Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:


“And so, thanks to Solzhenitsyn, human rights once again found their place in the vocabulary of our times. I don’t know a single politician who doesn’t mention 10 times a day ‘the fight for human rights’ or ‘violations of human rights’. But because people in the West are not threatened by concentration camps and are free to say and write what they want, the more the fight for human rights gains in popularity the more it loses any concrete content, becoming a kind of universal stance of everyone towards everything, a kind of energy that turns all human desires into rights. The world has become man’s right and everything in it has become a right: the desire for love the right to love, the desire for rest the right to rest, the desire for friendship the right to friendship, the desire to exceed the speed limit the right to exceed the speed limit, the desire for happiness the right to happiness, the desire to publish a book the right to publish a book, the desire to shout in the street in the middle of the night the right to shout in the street. The unemployed have the right to occupy an expensive food store, the women in fur coats have the right to buy caviar, Brigitte has the right to park on the pavement and everybody, the unemployed, the women in fur coats as well as Brigitte, belongs to the same army of fighters for human rights.”
- Andrew Clapham

"Only during hard times do people come to understand how difficult it is to be master of their feelings and thoughts."
- Anton Chekov

"But the objects of our passions, being external to us, are completely beyond our control. Thus, the more we allow ourselves to be controlled by them, the more we allow ourselves to be controlled by them, the more we are subject to passions and the less active and free we are."
- Baruch Spinoza




1. Irregular Warfare, American Style

2.  Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

3. Quad announces establishment of Working Group on Counter-Terrorism

4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4, 2023

5. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Message to the Force

6. Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

7. Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 1 and part 2)

8. China’s peace plan for Ukraine may just be smoke and mirrors

9. Medal of Honor Awarded to Paris Davis | SOF News

10. The U.S. Must Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels

11. China proffers 'peaceful reunification', Taiwan says respect our democracy

12. China Sets Conservative Growth Target as Challenges Loom

13. The turmoil disrupting China’s diplomatic priorities ahead of ‘two sessions’ 

14. This Day In History 1966: Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler hits #1 with “Ballad of the Green Berets”

15. The Threat and the Allure of the Chinese Balloons

16. How We the People Built American English

17. Former NATO chief: ‘There is nothing we cannot overcome as Americans’

18. Opinion | Washington has succumbed to dangerous groupthink on China

19. Wagner Boss Appears to Issue Veiled Threat to Kremlin in Ominous Video







1. Irregular Warfare, American Style


Some very interesting analysis. ​​In the opening paragraphs I was ready to criticise Professor Holmes for appearing to think irregular warfare consisted of COIN and CT, However in the remainder of the article he provides some unique analysis to include a comparison of Mao and Cobett from an IW perspective.


He correctly recognizes that China is employing its form of IW. His analysis appears to focus on IW as an economy of force method to be used when you have inferior forces until the time when you can field superior forces. His analysis makes me think the reason why IW is so loathed by most of the military is that he describes it as a strategy of the weak.  


He also does not address key elements including information and influence activities.  


He tries to describe an IW mindset and although he has provided interesting and useful analysis he really has not described the "IW mindset" that he mentions.


I prefer to describe the unconventional warfare mindset which must be the foundation for all operations conducted by US Special Forces and Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs forces ,


The Unconventional Warfare Mindset must be Sustained

 

1. Strategic Competition, the Gray Zone, and Irregular Warfare may be the current terms of art in the Department of Defense, but it is the Unconventional Warfare mindset that ensures the continued success of Special Forces.

 

2. Irregular Warfare is the military contribution to Political Warfare and Competitive Statecraft, but the Unconventional Warfare mindset makes the military contribution successful.

 

3. Essence of UW: UW thinking informs everything SF/SOF should do

 

      UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems

      And creating dilemmas for our adversaries

      UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it is integral to the action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA.

 

4. What is “Unconventional warfare thinking?” 

 

It is the two SF/SOF “trinities:”

 

(1) Missions

Irregular Warfare,

Unconventional Warfare,

Support to Political Warfare

 

(2) The comparative advantage of SOF:

Influence,

Governance,

Support to Indigenous Forces and Populations

 

 

It is thinking about the human element in the full spectrum of competition and conflict up to and including conventional and nuclear war. It includes, but is not limited to, all aspects of lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, political resistance, non-violent resistance, political violence, urban operations, stability operations, post-conflict operations, cyber operations, operations in the information environment (e.g., strategic influence through information advantage, information and influence activities, public diplomacy, psychological operations, military information support operations, public affairs), working through, with, and by indigenous forces and populations, in irregular warfare, political warfare, economic warfare, alliances, diplomacy, and competitive statecraft in all regions of the world.  



Irregular Warfare, American Style

19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 4, 2023

Of late there’s been a lively discussion in the halls of U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. (where I serve as the J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy) about whether and how the U.S. military should try to preserve lessons about irregular warfare learned through hard experience during the global war on terror.

The consensus, by my unscientific impression, is that it is important to retain what we’ve learned even as the world ambles into an age of great-power competition. We should not do what the armed forces did after the Vietnam War, and more or less resolve to forget the painful experience with counterinsurgent warfare and resume doing what they did well: preparing to fight conventional force-on-force battles.

Forgetfulness is not a virtue for martial institutions.

And that consensus in favor of institutional memory makes sense. While the U.S. leadership envisions waging long-term competitions against the likes of China and Russia, events have a way of clouding the looking glass through which human beings try to glimpse the future. The republic could again find itself dueling terrorist or insurgent groups, whether it wants to or not. Indeed, counterterror operations still sputter in such quarters as Iraq and Somalia. It would be pointless if not counterproductive to let go of the lessons from the past two decades, and be forced to relearn them yet again under the press of events.

But there are two other pressing reasons to keep irregular warfare at the forefront of debates over American strategy, operations, and tactics.

One, irregular warfare is part of how great powers compete nowadays, not just during open war but when employing coercive diplomacy beneath the threshold of violent force. What is Communist China’s gray-zone strategy if not a concerted use of irregular methods and forces to purloin territory from neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam?

A maritime militia embedded in China’s vast fishing fleet is Beijing’s implement of choice in the South China Sea. It backs up the militia with another paramilitary force, the China Coast Guard. Meanwhile it keeps heavy People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces over the horizon—and out of sight—as the enforcer of last resort for Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wishes.

China’s irregular-warfare strategy thrusts its neighbors onto the horns of a dilemma. They can escalate to violent force against ostensibly nonmilitary mariners to protect their sovereign rights, and embroil themselves in an unwinnable clash of arms. Or they can give ground.

To date, they have given ground. As the U.S. armed forces—including the U.S. Coast Guard, which is openly contemplating joint patrols with its Philippine ally—ponder how to defeat rival great powers’ irregular strategies and help allies and friends uphold their rights, they could do worse than revisit the lessons from counterinsurgent and counterterrorist operations. U.S. military history abounds with takeaways, all the way from the nineteenth-century frontier wars through the Philippine War through Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Let’s mine history for insight.

And two, the U.S. military should embrace irregular practices not just in a defensive but an offensive way. Balking China’s gray-zone offensive is necessary but insufficient to buoy the regional order in Asia. To prevail in open warfare, U.S. forces must make themselves into irregular warriors driven by an irregular mindset. Why? Because irregular warfare is a first resort of the weak, and U.S. and allied forces will probably be the weaker contender at the outset of any clash with China.

They need to enlist Father Time as a doughty ally, denying PLA commanders the short, sharp war they crave. Forestalling a speedy PLA victory means stringing things out, fanning out across the Indo-Pacific map, executing small-unit operations to start cutting the antagonist down to size, and helping pry open sea and air access so heavy forces can make their way to the battleground with sufficient firepower to win.

This is what founding CCP chairman Mao Zedong and his maritime contemporary, the English historian and strategist Julian Corbett, both call “active defense.” The logic of active defense is straightforward. If a force is outmatched at the onset of war, commanders would be foolhardy to essay a pitched battle they stand little chance of winning. Such a force concedes its inferiority and sets out to get its act together. It summons up manpower and militarily relevant resources while whittling away at enemy forces, breaking the foe’s alliances, and otherwise doing whatever it can to narrow the balance of military power. If successful it will reach strategic parity over time. Ultimately it will emerge ascendant and can undertake that pitched battle reasonably confident of victory.

Outright victory is the ultimate goal in irregular warfare just as in conventional warfare. Irregular warfare is merely a temporary expedient whereby the lesser contender takes its time to invert the balance of forces—and triumph.

Now, the principles underlying Maoist and Corbettian active defense are similar, but the two writers pitched their writings to very different audiences. The Maoist project was more fundamental, larger in scale, and more time-consuming. Mao was writing for a Red Army and Chinese Communist Party that had been hounded to the brink of extinction during the Chinese Civil War and were trying to rebound. The party and army were trying to invent a state in the face of powerful opposition.

Corbett was writing for an established power and oceangoing hegemon, Great Britain and its Royal Navy. The Royal Navy was the world’s finest nautical fighting force in Corbett’s day, but the demands of empire tended to scatter ships across the map. That meant individual units could find themselves outclassed by local opponents at certain places and times.

In other words, Corbett was mainly worried about how to gather superior sea forces at the time and place of battle to overpower some antagonist, while Mao was mainly worried about how to construct a winning force amid civil war in a country of continental scale. The difference in perspective matters. Mao’s works are well worth consulting for American irregular warriors, not just to know today’s rival but for pointers on how to employ irregular warfare as an adjunct to conventional operations in the Indo-Pacific.

They’re also an invaluable primer on the irregular mindset. Corbett’s brand of active defense probably supplies more immediately actionable operational guidance for U.S. and allied joint commanders, who, after all, head up powerful, already-existing forces—the heirs to the Royal Navy in its heyday.

The real trick will be to fuse the two varieties of active defense bequeathed us by that odd couple, Mao Zedong and Julian Corbett, into a unified doctrine. Call it irregular warfare . . . American style.

Author Expertise and Experience

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.


19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · March 4, 2023


2.  Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow



Access the entire article at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3208&context=parameters


SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

George Shatzer

Abstract

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.55540/0031-1723.3208

Recommended Citation

George Shatzer, "SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow," Parameters 53, no. 1 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3208.

Additional Files

04-02-Shatzer---Afghanistan-The-Logic-of-Failing-Fast-and-Slow.mp3 (1469 kB)

Decisive Point Podcast


3. Quad announces establishment of Working Group on Counter-Terrorism


They should really establish one for irregular warfare. As should AUKUS.

Quad announces establishment of Working Group on Counter-Terrorism

theprint.in · by ANI · March 3, 2023

New Delhi [India], March 3 (ANI): Quad grouping of countries comprising of US, Japan, Australia and India on Friday announced the establishment of a Working Group on Counter-Terrorism in sharpening of the group’s focus to combat terror.

A joint statement of the Quad Leaders issued in New Delhi today denounced the use of terrorist proxies and committed to promote accountability for terrorist attacks including the 26/11 attack in Mumbai, “which claimed lives of citizens from all Quad countries”. Heavily-armed terrorists from Pakistan struck in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 in which at least 174 people, including 26 foreign nationals, were killed and over 300 people injured.


“We announce the establishment of the Quad Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, which will explore cooperation amongst the Quad and with Indo-Pacific partners, to counter new and emerging forms of terrorism, radicalization to violence and violent extremism,” the joint statement said.

It noted that terrorism has become increasingly diffuse, aided by terrorists’ adaptation to, and the use of emerging and evolving technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and the internet, including social media platforms for recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts, as well as for the financing, planning, and preparation of terrorist activities.

The group also welcomed the focused discussions on these themes at the Quad Counter-Terrorism Policy Meeting and tabletop exercise hosted by Australia in October 2022 and said it looked forward to its first meeting in the United States in March 2023 to continue discussions on this global issue.

Earlier during a panel discussion on “The Quad Squad: Power and Purpose of the Polygon,” External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said that new things have come out during the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.

“If you ask me what were the new things which came out today, we agreed on a counter-terrorism working group. We agreed on cooperating more closely with Indian Ocean Rim Association. We agreed that we had earlier worked out a Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Quad initiative,” said Jaishankar.

“We are pleased to note the progress made under the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Partnership (HADR) for the Indo-Pacific, since our last meeting in September 2022, when we signed the Guidelines for the Partnership,” read the statement

Quad welcomed the outcomes of the first HADR tabletop exercise and biannual meeting held in India in December 2022 and looks forward to the finalization of the Partnership’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which would enable an efficacious and coordinated response mechanism.

Jaishankar also said that one of the outcomes that Quad agreed on was that the listings of terrorists, the counter-terrorism listings should not be politicised.

“We unequivocally condemn terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasize the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist organizations which could be used to launch or plan terrorist attacks, including transnational and cross-border attacks,” read the joint statement.

Moreover, Quad reiterates the condemnation of terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, which claimed the lives of citizens from all Quad countries, and the Pathankot attacks.

