing hydrogen forward in 2023 will be a tidal wave of government money in America. The Inflation Reduction Act, which is really a climate-change law, offers a staggering $3/kg in subsidy for green-hydrogen projects. Unlike Europe’s thicket of rules, America’s hydrogen policy is clear and extremely compelling, experts say. Many green-hydrogen projects, currently unable to compete against dirtier forms of hydrogen (which typically cost around $2/kg), will suddenly enjoy costs below $1/kg. In sun-kissed or wind-swept areas, some may even see negative costs.

Mr Heid predicts that America will leapfrog Europe in attracting hydrogen projects, with total investments possibly reaching $100bn by 2030. The global hydrogen race is hotting up, and 2023 looks to be a make-or-break year. Watch this gas.■

Vijay Vaitheeswaran: Global energy and climate innovation editor, The Economist, New York

This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2023 under the headline “Hydrogen rising”

The Economist

19. Russia, shaken by Ukrainian strike, said mulling more drones

​There will be retaliation and retribution by Russia.

Russia, shaken by Ukrainian strike, said mulling more drones

AP · by FELIPE DANA · January 3, 2023

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Russia is preparing to step up its attacks on Ukraine using Iranian-made exploding drones, according to Ukraine’s president, as Moscow looks for ways to keep up the pressure on Kyiv after a Ukrainian attack killed at least 63 Russian soldiers in the latest battlefield setback for the Kremlin’s war strategy.

“We have information that Russia is planning a prolonged attack by Shaheds (exploding drones),” President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address late Monday.

He said the goal is to break Ukraine’s resistance by “exhausting our people, (our) air defense, our energy,” more than 10 months after Russia invaded its neighbor.

Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be exploring ways to regain momentum in his flawed war effort, which in recent months has been frustrated by a Ukrainian counteroffensive backed by Western-supplied weapons. That has brought sharp rebukes in some Russian circles of the military’s performance.

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In the latest embarrassment for the Kremlin, Ukrainian forces fired rockets at a facility in the eastern Donetsk region where Russian soldiers were stationed, killing 63 of them, according to Russia’s Defense Ministry. Other, unconfirmed reports put the death toll much higher.

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It was one of the deadliest attacks on the Kremlin’s forces since the war began more than 10 months ago.

In the attack, Ukrainian forces fired six rockets from a HIMARS launch system and two of them were shot down, a Russian Defense Ministry statement said.

However, the Strategic Communications Directorate of Ukraine’s Armed Forces claimed Sunday that around 400 mobilized Russian soldiers were killed in a vocational school building in Makiivka and about 300 more were wounded. That claim couldn’t be independently verified. The Russian statement said the strike occurred “in the area of Makiivka” and didn’t mention the vocational school.

Satellite photos analyzed by The Associated Press show the apparent aftermath of the strike. An image from Dec. 20 showed the building standing. An image from Jan. 2 showed the building reduced to rubble. Other days had intense cloud cover, making seeing the site by standard satellite imagery impossible.

Vigils for soldiers killed in the strike took place in two Russian cities Tuesday, the state RIA Novosti agency reported.

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In Samara, in southwestern Russia, locals gathered for an Orthodox service in memory of the dead. The service was followed by a minute’s silence, and flowers were laid at a Soviet-era war memorial, RIA reported.

Unconfirmed reports in Russian-language media said that the victims were mobilized reservists from the region.

For the Russian military, the Iranian-made exploding drones are a cheap weapon which also spreads fear among troops and civilians. The United States and its allies have sparred with Iran over Tehran’s role in allegedly supplying Moscow with the drones.

The Institute for the Study of War said that Putin is looking to strengthen support for his strategy among key voices in Russia.

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“Russia’s air and missile campaign against Ukraine is likely not generating the Kremlin’s desired information effects among Russia’s nationalists,” the think tank said late Monday.

“Such profound military failures will continue to complicate Putin’s efforts to appease the Russian pro-war community and retain the dominant narrative in the domestic information space,” it added.

Zelenskyy warned that in the coming weeks, “the nights may be quite restless.”

Putin’s additional reliance on drones might not help him achieve his goals, however, as Ukraine claims a high success rate against the weapons.

During the first two days of the new year, which were marked by relentless nighttime drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure, the country’s forces shot down more than 80 Iranian-made drones, Zelenskyy said.

Since September, Ukraine’s armed forces have shot down almost 500 drones, Ukrainian air force spokesman Yurii Ihnat claimed in a television interview Tuesday, news website Ukrinform reported.

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As well as hoping to wear down resistance to Russia’s invasion, the long-range bombardments have targeted the power grid to leave civilians at the mercy of biting winter weather as power outages ripple across the country.

“Every downed drone, every downed missile, every day with electricity for our people and minimal shutdown schedules are exactly such victories,” Zelenskyy said.

In the latest fighting, a Russian missile strike overnight on the city of Druzhkivka in the partially occupied eastern Donetsk region wounded two people, the deputy head of Ukraine’s presidential office, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, reported Tuesday.

A reporter with French broadcaster TF1 was live on television screens when a blast from one of the strikes erupted behind him in Druzhkivka. A German reporter with Bild newspaper suffered a minor injury from shrapnel in the same bombardment.

Officials said the attack ruined an ice hockey arena described as the largest hockey and figure skating school in Ukraine.

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Overnight Russian shelling was also reported in the northeastern Kharkiv region and the southeastern Dnipropetrovsk region.

In the recently retaken areas of the southern Kherson region, Russian shelling on Monday killed two people and wounded nine others, Kherson’s Ukrainian governor, Yaroslav Yanushevich, said Tuesday. He said the Russian forces fired at the city of Kherson 32 times on Monday.

___

Jon Gambrell in Rome contributed to this report.

___

Follow the AP’s coverage of the war at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by FELIPE DANA · January 3, 2023​

20. Ukraine Situation Report: Troop Loss Catastrophe In Donetsk Outrages Russia's Military Bloggers

Ukraine Situation Report: Troop Loss Catastrophe In Donetsk Outrages Russia's Military Bloggers

Russia’s influential military bloggers lambast leadership for packing troops with little security discipline into a building with ammunition.

BY

HOWARD ALTMAN

|

PUBLISHED JAN 2, 2023 8:09 PM

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · January 3, 2023

Russia’s influential military bloggers, who operate somewhat outside Moscow’s tight restrictions on coverage of its ‘special military operation,’ are furious and heaping blame on Russian commanders after scores of troops were killed and even more were wounded in a massive Ukrainian New Year's Day attack on a converted school building in the occupied town of Makiivka.

The bloggers, who combined have millions of subscribers on Telegram and even hold a degree influence in the Kremlin, outright accused Russian military leaders of "criminal negligence" by packing hundreds of mobilized troops in one location, where a large amount of ammunition was stored while also failing to impose restrictions on the use of cell phones. That lack of signals discipline apparently tipped Ukraine off that the former vocational school building would be a prime target for Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) munitions fired by both U.S-donated M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) donated by NATO nations.

The Russian Defense Ministry said the attack by Ukrainian HIMARS on School No. 19 resulted in 63 troop deaths after the building was hit by four guided rockets, with another two destroyed by Russian air defenses. Video emerged on social media reportedly showing the HIMARS launcher involved in the attack, though The War Zone is unable to verify that claim.

