Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“It’s an universal law — intolerance is the first sign of an inadequate education. An ill-educated person behaves with arrogant impatience, whereas a truly profound education breeds humility.’

- Aleksander Solzhenitsyn

Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go to war first and then seek to win.

- Sun Tzu

Never be in a hurry; do everything quietly and in a calm spirit. Do not lose your inner peace for anything whatsoever, even if your whole world seems upset.

-Saint Francis de Sales

1. Why the Army-Navy Game Is Still Important After More Than 120 Years

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 9

3. Defense spending bill recognizes CIA's predecessor — the basis for a future national N. Va. museum

4. An Endgame in Ukraine: American Strategic Options

5. Is Putin Ready to Flee Russia if Defeated in Ukraine?

6. It Could Cost $1 Trillion to Rebuild Ukraine. Russia Must Pay

7. How the Decades-Long Chinese Espionage Campaign "Stole" US Military Technology

8. Recruited for Navy SEALs, Many Sailors Wind Up Scraping Paint

9. Why NATO shouldn’t align against China

10. Why India Can’t Replace China

11. Hicks Says U.S. Strengthening Indo-Pacific Alliances

12. Russia is providing 'unprecedented' military support to Iran in exchange for drones, officials say

13. Iran Surpasses 500 Executions in 2022

14. Neither Here Nor There – Jordan and the Abraham Accords

1. Why the Army-Navy Game Is Still Important After More Than 120 Years

Why the Army-Navy Game Is Still Important After More Than 120 Years

military.com · by Blake Stilwell · December 9, 2022

Neither the Black Knights nor the Midshipmen have cracked the AP Top 10 College Football Poll in decades. And the Army-Navy Game is not going to decide the NCAA FBS Championship. Some years, the Army-Navy Game doesn't even decide who gets the Commander-In-Chief's Trophy, for which the three service academies (along with Air Force) compete.

Yet during every college football season, somewhere between the end of the regular season play and the upcoming deluge of bowl games, Army meets Navy at a neutral location. And while the two sides battle it out, they take center stage as the only football game on television the first Saturday afternoon in December. With between seven to eight million people watching, it is annually one of the top-rated events on television for that week.

But if the game decides nothing beyond bragging rights, why does America tune in en masse to watch the Black Knights and Midshipmen duke it out year after year?

We spent time on the Army-Navy game’s 2022 media row, asking some of the people closest to the game for their thoughts.

Pete Medhurst, Play-By-Play Commentator, U.S. Naval Academy

"I think Army-Navy is still college football in its purest form," says Medhurst. "There's a lot of people out there that still like that form of football. And let's face it, knowing that kids are signing up for something greater than football, you know, upon graduation, they're gonna go serve a minimum of five years to help protect our freedom. I think people have a soft spot for those players and wanna root those kids on."

Rich DeMarco, Play-By-Play Commentator, U.S. Military Academy

"It's a throwback really. It's a throwback to what, you know, college football was," DeMarco tells Military.com. "I think it's something everyone can enjoy, right? I think you can be an Oklahoma fan and feel good about watching Army and Navy. I'm not sure there's any other game that doesn't involve the top-ranked teams that just have an interest where you just wanna watch it, you wanna be a part of it.”

"And then there's the fact that a lot of families have somebody that's either been in the Army or been in the Navy. They have that tie-in as an enlisted service member and it gives them someone to root for in the game."

Lt. Gen. Steven W. Gilland, U.S. Military Academy Superintendent

"It's two things. One: tradition, and what the two institutions bring when they get to the football field and what the game is," says Gilland. "But really second and, most importantly, is that both football teams are representing their respective service academies that represent our services.

"These are the young men and women that are leading our nation in our future, the next generation. I think that's really what you see as they go out there and demonstrate grit, overcome adversity, tenacity, perseverance as they go head to head."

Vice Adm. Sean Buck, U.S. Naval Academy Superintendent

"I think the Army-Navy game is what 'right' looks like, and I think the American public, when they see it, they're reassured that everything's good in this nation," Buck says. "When they see the men and women who serve in the academies and the men that go out and play a sport like the Army-Navy football game. It's what 'right' looks like. And that's what we need as a nation."

