Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:


"Most of us spend too much time on the last twenty-four hours and too little on the last six thousand years."
- Will Durant

“It is always the herd men who win battles and the free men who win wars.”
- John Steinbeck, The Moon is Down

"My idea was that the role of the special forces were to train Vietnamese to behave as guerrillas, harassing the supply lines down through the mountains of the, ah, the Viet Cong. And the special American special forces were to train their special forces to do that."
- Roger Hilsman




1. Untangling the Gordian Knot that is Irregular Warfare

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 8, 2023

3. Exposing the Chinese Spy Balloon Fleet

4. In Its Push for an Intelligence Edge, China’s Military Turned to Balloons

5. Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward

6.  Out of Alignment - What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Non-Western Powers

7. How a band of Ukraine civilians helped seal Russia's biggest defeat

8. Ukraine Can Achieve a Strategic Win over Russia. The West Must Step Up

9. What Russia Got Wrong

10. China's Spy Balloon Proves the U.S. Homeland Is Vulnerable

11. New Futures Command chief shifts main effort to designing Army of 2040

12. The Somme in the Sky: Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian Air War

13. Why it’s time to control the donkey trade

14. SpaceX didn't intend that Starlink be 'weaponized' by Ukraine: Shotwell






1. Untangling the Gordian Knot that is Irregular Warfare


An important read and contribution to the IW discussion from one of our most experienced practitioners in IW and unconventional warfare.


Thu, 02/09/2023 - 8:50am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/untangling-gordian-knot-irregular-warfare

Untangling the Gordian Knot that is Irregular Warfare

 

By Mark Grdovic

 

"All the revision in the world will not save a bad first draft: for the architecture of the thing comes, or fails to come, in the first conception, and revision only affects the detail and ornament, alas!”

 

T.E. Lawrence

 

As 2023 begins, the U.S. military finds itself addressing how it will institutionalize the topic of Irregular Warfare (IW). There is no shortage of speeches, articles and documents that extol the importance of the topic to the National Defense Strategy and its related concepts. While this sounds completely appropriate, there is a problem. The U.S. military has been in this position before, multiple times.  In 2009, I wrote an article as part of an introduction for an IW conference at Ft Bragg in which I said, “In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the U.S. military experienced a revival of interest in irregular warfare, or IW, similar to the one that is occurring today. In both of the previous periods, the topic enjoyed a celebrity-like popularity in professional military forums until such time that circumstances allowed it to be relegated back to the margins in favor of a return to proper soldiering. Both previous revivals produced high-quality doctrine and curriculum in professional-education courses. So why, then, did IW fail to become ingrained as part of the military mainstream?’[1]  It feels like little has changed since that time other than to add one more period of interest.

This raises the logical question, why did the three previous periods of enthusiasm fail to take root?[2] How a topic is framed is critical to its clarity and subsequent acceptance within an organizational culture. Without clarity, the topic is immediately susceptible to misinterpretation, competitive bias and inaccurate categorization. For example, during the height of the Global War on Terror (circa 2010), IW became a polarizing topic, dividing skeptics and advocates. Skeptics clung to the flawed notion that training for high intensity conflict by default prepares you for all lesser forms of combat or how this niche discipline was pulling scant resources from the more important endeavors, thereby degrading the overall capability of the force. Conversely, advocates condescendingly spoke of IW as the “advanced” or “graduate” form of warfare, routinely implying that its complexity was beyond the comprehension of “regular soldiers”. Both positions were then and are still, self-defeating arguments. 

While there is and has been a definition for IW for the last decade[3], it seems like the term is used with an increasingly casual regularity and often in an imprecise manner, both of which start to undermine the potential value and credibility of the term.  The term is routinely used to convey an environment or portion of the conflict spectrum, some type of strategy (for warfare) or as a synonym for a variety of special operations involving indigenous forces. A common theme often heard in the last few years was that the Force was too focused on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and needs to refocus on Irregular Warfare. This is a particularly confusing pairing given the description of IW as including counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) as part of its five core functions. So, what exactly would this IW refocus entail? 

The current definition for Irregular Warfare (IW) is defined as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.”[4]  Instinctively, this seems close enough to fulfill the requirements for a definition, but upon closer scrutiny fails to provide the required clarity. By defining IW in this way, it introduces two subtle aspects that start to cloud the topic. The first of these is the implication that both parties are engaged in “irregular warfare” (aka a violent a struggle), implying that the actions of both sides are variants of the same irregular activities, making it more of an environment in which this type of warfare occurs, than a clearly definable activity (or strategy). 

It makes sense that the military planners, indoctrinated to the concept of Traditional Warfare, would be inclined to define IW this way. In Traditional Warfare, the two participants are essentially applying variants of the same activities or tactics against each other to gain an advantage. The one who can do this better, generally prevails over the other (whether they applied a better strategy, performed better tactically, had an advantage of terrain and resource or some combination). As a result, it can be described or thought of as an environment without significant decrement to the clarity of the topic. 

 

However, with Irregular Warfare, the participants, for the most part, are not applying variants of the same tactics. The actions of the recipient (or host nation) are generally speaking, not “irregular” in nature.  By seeking a single description to accurately encompass or define both sides of this “struggle” begins to inaccurately frame the topic.  As is often the case with imprecise definitions, a heavy emphasis is placed on the follow-on paragraphs to provide amplifying clarity. Under the current definition (and description), five core activities are identified, the predominance of which are in fact counteractivities. This raises the question if the five core activities (FID, UW, CT, COIN and Stability Operations) are IW in of themselves and is it useful to categories them as such?  This would be akin to including Law Enforcement as core activity under a description of Criminal Activity. This grouping of types of operations starts to overshadow the actual definition (and associated clarity) causing the term to devolve to a disparate collection of tactics without context. Subsequently, the requirement to understand the approach or strategy that is IW is minimized if not eliminated. 

 

The second aspect previously mentioned, is the fact that the only remaining defining criteria is “the pursuit of legitimacy and influence over the population” as the sole defining characteristic and an irregular activity.  Gaining legitimacy and influence with the population is without question, a critical aspect within this “struggle”, but it is not a defining characteristic of Irregular Warfare (although this is debatable depending on the reader’s perspective whether the term denotes an environment, strategy or grouping of tactical operations).  As with other forms of warfare, the core defining characteristic is a description of a specific approach to defeating an adversary and not merely specific actions. For example, Traditional Warfare isn’t defined by the seizure of key terrain (as relevant and fundamental as this may be). From this perspective, defining IW as a “struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population” is defining it by its Ways, without consideration of the Ends. 

 

It’s also worth noting there is another definition for Irregular Warfare in legislation, specifically section 1202 of the 2018 National Defense Authorization act (NDAA) which created fiscal authorities to support Irregular Warfare activities.  While these authorities have provided a very useful capability, the associated wording further clouds the discussion somewhat depicting IW as a series of specific activities.  “this same concern is evident in the definition of irregular warfare that Congress included in Sec. 1202. This describes irregular warfare as ‘activities in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.’ This definition is not contained anywhere in DoD doctrine, and it presents a highly idiosyncratic conception of irregular warfare that is wholly unique to the statute. Because the statute’s definition of irregular warfare discusses support to “foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals”—i.e., anyone—who participate in a competition between “state and non-state actors”—i.e., any entity—the phrasing adds virtually nothing of value when trying to determine what a traditional armed conflict might be”.[5]  The description associated with this legislation frames IW as activities. This is the type of wording that eventually leads military members to start inappropriately using the term as a mission statement task, something that plagued the Army Special Forces community for decades prior to the adoption of the current definition of Unconventional Warfare in 2011. 

In 2008 I found myself participating in a workshop to define the topic of Irregular Warfare as part of the development of the soon to be published Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept (JOC). One of the international participants, expressed frustration with how the proposed definition was starting to take shape and stated that he didn’t think his country would support the concept because the vast majority of the military’s actions would be categorized as “irregular”. At the time, I offered an alternative construct for consideration. My suggestion was favorably accepted by the group but as pointed out by one of the moderators, “we are too far along in the concept to reconsider the definition.” Regrettably, one of the conclusions of the JOC was that defining the topic was difficult and messy.”[6] 

 

The concept I recommended at the time was that Irregular Warfare is a methodology of waging warfare that degrades an opponent’s resolve, legitimacy or capabilities while simultaneously mitigating their strengths and avoiding direct conflict. This is accomplished through indirect or unattributable attacks that limit the recipient’s ability to respond.   The associated activities are generally carried out by some variety of irregular forces. Many of the associated activities are not considered acceptable forms of warfare by international law and norms. It includes insurrection, terrorism, and subversion. IW can be waged by a state or nonstate entity, as an independent strategy or in some combination with traditional warfare. Historically speaking, IW is a much slower approach, often at higher cost in human life, with a lower probability of success compared to traditional warfare. Simply put, most participants aren’t waging IW because it’s a superior form of warfare or their preferred option but rather their only viable option.  

In this context, Irregular Warfare is not some amorphous environment in which this “struggle” takes place. It is a specific approach to waging war by one side. Nations counter the threats posed from IW by conducting COIN, CT, FID, Stability Operations and Information Operations as well as the full spectrum of normal (regular) governance and security functions (law enforcement activities, defensive cyber, counter threat finance, counter propaganda, etc.). These tactical operations are already well defined and shared as a responsibility across the entire military force. It is debatable what is the value added or need to further categorize these types of operations under an umbrella term.[7] 

 

In rare cases, the United States military may engage in limited forms of IW, when deemed legally acceptable[8] and appropriate to support its national security objectives, such as support to insurgencies and resistance movements (aka Unconventional Warfare or UW). For the most part, waging Irregular Warfare is largely limited within DoD to the special operations community. In these cases, any such activities would be governed by and conducted in accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict.

For this construct to make sense, there are several other definitions which would require revision as part of this broader concept.

Irregular Warfare – A methodology of waging warfare that degrades an opponent’s resolve, legitimacy or capabilities while simultaneously mitigating their strengths and avoiding direct conflict. The associated activities are generally carried out by some variety of irregular forces.

Insurgency and Resistance. The definition for Insurgency was refined out of decades of counterinsurgency efforts, while the term for Resistance Movements has predominantly been a topic of interest within the special operations community. 

 

Current Definitions

 

Insurgency - The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-24)

 

Resistance movement — An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability. (JP 3-05)

 

The current definitions do not provide clarity for the user. As a result, it is not uncommon to see both terms used in military, academic and public forums, in an imprecise or contradictory manner. Although the concepts are very similar, there are some important distinctions (for military professionals), and they should not be used interchangeably. While it is worth noting, that there is ample academic material to support any contention, from the U.S. military perspective, the term insurgency is an appropriate single overarching generic term for the conduct of insurrections (to include resistance movements). However, there is also value in distinguishing Insurgency as a movement that forms and revolts against the indigenous government and a Resistance Movement as a movement that forms in response to an external occupier.

Recommended Revisions

Resistance Movement — An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist an occupying military power. (the words legally established government have been deleted)

Resistance – Activities conducted by a resistance movement to disrupt, coerce, or defeat an occupying military power.

It is worth noting, these terms are also often used to convey a more positive or negative image, regardless of their correct technical categorization (“resistance movement” being the more positive and “insurgent” being the more negative connotation). Military planners and practitioners need to understand and accept this nuance and demonstrate some mental flexibility when speaking internally to peers and externally in a public civilian forum.  

Unconventional Warfare is defined as “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area”.  

It is important for planners to understand, despite the English grammatical wording, this term denotes a specific type of special operations and not “all things not conventional” (as an academic might use it). It is the U.S. military’s mechanism to conduct operations in support of resistance efforts. It is not synonymous with “resistance” in the same manner that Foreign Internal Defense or FID is not synonymous with counterinsurgency; they are the U.S. military efforts to enable these operations. It is critical that planners and operational personnel understand this distinction in order to ensure the topic remains linked with the critical requisite professional knowledge required for this very unique type of special operations. When the term is used imprecisely or loosely to denote any special forces operations or “irregular warfare”, it risks becoming decoupled from that knowledge and its relative value within the DoD.

Support to Resistance or STR was introduced as a new term in 2009, in an effort to capture the broader U.S. government contributions to a military operation to support a resistance movement. It became evident that several components within the U.S. Government have important contributions to make in this type of effort. However, categorizing these non-DoD efforts as “warfare” was deemed undesirable and inappropriate. While no official definition has been adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense or Interagency, the term is fairly clear by the obvious English grammatical definition. However, the topic has become embroiled in confusion since the publishing of the Army’s ATP 3-18.1 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (Mar 2019), that defines it as a U.S. government policy option and describes five varieties, with include resistance to terrorism and insurgencies (otherwise known as COIN and CT).[9]

Recommend the Army doctrine related to STR be rescinded and/or revised. Adopt a definition of STR as the USG activities to provide a wide range of support to designated resistance efforts. DoD should not try to doctrinally define these non-DoD efforts, but rather recognize their existence and the requirement to ensure concepts and operational efforts remain nested and integrated other U.S. interagency efforts.

Current Definitions

Support to Resistance – A United States Government policy option to support foreign resistance actors that offers an alternative to a direct U.S. military intervention or formal political engagement in a conflict. Also called STR. (ATP 3-18.1)

Recommended Definition

Support to Resistance - denotes the broader U.S. Government activities to support designated resistance efforts.

Irregular Forces. The current Army definition significantly limits who are considered irregular forces. Irregular forces, such as civilian militias (which are a formal part of the nation’s internal security forces) play an important role in mobilizing the population during counterinsurgency (COIN) and foreign internal defense (FID).[10] Working with these types of forces requires unique skills and experience, not normally resident in traditional military advisors and should be reflected in Army and SOF doctrine as a unique special operations contribution during COIN and FID.

 

Current Army Definition

Irregular Forces - Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces (FM 3-07).

 

Recommended Revision

Irregular Forces - Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the recognized regular armed forces or state security force.

Special Warfare. Special Warfare is a term that was popularized in the 1960s, specifically with the establishment of the Army’s Special Warfare Center and School in 1960 (now know known as the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School). Originally the term was defined as “the term used by the U.S. Army to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and psychological operations.[11]  The new Special Warfare center served as a centralized repository intended to institutionalize the education and training of U.S. Army and allied personnel in this discipline. Since its inception, the term Special Warfare has evolved to become essentially synonymous with special operations.[12] Subsequently, there is no need to conflate the term Special Warfare with Irregular Warfare other than to define Special Warfare “as the application and integration of special operations during the conduct of warfare”. 

Conclusion

Regardless of any potential merits, it’s easy to imagine the likely resistance that would accompany this concept, especially considering the significant Irregular Warfare branding that has already occurred, despite the lack of clarity. There are directorates, centers of excellence, doctrine, educational programs, and legislation, all inextricably tied to various interpretations of Irregular Warfare. In the wake of the overwhelming number of competing initiatives, clarity and utility are accepted as a given, and the cycle of boom and bust, as described in the 2018 NDS continues.  The words of the conference moderator from 2008, that I mentioned previously, come to mind, “we are too far along to make changes”. Is Irregular Warfare a strategy, a portion of the conflict continuum or just a grouping of activities? The Department of Defense will never achieve their desired results for this topic while these competing ambiguous concepts coexist.  

By framing Irregular Warfare as a specific approach to imposing one’s will against an opponent, it immediately starts to frame the reader’s understanding more clearly. It would untangle the topic from the various core (tactical) activities and places a greater focus on understanding the strategy before defaulting to the tactics required to counter it. It presents the topic, not as a niche industry for a select few to rally around, but in a manner that translates into a threat to the national security objectives. Subsequently, military planners at all levels, have a fundamental responsibility to understand this topic and the associated threat. Perhaps most importantly, it would finally provide a clear construct that would serve as a foundation for the required advocacy within the Department of Defense and enable the supporting range of useful doctrine, education, training and operational concepts that will rely on and evolve from this concept.

 

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

 

 

 

 [1] Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare, Mark Grdovic, Special Warfare Magazine, 30 Nov 2009.

 

[2] In the 1960s, the terms Irregular Warfare and Special Warfare were both popular until the end of the war in Vietnam. In the 1980s, the term Low Intensity Conflict or LIC gained popularity, only to die a quiet death with the end of the Cold War and victory in the Gulf War. In the 1990s, the term Operations Other than War or OOTW gained little popularity. The post 9/11 2001 timeframe saw a resurgence of Irregular Warfare as a term, which suffered a similar fate to its Vietnam predecessor as the war in Iraq came to an ignominious end. During an attempt to revitalize the effort with the 2018 NDAA IW Annex, the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 further complicated the topic.

 

[3] The Army has gone through three definitions for IW in the last 10 years. In 2014 the Army definition was “A broad form of conflicts in which insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare are the principal activities (FM 3-0)”. For a few years, the Army maintained the same definition as the current Joint IW definition. Recently the Army adopted the following IW definition - The overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.

 

[4] As defined in the 2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operation Concept (IWJOC) and later codified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

 

[5] By, With, And Through: Section 1202 and the Future of Unconventional Warfare, Major Christopher B. Rich, Jr., Captain Charles B. Johnson, and Major Paul T. Shirk, Pg 570-571

[6] “IW is a complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous social phenomenon that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition.”, U.S. DoD Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 2008.

 

[7] If a need to capture or categorize these activities was desired, the term Special Warfare meets the requirement more accurately.

 

[8] Legally acceptable can include a degree of plausible deniability that makes the act legally risk acceptable within the states own national standards. 

 

[9] Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, ATP 3-18.1, March 2019, Ch 3., Section 3, pgs. 3-21 through 3-27.

 

[10] Examples of Irregular Forces in support of FID or COIN include the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) in Vietnam, the Sons of Iraq in Iraq and the Village Stability Operations (VSO) in Afghanistan. While still defensive in nature, these types of forces play an important role in Irregular Warfare.

 

[11] FM 31-20 Special Forces Operations, 1961

 

[12] Special warfare – The execution of capabilities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment. (ADP 3-05). Special Operations – Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk. (JP 3-05) Referenced in ADP 3-05).