“We are committed to working together with our regional and international partners to promote accountability for the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks, including through designations by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee. In this regard, we express our concern at attempts to politicise the working of the UNSC Sanctions Regimes and call on all states to maintain the transparent, objective and evidence-based working methods of UNSC Sanctions Committees,” added the statement.

Speaking on reforms in the UN and Standard Operating Procedures on counter-terrorism, Jaishankar said, “So the SOP for that which I think the military people would obviously see as a prerequisite for their cooperation. We coordinated with the UN to make sure that the processes of the UN are respected and workings of the UN stayed true to its spirit. I was personally happy that there was a stronger expression of support from all of us collectively to the reform of the UN to the fact that there would be inter-governmental negotiations on the reform.”

He said that the Quad is working in 2023 because we have a leadership less burdened by baggage.

“I take the Quad back to Boxing Day 2004 when the Indian Ocean Tsunami happened. In 2006, when Prime Minister Abe came to India, before coming he had the idea that Quad could be an effective way of dealing with the challenges. There was actually a Quad meeting, my memory serves me right, in Manila in 2007. Then it did not work out. If you ask me why didn’t it work out, as opposed to what happened 10 years later because it was revived 10 years later in 2017,” said Jaishankar.

“In 2019, it became a Foreign Minister’s level, and when the Biden administration came in in 2021, it became a Summit level. One, there was greater strategic clarity on the part of all the countries concerned. If I were to look at India’s ties with the US, it became much deeper. With Japan also, grew, and the real big change has been in the last decade has been with Australia. In a way, Quad is working in 2023 because we have a leadership less burdened by baggage,” the external affairs minister added.

Meanwhile, in the joint statement issued today the Quad sought an end to violence and detentions by the Myanmar Junta. On Ukraine, the joint statement said they “continued to discuss our responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the immense human suffering it is causing, and concurred that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible”.

“We underscored the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. We emphasised that the rules-based international order must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, transparency and peaceful resolution of disputes,” the statetement added. (ANI)

This report is auto-generated from ANI news service. ThePrint holds no responsibility for its content.

theprint.in · by ANI · March 3, 2023


4. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4, 2023


Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2023


Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces appear to have secured a sufficient positional advantage to conduct a turning action against certain parts of Bakhmut but have not yet forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw and will not likely be able to encircle the city soon.
  • The purpose of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon prepared defensive positions and is different from the aim of an encirclement, which is to trap and destroy enemy forces. The Russians may have intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, but the Ukrainian command has signaled that it will likely withdraw rather than risk an encirclement.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Eastern Military District Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in western Donetsk Oblast, likely to assess the extent of Russian losses around Vuhledar and the possibility of a further offensive in this direction.
  • The Chinese government is reportedly angry with the Kremlin over the publicization of arms sales discussions.
  • Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapalov encouraged Russian companies to purchase their own air defense systems to defend against drones.
  • The Wagner Group reportedly opened at least three new recruitment centers at Russian sports clubs between March 2-4, possibly to augment Wagner’s recruitment base after losing access to prisoner recruits.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive actions along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Bakhmut and conduct ground attacks along the Donetsk Oblast front line.
  • Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for offensive operations in southern Ukraine.
  • Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues apparent efforts to increase Chechen influence within Russia through promoting Chechnya’s Special Forces (SPETSNAZ) and youth policy efforts.
  • Russian occupation administrations are strengthening law enforcement measures in occupied territories.


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, MARCH 4, 2023

Mar 4, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF

 

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 4, 6:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Russian forces appear to have secured a sufficient positional advantage to conduct a turning movement against certain parts of Bakhmut but have not yet forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw and will likely not be able to encircle the city soon. Russian forces made one limited confirmed advance near Bakhmut on March 4.[1] As ISW reported on March 3, Ukrainian forces are likely setting conditions for a controlled fighting withdrawal out of particularly difficult sectors of eastern Bakhmut, although it is not clear that Ukrainian commanders have decided to withdraw at this time.[2] Russian sources claim that Wagner Group elements have made gains in northeastern and eastern Bakhmut over the past few days, creating a tactically challenging turning movement in urban areas in northern Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian officials have recently reiterated that Ukrainian forces still control the situation in Bakhmut but have noted that circumstances are increasingly complicated and that the Wagner Group has committed its most advanced and prepared elements to assault operations in the area.[4]

Russian advances in Bakhmut have been slow and gradual and do not suggest that Russian forces will be able to encircle Bakhmut soon, much less that they will be able to take the city by frontal assaults. The Russians have, rather, managed to push close enough to critical ground lines of communication from the northeast to threaten Ukrainian withdrawal routes in a classical turning movement. The purpose of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon prepared defensive positions and is different from the aim of an encirclement, which is to trap and destroy enemy forces. The Russians may have intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, but the Ukrainian command has signaled that it will likely withdraw rather than risk an encirclement. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces are far more likely to withdraw than to become encircled and that the Ukrainians might still be able to hold their positions in Bakhmut if they choose to try. Russian forces have been suffering high casualties in these advances, and Ukrainian commanders’ assessments of the likelihood that they can force Russian attacks to culminate near or behind their current positions balanced against the risk of losing access to essential withdrawal routes will likely guide the Ukrainian decision to stay or pull back.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Eastern Military District (EMD) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in western Donetsk Oblast, likely to assess the extent of Russian losses around Vuhledar and the possibility of further offensives in this direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published a video on March 4 purporting to show Shoigu visiting Muradov in an unspecified area of western Donetsk Oblast and claimed that Muradov delivered a report on the current situation and actions of Russian forces in his area of responsibility.[5] Russian forces suffered catastrophic losses in a recent three-week offensive near Vuhledar, and severe personnel and equipment constraints are likely preventing Russian forces from making even marginal advances in this direction.[6] The Russian MoD may be considering whether transferring reserves of manpower and equipment to the Vuhledar area for renewed offensive operations is a worthwhile effort. The Russian MoD recently confirmed that Muradov is the EMD commander, and the substantial losses around Vuhledar have likely already caused Muradov significant reputational damage.[7] Shoigu may have therefore visited western Donetsk Oblast also to assess Muradov’s continued suitability for the position of EMD commander. Shoigu’s visit to Ukraine may suggest that the Russian MoD lacks confidence in Chief of the General Staff and theater commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov, who likely should have been the officer making this frontline visit or at least accompanying Shoigu.[8] Russia’s military district commanders report to Gerasimov on operational matters, and Shoigu’s publicized solo visit to western Donetsk appears to undermine Gerasimov.

The Chinese government is reportedly displeased with the Kremlin over the publicization of arms sales discussions. The Economist reported on March 2 that an unspecified European official claimed that the Chinese government wanted discussions of lethal aid to remain secret so that China could maintain its image as a neutral mediator.[9] CNBC reported on March 3 that US officials have indicated that information regarding Chinese considerations to send Russia arms was an assessment ”gleaned” from Russian officials.[10]

Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapalov stated that Russian companies should purchase their own air defense systems to defend against drones. A Russian state-owned news source reported that Kartapalov claimed on March 1 that Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) resources are focused on protecting critical state and military facilities. He argued that every “self-respecting corporation” should be able to purchase and install such systems for themselves.[11] This bizarre proposal would likely create further security issues for Russia, not resolve them, as the prospect of numerous companies fielding and presumably using their own air defense systems independent of the Russian military should alarm any sane Russian official. Kartapalov’s statements are almost certainly an extension of the domestic panic inflamed by reports of the March 2 incursion into Bryansk Oblast and accusations of recent Ukrainian drones in Russian airspace. Kartapalov may have additionally hoped to place the onus of defense on individual enterprises to frame Ukrainian activity as a direct threat to domestic Russian affairs.

The Wagner Group reportedly opened at least three new recruitment centers at Russian sports clubs between March 2 and 4, possibly to augment Wagner’s recruitment base after losing access to prisoner recruits. The Wagner Group reportedly opened at least three new recruiting centers collocated with Russian sporting clubs since Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin officially announced that Wagner launched recruiting efforts through Russian sports club on March 2.[12] The new Wagner recruiting centers are reportedly based at the “Dynamo” sports facility in Samara, the “Antares” Sports Club in Rostov, and the Russian Boxing Federation building in Tyumen.[13] This effort may seek to offset decreases in Wagner recruitment after the Wagner Group reportedly lost access to recruiting prisoners in early 2023. Prigozhin insinuated on March 3 that Russian government officials barred the Wagner Group from recruiting prisoners—just as the Russian Ministry of Defense sabotaged Wagner Group forces’ ammunition supplies.[14] Prigozhin announced on February 9 that Wagner had completely stopped recruiting prisoners but did not characterize it as the result of a Russian government ban at that time.[15]  Russian media additionally reported that Wagner has opened a ”Wagnernyok” youth club in St. Petersburg.[16]


Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces appear to have secured a sufficient positional advantage to conduct a turning action against certain parts of Bakhmut but have not yet forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw and will not likely be able to encircle the city soon.
  • The purpose of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon prepared defensive positions and is different from the aim of an encirclement, which is to trap and destroy enemy forces. The Russians may have intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, but the Ukrainian command has signaled that it will likely withdraw rather than risk an encirclement.
  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Eastern Military District Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov in western Donetsk Oblast, likely to assess the extent of Russian losses around Vuhledar and the possibility of a further offensive in this direction.
  • The Chinese government is reportedly angry with the Kremlin over the publicization of arms sales discussions.
  • Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapalov encouraged Russian companies to purchase their own air defense systems to defend against drones.
  • The Wagner Group reportedly opened at least three new recruitment centers at Russian sports clubs between March 2-4, possibly to augment Wagner’s recruitment base after losing access to prisoner recruits.
  • Russian forces conducted offensive actions along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
  • Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Bakhmut and conduct ground attacks along the Donetsk Oblast front line.
  • Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for offensive operations in southern Ukraine.
  • Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues apparent efforts to increase Chechen influence within Russia through promoting Chechnya’s Special Forces (SPETSNAZ) and youth policy efforts.
  • Russian occupation administrations are strengthening law enforcement measures in occupied territories.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations near Svatove on March 4. Geolocated footage published on March 4 indicates that Russian forces likely secured gains north of Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove).[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 3 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack Russian positions northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk in Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and Lyman Pershyi (12km east of Kupyansk).[18]

The reported Ukrainian evacuation of vulnerable citizens from Kupyansk does not suggest that Ukrainian forces believe that Russian forces threaten the city. Western media reported on March 3 that Ukrainian officials ordered the mandatory evacuation of vulnerable civilians from Kupyansk due to Russian shelling.[19] Russian forces are within the 25km range that allows them to shell Kupyansk with 152mm tube artillery, which poses considerable risk to civilians. Russian forces have conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk over the past month without making any significant confirmed advances and are unlikely to secure the gains required to threaten the city at their current pace of operations. ISW has assessed that the closest Russian advances are about 13km northeast of Kupyansk, and it is unlikely that Russian forces in this area have the capability to rapidly advance 13km cross-country and assault Kupyansk itself, if they are able to advance that far at all, which they have not yet shown the capacity to do.