Keenan Reynolds, Former Navy Quarterback

"There are service members everywhere that watch this game no matter what time of day it is," says Reynolds, who recently had his number retired at the Naval Academy. "They may be a Georgia fan, a Texas fan or whatever, but I guarantee you, along their family tree, they have someone that may have served.

“So I think that despite them not necessarily being, you know, avid followers of Army or Navy football, that connection to past service in their family is what brings them together when this game comes on."

Sgt. Maj. of the Army Michael A. Grinston

"These are America's future warriors." Grinston tells Miltary.com. "People aren't just watching a football game, they're supporting the future of the Army and the Navy. We're your Army. People want to see us battle it out, but afterward they want to see that we're on the same side.

Wayne Peacock, CEO, USAA

"I think it's special and bigger because it represents folks on the field who are going to switch those uniforms out and put on a different uniform," Peacock says. "To go put themselves in harm's way and defend our freedom."

"It really does represent what's right and what's good about America. I think the ability to showcase the athletes and the academies more broadly is really important for our country and a really important tradition for us to uphold."

Dan Rickert, West Point Graduate

"For me, it's the game the men on the field represent," says Rickert, who is now the Chief of Staff for Global Defense at software company Palantir. "I think the values of our country show and you don't necessarily see that in a lot of sports, frankly. These men are going to play this game and then go serve their country, and I think that's really inspiring for a lot of people."

-- Blake Stilwell can be reached at blake.stilwell@military.com. He can also be found on Twitter @blakestilwell or on Facebook.

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military.com · by Blake Stilwell · December 9, 2022

2. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 9

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9\

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to discuss negotiations with Ukraine as a means of separating Ukraine from its Western supporters by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to compromise or even to talk seriously.
Putin’s positioning in the Russian information space continues to oscillate between supporting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and backing the nationalist and pro-war milblogger community.
An independent open-source investigation by the BBC’s Russia service and independent Russia outlet Mediazona found that members of Russian national republics deploy to Ukraine at disproportionately higher rates than ethnically Russian oblasts, but that ethnic Russians are dying at a rate proportional to their representation in the Russian Federation population, contrary to previous ISW assessments.
Russian officials strengthened existing legislation to stifle domestic dissent.
Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems.
Russian forces established defensive lines near Svatove, and Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Russian forces may have established positions on an island west of Kherson City in the Dnipro River.
Ukrainian forces’ interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and logistics hubs in southern Ukraine has likely degraded Russian forces, their logistics lines, and broader Russian morale.
Putin doubled down on claims that Russia will not conduct a second wave of mobilization amidst persistent concerns within Russian society.
Russian occupation authorities continued to strengthen physical, legal, and social control over occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 9

Dec 9, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 9, 6:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to discuss negotiations with Ukraine as a means of separating Ukraine from its Western supporters by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to compromise or even to engage in serious talks. During a news conference at the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on December 9, Putin clarified his December 7 statements wherein he suggested that Russia was preparing for a “lengthy” war and stated that he meant the settlement process would be protracted.[1] Putin emphasized that the settlement process will be challenging and take time, and that all participants will need to agree with realities on the ground in Ukraine (by which he presumably means recognizing Russian control of any territories it has annexed), but that at the end of the day, Russia is open to negotiations.[2] Putin also criticized statements made by former German chancellor Angela Merkel that the 2014 Minsk Agreements were an attempt to “buy time for Ukraine” and accused Merkel and the West of propagating distrust in negotiating future settlements.[3] Putin remarked that based on this understanding of the Minsk Agreements, perhaps Russia should have begun military operations earlier.[4] Despite the constant employment of adversarial rhetoric regarding the settlement process, Putin continued to claim that Russia remains open to the possibility of negotiations.[5]

Putin has consistently weaponized invocations of the negotiation process to isolate Ukraine from partner support by framing Ukraine as refusing concessions and likely seeks to use any ceasefire and negotiation window to allow Russian troops time to reconstitute and relaunch operations, thus depriving Ukraine of the initiative. A ceasefire agreement that occurs soon enough to allow Russian forces to rest and refit this winter is extremely unlikely, however. Negotiating a protracted, theater-wide ceasefire takes time. Russia and Ukraine are extremely far apart on the terms of any such agreement, and it is almost impossible to imagine a ceasefire being agreed to, let alone implemented, for some months, which would deprive Russia of the opportunity to pause Ukrainian winter counter-offensives and reset before spring.