 

 

 

 

 


About the Author(s)


Mark Grdovic

Mark Grdovic retired as an Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel in 2012. He has served with 10th SFG(A), 5th SFG(A), the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, USASOC, the White House Military Office and SOCCENT. His service includes multiple deployments to Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and various crisis response operations in Africa. Since his retirement, he has worked as a Strategic Planner at U.S. CENTCOM and an adjunct faculty member and course director for the Joint Unconventional Warfare Course at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU). He is currently the Senior International SOF Advisor within the USSOCOM J3-International Division.










2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 8, 2023


Maps/graphics: https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2023


Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast.
  • The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun, even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains.
  • Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia command reportedly assumed control over a Russian artillery battalion, likely in support of an effort to strengthen degraded DNR forces ahead of an imminent Russian offensive.
  • The reported subordination of Russian mobilized personnel to DNR formations could also suggest that Russian military command may be continuing efforts to integrate ad hoc DNR and Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) formations into the Russian Armed Forces, but will likely face significant difficulties.
  • Russian officials continue to propose measures to prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while also likely setting further conditions for sanctions evasion.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and continued making tactical advances.
  • Russian forces continued offensive actions northwest of Svatove and intensified offensive operations near Kreminna.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continue small-scale skirmishes and reconnaissance activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the Kinburn Spit.
  • The Wagner Group is reportedly resorting to more coercive tactics in its prison recruitment campaign, possibly in response to the campaign’s declining effectiveness.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, FEBRUARY 8, 2023

Feb 8, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark

February 8, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast. The pace of Russian operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in western Luhansk Oblast has increased markedly over the past week, and Russian sources are widely reporting that conventional Russian troops are attacking Ukrainian defensive lines and making marginal advances along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, particularly northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk and west of Kreminna.[1] Geolocated combat footage has confirmed Russian gains in the Dvorichne area northwest of Svatove.[2] Russian military command additionally appears to have fully committed elements of several conventional divisions to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, as ISW previously reported.[3] Elements of several regiments of the 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) and a regiment of the 90th Tank Division (Central Military District), supported by elements of the 76th Airborne Division and unspecified Southern Military District elements, are conducting offensive operations along the entire Svatove-Kreminna line and are reportedly advancing against Ukrainian defenses.[4]

The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun, even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains. The Russian offensive likely has not yet reached its full tempo; Russian command has not yet committed elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District), which deployed to Luhansk Oblast in January after deploying to Belarus.[5] Russian forces are gradually beginning an offensive, but its success is not inherent or predetermined. While Russian forces in Luhansk Oblast now have the initiative (in that Russian forces are setting the terms of battle, ending the period of Ukrainian initiative from August 2022), the full commitment of these forces could lead to their eventual culmination along the Svatove-Kreminna line without achieving their objectives of capturing all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. That culmination would likely provide a window of opportunity for Ukrainian forces to exploit with their own counteroffensive.[6]

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia command reportedly assumed control over a Russian artillery battalion, likely in support of an effort to strengthen degraded DNR forces ahead of an imminent Russian offensive. A Russian source published a video appeal from mobilized personnel of the 640th howitzer battalion from Saratov Oblast on February 8 in which they stated that Russian military officials sent them to join DNR units and that DNR commanders are now trying to transfer them to infantry assault units.[7] ISW has not previously observed Russian personnel subordinated to a DNR formation and this claim, if true, would suggest that Russian forces may be reinforcing degraded DNR formations with mobilized personnel from Russia itself because DNR formations are unable to replenish losses themselves. The reported subordination of Russian military personnel to DNR formations may portend a Russian effort to prepare DNR formations for an expanded role in their zone of responsibility along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and the transfer of remaining conventional Russian forces from this area to the Bakhmut area and Luhansk Oblast, where Russian forces are conducting an increased pace of offensive operations.

The reported subordination of Russian mobilized personnel to DNR formations could also suggest that Russian military command may be continuing efforts to integrate ad hoc DNR and Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) formations into the Russian Armed Forces, but will likely face significant difficulties. The Russian Southern Military District formally controls the armed forces of the DNR and LNR through the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, respectively. However, many DNR and LNR formations remain ad hoc units and are not fully integrated into Russian MoD structures. ISW previously assessed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be rushing to integrate irregular conventional forces into a more traditional structure and may be creating new formations from DNR/LNR units in support of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s proposals to create new maneuver divisions.[8] Russian forces would likely need to temporarily remove these irregular forces from frontline positions to integrate them into new Russian formations, a prospect that would not be operationally sound ahead of increased Russan offensive operations in Ukraine. Russian officials therefore may be attempting to gradually integrate these irregular formations through subordinating mobilized personnel under them without disrupting the command structures and existing personnel operating at front line positions. The mobilized personnel of the 640th howitzer battalion claimed that DNR command is retraining assault units for artillery purposes yet still committing their artillery battalion to infantry roles, indicating a breakdown in command and the proper utilization of personnel among DNR formations.[9] The Russian MoD will likely struggle to correct the poor effectiveness of DNR/LNR forces through the rapid integration of Russian personnel.

Russian officials continue to propose measures to prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while also likely setting further conditions for sanctions evasion. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on February 8 that the Russian government will subsidize investment projects for the modernization of enterprises operating in the interests of the Russian military and will allocate significant funds for manufacturing new military equipment.[10] Mishustin also stated that the Russian government would extend benefits to Russian entrepreneurs who support the Russian military, including extended payment periods on rented federal property.[11] The Kremlin likely intends these measures to augment its overarching effort to gradually prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while avoiding a wider economic mobilization that would create further domestic economic disruptions and corresponding discontent.[12]

Russian officials also likely proposed these measures in coordination with a recent decree excluding Russian officials from requirements to list income declarations and proposals to repeal federal procurement procedures. The Kremlin may be creating a system of subsidies and benefits designed to have little oversight or accounting. This lack of oversight and accounting would likely allow Russian firms to better evade international sanctions regimes targeting Russia’s military industry.[13] The United Kingdom announced a new list of sanctioned entities on February 8 focused on Russia’s military industry.[14] ISW previously reported that 82% of Iranian-made drones downed in Ukraine had chips, semiconductors, and other components from the United States, suggesting that Russia and Iran are likely exploiting loopholes to transfer Western-produced arms components to Russia via proxy actors.[15] The Kremlin’s effort to prepare the Russian military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine in part relies on the ability of Russian military industry to have consistent access to multiple secure supply chains of key foreign components that it otherwise cannot produce.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces have regained the initiative in Ukraine and have begun their next major offensive in Luhansk Oblast.
  • The commitment of significant elements of at least three major Russian divisions to offensive operations in this sector indicates the Russian offensive has begun, even if Ukrainian forces are so far preventing Russian forces from securing significant gains.
  • Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia command reportedly assumed control over a Russian artillery battalion, likely in support of an effort to strengthen degraded DNR forces ahead of an imminent Russian offensive.
  • The reported subordination of Russian mobilized personnel to DNR formations could also suggest that Russian military command may be continuing efforts to integrate ad hoc DNR and Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) formations into the Russian Armed Forces, but will likely face significant difficulties.
  • Russian officials continue to propose measures to prepare Russia’s military industry for a protracted war in Ukraine while also likely setting further conditions for sanctions evasion.
  • Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and continued making tactical advances.
  • Russian forces continued offensive actions northwest of Svatove and intensified offensive operations near Kreminna.
  • Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and western Donetsk Oblast.
  • Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continue small-scale skirmishes and reconnaissance activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the Kinburn Spit.
  • The Wagner Group is reportedly resorting to more coercive tactics in its prison recruitment campaign, possibly in response to the campaign’s declining effectiveness.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts);
  • Russia Subordinate Main Effort #1—Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1- Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

ISW continues to assess the current Russian most likely course of action (MLCOA) is an imminent offensive effort in Luhansk Oblast and is therefore adjusting the structure of the daily campaign assessments. We will no longer include the Eastern Kharkiv and Western Luhansk Oblast area as part of Ukrainian counteroffensives and will assess this area as a subordinate part of the Russian main effort in Eastern Ukraine. The assessment of Luhansk Oblast as part of the Russian main effort does not preclude the possibility of continued Ukrainian counteroffensive actions here or anywhere else in theater in the future. ISW will report out on Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts as they occur.

Russian forces continued offensive actions northwest of Svatove on February 8. Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov reported on February 8 that Russian forces are increasing their presence northwest of Svatove in the Kupyansk and Dvorichna areas.[16] A former Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) deputy claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing 7km from the Kupyansk area, likely referring to areas near Synkivka, which Russian sources claimed Russian forces captured on February 6.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack near Novoselivske, about 15km northwest of Svatove.[18] Former Russian militant commander and nationalist milblogger Igor Girkin denied that Russian forces have made any significant territorial gains in Kharkiv Oblast, particularly in the Kupyansk direction, as of February 8.[19]

Russian forces also reportedly intensified offensive operations in the Kreminna area. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 8 that there has been a ”maximum escalation” in the Kreminna direction and that Russian forces are attempting to break through Ukrainian defenses in this area.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces attacked near Chervonopopivka (5km north of Kreminna).[21] Several Russian milbloggers circulated unconfirmed footage of unspecified Central and Western Military District elements which crossed the Zherebets River running north to south in western Luhansk Oblast, roughly parallel to the Svatove-Kreminna line) and captured Ukrainian positions in an unspecified location around February 6.[22] Russian sources also reported that elements of the 3rd Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) are approaching the Zherebets River and are threatening Ukrainian positions in the area.[23] A prominent Russian milblogger posted footage of the 59th Tank Regiment of the 144th Motor Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) attacking towards Torske (13km west of Kreminna) and claimed the unit pushed Ukrainian forces back to secondary lines of defense.[24]

Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kreminna on February 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian troops attacked near Shepilove (7km south of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[25] Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that elements of the Chechen ”Akhmat” special forces and 2nd Brigade of the Luhansk People’s Republic 2nd Army Corps captured Ukrainian positions near Berestove, 30km south of Kreminna.[26] Russian forces appear to be pushing northeast of the Bakhmut area towards Siversk (17km southwest of Kreminna) to provide a supporting line of advance to the likely main Russian push directly westward toward Kreminna.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and continued making tactical advances on February 8. Geolocated footage posted between February 4 and 8 confirms that Russian forces have made marginal advances north of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and Zaliznyanske (10km north of Bakhmut), in the Stupky area of northern Bakhmut, and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske.[27] Russian forces are visually confirmed to be within 2.5 km of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (30km northeast), Fedorivka (15km northeast), Spirne (27km northeast), and Vymika (20km northeast); north of Bakhmut near Paraskoviivka (5km north) and Krasna Hora (4km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest) and Dubovo-Vasylivka (7km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Chasiv Yar (10km west).[29] The Ukrainian General Staff’s report that Russian forces are attacking towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka is consistent with geolocated combat footage and indicates that Russian forces seek to encircle Bakhmut by cutting off Ukrainian forces’ access to the E40. Similarly, the report of a Russian attack on Chasiv Yar indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced closer to the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway southwest of Bakhmut. Russian sources claimed that Wagner Group fighters took control of Krasna Hora and are fighting northeast of Bakhmut.[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Wagner Group forces established fire control over a section of the T0504 highway between Stupochky and Ivanivske.[31]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on February 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka, north of Avdiivka near Kamianka, and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Vodyane, Pervomaiske, and Krasnohorivka.[32] Former Russian officer and prominent milblogger Igor Girkin claimed that Russian forces did not advance near Avdiivka and took heavy losses.[33] Another milblogger claimed that fighting is ongoing in western Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and that unspecified elements of the Southern Military District (SMD) advanced through urban areas of Marinka on February 8.[34] The milblogger also stated that Russian forces were able to gain a foothold in positions near a tire repair plant in Marinka.[35] Videos posted by milbloggers on February 8 reportedly show SMD tank units attacking a Ukrainian position in Marinka and Russian tanks operating in western Marinka.[36] Former Deputy LNR Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev posted a video on February 8 purportedly showing Russian elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, SMD) attacking Marinka and claimed that Russian forces had cleared all Ukrainian fortifications there.[37] The deployment of valuable Russian conventional military units (as opposed to DNR proxy forces) in the area is notable, if confirmed. Girkin, however, claimed that the situation in Marinka has not changed and continues at a sluggish pace.[38]

Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on February 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bohoyavlenka (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[39] Russian sources made conflicting claims about the status of operations in this area. One milblogger claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City), while other milbloggers stated that there is no active fighting in the area.[40] Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Vuhledar and inflicted heavy losses.[41] Odesa Military Administration Spokesman Serhiy Bratchuk shared a video on February 8 of Ukrainian forces attacking and halting a disorganized Russian mechanized column near Vuhledar.[42]



Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued small scale skirmishes and reconnaissance activity in the Dnipro River delta and on the Kinburn Spit on February 8. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces are using small boats to try to maintain a presence on islands in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City and that Ukrainian forces have deployed long-range artillery to strike several Russian outposts on the islands.[43] The UK MoD reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces have likely deployed small groups on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast, aiming to control the Dnipro Gulf.[44] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk previously stated that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta as part of an information operation to create a perceived threat against Kherson City.[45]

Russian forces continue to construct defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery collected between January 26 and February 7 shows Russian forces expanding trench and field fortifications near Tarasivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] Russian forces likely constructed these fortifications to further strengthen Russian positions along the T0401 highway between Polohy and Tokmak. Russian forces are likely establishing long defensive lines along critical grounds lines of communication (GLOCs) in Zaporizhia Oblast in preparation to defend against possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Zaporizhia frontline. However, ISW has not observed Russian forces constructing defenses intended to halt a cross-country Ukrainian attack on a large front, and defensive positions remain limited to main roads.

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv Oblasts on February 8.[47] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kherson City and in the vicinity of Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[48]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian officials continued attempts to extend social benefits held by regular Russian servicemembers to volunteer formations serving in Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated on February 8 that the Russian government has prepared new measures to support volunteers, including increasing pensions and social assistance payments related to injuries and disabilities.[49] The Russian State Duma is reportedly drafting a bill to include provisions against discrediting volunteer detachments assisting the Russian military in Ukraine, as Wagner Group Financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously demanded.[50] The Kremlin is likely pursuing efforts to more formally recognize volunteer formations in order to mitigate continued criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) over the unclear status of volunteer formations.[51]

The Wagner Group is reportedly resorting to more coercive tactics in its campaign to recruit prisoners, possibly in response to declining numbers of recruits since autumn 2022. Independent Russian outlet Agentstvo reported on February 8 that Russian lawyers and human rights activists stated that Wagner Group representatives and Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Federal Security Service (FSB) officials are threatening prisoners in Samara and Rostov oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and the North Caucasus with new criminal cases if they refuse to volunteer with the Wagner Group in Ukraine.[52] One of the lawyers reportedly stated that fewer convicts have agreed to volunteer with the Wagner Group in an unspecified recent period because of information about its high casualties, supporting ISW’s previous assessment that Russian convicts’ resistance may have caused a decline in the Wagner Group’s prison recruitment campaign.[53] The Wagner Group will likely continue these more coercive practices as it seeks to replenish its forces in Ukraine with more convict recruits following months of highly attritional human wave attacks in eastern Ukraine.

Russian officials continue to promote incremental efforts to fix longstanding personnel issues associated with mobilization. Russian Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council (and head of the mobilization working group) Andrey Turchak claimed that the mobilization working group has received appeals from 22,000 Russian servicemembers and their family members since holding its first meeting on December 29, 2022, addressing issues like the incorrect accrual of payments and the wrongful mobilization of fathers with many children who should be exempt.[54] Turchak stated that the working group has heavily focused on solving poor recordkeeping issues through efforts to digitize military registration information from military recruitment offices.[55] Turchak claimed that the working group sent a report to Russian President Vladimir Putin with recommendations to establish comprehensive rehabilitation centers, a minimum set of measures to support family members, a reduced term for recognizing a Russian soldier as missing, and a guarantee for receiving pensions.[56] These proposals and efforts are likely meant primarily to placate ultranationalist figures that criticized the numerous issues associated with mobilization and hedge against further domestic discontent ahead of a likely second wave of mobilization.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities are continuing efforts to increase connectivity between Russia and southern Ukraine. Kherson Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed on February 8 that Russian occupation authorities have approved design and research works on a new highway that will run from Crimea, north of the Sea of Azov, to Rostov-on-Don, Russia.[57] Saldo also claimed that the construction of a new town in the Arabat Spit in northeast Crimea has begun.[58] ISW has previously assessed that Russian occupation authorities likely seek to increase the population in the deep rear of occupied territories to strengthen production capabilities and support logistics related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[59]

Russian occupation authorities continue to lean on patronage-like partnerships with Russian federal subjects to restore infrastructure in occupied territories. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on February 8 that he held a meeting with Sakhalin Oblast Governor Valery Limarenko in which they discussed Sakhalin Oblast’s plans to help repair kindergartens, stadiums, schools, and playgrounds in occupied Shakhtarsk, Donetsk Oblast.[60] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik held a meeting with Voronezh Oblast Governor Aleksandr Gusev on February 8 during which Gusev claimed that Voronezh Oblast hopes to develop occupied Luhansk Oblast to not only extract raw materials, but also to develop a processing industry.[61] Gusev claimed that Voronezh Oblast will double the amount of aid it previously provided occupied Luhansk Oblast in 2022 to bring living standards in occupied Luhansk Oblast to those of Russia’s “national” level.[62]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.)