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Kreminna on March 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Nevske (17km north of Kreminna), Kreminna, and within 33km south of Kreminna near Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Spirne, and Vesele.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Terny (17km west of Kreminna), and Yampolvika (17km west of Kreminna) and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[21] Russian milbloggers amplified footage on March 4 purporting to show Russian assault units of the Central Military District capturing Ukrainian trenches in a forest area near Kreminna.[22] A Russian source claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces hold positions as close as 40 meters away from one another south of Kreminna.[23]

A Russian commander inaccurately framed Russian operations in Luhansk and Kharkiv oblasts as limited in scope, likely to set informational conditions for the potential culmination of the Russian offensive in this sector of the frontline. A BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve of the Country) commander stated on March 4 that Russian forces are conducting localized offensive operations to regain lost positions and push Ukrainian forces away from Russian-occupied Svatove and Belgorod Oblast.[24] The BARS-13 commander stated that Russian offensive operations in these areas ”can hardly be called a full-fledged offensive,” and that Russian forces are struggling to advance after pushing Ukrainian forces back from positions near Kreminna.[25] ISW assesses that Russian forces have likely committed almost the entirety of the 144th and 3rd Motorized Rifle Divisions of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District as well as regiment-sized elements of the 98th, 76th, and 106th Air Assault Division of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) to offensives along the Svatove-Kreminna line.[26] The commitment of the equivalent of three divisions to one discrete geographical area suggests that Russian forces intended to prioritize this axis of advance and make substantial gains in this area. ISW has previously assessed that the ongoing Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast may already be nearing culmination because these elements have been committed to decisive offensive operations in this area for some time, and Russian sources are likely trying to set informational conditions for the potential Russian loss of the initiative.[27]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Bakhmut on March 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (13km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Bodhanivka (8km northwest), and Hryhorivka (10km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[28] Geolocated footage posted on March 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions on the east bank of the Berkhivka reservoir, indicating that Russian troops have made advances about 5km northwest of Bakhmut.[29] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that the situation in Bakhmut is difficult but under control and remarked that Russian forces blew up the bridge that connects Bakhmut with Khromove to the west.[30] ISW observed geolocated footage of the Khromove bridge on March 3 that indicated that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge to inhibit Russian movement to the west of Bakhmut.[31] It is unclear who destroyed the Khromove bridge, but its destruction will in any case limit the abilities of Russian forces to approach Ukrainian positions in and around Khromove from positions in Bakhmut. Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing from Bakhmut but that certain Ukrainian elements remain within the city.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces cleared the “Tavr” meat processing plant in northeastern Bakhmut and are advancing towards central Bakhmut along streets in eastern and southwestern Bakhmut.[33] Milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner troops attacked Ukrainian positions west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Khromove.[34] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger noted that the only remaining bridge out of Bakhmut is a bridge across the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway in Ivanivske.[35]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on March 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka itself and around Avdiivka near Severne (5km west of Avdiivka), Novokalynove (10km north of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (9km north of Avdiivka), and Kamianka (5km northeast of Avdiivka); on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, and Krasnohorivka (the Krasnohorivka just northwest of Donetsk City and not the one 9km north of Avdiivka); and on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka and Pobieda.[36] Footage posted on March 4 shows a Ukrainian brigade destroying a Russian assault group near Avdiivka, resulting in the loss of three Russian tanks, five BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and the capture of six Russian prisoners.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, particularly elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps, are fighting along the outskirts of Donetsk City and in Marinka.[38] Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City in western Donetsk Oblast on March 4.[39]


Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for offensive operations in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 4 that Russian forces are attempting to improve their tactical positions in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to resume offensive operations in some areas.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff has recently changed its language to include information concerning the situation in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts in the same section, and it is unclear whether these reports refer to offensive preparations in both or just one of the oblasts. ISW has not observed any indicators that Russian forces are preparing for sustained offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast or any offensive activity in Kherson Oblast. Some Ukrainian officials have suggested that Russian forces could attempt to launch a decisive offensive effort towards Zaporizhzhia City, but ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not have the necessary combat power accumulated in Zaporizhia Oblast to launch a large-scale offensive in this sector of the frontline.[41] Russian forces would be highly unlikely to reach Zaporizhzhia City in the case of such an offensive.

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts on March 4.[42] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces shelled Kherson City and Nikopol in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and Ochakiv in Mykolaiv Oblast.[43]



Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to increase Chechen influence within Russia through promoting Chechnya’s Special Forces (SPETSNAZ) and youth policy efforts. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin visited SPETSNAZ University in Gudermes, Chechnya with Kadyrov and praised the experience of its instructors on March 3.[44] Kadyrov also stated that his son, Chechen Regional Chairman of the All-Russian Public State Movement of Children and Youth ”Movement of the First” Head Akhmat Kadyrov, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Chechnya on March 4 to discuss youth policy.[45]

Russian officials continue to make contradictory statements regarding plans to change the conscription age for upcoming conscription cycles. A Russian state-owned news source stated on March 3 that Russia’s Federation Council Defense Committee Head, Viktor Bondarev, claimed that Russian deputies plan to introduce a bill in spring 2023 to raise the age of conscription for Russian soldiers in alignment with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s December 21, 2022 proposal.[46] Shoigu proposed shifting the conscription bracket from 18-27 years of age to 21-30 years of age.[47] Russian Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartapolov has made contradictory statements about changes to the conscription age at different points since January 11.[48] These rhetorical inconsistencies indicate that partial mobilization and present conscription levels are insufficient to meet Russian personnel needs and that Russian authorities are likely exploring avenues for expanding force generation capacity without resorting to full-scale mobilization efforts.

Units of Russian mobilized soldiers have begun to record complaints about integration with and subjugation to Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces in addition to continuing complaints about DNR command. Russia’s 1252nd regiment – composed of mobilized soldiers from Mordovia and Mari El – recorded a video complaint published to social media on March 3 that asked Putin to address their mistreatment under LNR commanders in Lysychansk. The soldiers claimed LNR commanders disbanded their unit and improperly reassigned them, deployed them to positions that do not match their training, and failed to equip them sufficiently.[49] A Russian news source amplified on March 3 another video complaint against DNR commanders recorded by the wives of soldiers in Russia’s 1439th regiment - composed of mobilized soldiers from Irkutsk Oblast. The women stated that DNR commanders ordered their husbands to storm Avdiivka, allowed Ukrainian forces to surround them, and then abandoned them.[50] Soldiers from the 1439th regiment have thrice recorded their own viral complaints regarding their treatment under DNR commanders.[51] A Russian opposition source published on March 3 another complaint about the poor treatment of mobilized soldiers under DNR command from the wife of a covertly-mobilized soldier from Shakhtarsk, Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine.[52]

Russian official responses to these complaints remain inconsistent. Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor Kobzev posted on March 4 that Irkutsk Oblast representatives traveled to the front lines in Ukraine to investigate the complaints of the 1439th-regiment mobilized soldiers. Meanwhile, Russian commanders unsuccessfully endeavor to silence the complaints, as ISW has previously reported.[53] A Russian opposition news source posted a video on March 3 in which the 1439th regiment soldiers begin to film an appeal to Putin before a speaker off camera warns, “they’re coming,” and the video cuts off.[54]

Russian federal subjects (regions) continue to shoulder the financial burdens of Russian mobilization. An Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic, news source cited statements from Bashkirian authorities that they have spent hundreds of millions of rubles (millions of US dollars) out of the regional budget to implement the 2022 mobilization plan, pay the families of fallen soldiers, provision mobilized and volunteer soldiers, and more.[55]

Russian authorities continue to prosecute limited domestic resistance to Russian mobilization and to the war in Ukraine. Several Russian sources reported on March 4 that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers detained a Moscow resident and charged her with treason for financially assisting Ukrainian forces.[56] A Russian legal rights organization noted that this is the first known case of treason based on the provision of financial aid to Ukraine.[57] A Russian opposition news source reported on March 3 that Russia’s First Eastern District Military Court sentenced a Vladivostok resident to seven years imprisonment for setting fire to an unspecified military registration and enlistment office on June 8 after an unidentified customer allegedly offered him a 100,000-ruble ($1,326) reward to destroy the office.[58] A Russian state-owned news source claimed on March 4 that the Russian supreme court in occupied Crimea sentenced a Saint Petersburg resident to six years imprisonment for attempting to swim from Crimea to Odesa and join Ukrainian forces.[59]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to increase law enforcement measures in occupied territories. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials in Simferopol, Crimea created volunteer police patrols out of fear of Ukrainian partisan activity and due to the shortage of law enforcement personnel.[60] Kherson Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo used the alleged Ukrainian attack in Bryansk Oblast to announce that the Kherson occupation administration is strengthening internal checkpoints and patrols and introducing measures to identify terrorists.[61] Saldo also claimed that Russian forces will strengthen control of the line of contact.[62] Russian occupation officials may weaponize discourse surrounding the Bryansk Oblast incident to further consolidate repressions against residents of occupied areas.

Russian occupation authorities continue to prepare occupied territories for the September 10 Russian regional elections. Zaporizhia Occupation Administration Head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on March 4 that the first meeting of the Election Commission took place in occupied Zaporizhia in preparation for United Voting Day.[63] Balitsky stated that the Election Commission has 10 members with the right to vote and thanked the Russian Central Election Commission and chairperson Ella Pamfilova for their help in organizing election commissions in occupied areas.[64]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

Russian forces continue conducting training rotations in Belarus before deploying to fight in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian Border Guard Spokesman Andriy Demchenko stated on March 4 that the Russian force size in Belarus fluctuates but generally does not exceed 9,000 – 10,000 personnel at any given time.[65] Demchenko stated that Russian forces in Belarus redeploy from Belarus to Russia to support the Russian force group fighting in eastern Ukraine.[66] Demchenko stated that replacement Russian forces will likely deploy to Belarus after Russian forces redeploy from Belarus, keeping the overall number of Russian personnel in Belarus more or less equal over time.[67] Independent Belarusian monitoring group The Hajun Project reported on March 3 that Russia and Belarus expanded the duration of their ongoing joint exercises until at least March 13.[68] The Hajun Project reported that Russian forces are intensively training at several training grounds throughout Belarus, including the Osipovichsky, Domanovo, Lepelsky, and Obuz-Lesnovsky training grounds.[69] These reports support ISW’s assessment that the Russian military is utilizing Belarusian training grounds and trainers to train mobilized Russians to compensate for Russia‘s degraded training capacity.[70]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://twitter.com/EdsenTheWeather/status/1632014727688617985?s=20  

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://t.me/readovkanews/54010; https://t.me/rybar/44221

[4] https://suspilne dot media/399485-oleksandr-sirskij-rozpoviv-pro-situaciu-v-bahmuti/ 

[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/24551

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar03012023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021323

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021723

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar012523

[9] https://www.economist.com/china/2023/03/02/chinese-arms-could-revive-rus...

[10] https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/04/us-intel-on-china-considering-lethal-aid...

 

[11] https://tass dot ru/politika/17167181; https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2023/03/04/vgosdume-predlozhili-kompaniyam-samim-zakupat-pvo-dlya-zaschiti-otdronov-a35818; https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/04/v-gosdume-posovetovali-rossiyskim-kompaniyam-zakupatsya-pvo-dlya-zaschity-ot-ukrainskih-dronov

[12] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[13] https://stepnaya-now dot ru/2023/03/04/v-rostove-otkrylsya-tsentr-nabora-bojtsov-dlya-chvk-vagner/; https://www.1rnd dot ru/news/3557543/v-rostove-otkrylsa-centr-nabora-bojcov-dla-cvk-vagner; https://dzen dot ru/a/ZAI02XaeEBSdSzvR; https://ng72 dot ru/news/77419; https://news.rambler dot ru/army/50304120/?utm_content=news_media&utm_medium=read_more&utm_source=copylink; http://samara-news dot net/society/2023/03/03/306727.html; https://progorodsamara dot ru/news/view/prigozin-zaavil-ob-otkrytii-v-samare-centra-cvk-vagner-na-ul-lva-tolstogo-3-marta

[14] https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19744; https://t.me/voenkors/318; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive... https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operation...

[15] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[16] https://vk dot com/mol_wagner_center ; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/5845348; https://ria dot ru/20230303/klub-1855561044.html; https://t.me/mozhemobyasnit/14823; https://notes.citeam dot org/mobilization-mar-2-3

[17] https://twitter.com/SerDer_Daniels/status/1631987294977552384?s=20 ; h...

[18] https://t.me/rybar/44227

[19] https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-03-3-23...

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

[21] https://t.me/wargonzo/11226

[22] https://t.me/voenacher/40653; https://t.me/vladlentatarsky/19742

[23] https://t.me/readovkanews/54014

[24] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35983; https://t.me/dolgarevaanna/3207

[25] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/35983; https://t.me/dolgarevaanna/3207

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[27] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022823 ;

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

 

[29] https://twitter.com/EdsenTheWeather/status/1632014727688617985?s=20  

 

[30] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/04/dosvid-nashyh-zbrojnyh-syl-dozvolyaye-perebudovuvaty-oboronu-pid-bahmutom-cherevatyj/

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...

[32] https://t.me/milinfolive/97662; https://t.me/milchronicles/1620; https...

[33] https://t.me/readovkanews/54010; https://t.me/rybar/44221

[34] https://t.me/rybar/44221; https://t.me/wargonzo/11226; https://t.me/re...

[35] https://t.me/grey_zone/17552

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

 

[37] https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1631955518720729090; https://twitter....

[38] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/79681; https://t.me/wargonzo/11226

[39] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

 

 

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

[41] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020423

[42] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

[43] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ERLogQ9UP1JkA9zNYL1...

[44] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3409; https://t.me/pushilindenis/3229

[45] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3412; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3410

[46] https://ria dot ru/20230303/prizyv-1855516980.html; https://notes dot citeam.org/mobilization-mar-2-3

[47] https://isw.pub/UkrWar122122

[48] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[49] https://vk dot com/saryurist?w=wall-111745037_10899&z=video-111745037_456239081%2Fbe05a4c3b80913a9a3; https://notes dot citeam.org/mobilization-mar-2-3; https://t.me/Govorit_NeMoskva/5389; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/stat...

[50] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1631905839140274176; https://t.me...

[51]https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operation...