Ukrainian officials put the death toll far higher, saying 400 Russian troops were killed and 300 wounded in the attacks that came hours after Russia launched another wave of drones against Ukraine's power infrastructure.

Either way, the attack on Makiivka represents one of the largest single losses of life for Russian troops during its invasion. And while it is impossible to verify either number, one prominent Russian blogger says the actual death count is far more than what the Russian MoD says.

“The number of dead and wounded goes to many hundreds,” wrote Igor Girkin, a Russian Army veteran who played a key role in the annexation of Crimea and now has more than 766,000 Telegram subscribers. “I was WARNED that this could happen again AT ANY TIME, since this is not the only such (extremely dense) deployment of personnel and equipment in the zone of destruction of Hymers missiles. And - yes - this is not the first such case - last year there were also quite a few of them. Although, as a rule, still with fewer victims. But our generals are untrainable in principle, although they themselves - after the summer 'pogroms of headquarters' - prefer to stay away from the location of entrusted troops - outside the radius of destruction of enemy missiles.”

Another Russian Telegram channel said commanders neglected "common sense."

“The mobilized men claim responsibility lies with the regiment's commander Col Roman Yenikeyev. We partly disagree: the colonel's fault is only that he blindly followed his superiors' instructions and could not deploy his unit in accordance with the realities of the front," the Rybar Telegram channel, with more than 1.1 million subscribers, wrote Monday. "The blame for the tragedy lies with the command of the 1st Army Corps of the DPR. [U]nfortunately, after the death of General Roman Kutuzov, the command of the unit began to neglect common sense and intelligence information in favor of some kind of military science and expediency.”

There were many excuses offered, according to Rybar, including the use of cell phones by conscripts and Ukrainian spies on the ground that gave Ukrainian troops the location of a prime target.

“Everyone is to blame, except for the management, who decided to choose a place of the most compact residence,” Rybar said sarcastically.

The Readovka Telegram channel, with nearly 1.6 million subscribers, blamed Russian commanders for packing so many troops into a building unsuitable to house them in a combat zone.

"The fact of where the personnel of the unit was stationed caused massive criticism from military correspondents and experts," Readovka wrote. "An object that is unsuitable for the safe presence of the military in it, not equipped with shelters, is an easy target for an enemy located at a close distance from the location. The decision to deploy soldiers there is assessed by a number of experts as a crime.

Pavel Gubarev, with more than 50,000 Telegram subscribers, called the attack “criminal negligence” on the part of Russia’s military leaders.

“These are the mistakes of spring-summer 2022,” he wrote. “We are at war for the 11th month! Settling in small groups - everyone knows that. The mobilized might not know, but the authorities should know! If you don’t punish for this now, then only the bottom will continue! Makiivka is criminal negligence!”

Andrey Medvedev, who has more than 152,000 subscribers on Telegram, blamed Russian leadership for taking a cavalier attitude toward the troops.

“The bulk of the commanders are soldier generals with their sacred phrase ‘if you didn’t serve, you’re not a man.’” he wrote. “Blatant anti-intellectualism, reinforced by misunderstood brutality, is the very substance on which the generation of today's Russian warriors grew up.”

For those Russian military leaders, “the construction of fortifications is unnecessary (‘why do you need trenches, why are you not a man?’), training in tactical medicine is unnecessary (‘there are field doctors for this, there is no need to complicate everything’), dispersal in small groups is excessive caution (“[Russian peasants] are not afraid of anything). It is strange that a proposal to abandon body armor and helmets has not yet been received from them, because "a real peasant is all for nothing."

Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine was marred from the start with poor planning, unrealistic expectations, shoddy logistics and inadequate training. Since then, Russian President Vladimir Putin's mobilization effort has resulted in throngs of even more poorly trained troops on the battlefield.

The fact that they are poorly equipped and trained for cold weather operations, or even sustaining themselves on the battlefield at all, is likely a contributing factor to why they were all packed in the Makiivka school building. There have been major concerns about the mobilized conscripts becoming a bigger liability in many ways than an advantage. This may end up being glaring proof of such sentiments.

It was Moscow’s hope that the ascendancy of Russian Gen. Sergei Surovikin as the overall commander of Russian troops in Ukraine would have solved many of those issues.

But as the Russian milbloggers' response to Ukraine’s attack on Makiivka shows, apparently there are many lessons that remain unheeded.

Before we dive into the latest news from Ukraine this New Year’s Eve, The War Zone readers can get caught up on our previous rolling coverage here.

The Latest

The apparent operational security failure by Russian commanders in Makiivka is reportedly not an isolated incident. A Russian volunteer apparently posted photos on the VK social media platform with a member of the Russian GRU's 10th Spetsnaz Brigade at the Grand Prix country club in Sahy, Kherson Oblast, but forgot to turn off the location tagging. That reportedly enabled Ukrainian forces to track and strike the location.

The fiercest fighting continues to rage in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where both sides keep battling for small gains. Here are some key takeaways from the latest Institute for the Study of War assessment:

• Russian forces are likely depleting their stocks of artillery ammunition and will struggle to support their current pace of operations in Ukraine as a result.
• Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on December 31.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City on December 31.
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost connection to its last functioning backup power line on the evening of December 29.
• Russian forces continue operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and along the southern axis.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to intensify law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories in response to Ukrainian partisan activities.

For the third day in a row, Russia launched drones against Ukraine's power grid late Sunday night through early Monday morning. Ukraine's Air Force claimed it shot down all 39 Iranian-made Shahed-136/-131 drones launched, as well as two Orlon-10 drones and a Kh-59 missile.

But in addition to anti-aircraft missile units, Air Force fighter aviation and mobile fire groups, the defense against the drones involved the U.S.-provided National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), according to the Ukrainian Stratum Center. NASAMS' primary armament is the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM). AIM-120s built today cost roughly $1M a copy or more.

While "any defense is better than no defense, engaging drones with a weapon designed to defeat cruise missiles is expensive and will deplete your magazine faster," David Shank, a retired Army colonel and former commandant of the Army Air Defense Artillery School at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, told The War Zone Monday. "Israelis were lambasted a few years back for using a Patriot interceptor against a drone. But again, in Ukraine's case, it may have been their only option for defending." We have a feature on the AIM-120 and its relation to Ukraine's air defenses, as well as the cost of use and cost exchange ratio against drones, which you can read in full here.

Officially, Kyiv has been mum about attacks deep inside Russia, like these apparent Ukrainian drone assaults on the Engles Air Base 300 miles from the border. In a recent interview with ABC News, Ukrainian Maj. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, head of his nation's Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR), remained coy but promised that the strikes will continue "deeper and deeper" inside Russia.

During a recent national telethon, Budanov also said that Russia's Air Force is keeping its bombers close to bases when launching attacks to preserve their engines.

“Strategic missile-carrying bombers travel a long enough distance to launch missiles. And this is an increase in the motor resource of the aircraft,” Budanov said, according to The Odessa Journal. “Now, Russian bombers do not approach the usual attack areas: they take off, make a circle or two in the sky, and launch missiles almost over the airfield to reduce the engine resource of the planes.”