Belarusian airborne forces may be conducting tactical force-on-force exercises with Russian airborne elements in Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense announced on February 8 that unspecified airborne infantry companies — likely of the Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade — conducted a force-on-force company tactical exercise at the Brest Training Ground, emphasizing using unmanned aerial vehicles, urban warfare, small unit tactics, and tactical medicine.[63] It is unclear if Russian airborne forces participated in this exercise. The Belarusian 38th Air Assault Brigade has historically conducted joint exercises with elements of the Russian 76th Air Assault Division, 106th Airborne Division, and the 31st Air Assault Brigade - all units that have taken casualties in Ukraine and require regeneration.[64]

Belarusian maneuver elements continue conducting exercises in Belarus. Unspecified elements of the Belarusian 19th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade conducted tactical readiness exercises at the Lepelsky Training Ground in Vitebsk Oblast, Belarus, on February 8.[65]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[10] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402

[11] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402

[16] https://suspilne dot media/amp/378863-de-okupanti-posiluut-prisutnist-na-harkivsini-dani-sinegubova/

[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2023/02/01/zbilshennya-kilkosti-rozviduvalnyh-grup-voroga-v-gyrli-dnipra-mozhe-buty-oznakoyu-nagnitannya-sytuacziyi-gumenyuk/

[49] https://podolyaka dot ru/2023/02/08/zayavleniya-premer-ministra-rf-mihaila-mishustina-o-podderzhke-uchastnikov-svo-i-voennoy-promyshlennosti/; https://stolica-s dot su/archives/366231; https://t.me/rybar/43402

understandingwar.org


3. Exposing the Chinese Spy Balloon Fleet



​Recognize, understand, EXPOSE, and attack the PRC/PLA/CCP strategy.


Exposing the Chinese Spy Balloon Fleet

Biden can show and tell the world about Beijing’s global spying campaign.

By The Editorial BoardFollow

Updated Feb. 8, 2023 6:45 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-spy-balloon-biden-cuban-missile-crisis-beijing-11675898313?mod=hp_opin_pos_1


President Biden in his Tuesday State of the Union address made only a veiled reference to the Chinese spy balloon that appeared over Montana last week, and then only to boast about how he’s standing up to Beijing. If he means it, he can take a cue from the Cuban missile crisis and educate the world about China’s global spy campaign.

Beijing is complaining about the U.S. decision to shoot down the balloon, though it isn’t cooperating with U.S. attempts to engage on the issue. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s counterpart in China won’t take Mr. Austin’s call. This isn’t the behavior of a great power that wants better relations. All the more so given that China’s explanation that this was a merely a weather balloon that took a wrong turn at the Aleutian Islands has imploded under scrutiny and more disclosures.

The Pentagon said Wednesday that the balloon is part of a global fleet China has been operating for several years. Such Red Zeppelins have been spotted over “at least five continents,” including countries in Europe, Southeast Asia and South America.

The Defense Department says it’s confident this latest balloon was launched to get a close-up peek at America’s “strategic sites,” perhaps including intercontinental ballistic-missile bases in Montana. U.S. officials say at least four other balloons have surfaced over U.S. soil in recent years—though, shockingly, we only detected them after the fact. Civilian Trump officials were never informed.

The Biden Administration has said that one reason it didn’t shoot down the object earlier—say, as it crossed Alaska’s wide open spaces—was so U.S. intelligence could learn more about the balloon’s operation. Press reports say U.S. military assets accompanied the balloon on its final float. Americans are rightly absorbed with the episode, and it’s a teaching moment about Chinese ambitions and U.S. vulnerability.

A U.S. general said earlier this week that the blimp had a payload the size of a regional jetliner. Was it capable of carrying electromagnetic weapons, or blowing up on command?

The Administration is also now leaking to the press that the balloon could loiter on sites longer than satellites on low-earth orbit, after insisting for days the balloon presented no advantage over China’s other intelligence methods. Was it picking up signals that satellites can’t? Was it sending real-time data back to its overlords in Beijing?

An instructive if less threatening precedent here is the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when American U-2 spy planes captured photos of an enormous Soviet nuclear missile buildup 90 miles from Florida. The Kennedy Administration brain trust debated whether to inform the public or keep it quiet. The White House decided to show the world the threat, and the U.S. presented photographic proof of the missiles at a confrontation with the Soviets at the U.N. It helped to sway global opinion.

Navy divers are now salvaging debris from the balloon, and the U.S. ought to put it on display for the world to see, complete with experts explaining what it reveals about what China was up to. Put it all on stage, not merely in a Pentagon basement.

The Administration may fear a public airing of the spy balloon fleet could inflame Beijing and preclude a calmer relationship. But the opposite may be true. The real worry should be that the incident blows over without consequences and China’s war hawks conclude that such provocations are manageable risks.

The Biden crowd is no doubt eager to move on from the balloon affair, but the stakes are larger than their own embarrassment. Let’s show the world the truth about how China thinks it can act with impunity.

WSJ Opinion: Biden and the Chinese Spy Balloon

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Review and Outlook: Many questions remain unanswered since the U.S. President ordered the Chinese surveillance balloon to be shot down. Images: AFP via Getty Images/Reuters Composite: Mark Kelly


Appeared in the February 9, 2023, print edition as 'Exposing the Chinese Balloon Fleet'.


4. In Its Push for an Intelligence Edge, China’s Military Turned to Balloons


Sometimes less is more. Or old school can trump high tech or the merging of old school and high tech can be an effective capability.


But here is an argument for better open source intelligence analysis. Did we miss the open source indicators?


Excerpts:



American officials say that the balloon was part of a global surveillance effort targeting the military capabilities of various countries.
A review of Chinese military studies, newspaper articles and patent filings illuminates the range of Beijing’s interests and ambitions with balloons.
Chinese military scientists have been studying new materials and techniques to make balloons more durable, more steerable and harder to detect and track. People’s Liberation Army researchers have also been testing balloons as potential aerial platforms from which to fire weapons.


In Its Push for an Intelligence Edge, China’s Military Turned to Balloons


By Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien

Feb. 9, 2023, 5:45 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Amy Chang Chien · February 9, 2023

Chinese military scientists have been looking for ways to make them more durable, harder to detect and even to serve as platforms that fire advanced weapons.

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The Chinese spy balloon that floated over the United States seemed a new phenomenon. But China has long tested and used balloons as surveillance craft.Credit...Chad Fish, via Associated Press


By Chris Buckley and

Feb. 9, 2023, 5:45 a.m. ET

TAIPEI, Taiwan — Long before an unmanned Chinese airship floating over the United States grabbed the world’s attention, Taiwan may have glimpsed Beijing’s ambitions to turn balloons — seemingly so old-fashioned and ponderous — into elusive tools of 21st-century military power.

Residents in Taipei and elsewhere on the island have spotted and photographed mysterious pale orbs high in the sky at least several times in the previous two years. But few people here, even officials, gave them much thought then. Now, Taiwanese officials are grappling with whether any of the balloons were part of China’s growing fleet of airborne surveillance craft, deployed to gather information from the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as its own.

The incursions have come into focus since the United States identified and shot down the Chinese balloon that had spent days traversing the country. Beijing has protested the balloon’s downing, asserting that it was a civilian ship doing scientific research. But American officials say that the balloon was part of a global surveillance effort targeting the military capabilities of various countries.

China’s surveillance airships are likely operated by the Strategic Support Force, experts say, a relatively new and often secretive arm of the Chinese military that carries out electronic surveillance and cyber operations. The force emerged from the Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s drive to modernize the People’s Liberation Army, including expanding its intelligence capabilities, spanning from satellites in space to vessels deep undersea, said Su Tzu-yun, an analyst at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei.

“The balloons should be understood as one part of its electronic spying system,” he said in an interview. Even data that the balloons can gather about humidity and air currents may be militarily useful, he said. If China ever launches missiles, “this atmospheric information could improve their accuracy.”

American officials say that the balloon was part of a global surveillance effort targeting the military capabilities of various countries.

A review of Chinese military studies, newspaper articles and patent filings illuminates the range of Beijing’s interests and ambitions with balloons.

Chinese military scientists have been studying new materials and techniques to make balloons more durable, more steerable and harder to detect and track. People’s Liberation Army researchers have also been testing balloons as potential aerial platforms from which to fire weapons.

Even in this hitherto obscure corner of military innovation, China sees big stakes. Its military researchers warn that rival governments, above all the United States, could beat them at their own game. They especially worry about dominance in “near space,” the inhospitable layer of the atmosphere between 12 and 62 miles above earth.

“Near space has become a new battleground in modern warfare,” an article in the Liberation Army Daily, the official newspaper of China’s military, said in 2018. It celebrated China’s feat in the previous year of sending a balloon, carrying a small live turtle, over 12 miles up. Last year, China experimented with using rockets to propel balloons up to 25 miles above the earth.

The Chinese Spy Balloon Showdown

The discovery of a Chinese surveillance balloon floating over the United States has added to the rising tensions between the two superpowers.

The Chinese military, like other militaries, wants to “try all the options,” said Bates Gill, the author of a recent study, Daring to Struggle: China’s Global Ambitions Under Xi Jinping.

“My sense is the People’s Liberation Army is pretty unrestrained these days,” said Mr. Gill, the executive director of the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. “Not in the ‘Wild West,’ corrupt sense of the past, but in the sense of how it experiments and pushes the envelope.”

Such boldness may explain the recent balloon flights in the United States and Taiwan, which did not go entirely unnoticed. In September 2021, residents of Taipei, the capital of the island, made anxious calls to weather officials to ask about a pale, tiny dot they were seeing high above them.

Cheng Ming-dean, the head of Taiwan’s Central Weather Bureau, checked a close-up photograph of it and told people to relax: It was just a balloon. The large balloons were seen twice in late 2021 as well as in March of last year. Four clusters of smaller balloons were also spotted early last year.

A photograph provided by Taiwan’s Central Weather Bureau showing a balloon — the faint white dot in the center of the sky — in September 2021.Credit...Central Weather Bureau Taiwan

A detailed photograph of the same balloon seen in September 2021, provided by the Central Weather Bureau in Taiwan.Credit...Central Weather Bureau Taiwan

“Back then, I don’t think Taiwan was paying particular attention to this kind of thing,” Mr. Cheng said in an interview.

Now, as some smaller states — particularly those the United States describes as allies and partners — confront this new potential threat of surveillance, their options may be limited.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

Learn more about our process.

Shooting down balloons is likely to be difficult and expensive for many air forces, said Chang Yan-ting, a retired deputy commander of Taiwan’s Air Force. Over 30 years ago, he was a jet pilot sent up to inspect three balloons that were believed to be Chinese. In the end, he decided that they posed no threat, and would have been too hard to bring down, anyway.

“It’s very difficult; these balloons don’t give a radar reflection,” he said in an interview. “Look at the United States: It went to enormous efforts to send F-22s, its best fighter jet, and used its most advanced missiles to strike it — did you see? A bit like using a cannon to shoot a small bird.”

To be clear, the core of China’s digital intelligence collection system remains an armada of more than 260 satellites dedicated to intelligence and surveillance. The balloons, however, may offer some advantages over satellites because they can hover over areas and may produce clearer images, according to U.S. officials who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters.

The Chinese military is aware of such advantages. In modern battlefields, too, “maintaining constant aerial surveillance has become an urgent task,” a Chinese Liberation Army Daily report said in 2021. With satellites and planes alone, the report said, “it is hard to achieve full-time, full-scope, fixed-point early warning and surveillance from the air.”

If the Chinese Strategic Support Force was responsible for the recent balloon mission over the United States, the force’s relative newness and fragmented background may help to explain how the operation went ahead with seemingly little calculation of the trouble it could create, said Mr. Gill, who has studied the force. It was formed as part of a sweeping military reorganization that Mr. Xi launched in 2015, absorbing parts of the air force, navy and army.

Xi Jinping, China’s leader, attending a ceremony marking the founding of the Strategic Support Force in Beijing in 2015. Credit...Li Gang/Xinhua, via Alamy

Poor internal communication between the Chinese military and civilian government, and even inside the People’s Liberation Army and Strategic Support Force itself, may have contributed to the problem, Mr. Gill said.

“It’s a really good example of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing in China,” he said.

The recent attention on China’s balloon program may discourage the Chinese military from deploying new ones for a while. But the research will likely forge ahead.

Military scientists, especially at China’s National University of Defense Technology, have worked on new materials, designs and navigation tools to make balloons more nimble and long-lasting. They have filed patents for innovations such as a “three-dimensional flight path tracking method for an unmanned airship,” and articles in the Chinese military’s newspapers indicate it pays attention to balloon developments in the United States, France, Israel and other countries.

One lecturer from the National University of Defense Technology, wrote last year in the Liberation Army Daily that China could try to develop smart high-altitude balloons that are able to escape the more turbulent lower atmosphere and catch the steadier wind currents of the upper atmosphere, enabling them to surf long distances helped by small motors.

“With their many advantages,” another article in the same newspaper said last year, “balloons seem to be ushering in their springtime of development.”

Chinese researchers have also speculated about using high-altitude balloons to carry and launch missiles from near space, where they would be harder to detect, to earth.

In 2018, China’s state broadcaster said that researchers had tested a balloon platform that they said could be used to launch hypersonic weapons — which can fly at several times the speed of sound — from midair. But Chinese reports about the country’s military advances are prone to exaggeration. That report noted that the test used scale models, and it is debatable whether China’s other military balloon capabilities always live up to the swaggering claims.

Technical shortcomings may help explain the untimely appearance of the Chinese balloon over the United States — just before the Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, was to fly to Beijing. He canceled that trip.

“It may have been bad timing,” Mr. Su, the Taiwanese military researcher, said. “It’s become relatively easy to control the direction of balloons, but controlling their speed is a different matter.”

The New York Times · by Amy Chang Chien · February 9, 2023



5. Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward



Michaela Dodge, Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward, No. 547, February 8, 2023 – Nipp

nipp.org

Allied Assurance, Extended Deterrence, and Adjusting for the Multipolar Environment: The Way Forward

Dr. Michaela Dodge

Dr. Michaela Dodge is a Research Scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.

The United States is facing new challenges in trying to assure allies and deter revisionist adversaries, most notably Russia, China, and North Korea. These revisionist powers are expanding their nuclear arsenals and are threatening nuclear weapons use for coercive purposes to advance their goals, particularly in a regional context. Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of United States Strategic Command recently pointed out that “We have to account for three-party [threats]… That is unprecedented in this nation’s history. We have never faced two peer nuclear-capable opponents at the same time, who have to be deterred differently.” These new realities are shaping extended deterrence and assurance requirements and warrant a departure from the U.S. post-Cold War optimism about decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in international security.

U.S. Security Assurances Today: Tough Neighborhoods

Emerging regional threat developments with global implications place the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance commitments at risk, particularly given the fact that the United States adapted its force posture to reflect an anticipated, long-term, benign strategic environment starting in the 1990s. The United States has never planned for the prospect of having to deter two highly motivated and revisionist nuclear peers. During the Cold War, U.S. officials assumed that if the United States successfully deterred the Soviet Union, other lesser nuclear-armed actors would be deterred by extension. The situation today is vastly different and a multipolar nuclear threat context creates new extended deterrence and assurance requirements, particularly given the prospect of coordination between China and Russia.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) discussed the goal of assuring allies and partners and the value of nuclear forces for extended deterrence. It stated that “Assurance is a common goal and advances our common security interests” and that it includes “sustained allied dialogues to understand each other’s threat perceptions and to arrive at a shared understanding of how best to demonstrate our collective capabilities and resolve.” The 2018 NPR also noted “an increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries.” The Biden Administration’s 2022 NPR also emphasizes the importance of assuring allies and partners.

International security developments appear to be increasing demands for U.S. assurance guarantees, including those dependent upon the U.S. “nuclear umbrella.” For example, Polish President Andrzej Duda recently stated that “The problem above all is that we don’t have nuclear weapons” and that “There is always the opportunity to participate in nuclear sharing. We have spoken to US leaders about whether the US is considering such a possibility. The topic is open.” The White House subsequently denied having talks with Warsaw about Poland hosting nuclear weapons. In 2017, Shigeru Ishiba, former Japanese defense minister, said that “Japan should have the technology to build a nuclear weapon if it wants to do so.” As many as 71 percent of South Koreans support a “domestic nuclear weapons program.” Song Min-soon, South Korea’s former foreign minister, argued that “It’s necessary for South Korea to move on to a self-reliant alliance from a dependent alliance,” and that “a defensive nuclear capacity, with a missile range limited to the Korean Peninsula” was “justified.”

Practical Steps to Assure Allies

The United States would do well to remember that deterrence credibility depends on how opponents perceive the U.S. will to act, and, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.” Currently, the United States faces several emerging capability gaps that may make it look less willing than it otherwise should be for deterrence and assurance purposes; chief among them are insufficient conventional forces able to sustain two simultaneous engagements in geographically separate regions, insufficient missile defense capabilities, and large asymmetries in short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces. The following recommendations can help the United States chart a path to success in an increasingly volatile international security environment where assuring allies and extending deterrence appear more challenging.

Expand Nuclear Policy Consultations. In order to understand U.S. allies’ assurance needs in as much detail as possible, the United States ought to expand ongoing deterrence and assurance dialogues. These dialogues would serve several purposes: one, they would keep the United States apprised of its allies’ needs and perceptions, and help develop an understanding of their views of assurance requirements. Two, they would help to develop a cadre of foreign professionals that would be well-versed in nuclear deterrence issues and the nuances of nuclear weapons policies. These professionals would then be better able to communicate issues within their respective governments and publics, allowing the governments more effectively to communicate with their electorates in ways that would increase citizen awareness of nuclear deterrence issues and help counter malicious foreign interference and manipulation regarding nuclear policy topics. The Czech Republic’s debate about a U.S. radar deployment in the 2006-2009 timeframe illustrates some of the difficulties of communicating complex national security issues to publics in an ad hoc manner. Three, through dialogue, allies would contribute to developing joint and hopefully better informed “strategic profiles” of adversaries.

Continue Nuclear Weapons Modernization. Even though few allied countries have a detailed understanding of U.S. nuclear weapons programs or the infrastructure that supports them, many consider ongoing U.S. nuclear weapons modernization important for both extended deterrence and allied assurance. They worry about inconsistency in the signals that the United States sends by expressing the rationale for weapon programs, only to cancel them when the next presidential administration is elected.