[52] https://t.me/mobdnrlive2042; https://t.me/astrapress/22253; https://no... citeam.org/mobilization-mar-2-3

[53] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[54] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/9570; https://notes.citeam%20dot%20org/mobilization-mar-2-3

[55] https://t.me/ufa1news/10218; https://ufa1 dot ru/text/politics/2023/03/03/72106373/?utm_source=telegram&amp%3Butm_medium=messenger&amp%3Butm_campaign=ufa1

[56] https://meduza dot io/news/2023/03/04/fsb-otchitalas-chto-zaderzhala-moskvichku-za-finansovuyu-pomosch-vsu-na-nee-zaveli-delo-o-gosizmene; https://iz dot ru/1478719/2023-03-04/moskvichku-zaderzhali-po-podozreniiu-v-

[57] https://t.me/deptone/4784

[58] https://t.me/tvrain/63473; https://notes dot citeam.org/mobilization-mar-2-3

[59] https://crimea.ria dot ru/20230303/pytalsya-pereplyt-granitsu-v-krymu-peterburzhtsa-osudili-za-gosizmenu--1127319872.html

[60] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0Ps2kSn9E9x5hhEy18D5...

[61] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/506

[62] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/506

[63] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/837

[64] https://t.me/BalitskyEV/837

[65] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/04/u-bilorusi-rosiyany-trenuyut-svoyih-vijskovyh-dlya-vidpravky-na-shid-ukrayiny/

[66] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/04/u-bilorusi-rosiyany-trenuyut-svoyih-vijskovyh-dlya-vidpravky-na-shid-ukrayiny/

[67] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/03/04/u-bilorusi-rosiyany-trenuyut-svoyih-vijskovyh-dlya-vidpravky-na-shid-ukrayiny/

[68] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/6534

[69] https://t.me/Hajun_BY/6534

[70] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

 

File Attachments: 

Wagner Group Recruting Centers As of March 4, 2023.png

Zaporizhia Battle Map Draft March 04,2023.png

Kherson-Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft March 04,2023.png

Donetsk Battle Map Draft March 04,2023.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft March 04,2023.png

DraftUkraineCoTMarch04,2023.png


5. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Message to the Force


The 3 page memo can be accessed here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Mar/02/2003171462/-1/-1/1/MESSAGE-TO-THE-FORCE.PDF


RELEASE

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Message to the Force

March 2, 2023 |

defense.gov

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Message to the Force

March 2, 2023 |

Today, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, published a Message to the Force to reaffirm his three priorities: defending the Nation, taking care of our people, and succeeding through teamwork. The memorandum reinforces the guiding principles and critical priorities in accordance with the National Defense Strategy while recognizing the commitment and hard work of the Department.

Secretary Austin provided his priorities and specific areas of focus:

1. DEFEND THE NATION

  • Prioritize China as the “Pacing Challenge”
  • Tackle the Acute Russian Threat
  • Address Advanced and Persistent Threats
  • Innovate and Modernize
  • Meet the Climate Crisis

2. TAKING CARE OF OUR PEOPLE

  • Grow Our Talent
  • Build Resilience and Readiness
  • Ensure Accountable Leadership

3. SUCCEED THROUGH TEAMWORK

  • Join Forces with Our Allies and Partners
  • Strengthen Partnerships Across America
  • Build Unity Within the Department

The full memorandum can be read here.

Memo updated as of 1800 EST, 2-March

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6. Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow


Access the entire article at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3208&context=parameters


SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow

George Shatzer

Abstract

In the fifth installment of the SRAD Director’s Corner, “Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow,” George Shatzer focuses on the failure of the US-led war and reconstruction campaign in Afghanistan. He reviews The Forty-year War in Afghanistan: A Chronicle Foretold by Tariq Ali and The Fifth Act: America’s End in Afghanistan by Elliot Ackerman. He brings personal experience to bear in his review, painting a picture of why the United States failed in Afghanistan and posing these failures as lessons that must be learned before the next war. The books also provide insights for strategists attempting to plan for security in the region.

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.55540/0031-1723.3208

Recommended Citation

George Shatzer, "SRAD Director's Corner: Afghanistan: The Logic of Failing, Fast and Slow," Parameters 53, no. 1 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3208.

Additional Files

04-02-Shatzer---Afghanistan-The-Logic-of-Failing-Fast-and-Slow.mp3 (1469 kB)

Decisive Point Podcast




7. Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 1 and part 2)


The review by Alex, Special Operations NCO and the response by Dr Nagl can be read at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3209&context=parameters




Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 1)

Alex Special Operations NCO

John A. Nagl

Abstract

This commentary responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3).

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.55540/0031-1723.3209

Recommended Citation

Alex Special Operations NCO & John A. Nagl, "Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 1)," Parameters 53, no. 1 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3209.




​Part can be downloaded here: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3210&context=parameters​

Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 2)

G. L. Lamborn

John A. Nagl

Abstract

This commentary responds to John A. Nagl’s article, “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars,” published in the Autumn 2022 issue of Parameters (vol. 52, no. 3).

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.55540/0031-1723.3210

Recommended Citation

G. L. Lamborn & John A. Nagl, "Review and Reply: On “Why America’s Army Can’t Win America’s Wars” (part 2)," Parameters 53, no. 1 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3210.


8. China’s peace plan for Ukraine may just be smoke and mirrors


May be???



Conclusion:


Its peace plan will remain empty rhetoric until it is ready to take concrete steps to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Zelensky put it in his response to the Chinese peace plan, the question is what might follow Beijing’s words.



China’s peace plan for Ukraine may just be smoke and mirrors


China’s proposal merits careful consideration, but it should only be judged in terms of concrete support for Ukrainian sovereignty




asiatimes.com · by More by Tuvia Gering · March 4, 2023

Last week, on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China issued a 12-point position paper outlining its “peace plan” for resolving the conflict. The document was released in the wake of statements by senior US officials, including Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the White House national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, warning that China is contemplating sending lethal weapons to Russia, a step it has avoided so far.

Western policymakers have not forgotten the joint statement issued by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in the weeks leading up to the invasion, in which they declared their “no-limit partnership.” The West’s chief concern is that the escalating rivalry with China has brought together two authoritarian countries hell-bent on reshaping the international order.

Chinese party-state media and pundits refute the claims. In contrast to Moscow’s rogue regime, Beijing’s worldview, in their opinion, supports the existing order because it has benefited the most from it.


They argue that the peace plan reflects China’s responsible and neutral stance throughout the conflict. Some even see it as a direct criticism of Putin, citing the emphasis on the inviolability of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, as well as its clear support for a peaceful resolution and explicit opposition to nuclear brinkmanship.

For instance, retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo of Tsinghua University debunked Western claims regarding Beijing’s pro-Russian stance: “China is not sitting out the conflict. If China had truly sided with Russia, World War III would have erupted. China’s greatest contribution has been to refuse to add fuel to the fire and to try to encourage peace talks.”

“Adding fuel to the fire” is the go-to Chinese expression for US and NATO military assistance to Ukraine. The phrase was used last Monday by Mao Ning, a spokeswoman for the Foreign Ministry, to accuse the US of prolonging and escalating the conflict by “pouring $32 billion worth of arms to one side” while making false allegations against China. “This is out-and-out hegemonism and double standard, and absolute hypocrisy,” she said.

In addition to offering nothing new to China’s position over the past year, nor a real roadmap or practical solutions, the Chinese plan appears to use Ukrainian hardship to further its own battle of narratives with the West – “Cold War mentality,” “exclusive security,” opposing military blocs, unilateral sanctions, and long-arm jurisdiction, and so on – such talking points can only be interpreted this way after years of Pavlovian conditioning on every possible Chinese platform.

Even the ostensibly responsible condemnation of the use of chemical and biological weapons is reminiscent of the Kremlin conspiracy theories that China’s propaganda arm has amplified regarding a purported US-Ukrainian bioweapons program.


Moreover, the peace plan’s stance against “pursuing one’s own security at the expense of others’ security” is straight out of the Kremlin playbook. According to Beijing, the invasion of a sovereign nation can be rationalized as a preventative measure to thwart NATO expansionism. It still eschews referring to the war as such, instead opting for the Russian euphemism “special military operation.”

Xi Jinping is currently planning a trip to Russia after speaking with Putin several times and meeting him in person in September. Meanwhile, Volodymyr Zelensky is still waiting for him to pick up the phone.

In contrast to Beijing’s claims, Chinese customs data show how local companies are assisting Russia’s war effort by exporting dual-use components, such as a double-digit increase in chip exports, a significant uptick in DJI drone exports, or a 400-fold increase in exports of aluminum oxide essential for weapons production.

Even if these numbers are disregarded, China-Russia trade last year reached a record US$190 billion, up 30% from the previous year. Behind the figures are European sanctions that allow China to purchase energy at a low cost while providing an economic lifeline to Russia. At the same time, Beijing’s humanitarian assistance to Kiev has been virtually nil.

Der Spiegel reported last week that a Chinese arms manufacturer is planning to send Russia 100 kamikaze drones by April, similar to the Iranian Shahad-136 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) used by Russian forces to kill civilians in Kiev. China denies the accusations, but if lethal Chinese weapons are discovered to be destroying Ukrainian homes, Zhou Bo’s predictions of World War III will be more than mere conjecture.


In the end, China’s peace plan is just a smokescreen to shift the conversation away from Beijing and toward the US and its allies. Despite claims of objectivity and neutrality, its actions over the past year have made it abundantly clear that its top priority is narrow national interests, rather than playing the role of the “responsible major power” that it has envisaged for itself.

Its peace plan will remain empty rhetoric until it is ready to take concrete steps to support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Zelensky put it in his response to the Chinese peace plan, the question is what might follow Beijing’s words.

Any views expressed in this article, as well as any errors, are solely those of the author.

asiatimes.com · by More by Tuvia Gering · March 4, 2023


9. Medal of Honor Awarded to Paris Davis | SOF News



A great honor for a great man finally bestowed upon him. Links to videos and articles below.


Medal of Honor Awarded to Paris Davis | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · March 4, 2023


A Special Forces soldier who served in Vietnam received the Medal of Honor at the White House on March 3, 2023. Colonel (Ret.) Paris Davis, at the time a captain, was in a fiece battle for more than 19 hours. The combat action took place in June 1965 against a larger Viet Cong force. His small unit of South Vietnamese and American troops was pinned down by the enemy and suffered numerous casualties.

Davis made several successful rescues of his troops on the battlefield – removing them under fire to safety and later onto evacuation helicopters. He did this even though he himself had been wounded. He ignored orders to evacuate himself until all of his teammates were extracted.

Davis served in the Army for many years after his tour in Vietnam. His last assignment was as commander of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.

A detailed account of the battle and the heroic actions of Davis is provided by the U.S. Army at this link:

https://www.army.mil/medalofhonor/davis/

A video of the award ceremony at the White House is provided at this link:

Medal of Honor to Ret. U.S. Army Colonel Paris Davis, The White House, March 3, 2023.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lH3FoQxQEw&t=1534s

*********

References:

March 3, 2023, “Biden Presents Medal of Honor to Special Forces Soldier”, DoD News.

March 3, 2023, “No man left behind”, Army News Service.

sof.news · by SOF News · March 4, 2023


10. The U.S. Must Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels


The U.S. Must Defeat Mexico’s Drug Cartels

The narco-terrorists are more like ISIS than the American mafia.

By William P. Barr

March 2, 2023 1:04 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-us-must-defeat-mexicos-drug-cartels-narco-terrorism-amlo-el-chapo-crenshaw-military-law-enforcement-b8fac731?st



America can no longer tolerate narco-terrorist cartels. Operating from havens in Mexico, their production of deadly drugs on an industrial scale is flooding our country with this poison. The time is long past to deal with this outrage decisively. Reps. Dan Crenshaw (R., Texas) and Michael Waltz (R., Fla.) have proposed a joint resolution giving the president authority to use the U.S. military against these cartels in Mexico. This is a necessary step and puts the focus where it must be.

Overdose deaths every year—more than 100,000—exceed the number of Americans killed in action during the bloodiest year of World War II. But the devastation from drug abuse goes much deeper. A 2017 analysis, accounting for the costs of healthcare, criminal justice, lost productivity and social and family services, estimated that the total cost of America’s drug epidemic was more than $1 trillion annually, or 5% of gross domestic product. Given the explosion in illicit drug deaths since then, this estimate now seems conservative.

Almost all illicit drugs coming into the U.S. are controlled by the Mexican cartels, principally those based in the states of Sinaloa and Jalisco. These paramilitary organizations use bribery and terror tactics to entrench themselves as essentially states within the state, controlling large areas of Mexico. They have become so powerful they can confront the Mexican government with the narcoterrorists’ stark choice: “plata o plomo”—silver or lead. If they can’t buy off officials, they try to cow them with threats of violence.

An antidrug strategy that leaves the drug supply chain untouched will have minimal impact. Real progress requires aggressively attacking the drug supply at its source. The head of the snake is in Mexico, and that is where the main thrust of our efforts must be directed. Experience in the early 1990s proved this, when the U.S. and Colombian governments joined in an all-out attack on the Medellín and Cali cartels inside Colombia, successfully eliminating them. Unfortunately, in the mid-1990s, we pulled back from this kind of extraterritorial engagement.