Budanov claims Russia currently has about 70 Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear-H bombers and about 70 to 80 Tu-22M3 Backfire-C bombers.

"About 40% of them are defective," he said. "The situation with the fleet of strategic aviation is approximately the same. In fact, in Russia, there is no construction of strategic bombers, so they are trying to reduce the motor resource of these aircraft."

Last week, we told you how after an apparent Ukrainian drone attack on Sevastopol, Russian-installed occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhayev said on his Telegram channel that "the air defense system worked out" and that "all services are operating normally. Our military, as always, worked well. Everyone please remain calm.”

Well, apparently, Razvozhayev's idea of staying calm was to pack up his family and pets and head to Cyprus, according to The Ukrainian News Agency, citing the Center for National Resistance.

"The so-called governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhaev, brought all his property, including dogs and cats, to Cyprus," the outlet reported. "In addition, the Gauleiter took his children abroad. It seems that the Moscow henchmen are not very confident in the safety of their families and in their own future, despite their own statements that they make on camera."

Sevastopol of course is not the only target of Ukrainian drones, as was the case in this video.

Video emerged on social media of Ukrainian National Guard troops using an Igla man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) against a Russian cruise missile heading to Kyiv. While the outcome is unseen in this video, the reaction from the troops seems to indicate it hit the target.

The German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann defense contractor has begun production on the Boxer RCH 155mm self-propelled wheeled artillery units for Ukraine, the company announced Saturday in a Tweet. Last month, Germany officially announced that 18 units will be transferred to Ukraine.

Sweden sent two Bandvagn tracked vehicles, developed by Saab for the Swedish military, to Ukraine for use as ambulances. The tracks will come in particularly handy in Ukraine's swampy and snowy terrain.

To ring in the New Year, Ukraine's Air Force released a video of some pretty nifty flying, which you can see here.

But not all pilots are so high-flying. In order to survive, helicopters from both sides are flying at low altitudes, like the Ukrainian crew seen in this video.

Russian troops apparently struggled saving one of its giant 2S4 Tyulpan self-propelled mortar. While this video appears to show Russian troops eventually putting out the fire, it is unclear if the 'Tulip' is reparable.

The number of graves for Wagner mercenary group troops in Ukraine appears to be growing.

To fill his ranks, Wagner boss Yevgeny Prighozin is apparently importing troops from Africa, where his mercenaries have a growing presence.

And finally, the difference between life and death in battle often comes down to luck. As you can see in this video below, this Ukrainian soldier is clearly one of the luckiest of them all.

That's it for now. We will update this story when there is anything major to add.

Contact the author:

thedrive.com · by Howard Altman · January 3, 2023

21. The zombification of US national security - Responsible Statecraft

Where to begin? Blame the establishment and the blob.

The zombification of US national security - Responsible Statecraft

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Gregory Foster · January 2, 2023

Grand Strategy

The zombification of US national security

Time to drive a stake through the heart of these establishmentarian ideas, which are super dysfunctional but never seem to die.

January 2, 2023

Written by

Gregory Foster

The zombification of US national security

A recent New York Times commentary by conservative columnist Bret Stephens asks this question: “Are We Sleepwalking Through a ‘Decisive Decade’?” To which he answers resoundingly, in so many words, yes.

“We” is all of us: American society as a whole — but, more precisely, the policy officials and military leaders who purport to guide us through the thickets of international relations. Sleepwalking is a euphemism, of course, for our collective cluelessness, ignorance, and indifference in matters of present-day national security. It’s an apt but imperfect metaphor.

Zombification would be more to the point, since we’re talking about the community of national security practitioners, observers, and commentators — the so-called “Blob” — whose establishmentarian ideas never completely die. Stephens is singularly representative of them and speaks to them in their language from his august journalistic perch.

In the interest of parsimony, let’s forgo the temptation to question the validity of the claim that we inhabit a uniquely “decisive decade.” These are words President Biden has used repeatedly, most recently in the preface to his new National Security Strategy document. It’s a highly debatable proposition that we’ll save for a later discussion. Instead, let’s focus on some of the received truths that Stephens lays claim to, explicitly and implicitly, on behalf of his Blob brethren.

The Fetishization of .mil-ism. For starters, most of the community accepts uncritically as an article of faith that the military is the centerpiece of national security, in its narrowest conception.

Despite incessant rhetorical blather about soft power, smart power, and the simplistic, doctrinally sanctioned instruments of power — axiomatically referred to as DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, economic) — most true believers remain wedded to the centrality of the M (read “providing for the common defense”), thereby ignoring the other precepts in America’s Security Credo, the Preamble to the Constitution: achieving national unity (a more perfect union), establishing justice, ensuring domestic tranquility, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty for the generations.

According the military a position of such primacy leads inevitably to misperceptions among the uninitiated that military is necessarily synonymous with militarization and militarism.

The Enduring Gluttony of Defense Spending. The traditionalist fellow travelers of the national security community almost without exception consider defense spending to be at the very heart of our national security posture: the obvious pathway to restoring the deserved strategic advantage the United States supposedly has forsaken in recent years to others more focused and resolute than we.

It is widely recognized that we spend more on defense than the next nine nations combined; less well noted that our baseline defense budget exceeds the GDPs of all but some 18 countries. And that doesn’t count other defense-related spending (like off-budget emergency contingency funding, veterans affairs, and nuclear stockpiles). Yet, we continue to thirst for more. Washington rarely acknowledges the other strategic priorities that must be sacrificed to accommodate such defense gluttony, or the distortions of the political process caused by politicians scared of being labeled weak on defense for favoring spending cutbacks.

Meanwhile, inexorable advances in weapon system sophistication, lethality, destructiveness, and cost continue unabated year after year.

The Canonization of Military Essence. To be accepted as a legitimate player in national security affairs, one must accept the largely unstated verity that militaries are what they always have been and, inarguably, always will be: warfighting machines whose primordial purpose is to wage organized violence — as massively, lethally, and destructively as possible — for political purposes against like-minded, comparably organized and equipped foes. (This, despite the fact that not all foes cooperate, as when they engage in the strategic jiujitsu of asymmetric, hybrid, gray zone, 4th-generation warfare.)

To Stephens, “The Pentagon is broken,” but not just for the reasons he cites: waste, procurement failings, weapon system cost overruns. The real indicators of the Pentagon’s brokenness are institutional parochialism, rearview-mirror thinking, a persistent inability to any longer win wars (that, by the way, are inherently unwinnable), and unimaginative generals and admirals who are more bureaucrats and administrators than they are commanders and strategists.

Never do the alleged authorities among us give serious thought to the possibility that we could completely transform the rules of the game and alter the contours of the “global battle field” by deploying a reoriented military whose primary missions are non-warfighting (humanitarian assistance and disaster response, for example).

The Delusion of Military Autarky. Yet another persistent, near-universal tendency among traditionalists is to assume that our military must be self-contained and self-sufficient in all respects across the full range of circumstances it conceivably could face.

The cardinal imperative for us, rhetoric to the contrary, has always been to prepare for unilateralism — going it alone — whenever possible; multilateralism — acting in concert with others — only when necessary.