Continue to Develop Missile Defense Capabilities. The United States ought to continue to develop its missile defense capabilities. While missile defenses will not supplant nuclear deterrence and assurance anytime soon, they are nevertheless an important component of allied assurance. This applies both to homeland and regional missile defense systems.

Do Not Change U.S. Declaratory Policy. Changing U.S. nuclear declaratory policy to reflect “sole purpose” or “no first use,” especially amid Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine, would make the United States risk being seen as irresolute by adversaries and alienate allies. Adversaries could interpret the change as proof the United States was deterred by their actions, while allies could interpret this as the United States not being willing to accept the risk of its commitments to them, undermining U.S. extended deterrence and assurance goals (and potentially U.S. nonproliferation goals). Maintaining the status quo (i.e., a measure of ambiguity regarding the timing and scope of U.S. nuclear use) in U.S. declaratory policy helps in this regard. The Biden Administration’s NPR says that, for the time being, it will not adopt a “no first use” or “sole purpose” declaratory policy.

Maintain Sufficient Conventional Capabilities and a Robust Production Base. The U.S. Department of Defense has felt the pressure of decreasing resources for recapitalization and modernization. Maintaining sufficient forces that can be deployed to Europe without compromising the U.S. posture in Asia (and vice-versa) will continue to be important for assurance and extended deterrence. The United States should have the capacity to forward deploy additional forces in both theaters quickly and simultaneously if the security situation deteriorates. The war in Ukraine highlights the difficulties of supplying a partner nation in the middle of a conflict and the importance of prepositioning systems to the theater beforehand. It also underscores the need for maintaining a healthy and responsive defense industrial base.

Do Not Forget that Allies Are Assured by a Range of Activities. Extended deterrence and assurance guarantees are not generated by just military capabilities but encompass a range of actions from nominating ambassadors in a timely manner, to high-level visits, to joint military exercises, professional exchanges, and public messaging coordination. The United States ought to take advantage of all the tools at its disposal to maximize synergies inherent in coordinating supportive activities well.

Nurture the Development of Nuclear Policy Expertise Among Allies. The United States must nurture and develop nuclear policy expertise among its allies. Continued bilateral and multilateral discussions and strategic dialogues are one way of doing so. Facilitating and supporting expert visits to nuclear sites and bases that host nuclear weapon systems is another way of developing policy expertise. This requires allies willing to invest resources and manpower in the endeavor; the United States cannot accomplish this task on its own.

Revitalize the U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production Complex. The United States must have a flexible and resilient nuclear warhead infrastructure. All administrations since the end of the Cold War have supported this (largely unfulfilled) objective. With China rapidly increasing the size of its strategic nuclear arsenal and Russia developing a suite of systems unregulated by any arms control treaties, this requirement is becoming more pressing. While few experts in allied states pay attention to the status of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure, it is inseparable from judging the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance guarantees. A warhead issue the United States cannot address in a timely manner could undermine allied belief in the U.S. ability to respond to negative trends in the security environment quickly and thereby degrade the credibility of U.S. commitments to allied security.

Abrogate the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and coercive nuclear threats to NATO members are inconsistent with the Act, which calls for “refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in any manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and with the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act.” The United States empirically knows the valuable, stabilizing, and reassuring effects its permanent military presence has on allies. It also can be cheaper than a rotational presence. Yet, the Act currently precludes it, even as Russia aggressively undermines the stability of the European security order. In light of Russia’s actions, the United States and NATO should not be bound by an agreement that the other side ignores.

Develop U.S. Regional Expertise and Understanding of Adversaries and Allies. The United States must continue to develop regional expertise to foster an understanding of domestic politics in allied countries, an endeavor that took somewhat of a back seat amid its focus on terrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the past years.

Conclusion

Implementing these steps would go a long way to extending deterrence and strengthening the credibility of the U.S. commitment to allied security in a multipolar environment. Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that there are emerging deterrence and assurance gaps in the current U.S. and allied force postures. According to Admiral Richard, “The war in Ukraine and China’s nuclear trajectory — their strategic breakout — demonstrates that we have a deterrence and assurance gap based on the threat of limited nuclear employment.” This observation is particularly relevant for regional scenarios involving U.S. allies in which asymmetries between U.S. and adversaries’ short- and intermediate-range nuclear arsenals are the largest and most concerning.

For now, the United States appears to have done a good enough job for extended deterrence and assurance. No allies are seriously pondering developing indigenous nuclear weapons programs, and proposals to make a separate peace with Russia and China at U.S. expense are still largely relegated to fringe parts of the political spectrum in allied countries. But challenges, uncertainties, and questions are emerging just below the surface. As they mount, the United States will have to work harder to extend deterrence and convince allies and adversaries of the credibility of its commitment to allied security. Such a process will require larger defense spending than what the United States has been willing to invest after the end of the Cold War, more focused consultations and strategic dialogues with allies, and potentially new nuclear weapons and missile defense capabilities in the future. It will also require a recapitalization of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex so that it truly would be flexible and resilient and provide the United States with an ability to respond to unforeseen challenges and problems on a reasonable timescale. These are no small tasks, but failing in them could undermine the U.S. global alliance system and thus entail immeasurable cost.

This Information Series is based on the author’s Occasional Paper entitled, Multipolarity, Extended Deterrence, and Allied Assurance and on interviews with experts conducted in preparation for the Occasional Paper. See Michaela Dodge, Alliance Politics in a Multipolar World, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 10 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, October 26, 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/OP-Vol.-2-No.-10.pdf.

For an elaboration on this point see Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, August 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf.

Tara Copp, “US Military ‘Furiously’ Rewriting Nuclear Deterrence to Address Russia and China, STRATCOM Chief Says,” Defense One, August 11, 2022, available at https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/08/us-military-furiously-rewriting-nuclear-deterrence-address-russia-and-china-stratcom-chief-says/375725/.

Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, op. cit.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2018, pp. 22-23, available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PD.

Ibid, p. 22.

Ibid, pp. 22-23.

Ibid, pp. 7-8.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 2022, p. 1, available at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.

Jo Harper, “Poland in talks to join NATO nuclear sharing program,” Anadolu Agency, October 5, 2022, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/poland-in-talks-to-join-nato-nuclear-sharing-program/2703041.

Alyssa Blakemore, “White House Denies Having Talks With Poland To Host US Nukes Amid Escalating Tensions With Russia,” Daily Caller, October 5, 2022, available at https://dailycaller.com/2022/10/05/poland-talks-host-us-nukes-amid-escalating-tensions-russia-polish-president-claims/.

“Japan Should Be Able to Build Nuclear Weapons: Ex-LDP Secretary-General Ishiba,” The Japan Times, November 6, 2017, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/06/national/japan-able-build-nuclear-weapons-ex-ldp-secretary-general-ishiba/.

Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs, February 2022, available at https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Korea%20Nuclear%20Report%20PDF.pdf.

Jesse Johnson, “South Korea Developing Its Own Nukes One Solution to U.S. Cost-Sharing Demands, Ex-Top Diplomat Says,” The Japan Times, November 12, 2019, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/12/asia-pacific/nuclear-weapons-cost-sharing-south-korea/.

Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 213-214.

For an elaboration on this point see Keith Payne and David Trachtenberg, Deterrence in the Emerging Great Environment: What is Different and Why it Matters, Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 8 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, August 2022), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OP-Vol.-2-No.-8.pdf.

Michaela Dodge, “Russia’s Influence Operations in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania,” Occasional Paper, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, April 2022), pp. 11-30, available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/OP-Vol.-2-No.-4.pdf.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report 2022, op. cit., p. 9.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept states that “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept, June 29, 2022, p. 8, available at https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation Signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.

Bryant Harris, “U.S. nuclear commander warns of deterrence ‘crisis’ against Russia and China,” Defense News Online, May 4, 2022, available at, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/05/04/us-nuclear-commander-warns-of-deterrence-crisis-against-russia-and-china/.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

© National Institute Press, 2023

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6. Out of Alignment - What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Non-Western Powers


Excerpts:


All in all, the war in Ukraine and the growing rivalry between China and the United States has produced a fluid situation for countries outside of the United States and Europe. For some larger and more powerful middle powers, there are new opportunities in this uncertain world. India, for example, can work with neighbors to build the peaceful and more prosperous periphery that its own development demands. It can participate in the remaking of the rules of the international system now underway, particularly in new domains such as cyberspace. And it can reengage economically with the dynamic economies of Asia, participating in global value chains, to further its own transformation.
But many smaller states are more vulnerable than ever. And overall systemic risk is higher than it has been for many decades. That heightened risk is less about the prospect of a direct great-power conflict: as the first year of the war in Ukraine and the aftermath of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August have shown, the United States and other great powers are capable of avoiding direct conflict among themselves. But their ability to contain local conflicts, or even to get their way in their own neighborhoods, has been constrained by their rivalry and by the demands of a globalized economy. It is also limited in Asia in particular by the fact that power in the region is much more evenly distributed than it was during the Cold War or the subsequent unipolar moment of U.S. dominance.
With India chairing the G-20 in 2023, New Delhi may be tempted to try to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, though that seems unlikely to produce results for now. A more fruitful way ahead would be for India to bring the concerns of the global South to the forefront of the international agenda. For the time being, however, it seems likely that the international system will continue to drift. Amid a prolonged war and continued great-power rivalry, the coming year is unlikely to see more than incremental progress in addressing the urgent issues that preoccupy much of the developing world.


Out of Alignment

What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Non-Western Powers

By Shivshankar Menon

February 9, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Shivshankar Menon · February 9, 2023

For the past year, many Western analysts have regarded the war in Ukraine as marking a turning point in geopolitics, bringing together not only the United States and its NATO allies but also a broader liberal coalition to counter Russian aggression. In this view, countries around the world should naturally support the West in this defining contest between democracy and autocracy.

Beyond the borders of North America and Europe, however, the past 12 months have looked very different. At the outset of the war, numerous countries in the global South identified with neither the West nor Russia. Several dozen—including such large democracies as India, Indonesia, and South Africa, as well as numerous other countries in Africa—abstained from resolutions condemning Russia at the UN General Assembly and in the UN Human Rights Council. Many of them have also been reluctant to formally adopt the West’s economic sanctions against Russia while respecting them in practice, and, as the war has unfolded, some of them have sought to maintain relations with Russia as much as with the West.

Moreover, in many parts of the world, the most crucial issues of 2022 had little to do with the war in Ukraine. Emerging from the havoc of the pandemic and confronted by far-reaching challenges ranging from debt crises to a slowing world economy to climate change, many developing countries have been alienated by what they view as the self-absorption of the West and of China and Russia. For them, the war in Ukraine is about the future of Europe, not the future of the world order, and the war has become a distraction from the more pressing global issues of our time.

Yet despite this disillusionment, a coherent third way, a clear alternative to current great-power rivalry, has yet to emerge. Instead, these countries have sought to work with present realities, respecting Western sanctions on Russia, for instance, in an international system that no longer inspires much faith in its relevance to their security and economic concerns. In this sense, for many parts of the globe, a year of war in Ukraine has done less to redefine the world order than to set it further adrift, raising new questions about how urgent transnational challenges can be met.

GREATER RIVALRY, DIMINISHED POWER

A year of war in Ukraine has weakened the world order in two important ways. First, the Russian invasion, combined with the continuing effects of the pandemic and the global economic slowdown, diminished all the great powers in both power and prestige. The diminution was most apparent for Russia itself: in the unanticipated course of the war, in the country’s increasing economic and political isolation, and in the acceleration of its decline. It was least evident in the United States, which has managed to respond forcefully to the war without involving its own forces or causing serious escalation, while at the same time strengthening Western unity and staying focused on the main game in Asia.


Worries, however, remain about the United States being distracted by Ukraine from its roles elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. The precipitate withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 also raised questions about U.S. staying power and perseverance, especially now as it enters a new presidential electoral cycle. Nor has its own domestic politics permitted the United States to provide constructive leadership to the international multilateral system. For Europe, the war has limited its ability to play a broader global role, given its preoccupation with European order for the foreseeable future, regardless of whether the war ends in victory for either side or in a protracted frozen conflict.

China, too, has been taxed by the war. Because of its secondary effects on the world economy, on China’s own energy and food imports, and on China’s virtual alliance with Russia, the war has limited Beijing’s influence abroad. Unlike other permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has not played a meaningful political or military role in the Ukraine crisis. Other middle powers outside Europe have experienced similar effects. But in China’s case, two additional factors have been at play. One was Beijing’s domestic preoccupations through much of the year with its own economic slowdown and its need to project a smooth buildup to the 20th Party Congress in October. The other was China’s zero-COVID policy, which compounded its inward fixation. Together, these domestic concerns reinforced the effects of China’s unproductive “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, which created an inability to find negotiated solutions to bilateral disputes or to play a meaningful role on transnational issues such as climate change and the developing-country debt crisis.


For the global South, the war has become a distraction from more pressing issues.

It is not yet certain how China and the other powers will respond to their straitened circumstances. Since the Party Congress, China seems to be attempting to restore some balance in important relationships with Australia, Europe, and the United States. But Beijing’s domestic imperatives to reignite economic growth and to control the social and political fallout of its COVID-19 policies are likely to take precedence and limit meaningful shifts away from its recent assertive actions in maritime Asia and its land border with India.

The second effect of a year of war is that economic policies of major powers like China, Europe, and the United States are now shaped by politics as much as by economics. Today, in many cases, security of supply and political interests take priority over price considerations in global manufacturing and value chains. Friend-shoring and onshoring are being driven by political considerations rather than by economic responses to the changing situation. Although globalized markets have limited the extent of decoupling between the United States and China, they have not prevented strong efforts by both countries to reduce mutual dependence in strategic sectors such as semiconductor manufacturing, AI, energy, and rare-earth metals.

The response of countries that have hitherto relied on their economic strength for global influence has varied. Japan is now making a transition to stronger defense and security policies that are better suited for today’s challenges, giving it a more balanced stance that emphasizes political and military power, too. Germany’s government speaks of a Zeitenwende, or historic turning point. And China, a global economic power that is militarily and politically constrained in its own neighborhood, has recalibrated both the nature of its engagement abroad and the way that it projects that engagement to its own people and to the world. Meanwhile, Europe and many countries in the global South pay an economic price for the West’s unprecedented sanctions against Moscow, and recession looms in some of the world’s most important economies.

ALIENATED AND UNALIGNED

As much as the war has affected relations between the major powers, the effect of a weakening world order is also profound on countries outside of the West. One year later, these countries seek alternatives to the present order, but a clear third way, whether economically or politically, has yet to emerge. A growing debt crisis has affected over 50 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America since before the pandemic, according to the International Monetary Fund. This limits the developing world’s ability to strike out on an independent economic path. Indeed, most countries have respected the sanctions on Russia in practice.


Politically, too, the present situation inhibits the emergence of a single or coherent third way akin to the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War. A crucial difference is that today, unlike in the Cold War, there is no bipolar order. For all the talk of autocracies and democracies facing off against each other, economic interdependence between China and the United States and the reality of a globalized economy mean that the world does not have a clear two-part division offering opportunities for traditional balancing. Instead, it is a world in which great-power rivalry is not between two superpowers but among multiple players. As a result, the multisided competition and great-power rivalry have led many countries in the global South to be unaligned rather than non-aligned, disassociated from the present order and seeking their own independent solutions rather than an alternative set of widely held approaches to global issues.


Disillusioned by great-power rivalry, many countries are seeking their own solutions.

Alienated and resentful, many developing countries see the war in Ukraine and the West’s rivalry with China as distracting from urgent issues such as debt, climate change, and the effects of the pandemic. Take South Asia. Three countries in the region—Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have been in talks with the IMF for more than a year about adjustment packages to deal with their debt. And over the last 18 months, five countries in the region—Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—have also changed governments, and not always smoothly or constitutionally. Sri Lanka defaulted on its international debts in April 2022. During the summer, one-fifth of Pakistan’s population was rendered homeless by floods inundating one-third of the country—a devastating consequence of climate change. Neither international institutions, nor the West, nor its Chinese and Russian rivals, have found or offered meaningful solutions to these problems.

Great-power rivalry complicates the task of addressing such issues. In dealing with Sri Lanka’s debt, for instance, the West is naturally reluctant to pay for Sri Lanka to settle accounts with China, the country’s largest creditor. For its part, Beijing is waiting for the rest of the international community to act, worried that if it moves to reschedule Sri Lanka’s debt, it will set a precedent for other countries that have taken on significant loans in China’s $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, many of which are only marginally more solvent than Sri Lanka. Indeed, the situation in South Asia is paralleled in many other parts of the developing world. Many countries now feel that they have been left to their own devices in the absence of a working multilateral system or international order. But this malaise has yet to produce a coherent or organized response.

INDIA’S OPPORTUNITY?

All in all, the war in Ukraine and the growing rivalry between China and the United States has produced a fluid situation for countries outside of the United States and Europe. For some larger and more powerful middle powers, there are new opportunities in this uncertain world. India, for example, can work with neighbors to build the peaceful and more prosperous periphery that its own development demands. It can participate in the remaking of the rules of the international system now underway, particularly in new domains such as cyberspace. And it can reengage economically with the dynamic economies of Asia, participating in global value chains, to further its own transformation.

But many smaller states are more vulnerable than ever. And overall systemic risk is higher than it has been for many decades. That heightened risk is less about the prospect of a direct great-power conflict: as the first year of the war in Ukraine and the aftermath of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August have shown, the United States and other great powers are capable of avoiding direct conflict among themselves. But their ability to contain local conflicts, or even to get their way in their own neighborhoods, has been constrained by their rivalry and by the demands of a globalized economy. It is also limited in Asia in particular by the fact that power in the region is much more evenly distributed than it was during the Cold War or the subsequent unipolar moment of U.S. dominance.

