Quotes of the Day:

"Most of us spend too much time on the last twenty-four hours and too little on the last six thousand years."

- Will Durant

“It is always the herd men who win battles and the free men who win wars.”

- John Steinbeck, The Moon is Down

"My idea was that the role of the special forces were to train Vietnamese to behave as guerrillas, harassing the supply lines down through the mountains of the, ah, the Viet Cong. And the special American special forces were to train their special forces to do that."

- Roger Hilsman

1. Kim Jong Un puts daughter front and center at lavish military banquet

2. North displays enough ICBM launchers to defeat U.S. missile defense

3. North Korea holds military parade to celebrate Korean People's Army

4. S. Korean team rescues 5 survivors in quake-hit Turkey

5. Panel points to major holes in South's cyber security

6. Shinzo Abe Book Criticizes Trump as Weak on North Korea

7. Kim Jong Un Stirs Up Loyalty of KPA Officers Ahead of Military Parade

8. Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward

9. America Needs to Reassure Japan and South Korea

10. North Korea displays 'solid-fuel ICBM' at military parade

11. [PHOTOS] North Korea's army anniversary military parade

12. Korea at a crossroads on the 40th anniversary of Tokyo Declaration

13. Korean War POW who sued Kim Jong-un dies at 89

14. N. Korean military calls for efforts to prevent incidents between civilians and soldiers

1. Kim Jong Un puts daughter front and center at lavish military banquet

Kim Ju Ae is surely distracting us.

Photos and video at the link: https://edition.cnn.com/2023/02/08/asia/north-korea-kim-jong-un-daughter-banquet-intl-hnk/index.html

To reiterate past comments, why are we seeing so much of the daughter?

I am sure Kim Jong Un likes the notoriety she is bringing to the regime. 

KJU might be trying to soften his image and try to appear like a “normal” person. Or he may be laughing at all of us who are speculating that she has been designated for succession and this distracts us from other issues (and while we focus on her he continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles) Look at all of the reporting on that. It could be his understanding of the American mindset. This could be for deterrence as he may believe we would not attack him with an “innocent” child who would be hurt.

One thing no one is discussing is that this could also be for internal purposes to reinforce Songbun or Military First Politics. Bringing her to these events may be Kim signaling that military first politics continues.

Kim Jong Un puts daughter front and center at lavish military banquet | CNN

CNN · by Yoonjung Seo,Brad Lendon · February 8, 2023

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Kim Jong Un's daughter on display at lavish event. Here's what it could mean

Seoul, South Korea CNN —

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un brought his daughter to a lavish banquet at a military barracks on Tuesday, the latest sign the girl is possibly being groomed as his eventual successor in an authoritarian family regime dating back decades.

The girl – believed to be Kim’s second child, Ju Ae, who is around 9 years old – and her father were joined by his wife, Ri Sol Ju, in the visit to the barracks and subsequent banquet to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), state media reported Wednesday.

And on Wednesday night, the girl appeared again, this time watching with Kim as massive intercontinental ballistic missiles were paraded through Pyongyang’s Kim Il Sung square in a military parade.

A Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report described seeing Kim and “his respected” daughter at the Tuesday night banquet as a dream come true for the military officials present.

Pictures published by the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper showed the girl walking next to Kim and her mother as they entered the venue for the banquet while military officers applauded.

At the banquet, the girl was seated in the center of the lead table between Kim and her mother.

In a country where the Kim family and the military are all powerful, the presence of the girl at such an important event sends clear signals, said Leif-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha University in Seoul.

“By ostentatiously including his wife and daughter, Kim wants observers at home and abroad to see his family dynasty and the North Korean military as irrevocably linked,” he said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited military barracks with his daughter and wife to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army (KPA), state media reported.

Rodong Sinmun

Other observers said it’s clear Kim has made a choice of his successor, confirming speculation that began with the girl’s appearance at the November test-launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with her father.

South Korean lawmaker and secretary of the National Intelligence Service Yoo Sang-bum said after that launch that the girl was thought to be Ju Ae.

Images showed the two walking hand in hand while inspecting the massive missile, while state media called her Kim’s “beloved” daughter.

North Korean state media published a story later that month with pictures of Kim and his daughter, describing her as his “most beloved” child, said Cheong Seong-chang,​ a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea.

Military officers applaud North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his wife and daughter during their visit to a military barracks on Tuesday in a photo released by state-run media.

Rodong Sinmun

“Considering these, there is no longer any doubt that Kim Ju Ae has been appointed as the successor to Kim Jong Un, and it is necessary to pay attention to how this will affect North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies in the mid- to long-term, and how North Koreans will accept the succession of the fourth generation,” Cheong said.

The Kim family’s rule in North Korea stretches back to 1948, when Kim Il Sung came to power in the aftermath of World War II.

When he died in 1994, his son Kim Jong Il took control of the country. Kim Jong Un came to power in December 2011 after the death of Kim Jong Il, his father.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, along with his daughter, inspects an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in this undated photo released on November 19, 2022 by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). KCNA via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE WAS PROVIDED BY A THIRD PARTY. NO THIRD PARTY SALES. SOUTH KOREA OUT. NO COMMERCIAL OR EDITORIAL SALES IN SOUTH KOREA. REUTERS IS UNABLE TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFY THIS IMAGE.

KCNA/Reuters

video

Kim Jong Un's daughter seen in first public appearance

There’s no indication Kim Jong Un would pass on the leadership anytime soon.

While the Kim regime has held previous such banquets for the military, pictures from Tuesday’s event depicted a more splashy setting than has been seen before.

“Kim’s lavish banquet commemorating the armed forces is meant to show that officers are highly respected in society and soldiers are well supported by the state,” Easley said.

KCNA reported that Kim Jong Un had made a speech at the banquet in which the North Korean leader praised and encouraged the military without making remarks about the United States or South Korea.

Tuesday’s banquet came a day before what many experts expect to be North Korea’s biggest military parade ever.

Pyongyang is coming off a record year of missile testing, and analysts are expecting to see examples of those missiles and more during an event expected to begin late Wednesday night.

CNN · by Yoonjung Seo,Brad Lendon · February 8, 2023

2. North displays enough ICBM launchers to defeat U.S. missile defense

Photos at the link.

Thursday

February 9, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

North displays enough ICBM launchers to defeat U.S. missile defense

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/09/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-ICBM/20230209161937476.html

A photo released by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows a vehicle carrying a mock-up of a solid-fuel intercontinental missile under development at a military parade in Kim Il Sung Square in downtown Pyongyang on Wednesday evening. [YONHAP]

North Korea displayed the largest number of its longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile at a nighttime military parade on Wednesday, as well as mock-ups of a new solid-fuel missile under development, state media photos showed Thursday.

Photos also showed leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter Kim Ju-ae smiling from a viewing stand as they observed Wednesday’s parade in Pyongyang's Kim Il Sung Square, which marked the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). 

Pyongyang’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released photos that showed weapons in the parade procession included at least 11 Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) carried by 11-axle (22-wheeled) transporter-erector-launchers (TEL), as well as five 9-axle TELs carrying missile canisters representing solid-fuel ICBMs.

The Hwasong-17 has an estimated range of 15,000 kilometers (9,320 miles) — enough to reach all of the continental United States.

North Korea’s TELs lend greater mobility and survivability to the regime’s missiles should Pyongyang decide to fire them, especially if the missiles are powered by solid-fuel engines that do not need to be fueled at their launch site, unlike most liquid-fuel missiles.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, observes Wednesday evening's military parade in downtown Pyongyang with his daughter Kim Ju-ae, right, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). [YONHAP]

“[This] may well be the first North Korean military parade to exhibit a number of ICBM launchers in excess of that needed to saturate existing U.S. GMD deployment,” wrote Ankit Panda, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on Twitter.

GMD refers to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, the only operationally deployed U.S. missile defense program capable of defending the mainland United States, including Alaska and Hawaii, against long-range ballistic missile attacks.

The United States currently has 44 ground-based interceptors, but current military logic assumes 4 interceptors are required for each missile re-entry vehicle. 

In previous testimony to the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee, Panda said Pyongyang could overwhelm the currently deployed GMD system with 10 ICBM launchers, especially with a larger ICBM capable of delivering multiple reentry vehicles.

A photo released by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) shows a procession of Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at a military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army in Kim Il Sung Square in downtown Pyongyang on Wednesday evening. [YONHAP]

Panda also called the appearance of vehicles with mounted mock-ups of a “canisterized” solid-fuel ICBM at the parade as representing a “more credible” threat “than the last time they paraded similar mock-ups in 2017, given broad [North Korean] progress in solid rocket motors.”