Any thought that institutionalized multilateralism could ever be an essential end in itself, rather than a convenient, expedient means to national ends, has always been anathema. The result is that we and all the other countries we would normally align ourselves with maintain largely redundant militaries that cost appreciably more than if we seriously pursued a more fully integrated, non-duplicative posture.

The blinkered thinking behind this is that it’s too risky to depend unreservedly on the unreliability of self-interested allies.

The Capabilities-Commitments Conundrum. Since historian Paul Kennedy sensitized us 35 years ago to the obligations and impacts of imperial overstretch, we and others have harbored lasting primal angst over so-called capabilities-commitments mismatches.

Obviously, we can either reduce our commitments to match our capabilities — and live with what Stephens considers the presumably catastrophic consequences — or expand our capabilities to match our commitments.

To the establishmentarians in our midst, there is only one possibility: expanding our capabilities, with all that implies about vastly increased spending, reengineered procurement processes, and unimpeded supply chains for the continued fielding of the most advanced weaponry. Such thinking perpetuates the idealization that commitments and associated “requirements” dictate the capabilities we field.

The reality, as anyone with enough experience to be healthily jaded can attest, is that the capabilities we have are the ones we want, and they determine what we accept as requirements and commitments. Who among us desirous of preserving their credibility would have the temerity to argue for the elimination of, say, tanks or submarines or strategic bombers or the Marines or, above all else, nuclear weapons?

Stephens goes so far as to advocate enlarging and modernizing our nuclear arsenal even more than at present to keep others like Saudi Arabia and Japan from going nuclear.

The Great Power Competition Subterfuge. Few among us have resisted the Blob’s platitudinous assertions that we are now in a new era of great-power competition in which our traditional, deserved military advantages have eroded in the face of aggressive adversaries committed to unseating us. Buying into such rhetoric and thereby giving life to a new Cold War mindset ensures that we will remain wedded to outmoded conceptions of what militaries properly do; that we will continue to arm ourselves to the teeth with the most advanced, costly weaponry; that others, rather than being dissuaded from further militarization, will mirror us; and that the result will be a never-ending escalatory spiral so costly that we will neglect more strategically remunerative priorities and, ultimately, spend ourselves into oblivion.

The subtext of all this, and one that Bret Stephens puts into stark relief, is the self-serving, self-deluding fantasy that the most ominous threats we face are external, conventional, state-based ones. The reality, however, is that we should be preparing for the internally generated, intellectual zombie apocalypse that only we can defeat by refusing to accept the received truths of the undead among us.

Written by

Gregory Foster

responsiblestatecraft.org · by Gregory Foster · January 2, 2023

22. On my honor

My friend and former student.

On my honor

Jack McCain on duty, helping Afghan refugees, and living up to his father’s legacy

By Lois M. CollinsLcollins@deseretnews.com

 Dec 31, 2022, 12:03am EST

deseret.com · December 31, 2022

At 36, Jack McCain has had an impressive military career. The fourth-generation naval officer’s journey has included five deployments in the Pacific, Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, as well as participating in search and rescue operations, including three that saved lives.

He taught at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he earned a degree in international relations before going on to a master’s degree in security studies from Georgetown University.

But nowhere has the naval aviator — he flies helicopters — forged stronger connections than in Afghanistan, where he’d volunteered for combat as a cultural liaison.

During a tough year of combat training, he also learned about Afghanistan history and politics, learning the Dari language before deploying to Kandahar Airfield as an air adviser, flying alongside, teaching, training with and relying on his Afghan counterparts as an “Afghan Hand.” That’s a link between the U.S. and Afghan militaries, advising on the culture, politics and military issues of the Middle Eastern country.

That birthed a passion — born of gratitude, respect and genuine affection — for helping resettle Afghan evacuees, who took great personal risk to help America’s military, into satisfying lives in the United States.

He still flies as a reserve naval aviator. But back home in Arizona, his day job now is director of state and local government affairs for American Airlines’ Phoenix hub. And President

Joe Biden this year appointed McCain to the Board of Visitors for the U.S. Naval Academy to “inquire into the state of morale and discipline, the curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods,” among other matters.

Despite his personal accomplishments, though, the question of lineage invariably peeps through. And Jack McCain has no intention of cruising on the fact that he’s the son of the late Sen. John S. McCain — is, in fact, John S. McCain IV. He’s also happy to “wiggle out of talking politics.”

He’s simply Jack, he says, though he’s proud to serve as a trustee of the McCain Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank dedicated to advancing democracy and defending human rights.

He hopes his action speaks louder than his name. “In the military, it took time for people to figure out who I was related to,” says McCain. “I generally do everything I can to obscure that fact. … I never want to make that association explicit because to use that would be incorrect. It would be something that would drive the old man nuts if I were running around talking about who I was related to, provided I am trying to do good work and serve a cause that’s greater than my own self-interest.”

Deseret Magazine talked to McCain about helping Afghan refugees, civility and pursuing passion that serves a greater good.

Deseret Magazine: Your resume is rich. How do you introduce yourself?

Jack McCain: The thing I usually lead with, depending on context, is whoever I’m working for in that moment, which at times is difficult to pin down, whether I’m working for American Airlines, or I’m working for the McCain Institute, or working for the Navy, or on behalf of the Afghan evacuees. The things that become permanent are I’m a veteran, a helicopter pilot — which I love, because it’s probably the most interesting thing about me — and I also am an Arizonan. The older you get, the more you realize how much where you’re from impacts who you become.

DM: Why is working with Afghan refugees important to you?

JM: They protected me in a place where they didn’t have to. I spent a year of my life flying alongside Afghan pilots in Blackhawks in Kandahar and Helmand, which are notably rough neighborhoods. And when the collapse came, I wanted to do everything I could to help protect the people who protected me. It was a long and arduous process. And we didn’t get all of the people that deserved to be evacuated.

Now they’re here. In my specific case, the pilots I flew with and their families are in Arizona. Given that they were willing to bet their lives on the promises that America gave them, we owe them everything we can give now.

DM: How many pilots and how did you help get them here?

JM: About 60 pilots, 250 Afghans in total, so pilots and family members. I was a very small part in a very large effort. I spoke the language and had the contacts on the ground. My job was to organize them, figure out where they were and try to get them moved to positions that could help them get evacuated in different regions. I was a very small piece of a verybig machine in August 2021.

DM: Are you in touch with some of them?

JM: I am in very close contact with almost all of them — efforts to try to help improve their situations, get the kids educated, get them integrated into society so that they can live safe, stable and sustainable lives.

DM: Was the evacuation through an organization?

JM: Their actual evacuation was not. The effort was very, very haphazard. It was just everyone doing what they could. They received support from multiple organizations, one of them being the International Rescue Committee, to help resettle once they arrived in the U.S. It helped provide for some of their basic needs. Because of the way the refugee system works in the U.S., it’s a very short amount of time that they’re taken care of.

These are all educated men and women who operated their craft at high levels in the Afghan military, so they’re not your standard evacuees. I’m trying to help them get what they deserve.

DM: Are paying debts and honor important to you?

JM: Honor is a very interesting concept of differing levels, from the personal level to national or even international. The concepts may be a little arcane, but they are important because they provide you with an ethos, with guidance into circumstances where there may not be a clear right thing to do — or circumstances in which it’s difficult to do the right thing.