With India chairing the G-20 in 2023, New Delhi may be tempted to try to mediate between Ukraine and Russia, though that seems unlikely to produce results for now. A more fruitful way ahead would be for India to bring the concerns of the global South to the forefront of the international agenda. For the time being, however, it seems likely that the international system will continue to drift. Amid a prolonged war and continued great-power rivalry, the coming year is unlikely to see more than incremental progress in addressing the urgent issues that preoccupy much of the developing world.

  • SHIVSHANKAR MENON is Visiting Professor of International Relations at Ashoka University. From 2010 to 2014, he served as National Security Adviser to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Foreign Affairs · by Shivshankar Menon · February 9, 2023


7. How a band of Ukraine civilians helped seal Russia's biggest defeat



​As you read this please listen to "Kyiv Calling"​ (We live for resistance). (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWQUkRKqp2E&list=FL3fu5rXx0ma6f9Ze3C1i-MA&index=30​)​


Note the importance of undergrounds and auxiliaries. This is why we must sustain "Unconventional Warfare thinking" among the SF regiment.



1. Strategic Competition, the Gray Zone, and Irregular Warfare may be the current terms of art in the Department of Defense, but it is the Unconventional Warfare mindset that ensures the continued success of Special Forces.
 
2. Irregular Warfare is the military contribution to Political Warfare, but the Unconventional Warfare mindset makes them successful.
 
3. Essence of UW: UW thinking informs everything SF should do
 
      UW is fundamentally problem solving; ​often ​using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems
      And creating dilemmas for our adversaries
      UW is fundamentally about influencing behavior of target audiences (which can include a population, a segment of the population, a political structure, or a military force); therefore, it is integral to the action arms of IO/PSYOP/CA. 



How a band of Ukraine civilians helped seal Russia's biggest defeat

Reuters · by Jonathan Landay

KHERSON, Ukraine, Feb 9 (Reuters) - Ukrainian intelligence wanted confirmation last autumn that officers of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) overseeing the occupation of Kherson were staying in a small hotel on a back street of the southern port city.

The task was assigned to Dollar: the code name for a civilian who had been secretly providing targeting coordinates and information on enemy operations in Kherson and the surrounding region, the operative said.

Reuters held extensive interviews with Dollar and two other members of the underground partisan network in Kherson after the city was captured in early November.

Their separate accounts provide a rare window into how information and sabotage operations were coordinated with Ukrainian intelligence services behind enemy lines, operations that are still ongoing elsewhere in Ukraine.

While Reuters could not corroborate the specific events they described, two U.S. officials said that such operations by an underground of intelligence operatives, ex-soldiers and amateurs helped hasten Russia's withdrawal from Kherson - one of the biggest setbacks for the Kremlin in a war that marks its first anniversary on Feb. 24.

Dollar, who declined to give his name for security reasons, said he began driving by the Hotel Ninel – Lenin spelled backwards – with his wife, a fellow operative who is part of the network and uses the code name Kosatka, Ukrainian for killer whale.

The gun-toting security men they regularly saw outside the hotel convinced the couple that FSB officers were staying inside; Dollar said he texted his observations to his handler at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

Ukraine's SBU and Russia's FSB did not respond to requests for comment on Dollar’s account or other partisan operations. The defense ministry also did not respond to requests for comment.

Before dawn on Oct. 5, a huge explosion ripped through the hotel, according to Ukrainian media reports and regional lawmaker Serhii Khlan, who wrote on Facebook that two FSB officers and seven Russian military officials died.

"I received an SMS (text) that said, 'Have a look and see how the Hotel Ninel is doing,'" recalled Dollar, who took Reuters to view the shattered hulk. "I went over and reported back: 'There is no more Hotel Ninel.'"

Reuters was unable to review the text message. Dollar and other partisans say they regularly deleted their chats and social media for security reasons.

Dollar and Kosatka received decorations from Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov inscribed with thanks for "cooperating with the armed forces," according to a photograph seen by Reuters dated Dec. 1 in which the inscriptions are visible. Mart and Kolia, the other two members of their four-person cell, were also decorated by Reznikov, Dollar said.

Asked about resistance operations in occupied territory, an official from Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) said “the local population is supportive,” declining to provide details of specific activities.

Operations to target Russian security personnel and disrupt their plans are continuing across swathes of eastern and southern Ukraine held by Russia and its allies, according to several Ukrainian and Russian-installed officials as well as members of the Kherson partisan cell.

The Institute for the Study of War also says Ukrainian partisan warfare is being waged in Melitopol, Tokmak and Mariupol in the south and Donetsk and Svatove in the east.

Serhiy Haidai, the exiled governor of the eastern Luhansk province which has been under Russian control since last June, said partisans there were conducting sabotage operations there and attacks on suspected Russian collaborators.

In an interview on Jan. 23, he credited partisans with a recent attack on a railway line that Russia’s military was using to transport troops and equipment. He declined to provide further details for security reasons and Reuters could not independently confirm partisan involvement in the attacks.

CAPTURED PARTISANS

Risking arrest, interrogation, torture and death, partisans in Kherson hung Ukraine's blue-and-yellow national colors on trees and relayed Russian positions on Google Earth and other online maps to Ukrainian security officials, Dollar said.

Vitalyi Bogdanov, 51, a regional council member, said that during the eight-month Russian occupation, he collected and relayed to law enforcement authorities in Kyiv information later used to launch investigations into suspected collaborators.

"We were able to start a very big number of criminal cases," he said. He declined to provide further details because the investigations were ongoing.

Kolia, part of the 4-member Kherson cell, said that the group was told by its handlers not to use firearms because information was a more potent weapon.

Other partisans took up arms.

Alexei Ladin, a lawyer in Russian-occupied Crimea, told Reuters he was defending two Ukrainians held there, accused by the FSB of violent attacks against the Russians.

Pavlo Zaporozhets served in the Ukrainian army from 2014-17 and joined Ukraine's GUR military intelligence during the occupation of Kherson, Ladin said.

Zaporozhets was arrested while attempting to attack a Russian military night patrol and faces up to life imprisonment on charges of international terrorism, Ladin said.

He said Zaporozhets was being held in a detention facility in Simferopol and that he and his client attended a preliminary court hearing in the Russian port city of Rostov-on-Don by video link on Feb. 2. The court ordered Zaporozhets' transfer to a facility in Rostov, Ladin said.

According to an FSB account seen by Reuters, Zaporozhets, then 31, was arrested in Kherson by FSB officers on May 9 carrying two grenades, a fishing line and two plastic bottles that he had made into homemade bombs.

Zaparozhets told his questioners he was contacted by a Ukrainian GUR handler codenamed Optium and agreed to carry out his orders for 30,000 hryvnias ($800) a month, according to the FSB case documents seen by Reuters.

Ladin said the FSB account was based on testimony obtained when his client was tortured during questioning and showed Reuters a copy of a handwritten note from Zaporozhets dated from last August in which he described being beaten and subjected to electric shocks while in custody.

While some details about the FSB account were true, Ladin said, the FSB falsely accused Zaporozhets of deliberately targeting civilians as well as the night patrol. The military action was meant to be carried out during the curfew with intention of avoiding civilian casualties, Ladin said.

Ladin said the "optimal solution" would be an exchange of Zaporozhets and another client, Yaroslav Zhuk - who was arrested in Melitopol in June and accused of setting off a home-made bomb - for Russian POWs held by Ukraine. Zhuk denies attacking civilian targets, Ladin said.

The FSB has declined to recognize Zaporozhets as a Ukrainian serviceman eligible for a prisoner swap, saying they could not verify a document presented by the defense confirming his status, Ladin said. In the case of Zhuk, Ladin says his client is a combatant covered by the Geneva convention; the FSB has not accepted the designation.

Reuters was unable to speak to the two detainees directly.

FLEEING KHERSON

Dollar, Kolia and Mart – another member of the cell - said they felt compelled to resist the Russian takeover of Kherson because there was no organized defense of their city when the Russians attacked on Feb. 24.

Dollar and Mart’s first overt bid to confront the Russians came on March 1, they said, when they drove a truck loaded with concrete blocks toward the Antonovskiy Bridge, a main entry point to the city, aiming to slow Russia's advance.

They turned around because they feared the invaders already were in the city, they said.

Dollar considered his options: organize a civil disobedience movement, take up arms or gather intelligence.

Friends put him in touch with an SBU officer. Dollar and Kolia, who were old friends, agreed to collect and relay information on the Russians and build a network of retired police officers, former SBU officials, pensioners, and others, they said.

Kolia, a seasoned hunter who knew the Kherson countryside, solicited information from local villagers, including an elderly woman who would count Russian convoys as she milked her cow.

Between reconnaissance forays, the pair would meet sources in a coffee shop to gather intelligence.

Over the summer one farmer gave Kolia the position of a Russian truck-mounted missile launcher known as a Tochka-U around the village of Muzykivka, about 12 km (7.5 miles) north of Kherson. Dollar said he passed on the information.

The next day the farmer reported to Kolia that there was only a hole in the road where the truck once stood, Dollar said. Reuters could not independently confirm the attack.

Dollar's wife, Kosatka, recruited her own network of informants, he said. Kosatka declined to comment for this story.

THE AIRPORT

At the same time, Mart pursued an independent intelligence gathering effort, visiting people living near the Kherson International Airport in Chornobaivka on April 10 and urging them in person and over Telegram chats to send him information about Russian troop movements. He codenamed his five-person cell Miami. Reuters did not view the chats, which Mart said he deleted.

Russian forces in March had established their headquarters within the three-square kilometre airport complex, which was repeatedly bombed by Ukrainian forces.

Kyiv said large numbers of Russians soldiers were killed, including at least two generals, while aircraft and ammunition stores were also destroyed. Moscow withdrew its military hardware in October.

As Russian losses mounted, some members of the cell Mart had recruited grew over-confident and began taking greater risks, said Mart and Dollar.

When the Russians arrested four of the Miami members at the end of August, Mart feared they would give him away. Reuters was unable to determine what later happened to the four members.

Mart fled to Vasliyevka village in Zaporizhzhia province, the only checkpoint where Russians allowed Ukrainian civilians to cross into Ukrainian-controlled territory, and then made his way to Kyiv.

Despite the liberation of Kherson, Dollar said he and Kosatka would continue aiding the resistance until Ukrainian troops recover Crimea, where the couple owns an apartment.

"The end of the war for me will be when I move back into my apartment," he said.

Reporting by Jonathan Landay and Tom Balmforth; Editing by Mike Collett-White and Suzanne Goldenberg

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.


Reuters · by Jonathan Landay


8. Ukraine Can Achieve a Strategic Win over Russia. The West Must Step Up


Excerpts:

By now, it should be abundantly clear that the Ukrainians are buying the rest of Europe time to undo the damage inflicted on their militaries by three decades of disarmament. Ukraine is fighting for European and transatlantic security, and it’s hard to overstate the implications of what is riding on the war’s outcome. This is a system-transforming war. Should Ukraine lose, not only would Russia and China be emboldened to press their advantage. Recriminations over the failure to adequately support Ukraine between countries on NATO’s eastern flank and their allies further West could also put a severe strain on the alliance—and possibly fracture it. The consequences of this war thus reach far beyond the question of who wins in Ukraine.
For its own sake and not just the Ukrainians’, the West should therefore give Ukraine what it needs to stop the Russian military and expel it from its territory.


Ukraine Can Achieve a Strategic Win over Russia. The West Must Step Up

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · February 8, 2023

Ukraine Can Achieve a Strategic Win, and It Matters to the West that It Does: A few days ago, CIA Director William Burns said in a CBS News interview that the next six months in the war in Ukraine would be critical. According to Burns, Russian President Vladimir Putin is betting that the West will grow weary of supporting Ukraine, and that time is on Russia’s side. Stopping Putin and showing him that he will not achieve his objectives – “puncturing his hubris,” as Burns put it – will be key to how this war unfolds.

(Subscribe to 19FortyFive‘s New YouTube Channel here.)

Ukraine War: What Happens Next?

Russia will likely try to launch its anticipated offensive soon—before much-delayed Western tanks and other new equipment begins to trickle into Ukraine. Some analysts have argued that the fierce battles in and around the eastern Ukrainian town of Bakhmut are already part of that offensive, or at the very least its preparatory stage.

Keep in mind that if Ukraine continues in this fashion, meeting the enemy head-on in a 21st century replay of World War I attrition warfare, then the sheer logic of the two countries’ disparity in population and resources will define the outcome. In the wake of the mass destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure and the flight of its citizens (an estimated 9 million Ukrainian refugees have passed through Poland alone), a fight with an enemy commanding approximately four times Ukraine’s population can only end one way.

So Ukraine needs forces to allow it to break out of the current stalemate, check the Russian advance, and maneuver to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield. It needs to fight on its own terms. To do this it needs modern Western main battle tanks and long-range fires – in greater numbers than promised so far, and, most importantly, aircraft.

The United States and its allies have, in each instance, met Ukraine’s requests for ever-more sophisticated weapons systems – most recently with several countries’ decisions to supply Leopard 2s and other main battle tanks – but the process is painfully slow. Negotiations have dragged on, delaying the training of Ukrainian crews on the new equipment, and ultimately risking that the moment of decision may be missed if new military hardware is not brought into action during the phase in the war when it is needed most.

Putin surely hopes that the approaching U.S. presidential campaign will throw sand into the gears of the United States’ military support for Ukraine. He may be right—because, regrettably, the issue of aiding Ukraine has become politicized. It is likely to become even more contentious as the presidential primaries approach. Should the United States cut Ukraine off, the country could not sustain its defense against Russia for long, regardless of what European NATO members and other supporters of Ukraine would do. Although Poland, Estonia, Finland, and other countries close to Russia have been emptying their stocks to aid Ukraine, their remaining spare supplies are much too little to sustain Ukraine on their own.

An Inflection Point

This war is approaching a decision point that will be defined by two variables: First, how long Western support will last; and second, how long the Russians can endure before they run out of stocks themselves. Considering the sheer amount of Cold War-era equipment stocks that Putin can still field, he is betting that he can outlast the West in this regard—and that’s not even considering ramped-up Iranian and other deliveries. Another factor to consider is that the West’s ability to supply Ukraine is not solely dependent on political will; it is first and foremost a numbers game.

Unless the United States and its European allies make urgently needed decisions to invest in their defense industry, it may become impossible to supply Ukraine in the long run—even if the political will remains. Simply put, looking at the rates at which weapons and munitions are being consumed in this war, the West needs to move its defense industry away from the “just-in-time,” low-volume paradigm of the past thirty years to a “just-in-case” approach, whereby it amasses the quantities of weapons and munitions needed to sustain a protracted fight with a near-peer adversary.

This means that most European NATO allies need to dramatically rethink their procurement system. Above all, they need to spend real cash on rearmament. There is no indication, unfortunately, that any of these decisions have been made—or even seriously discussed in Europe except for countries along the Eastern flank, especially Poland Finland, Sweden and the Baltic States. At the same time the U.S. has moved to increase the production of 155mm howitzer ammunition fivefold, and to increase HIMARS production. Meanwhile, Russia is slowly but inexorably moving its industry to a war footing.

Analysts and scholars speculate that the war in Ukraine could drag on for years. Even if the West were to tire of supplying Ukraine and if the Russians were to break through Ukrainian defenses, there is no chance that the Ukrainian people would accept defeat. Guerrilla warfare would replace conventional military engagements.

But the West should consider another possibility: Given the right equipment, the Ukrainian army could defeat the Russian military within the next six months, setting in motion forces in Russia that could implode Putin’s regime. In Russian history, military defeats have usually been accompanied by internal fracturing—including the 1905 revolution that followed Russia’s defeat by Japan, the February and Bolshevik revolutions in 1917 in the wake of Russia’s defeat by Germany, and the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union following its rout in Afghanistan.

But even if Russia’s defeat in Ukraine fails to set loose the centrifugal forces needed to break Putin’s kleptocratic empire, the West must help Ukraine win a strategic victory on the battlefield. Such a victory would erode and hopefully significantly delay Russia’s ability to regenerate its military and attack again—either in Ukraine or elsewhere in the neighborhood. It should be understood in both Washington and European capitals that if Russia were to defeat Ukraine, it would be poised in a few years to move against NATO’s frontier states, with the Baltic States being the most vulnerable, and possibly other targets after that.

The West Needs to Step Up

By now, it should be abundantly clear that the Ukrainians are buying the rest of Europe time to undo the damage inflicted on their militaries by three decades of disarmament. Ukraine is fighting for European and transatlantic security, and it’s hard to overstate the implications of what is riding on the war’s outcome. This is a system-transforming war. Should Ukraine lose, not only would Russia and China be emboldened to press their advantage. Recriminations over the failure to adequately support Ukraine between countries on NATO’s eastern flank and their allies further West could also put a severe strain on the alliance—and possibly fracture it. The consequences of this war thus reach far beyond the question of who wins in Ukraine.

For its own sake and not just the Ukrainians’, the West should therefore give Ukraine what it needs to stop the Russian military and expel it from its territory.