Putin may be overly optimistic about the prospects for a more immediate cessation of hostilities, but that is also unlikely given his rhetoric as well as statements by Ukrainian leaders and the West, of which he is well aware. It is more likely that Putin is fanning discussions of a ceasefire primarily as part of an information operation designed to expand cleavages between Ukraine and its backers by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to talk. Putin is likely secondarily setting conditions for actual negotiations sometime in 2023, presumably after Russian forces have secured more of the territory he claims to have annexed.

Putin’s positioning in the Russian information space continues to oscillate between supporting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and backing the nationalist and pro-war milblogger community. Putin stated that the Russian MoD “behaves transparently” and properly reflects the “stable” progress of the “special military operation” in its daily reports.[6] Putin, however, then proceeded to undermine the Russian MoD when responding to a question about persistent problems with supplying the army and mobilization, noting that the Russian MoD informed him that the Russian Armed Forces has solved most of its debilitating issues.[7] Putin also told journalists: “You cannot trust anyone. You can only trust me,” when responding to a question about whether Russians should trust Russian MoD or sources operating on the frontlines.[8] Putin’s statements seemingly indicate that he is distancing himself from the milblogger community, which largely reports or obtains information from the frontlines. Putin’s statement on the transparency of the Russian MoD briefs—which the Russian milblogger community heavily criticizes for its inaccuracies and censorship—may aim to blunt such critiques or could be an effort to deflect the blame for military failures in Ukraine onto the Russian MoD, or both.

Putin likely attempts to preserve the position he has tried to occupy throughout his reign, in which he is seemingly aware of all Russian problems while not being directly responsible for them. Putin has long established the Russian MoD as a scapegoat for his failures, but the quasi-official milblogger community may pose a threat to his pretense of ignorance of problems. Putin remains in a predicament in which he relies on the support of the nationalist community to rally support behind his war in Ukraine, but must also mitigate the risk of angering the nationalists by failing to deliver their unrealistic and unattainable visions for the Russian military campaign. Putin, thus, needs to continue to play the part of the ultimate arbiter of the truth to manage the prominence of the quasi-official sources while simultaneously appealing to them in critiquing his very own security institutions. He remains unlikely to shut down the independent milblogger community but equally unlikely to commit fully to supporting it or pursuing its preferred extremist courses of action.

An independent open-source investigation by BBC’s Russia service and independent Russia outlet Mediazona offered a series of observations on the nature of losses suffered by Russian troops in Ukraine. The BBC confirmed the deaths of 10,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine based on open-source records and noted that over 400 of the deceased were soldiers called up by partial mobilization.[9] This number notably does not encapsulate the actual scale of Russian losses in Ukraine and reflects only those whose deaths are confirmable in the open source. The BBC investigation found that Russia’s Krasnodar Krai had the highest number of confirmed losses (428 dead), followed by Dagestan (363 dead), and Buryatia (356 dead).[10] In comparison, BBC only found 54 confirmed deaths from Moscow, which by itself makes up 9% of the population of Russia.[11] BBC concluded that although citizens of national republics (such as Dagestan, Buryatia, Altai, and Bashkortostan) are sent to the front and die in combat at higher rates than citizens of ethnically Russian regions, in absolute terms, ethnic Russians comprise the majority of Russian military deaths, and their proportion of the military dead is approximately equal to their proportion in the overall Russian population.[12] BBC concluded that this finding suggests that discrepancies in Russian force generation efforts therefore fall along regional and territorial lines as opposed to predominantly ethnic lines and noted that military service is seen as the only lifeline in regions on Russia‘s economic periphery where social mobility is greatly restrained.[13] As ISW has previously observed, the impacts of force generation have been firmly siloed on a regional basis, which further breaks down along overlapping ethnic and socioeconomic lines.[14] The BBC investigation partially contradicts ISW’s previous assessments that the Kremlin was attempting to shield the ethnic Russian population from the war by drawing disproportionately on minority regions. ISW has no basis for questioning this conclusion.