Mexican cartels have flourished because Mexican administrations haven’t been willing to take them on. The exception was President Felipe Calderón (2006-12) who wanted to go full bore against the cartels, but American priorities were elsewhere at the time. Today, the cartels’ chief enabler is President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, known as AMLO. When he came to power at the end of 2018, he announced the switch to a policy of “hugs, not bullets” and shut down counternarcotics cooperation with the U.S. Under strong pressure from President Trump, he occasionally engaged in a high-profile operation to create the illusion of cooperation, but these were smoke screens. In reality, AMLO is unwilling to take action that would seriously challenge the cartels. He shields them by consistently invoking Mexico’s sovereignty to block the U.S. from taking effective action.

This posture should anger Americans. Under international law, a government has a duty to ensure that lawless groups don’t use its territory to carry out predations against its neighbors. If a government is unwilling or unable to do so, then the country being harmed has the right to take direct action to eliminate the threat, with or without the host country’s approval.

Even if AMLO were willing to move against the cartels, Mexico can’t do the job itself. Its criminal-justice system is dysfunctional: 95% of all violent crimes go unpunished. Pervasive corruption at every level of Mexico’s government makes it almost impossible to mount effective law-enforcement or military operations without the cartels being tipped off in advance. The big cartels have become potent paramilitary forces, with heavily armed mobile units able to stand their ground against the Mexican military.

In October 2019, when Mexican troops went into Sinaloa and arrested El Chapo’s son, they were surrounded by 700 cartel paramilitary fighters with armored cars, rocket launchers and heavy machine guns, and the military was forced to release its prisoner. This past January, it repeated the operation with 4,000 troops, supported by aircraft. As a former Mexican security official complained, the military simply withdrew after capturing El Chapo’s son, leaving the cartel army intact and free to rampage around the state.

What will it take to defeat the Mexican cartels? First, a far more aggressive American effort inside Mexico than ever before, including a significant U.S. law-enforcement and intelligence presence, as well as select military capabilities. Optimally, the Mexican government will support and participate in this effort, and it is likely to do so once they understand that the U.S. is committed to do whatever is necessary to cripple the cartels, whether or not the Mexican government participates.

Second, the danger cartels pose to the U.S. requires that we confront them primarily as national-security threats, not a law-enforcement matter. These narco-terrorist groups are more like ISIS than like the American mafia. Case-by-case prosecution of individuals can be a part of an overall effort, but the only way to defeat them is to use every tool at our disposal inside Mexico. Merely designating the cartels as terrorist groups will do nothing by itself. The real question is whether we are willing to go after them as we would a terrorist group.

The goal isn’t a perfect Mexico. Our objective must be to degrade the cartels to the point that Mexican governments can muster the will and the wherewithal to keep them in check. We can’t get caught in the trap of “nation building.” Attempts to reform Mexico’s institutions and surmount its pervasive corruption will get nowhere as long as cartels hold the dominance they do.

The cartels have Mexico in a python-like stranglehold. American leadership is needed to help Mexico break free. We can’t accept a failed narco-state on our border, providing sanctuary to narco-terrorist groups preying on the American people.

Mr. Barr is a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute and author of the memoir “One Damn Thing After Another.” He served as U.S. attorney general, 1991-93 and 2019-20.

WSJ Opinion: The Known Unknowns of Joe Biden’s UFO Silence

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Appeared in the March 3, 2023, print edition as 'The U.S. Must Defeat Mexico’s Cartels'.





11. China proffers 'peaceful reunification', Taiwan says respect our democracy



China not only won't respect Taiwan's democracy, it can't respect Taiwan's or any other countries' democracy. Democracy is an existential threat to the Chinese Communist Party. It cannot allow power to the people.


China proffers 'peaceful reunification', Taiwan says respect our democracy

Reuters · by Yew Lun Tian

BEIJING/TAIPEI, March 5 (Reuters) - Chinese Premier Li Keqiang pledged "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan on Sunday as well as resolute steps to oppose Taiwan independence, with Taipei responding that Beijing should respect the Taiwanese people's commitment to democracy and freedom.

China, which claims democratic Taiwan as its own territory, has increased its military activity near the island over the past three years, responding to what it calls "collusion" between Taipei and Washington, Taiwan's main international backer and arms supplier.

In August, China staged war games around Taiwan in response to a visit to Taipei by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Speaking at the opening of the annual meeting of China's parliament, Li said Beijing stands by the "one China" principle, which states that Taiwan is part of China, though did not directly threaten military action.

The government should implement our party's policy for "resolving the Taiwan question" and "take resolute steps to oppose Taiwan independence and promote reunification", he told the roughly 3,000 delegates at Beijing's enormous Great Hall of the People.

"We should promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and advance the process of China's peaceful reunification."

Most Taiwanese people have shown no interest in being ruled by autocratic China, which has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control.

Li, in separate comments on defence, said the armed forces should boost combat preparedness, though did not mention Taiwan within that context.

Taiwan's China-policy making Mainland Affairs Council responded to what it called Li's "reaffirmation" of China's Taiwan policy by saying Beijing should face up to the reality that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are "not subordinate to each other".

China should "respect the Taiwanese people's commitment to the core concepts of holding fast to the sovereignty, democracy and freedom of the Republic of China", it said, using Taiwan's formal name.

China should deal with cross-strait affairs pragmatically in a rational, equal and mutually respectful manner, so as to create conditions for healthy interactions, it added.

Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen has repeatedly offered talks with China, which have been rebuffed as Beijing believes her to be a separatist.

Taiwan's government strongly disputes Beijing's sovereignty claims, and says only the island's 23 million people can decide their future.

Taiwan holds presidential and parliamentary elections in early 2024 and tensions with China are likely to dominate campaigning.

Reporting by Yew Lun Tian in Beijing and Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.


Reuters · by Yew Lun Tian


12. China Sets Conservative Growth Target as Challenges Loom



How will this affect Chinese strategy going forward? Impact on defense and national security? Will it have psychological effects among the population and the business and investment community? Or is this not significant?



China Sets Conservative Growth Target as Challenges Loom

Officials aim for around 5% GDP growth this year, the lowest target in a quarter-century

https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-sets-economic-growth-target-of-around-5-for-the-year-88eaff89


By Stella Yifan XieFollow

Updated March 4, 2023 11:53 pm ET



HONG KONG—China unveiled its lowest growth target in more than a quarter-century as Beijing faces challenges in the domestic and global economy following its emergence from three years of strict Covid-19 measures.

China’s target of around 5% growth this year in gross domestic product, announced on Sunday by Premier Li Keqiang at the start of the country’s annual legislative session, suggests that officials are less concerned about raw economic expansion as they turn their attention to other priorities.

At this week’s legislative meetings, leader Xi Jinping is expected to further consolidate his grip over the realms of security, finance and technology, reshuffling key posts to further dilute the government’s role in policy-making at the expense of the Communist Party, The Wall Street Journal has reported.

This year’s growth target was more conservative than the roughly 5.5% goal set by Beijing last year—a target that the world’s second-largest economy missed by a wide margin, held back by Mr. Xi’s stringent Covid controls and a prolonged property slump. Last year’s 3% growth rate was the slowest in decades, with the exception of Covid-plagued 2020, when officials dropped its target altogether.

“This year, it is essential to prioritize economic stability and pursue progress while ensuring stability,” Mr. Li said in the government work report, his last before he is set to step down.

That emphasis on stability comes after three years of “zero-Covid” policies, when containing the pandemic trumped all other priorities, including supporting the economy. If China’s economy is able to find its footing following the dismantling of Covid-related restrictions, it could put the country back onto a trajectory that would allow it to eventually surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy—a prospect that many economists had grown increasingly skeptical of as the pandemic stretched on.

Achieving a growth rate of around 5% this year would mean the Chinese economy would expand by an average of roughly 4.6% for the four years from 2020 to 2023, down a notch from the 6.7% average annual growth rate between 2015 and 2019.


In the near term, the relatively conservative 5% growth target shows that policy makers are wary of a litany of challenges that could slow down the pace of recovery, even with Covid controls scrapped—a list of headwinds that includes tepid business and consumer confidence, weak overseas demand for Chinese-made goods and heavy local government debt loads that could limit their ability to stimulate the economy.

The 5% target is especially cautious given the strong rebound in business activity in the first two months of the year, said Louise Loo, a Singapore-based China economist for Oxford Economics. Official and private gauges of China’s manufacturing, service and construction sectors all rebounded strongly in January and February.

“The language today suggests that Beijing believes the reopening boost is likely to be only temporary,” Ms. Loo said. “The policy push is to spend just enough to reach the 5% growth target.”

Mr. Li said Sunday that the government would boost fiscal spending by 5.6% this year, less than last year’s increase, while fiscal revenue was expected to grow by 6.7% this year, more than last year. Officials are aiming for a fiscal deficit of 3% relative to GDP this year, up modestly from 2.8% in 2022—suggesting Beijing isn’t likely to stimulate aggressively.

One question this year will be the extent to which export growth slows after powering China’s economy through much of the pandemic. Export growth began to slow in year-on-year terms, and then to reverse course in October, after consumers and businesses in the West cut back on spending amid central banks’ aggressive moves to tame inflation.

China is scheduled to release trade data on Tuesday for the first two months of the year. Analysts say plunging shipping costs and a glut of empty containers at Chinese ports in recent weeks suggest trade demand remains sluggish.


China is scheduled to release trade data on Tuesday for the first two months of the year.

PHOTO: MARK SCHIEFELBEIN/ASSOCIATED PRESS

“If exports turn out to be a lot weaker than we expect, policymakers may need to boost monetary or fiscal easing and infrastructure building again,” Goldman Sachs economists told clients in a note March 2.

Another critical factor for China’s overall recovery is the sustainability of any postpandemic rebound in consumer spending.

Economists are watching to see how Chinese households deploy their pile of excess savings built during the pandemic, though some have argued that lingering uncertainty will crimp consumers’ urge to splurge.

Though Mr. Li called for the government to “stabilize spending on big-ticket items and promote recovery in consumption of consumer services,” he made no mention of cash handouts, a pandemic-era practice widely adopted in many Western economies to spur consumption.

Instead, Mr. Li called for the boosting of people’s income levels to encourage consumption, without elaborating. Youth joblessness remains high by official measures after peaking at nearly 20% last year. Migrant workers face higher job insecurity as factories likely hold back on hiring as export demand wobbles.

Officials on Sunday also signaled little in the way of fresh support for the beleaguered property market, which has been stuck in a downturn since late 2020, when regulators began strictly enforcing lending curbs on real-estate developers.

The government work report called for support for first-time home buyers, new urban residents and young people. However, it also reiterated the “housing is for living in, not for speculating on” mantra that Mr. Xi and other officials have adopted in their campaign against runaway housing prices.

That suggests that property, though likely to enjoy some relief from regulators this year, may not be given the chance to reprise its historic role as a major engine of growth.

The overall cautious tone in the government work report reflects a continuing concern with fiscal rectitude in Beijing—a preoccupation that predates the pandemic.

“Beijing will prioritize the fiscal sustainability issue this year,” says Houze Song, a fellow at the Paulson Institute in Chicago.

To that end, Beijing signaled modest support on Sunday for local governments, whose debt burden ballooned amid Covid-related spending mandates and the downturn in the property market, hitting the land auctions that had become a major revenue source for local officials.

Fiscal transfers from Beijing to local governments are set to increase 3.6% to 10.06 trillion yuan this year, a far cry from last year’s 18% increase.

Beijing will allow localities to issue a combined 3.8 trillion yuan, or $550 billion, worth of local government special-purpose bonds, which are mainly used to fund infrastructure projects, down from last year’s 4.04 trillion yuan.

Beyond the goals outlined in Sunday’s government work report, the economy’s performance will hinge on whether the new cabinet—packed with loyalists to Mr. Xi—can revive confidence among households and private businesses.

“The challenge the government faces is how to bolster the private sector, which is crucial for better employment and productivity growth,” said Eswar Prasad, a professor of trade policy at Cornell University.

—Grace Zhu in Beijing contributed to this article.

Write to Stella Yifan Xie at stella.xie@wsj.com



13. The turmoil disrupting China’s diplomatic priorities ahead of ‘two sessions’



The turmoil disrupting China’s diplomatic priorities ahead of ‘two sessions’

  • Leading diplomats Wang Yi and Qin Gang’s efforts to set the foreign policy stage have been hampered by balloon saga and Ukraine war
  • But a look at their diaries in the past two months shows a focus on Europe and developing countries rather than the US


Kinling Lo

Published: 11:58am, 5 Mar, 2023

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3212221/turmoil-disrupting-chinas-diplomatic-priorities-ahead-two-sessions?utm_source=rss_feed


This year’s “two sessions” – the annual meetings of the legislature and political advisory body – begin on March 4 and will complete a twice-a-decade leadership transition, with a reshuffle of top government jobs including the premier, and Xi Jinping set to secure a third term as president. As part of a series on what to expect from this key event, Kinling Lo looks at the general diplomacy direction in China.