Author Expertise and Experience

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Andrew A. Michta is Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

19fortyfive.com · by Andrew A. Michta · February 8, 2023


9. What Russia Got Wrong


Excerpts:

The Russian military has, however, corrected certain important problems. To overcome a bad plan, it fixed its command structure and changed many of its tactics. It has consolidated its positions in Ukraine after heavy losses while adding more personnel, which will make Ukrainian counteroffensives more costly. Russian military leaders announced their intention to bring back many of the larger divisions from before the 2008 reforms to partly correct for force structure problems. As the Russian economy mobilizes, the defense base could better produce more equipment to make up for wartime losses. Western defense industries, meanwhile, are straining under the demands of replenishing Ukraine. Russia may calculate that it can shore up its position while biding time until Western supplies are exhausted or the world moves on.
But analysts should be careful about forecasting outcomes. The classic adage still holds: in war, the first reports are often wrong or fragmentary. Only time will tell whether Russia can salvage its invasion or whether Ukrainian forces will prevail. The conflict has already followed an unpredictable course, and so the West should avoid making hasty judgments about what went wrong with Russia’s campaign, lest it learn the wrong lessons, devise incorrect strategies, or acquire the wrong types of weapons. Just as the West overestimated Russia’s capabilities before the invasion, it could now underestimate them. And it could overestimate a similarly closed system, such as the Chinese military. It takes time for analysts to learn how a combatant adapts and changes its tactics.
Experts should not, however, toss out the tools they now use to evaluate military power. Many standard metrics—such as the way a force is structured, the technical specifications of its weapons, and the quality of its training programs—are still valid. But although these factors, along with a military’s doctrine and previous operations, are important, they are not necessarily predictive. As this war and other recent conflicts have shown, analysts need better ways to measure the intangible elements of military capability—such as the military’s culture, its ability to learn, its level of corruption, and its will to fight—if they want to accurately forecast power and plan for future conflicts.
Unfortunately, analysts will likely have plenty of time to develop and hone such metrics. Because for all the uncertainty, this much is clear: as Russia continues to mobilize and Kyiv and its supporters dig in, the war is poised to continue.


What Russia Got Wrong

Can Moscow Learn From Its Failures in Ukraine?

By Dara Massicot

March/April 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Dara Massicot · February 8, 2023

Three months before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, CIA Director William Burns and U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Sullivan met in Moscow with Nikolai Patrushev, an ultra-hawkish adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Burns and Sullivan informed Patrushev that they knew of Russia’s invasion plans and that the West would respond with severe consequences if Russia proceeded. According to Burns, Patrushev said nothing about the invasion. Instead, he looked them in the eye, conveying what Burns took as a message: the Russian military could achieve what it wanted.

Once home, the two Americans informed U.S. President Joe Biden that Moscow had made up its mind. Not long after, Washington began publicly warning the world that Russia would attack Ukraine. Three months ahead of the invasion, the Kremlin knew that the United States had discovered its war plans and that the world would be primed for an assault—yet Putin decided to deny his intentions to Russia’s own troops and most of its senior leaders. They did not learn of the invasion until several days or even hours before it began. The secrecy was a mistake. By orchestrating the attack with just a small group of advisers, Putin undercut many of the advantages his country should have had.

These strengths were substantial. Before the invasion, Russia’s military was larger and better equipped than Ukraine’s. Its forces had more combat experience than did Kyiv’s, even though both had fought in Ukraine’s eastern territories. Most Western analysts therefore assumed that if Russian forces used their advantages wisely, the Ukrainians could not withstand the attack for long.

Why Russia did not prevail—why it was instead stopped in its tracks, routed outside major cities, and put on the defensive—has become one of the most important questions in both U.S. foreign policy and international security more broadly. The answer has many components. The excessive internal secrecy gave troops and commanders little time to prepare, leading to heavy losses. Russia created an invasion plan that was riddled with faulty assumptions, arbitrary political guidance, and planning errors that departed from key Russian military principles. The initial invasion called for multiple lines of attack with no follow-on force, tethering the military to operational objectives that were overly ambitious for the size of its forces. And the Kremlin erroneously believed that its war plans were sound, that Ukraine would not put up much resistance, and that the West’s support would not be strong enough to make a difference. As a result, Russia was shocked when its troops ran into a determined Ukraine backed by Western intelligence and weapons. Russian forces were then repeatedly beaten.

But as the war drags on into its second year, analysts must not focus only on Russia’s failures. The story of Russia’s military performance is far more nuanced than many early narratives about the war have suggested. The Russian armed forces are not wholly incompetent or incapable of learning. They can execute some types of complex operations—such as mass strikes that disable Ukraine’s critical infrastructure—which they had eschewed during the first part of the invasion, when Moscow hoped to capture the Ukrainian state largely intact. The Russian military has learned from its mistakes and made big adjustments, such as downsizing its objectives and mobilizing new personnel, as well as tactical ones, such as using electronic warfare tools that jam Ukrainian military communications without affecting its own. Russian forces can also sustain higher combat intensity than most other militaries; as of December, they were firing an impressive 20,000 rounds of artillery per day or more (although, according to CNN, in early 2023, that figure had dropped to 5,000). And they have been operating with more consistency and stability since shifting to the defensive in late 2022, making it harder for Ukrainian troops to advance.


Russia has still not been able to break Ukraine’s will to fight or impede the West’s materiel and intelligence support. It is unlikely to achieve its initial goal of turning Ukraine into a puppet state. But it could continue to adjust its strategy and solidify its occupied holdings in the south and east, eventually snatching a diminished variant of victory from the jaws of defeat.

TOO MUCH AND NOT ENOUGH

Before the war in Ukraine began, the Russian military had several known structural problems, each of which undermined its ability to conduct a large invasion. Over a decade ago, Moscow deliberately dismantled its army and turned it into a smaller force designed for rapid response operations. The transformation required massive changes. After World War II, the Soviet Union maintained an enormous force designed to wage protracted, vast conflicts in Europe by conscripting millions of soldiers and creating a huge defense industry to menace NATO and enforce communist rule in allied states. The Soviet military suffered from endemic corruption, and it struggled to produce equipment on par with the West’s. But its size and sprawling footprint made it a formidable Cold War challenge.

When the Soviet regime collapsed, Russian leaders could not manage or justify such a large military. The prospect of a land battle with NATO was fading into the past. In response, starting in the early 1990s, Russia’s leaders began a reform and modernization process. The goal was to create a military that would be smaller but more professional and nimble, ready to quickly suppress flare-ups on Russia’s periphery.

This process continued, on and off, into the new millennium. In 2008, the Russian military announced a comprehensive reform program called “New Look” that intended to restructure the force by disbanding units, retiring officers, overhauling training programs and military education, and allocating more funds—including to expand the ranks of professional enlisted soldiers and to acquire newer weapons. As part of this process, Russia replaced sizable Soviet divisions designed to fight major land wars with less-cumbersome brigades and battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Moscow also worked to reduce its dependence on conscripts.


Russia’s military modernization efforts failed to root out corruption.

By 2020, it seemed as if the military had met many of its benchmarks. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu declared that 70 percent of his country’s equipment was new or had been modernized. The country had a growing arsenal of conventional precision munitions, and the military possessed more professional enlisted personnel than conscripts. Russia had conducted two successful operations, one in Syria—to prop up the regime of Bashar al-Assad—and another to take territory in eastern Ukraine.

But the 2022 wholesale invasion of Ukraine exposed these reforms as insufficient. The modernization effort neglected, for example, the mobilization system. Russia’s attempts to build better weapons and improve training did not translate into increased proficiency on the battlefield. Some of the ostensibly new gear that left Russian factories is seriously flawed. Russia’s missile failure rates are high, and many of its tanks lack proper self-defense equipment, making them highly vulnerable to antitank weapons. Meanwhile, there is little evidence that Russia modified its training programs ahead of its February 2022 invasion to prepare troops for the tasks they would later face in Ukraine. In fact, the steps Russia did take to prepare made proper training more difficult. By deploying many units near the Ukrainian border almost a year before the war and keeping equipment in the field, the Russian military deprived its soldiers of the ability to practice appropriate skills and conduct required equipment maintenance.


Russia’s modernization efforts also failed to root out corruption, which still afflicts multiple aspects of Russian military life. The country’s armed forces frequently inflated the number of prewar personnel in individual units to meet recruiting quotas, allowing some commanders to steal surplus funds. The military is plagued by missing supplies. It generally has unreliable and opaque reporting up and down the command chain, which possibly led Russia’s leadership to believe its forces were better, quantitatively and qualitatively, than they really were at the start of the invasion.

A destroyed Russian tank outside of Kherson, Ukraine, November 2022

Valentyn Ogirenko / Reuters

Modernization may have helped Russia in its smaller, 2014 invasion of Ukraine and its air campaigns in Syria. But it does not appear to have learned from its operational experience in either conflict. In both, for instance, Russia had many ground-based special forces teams to guide incoming strikes, something it has lacked in the current war. Russia also had a unified operational command, which it did not create for the current invasion until several months after it began.

In at least one case, the modernization effort was actively incompatible with high-intensity warfare. As part of its scheme to cultivate trust with the Russian population after its wars in Chechnya, the Kremlin largely prohibited new conscripts from serving in war zones. This meant that Russia pulled professional soldiers from most units across the country and deployed them as BTGs to staff its Ukraine invasion. The move was itself a questionable decision: even a fully staffed and equipped BTG is not capable of protracted, intense combat along an extended frontline, as many experts, including U.S. Army analysts Charles Bartles and Lester Grau, have noted. On top of that, according to documents recovered from the invasion by the Ukrainian military, plenty of these units were understaffed when they invaded Ukraine. Personnel shortages also meant that Russia’s technically more modern and capable equipment did not perform at its full potential, as many pieces were only partly crewed. And the country did not have enough dismounted infantry or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance forces to effectively clear routes and avoid ambushes.

The resulting failures may have surprised much of the world. But they did not come as a shock to many of the experts who watch the Russian military. They knew from assessing the country’s force structure that it was ill suited to send a force of 190,000 personnel into a large neighboring state across multiple lines of advance. They were therefore astonished as the Kremlin commanded the military to do exactly that.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

To understand how Russia’s bad planning undermined its performance and advantages, it is helpful to imagine how the invasion of Ukraine would have started if Moscow had followed its prescribed military strategy. According to Russian doctrine, an interstate war such as this one should begin with weeks of air and missile attacks against an enemy’s military and critical infrastructure during what strategists call “the initial period of war.” Russia’s planners consider this the decisive period of warfare, with air force operations and missile strikes, lasting between four and six weeks, designed to erode the opposing country’s military capabilities and capacity to resist. According to Russia’s theory, ground forces are typically deployed to secure objectives only after air forces and missile attacks have achieved many of their objectives.

The Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) did conduct strikes against Ukrainian positions at the war’s beginning. But it did not systematically attack critical infrastructure, possibly because the Russians believed they would need to quickly administer Ukraine and wanted to keep its leadership facilities intact, its power grid online, and the Ukrainian population apathetic. Fatefully, the Russian military committed its ground troops on day one rather than waiting until it had managed to clear roads and suppress Ukrainian units. The result was catastrophic. Russian forces, rushing to meet what they believed were orders to arrive in certain areas by set times, overran their logistics and found themselves hemmed in to specific routes by Ukrainian units. They were then relentlessly bombarded by artillery and antiarmor weapons.

Moscow also decided to commit nearly all its professional ground and airborne forces to one multiaxis attack, counter to the Russian military’s tradition of keeping forces from Siberia and the Russian Far East as a second echelon or a strategic reserve. This decision made little military sense. By attempting to seize several parts of Ukraine simultaneously, Russia stretched its logistics and support systems to the breaking point. Had Russia launched air and missile strikes days or weeks before committing ground forces, attacked along a smaller frontline, and maintained a large reserve force, its invasion might have looked different. In this case, Russia would have had simpler logistics, concentrated fires, and reduced exposure for its advancing units. It might even have overwhelmed local groups of Ukrainian air defenses.

Moscow stretched its logistics and support systems to the breaking point.

It is difficult to know exactly why Russia deviated so wildly from its military doctrine (and from common sense). But one reason seems clear: the Kremlin’s political interference. According to information obtained by reporters from The Washington Post, the war was planned only by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his closest confidants in the intelligence services, the armed forces, and the Kremlin. Based on these accounts, this team advocated for a rapid invasion on multiple fronts, a mad dash to Kyiv to neutralize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky through assassination or kidnapping, and the installation of a network of collaborators who would administer a new government—steps that a broader, more experienced collection of planners might have explained would not work.


The Kremlin’s ideas were obviously ineffective. Yet it delayed important course corrections, likely because it believed they would be politically unpopular at home. For example, the Kremlin tried to entice ad hoc volunteers in the early summer to plug holes created by severe battlefield losses, but this effort attracted far too few personnel. Only after the September collapse of the military’s front in Kharkiv did Moscow order a mobilization. Later, the Kremlin did not allow a retreat from the city of Kherson until months after their positions became untenable, risking thousands of troops.

HOW RUSSIA PLAYED ITSELF

Before and during wars, countries rely on operational security, or OPSEC, to keep crucial aspects of their plans secret and to reduce vulnerabilities for their own forces. In some cases, that entails deception. In World War II, for instance, the Allies stationed troops and decoys on a range of beaches in the southern United Kingdom to confuse the Nazis as to which location would be used to launch an attack. In other instances, OPSEC involves limiting the internal dissemination of war plans to lower the risk that they will go public. For example, in preparation for Operation Desert Storm, U.S. pilots who would later be assigned to eliminate Iraqi air defenses trained for months to conduct such strikes but were not told about their specific targets until days before the attack began.

The Kremlin’s war plans, of course, were made public months before the war. As a number of news outlets have reported, including The New York Times and The Washington Post, U.S. intelligence agencies uncovered detailed and accurate outlines of Russia’s plans and then shared them with the media, as well as with allies and partners. Rather than abort the invasion, the Kremlin insisted to journalists and diplomats that the large contingents of troops massed on Ukraine’s borders were there for training and that it had no intention of attacking its neighbor. These claims did not fool the West, but they did fool most Russians—including those in the armed forces. The Kremlin withheld its war plans from military stakeholders at many levels, from individual soldiers and pilots to general officers, and many troops and officials were surprised when they received orders to invade. A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a British defense and security think tank, which was based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with Ukrainian officials, found that even senior members of the Russian General Staff were kept in the dark about the invasion plans until shortly before it started.


In front of a Russian anti-aircraft missile system in the Luhansk region, Ukraine, January 2023

Alexander Ermochenko / Reuters

Because most military leaders were not brought into the planning effort until the last minute, they could not correct major mistakes. The government did not appear to undergo what is referred to in Russian strategy as a “special period”—a time of categorizing, stockpiling, and organizing resources for a major war—because its planners did not know they needed to get ready for one. The excessive secrecy also meant that Moscow missed several key opportunities to prepare the defense industry to produce and store essential ammunition. Even after they were stationed near Ukraine, Russian units were not staffed or supplied at appropriate levels, likely because planners believed the troops were conducting training exercises. And because the military did not have time to coordinate its electronic warfare systems, when Russian forces attempted to jam Ukraine’s communications, they also jammed their own.

Prewar secrecy led to problems that were especially pronounced in the air. Before the invasion, Russian pilots had experience fighting in Syria, but operations there had taken place over uncontested territory, most often in the desert. The pilots had virtually no experience fighting over a larger, forested country, let alone against an adversary capable of hitting their jets with layers of air defenses. They were given little to no training in such tactics before the invasion. That inexperience is partly why, despite sometimes flying hundreds of missions per day, Russia has been unable to dismantle Ukraine’s air force or air defenses. Another factor was how Russia decided to employ its forces. Because Russia’s ground troops were in grave danger within days, the VKS was quickly reassigned from suppressing Ukrainian air defenses to providing close air support, according to RUSI analysis. This adjustment helped prevent Russia from establishing air supremacy, and it forced the Russians to fly at low altitudes, within reach of Ukraine’s Stinger missiles. As a result, they lost many helicopters and fighter jets.

Prewar secrecy and lies were not the only ways that the Kremlin played itself. Once troops began rushing toward Kyiv, Moscow could no longer deny the fact of its invasion. But for months, it continued to obscure the conflict or delay important decisions in ways that hurt its own operations. At a basic level, Russia has refused to classify the invasion as a war, instead calling it a “special military operation.” This decision, made either to mollify the Russian population or because the Kremlin assumed the conflict would end quickly, prevented the country from implementing administrative rules that would have allowed it to gain quick access to the legal, economic, and material resources it needed to support the invasion. For at least the first six months, the false classification also made it easy for soldiers to resign or refuse to fight without facing desertion charges.

PAY NO HEED

The Russian government appears to have assumed that the Ukrainians would not resist, that the Ukrainian army would fade away, and that the West would not be able to help Kyiv in time. These conclusions were not entirely unsupported. According to The Washington Post, the Russian intelligence services had their own prewar covert polling suggesting that only 48 percent of the population was “ready to defend” Ukraine. Zelensky’s approval rating was less than 30 percent on the eve of the war. Russia’s intelligence agencies had an extensive spy network inside Ukraine to set up a collaborationist government. (Ukraine later arrested and charged 651 people for treason and collaboration, including several officials in its security services.) Russian planners may also have assumed that Ukraine’s forces would not be ready because the Ukrainian government did not move to a war footing until a few weeks before the invasion. They likely thought that Ukraine’s artillery munitions would quickly run out. Based on the West’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its relatively small arms provisions during the run-up to the war in 2022, Moscow might reasonably have assumed that the United States and Europe would not provide major support for Ukraine, or at least not in time.


But the Kremlin was evaluating data points that simply allowed it to see what it wished to see. The same intelligence services poll, for instance, suggested that 84 percent of Ukrainian respondents would consider Russian forces to be occupiers, not liberators. The United States and its allies broadcast Russia’s plans and various attempts to generate a pretext for invasion, and they warned Russia privately and publicly that the country would face enormous repercussions if it started a war. Yet apparently, no one in Putin’s inner circle convinced him that he should revise Russia’s approach and prepare for a different, harder type of conflict: one in which Ukrainians fought back and received substantial Western assistance.

Putin is digging in for the long haul.

Such a conflict is exactly what happened. The Ukrainians rallied to defend their sovereignty, enlisting in the military and creating territorial defense units that have resisted the Russians. Zelensky, domestically unpopular before the invasion, saw his approval ratings skyrocket and became a globally recognized wartime leader. And the Ukrainian government succeeded in getting historic amounts of aid from the West. As of late January 2023, the United States has provided $26.8 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s invasion, and European states have contributed billions more. The Ukrainians have been stocked with body armor, air defense systems, helicopters, M777 artillery, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). They are receiving Western tanks. The massive and diverse weapons provisions enabled Ukrainian forces to gain a qualitative edge over Moscow’s troops in terms of battlefield awareness during Russia’s initial push to Kyiv, and it allowed Ukraine to conduct precision strikes on Russian logistics depots and command centers in its eastern regions.