There’s a very popular line: “Character is doing the right thing when no one’s looking.” I’ve come to hate that line, because I believe it is most difficult sometimes to do the right thing when everyone is looking. You see that throughout history and throughout your personal life. The idea of honor and character is simply doing the right thing by virtue of the fact it’s the right thing to do.

I speak about civility more often. It seems to be a little more pertinent. Whether that’s perception or reality, I’m not sure. But civility, especially interpersonal and political civility, are vastly important not just for bringing the temperature of discourse down. Without civility, it becomes easy to fire back and forth as opposed to, in a political sense, legislating.

You have to cooperate to legislate. If you can’t respect the person across from you or you can’t speak to them, you certainly can’t cooperate. Then you don’t get anything done, which is why you see almost political paralysis across state, local and national governments.

Civility is very near and dear to me.

DM: Where beside politics do you see incivility?

JM: I spend a significant amount of time on social media. I think that’s a place where civility would be very useful. It becomes easy to see the person sitting across from you or the person you’re interacting with as an avatar or a nameless, faceless being as opposed to a human being. It becomes easy to say things that we wouldn’t necessarily say if we were close to watch the consequences. I don’t have a pitch and I’m not selling anything. I just think that to reframe ourselves when it comes to civility in interpersonal discourse, social media, even news media and politics would be a useful exercise for all of us.

DM: What challenges do you see people face?

JM: Everybody’s circumstances are a little bit different, but one of the broad-stroke things is uncertainty — whether it’s inflation or whatever talking point you want to use, which can become partisan quickly. But this idea of things not being certain or not feeling right becomes a problem.

I think it has myriad causes and influences. At the end of it, lacking certainty is a difficult way to live and has a tendency to give you a bit of tunnel vision, to maybe not make decisions the same way you would if you were able to look further ahead.

I do see a lack of civility between individuals at all levels of government and personal media as a problem because people have stopped trusting the sources of information that they usually did and started finding alternatives. Or maybe it’s not even a lack of trust, but the availability of different sources of information. The best way for ideas to be better is a free marketplace of ideas.

I’m not one to intimate that there should be some sort of censorship or anything like that. But I do see a symptom in our inability to talk to one another.

DM: What are the bright lights in your life right now?

JM: The brightest light — also the perfect duality, the brightest and darkest light that I have at this moment — is the circumstances of the Afghan humanitarian parolees, because they are here and I’m incredibly happy about it. They’re no longer in danger. They have opportunity. But integration into a society that’s alien to you is an almost impossible feat when you are not prepared for it — and nobody was — and when you are not given resources to thrive.

I was a cultural adviser in Afghanistan, so I am very aware of what it takes to integrate into another society. There are an incredible number of well-intentioned and willing people that have stepped up to help. But it takes a larger effort because 70,000 to 100,000 Afghans are now evacuating. It is an amazing fact that that effort happened. But it is also worrisome that we have not followed through.

I would also say I am happy to be gainfully employed, I’m happy living back in Arizona and still able to fly on weekends in the reserves. Frankly, I enjoy that because it’s fun — and it’s difficult and dangerous and exciting. And still able to give back, even if it’s not full-time. It’s one weekend a month, two weeks a year. And sometimes that’s good enough.

DM: Can readers make a difference to those refugees?

JM: Absolutely. There’s a piece of legislation that has not passed. It has been worked on through blood, sweat and tears by a massive number of people, but it is stalled. It’s called the Afghan Adjustment Act. If any reader feels compelled or reads up on this issue and feels like they have a desire to call their congressmen, burn up the phone lines, send emails — just get the awareness that this needs to pass. The legislation fixes a lot of the problems that we’ve had since arrival. Plenty of people are worried about vetting and it fixes that problem. It provides them resources and codifies their legal status in the United States. They have a degree of uncertainty that would be impossible to live under. They don’t know if in less than a year they’re going to get deported back to Afghanistan.

I would also say, if you run into or know of Afghan refugees in your community, do what you can to reach out, ask what they need or simply present a friendly face because they arein a place that is about as different from their home as anything could be.

DM: Any last word?

JM: I would say that the guiding light that I was given by my old man was “Whatever you do, find and serve a cause greater than your own self-interest.”

This story appears in the January/February issue of Deseret Magazine. Learn more about how to subscribe.

deseret.com · December 31, 2022

23. 2023 And The Questions For Asia

Korea not included (less one very minor mention)

2023 And The Questions For Asia

A partial journalistic traipse around the region

20 hr ago

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/2023-questions-for-asia?isFreemail=false&post_id=94269034&publication_id=23934&utm_source=pocket_reader

2

By: Asia Sentinel Correspondents

India

The coming year is India’s chance to show that it is now its turn to be the focus of global change. But can Prime Minister Narendra Modi show it is as capable of taking risks economically as China did when it opened to a flood of investment and allowed old industries to collapse? Can Modi too reject the protectionist pressures of interest groups and oligarchs in the same way as then-Prime Minister Zhu Rongji did at the turn of the century in China? Can Modi also show that he is really a modernizer who can address the shocking state of education in much of his country – the north and east in particular – and provide a vision of a united country in place of the Hindu obscurantism and communal division which has been so much part of his electoral appeal?

For India, 2023 matters in a number of ways. It is the year when its population will overtake that of China, a landmark more significant for the future than for today when its economy is one-fifth the size of that of its none-too-friendly and vastly more centralized neighbor. Year 2023 is also when India takes its turn as chairman of the group of Twenty (G20) major nations. Can it use this to leverage its global influence, perhaps taking advantage of decades of good relations with Moscow to play a role in ending the war on Ukraine? Can its diplomats show more self-assurance, thicker skins than in the past? Or will the G20 summit in Delhi in September at best be a photo opportunity or at worst an illustration of national infrastructural and organizational failures?

At a time when China’s growth is slowed by demographics, Covid hangover, and weak export demand, can India show a capacity to attract and absorb investment, whether to supply Apple or build steel plants competitive with Korea or China? Can it compete more effectively in markets in the Middle East and Africa where it once had closer ties than China? Can the ruling BJP end its anti-Muslim rhetoric in pursuit of friends and markets from Bangladesh to Morocco? Can it show that diversity, secularism, and separation of powers are alive and well and worthy of respect and imitation? In short, 2023 is India’s year to show its mettle.

Malaysia

Diversity, secularism, and separation of powers will also be the issues with which the Anwar Ibrahim-led Pakatan Harapan coalition in Malaysia must grasp in what arguably is Asia’s most interesting experiment in democracy following the November elections that drove the entrenched Malays-first government from power. Can the United Malays National Organization see itself as co-leader of a multiracial Barisan after being drubbed rather than as a money pot for a Malay elite? Can Anwar show the Malays who voted him for show that they have nothing to fear from a multi-ethnic government? Indeed, can the parties from Sarawak and Sabah – in particular, coalition members of Sarawak get beyond pushing local interests to show off their states as examples of the benefits of pluralism – how for example Muslims thrive in Sarawak though they are a minority?