While some key positions are expected to be finalised at China’s annual parliamentary meetings which open this weekend, two senior diplomats have been laying the groundwork for the new term of government since the end of 2022.

Wang Yi and Qin Gang were appointed on December 30 – as director of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and foreign minister, respectively – and got straight to work, setting the scene for the government’s foreign policy agenda.

Their efforts were meant to set the stage for President Xi Jinping’s groundbreaking third term at the “two sessions” meetings of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).


It did not turn out exactly as they could have expected just a few weeks ago, when the Chinese balloon saga erupted just as China-US relations seemed to be headed for some improvement after reaching their lowest point in decades.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to China in early February was cancelled in the heat of spying accusations against Beijing, followed by weeks of the two powers trading barbs and dashing hopes for a reset in their troubled relations.

But Wang and Qin’s work since taking up their new positions has given the world a glimpse of Beijing’s priorities, not only in its US ties but also relations with Europe.

China’s top diplomat urges US to ‘avoid misjudgment’ as Blinken trip postponed over balloon issue

In a speech last month to the Munich Security Conference, Wang, 69 – who served as foreign minister for a decade before taking on the role of China’s most senior diplomat – reflected on the geopolitical environment that Xi faces in his third term.

“Three years on, the pandemic is contained, but the world is not yet safer. Trust between major countries is lacking, geopolitical rifts are widening, unilateralism is rampant, the cold war mentality has returned, and new types of security threats from energy, food, climate, biosecurity and artificial intelligence keep emerging,” he said.


Among Wang’s 30 meetings and phone calls since his promotion, half were with European counterparts, with most taking place during his February visits to Italy, Hungary, Germany and Brussels.

Wang’s narrative after the trip expressed China’s hopes of a reset in its relations with Europe, strained over the war in Ukraine, human rights issues, and national security concerns.

Qin, 56 – who is widely tipped to become a state councillor during the two sessions, a move that would replicate Wang’s trajectory as foreign minister – had very few official interactions with Western countries in the same period.

Asean must not be proxy for any side, Indonesia says as China’s Qin Gang visits

22 Feb 2023

Instead, the former ambassador to the US concentrated on developing countries and China’s Asian neighbours.

His calls included half of the 10 countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia and Singapore – as well as South Korea and Japan. More than half of the rest of Qin’s three dozen meetings were with developing nations.

Lu Xiang, a specialist in US-China relations at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said there was still a window for pragmatic developments between Washington and Beijing in the first six months of 2023, but it was closing.

US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s statement after the balloon row – that she is still interested in visiting China – was a good sign, but by the end of the year campaigning would begin for the 2024 presidential election, Lu said.


01:44

A first in 2 years: top economic officials from US and China meet face to face

A first in 2 years: top economic officials from US and China meet face to face

“If nothing positive comes out in the first half of this year, it means there is not going to be any meaningful progress in the bilateral relations in this term of the Biden government,” he said. “By then, everything [the US does] will only be out of election concerns.”

While Chinese experts were sceptical that Blinken’s trip would have led to a softening in stance from either Beijing or Washington, they said China-US relations were even more up in the air since its cancellation.

“China-US relations are at a very high level of uncertainty. It is extremely difficult [for both countries] to know or plan for the next step,” Lu said.

Beijing hits out at Blinken’s ‘irresponsible and absurd’ Taiwan comments

1 Mar 2023

Last year’s government report, delivered by outgoing Premier Li Keqiang to the two sessions, made no direct reference to the US in its review of the previous year. It was the first time since 2021 and, according to Lu, it may not get a mention this year.

“We should not expect the US to be mentioned in the government report, which is usually very focused on the economy anyway. China-US relations are now very much understood as an overwhelmingly political issue,” he said.

The 2021 work report included ongoing trade negotiations with Japan and South Korea, progress on “fair and mutually beneficial China-US trade relations”, and the signing of the now-stalled EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

Wang’s attempt to revive China’s relations with Europe were met with a mixed response. Returning from his European trip, the diplomat said his meetings were “filled with expectations towards China’s development and … high hopes for China’s role on the world stage”.

China’s top diplomat urges France to boost tech ties and avoid decoupling

16 Feb 2023

Wang said Europe was willing to push for a turnaround in economic and trade cooperation, as well as a revival for the China-EU comprehensive partnership. “They all hope to see a resumption of face-to-face exchanges at many levels, and reactivating cooperation in all-ranging aspects,” he said.

In an interview with Chinese state media published on February 24, Wang said he expected China-Europe relations to show a “direction of positive development”.

Wang’s friendly advances were met first with a slap – when EU leaders marked the anniversary of the war in Ukraine by echoing US warnings to China against sending arms to Russia – followed by the opening of a line of communication, when French President Emmanuel Macron said he would visit Beijing in April.


“China-EU relations are not just important for this year, but for the coming decade. As long as China-US strategic competition goes on, Europe will always be a focus [for China],” said Song Luzheng, an international affairs researcher at Fudan University.

“Actually this is not such a bad position for China to be in, because we are all certain now that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will linger on.’

“China [thus] has the Russia card to play when dealing with Europe, as Europe sees the importance of China. [If China improves relations with Europe,] it has the Europe card to play with the US. This will put China in a much better position with the US.”

How EU-China relations became a casualty of the war in Ukraine

1 Mar 2023

Zhiqun Zhu, a professor in international relations at Bucknell University in the US, said China’s foreign policy direction would be about consolidating relations with the developing world, while trying to break the Western alliance.

“China is attempting to break the apparent Western united front against China and to consolidate its traditional ties with developing countries,” he said.

“This is why China has worked to improve relations with US allies such as Australia and reached out to others including France, Germany and Italy. Wang Yi’s tour to Europe is part of such a strategy.

“In addition, China has continued to strengthen relations with the developing world, with high-level exchanges between China and Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Latin America.”

China plans to train 5,000 security personnel from developing countries

25 Feb 2023

Pang Zhongying, a professor in international political economy at southwestern China’s Sichuan University, said Beijing’s focus on shoring up ties with developing countries was nothing new.

“It has been a tradition that China attempts to drive closer to developing nations, or small and medium-sized countries, when they have a difficult relationship with the West, especially when it’s expected to be a prolonged one,” he said.

“But when these countries come to China to ask for economic support, the question is whether China still has resources for it, and whether it is sustainable.”

Additional reporting by Jun Mai



Kinling Lo

myNEWS

Kinling Lo is a China reporter covering diplomacy and society news for the Post. She joined the team in 2016 as a cadet reporter.




14. This Day In History 1966: Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler hits #1 with “Ballad of the Green Berets”



Yes, I am biased.


For those unfamiliar with this ballad see the late Barry Sadler perform it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yF6MNWgsXZU


https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/staff-sergeant-barry-sadler-hits-1-with-ballad-of-the-green-berets

THIS DAY IN HISTORY

MARCH 05

1966

March 05

Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler hits #1 with “Ballad of the Green Berets”





Thanks to Hollywood, America’s collective memory of the Vietnam War is now inextricably linked with the popular music of that era. More specifically, it is linked with the music of the late-'60s counterculture and antiwar movement. But opposition to the war was far from widespread back in 1966—a fact that was reflected not just in popular opinion polls, but in the pop charts, too. Near the very height of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, on March 5, 1966, American popular-music fans made a #1 hit out of a song called “The Ballad Of The Green Berets” by Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler.

Sadler was exactly what his name and uniform implied he was: a real-life, active-duty member of the United States Army Special Forces—the elite unit popularly known as the Green Berets. In early 1965, Sadler suffered a severe punji stick injury that brought a premature end to his tour of duty as a combat medic in Vietnam. During his long hospitalization back in the United States, Sadler, an aspiring musician prior to the war, wrote and submitted to music publishers an epic ballad that eventually made its way in printed form to Robin Moore, author of the then-current nonfiction book called The Green Berets. Moore worked with Sadler to whittle his 12-verse original down to a pop-radio-friendly length, and Sadler recorded the song himself in late 1965, first for distribution only within the military, and later for RCA when the original took off as an underground hit. Within two weeks of its major-label release, The Ballad of the Green Berets had sold more than a million copies, going on to become Billboard magazine’s #1 single for all of 1966.


15.  The Threat and the Allure of the Chinese Balloons



An interesting and fun read. A little history of balloons.


Conclusion:


That a large orb floating above the landscape is as much a potential weapon as it is a vector of inquiry, or a vision of lighter-than-air beauty, is evident in one of the earliest known balloon stories. Though the date of the “first” hot-air balloons is often tied to eighteenth-century France, there were earlier balloons, broadly defined. During the Three Kingdoms era, in China, from 220 to 280 A.D., Kongming lanterns were used for military signalling. These hot-air balloons, which are still in use today, are ingenious and simple: a candle is lit under a rice-paper bag; the warm air inside the bag carries it aloft. The lanterns were supposedly invented by the statesman Zhuge Liang (also known as Kongming) when he was trapped during a battle, as a way to call for reinforcements. Now they are part of lantern festivals, in China, Taiwan, and elsewhere, and notes, prayers, and worry lists are sometimes attached—with the hope that those wishes will be met, the prayers will be heard, and the worries will fly away.


The Threat and the Allure of the Chinese Balloons

Even balloons launched for scientific reasons have always carried political ballast.

The New Yorker · by Rivka Galchen · March 4, 2023

By international agreement, each day at noon and midnight G.M.T., rain or shine, weather balloons are released from roughly nine hundred locations around the world. Within a couple of hours, most of them will be beyond the clouds, and still climbing. As they rise, they expand, going from the size of a car to the size of an orca. And then they pop. Usually, a complex device inside them, called a radiosonde, parachutes down to Earth. The radiosonde provides data on temperature, humidity, and air pressure, allowing forecasters around the world to predict sunshine in Montreal on Tuesday and rains in Mumbai on Wednesday. Often enough, someone finds one of the National Weather Service’s radiosondes on the ground, along with its bright-orange parachute. The radiosondes come equipped with mailing bags, so that they can be sent back to the N.O.A.A.’s National Reconditioning Center, in Missouri, and be reused.

Last month, a balloon the size of three buses was spotted over Billings, Montana. The Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that it was a weather balloon blown off course, which was not entirely implausible. (It later became clear that the balloon was not a weather balloon; afterward, when more balloons were noticed, and shot down, it turned out that at least one of those likely was a weather balloon, and none were spy balloons.) But even balloons deployed for scientific aims have often carried political ballast. In 1783, one of the earliest manned balloons was built with finances from the King of France, launched with great pomp and bearing the fleur-de-lis. After the king’s overthrow, in 1790, another balloon was launched, with the goal “to see if the inhabitants of the moon were free” and, if they were not, to hand them the Declaration of the Rights of Man. That balloon faltered. But a year later, over a crowded Champs-Élysées, a balloon with a rooster-shaped basket (the rooster had become a symbol of the French people) successfully ascended twelve thousand feet. On the way down, the aeronaut, having toasted to freedom, dropped leaflets of the new constitution.

Ballooning was a performance of scientific knowledge—political armor in a time of purported democratic rationality. The French revolutionaries replaced the foot, based on the length of a man’s foot, with the metre. The “mysterious” arts—weaving, blacksmithing—appeared in plain terms in Diderot and D’Alembert’s encyclopedia. Even the republic was set to Year One, eschewing religious tomfoolery. And a military ballooning unit was formed, called the French Aerostatic Corps.

The Montgolfier brothers, the twelfth and fifteenth sons of a paper manufacturer, had started the balloon craze, in 1783. They used buttons to combine pieces of paper-lined burlap, forming a ten-metre-wide balloon, which rose more than six thousand feet, stayed aloft for ten minutes, and drifted about a mile. The brothers explained that they used “Montgolfier gas,” which was lighter than air—it was understood only later that Montgolfier air was simply warmer air.

Air is a substance that balloons have been well suited to study. The Victorian scientist James Glaisher wanted to create a map of the upper atmosphere, and see how the qualities of air changed with altitude. Earlier generations of scientists had climbed the Puy de Dôme, a dormant French volcano of modest height, carrying barometers (which, at the time, were awkward, fragile, and heavy). Glaisher wanted to check out the air even higher up. In 1862, he went up in a balloon with an expert, Henry Tracey Coxwell. At five thousand feet, they reached the clouds; at eight thousand feet, “the tops of the mountain like clouds became silvery and golden,” Glaisher later wrote. When they reached some five miles above the Earth, the barometer read 10.8 inches—at sea level, barometric pressure, which measures among other things the saturation of oxygen, is closer to thirty inches—and Glaisher’s sight began to fail. He reached for the brandy, but couldn’t extend his hand that far; he kept trying to read the barometer until he passed out. A pigeon they had brought up with them died. At that point, Coxwell, feeling weak himself, took hold with his teeth of a rope that would help them descend; his frozen hands had become ineffective. They started to descend, and survived. So: there is less oxygen up there, they learned, among other lessons.