State media claimed the regime successfully tested a “high-thrust solid-fuel motor” for a “new-type strategic weapons system” at the Sohae Satellite Testing Ground on Dec. 15, while satellite images taken on Jan. 29 and Jan. 30 showed the regime likely conducted another solid-fuel engine test at a different site between those dates.

The North already possesses solid-fuel missiles, but these are its short-range ballistic missiles, dubbed KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25 by U.S. military intelligence. The range of these missiles is between 400 and 500 kilometers — enough to reach most targets in South Korea and Japan.

Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute’s Center for Foreign Policy and National Security, said it was likely that the new solid-fuel missile canisters that were displayed at Wednesday’s parade were mock-ups for a new, solid-fuel version of a Hwasong-14 or Hwasong-15-type ICBM, given the shorter length of the chassis carrying the canisters compared to the TELs carrying the Hwasong-17 missiles.

The Hwasong 14 has a range of approximately 10,000 kilometers, while the Hwasong-15’s range is estimated to be between 8,500 and 13,000 kilometers.

Yang also noted that the TELs carrying missile canisters at Wednesday’s parade were longer than the 8-axle vehicles used to carry canisters at the April 2017 parade.

Although he acknowledged the possibility that the North was “bluffing” by showing empty canisters at the parade, Yang also said it was unlikely.

“Recently, the North has often shown a model of a new weapon before embarking on actual developmental testing," he said.

"I think we should assume that this is not a toy weapon, but a weapons system that is currently in the development stage.”

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

3. North Korea holds military parade to celebrate Korean People's Army

And of course here is the fashion statement. Social media speculation is the pendant is of a Hwasong 17.

Kim’s wife Ri Sol-ju, also in attendance, wore a necklace with a pendant in the shape of Hwaseong-17.

Imagine if the US First lady wore a Minuteman ICBM pendant to the State of the union

Thursday

February 9, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

North Korea holds military parade to celebrate Korean People's Army

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/09/national/northKorea/North-Korea-military-parade-Hwaseong17/20230209104205138.html

Fireworks at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on Wednesday in celebrating the 75th anniversary of the North Korean’s army. [YONHAP]

North Korea held a military parade late Wednesday, its first since April 2022, in celebration of the 75th foundation anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).  

Maxar Technologies’ satellite images show what appears to be a convoy of missiles, including North Korea’s longest-range intercontinental ballistic missile Hwaseong-17 and slightly shorter-range missiles, passing through a huge crowd in front of the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang. 

While this is the 13th military parade held since Kim Jong-un became North Korean leader in 2012, it is only the fifth parade that was held late at night.

North Korea has been holding its military parades after dark since 2020.

Satellite images of the North Korea military parade. [MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES]

The parade was not livestreamed.

On Tuesday, Kim Jong-un met with North Korean soldiers at an army barracks and attended a banquet in which his daughter Kim Ju-ae also attended, positioned in the center.

Kim’s wife Ri Sol-ju, also in attendance, wore a necklace with a pendant in the shape of Hwaseong-17.

BY LEE HO-JEONG [lee.hojeong@joongang.co.kr]

4. S. Korean team rescues 5 survivors in quake-hit Turkey

Good work.

(3rd LD) S. Korean team rescues 5 survivors in quake-hit Turkey | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · February 9, 2023

(ATTN: CHANGES headline, lead; UPDATES with more details in para 5; ADDS photos)

ANTAKYA, Turkey, Feb. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's disaster relief team operating in quake-struck Turkey rescued five survivors Thursday, according to on-site team officials and Seoul's foreign ministry.

The team rescued a man in his 70s at around 5 a.m. (local time) from the rubble at the site of a high school in Hatay's provincial capital of Antakya, according to the ministry.

The man was conscious and appeared to have sustained no major injuries, according to the ministry. Four others were found dead at the site.

This photo provided by the Korea Disaster Relief Team shows South Korean workers rescuing a toddler in Antakya, in the Turkish province of Hatay, on Feb. 9, 2023, after a deadly 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit Turkey and Syria on Feb. 6. (Yonhap)

South Korean workers later rescued a two-year-old girl and her father, along with an unrelated woman from the rubble of a five-story building in the city. The three were reportedly in relatively stable conditions, officials said.

The ministry also confirmed the rescue of a 10-year-old girl and said she was in stable condition.

The 118-member rescue team, the largest-ever sent by South Korea for emergency overseas rescue work, arrived Wednesday in the southeastern city of Gaziantep, one of the hardest-hit areas, for relief efforts in various regions affected by the quake.

Youtube

https://youtu.be/-RbBm9X_IdM

A South Korean rescue team conducts search and rescue operations in the quake-hit region of Antakya, Hatay, Turkey, on Feb. 9, 2023, in this photo provided by the Korea Disaster Relief Team. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · February 9, 2023

5. Panel points to major holes in South's cyber security

While we are distracted with parades of ICBM and Kim Jong Un's daughter, the regime's all purpose sword is hard at work. 

While ICBMs are potential threats the regime's cyber activities are actual and ongoing threats that we need to defend against.

Thursday

February 9, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Panel points to major holes in South's cyber security

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/02/09/national/northKorea/Korea-British-Embassy-Cyber-Week/20230209185859409.html

The British Embassy in Seoul hosted a panel discussion on deterring North Korean cyber attacks at the Four Seasons Hotel in Jongno District, central Seoul on Thursday morning as part of its Cyber Week series of talks. [BRITISH EMBASSY]

South Korea’s defenses against North Korean hackers are hampered by Seoul’s lack of clear guidance for private companies and the country’s balkanized cyber security market, a risk analyst said at an expert panel on Thursday.

The discussion, titled “Deterring North Korean Cyber Attacks,” was part of a two-day panel series at the Four Seasons Hotel in Jongno District, central Seoul, hosted by the British Embassy in Seoul as part of its Cyber Week that kicked off on Wednesday.

Nils Weisensee, director of news operations at the Korea Risk Group, said that South Korean cyber security could benefit from institutional and policy changes that encourage “a culture of exchange and open discussion of weaknesses” in the country’s online infrastructure, and called on the government to impose “financial costs” on companies that do not maximize their resilience and security measures against cyber attacks.

Weisensee also noted that cyber security companies in Korea “never talk to each other because they are competitors, with no one sharing information or intelligence about threats” — a state of affairs he contrasted with that of the United States, which he said was characterized by “a constant flow of ideas between experts” who “understand that no one wins if crucial information is withheld.”

He also identified South Korea’s reliance on multiple browser plug-ins and outdated software as “highly vulnerable singular points of weakness” that expose the country to attacks by North Korean hackers.

The attacks, which have recently focused on stealing from financial institutions and especially cryptocurrency exchanges, have increased in sophistication and brazenness in the past five years, mainly due to the adoption of tighter international sanctions in 2016 and 2017 that closed off the North’s other revenue streams, according to Oh Il Seok, a research fellow at Seoul’s Institute for National Security Strategy.

“It’s hard to see how further sanctions would deter North Korea’s malicious cyber activities, because North Korean cyber attacks are aimed at earning foreign currency to support its missile and nuclear weapons programs,” Oh said. “As sanctions have been tightened, we have observed that regime cohesion has actually increased.”

Blockchain analysis company Chainalysis released a report last week that said North Korea-backed hackers stole $1.7 billion through cryptocurrency heists in 2022 — a near-fourfold increase from the country’s previous record of $429 million in 2021.

Oh noted that deepening division between the United States and allies like South Korea and Britain on one side and Russia, China and North Korea on the other would likely only encourage North Korea to ramp up illicit cyber activities, given the lower likelihood that countries like Russia would enforce existing sanctions.

Fellow panelist Chai Kyung-hoon, who serves as director of the Foreign Ministry’s North Korean nuclear policy division, noted that the North has also found ways around international bans on its labor exports through its IT workers.

“Not only do North Korean IT workers raise hard currency for the regime by working for foreign, usually English-speaking companies under false identities, but they also procure information and materiel for missile and nuclear weapons components,” Chai said.

Oh observed that while North Korea’s IT workers are highly motivated to work for the regime as “it is one of the few ways they are permitted to leave their country,” South Korea’s top-tier IT workers tend to work for private companies that pay better than the government.