The BBC investigation also found that both elite units and officers have suffered substantial losses in Ukraine. The BBC reported that the Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU Spetznaz) has suffered 250 confirmed losses, nearly 25% of whom were officers, which in the case of some individual Spetsnaz units exceeds cumulative losses over 10 years of Russian operations in Chechnya.[15] The BBC additionally identified 1,509 confirmed officer deaths- or 15% of the 10,002 identified losses.[16] The losses accrued by elite units and the Russian officer cadre will have significant and generational ramifications for the Russian military.

Russian officials continue efforts to place legislative controls on domestic dissent. Independent Russian outlet Meduza reported on December 9 that Russian State Duma deputies proposed a bill introducing new crimes and charges related to financing, inducing, recruiting, training for, organizing, or engaging in sabotage activities.[17] In all cases, except for complicity in sabotage, the proposed law introduces a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is currently the maximum sentence only in the case of deaths resulting from sabotage actions.[18] As ISW has recently reported, Russian officials have been taking similar measures to expand legislative oversight of domestic affairs in an attempt to further stifle domestic dissent. The Russian Ministry of Justice, for example, expanded the list of “individual foreign agents” on November 27, and Russian media began reporting that the Russian government is taking steps to broaden the definition of foreign agents, as well as imposing additional restrictions on the activities and movements of those deemed to be foreign agents.[19] Such legislative efforts suggest that the Kremlin continues to fear domestic friction resulting from the effects of its conduct of the war in Ukraine.

Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems. NBC News reported on December 9 that senior US presidential administration officials stated that Russia may be providing Iran with advanced military equipment and components, including helicopters and air defense systems, in exchange for Iranian-made high-precision weapons systems that Russia has used and intends to use in the war in Ukraine.[20] The officials specified that Russia may send Iran Su-35 aircraft within the next year and that Russia is possibly seeking to establish a joint Russian Iranian production line for drone systems in the Russian Federation.[21] US intelligence officials stated on November 19 that Russian and Iranian officials finalized a deal in early November to manufacture Iranian drones on Russian territory.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 9 that air traffic monitors show that Iranian Air Force cargo planes resumed flights to Moscow on December 8 following a short break in such flights.[23] ISW assessed that Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran on December 3, likely to further discuss the sale of Iranian drones and missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine.[24] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian military is increasingly reliant on Iranian-made weapons systems due to the depletion of its arsenal of high-precision weapons systems.[25]

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to discuss negotiations with Ukraine as a means of separating Ukraine from its Western supporters by portraying Kyiv as unwilling to compromise or even to talk seriously.
Putin’s positioning in the Russian information space continues to oscillate between supporting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and backing the nationalist and pro-war milblogger community.
An independent open-source investigation by the BBC’s Russia service and independent Russia outlet Mediazona found that members of Russian national republics deploy to Ukraine at disproportionately higher rates than ethnically Russian oblasts, but that ethnic Russians are dying at a rate proportional to their representation in the Russian Federation population, contrary to previous ISW assessments.
Russian officials strengthened existing legislation to stifle domestic dissent.
Senior US officials stated that Russia is providing an unprecedented level of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Iranian-made weapons systems.
Russian forces established defensive lines near Svatove, and Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
Russian forces may have established positions on an island west of Kherson City in the Dnipro River.
Ukrainian forces’ interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and logistics hubs in southern Ukraine has likely degraded Russian forces, their logistics lines, and broader Russian morale.
Putin doubled down on claims that Russia will not conduct a second wave of mobilization amidst persistent concerns within Russian society.
Russian occupation authorities continued to strengthen physical, legal, and social control over occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued defensive operations in the Svatove area on December 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending their positions northwest of Svatove in the direction of Kupyansk.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are widely constructing defensive lines in the Svatove area.[27] A social media source posted a map purporting to show the locations of extensive Russian fortifications extending from 55km north of Svatove toward Troitske and 40km south of Svatove toward Kreminna.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that there is a large number of Russian mobilized personnel operating in the Svatove area.[29] A social media source posted images on December 9 showing elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army operating south of Oborotnivka (19km northwest of Svatove), corroborating a December 8 report from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) stating that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army have likely deployed along the defensive line near Svatove.[30]