Other people discovered the stratosphere. Léon Teisserenc de Bort sent up some two hundred balloons. He designed them himself, using kerosene paper, which is water-resistant. He also designed the instruments that his balloons carried. He dispensed with the human element, sending them up unmanned, then searching for the instruments once they fell back to Earth. He came across a mystery. Generally, as you ascend, the temperature drops. But Teisserenc’s instruments were telling him that, beyond seven miles or so, the temperature began to stabilize, and occasionally even rose. He thought that perhaps his thermometers were being affected by the sun; he wrapped them in cork and flew the balloons at night, to no avail. After two years, and similar work by a German scientist, Richard Assmann (who had fancier equipment, including balloons made of rubber), Teisserenc realized that the temperature recordings were accurate, and revealed a boundary between what we today call the troposphere—the first layer of our atmosphere—and the stratosphere, the second layer. Mt. Everest reaches up almost to that boundary, after which the air gets drier and less dense, and warmer again—these conditions prevent the two layers from mixing much.

Another momentous scientific-balloon story: in 1906, a young physicist named Victor Hess made arrangements to go to Berlin, to study optics under a revered professor. Before he arrived, the professor died, of suicide, and Hess ended up in Vienna, studying under an expert in radiation. At the time, most scientists assumed that radiation came only from the Earth itself. But one scientist had measured radiation at the top and the bottom of the Eiffel Tower—and there was more radiation at the top. Another scientist had sunk a measuring device to the bottom of the Bay of Livorno, where he found little radiation. So, in 1912, Hess took flight in a balloon, to measure radiation levels at greater heights. He went up ten times. One of those ascents was during a solar eclipse, to rule out the sun as the source of the radiation. He found that, though radiation initially decreased with height, eventually it began to rise again. After a certain point, the higher the altitude at which measurements were taken, the more radiation was found. The mysterious radiation, he deduced, must be coming from somewhere beyond Earth’s atmosphere. (Later the source of the radiation was found to be cosmic rays.) Hess had to flee Austria, in 1937; his wife was Jewish. He eventually became a professor at Fordham, in New York, and studied radioactive fallout.

I grew up with the sense that a balloon was a rocket for a modest scientist. My mother, who was a computer programmer for the National Severe Storms Laboratory, in Norman, Oklahoma, would sometimes announce that she had to go in to work for a balloon launch, and this made her work seem even more like a game, because the radar installations near the lab were housed in structures that looked like giant golf balls set up on pale-blue tees. I called up my mom’s old boss, the scientist and engineer Dušan Zrnić, to ask about the balloons. “These weren’t operational weather balloons but specialized balloons for coming up with a better way to track balloons,” he said. Doppler weather radar following the balloons, with no additional sophisticated equipment, could determine winds. “You know, balloons are relatively cheap,” he said. “If you want to do soundings with an airplane, that’s going to be much more costly.” He told me that the N.S.S.L. had its own balloons that were used every spring, launched every fifteen minutes into the storms that spawned tornadoes, to gather data both for forecasting and for research on questions about the influence of wind on storm behavior.

NASA also uses balloons, launched into the stratosphere, for research into cosmic questions. One recent NASA experiment set a series of balloons aloft over Albuquerque, one of which was launched with an All-Sky Heliospheric Imager, to get a better view of the winds surrounding and extending from our sun. Another NASA mission will soon send a football-field-sized balloon floating over Antarctica, carrying a telescope to look at the life cycles of stars. Some of the largest balloons can stay aloft for a hundred days—they’re referred to as Pumpkin balloons, since the seams of the material resemble a pumpkin’s ridges. Some of them, as their clear bodies flow upward during launch, look like enormous jellyfish. Sometimes they’re equipped with long, thin vents that hang down like legs. There are dreams of using them to visit other planets; if you were a Martian and saw one of these, you would likely be struck with as much wonder as terror.

That a large orb floating above the landscape is as much a potential weapon as it is a vector of inquiry, or a vision of lighter-than-air beauty, is evident in one of the earliest known balloon stories. Though the date of the “first” hot-air balloons is often tied to eighteenth-century France, there were earlier balloons, broadly defined. During the Three Kingdoms era, in China, from 220 to 280 A.D., Kongming lanterns were used for military signalling. These hot-air balloons, which are still in use today, are ingenious and simple: a candle is lit under a rice-paper bag; the warm air inside the bag carries it aloft. The lanterns were supposedly invented by the statesman Zhuge Liang (also known as Kongming) when he was trapped during a battle, as a way to call for reinforcements. Now they are part of lantern festivals, in China, Taiwan, and elsewhere, and notes, prayers, and worry lists are sometimes attached—with the hope that those wishes will be met, the prayers will be heard, and the worries will fly away.


Rivka Galchen, a staff writer at The New Yorker, has contributed fiction and nonfiction to the magazine since 2008. Her most recent novel is “Everyone Knows Your Mother Is a Witch.”

The New Yorker · by Rivka Galchen · March 4, 2023

16. How We the People Built American English



An interesting weekend read.


Excerpt:


American English doesn’t really need protection. It consumes everything in its reach, while also keeping its flexible structure intact.





How We the People Built American English

After winning their independence, Americans seized the old language and turned it into something dynamic and new—an expression of the country’s diversity

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-we-the-people-built-american-english-ae45a25

By Ilan Stavans

March 3, 2023 10:54 am ET


To create a nation, you need a language. Other ingredients are also required: a territory, a flag, a government, a currency, a postal service and so on. But language is the crux. Without it, you have no conversation.

Of course, new languages don’t emerge from a vacuum. They evolve slowly from other languages, acquiring their own character only after a long process of decantation. George Bernard Shaw once purportedly said that England and the U.S. are separated by a common language. That separation is what American English has achieved, not without pain, over a period spanning more than four centuries.

The language would need to be subverted from within—to give birth to its own new vocabulary—in order to make room for the American revolutionary spirit.

English arrived on American shores with the Pilgrims in 1620. It was the language they used to communicate with one another in their quest for religious freedom. But, inescapably, it was also the language of the persecuting environment from which they fled. Could their new nation achieve its independence with English as its main form of communication?

Nowhere, it seems, not in the Federalist Papers nor in any other historical document, did the founding generation consider the idea of replacing English with another tongue. The language would need to be subverted from within—to give birth to its own new vocabulary—in order to make room for the American revolutionary spirit. But sooner or later, the young republic would thrive in it.

At the same time, for better or worse, the founders never made English official. There is much debate as to why. They may have assumed that, by virtue of its usage, American English would eventually become a social congealer, bringing people together. They may not have imagined the debates over its dilution that would ensue as the country expanded and drew ever more immigrants to its shores, though a version of those arguments can be discerned even among the founders themselves.


Thomas Jefferson believed that innovation gave English its nerve and beauty.

PHOTO: SHUTTERSTOCK

Thomas Jefferson was obsessed with grammar. He wrote treatises comparing English with Greek, Latin and French. And he wrote to friends about the well-being of the language, once stating that he was no friend “to what is called Purism, but a zealous one to the Neology which has introduced these two words without the authority of any dictionary.” Jefferson believed that purists opposed what was most beautiful in a language: its innovative drive. For Jefferson, that drive was what gave English its nerve, its beauty and its copiousness.

Jefferson’s political rival, John Adams, took the side of purism, or authority, arguing for an academy of American English. Many languages vest authority in legislative institutions empowered to safe-keep their health, such as the Académie Française, the Real Academia Española and the Accademia della Crusca. There was no such governing body for English in Adams’s day, nor is there now—neither in the U.S. nor anywhere else where English is used.

Adams worried that the lack of such authority undermined the consistency and panache of American English. “As eloquence is cultivated with more care in free republics than in other governments,” he wrote in “Proposal for an American Language Academy” while on a diplomatic mission to Europe during the Revolutionary War, “it has been found by constant experience that such republics have produced the greatest purity, copiousness and perfection of language.”

A century after Adams, Simon Pokagon, a member of the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and the author of “The Red Man’s Rebuke” in 1893, was among the first indigenous writers in America to fully articulate an argument against the sovereignty of American English. Purity could only come at a price in a polyglot land. Pokagon wrote that when colonizers rejoiced in admiration “over the beauty and grandeur of this young republic,” they ought not to forget that their success came through “the sacrifice of our homes and a once happy race,” as well as of indigenous languages. Approximately three hundred native tongues, from Iroquois to Cherokee, flourished among the population when European settlers arrived and were silenced by the forced internal migration of their speakers.

Approximately three hundred native tongues, from Iroquois to Cherokee, flourished among the population when European settlers arrived and were silenced by the forced internal migration of their speakers.

There would be no Academy of American English, but authority came by other means. Noah Webster was the first to propose an American dictionary reflecting “the parlance of the people.” The result in 1828 was “An American Dictionary of the English Language,” which incorporated new terms—“skunk” and “squash,” for instance—that Americans used. Webster reformed spelling, switching “centre” to “center” and “colour” to “color.” As he stated in his preface, his intention was to look at language as the expression of ideas, “and if the people of one country cannot preserve an identity of ideas, they cannot retain an identity of language.”

Interestingly, and controversially for future generations, Webster defined an American as “a native of America; originally applied to the aboriginals, or copper-colored races, found here by the Europeans; but now applied to the descendants of Europeans born in America.”

When Webster died in 1843 at the age of 84, his dictionary was acquired by a pair of entrepreneurial siblings in Springfield, Mass.: George and Charles Merriam. In time, the Merriams made it stunningly successful, both commercially and in terms of critical reception. Unlike its British counterpart, the Oxford English Dictionary, which depends on a slow-moving cabal of dons at what Matthew Arnold called “the city of dreaming spires,” the Merriam-Webster dictionary is a business, which is to say that it seeks to make a profit—a very American endeavor. It still sells many thousands of copies a year.


PHOTO: DEREK BRAHNEY FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

How Americans should speak was a constant topic throughout the 19th century. One finds arguments in Walt Whitman’s views on American slang, in Lydia Huntley Sigourney’s reflections on “Indian Names” and in Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet’s case for an American variety of sign language.

Perhaps the richest document of the American vernacular from this time is Mark Twain’s “Adventures of Huckleberry Finn,” published in 1884. It is a veritable fountainhead of dialects. Twain tried to give different segments of pre-Civil War society voices that were studiously authentic. At one point, young Huck, unable to reconcile the help he’s giving to his friend Jim (an enslaved man who has run away) with the social expectations of the time, tries to find comfort in prayer but fails: “It warn’t no use to try and hide it from Him. Nor from ME, neither. I knowed very well why [the words] wouldn’t come. It was because my heart warn’t right; it was because I warn’t square; it was because I was playing double.”


Zora Neale Hurston was among the writers who gave voice to the black diaspora of the mid-20th century.

PHOTO: ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION/ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Civil War was a watershed in American linguistic development. During the period that followed, the efforts and refusals to redress the inequities of slavery pushed Black Americans in centrifugal directions. They developed an ethnic parlance that had roots in “Negro spirituals” but was interconnected with different urban scenes. This coincided with the arrival of successive waves of immigrants from poor parts of Europe, including Ireland, Italy and Russia.

Myriad hybrid languages now reshaped the American soundscape and became manifest in the popular culture that the U.S. consumed and exported in the first half of the 20th century. Claude McKay, in his poetry, made Jamaican Creole come alive in American English. Paul Laurence Dunbar, Zora Neale Hurston (“What dat ole forty year ole ’oman doin’ wid her hair swingin’ down her back lak some young gal?”) and James Baldwin added a surfeit of ebullient voices from the Black diaspora. Mary Antin’s memoir “The Promised Land” recounts her odyssey as a Russian girl in Boston learning English.

American English doesn’t really need protection. It consumes everything in its reach, while also keeping its flexible structure intact.

Anti-Italian acrimony and mockery of Italian speech seeped into the press in the early 1920s, surrounding the scapegoating of anarcho-syndicalists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. The lively pidgin spoken by Japanese American soldiers in a division from Hawaii in World War II is featured in Martin Minoru Iida’s lyrics to the war song “Go for Broke.” And Henry Roth, an immigrant from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in his novel “Call It Sleep,” depicts the adventures of a 6-year-old Jewish boy on New York’s Lower East Side, using a Yiddishized English for parts of the narrative: “‘Jost you waid!’ Maxey spat out venomously. ‘Ask me fuh sompt’n youse guys. Bubbikiss you’ll ged!’”

One of the most accomplished—and feisty—chroniclers of the transformation of American English was H.L. Mencken, the irascible Baltimore journalist and editor, who spent a generous portion of his long career examining slangs, accents and localisms in his multivolume 1919 book, “The American Language: An Inquiry into the Development of English in the United States.” Ever-cantankerous, Mencken chronicles the vicissitudes of the language of Irish, Italian, German, Polish and Slavic speakers, among many others. He thoroughly disliked the idea of a prescriptive grammar. In his view, parlance arises in the kitchen, at the bar, on the street—wherever people express themselves freely.


The journalist and editor H.L. Mencken chronicled the transformations of American English in a multivolume book in 1919.