“Our countries need to train skilled IT workers who will go on to work in the public sector to be beef up our cyber defenses and responses,” Oh said.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

6. Shinzo Abe Book Criticizes Trump as Weak on North Korea

Excerpts:

The former Japanese leader’s book largely tracks the accounts of John Bolton, who was Mr. Trump’s national security adviser from April 2018 to September 2019. 

In public statements and a book published in 2020, Mr. Bolton said Mr. Trump didn’t put enough pressure on North Korea. Mr. Trump responded by calling Mr. Bolton a liar, and he said he had to block his adviser from pushing the U.S. into war.

The U.S. and North Korea ultimately didn’t reach a deal. A Trump-Kim meeting in Hanoi in February 2019 broke up without agreement after Pyongyang declined to freeze all of its weapons programs and sought billions of dollars in sanctions relief. Leaders of the two countries haven’t met since.

Shinzo Abe Book Criticizes Trump as Weak on North Korea

Late Japanese leader wanted more-hawkish policy, but then-president thought he was helping prevent war

https://www.wsj.com/articles/shinzo-abe-book-criticizes-trump-as-weak-on-north-korea-11675927659?mod=Searchresults_pos3&page=1

By Peter LandersFollow

 and Chieko TsuneokaFollow

Feb. 9, 2023 2:27 am ET

TOKYO—In a posthumously published book, former Japanese leader Shinzo Abe said he pushed then-President Donald Trump to take a stronger stand on North Korea but found Mr. Trump weak and overly eager for a deal.

Mr. Abe said in the Japanese-language book, published this week, that he grew worried North Korea would learn of Mr. Trump’s dovish tendencies. “We absolutely couldn’t let the outside world catch wind of it,” he said.

Mr. Trump has said his effort to build a relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un helped forestall conflicts. 

The memoir consists of interviews Mr. Abe gave to two journalists between October 2020 and October 2021 after he stepped down as Japan’s prime minister in September 2020.

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Mr. Abe, who stayed in Parliament and remained active in politics, initially wanted to put off publication because he felt the content was too sensitive, according to the book’s introduction. After he was assassinated in July 2022 at age 67, his widow gave consent for the book to be released, the introduction says.

One passage of the book focuses on preparations for a June 2018 summit meeting between Messrs. Trump and Kim in Singapore. 

Mr. Abe said that at a meeting in Florida two months earlier, he urged Mr. Trump to demand that Mr. Kim irreversibly abandon his nuclear-weapons program as a condition for any U.S.-North Korea deal. Mr. Abe said Mr. Trump’s national-security staff, which shared that position, privately asked him to stress it because they feared the president wasn’t listening. 

Mr. Trump treated the stance as if it were an extra weight on his back disrupting his march toward a historic deal, Mr. Abe said.

​Mr. Abe said the case he made to Mr. Trump was: “What Kim Jong Un fears most is having a Tomahawk [missile] suddenly fired at him, and him and his family losing their lives. Only the U.S. can apply pressure involving the use of force.”

He said such hawkish talk made little impression on the president.

Mr. Abe said Mr. Trump had suggested in an earlier conversation it would be cheaper for the U.S. to keep its aircraft carrier groups docked in ports, and wasn’t persuaded when Mr. Abe argued that such forces needed to roam the oceans to project U.S. power. 

“Not just myself but also the U.S. national-security team did all they could to hide Mr. Trump’s instincts,” Mr. Abe said.

A representative of Mr. Trump didn’t respond to a request for comment about the Abe book. At a presidential debate in October 2020, Mr. Trump defended his outreach to Mr. Kim, saying it reduced the chances of America being drawn into conflict. 

“We have a very good relationship, and there’s no war,” Mr. Trump said. 

At the June 2018 summit, Messrs. Trump and Kim released a joint statement calling for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but it didn’t include language stating that the process should be verifiable and irreversible, as Mr. Abe had wanted.

Mr. Abe said the U.S. should also have insisted that North Korea abandon its intercontinental and midrange missiles as well as its biological weapons. 

While in office, Mr. Abe was careful not to criticize Mr. Trump and the two enjoyed a warm relationship that included playing golf together five times. 

The former Japanese leader’s book largely tracks the accounts of John Bolton, who was Mr. Trump’s national security adviser from April 2018 to September 2019. 

In public statements and a book published in 2020, Mr. Bolton said Mr. Trump didn’t put enough pressure on North Korea. Mr. Trump responded by calling Mr. Bolton a liar, and he said he had to block his adviser from pushing the U.S. into war.

The U.S. and North Korea ultimately didn’t reach a deal. A Trump-Kim meeting in Hanoi in February 2019 broke up without agreement after Pyongyang declined to freeze all of its weapons programs and sought billions of dollars in sanctions relief. Leaders of the two countries haven’t met since.

Write to Peter Landers at Peter.Landers@wsj.com and Chieko Tsuneoka at chieko.Tsuneoka@wsj.com

7. Kim Jong Un Stirs Up Loyalty of KPA Officers Ahead of Military Parade

Military First Politics.

The military is key to regime survival. And their loyalty to Kim is key to the survival of military leaders.

We should keep in mind regime collapse will occur when two conditions occur: the loss of central government effectiveness of the party in Pyongyang and the loss of coherence of the military (good order and discipline) and military's support for the regime. While we observe for indicators of intentions and preparation for an attack we also need to be observing for indicators of military breaks down and the regime's ability to provide resources to military units throughout the north.

Kim Jong Un Stirs Up Loyalty of KPA Officers Ahead of Military Parade

In a speech marking the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), leader Kim Jong Un urged his military to faithfully inherit the revolutionary and fighting spirit. 

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · February 8, 2023

Advertisement

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un made a speech to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) on Tuesday, according to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), one of the North’s state-controlled media.

“The highest honor of the 75-year-long history of our People’s Army lies in the great succession which continues staunchly and vigorously despite the passage of time and the storms of history,” Kim said.

A day after he presided over a meeting of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) on military affairs, Kim visited the lodging quarters of KPA officers with his “respected” daughter to celebrate the event. The same daughter was previously called “the most beloved” child of Kim when she appeared in a photo session with scientists and technicians who contributed to the development of the North’s Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November. Now, as she appeared again with her father at a venue celebrating the anniversary of the KPA’s founding, it may contribute to the speculation that she has been tapped as the successor of Kim.

Looking back at the history of the North Korean army’s fight against national enemies, Kim again reiterated his principles of “strength to strength” and “self-reliance” to urge his military to unconditionally follow his will.

“A history of righteous strength was made on this land, proving through a hard-won victory the truth that dignity and honor are only given to the strong and the validity of the revolutionary cause is verified only through victory, and independence and self-sufficiency are only guaranteed by self-reliance in defense,” Kim said.

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Since he ascended the throne after his father Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, Kim Jong Un has been dedicated to boosting his military capabilities to stabilize his power and confront South Korea and the United States in the region. During his tenure so far, North Korea has carried out four nuclear tests and significantly advanced ballistic missile programs, such as ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). North Korea is believed to have dozens of nuclear warheads already and is expected to have hundreds more in the coming years.

At the Eighth Congress of the WPK held in January 2021, North Korea also pledged to develop more powerful and advanced missile programs such as super-large hydrogen bombs, hypersonic gliding flight warheads, multi-warhead missiles, and new types of ballistic missiles. According to the North’s state media reports, it will finish preparations for launching its first military reconnaissance satellite by April – which would trigger more active corresponding measures from the United States and South Korea.

Besides Kim’s speech, satellite imagery suggested that North Korea was also preparing to hold a military parade for the 75th anniversary of the founding of the KPA. Early indications were that the parade started around 9 p.m. in the evening of February 8.

CONTRIBUTING AUTHOR

Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is an assistant editor at The Diplomat and nonresident Korea Foundation fellow at Pacific Forum.

thediplomat.com · by Mitch Shin · February 8, 2023

8. Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward

Michaela Dodge, Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward, No. 547, February 8, 2023 – Nipp

nipp.org

Allied Assurance, Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward

Dr. Michaela Dodge

Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.

The United States is facing new challenges in trying to assure allies and deter revisionist adversaries, most notably Russia, China, and North Korea. These revisionist powers are expanding their nuclear arsenals and are threatening nuclear weapons use for coercive purposes to advance their goals, particularly in a regional context. Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of United States Strategic Command recently pointed out that “We have to account for three-party [threats]… That is unprecedented in this nation’s history. We have never faced two peer nuclear-capable opponents at the same time, who have to be deterred differently.” These new realities are shaping extended deterrence and assurance requirements and warrant a departure from the U.S. post-Cold War optimism about decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in international security.