Russian forces continued to conduct counterattacks in the Kreminna area while Ukrainian forces reportedly continued counteroffensive operations in the area on December 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces continued unspecified offensive operations west of Kreminna in the direction of Lyman.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations on the Kreminna-Makiivka front and making marginal advances in the area.[33] Another milblogger claimed that there was fighting between Ukrainian and Russian forces near Chervonopopivka (5km north of Kreminna) and Ploshchanka (15km northwest of Kreminna).[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Ploshchanka and west in the direction of Nevske.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attempt to break through Russian positions near Lysychansk (15km southeast of Kreminna).[36] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian rear area in Pervomaisk (50km southeast of Kreminna) with HIMARS rockets.[37]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on December 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Klishchiivka, about 7km southwest of Bakhmut.[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and a Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked near Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut) from the direction of Horlivka.[39] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted assault operations in Bakhmut and to the north and south of Bakhmut and claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered heavy losses.[40] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck forward Ukrainian positions in Bakhmutske (10km northeast of Bakhmut) and claimed that Russian forces continue to push through Ukrainian defenses near Spirne (30km northeast of Bakhmut).[41] A Russian source amplified claims that the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion has taken control of Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut).[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in this area.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on December 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Marinka in Donetsk Oblast.[44] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces resumed an offensive against Marinka and stormed a fortified Ukrainian position in the settlement.[45] A Russian source shared video footage reportedly of an unsuccessful Ukrainian attack near Pisky (5km northwest of Donetsk City).[46] The source claimed that a Ukrainian convoy moved from Pervomaiske and Vodiane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) in the direction of Pisky but that the 238th Artillery Brigade of the 8th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District and the DNR “Sparta” and “Somalia” battalions repelled the attack. Another Russian source claimed that Russian forces entered southern Vodiane and advanced slightly in Pervomaiske.[47] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began attacking Ukrainian positions in the Novomykhailivka area (36km southwest of Avdiivka) and struck Ukrainian positions in Vesele (5km north of Avdiivka).[48] Russian forces continued routine shelling along the line of contact in this area.[49]

Russian forces continued defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are defending their positions in the Novopavlivka (western Donetsk Oblast) direction.[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces in the direction of Volodymyrivka and Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast, and Novodarivka, Zaporizhia Oblast.[51] A social media user shared images from the Russian “Kaskad” Battalion purporting to show Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (5km southeast of Vuhledar).[52] Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[53]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces may have established positions on an island west of Kherson City in the Dnipro River as of December 9. Some unofficial Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed on December 9 that Russian forces landed on Potemkin Island (10km southwest of Kherson City in the Dnipro River) and established firing positions there, suggesting that the network of islands in the Dnipro River near Kherson City may remain contested.[54] No official sources have supported such claims and ISW is currently unable to confirm their veracity. Russian forces continued to shell areas on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, including Kherson City and its environs.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentrations in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that December 7 Ukrainian strikes against Russian forces near Berdyansk, Tokmak, Melitopol, Enerhodar, Dniprorudne, Polohy, and Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast— all along strategic logistics lines – wounded 240 personnel and destroyed three ammunition depots and 20 pieces of military equipment.[56] A Ukrainian source reported that Ukrainian forces struck Hola Prystan (on the Kherson City-Armiansk highway) and Chaplynka (on the Nova Kakhovka-Armiansk highway), Kherson Oblast, both areas of reported Russian defensive fortifications.[57]

Ukrainian forces’ interdiction campaign against Russian military assets and logistics hubs in southern Ukraine has likely degraded Russian forces, their logistics lines, and broader Russian morale. A Russian milblogger claimed that he spoke to Russian soldiers who have served in Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, who claim that Ukrainian HIMARS strikes completely destroyed military infrastructure in Nova Kakhovka, including housing, river crossings, and equipment concentrations, and inflicted significant manpower casualties—all of which the milblogger claimed significantly degraded Russian forces, adding that Russian forces have not been able to replenish their losses at an appropriate rate or quality.[58] The milblogger noted that Russian forces in “all major cities” suffered the same results from Ukrainian strikes and expressed anger that Russian military leadership failed to compensate for enough of its shortcomings to win the war.[59]