PHOTO: CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRAY/EVERETT COLLECTION

Mencken believed that America’s values—individualism being the most exemplary—and the enormous expanse of its land made American English substantially more complex than British English. Global interaction was vital to that complexity: “A living language,” he posited, “is like a man suffering incessantly from small hemorrhages, and what it needs above all else is constant transactions of new blood from other tongues. The day the gates go up, that day it begins to die.” Counter to Adams’s concern for protecting English from the “barbarians,” Mencken opined that “the notion that anything is gained by fixing a language in a groove is cherished only by pedants.”


Here I should say that I am myself a lover of linguistic pollution. I came to the U.S. from Mexico—and thus to English—in 1985, and I’ve been in awe of the ingenuity of American English speakers ever since. My first exposure to its multifarious character was in the New York City subway, where I attuned my then innocent ear to the intermingling tonalities of a typhoon of tongues. The profusion of sounds hypnotized me. What was the meaning behind it?

It took me a while to reach a conclusion, yet once I did there was no turning back: American English doesn’t really need protection. It consumes everything in its reach, while also keeping its flexible structure intact. Originally a Germanic language spoken by the Angles, Saxons, Jutes and Frisians, and recalibrating itself through encounters with the Normans, the Vikings, the Bretons and the French, it has magisterially expanded its horizons, especially since the 1800s, by going from the British Isles to just about everywhere else.


Mark Twain captured the dialects of pre-Civil War America in “Huckleberry Finn”

PHOTO: GETTY IMAGES

Translation is at the core of the American experiment. To translate is to create bridges, to find common ground, to push beyond one’s own parochialism. It is also, inevitably, about making the U.S. global. Translators are linguistic refreshers: They alert us to etymologies, expand our vocabularies and remind us that we aren’t alone in trying to decipher the universe. Our existence depends on constantly climbing up and down the Tower of Babel.

Yet the history of linguistic xenophobia in America is intense. Propelled by anti-German sentiment during World War I, in 1918 Iowa Gov. William L. Harding forbade people in his state to use any language other than English—even on the telephone. And Teddy Roosevelt, on his deathbed in 1919, announced that there was only one language for Americans and that was the English language. While perhaps not as heated as in the past, such efforts continue to divide America.

Perhaps not incidentally, they come at a time when more non-Americans speak American English than ever before. Though not the language spoken by the most people in the world (Mandarin Chinese wins that distinction), it is unquestionably the most important for business, education, scientific research and entertainment. A global vernacular that is everyone’s favorite “second” language, American English is less grounded—less local—than it used to be. For every native speaker of American English in the world, there are approximately a dozen more non-native American English speakers.

Keeping a syntactic order in place under these circumstances is challenging, and social media has pushed American English into a paroxysmal state. Punctuation is erratic, and spelling is unstable. Brand names, acronyms and texting abbreviations are now an integral part of the language. The LGBTQ movement has succeeded in contesting gender pronouns, such that Merriam-Webster declared “they” the word of the year in 2021, and automatic translation machines, such as Google, deconstruct codes in ways that make English seem frenzied.

Were Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Noah Webster to walk among us again, they might not feel that this is the language they helped to create. Still, if there is a lesson to be learned from history, it is that American English thrives through contradictions.

From the start, this nation’s language has existed in a state of constant innovation. Frank Zappa once said that “all the good music has already been written by people with wigs and stuff,” meaning that it was time to turn ugly music into new good music. In language, the good isn’t the opposite of the bad but simply its companion. American English is of the people, by the people and for the people. It answers only to them.

This essay is adapted from Mr. Stavans’s introduction to a new volume he has edited, “The People’s Tongue: Americans and the English Language,” recently published by Restless Books. He is the Lewis-Sebring Professor of Humanities and Latin American and Latino Culture at Amherst College.


Appeared in the March 4, 2023, print edition as 'How We the People Built American English The Making of the People’s Tongue'.



17. Former NATO chief: ‘There is nothing we cannot overcome as Americans’




Former NATO chief: ‘There is nothing we cannot overcome as Americans’

BY JULIA SHAPERO - 03/05/23 7:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3884566-former-nato-chief-there-is-nothing-we-cannot-overcome-as-americans/?segment=1*ncq62t*s_amp_id*b3BpQjgtQzJDalBoeFZmTGJrcFVGUnh3aWpyNkF3Um9fUnlUQVdfV3lnbkNkSENvSmt6WjVjUmdNc09HMEg1Mg


Former NATO chief James Stavridis on Sunday encouraged Americans to remain optimistic about the state of global affairs, even in the face of “concerning situations” with Russia’s war in Ukraine and tense U.S. relations with China.

“There is nothing we cannot overcome as Americans,” Stavridis said on WABC 770 AM morning show “The Cats Roundtable.”

“We just have to pull together as Americans,” he told host John Catsimatidis. “We’ve got political divisions in the country. We need to pull together. If we do, we can overcome all of these challenges.”

More than a year in, the war in Ukraine continues to rage on. Russia recently launched its long-awaited counteroffensive in eastern Ukraine, sending in tens of thousands of new recruits.

The U.S. and its Western allies have continued to supply Kyiv with increasingly heavy weaponry to support the fight against Russia, most recently several American-made Abrams tanks and German-made Leopard 2 tanks.

U.S.-China relations — which were already tense over Beijing’s threatening stance toward Taiwan and expansion in the South China Sea — has deteriorated in recent weeks over a Chinese surveillance balloon in U.S. airspace and allegations that Beijing is considering providing Russia with lethal aid for its war in Ukraine.

“It’s perfectly understandable that people open up a newspaper, turn on the television, and they see very concerning situations,” Stavridis said. “The war in Ukraine; China on the march in the South China Sea, Iran and North Korea … It’s very concerning.”

He added that there will be a lot of these ups and downs and “tactical flashpoints.”

“But I think strategically the long throw of history is marching along towards a more integrated global economy, toward cooperation,” Stavridis said. 


“And certainly, we will see competition from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, but they don’t have the global economic throw weight to really disrupt the world,” he added.




18. Opinion | Washington has succumbed to dangerous groupthink on China


I guess I am a victim of groupthink. This was my thesis some years ago and I continue to believe it:


China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.



Opinion | Washington has succumbed to dangerous groupthink on China

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · March 3, 2023

We are often told that the United States is deeply divided, that polarization makes it impossible to make any progress in policy, and that our country is so internally conflicted that it cannot project unity and strength to the world. But on the most important foreign policy issue confronting policymakers, the problem is closer to the opposite. Washington has embraced a wide-ranging consensus on China that has turned into a classic example of groupthink.

To watch Tuesday’s hearing of the new House select committee on China was to be transported back to the 1950s. Members of both parties tried to outdo one another in their denunciations of China, describing — as committee chairman Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) did — the Communist Party as an “existential” threat to the United States, and blaming it directly for every problem in America, from drug use to covid-19 to unemployment. (An odd charge since unemployment is currently at its lowest in more than 50 years.)

One could dismiss some of this more extreme rhetoric as the usual congressional grandstanding, but it creates a dynamic that makes rational policy difficult. Consider what happened a few weeks ago. The president of the United States, in what can only be described as a panic, ordered the U.S. military to shoot down three balloons that were probably private weather balloons — similar to hundreds of such objects in the sky around the world — that posed no threat to anyone. The sorts of balloons used by hobbyists and meteorological clubs can cost as little as $12. The missiles used to shoot down the recent offending objects cost more than $400,000 each. The shootdowns were ordered, of course, so that no one could claim Joe Biden was soft on China.

China is a serious strategic competitor, the most significant great-power challenger the United States has faced in many decades. That is all the more reason for Washington to shape a rational and considered foreign policy toward it — rather than one forged out of paranoia, hysteria and, above all, fears of being branded as soft. Whenever policy is made in those latter circumstances, as in the cases of Vietnam or Iraq, it turns out badly. In 2003, when then-Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) tried to make the case for more diplomacy before war with Iraq, then-Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) suggested Daschle was giving comfort to the enemy. The select committee on China spoke of those who dared to suggest improving relations with Beijing in similar terms.

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Six years ago, before Donald Trump came into power, one would have described the U.S.-China relationship as difficult, perhaps even strained — and yet manageable, with regular dialogue between the two nations at the highest levels. When Washington confronted China on certain issues, such as currency manipulation and economic espionage, Beijing would make some effort to address the charges.

Today, U.S.-China relations are a mess. China continues to do things that alarm Washington but there is no discussion between the two sides. Beijing is actively supporting Russia economically and diplomatically in its war in Ukraine. Were that support to expand to include military assistance, Russia would gain an almost unlimited supply of armaments, transforming the war. Then-Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to Taiwan gave the People’s Liberation Army a golden opportunity to practice a multi-day blockade of the island, their most likely military intervention in the event of a crisis. Were current Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) to visit Taiwan, the PLA would likely use it as a pretext to practice a longer and more complete cutoff strategy, showing Taiwan that it could be isolated at will.

Most troubling of all, China has embarked on a serious program of nuclear modernization. For decades, Beijing took the position that its small nuclear arsenal — hovering at just over 200 warheads — was an adequate deterrent. The Chinese also routinely affirmed their “no first use” doctrine.

Today, Beijing’s warhead stockpile is estimated to be over 400, and China is on a path to more than triple that. Meanwhile, Russia has practically abandoned all nuclear arms control talks and treaties with the United States. As I’ve noted before, we face a new nuclear age in which two of the three largest arsenals on the planet are closely allied, with their missiles likely targeting the United States.

How much of this was inevitable? It’s hard to say. China has grown in power mightily since 2000. Back then, it accounted for almost 4 percent of global gross domestic product; today, that figure is about 18 percent. Its military expenditures have grown even faster. Xi Jinping is a far more aggressive leader than his predecessors.

But it is also true that U.S. policy has changed. Today, we have a strong bipartisan view of the allegedly existential danger posed by the Chinese Communist Party, which implies that regime change would be the only solution to this problem. But has this comfortable consensus created a more secure world for Americans (and others)? Or are we moving down a path that takes us toward decades of arms races, crises, perhaps even war?

The Washington Post · by Fareed Zakaria · March 3, 2023




19. Wagner Boss Appears to Issue Veiled Threat to Kremlin in Ominous Video





Wagner Boss Appears to Issue Veiled Threat to Kremlin in Ominous Video

news.yahoo.com · by Allison QuinnMarch 4, 2023, 3:26 PM·3 min read


via Twitter

Just as the Wagner Group appears on track to bring Moscow its first battlefield win in Ukraine in months, founder Yevgeny Prigozhin has released a nearly four-minute video apparently issuing a veiled threat to the Kremlin.

Unlike a video released a day earlier, in which Prigozhin gleefully boasted that Wagner was on the brink of victory in Bakhmut, this time he spoke solemnly in a dark room to warn of the bloody consequences for Russia if his men were to now “retreat.”

“If Wagner retreats from Bakhmut now, the whole front will collapse,” he said.

“The situation will be unpleasant for all military formations protecting Russia’s interests,” he added, claiming the [Russian] army would be “forced to stabilize the front” while “Crimea falls” and there would be “many other cataclysms.”

Predicting that Wagner would be scapegoated for Russia losing the war, he said mercenaries under his command would know exactly who to blame for the betrayal. “And this is exactly the problem with ammunition hunger. … Regular fighters… They will come and say, ‘Boss, could it be that this story is being played up somewhere deep in the Defense Ministry, or maybe higher, in order to explain to the Russian people why we ended up in this trouble? What if they want to set us up and say we are villains, and that’s why we aren’t given ammo and weapons and allowed to reinforce personnel, including convicts?”

Apparently trying to drill home the message that Wagner—and not Russia’s regular army—was the one keeping the Kremlin’s war machine afloat, Prigozhin repeatedly described his mercenaries as the “cement” holding the whole war effort together “at the very top.”

It was not clear if his message was meant as an ultimatum to strong-arm defense officials into sending Wagner the help Prigozhin has repeatedly alleged the Defense Ministry is deliberately withholding. Or if it was simply a demand for the mercenary group to get credit for its ruthless performance on the battlefield.

While Prigozhin is long said to have had President Vladimir Putin’s ear, there have been growing signs in recent weeks that he’s now become a thorn in the Kremlin’s side.

His simmering feud with top Russian military brass erupted last month into him publicly accusing Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov of committing “treason” by trying to “destroy” Wagner, supposedly because they were jealous that the shadowy group had outshined regular troops on the battlefield.

He suggested they were also to blame for Wagner having been sidelined from recruiting convicts for the war effort.

But the Kremlin so far has stood by its own military brass and omitted Wagner from its announcements about the state of the war. And some close to Prigozhin reportedly fear that his power grab might dramatically backfire. One unnamed source in his circle told the Financial Times late last month, “There’s a risk he could end up like Icarus.”

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news.yahoo.com · by Allison QuinnMarch 4, 2023, 3:26 PM·3 min read











De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."


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