U.S. Security Assurances Today: Tough Neighborhoods

Emerging regional threat developments with global implications place the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance commitments at risk, particularly given the fact that the United States adapted its force posture to reflect an anticipated, long-term, benign strategic environment starting in the 1990s. The United States has never planned for the prospect of having to deter two highly motivated and revisionist nuclear peers. During the Cold War, U.S. officials assumed that if the United States successfully deterred the Soviet Union, other lesser nuclear-armed actors would be deterred by extension. The situation today is vastly different and a multipolar nuclear threat context creates new extended deterrence and assurance requirements, particularly given the prospect of coordination between China and Russia.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) discussed the goal of assuring allies and partners and the value of nuclear forces for extended deterrence. It stated that “Assurance is a common goal and advances our common security interests” and that it includes “sustained allied dialogues to understand each other’s threat perceptions and to arrive at a shared understanding of how best to demonstrate our collective capabilities and resolve.” The 2018 NPR also noted “an increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries.” The Biden Administration’s 2022 NPR also emphasizes the importance of assuring allies and partners.

International security developments appear to be increasing demands for U.S. assurance guarantees, including those dependent upon the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” For example, Polish President Andrzej Duda recently stated that “The problem above all is that we don’t have nuclear weapons” and that “There is always the opportunity to participate in nuclear sharing. We have spoken to US leaders about whether the US is considering such a possibility. The topic is open.” The White House subsequently denied having talks with Warsaw about Poland hosting nuclear weapons. In 2017, Shigeru Ishiba, former Japanese defense minister, said that “Japan should have the technology to build a nuclear weapon if it wants to do so.” As many as 71 percent of South Koreans support a “domestic nuclear weapons program.” Song Min-soon, South Korea’s former foreign minister, argued that “It’s necessary for South Korea to move on to a self-reliant alliance from a dependent alliance,” and that “a defensive nuclear capacity, with a missile range limited to the Korean Peninsula” was “justified.”

Practical Steps to Assure Allies

The United States would do well to remember that deterrence credibility depends on how opponents perceive the U.S. will to act, and, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.” Currently, the United States faces several emerging capability gaps that may make it look less willing than it otherwise should be for deterrence and assurance purposes; chief among them are insufficient conventional forces able to sustain two simultaneous engagements in geographically separate regions, insufficient missile defense capabilities, and large asymmetries in short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces. The following recommendations can help the United States chart a path to success in an increasingly volatile international security environment where assuring allies and extending deterrence appear more challenging.

Expand Nuclear Policy Consultations. In order to understand U.S. allies’ assurance needs in as much detail as possible, the United States ought to expand ongoing deterrence and assurance dialogues. These dialogues would serve several purposes: one, they would keep the United States apprised of its allies’ needs and perceptions, and help develop an understanding of their views of assurance requirements. Two, they would help to develop a cadre of foreign professionals that would be well-versed in nuclear deterrence issues and the nuances of nuclear weapons policies. These professionals would then be better able to communicate issues within their respective governments and publics, allowing the governments more effectively to communicate with their electorates in ways that would increase citizen awareness of nuclear deterrence issues and help counter malicious foreign interference and manipulation regarding nuclear policy topics. The Czech Republic’s debate about a U.S. radar deployment in the 2006-2009 timeframe illustrates some of the difficulties of communicating complex national security issues to publics in an ad hoc manner. Three, through dialogue, allies would contribute to developing joint and hopefully better informed “strategic profiles” of adversaries.

Continue Nuclear Weapons Modernization. Even though few allied countries have a detailed understanding of U.S. nuclear weapons programs or the infrastructure that supports them, many consider ongoing U.S. nuclear weapons modernization important for both extended deterrence and allied assurance. They worry about inconsistency in the signals that the United States sends by expressing the rationale for weapon programs, only to cancel them when the next presidential administration is elected.

Continue to Develop Missile Defense Capabilities. The United States ought to continue to develop its missile defense capabilities. While missile defenses will not supplant nuclear deterrence and assurance anytime soon, they are nevertheless an important component of allied assurance. This applies both to homeland and regional missile defense systems.

Do Not Change U.S. Declaratory Policy. Changing U.S. nuclear declaratory policy to reflect “sole purpose” or “no first use,” especially amid Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, would make the United States risk being seen as irresolute by adversaries and alienate allies. Adversaries could interpret the change as proof the United States was deterred by their actions, while allies could interpret this as the United States not being willing to accept the risk of its commitments to them, undermining U.S. extended deterrence and assurance goals (and potentially U.S. nonproliferation goals). Maintaining the status quo (i.e., a measure of ambiguity regarding the timing and scope of U.S. nuclear use) in U.S. declaratory policy helps in this regard. The Biden Administration’s NPR says that, for the time being, it will not adopt a “no first use” or “sole purpose” declaratory policy.

Maintain Sufficient Conventional Capabilities and a Robust Production Base. The U.S. Department of Defense has felt the pressure of decreasing resources for recapitalization and modernization. Maintaining sufficient forces that can be deployed to Europe without compromising the U.S. posture in Asia (and vice-versa) will continue to be important for assurance and extended deterrence. The United States should have the capacity to forward deploy additional forces in both theaters quickly and simultaneously if the security situation deteriorates. The war in Ukraine highlights the difficulties of supplying a partner nation in the middle of a conflict and the importance of prepositioning systems to the theater beforehand. It also underscores the need for maintaining a healthy and responsive defense industrial base.

Do Not Forget that Allies Are Assured by a Range of Activities. Extended deterrence and assurance guarantees are not generated by just military capabilities but encompass a range of actions from nominating ambassadors in a timely manner, to high-level visits, to joint military exercises, professional exchanges, and public messaging coordination. The United States ought to take advantage of all the tools at its disposal to maximize synergies inherent in coordinating supportive activities well.

Nurture the Development of Nuclear Policy Expertise Among Allies. The United States must nurture and develop nuclear policy expertise among its allies. Continued bilateral and multilateral discussions and strategic dialogues are one way of doing so. Facilitating and supporting expert visits to nuclear sites and bases that host nuclear weapon systems is another way of developing policy expertise. This requires allies willing to invest resources and manpower in the endeavor; the United States cannot accomplish this task on its own.

Revitalize the U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production Complex. The United States must have a flexible and resilient nuclear warhead infrastructure. All administrations since the end of the Cold War have supported this (largely unfulfilled) objective. With China rapidly increasing the size of its strategic nuclear arsenal and Russia developing a suite of systems unregulated by any arms control treaties, this requirement is becoming more pressing. While few experts in allied states pay attention to the status of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, it is inseparable from judging the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance guarantees. A warhead issue the United States cannot address in a timely manner could undermine allied belief in the U.S. ability to respond to negative trends in the security environment quickly and thereby degrade the credibility of U.S. commitments to allied security.

Abrogate the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and coercive nuclear threats to NATO members are inconsistent with the Act, which calls for “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.” The United States empirically knows the valuable, stabilizing, and reassuring effects its permanent military presence has on allies. It also can be cheaper than a rotational presence. Yet, the Act currently precludes it, even as Russia aggressively undermines the stability of the European security order. In light of Russia’s actions, the United States and NATO should not be bound by an agreement that the other side ignores.

Develop U.S. Regional Expertise and Understanding of Adversaries and Allies. The United States must continue to develop regional expertise to foster an understanding of domestic politics in allied countries, an endeavor that took somewhat of a back seat amid its focus on terrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the past years.

Conclusion

Implementing these steps would go a long way to extending deterrence and strengthening the credibility of the U.S. commitment to allied security in a multipolar environment. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that there are emerging deterrence and assurance gaps in the current U.S. and allied force postures. According to Admiral Richard, “The war in Ukraine and China’s nuclear trajectory — their strategic breakout — demonstrates that we have a deterrence and assurance gap based on the threat of limited nuclear employment.” This observation is particularly relevant for regional scenarios involving U.S. allies in which asymmetries between U.S. and adversaries’ short- and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals are the largest and most concerning.