The new importance of the Borneo states to federal politics can have a healing effect on the peninsula. But if Anwar’s coalition fails and the rural Islamic PAS and its Malay superiority allies impose additional doses of shariah law and Malay supremacy, one must wonder how long the eastern states will be more than nominal parts of the Federation. Meanwhile, unless the anti-secular trend on the peninsula is reversed, expect a continuing exodus of talent and capital, and a continued decline of the educational system to the point where the country will be unable to sustain existing standards of living which rely heavily on natural resources.

Thailand

Thailand has no threat from divided geography but an equally divisive issue may come more into focus in 2023. The recent sudden and probably fatal medical crisis of Princess Bajrakitiyabha, often known as Ong-Bha, has left a gap in a monarchical system already subject to stress. She is on life support and seems unlikely to recover. She was held in high regard as well as being her father’s eldest child, daughter of his first wife Princess Soamsawali, so would have seemed a natural successor to King Vajiralongkorn, now 70, given that his only son with a royal title, Prince Dipangkorn, aged 17 and son of disgraced and domestically exiled former Princess Srirasmi, is understood to have his own medical issues.

That would leave the Chakri dynasty only two choices – the king’s much-respected but unmarried and childless sister, Princess Sirindhorn, 67, or his youngest daughter Princess Sirrivannavari, 35. This princess is known for her talents as badminton player and dress designer and has been undertaking some royal duties. But it might be held against her that she has a French boyfriend and that her mother and four brothers live in the US after being banished from Thailand in 1996 when the mother was accused by her husband of adultery.

Given the apparent shift in the perception of the monarchy since the 2016 death of King Bhumibol, who was on the throne for 70 years, the dynastic issue now poses an additional question for the palace and army-aligned conservative forces. Headed by current Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha, they have been in power since the 2014 coup which overthrew of Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister Yingluck. They now also face the electoral popularity of Thaksin’s daughter Paetongkarn Shinawatra. The king’s absence in Germany and his autocratic behavior had already undermined the status of the monarchy so the combination of the succession issue with the possible return of the Shinawatras could mean that Thailand sees more change in 2023 than for quite some years.

Indonesia

Indonesia will be getting ready to hold elections to choose the president and vice president, and members of the House of Representatives scheduled for February 2024, generating a groundswell of funding as politicians and parties campaign, enriching the media and other politics-related entities to the point where – at least as it has in the past – it adds a few percentage points to GDP. In accordance with the constitution, the current President Joko Widodo will no longer be able to stand, so many new names of candidates such as former Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan and Head of House of Representatives Puan Maharani are predicted to fight in the race along with Defense Minister and perennial candidate Prabowo Subiatno. Feted in th country for a steady performance, Jokowi is looking for a new job as head of the United Nations, the drums say.

The country will still be busy realizing its five priority agendas including downstreaming and industrializing natural resources, with bauxite particularly the next target and with foreign refiners expected to get the same treatment as nickel refiners did over the past several years. The government is seeking to optimize clean energy sources and increase the green economy, strengthening legal, social, political and economic protection for the people, continuing economic digitalization, and continuing the construction of the new capital city in East Kalimantan.

Jokowi at the end of December lifted restrictions on community activities due to Covid-19 throughout the country. Some international economic institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) predict that Indonesia's economy will slow amid the world recession, but the World Bank predicts this will remain stable with a growth rate of 5.1 percent in 2023.

Philippines

The two major defining issues for the Marcos administration will be relations with China and food security.

About China, former President Rodrigo Duterte said in 2017 that when he told Xi Jinping that the Philippines wanted to drill for oil and gas in the West Philippine Sea, Xi said that if Manila pushed ahead with the idea there would be war. And Duterte let go of the idea and did not do anything even about the Chinese navy freely entering Philippine territorial waters and threatening Filipino fishermen. 

Marcos has shifted from that position. In his inaugural policy statement, he said that he will not allow even a millimeter of Philippine territory to be trampled upon. More recently, he said the West Philippine Sea is "ours," and "our laws" should apply there. He also said that if no agreement can be reached with China for joint exploration of oil and gas, he will have to find other ways for exploring the resources, because "we need it." Lately, the Dept of National Defense has ordered the armed forces to increase patrolling Philippine waters to check for Chinese incursions. When Marcos meets Xi they will declare each other’s position and agree to disagree. Maybe, both will draw their Red lines. But then, Marcos will have to make good on the tough positions he has publicly taken on territorial rights and oil exploration.

On food security, Marcos, in his policy statement, set a goal to lift the country to middle-income level by 2024. It is a huge task. The actions he will take in 2023 will define success or failure. Cash handout to farmers, and giving land to veterans will not increase production. So he has to come up with creative ideas, with or without an agriculture secretary. Failure on this front could determine if he will be allowed to complete his term in office. 

Singapore

Although no election is due before November 2025 – almost three years – the constant buzz in the island republic is that the People’s Action Party could call a snap election to give its anointed princeling Lawrence Wong the chance to show his political nous. Wong has been making voluminous public appearances all over the city, adding to the suspicions. The suspicious believe the current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong, who either is or is not the last of the powerful Lee clan to run the country, will give Wong the chance to hang himself in a sharply descending economy. Lee has served as premier for nearly 19 years and has pushed past his announced retirement date twice to announce he must stay on to steady the ship. The suspicious also believe Lee is grooming his son, Li Hongyi, for a political career to replace him after a Wong interregnum, as he replaced his father after Goh Chok Tong’s reign. The son has said he has no interest in politics.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore predicted in mid-December that GDP is expected to expand by an anemic 1.8 percent in 2023, an indication that the ship might need steadying again in the wake of the global Covid-19 crisis, which Singapore’s technocrats handled considerably better than any of its regional neighbors, with only 1,700 deaths from 2.2 million cases.

The Lee family has staged one of Asia’s bitterest feuds, with Hsien Loong’s brother, Lee Hsien Yang, decamping to the UK out of an announced fear that harm could come to him. Hsien Yang has hinted he would run for the largely ceremonial presidency, which must be held midyear, when the term of the incumbent president Halimah Yacob ends. In September. She is the first female president in the country's history

Despite its reputation for humorlessness and a restrictive attitude toward the press and the political opposition, the country is benefiting from the exodus of multinationals from Hong Kong, which since the imposition of a draconian national security law has become even less attractive. That trend is likely to continue.

Taiwan

Heavily-export-reliant Taiwan is finding itself at the end of a prolonged export boom that fed on enormous global demand for electronic gadgets and semiconductors during the Covid-19 lockdowns and faced with a continuing cross-strait crisis that shows no sign of ending. A week ago, China sent 71 planes and seven ships towards Taiwan, according to the Taiwanese defense ministry, marking the biggest daily incursion yet. Except for the island’s semiconductor-makers, Taiwanese manufacturers have been reporting markedly slowing order growth due to high customer inventories, which, in turn, is associated with belt-tightening amid inflation and rising interest rates. The Taiwanese public, coddled for two years by reports of double-digit-year-on-year growth rates, is now being exposed to newspaper headlines with negative economic figures, taking a toll on the island’s psyche.

“Our industry depends mostly on the buildings that are built in the US and the European markets, with rising credit costs and inflation discouraging construction,” an export manager of a Taiwanese screw manufacturer recently told Asia Sentinel. “As the time when everyone was working at home has ended, we are now witnessing a period when many millions of households have stocked more screws and nails than they will need for some time to come.” On top of that, the US is pouring billions of dollars into creating its own high-end semiconductor manufacturing, a so-far distant threat to Taiwan’s stock in trade. 