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on December 9 that Russian authorities plan to reopen the road span of the Kerch Strait Bridge in March 2021 and the bridge’s rail lines in mid-summer 2023, significant delays from previously promised dates.[60] This announcement comes just four days after Putin drove across the Kerch Strait Bridge as part of a likely information operation to convince the Russian populace that the bridge is secure and to suppress panic over a possible future Ukrainian counteroffensive.[61]

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian President Vladimir Putin doubled down on claims that Russia will not conduct a second wave of mobilization amidst persistent concerns within Russian society. Putin stated during the Eurasian Economic Union summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, that there are not any “factors” present now that would require the Kremlin to reinstate partial mobilization.[62] Putin reiterated that 150,000 mobilized men of the mobilized 300,000 are currently undergoing training in Russia, while another 77,000 have entered the combat zone as part of combat units. Putin added that the remaining 73,000 mobilized men are performing territorial defense duties on the second and third defensive lines. Putin had vaguely responded to a question regarding rotations of mobilized personnel, noting that such procedures depend on the situation on the front lines.[63] Putin added that rotated units will also receive veteran status, further committing the Kremlin to a long-term financial responsibility to mobilized personnel.

The Kremlin continued to set legal conditions that would ease mobilization proceedings and maintained its crypto mobilization campaign despite Putin’s assurances in Bishkek. Russian state news wire TASS stated that the Russian Ministry of Education clarified that Russian men can only defer from mobilization once while being a student in a higher education institution. The ministry stated that Russian mobilization law allows Russian students to retain the deferment right from the start of their first higher education until their graduation. The ministry noted that students will not receive a second deferment from mobilization if they enroll in a higher education institution for a second time. Russian opposition outlets noted instances of Russian officials using this provision to mobilize three students, despite these students indicating that they qualify for deferment.[64] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Samara Oblast continues to deliver summonses to men of military age, while some Russian regions have maintained their mobilization efforts.[65]

Numerous Russian claims of desertion among mobilized personnel continue to challenge Putin’s December 7 claims regarding deserters. A Russian opposition source collected social media evidence composed of photos, videos, and family accounts that indicate that Russian forces are continuing to detain deserters and are holding them in 12 detention centers in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.[66] Pskov Oblast officials have asked military prosecutors to investigate the appeals from families and their lawyers regarding the 265 mobilized men detained in basements in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[67]

Putin also claimed on December 7 and December 9 that Russian officials have resolved major issues with mobilization, but Russian families of mobilized personnel continued to report instances of poor treatment and conditions among the mobilized servicemen. Wives of mobilized men from Irkutsk appealed to the Irkutsk Oblast Governor Igor Kobzev that their husbands are sick “en masse” at Novosibirsk training ranges with pneumonia and bronchitis due to lack of adequate medical care, insufficient uniforms, and low levels of professional training.[68] A mother of a mobilized serviceman who died at a training ground in Novosibirsk in October reported spotting signs of beating on his body, despite officials declaring his death as the result of ethanol poisoning.[69] The Kremlin, however, continues to target individual activists who advocate for the rights of mobilized personnel instead of actually resolving the fundamental issues with its force-generation measures. Samara Oblast officials detained the representative of the Council of Mothers and Wives, Olga Tsukanova, for example.[70]

Russian mobilization will continue to have long-term societal and economic implications for Russia. The Moscow Times reported that about 30% of Russian companies reported paying attention to the recruits who are fit for military service, noting that they are reluctant to hire individuals of military build and age.[71] The Moscow Times added that every tenth company that participated in the survey rejects applicants with in-demand military occupations, while another 10% of responders reported reducing vacancies for potential conscripts. The publication noted that employers are increasingly turning to a female workforce, likely in an effort to preempt labor shortages amidst future force generation campaigns.