For now, the United States appears to have done a good enough job for extended deterrence and assurance. No allies are seriously pondering developing indigenous nuclear weapons programs, and proposals to make a separate peace with Russia and China at U.S. expense are still largely relegated to fringe parts of the political spectrum in allied countries. But challenges, uncertainties, and questions are emerging just below the surface. As they mount, the United States will have to work harder to extend deterrence and convince allies and adversaries of the credibility of its commitment to allied security. Such a process will require larger defense spending than what the United States has been willing to invest after the end of the Cold War, more focused consultations and strategic dialogues with allies, and potentially new nuclear weapons and missile defense capabilities in the future. It will also require a recapitalization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex so that it truly would be flexible and resilient and provide the United States with an ability to respond to unforeseen challenges and problems on a reasonable timescale. These are no small tasks, but failing in them could undermine the U.S. global alliance system and thus entail immeasurable cost.

This Information Series is based on the author’s Occasional Paper entitled, Multipolarity, Extended Deterrence, and Allied Assurance and on interviews with experts conducted in preparation for the Occasional Paper. See Michaela Dodge, Alliance Politics in a Multipolar World, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 10 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, October 26, 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/OP-Vol.-2-No.-10.pdf.

For an elaboration on this point see Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, August 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf.

Tara Copp, “US Military ‘Furiously’ Rewriting Nuclear Deterrence to Address Russia and China, STRATCOM Chief Says,” Defense One, August 11, 2022, available at https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/08/us-military-furiously-rewriting-nuclear-deterrence-address-russia-and-china-stratcom-chief-says/375725/.

Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, op. cit.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2018, pp. 22-23, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PD.

Ibid, p. 22.

Ibid, pp. 22-23.

Ibid, pp. 7-8.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2022, p. 1, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

Jo Harper, “Poland in talks to join NATO nuclear sharing program,” Anadolu Agency, October 5, 2022, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-in-talks-to-join-nato-nuclear-sharing-program/2703041.

Alyssa Blakemore, “White House Denies Having Talks With Poland To Host US Nukes Amid Escalating Tensions With Russia,” Daily Caller, October 5, 2022, available at https://dailycaller.com/2022/10/05/poland-talks-host-us-nukes-amid-escalating-tensions-russia-polish-president-claims/.

“Japan Should Be Able to Build Nuclear Weapons: Ex-LDP Secretary-General Ishiba,” The Japan Times, November 6, 2017, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/06/national/japan-able-build-nuclear-weapons-ex-ldp-secretary-general-ishiba/.

Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, February 2022, available at https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Korea%20Nuclear%20Report%20PDF.pdf.

Jesse Johnson, “South Korea Developing Its Own Nukes One Solution to U.S. Cost-Sharing Demands, Ex-Top Diplomat Says,” The Japan Times, November 12, 2019, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/12/asia-pacific/nuclear-weapons-cost-sharing-south-korea/.

Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 213-214.

For an elaboration on this point see Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, August 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf.

Michaela Dodge, “Russia’s Influence Operations in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania,” Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, April 2022), pp. 11-30, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/OP-Vol.-2-No.-4.pdf.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2022, op. cit., p. 9.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states that “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, p. 8, available at https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.

Bryant Harris, “U.S. nuclear commander warns of deterrence ‘crisis’ against Russia and China,” Defense News Online, May 4, 2022, available at, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/05/04/us-nuclear-commander-warns-of-deterrence-crisis-against-russia-and-china/.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

© National Institute Press, 2023

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9. America Needs to Reassure Japan and South Korea

Is CSIS putting out trial balloons about the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to Korea at the request of the USG or ROKG? There has not been any real pushback since the release of the CSIS report. (https://www.csis.org/analysis/recommendations-north-korea-policy-and-extended-deterrence)

Excerpts:

Finally, Washington should consider laying the groundwork for the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Under the present circumstances, the United States should not redeploy such weapons or support South Korea’s acquisition of them. But Washington and Seoul should consider beginning and publicly acknowledging planning for a potential future tactical nuclear redeployment to South Korea. This planning could include conversations about the infrastructure and military prerequisites for storing such weapons on the peninsula, as well as the potential downsides of doing so, including the high likelihood that tactical nukes would become targets for North Korean missiles, the potential for nuclear redeployment to heighten tensions in the region, the redundancy of tactical nuclear weapons given other U.S. capabilities, and the challenges these weapons could pose to controlling escalatory spirals in a crisis.

Before they make any decisions, the allies might also consider conducting war games to map out potential phases of preparation for redeployment, all contingent on changes in the threat environment. Such exercises would signal U.S. resolve and commitment to Japan and South Korea without crossing the proliferation threshold. They would also pressure Pyongyang to halt its provocations and perhaps spur China to rein in North Korea in order to prevent the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. It is possible that Pyongyang would respond to planning of this kind with additional provocations, but the North could hardly be more belligerent than it was in 2022, when it conducted scores of missile launches. And in any case, the costs of North Korean provocations pale in comparison to the benefits of shoring up extended deterrence, which has underwritten 70 years of peace on the peninsula.

Allied concerns about U.S. credibility will never disappear entirely. But they can and should be managed to avoid the erosion of alliances. New levels of doubt among U.S. allies call for Washington to devise new ways to restore the credibility of extended deterrence—both to reduce Japan’s and South Korea’s sense of vulnerability and to ensure that U.S. alliances in Asia remain a force for stability long into the future.

America Needs to Reassure Japan and South Korea

How to Shore Up Washington’s Eroding Credibility in Asia

By Katrin Fraser Katz, Christopher Johnstone, and Victor Cha

February 9, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Katrin Fraser Katz, Christopher Johnstone, and Victor Cha · February 9, 2023

Last month, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol warned that in the face of mounting North Korean provocations, South Korea might consider building its own nuclear weapons or asking the United States to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the South, as it did during the Cold War. Although Yoon later stressed that his comments did not represent official policy, they were still significant—marking the first time that a South Korean president has raised the prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons since Washington withdrew its own nukes from the South in 1991.

Yoon’s comments are not the only indication that U.S. allies in East Asia are growing concerned about the credibility of Washington’s so-called extended deterrence commitments. These allies have little doubt that adversaries of the United States would think twice about attacking the U.S. homeland for fear of overwhelming retaliation; Washington is ably deterring that sort of aggression. They are increasingly uncertain, however, that U.S. deterrence extends to them. Would the United States honor its pledges to use the full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to deter and, if need be, defeat external attacks on the territory and sovereignty of its allies?

In Japan, which has barred the possession, production, and introduction of nuclear weapons since 1971, discussions about acquiring a nuclear deterrent have not yet entered the mainstream. Nonetheless, unease is growing in the Japanese government about the ability of the United States to uphold its security commitments. In March 2022, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested that Japan should consider a nuclear-sharing arrangement like the one NATO maintains with Washington. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida quickly dismissed Abe’s suggestion, but last month, a meeting between Japan’s foreign and defense ministers and their American counterparts for the first time included a dedicated discussion of extended deterrence at this level, reflecting Japan’s heightened focus on the issue.

Worries about U.S. security guarantees extend beyond elite policy circles in Seoul and Tokyo. The Japanese and South Korean publics are also increasingly concerned about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and support moves to bolster their own countries’ defenses. A February 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace showed that over 70 percent of South Koreans support going nuclear and over 50 percent favor the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. And according to a December 2022 poll conducted by the newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun, more than 80 percent of Japanese consider China, North Korea, and Russia as military threats. Strong majorities also support the Kishida government’s plans for unprecedented spending increases, underscoring the public’s concerns.

To assuage Tokyo and Seoul, the United States should make a concerted effort to shore up the credibility of extended deterrence. That means acknowledging the sources of allied fears, emphasizing that the presence of American troops in Japan and South Korea ties together the fates of the United States and its allies, increasing nuclear-related cooperation and planning with both countries, and possibly launching preliminary discussions about the potential redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes to South Korea.

DRIVERS OF DOUBT

Allied apprehension about U.S. security commitments may seem puzzling in light of the Biden administration’s emphasis on shoring up U.S. alliances and the broad alignment of the Biden, Yoon, and Kishida administrations on North Korea and regional policies. But even at the best of times, maintaining the credibility of external deterrence commitments is a challenge. Doing so requires convincing allies not just that the United States has the capabilities to deter and defend against potential attacks against them but that it also has the will to use those capabilities—even if that means putting U.S. cities at risk. This is an inherently difficult endeavor, so a baseline of allied doubt about extended deterrence is predictable and normal.