Of course, a period of economic slowdown does not bode well for the standing of the government. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of President Tsai Ing-wen recently suffered a major defeat against the Kuomintang (KMT) in island-wide local elections. To handle China’s rapidly strengthening military activity surrounding Taiwan, Tsai was last week forced to extend compulsory military service from four months to a year starting in 2024 in a move drastically disrupting career planning of tens of thousands young men. Although the KMT backed the service extension, it argues that the Chinese aggressions versus Taiwan were triggered by the DPP with reckless anti-unification rhetoric.

“Vote for the DPP, youth go to the battlefield. Vote for the KMT, there will be no battlefield on either side of the strait,” former president Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT said at a New Year flag-raising ceremony at the KMT headquarters. Taiwan’s next presidential and legislative elections are scheduled to be held in early 2024, coinciding with the start of extended military service. Owing to the cyclical nature of economic performance, newspaper headlines will be returning to upbeat economic growth figures roughly at that time.

24. Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM

As you can probably guess I disagree with most of the allegations in this piece. But I am happy to publish this in SWJ as it contributes to the debate.

Tue, 01/03/2023 - 8:39am

Developing Mastery of Irregular Warfare is a Pipe Dream if the DOD is Forced to Rely on SOCOM 

By James Armstrong

This opinion piece is written directly in response to the words of LTG(R) Cleveland, himself a former commander of US Army Special Operations Command, Special Operations Command Central, Special Operations Command South, and 10th Special Forces Group. 

I will point out the first great big elephant in the room, “Irregular Warfare” is largely the responsibility of the US Army as the primary land force for the DOD. The US Air Force, US Navy, and US Marine Corps do have a role to play, but by large the personnel and resources for waging any warfare where “the human dimension” is the critical factor reside within the US Army’s “campaign quality.” People mostly live in the land domain, and that’s why the US Army must master irregular warfare. Any push at professionalizing the Department of Defense on irregular warfare, we must first professionalize the entire US Army on irregular warfare.

The second great big elephant in the room is failure. The last twenty years of war have shown “irregular warfare” as led by SOCOM have proven incapable of delivering operational and strategic victory in Afghanistan. The entire United States Army collective unit training and validation pipeline shifted from a near-peer high intensity fight to “Counter Insurgency” which SOCOM claims to be a “core activity” of SOF personnel and units and defines it as “The blend of civilian and military efforts designed to end insurgent violence and facilitate a return to peaceful political processes.” source: https://www.socom.mil/about/core-activities

We should view the creation of the “Irregular Warfare Functional Center” (IFWC) not as a validation of SOCOM competence, but as a failure of SOCOM to deliver. As a side note, it is the history of Joint Special Operations failure at Desert One that led to the creation of USSOCOM as a combatant command. From an organizational perspective when failure leads to more resources you have a very good reason to fail. This is what economists would call a “perverse incentive.”

Now it is my opinion that the war in Afghanistan was never “winnable” without multi-generational US force presence to stabilize the country and that Desert One was a good and noble attempt complicated by conditions beyond the control of SOF planners. However, the “occupy Afghanistan forever” option became unacceptable to our duly elected political leadership, and what had the potential for “victory” or at least “maintenance of the status quo” became a full on retreat and ceding the territory of Afghanistan to violent extremist organizations (to use the current JP 3-24 term). However, that might as well be putting ointment on cancer as Afghanistan highlights a few fundamental problems that are solely within SOCOM’s ability to fix in the short term.

1. Education. There is not a lack of curriculum on irregular warfare within the SOCOM training and education system. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), or the Special Operations Captain’s Career Course are both examples of training and educational opportunities offered to Special Operators but largely not offered to the rest of the United States Army. In 2013 the Special Operations Captain’s Career Course stood up at Fort Bragg, NC to save time and money creating 18As. This served to further isolate the Army SOF community from conventional captain’s career course cross pollination opportunities, one of the “intangibles” of professional military education.

2. Proponent push off. In 2014 US Army Training and Doctrine Command published TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5 “U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement” in which “Engagement” would be a new “Warfighting Function” as well as TP 525-3-7 “The U.S. Army Human Dimension Concept.” Both documents were designed to guide future doctrinal development towards educating and training the force on winning wars within the human and political arenas. The proponent for developing “Engagement” as a warfighting function was given to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Both documents were rescinded on 27 September 2019 due to “obsolescence.”

So, this fundamentally highlights a big problem, USASOC had proponency for functions that the entire US Army requires to get better at irregular warfare and did nothing. This is because SOCOM has a “perverse incentive” to keep the “regular Army” from conducting “irregular warfare.” In the “limited pie” mentality, any increase in irregular warfare expertise by conventional forces represents a loss to SOF. If you want to see this mentality in action, simply search through the web about SF thoughts about the creation of the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) in the regular Army. This was seen as a direct threat to SOCOM’s primacy in “period of competition” operations, and still is. 

I personally enjoy the honesty of this quote: “SF troops are already smarting from the higher-ups who are closing the Special Forces Museum, which they feel (correctly so) is impinging on their legacy. Now another part of their legacy (the counternarcotics mission to Colombia) is now going, going, gone to the SFAB.”

In closing, historically the SOF Community has worked very hard to protect their “special missions” to the detriment of educating the entire force. If the IWFC is placed in SOCOM it would be most reasonable to assume that the same outcome would occur in that any value from IWFC would only go back into the SOF community. If we truly desire an Army that has some level of irregular warfare mastery that must come through updates to TRADOC professional military education, updates to Combat Training Center rotational exercises, and likely a directed change to unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) directed by the DA G-3. All these changes should of course be informed by validated operational requirements, of which the IWFC may provide some utility if not locked away inside of SOCOM.

About the Author(s)

James Armstrong

With over twenty two years of active service and four deployments to the CENTCOM AOR, MAJ James Armstrong is a former Infantry Officer currently teaching Cyber Electromagnetic Operations at the US Army Cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare School.

​25. Ukraine Has Digitized Its Fighting Forces on a Shoestring

We can learn from the Ukrainians.

Excerpts:

One important ingredient for Ukraine’s military technology has been the decision by SpaceX to provide thousands of Starlink connection terminals early in the war, Ukrainian soldiers and commanders say. Most units have one, sometimes camouflaged in cardboard or garbage to avoid being spotted by enemy drones.

The U.S. is trying to adopt new technologies more quickly, including through a network of nongovernmental innovation hubs that are linked to the Pentagon but outside its bureaucracy, under the umbrella Defensewerx. They tap civilian know-how for military purposes and encourage brainstorming. Now, those hubs—and particularly Sofwerx, tied to U.S. Special Operations Command—will be studying Ukraine’s example, say people familiar with their work.

Ukraine Has Digitized Its Fighting Forces on a Shoestring

Kyiv’s forces networked under Russian attack, achieving a cut-priced ‘MacGyver’ version of systems the Pentagon has spent decades developing

By Sam SchechnerFollow

 and Daniel MichaelsFollow

Jan. 3, 2023 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-has-digitized-its-fighting-forces-on-a-shoestring-11672741405?mod=hp_lead_pos6

Ukraine has achieved a cut-price version of what the Pentagon has spent decades and billions of dollars striving to accomplish: digitally networked fighters, intelligence and weapons.