Washington also began providing a stream of what U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks described as “vital” and “high-end” intelligence to Kyiv. The director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency claimed that intelligence sharing with Ukraine has been “revolutionary” in nature, and the director of the National Security Administration and U.S. Cyber Command testified that he had never seen a better example of intelligence sharing in his 35 years of government service. (According to the Pentagon, the United States does not provide intelligence on senior leader locations or participate in Ukrainian targeting decisions.)

This intelligence sharing has mattered at several pivotal points in the war. In congressional testimony, CIA director Burns said he informed Zelensky about the attack on Kyiv before the war, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Zelensky about Russian threats to him personally. These alerts gave Ukraine time to prepare a defense that was essential to protecting both the capital and Zelensky. According to senior defense officials, the United States also provided planning and war-gaming support for Ukraine’s September counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, both of which ended with tremendous success.

THE BEAR IS LEARNING

Ukraine’s supporters have had many reasons to celebrate in 2022, and joyful scenes have emerged from recently liberated Ukrainian land. But difficult scenes followed. Ukrainian and international investigators have uncovered evidence of war crimes in recently liberated cities such as Bucha, Izyum, and Kherson. And despite hopes to the contrary, it is too soon to say that Russia’s campaign will collapse. Putin is certainly digging in for the long haul, and although wounded, the Russian military is still capable of complex operations, adaptive learning, and withstanding a level of combat that few militaries in the world can. Sustained high-intensity, high-attrition combined-arms warfare is extraordinarily difficult, and Russia and Ukraine now have more recent experience with it than any other country in the world.

Take, for example, the VKS. Although its pilots have failed to suppress Ukraine’s air defenses, analysts must remember that such missions are notoriously time-consuming and difficult, as U.S. pilots have noted. The VKS is learning, and rather than continuing to waste aircraft by flying more-conservative and less-effective missions, it is trying to wear down Ukrainian air defenses by using empty Soviet-era missiles and Shaheed drones purchased from Iran.

The Russian military also appears to be getting better at performing one of the most dangerous army maneuvers of all: crossing rivers under fire. Such operations require planned withdrawals, discipline, force protection plans, and tight sequencing that few others demand. When these operations are executed poorly, many soldiers can die; in May 2022, the Ukrainian military destroyed a Russian BTG as it attempted to cross the Donets River. But the military’s November withdrawal across the Dnieper River was comparatively smooth, partly because it was better planned. Despite coming under artillery fire, thousands of Russian forces successfully retreated east.



Russia has learned to correct for past mistakes in other areas, as well. In late spring, Russian forces finally succeeded in jamming Ukrainian communications without jamming their own. During September, the Kremlin declared a partial mobilization to compensate for personnel shortages, pulling 300,000 draftees into the armed forces. The process was chaotic, and these new soldiers have not received good training. But now, these new forces are inside eastern Ukraine, where they have shored up defensive positions and helped depleted units with basic but important tasks. The government is also incrementally putting the Russian economy on a wartime footing, helping the state get ready for a long conflict.

These modifications are starting to show results. Russia’s defense industrial base may be straining under sanctions and import restrictions, but its factories are intact and working around the clock to try to keep up with demand. Although Russia is running low on missiles, it has expanded its inventory by repurposing antiship cruise missiles and air-defense missiles. The Russian military has not yet improved its battle damage assessment process or its ability to strike moving targets, but it is now hitting Ukraine’s electrical grid with precision. As of January 2023, Russian strikes have damaged roughly 40 percent of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, at one point knocking out power for more than 10 million people.

The Ukrainians’ learning curve has also been steep, and through experimentation, they have been able to keep Russian forces off balance. The military has shown creativity in its planning, and it has hit Russian air bases and the Black Sea Fleet. Ukraine’s pilots and soldiers, like Russia’s, have garnered remarkable and unique combat experience. Ukraine has benefited more from external support than has Russia.

The Kremlin aspires to do more than just hold the land it has already taken.

But Russian forces have successfully adapted and experimented as they have assumed a defensive posture. After weeks of devastating HIMARS attacks during the summer of 2022, Russia moved its command sites and many logistics depots out of range. Russian forces have shown more competence on the defensive than on the offensive, particularly in the south, where they created layered defenses that were difficult for Ukrainian forces to fight through. General Sergey Surovikin, who was named Russia’s overall commander in October, was previously the commander of the southern operational group, and he brought this experience to other regions that Russia partly occupies. Troops have dug extensive trenches and created other defensive positions.

Notably, Russia withdrew from the city of Kherson and transitioned to defense only after Surovikin was appointed as the war’s commander. Putin also began admitting that the conflict will be challenging once Surovikin assumed charge. These changes suggest that Putin may have received more realistic appraisals of the situation in Ukraine under Surovikin’s tenure.

Yet in January 2023, Surovikin was demoted in favor of General Valeriy Gerasimov. Although the reasons for this command change are unclear, palace intrigue and cronyism may be behind it rather than any specific failure of Surovikin’s leadership. And no Russian commander has been able to break Ukraine’s will to fight even though Russia continues to launch missiles that inflict suffering on the Ukrainian people. But the bombings and entrenchment may well degrade Ukraine’s capacity, making it harder for the country to reclaim more of its land.

KNOWN UNKNOWNS

The Kremlin, however, aspires to do more than just hold the land it has already taken. Putin has made it clear that he wants all four provinces that Moscow illegally annexed in September—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—and in a televised meeting last December, he indicated that he is prepared to undergo “a long process” to get them. Putin’s downsized objectives and sudden candor about the campaign’s length show that the Kremlin can adapt to its weakened position and condition its population for a long war. Russia, then, is either evolving or buying time until it can regenerate its forces. The question is whether its changes will be enough.

There are reasons to think the shifts will not salvage the war for Russia, partly because so many things need to change; no single factor explains why the war has gone so poorly for Russia thus far. The explanations include problems that are not easy to address because they are intractable parts of the Russian system, such as the self-defeating deceit illustrated by the Kremlin’s decision to prioritize secrecy and domestic stability over adequate planning. And Moscow has, if anything, doubled down on silencing frank discussion of the conflict, even going so far as to criminalize assessments of combat deaths and forecasts about how the war might unfold. Although officials can safely talk about some problems—for example, Russian military leaders have called for an expansion of the armed forces—others remain decidedly off-limits, including the larger issues of incompetence and the poor command climate that has led to the military’s horrific problems inside Ukraine. This censorship makes it hard for the Kremlin to get good information on what is going wrong in the war, complicating efforts to correct course.


Some of the major issues for Russia are largely beyond Moscow’s control. Ukrainian resolve has hardened against Russia, something the Russian military, for all its brutality, cannot undo. Russia has also been unable or unwilling to interdict Western weapons flows or intelligence to Ukraine. As long as these two factors—Ukrainian resolve and Western support—remain in place, the Kremlin cannot turn Ukraine into a puppet state, as it originally sought to do.


Just as the West overestimated the Russians, it could now underestimate them.

The Russian military has, however, corrected certain important problems. To overcome a bad plan, it fixed its command structure and changed many of its tactics. It has consolidated its positions in Ukraine after heavy losses while adding more personnel, which will make Ukrainian counteroffensives more costly. Russian military leaders announced their intention to bring back many of the larger divisions from before the 2008 reforms to partly correct for force structure problems. As the Russian economy mobilizes, the defense base could better produce more equipment to make up for wartime losses. Western defense industries, meanwhile, are straining under the demands of replenishing Ukraine. Russia may calculate that it can shore up its position while biding time until Western supplies are exhausted or the world moves on.

But analysts should be careful about forecasting outcomes. The classic adage still holds: in war, the first reports are often wrong or fragmentary. Only time will tell whether Russia can salvage its invasion or whether Ukrainian forces will prevail. The conflict has already followed an unpredictable course, and so the West should avoid making hasty judgments about what went wrong with Russia’s campaign, lest it learn the wrong lessons, devise incorrect strategies, or acquire the wrong types of weapons. Just as the West overestimated Russia’s capabilities before the invasion, it could now underestimate them. And it could overestimate a similarly closed system, such as the Chinese military. It takes time for analysts to learn how a combatant adapts and changes its tactics.

Experts should not, however, toss out the tools they now use to evaluate military power. Many standard metrics—such as the way a force is structured, the technical specifications of its weapons, and the quality of its training programs—are still valid. But although these factors, along with a military’s doctrine and previous operations, are important, they are not necessarily predictive. As this war and other recent conflicts have shown, analysts need better ways to measure the intangible elements of military capability—such as the military’s culture, its ability to learn, its level of corruption, and its will to fight—if they want to accurately forecast power and plan for future conflicts.

Unfortunately, analysts will likely have plenty of time to develop and hone such metrics. Because for all the uncertainty, this much is clear: as Russia continues to mobilize and Kyiv and its supporters dig in, the war is poised to continue.

  • DARA MASSICOT is a Senior Policy Researcher at the RAND Corporation. Before joining RAND, she served as a senior analyst for Russian military capabilities at the Department of Defense.

Foreign Affairs · by Dara Massicot · February 8, 2023


10. China's Spy Balloon Proves the U.S. Homeland Is Vulnerable


China's Spy Balloon Proves the U.S. Homeland Is Vulnerable

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · February 8, 2023

Before 9/11, most Americans believed they were safe from foreign attack. The smoking holes in the heart of New York City and the side of the Pentagon set them straight.

Perhaps the most consequential aftermath of those horrific tragedies was a national consensus to take homeland security seriously. Congress established the Department of Homeland Security, not just as a federal agency for our protection, but as the hub of a national enterprise to ensure a unified response to foreign threats and disasters.

The Department of Defense established NORTHCOM, a domestic military command dedicated to protecting the homeland and providing military assistance to civilian authorities for disasters and domestic response. These were unprecedented institutions, with the mission of safeguarding the safety, prosperity, and freedoms of Americans as rigorously in peacetime as in times of war.

Up In a Balloon

Biden’s balloon follies demonstrate how far in two decades our government has drifted from the noble vision of limited government providing the fundamental service we expect from the government: providing for the common defense.

The intent of homeland security was to better serve Americans. Instead, Joe Biden has exploited that centralization of authority, like every other instrument of government from the IRS to the CDC, to put politics ahead of the American people.

Once word about Xi’s hot-air overflight got out, the Administration’s initial reaction was to obsess over the politics of the problem. Rather than address the problem directly and forthrightly, they deflected and obfuscated to try to obscure the fact that they had failed to respond appropriately. We’ve seen this before when they abandoned Afghanistan. Balloon-gate was no different.

There are no two ways to parse this. A Chinese spy balloon traversing the entirety of the United States is blatantly illegal, a clear violation of American airspace, and a deliberate encroachment on American sovereignty. It is a perfect example of the kind of threat that post-9/11 homeland security measures were meant to prevent.

Biden floated a variety of explanations and excuses as to why the balloon was allowed to survey critical defense facilities from coast to coast—from “Blame Trump” to “Everything is under control,” to “I am really the hero here.” But the real reason for the Administration’s belated, muddled, and confused response is that Biden is trapped between his desire to want to normalize relations with China, and the American people who want him to get tough on China and protect us.

Biden has a long track record of failing to be honest about the China threat. The balloon fiasco is just the latest example of the White House putting its politics over our security.

The Border Threat

And it is not just the China threat where Biden is playing fast and loose with our safety. Border security has become such a massive disaster that now Congress is considering impeaching the Secretary of Homeland Security. The administration’s malfeasance on the border is so egregious, writes former U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Mark Morgan, they have tried to lower the number of illegal border crossings by mass “pardoning” ineligible immigrants and waving them through ports of entry. This shell game serves Biden politically but does nothing to secure the border.

From sending the FBI to investigate school boards to using the Department of Homeland Security to open the gates to millions of unvetted immigrants, Biden has inverted the nation’s homeland security architecture to serve his purposes rather than our security.

Biden may think this is all just good politics, and he may be right—until the next 9/11. The reason Americans took homeland security seriously after the Sept. 11 attacks is because they recognized there were foreign enemies intent on killing us in our own communities—and we were acting like fat and happy sitting ducks. The sorry state of our border security and the balloon overflight are global advertising to America’s enemies that America is open for monkey business.

This unserious approach to homeland security must stop right now. Biden is no doubt hoping that the worst that can happen won’t happen under his watch.

But hope is not a strategy. Nor is it good enough for America. The world has only gotten more dangerous since 2001. It’s time for Biden to wise up and put national security before political calculations.

A Heritage Foundation vice president, James Jay Carafano directs the think tank’s research on matters of national security and foreign affairs. He is a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by James Jay Carafano · February 8, 2023


11. New Futures Command chief shifts main effort to designing Army of 2040





New Futures Command chief shifts main effort to designing Army of 2040

Defense News · by Jen Judson · February 8, 2023

WASHINGTON — The new head of Army Futures Command has shifted the organization’s focus from delivering a modernized force by 2030 to designing the Army of 2040, he said Feb. 8 at an Association of the U.S. Army breakfast.

The four-star command — based in Austin, Texas, developed in 2017 and stood up in 2018 — was tasked to modernize the force by 2030. Army leadership developed priorities and lists of weapons systems that would be developed within each priority area to fully flesh out a force capable of successfully fighting near-peer adversaries Russia and China.

Gen. James Rainey became the second Army Futures Command chief in the fall of 2022, almost a year after the first commander, Gen. Mike Murray, retired.

Now, in Rainey’s view, the command’s part in the servicewide modernization effort is “transformation.”

“Modernization is part of transformation, but modernizing and not transforming is going to end up with a bunch of kit without the right leaders, without trained units, without formational lethality,” Rainey said.

“We need to outthink the Chinese, boldly maneuver ahead of them,” Rainey said of the U.S. military’s pacing threat as laid out in the National Defense Strategy. The Army needs to “grab some ground and anchor it, so they wake up trying to figure out how they’re going to keep up with us. I think that’s well within our capabilities as an institution.”

Now that the Army is locked in and not much will change between now and 2030, Rainey said focusing beyond that is what he is “really excited about” and where big opportunities lie.

The command is already working on a concept for 2040, Rainey said, which is taking place at its Futures and Concepts Center. But, he added, “I think we have a little bit of time to slow down … and make sure that we’ve got the assumptions right.”

The key to preparing for a future fight, according to Rainey, is assessing what might and might not change between now and 2040, and the implications of that.

That understanding will “translate into new concept-required capabilities,” he added, “where we can then go out to our teammates inside the Army, in the joint force, to industry, to Congress, [those] that we’re accountable to, and say: ‘Hey, here are the things we’re going to need to be able to do in 2040.’ ”

The service will go after rapidly fielding some capabilities “aggressively,” but some others will not be possible yet and pursued through research and experimentation, he said.

Rainey stressed the need to move now to pursue a force design for 2040, even though a big focus is turned to meeting the goals set out for 2030. To deliver capability by 2040 means fielding must begin in 2035, Rainey added, which means bending metal in 2030 and developing funding plans even earlier.

“I know I said to slow down, but I meant a little bit,” Rainey said. “We’ve got a sense of urgency, and it’s a huge opportunity. Now’s the time to get this.”

About Jen Judson

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.



12. The Somme in the Sky: Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian Air War


Conclusion:


In conclusion, the air campaign has been an indispensable aspect of the Ukrainian success to date. Allied military planners and strategists should not draw the wrong lessons, especially by conflating a seeming lack of motion in the air with its lack of importance. The Ukrainian Air Force and air defense force’s ability to leverage all domains into an air campaign demonstrate the value of a stalemate. Waging an exemplary defensive air campaign provides many case studies, especially for allies and partners who find themselves in a position of aerial disadvantage.

The Somme in the Sky: Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian Air War - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Michael Stefanovic · February 9, 2023

The skies over Ukraine resemble an aerial version of the World War I Battle of the Somme. In contrast to the first frenzied days over Kyiv, neither side is attempting to penetrate deep into the other’s airspace. Much like the machine guns in the French and German trenches, an array of surface-to-air missiles and defensive fighters would make such an attempt suicidal. This has resulted in an aerial no-man’s-land. Both sides trade stand-off strikes using expendable platforms and munitions, and both sides take pot-shots at each other along the front lines from extremely low altitudes, but neither side can marshal decisive combat power in the air.

Yet, this doesn’t mean they aren’t trying. The stalemate in the air is maintained by continued aggressive action from both Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continue to push for Western airpower, and the Russia has fielded new fleets of Iranian drones. Air defense systems feature prominently in recent aid packages to Kyiv, while Russia leans on their deep stockpiles of long-range weapons. In short, the relative lack of motion demonstrates the importance placed on the air fight by both parties, as each new effort is quickly countered by the other.

Imagine the consequences of either side achieving a breakthrough in the air. Critical Western aid to Kyiv is arriving via road and rail from Eastern Europe. If Russian aviation could interdict these convoys, the Ukrainian ground forces would be hard pressed to hold their lines, much less conduct offensives. And if Russia had air superiority, it could use its near-infinite supply of unguided weapons to ravage Ukrainian cities as Russian bombers did in Aleppo. Conversely, if Ukrainian attack aircraft could turn Russian supply lines into highways of death, Russian artillery and armored forces would collapse without fuel or ammunition. Because of these high stakes, the Ukrainian Air Force’s air and ground interceptors face fearful odds on a daily basis, despite being outnumbered ten-to-one and technologically outclassed. Neither side can win the air fight, but neither side can afford to lose it either.