In recent years, however, the level of doubt among Japanese and South Korean officials has exceeded that normal baseline level. Rapidly intensifying threats—particularly from North Korea, China, and Russia—have created unique and urgent security challenges that Tokyo and Seoul worry the United States is either unwilling or unable to address. In 2022, for instance, North Korea embarked on an unprecedented campaign of weapons development, testing over 90 cruise and ballistic missiles of various ranges (one of which flew over Japan) and preparing for a nuclear test, which would be the seventh it has carried out since 2006. This turbocharged testing spree has enabled Pyongyang to advance toward its aim of credibly threatening to strike the U.S. homeland with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, a capability that could sow doubt among U.S. allies about Washington’s willingness to put its own territory at risk to defend them. North Korea has also introduced a “first use” nuclear doctrine—threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to military interventions, regime-change efforts, or even new sanctions by outside powers—and is getting close to being able to deploy tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield.

China’s sweeping military modernization is also fueling Japanese and South Korean security concerns. After more than two decades of near double-digit growth in defense spending, including efforts to improve its missile capabilities and dramatically expand its nuclear arsenal, China is increasing its maritime and air activity near Japan, including making regular incursions into the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands). China’s behavior has also increasingly unnerved South Korea as Beijing has come to see Seoul’s missile defense systems—including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery deployed in 2017—as threats to China rather than as mere defenses against North Korea.

The war in Ukraine has provided North Korea with an ideal environment to accelerate its nuclear and missile programs.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Moscow’s “no limits” partnership with Beijing have contributed to the uneasiness of Japan and South Korea, as well. For Tokyo, these developments have underscored the need to reinforce deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Both Kishida and Yoon have drawn direct connections between the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific, suggesting that Russia’s moves in Ukraine could spur China to attempt to take Taiwan by force or potentially tempt North Korea to invade the South. Japan’s new national security strategy, released in December 2022, notes that “Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order” and that “the possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region.” Joint Chinese-Russian exercises near Japan last May and November further jarred Tokyo, as did China’s decision to fire five missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during major military exercises around Taiwan in August.

For Seoul, the war in Ukraine has amplified the sense of vulnerability that comes with being a nonnuclear state next to nuclear-armed North Korea. Both Japan and South Korea worry that Russia’s aggression in Europe will distract the United States from the rapidly evolving array of security challenges in Asia. And Yoon recently pondered whether a prolonged war “could send a message to North Korea that the international community would fail to respond to an act of invasion with the appropriate sanctions or punishment, and that message would further encourage the North to conduct provocations.” The war in Ukraine has also provided North Korea with an ideal environment to accelerate its nuclear and missile programs, since Beijing and Moscow are no longer willing to join Washington and its allies in punishing Pyongyang for its provocations.

Finally, U.S. allies in Asia are concerned about developments in the United States itself. In particular, they worry that a future U.S. administration could downgrade the importance of alliances, as U.S. President Donald Trump did during his administration. Both Tokyo and Seoul look at the lingering strain of “America first” thinking in U.S. politics and wonder whether Washington will remain committed to protecting them.

GOING IT ALONE

Japan and South Korea have responded to this heightened sense of vulnerability in part by increasing their own military capabilities. To enhance deterrence against North Korea, South Korea has developed a “three axis” defense system that consists of a preemptive strike platform, air- and missile-defense systems, and a retaliation plan designed to incapacitate the North Korean leadership and military facilities in the event of an attack. In order to fund this system and other defense capability improvements, South Korea has said it aims to increase defense expenditures by an average of 6.8 percent per year over the next five years, spending a total of $261 billion.

Japan has also taken bold steps to enhance its defense capabilities. It has committed to increasing defense spending by more than 60 percent over the next five years and to acquiring “counterstrike capabilities” that would enable it to strike North Korea or mainland China in the event of an attack. These pathbreaking steps, outlined in three strategic documents released late last year, represent the most dramatic advances in Japan’s defense capabilities since the end of World War II.

The United States has enabled these moves by its allies to take on greater defense responsibility while also reassuring them of the credibility of its security commitments. The Biden administration has supported the resumption and expansion of joint military exercises with South Korea, and in May 2021, Washington and Seoul announced the removal of restrictions on the range of South Korean missiles. The United States has also expressed support for Japan’s acquisition of “counterstrike capabilities” and is poised to sell U.S.-made Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, which Japan plans to deploy on naval destroyers by 2026. And President Joe Biden has reiterated the United States’ commitment to defend its allies with the full spectrum of military capabilities, including nuclear weapons. He has also elevated extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea and encouraged greater missile defense cooperation among the three allies.

But these efforts, though important, have not been sufficient to extinguish allied concerns about extended deterrence. That is partly because reassurance alone can never be enough; nuclear commitments inevitably invite doubt that the United States would really risk a nuclear attack on one of its cities to defend Tokyo or Seoul. Moreover, the success that U.S. alliances have had in deterring a major war over the last eight decades ironically means that Washington’s security guarantees have never been put to a hard test.

U.S allies also have bureaucratic reasons for their persistent doubts. Some U.S. officials have been reluctant to involve allies in the United States’ nuclear enterprise and operations much beyond occasional site visits. Some of this hesitancy stems from concerns about the security of classified information, but some of it stems from a general “just trust us” attitude with regard to nuclear weapons that has started to undercut the effectiveness of U.S. alliances. Extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and South Korea have become more detailed and comprehensive over time, and visits to facilities that support the U.S. nuclear umbrella offer some insight and assurance to U.S. allies. But they fall short of real transparency; there is a sense that the allies are little more than nuclear tourists.

AIN’T NOTHING LIKE AN ALLIANCE

Given these lingering doubts (and the costs that U.S. security guarantees entail for the United States), some analysts argue that Washington shouldn’t bother trying to salvage extended deterrence and that U.S. allies in East Asia should seek their own nuclear weapons. After all, this would lower some risks to the United States and allow highly capable allies to shoulder more of the responsibility for their own defense. Yoon has said publicly that South Korea could develop its own nukes quickly and with the support of its public. Alliance skeptics in the United States may even interpret such comments as further proof that the alliance system is outdated, costly, and dangerous because it has the potential to draw Washington into far-away conflicts.

Some U.S. commentators have wondered whether Washington ought to encourage U.S. allies to go nuclear. Such viewpoints are worthy of consideration, especially because they have gained adherents among advocates of restraint and isolationism on both the left and the right. But they rarely acknowledge all the problems that an indigenous nuclear program in South Korea would introduce—including forcing Seoul to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and likely face sanctions, and risking a regional nuclear arms race between China, North Korea, South Korea, and possibly others. Indeed, a nuclear South Korea would almost certainly strain the U.S. alliance network in Asia, unleashing a divisive debate in Japan about that country’s military posture and the future of the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and creating additional friction in Tokyo’s relationship with Seoul. Australia would also likely worry about the destabilizing effect of a nuclear South Korea and the implications for other actors in the region, including Taiwan.

Those who advocate for downgrading or abandoning alliances would also need to detail an alternative method for managing the United States’ most serious geopolitical challenge—China—as well as issues such as climate change, pandemics, and supply chain problems that by their very nature cannot be handled by one country alone. Given that no such alternative has been offered, the United States will need to continue the difficult but necessary slog of shoring up extended deterrence, ensuring that this decades-old tool for maintaining regional peace and stability is up to the significant challenges of the coming decade.

A COMMUNITY OF SHARED FATE

To that end, Biden should build on the efforts his administration has already undertaken to restore the credibility of U.S. security guarantees. He should start by acknowledging the causes of allied concern: not just the increasing military capabilities of regional rivals but also the U.S. political realities that have caused allies to question Washington’s will to protect them from growing threats. Only by being more frank and open with allies—particularly regarding the nuclear aspect of extended deterrence—can the United States hope to assuage their fears.

At the same time, the Biden administration should emphasize that more than its credibility is at stake when it promises to use the “full range of U.S. capabilities, including nuclear,” to defend Tokyo and Seoul: more than 80,000 U.S. forces are stationed in Japan and South Korea, and 120,000 U.S. citizens live in the two countries, creating what the political scientist Joseph Nye calls a “community of shared fate” that binds the United States to its allies. This shared fate forms the core of extended deterrence and is a costly signal of U.S. resolve to deter and defend its allies against external aggression.

To develop stronger bonds of trust, the United States should also create a framework for joint nuclear planning with Japan and South Korea similar to a NATO planning group, which would offer Tokyo and Seoul more insight into U.S. decision-making and processes involving nuclear weapons. Such a framework would allow the United States to plan bilaterally and trilaterally while remaining in control. The Biden administration might also consider augmenting existing bilateral extended deterrence dialogues by creating a new trilateral strategic dialogue to increase information sharing and identify coordination opportunities. If either Tokyo or Seoul is hesitant to participate, the exchange could be conducted at the so-called track 1.5 level between officials acting in an unofficial capacity and nongovernmental experts.