Kyiv’s improvised web of drones, fighters and weapons, linked through satellite communications and custom software, is giving its soldiers a level of intelligence, coordination and accuracy that has allowed the initially outnumbered and outgunned forces to run circles around Russia’s massive but lumbering armies.

Ukraine’s grab bag of systems, built largely around off-the-shelf equipment, remain a far cry from the U.S. military’s sprawling and hugely ambitious digitization effort, which has evolved and expanded with technological advances and carries names such as network-centric warfare. The Defense Department aims for network scale, security and bandwidth that far exceed Ukraine’s ambitions.

Still, say veterans of U.S. and allied digitization projects, Ukraine’s success cobbling together a virtual command-and-control system on the fly offers valuable lessons for the West, particularly about the need to experiment and include nonmilitary experts.

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“The lesson is you’ve got to innovate, and we don’t,” said Glen Grant, a retired British lieutenant colonel experienced in military digitization who has worked with U.S. forces and Ukraine since 2014 on defense reform. Bureaucratic Western militaries are “too slow and too heavy” to apply new technical solutions to battlefield problems quickly, he said.

Ukraine’s tech-savvy population has updated guerilla-war techniques for a digital age.

Insurgencies have always repurposed tools at hand into weapons—from bamboo spikes to Molotov cocktails. In Ukraine, home to a thriving tech-outsourcing industry and hackers who operate outside the law, the motivated people are often software engineers who connect using digital services like encrypted messenger Signal and networks from companies like Elon Musk‘s SpaceX. And their tools have become mobile apps, 3-D printers and consumer drones.

“The enemy has been preparing for full-fledged [technology] war for 20 years. We made a technological leap in 10 months” Ukrainian Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov said on Twitter last week.

Two Ukrainian soldiers armed a drone with a modified grenade to test it near Bakhmut, Ukraine, in November.

PHOTO: LEAH MILLIS/REUTERS

Units are modifying off-the-shelf drones with slings they can release remotely to drop grenades on enemy positions. Volunteer soldiers are using their private-sector experience developing enterprise resource-management software for multinationals to automate payroll on the front lines. One Ukrainian company is building remote-controlled electric vehicles that can be mounted with heavy machine guns or other cargo.

And Ukrainian programmers have updated a system the military calls Delta to give local commanders real-time battlefield intelligence received from drones and from spotters living in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine.

“It’s called connected war, and the Ukrainian army will be the most advanced ever because of life experience,” said Roman Perimov, who is leading a new military technology development unit within a brigade of the Ukrainian army. His team is building homemade drone-jamming equipment and churns out cheap, high-capacity battery units to keep soldiers online during the fighting.

“You can have 500 drones in the sky for a relatively standard military action,” he said. “This has never been seen before.”

Cheap drones and drone defense represent one of the biggest innovation areas to emerge in this war. Both Ukrainian and Russian units typically use modified versions of small commercial drones for reconnaissance and attacks.

A Ukrainian soldier watched a drone feed from an underground command center in Bakhmut, Donetsk region, Ukraine, in December.

PHOTO: LIBKOS/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Ukrainian soldiers have been using 3-D printers to build compact plastic harnesses that snap onto popular commercial drones so that they can be armed with grenades, Mr. Perimov said. The harnesses have inexpensive light sensors attached to a mechanical clasp. When the operator tells the drone to flash lights on its belly, the sensors pick up the light, triggering the clasp to release a strap holding a grenade. Total cost for a 3-D-printed harness is about $10 to $15, Mr. Perimov said.

“It doesn’t do a lot of damage, but it could destroy a vehicle or a couple of troopers,” said Mr. Perimov, whose unit is now exploring the use of stratospheric commercial balloons that could perform reconnaissance or relay communications over swaths of the battlefield.

One element of Ukraine’s success in innovation is how different military units and Ukrainian tech companies are working on their own new military technologies—a bottom-up approach that at times more closely resembles a string of Silicon Valley garages than a Pentagon-funded project.

“We can’t even write a contract fast enough,” says Brad Halsey, an engineer and former U.S. special operations officer who now trains U.S. soldiers in what he calls “MacGyver-ing” to address immediate needs, who notes it can take the Pentagon a year to complete an acquisition. In Iraq, he ran a techie workspace to improvise tools for soldiers, such as probes to inspect innocent-looking objects for hidden explosive devices. “Our new mantra should be ‘how to be Ukrainian,’” Mr. Halsey said.

One effort involving armed, remote-control electric ground vehicles stems from a Ukrainian military contractor that also is working on remote-controlled machine guns. The company has been demonstrating the technology in recent months, but its founder declined to comment.

One resource-management software project started in a military unit that was looking to make payroll easier after onboarding so many new soldiers. Programmers who once built such systems for private companies as part of Ukraine’s sprawling technology-outsourcing sector turned to building an open-source system for automating payroll calculations. Now they are building other modules to the software to cover things such as equipment storage, according to people involved in the project.

Ukraine’s success cobbling together a virtual command-and-control system on the fly offers valuable lessons for the West.

PHOTO: CLODAGH KILCOYNE/REUTERS

Ukraine has had some centralized innovation, too. Its Defense Ministry and security services dusted off a battlefield-awareness platform that they had built to North Atlantic Treaty Organization standards but largely abandoned, said Yaroslav Honchar, a co-founder of Aerorozvidka, a nongovernmental organization that has been helping the Ukrainian army with surveillance drones since 2014. Ukraine used the system to consolidate information from drones and satellites as well as on chatbots with names such as “STOP Russian war” through which Ukrainians could send tips.

Almost every unit that participated in the battle for Kyiv last spring used Delta, which units can access by laptop or tablet, Mr. Honchar said. “Those who are under shelling are the best learners,” he added.

The result is a cut-price, improvised approximation of vast efforts that the Defense Department and other Western militaries have been working on for years, a secure digital matrix linking commanders, fighters, weapons and intelligence, say Western defense specialists familiar with Ukraine’s systems. U.S. ambitions for networked warfare have sprawled to cover a panoply of services, weapons systems and intelligence agencies while also trying to keep pace with tech advances.

Ukrainian soldiers retrieved Starlink satellite connection hardware from a roof of a damaged university after a missile attack in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, in December.

PHOTO: SHANNON STAPLETON/REUTERS

One important ingredient for Ukraine’s military technology has been the decision by SpaceX to provide thousands of Starlink connection terminals early in the war, Ukrainian soldiers and commanders say. Most units have one, sometimes camouflaged in cardboard or garbage to avoid being spotted by enemy drones.

The U.S. is trying to adopt new technologies more quickly, including through a network of nongovernmental innovation hubs that are linked to the Pentagon but outside its bureaucracy, under the umbrella Defensewerx. They tap civilian know-how for military purposes and encourage brainstorming. Now, those hubs—and particularly Sofwerx, tied to U.S. Special Operations Command—will be studying Ukraine’s example, say people familiar with their work.

Write to Sam Schechner at Sam.Schechner@wsj.com and Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

​

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com