Become a Member

It is unwise to make categorical assertions about technologies or tactics based on incomplete information in an unfinished conflict, but one year of fighting suggests several key principles that might inform future Western concepts and investments. First, a stalemate is not an indicator of irrelevance but rather of great importance. Supporting Ukraine in the air remains a prerequisite for success on the ground. Second, the air campaign is not limited to the air domain — it should involve all domains. In order to win the next fight, U.S. and allied forces should not only invest in cross-domain datalinks and interoperability, but also in joint training to build habitual relationships across domain boundaries. Finally, offense is not necessarily the essence of airpower — the dynamics of defense can be crucial too. A strategy of air denial may be all that is needed, and inexpensive shorter-range platforms fielded en masse are a good means to that end.

A Stalemate Is an Indicator of Strategic Importance, Not Irrelevance

From the very outset, Ukraine aggressively pursued a wide range of means to deny Russia the use of their airspace. Reducing the offensive potential of Russian airpower was a necessary condition for the initial reversals around Kyiv, holding the line in the East, the Kharkiv breakthrough, and the Kherson offensive. Sustaining that stalemate is a costly endeavor that requires a great deal of bravery and sacrifice from the Ukrainian forces, and a great deal of effort and resources from the partners of the Ukrainian people.

To return to the Battle of the Somme, no serious analysis of the World War I would conflate the static trench-lines with a lack of strategic importance. The difficulty in breaking through networks of defenses was perhaps the central feature of that war. The stalemate led to a tremendous amount of battlefield innovation, with the French and British producing tanks and the Germans developing Stormtrooper tactics, both of which figured prominently in World War II. Similarly, Ukraine has developed remarkably clever tactics and worked with international partners to field novel combinations of capabilities such as the High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile-shooting MiG-29. Russia reciprocated by digging deeper into their national stockpile of exquisite weapons and repurposing legacy inventory.


Part of the art of operational design is knowing where you must win, and where you must simply prevent your enemy from winning. In an era of aerial stalemate, the United States and its allies cannot assume the same extraordinary overmatch they enjoyed in recent wars. Therefore, the United States should learn to play Corbett’s hand as well as Mahan’s. This means learning to deny the use of the air when they cannot control it, while finding ways to take control for decisive windows. In future conflicts, allied air forces do not necessarily need to hold the air, they just need to ensure superiority at the right time and place to enable decisive action by the joint force.

The Air Campaign Is Not Just the Air Domain

In the wake of their victory at Pearl Harbor, Japanese strategists found their force afflicted with a “victory disease.” Success in the early phases of the fight led to overconfidence, which in turn led to strategists fighting how they wanted to fight rather than how they needed to fight. Similarly, after decades of unquestioned allied air dominance, it is easy to take the air domain for granted. Indeed, in the U.S. military’s institutional memory, its power in the air domain was sufficient to unilaterally prevail in the air campaign and then quickly transition to advance other joint campaigns. But these are dangerous assumptions when dealing with an adversary’s air force that enjoys at least parity, if not overmatch. Allied air forces should double down on the air domain — as our respective joint forces are built upon the assumption of our success — but they should also weave other domains into the joint air campaign.

The essence of a successful air campaign is its ability to transcend the limitations of the surface fight and strike deep into the heart of an adversary’s war-making power. However, doing so comes at a cost, and airmen must be frugal in their application of effects. Therefore, airmen envision the adversary as a system, identify key nodes, and apply effects against those nodes to incapacitate that system — whether fuel depots in World War II, bridges in Vietnam, or improvised explosive device networks in more recent conflicts. These effects can, and should, come from multiple domains. The Israeli Air Force offers an excellent example of this, launching anti-radar missiles from trucks based on targeting data from uncrewed aerial vehicles and battlefield airmen.

Ukrainian forces are conducting a masterful air campaign by combining domains in these ways. They are identifying key adversary nodes such as supply depots and surface-to-air missile sites using air, space, and cyber means, and then using a mix of air and ground fires to neutralize these nodes. Without a systems-centric targeting strategy, the sheer volume of Russian artillery would have greatly worsened the odds for Ukrainian land forces. Similarly, a blend of aircraft and surface-to-air fires comprises the Ukrainian air campaign’s essential defensive counter-air mission. Even the maritime domain has played a role, as the volume of cruise missile fires would be much greater if Russia retained the ability to sortie their fleet off the Ukrainian coast. By taking an all-domain approach to the air campaign, Ukraine has offset its disadvantages in the air domain and achieved air denial — a major feat.

The joint all-domain approach to airpower has strong historical precedents. During World War II’s North African campaign, the Royal Air Force was in a tough position against the technological and numerical strength of the Luftwaffe. In order to offset the enemy’s strength in the air, the progenitors of the Special Air Services conducted clandestine raids on enemy air bases around the Mediterranean. Whether an aircraft is destroyed in a dogfight or in a fire on the ground is of little importance, the fact remains that it is no longer a factor in the fight. When German ground radars were inflicting grievous losses on the Allied bomber force, a British commando raid seized and exfiltrated a Freya radar in the daring 1941 Bruneval Raid. Their success ultimately led to the creation of effective countermeasures in the form of chaff (or “window”), saving untold bomber crews’ lives. The same principles were at work six decades later when coalition Special Operations Forces provided targeting data to B-52 crews during the initial campaign against the Taliban.

The key lesson for U.S. and allied planners is to aggressively pursue interoperability, both on the technical front with Joint All-Domain Command and Control technologies, and on the tactical front through exercises. As U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Brown has said, U.S. forces must be “integrated by design” across both domains and alliances. Moreover, allied services should reinforce their strength in the air domain to prevail in the air campaign, thereby helping land and sea forces prevent the enemy from marshalling deep combat power.

Offense is Not Necessarily the Essence of Airpower

For most of American history, airpower was an away game, which helps explain Gen. “Hap” Arnold’s iconic quote that “offense is the essence of airpower.” However, America’s allies and partners cannot always make the same assumption, and as a result the United States is ill-served if its air services cannot effectively conduct defensive air campaigns as well. Ukraine has taken a largely defensive approach to their air campaign out of necessity. Had they tried to conduct mass strikes on airfields and central air defense network nodes, they would have sustained unacceptable losses. Instead, they used a “strategy of corrosion,” inducing friction and drag on any Russian attempt to command the air. By doing so, they prevented Russia from employing their brutal yet tragically effective Syrian strategy of carpet-bombing civilian infrastructure with unguided “dumb” bombs. The operational and humanitarian impact of these tactics would have been devastating. Russia continues to commit egregious violations of the laws of war with their stand-off weapons, but a cruise missile problem is still better than a gravity bomb problem. Ukraine’s defensive strategy must therefore be judged a success, especially considering the correlation of forces.

Here too there are revealing historical precedents. In the Battle of Britain, the Royal Air Force exercised tremendous discipline in eroding its adversary and avoiding decisive engagements. With the help of the Chain Home radar system, the United Kingdom’s Spitfires and Hurricanes would climb to altitude and make a single diving pass on the invading German formations and then disengage. While the battle was a close-run thing, it led Germany to shift focus away from destroying the Royal Air Force in order to target civilian populations. This was a decisive mistake that allowed Britain to continue its strategy of corrosion. Repeating this tactic day after day, week after week, the Royal Air Force attrited the Luftwaffe to the point that it could no longer continue operations.

The threats that Washington and its allies face in the Atlantic and the Pacific theaters are well suited to defensive campaigns. In the case of both Taiwan and the Baltics, small allied or partner nations face the risk of an invasion from a larger neighbor. If an attacker like China or Russia gained control of the airspace above one of these countries, that country could still seek to use, contest, or control the airspace below 10,000 feet to considerable effect. Small drones like the Ukrainian Aerorozvidka have proved immensely successful in both directing fires and dropping gravity munitions, which would be valuable in slowing or distracting an attacker. Furthermore, in this situation, integrated air defense systems, special operations forces, and traditional shoulder-fired missiles could also be used to create a fearsome low-level environment.

In conclusion, the air campaign has been an indispensable aspect of the Ukrainian success to date. Allied military planners and strategists should not draw the wrong lessons, especially by conflating a seeming lack of motion in the air with its lack of importance. The Ukrainian Air Force and air defense force’s ability to leverage all domains into an air campaign demonstrate the value of a stalemate. Waging an exemplary defensive air campaign provides many case studies, especially for allies and partners who find themselves in a position of aerial disadvantage.

Become a Member

Col. Michael Stefanovic is a U.S. Air Force civil engineer and explosive ordnance disposal technician. A graduate of the Blue Horizons Innovation program, he led explosive ordnance disposal teams in Iraq and currently serves as head of the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group.

Group Capt. Robert “Chuck” Norris is the Royal Air Force exchange officer to the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group. A helicopter pilot and instructor with 4,500 flying hours, he also has extensive command and staff experience in the U. K. Joint Headquarters, the U. K. Ministry of Defence and NATO headquarters

Col. Christophe Piubeni is the French Air and Space Force exchange officer to the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group. An A400M pilot and instructor with more than 4,000 flying hours and 100 combat missions, he has extensive operational and command experience, as well as staff experience in procurement and capability development. He is the Strategic Studies Group Artificial Intelligence lead and a graduate from the U.K. Joint Staff College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan Institute. He also holds a masters of arts in war studies from King’s College.

Lt. Col. Dave Blair is the innovation lead for the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group. He is an evaluator pilot with more than 2,000 hours in the MQ-1/9 and AC-130. A graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy and the Harvard Kennedy School, he holds a Ph.D. in international relations from Georgetown University, where he teaches as an adjunct professor on the politics of defense innovation.

The authors are all members of the Trilateral Strategic Initiative, which was created a decade ago to strengthen operational effectiveness by encouraging continued collaboration and exchanges between the Royal Air Force, the U.S. Air Force, and the French Air and Space Force. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, or the U.S. Space Force. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of Defense of the linked website for the information, products, or services contained therein.

Image: Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Michael Stefanovic · February 9, 2023



13. Why it’s time to control the donkey trade


The Africa-China donkey trade.

Why it’s time to control the donkey trade

China’s demand for Africa’s donkey hides is rising, putting many families at risk

asiatimes.com · by More by Lauren Johnston · February 9, 2023

In recent years, there has been a huge, rising demand for donkey hides in China, where they are used to make an ancient health-related product called ejiao. Ejiao is made from collagen that has been extracted from donkey hides mixed with herbs and other ingredients to create medicinal and health consumer products.

It’s believed to have properties that strengthen the blood, stop bleeding and improve the quality of both vital fluids and sleep.

Ejiao sells for about US$783 per kilogram and the Chinese market for it has increased from about $3.2 billion in 2013 to about $7.8 billion in 2020. This recent rise in demand is driven by several factors, including rising incomes, popularization of the product via a television series, and an aging population (age is a key demographic driving demand).


In addition, ejiao is sometimes prescribed by doctors, and the cost can newly be covered by health insurance.

A slab of donkey-hide gelatin, Photo: Wikipedia

The demand for ejiao has led to a shortage of donkeys in China and increasingly worldwide. Countries in Africa have been particularly affected.

Africa is home to the highest number of donkeys in the world: about two-thirds of the estimated global population of 53 million donkeys in 2020.

Exact figures on how many hides are exported to China aren’t available because of a growing illicit trade, but there are indications. A study of South Africa’s donkey population, for instance, suggests that it went from 210,000 in 1996 to about 146,000 in 2019. This was attributed to the export of donkey hides.

In a recent paper I examined the trends, issues and prospects for the Africa-China donkey trade. My information came from interviews, literature and news reviews in English and Chinese.


My findings are that the scale of the donkey trade, both illicit and legal, poses a challenge for many countries in Africa, especially in terms of its impact on the most marginalized communities.

Besides donkey welfare, a big part of the challenge is how affordable donkeys are locally. Donkeys have a valuable, ancient role as a workhorse, and losing access to them creates a huge problem for poor households.

The other part of the challenge is regulatory. Only when the donkey hide trade is fully regulated, and export numbers are able to be very limited, might the trade work without adverse consequences for the poor.

This was also highlighted by a recent survey of the East African Community that found that the region was not ready for the mass slaughter and unregulated trade of donkeys. Millions of vulnerable East Africans rely on donkeys for a living and are at risk of losing out through the donkey-skin trade.

Value of donkeys

Donkeys are estimated to support about 158 million people in Africa. In rural areas, the presence of a donkey in a household helps to alleviate poverty and frees women and girls from household drudgery.


Donkeys are one of the simplest, most sustainable and affordable means of transporting people, goods and farm inputs and outputs from home to farm to market and vice versa, as well as to water wells and other places. Even in harsh environments donkeys can travel long distances with a heavy load, limited fluids, and without showing signs of fatigue. They are a durable household asset.

Donkey ownership increases productivity and lessens hard work by, for example, reducing the loads women must otherwise carry themselves. In Ghana, for instance, owning a donkey was found to save adults about five hours of labor a week, and children 10 hours a week. The presence of a donkey also freed girl children to go to school.

Donkeys can also carry heavy loads of firewood and water. This means people need to make fewer trips. This frees up labor and time for other income-generating activities, such as sowing someone’s farm for money.

The value of having a donkey in the household is evident. The loss of a donkey to a household in rural Kenya is associated with an increased risk of poverty – children drop out of school, and there’s less water security and more economic fragility. This makes the donkey trade a sensitive topic.

Government responses

Rising Chinese demand for donkeys has elicited a variety of responses by governments across Africa.


Tanzania, for example, attempted to create a formal donkey industry and trade. But last year, authorities banned it because legal supply couldn’t keep up with demand. Female donkeys typically produce only a few foals each in a lifetime.

In Kenya, public outrage – largely due to the rise of donkey prices and diminishing supply – led to a ban on exports in February 2020. Kenya’s donkey exporters, however, took their case against the ban to Kenya’s High Court in June 2020, and won.

Elsewhere, countries such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Tanzania have banned donkey exports. Others, such as South Africa, banned or limited the donkey trade with requirements for established slaughterhouses and related quotas.

However, the implementation of donkey bans varies according to the strength of the regulatory capacity in each country – and how easy it is to smuggle things across borders.

In South Africa’s case, export quotas have merely sent the trade underground. This leads to more donkey theft. Illicitly traded hides from South Africa are typically from donkeys that are slaughtered inhumanely in the bush or in substandard slaughterhouses in Lesotho. Then they are exported to China.

Poverty also fosters the trade, which in turn can lead to further impoverishment. Donkey owners, needing a short-term income windfall, will sell their animal. It may then be slaughtered and traded illegally and lead to diminished income-earning opportunity in the medium and long run.

What needs to be done

A recent Pan-African Donkey Conference called for a 15-year continent-wide moratorium on the trade to allow supply to recover and regulatory capacity to be enhanced.

The ejiao industry in China is well organized and resourced. A handful of major firms and one province dominate the industry in China, and they are represented by the Shandong Ejiao Industry Association.

A China-Africa donkey hide trade may be possible if African countries get organized, form associations and establish a dialogue with the Shandong Ejiao Industry. The aim would be to work out sustainable mechanisms, prevent damage to local interests and help to counter the illicit trade.

In parallel to this, it would be important for animal-welfare agencies in China to raise awareness of the illicit and damaging impact of the illicit donkey-hide trade.

For now, I believe that the trade is premature. Better regulatory standards are needed by China’s ejiao industry such that illegally traded and stolen donkey hides are not part of the industry.

Deeper cooperation across African countries would also help to preserve the ancient role of the donkey in supporting trade and the continent’s most vulnerable and geographically isolated groups.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

asiatimes.com · by More by Lauren Johnston · February 9, 2023


14. SpaceX didn't intend that Starlink be 'weaponized' by Ukraine: Shotwell



People who fight for their lives and countries will do creative things and adapt tools to support their resistance regardless of what the designers intended for thsose tools.


SpaceX didn't intend that Starlink be 'weaponized' by Ukraine: Shotwell - Breaking Defense

Moscow has charged that Starlink is directly enhancing the ability of Ukrainian forces to target weapons on Russian forces.

breakingdefense.com · by Theresa Hitchens · February 8, 2023

The Starlink logo is seen on a mobile device with a Ukrainian flag in the background in this illustration photo in Warsaw, Poland on 21 September, 2022. (STR/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

WASHINGTON — The Ukraine military’s use of SpaceX’s Starlink internet communications service as a weapon system in its war with Russia was something the company neither foresaw or agreed to, SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell said today.

“We were really pleased to be able to provide Ukraine connectivity, and help them in their … fight for freedom. It was never intended to be weaponized, however,” she told the 25th Annual FAA Commercial Space Transportation Conference here today.

“The Ukrainians have leveraged it in ways that were unintentional and not part of any agreement. So you know, we have to work on that [with] Starlink. You offer a commercial product by connectivity to people which is helpful in conflict, but you also want to be careful of how they use it,” she added. “On the other hand, they’re trying to fight for their country, so I understand it. The thing is, it’s not what was intended.”

Shotwell didn’t elaborate on what exact use the Ukrainian military made of Starlink to “weaponize” the satellite constellation and its communications terminals. It is clear, however, that the government in Kiev has been using the satellite network for not only strategic, but also tactical communications with embattled troops on the ground — for instance, for coordinating strikes on the invading Russian forces.

Moscow further has charged that Starlink is directly enhancing the ability of Ukrainian forces to target weapons on Russian forces.

Konstantin Vorontosov, the head of Russia’s delegation to the UN Open Ended Working Group on Reducing Space threats that recently concluded in Geneva, told the group on Jan. 31 that Starlink satellites are being used “not just for communications, but also for guiding drones and also amending the trajectory of artillery shells.”

It also is possible that the communication network has played a role in Ukrainian efforts to fight back against Russian efforts at cyber intrusion, as it is at least technically possible that Russian hacking attempts into Ukrainian communications are being hacked back along the same route by Ukrainian malware.

Starlink has proven a challenge for Russian jamming and hacking attempts — due in part simply to the enormous numbers of satellites making up the constellation. As of mid-January, SpaceX has some 3,120 operational satellites on orbit.

“It’s just the ubiquity,” Shotwell said. “If you got six satellites in view or more, it’s really hard to point a weapon at it, whether it’s a kinetic or whether it’s anything.”









De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of DemocracPhone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:


"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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