The United States should strengthen its regional military and nuclear posture as well, including possibly by doing more to showcase its nuclear capabilities. This could involve continually deploying submarines that can be equipped with nuclear missiles to the region or deploying aircraft capable of both conventional and nuclear missions on a rotating basis. The three allies should also explore opportunities for more joint military activities related to extended deterrence, such as combined Japanese and South Korean escorts of U.S. strategic bomber flights.

Finally, Washington should consider laying the groundwork for the possible redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Under the present circumstances, the United States should not redeploy such weapons or support South Korea’s acquisition of them. But Washington and Seoul should consider beginning and publicly acknowledging planning for a potential future tactical nuclear redeployment to South Korea. This planning could include conversations about the infrastructure and military prerequisites for storing such weapons on the peninsula, as well as the potential downsides of doing so, including the high likelihood that tactical nukes would become targets for North Korean missiles, the potential for nuclear redeployment to heighten tensions in the region, the redundancy of tactical nuclear weapons given other U.S. capabilities, and the challenges these weapons could pose to controlling escalatory spirals in a crisis.

Before they make any decisions, the allies might also consider conducting war games to map out potential phases of preparation for redeployment, all contingent on changes in the threat environment. Such exercises would signal U.S. resolve and commitment to Japan and South Korea without crossing the proliferation threshold. They would also pressure Pyongyang to halt its provocations and perhaps spur China to rein in North Korea in order to prevent the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. It is possible that Pyongyang would respond to planning of this kind with additional provocations, but the North could hardly be more belligerent than it was in 2022, when it conducted scores of missile launches. And in any case, the costs of North Korean provocations pale in comparison to the benefits of shoring up extended deterrence, which has underwritten 70 years of peace on the peninsula.

Allied concerns about U.S. credibility will never disappear entirely. But they can and should be managed to avoid the erosion of alliances. New levels of doubt among U.S. allies call for Washington to devise new ways to restore the credibility of extended deterrence—both to reduce Japan’s and South Korea’s sense of vulnerability and to ensure that U.S. alliances in Asia remain a force for stability long into the future.

• KATRIN FRASER KATZ is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a Scholar in Residence at the University of Miami. From 2007 to 2008, she served as Director for Japan, Korea, and Oceanic Affairs at the National Security Council.
• CHRISTOPHER JOHNSTONE is Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. At the National Security Council, he served as Director for East Asia from 2021 to 2022 and Director for Japan and Oceanian Affairs from 2014 to 2016.
• VICTOR CHA is Senior Vice President and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a Professor at Georgetown University. From 2004 to 2007, he was Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.

Foreign Affairs · by Katrin Fraser Katz, Christopher Johnstone, and Victor Cha · February 9, 2023

10. North Korea displays 'solid-fuel ICBM' at military parade

I defer to the intelligence experts to explain the indicators to determine if this is an actual functional solid fuel rocket.

North Korea displays 'solid-fuel ICBM' at military parade

The Korea Times · by 2023-02-09 12:03 | North Korea · February 9, 2023

This photo released Thursday shows what appears to be a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile displayed at a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday. Yonhap

Presidential office says it is 'closely monitoring' situation

By Jung Min-ho

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un brought his daughter to a massive military parade showing off its most advanced weapons, including what appeared to be a solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), state media reported Thursday.

The parade, held in Pyongyang the previous evening to mark the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea's army, featured "nuclear-capable weapons" including the ICBM carried on a missile vehicle and Hwasong-17s, the North's largest ICBM that could potentially reach the U.S. mainland, according to its Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and satellite images.

Wearing a long black coat and fedora ― a style that would remind the public of Kim Il-sung, North Korea's late founder ― Kim Jong-un was seen standing next to his daughter, Ju-ae, saluting as top military officers celebrated the moment.

North Korea also presented a "tactical nuclear operation unit" in a demonstration of its "war deterrence and counterstrike capabilities."

A photo released Thursday shows Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missiles displayed during a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday. Yonhap

State media did not specifically identify the weapons displayed. But experts say they included a solid-propellant ICBM that North Korea has long been seeking to develop.

[PHOTOS] North Korea's army anniversary military parade

"The solid-fuel ICBM appears to be a few meters longer than the one revealed in 2017," Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, a think tank, told The Korea Times. "The nuclear operation unit is the latest sign of what North Korea is aiming for: developing a more powerful and diversified nuclear arsenal."

Solid fuel offers greater mobility for missiles and reduces launch preparation time. It is also cheaper to produce and more reliable. Given that the movement of North Korean military personnel handling liquid fuel alerts South Korea and the U.S. before the launch of missiles, solid-fuel ICBMs pose a greater threat and could possibly weaken their joint missile defense system that relies highly on such intelligence. All of the ICBMs the North has tested since 2017 used liquid propellants.

A photo released Thursday shows North Korean soldiers marching during a military parade at Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday. Yonhap

North Korea has already developed solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles such as the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25 ― weapons that can strike much of South Korea, but not Guam or Japan from which the U.S.' key strategic assets would be launched to assist in the case of war on the peninsula.

"This is cumulatively more ICBM launchers than we've ever seen before at a North Korean parade," Ankit Panda, a security expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a U.S.-based think tank, said on Twitter. "North Korea displays enough ICBMs to overwhelm the U.S. defense system against them."

Images released by state media show missile-carrying military vehicles, tens of thousands of troops and civilians, and fireworks illuminating Kim Il-sung Square.

"ICBMs showing off the defense development of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and nuclear capabilities joined the parade on the square which was filled with pride and passionate cheering," KCNA said. "Our armed forces are capable of destroying the violent imperialism with an absolute power."

This photo released Thursday shows North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his daughter, Ju-ae, smiling during a military parade in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday. Yonhap

The parade was the fifth public appearance by Kim Ju-ae, who has been widely touted as the regime's heir apparent despite being only around nine years old.

On Tuesday, Kim Jong-un brought her to visit the barracks of his top military brass. In photos and videos released later, she was seen walking with her father smiling and holding his hand occasionally. She even took the center seat for pictures with her parents and the officers.

Covering the parade, KCNA called her the "respected" daughter. The title of honor was used to refer to Kim Jong-un a few days after the death of his father Kim Jong-il in 2011. Kim Ju-ae was previously described as "precious." Such descriptions would not be allowed if she was not the next in line of succession, according to some experts such as Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, a local think tank.

Speaking to reporters, an official at the presidential office said it is "closely monitoring" the situation, which involves the dangerous development of North Korea's weapons program. When asked about the possibility of the daughter being tapped to become the regime's next successor, the official declined to comment.

The Korea Times · by 2023-02-09 12:03 | North Korea · February 9, 2023

11. [PHOTOS] North Korea's army anniversary military parade

​Photos at the link: https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2023/02/103_345118.html

​

I will update some of my lecture slides.

[PHOTOS] North Korea's army anniversary military parade

The Korea Times · by 2023-02-09 16:52 | North Korea · February 9, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, together with his daughter and wife, enters Kim Il Sung Square where the nighttime military parade commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army took place in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un smiles during a nighttime military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. Behind him to the right is his daughter, Ju-ae. YonhapKim Ju-ae, daughter of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, applauds during a nighttime military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapPeople watch fireworks during a nighttime military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapNorth Korean leader Kim Jong-un reacts to cheering crowds waving flags during a nighttime military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapA military parade is underway in Pyongyang to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army, Feb. 8. YonhapA military parade is underway in Pyongyang to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the North's Korean People's Army, Feb. 8. YonhapSoldiers march during a military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the North's Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapSoldiers march during a military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the North's Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. YonhapA military vehicle is seen at a military parade to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the North's Korean People's Army in Pyongyang, Feb. 8. Yonhap

The Korea Times · by 2023-02-09 16:52 | North Korea · February 9, 2023

12. Korea at a crossroads on the 40th anniversary of Tokyo Declaration

Conclusion:

In the era of economic security, global competition cannot be left only in the hands of the businesses. Full support from the government is needed in all areas, including R&D, investment, and talent acquisition. Although Korean semiconductors have been in crisis lately, it is nothing compared to the time when everything had to begin from scratch. Just as the seeds sown 40 years ago blossomed into a “semiconductor legend,” the government and businesses must work together to achieve the miracle of a “quantum jump” once again.

Korea at a crossroads on the 40th anniversary of Tokyo Declaration

donga.com

Posted February. 08, 2023 07:52,

Updated February. 08, 2023 07:52

Korea at a crossroads on the 40th anniversary of Tokyo Declaration. February. 08, 2023 07:52. .

Tuesday marks the 40th anniversary since the late Lee Byung-chull, the founder of the Samsung Group, declared advancement in the semiconductor business in Tokyo, Japan. When Samsung, a latecomer then, announced a large-scale investment in Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI), a state-of-the-art semiconductor technology, the world at the time ridiculed it as a “reckless undertaking” and “he’s a megalomaniac.” However, his call that “in difficult times, we must invest in future industries to survive,” is considered a decisive step in the right direction that changed the growth trajectory of the Korean economy.

Korea's semiconductor legend is the product of the persistent resolve of a business, a favorable international environment, and the government's proactive support. Samsung, which did not give up on technology development and continued pursuing it, succeeded in developing 64K DRAM for the third time following the U.S. and Japan in the same year that it declared advancement in the semiconductor industry. Since then, it has been on a winning streak, leaving “world first” records. In the 1980s, when the U.S. efforts to contain the Japanese semiconductor industry, which excelled the most, served as an opportunity for Korea to expand its market. The government also supported the industry with a long-term semiconductor fostering plan and offered assistance for the Samsung Giheung Campus plant site.

Forty years after the ‘Tokyo Declaration,’ the reality facing Korean semiconductors is treacherous at best. The supply chain crisis caused by the U.S.-China conflict is exacerbating uncertainties, and there is a prolonged 'semiconductor cold wave' due to sluggish global demand. Although Korea is maintaining its No. 1 spot in the memory market, including DRAM, the gap is narrowing. In addition, there are areas requiring improvement, for instance, we need to break away from excessive focus on memory semiconductors and enhance competitiveness in design, foundry (semiconductor consignment production), and systems. The rapid growth of the artificial intelligence (AI) market, which will begin with 'ChatGPT,’ can act as an opportunity to increase demand for semiconductors.

Countries around the world consider the semiconductor industry as the core of economic security and are competitively offering subsidies and tax benefits. On Tuesday, Japan announced that it would support one-third of semiconductor facility investment to companies on condition that they produce on their soil for more than 10 years. The U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) has recently started discussing the “Second Semiconductor Support Act” in semiconductor design. But in Korea, the sense of tension is nowhere to be found. Discussion on the semiconductor tax support bill submitted by the government last month has not begun at the National Assembly, and SK hynix's Yongin Semiconductor Cluster has not even broken ground four years after it was announced.

In the era of economic security, global competition cannot be left only in the hands of the businesses. Full support from the government is needed in all areas, including R&D, investment, and talent acquisition. Although Korean semiconductors have been in crisis lately, it is nothing compared to the time when everything had to begin from scratch. Just as the seeds sown 40 years ago blossomed into a “semiconductor legend,” the government and businesses must work together to achieve the miracle of a “quantum jump” once again.

한국어

donga.com

13. Korean War POW who sued Kim Jong-un dies at 89

With the passing of most of the 78,000 ROK prisoners who were not allowed to return to the South we should not think the suffering is over. These prisoners were allowed to marry. But because the placed in the low levels of Songbun (the social classification system) and branded as people from the South, their wives assumed that level of Singbun and their children assumed the same Songbun as teir parents. The only work these prisoners were allowed to do is mining and other slave labor activities. And what perpetuates this crime against humanity is that their children were sentenced to the same work. What the regime has done is used these 78,000 prisoners from the South to create a perpetual slave labor pool. One of the saddest things I have ever heard was a mother who escaped to the South tell of the heartbreak when her child asked their mother and father, "Why did you even bring me into this world?"

We should never forget what the regime has done.

Korean War POW who sued Kim Jong-un dies at 89

The Korea Times · February 9, 2023

Han Jae-bok, right, a former South Korean prisoner of war who was captured by the North Koreans during the Korean War, stands during a press conference in 2020 after the court ruled in favor of him, ordering North Korea to compensate him for his forced labor. Korea Times photo by Seo Jae-hoon

By Lee Yeon-woo

Han Jae-bok, a former South Korean prisoner who was detained in North Korea for five decades before escaping, died on Wednesday. He was 89.

With his death, the number of former prisoners of war living in South Korea is now 13.

Han was born in Jeongeup City, North Jeolla Province in 1934. At the age of 17, he voluntarily joined the South Korean army after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. He was captured in North Korea in 1951. He was forced to work in coal mines in North Korea from Sept. 1953 until he escaped to South Korea in 2001.

After his return, he constantly spoke out about the repatriation of South Korean prisoners of war while working as a chairman of the Association of Returned Korean POWs.

In 2016, Han received international attention after filing a lawsuit against North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, seeking damages for his forced labor. In 2020, the court ruled in favor of Han and asked North Korea to compensate 21 million won ($16,608). It was the first time that a Korean court ruled against North Korea regarding the exploitation of prisoners of war.

Han could not secure actual compensation or an apology from North Korea during his lifetime. He had been in dispute with the Foundation of Inter-Korea Cooperation ― a South Korean institution that pays copyright fees to North Korea for the use of North Korean footage ― for compensation payment on behalf of North Korea. He lost the first trial last January.

During his life, Han expressed regret that the issue of prisoners of war has been left out of the discussion.

"I feel sad that nobody pays attention to South Korean prisoners of war except for Dream makers for NK (a NK human rights civil organizations)," he said after he won the case in 2020.

The Korea Times · February 9, 2023

14. N. Korean military calls for efforts to prevent incidents between civilians and soldiers

A breakdown in good order and discipline.

N. Korean military calls for efforts to prevent incidents between civilians and soldiers

The order appears connected with an incident involving a truck carrying five cadets from an officers' academy driving off a cliff, killing everyone onboard

By Jeong Tae Joo - 2023.02.08 4:20pm

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: A North Korean truck drives along the bank of the Yalu River in North Pyongan Province. (Daily NK)

The North Korean army’s General Staff Department recently issued an emergency order to the entire military calling for measures to prevent incidents that worsen relations between soldiers and civilians during the winter training period.

A source told Daily NK on Monday that the order was connected to a recent accident in which a truck carrying five cadets from Ri Je Sun Officers Academy drove off a cliff, killing everyone onboard.

Based on the source’s account, a cadet from Ri Je Sun Officers Academy suddenly lost consciousness during outdoor tactical drills in Songgan County, Chagang Province, last Thursday.

Four other members of his squad quickly tried to stop a truck passing through nearby Kubong Pass, but when the truck did not stop, the cadets sprung themselves at the driver’s seat and beat the civilian driver.

The four cadets, taking along the unconscious one, boarded the truck, but the driver — now a bloody mess from the beating — was unable to keep his rage in check.

In an apparent suicidal move, the driver proceeded to drive the truck off a cliff, killing everyone on board.

Witnesses who were passing through Kubong Pass at the time and saw what happened used their mobile phones to inform the police, who immediately arrived at the scene to conduct an investigation.

The police found that the truck belonged to Songgan Factory No. 11.

The provincial police reported to the provincial authorities what happened based on its onsite investigation and witness testimony, and the provincial party’s military commission reported the incident to the Central Military Commission.

The source said the Central Military Commission ordered the military to seriously deal with the issue of worsening relations between the military and civilians during the winter training period, and the General Staff Department telegraphed an emergency order to that effect to the entire military on Saturday morning.

The General Staff Department’s order called on units across the entire military to take special care to prevent incidents that damage the relationship between soldiers and civilians during outdoor winter tactical training.

It also called for questioning of onsite commanders, political officers and concerned parties when accidents or incidents occur, with serious offenders being sent to forced labor units.

The military commission of Chagang Province reportedly told Ri Je Sun Officers Academy to better control its cadets.

It said that cars usually stop for soldiers when liaison personnel ask them to, but in this case, the soldiers doing the asking were not liaison personnel, and moreover, the truck probably would have stopped for the cadets anyway if they had just explained that they had an unwell soldier instead of jumping the driver.

However, the school and the families of the bereaved reportedly complained about this and criticized the driver.

The source said the academy and families of the dead said the dead cadets were in their early 20s, and that in driving them off a cliff, the civilian driver had gone way too far.

This, they said, was what the military commission should be criticizing, and were astonished that it blamed the cadets instead.

Ri Je Sun Officers Academy is a training school for officers placed in the border guard. In 1999-2000, it relocated from Ryongsong District in Pyongyang to Sokhyon-dong in Kanggye, Chagang Province.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com