The Russian State Duma tried—and failed—to clarify the purpose and operations of the territorial defense battalions in Belgorod Oblast on December 9. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov stated that these battalions are not formally part of the Russian Armed Forces, and thus will not receive supplies or armaments from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[72] Kartapolov stated that these battalions are composed of civilians that will follow objectives “related to the Russian MoD.” Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin previously indirectly implied that Wagner forces will train Belgorod Oblast's “people’s militia” in the oblast “to defend the borders of the oblast.”[73] The battalions’ independent status from the Russian MoD and Prigozhin’s involvement with Belgorod Oblast officials may indicate the battalions’ affiliation with the Wagner Group.[74] Prigozhin, however, denied Wagner’s involvement in training the Belgorod Oblast militia, noting only the presence of some Wagner former servicemen in the area.[75]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials continued efforts to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of medical rehabilitation schemes and adoption programs on December 8 and 9. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevheny Balitsky stated on December 9 that 75 Ukrainian children previously living in Russian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast arrived at a camp near Moscow for “psychological rehabilitation.”[76] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on December 8 that Russian officials are forcibly deporting Ukrainian children to remote regions in Russia for “medical treatment.”[77] The Ukrainian Resistance Center added that Russian officials are deporting children from foster homes in occupied Ukraine for forced adoption in Russia.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian officials have also instituted a payment system to incentivize Russian families to adopt forcibly deported Ukrainian children.[79]

Russian occupation authorities are continuing to force Ukrainian civilians to apply for Russian passports. Russian independent outlet Meduza reported on December 9 that Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas are often denied humanitarian aid, medical care, and social assistance unless they hold a Russian passport.[80] Russian independent outlet Mediazona claimed on December 8 that Russian officials have issued passports to over 300,000 Ukrainian citizens from February 2022 through October 2022.[81] The report noted that Russian officials have simplified the process to obtain Russian passports in occupied Ukrainian territories, with Russian officials having issued over 40,000 passports within a month of Russian President Vladimir Putin formally annexing four Ukrainian regions on September 30.[82]

Russian occupation officials continued forced evacuation measures on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on December 9. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on December 9 that the largest evacuation drives occurred in Oleshky (7km southeast of Kherson City) and Nova Kakhovka.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian officials are deporting evacuated Ukrainian civilians to the Caucasus in an effort to balance demographics in the area.[84]

Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian healthcare apparatus on December 9. Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik and Chairman of Russia's Federal Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund Ilya Balanin signed an Agreement on Cooperation on December 9 to facilitate distributing medical insurance policies to residents of occupied territories in Luhansk Oblast. Pasechnik stated that a branch of the fund will open in LNR territory in the near future, allowing LNR residents to obtain compulsory medical insurance policies that guarantee medicine and treatment free of charge from Russia.[85]

Russian officials continued proposing new law enforcement measures in occupied territories on December 8. The Russian State Duma introduced a bill on December 8 that, if implemented, would punish the organization of and participation in sabotage activities in occupied territories. Russian independent media outlet Meduza stated that the current Russian penal code allows for a life sentence if deaths result from acts of sabotage.[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] ttps://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068

[2] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068

[3] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068

[4] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068

[5] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56; https://ria dot ru/20221209/putin-1837547068.html?chat_room_id=1837547068

[6] https://www do rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/6393394d9a79471ae0a68d56

[7] https://ria dot ru/20221209/armiya-1837557939.html

[8] https://ria dot ru/20221209/armiya-1837557939.html

[60] https://radiosputnik ria.ru/20221209/krymskiy-most-1837578081.html

[62] https://tass dot ru/politika/16553333

[63] https://radiosputnik dot ria dot ru/20221209/spetsoperatsiya-1837597359.html

[70] https://t.me/istories_media/1850 ; https://vk dot com/wall-214518425_5013

[71] https://www.moscowtimes dot ru/2022/12/08/rossiyanam-prizivnogo-vozrasta-nachali-otkazivat-v-rabote-iz-za-mobilizatsii-a27848

[72] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/09/12/2022/639087b29a79473c98ae594d

[77] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/

[78] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/

[79] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/08/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-vykradaty-ukrayinskyh-ditej-2/

[80] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/09/mediazona-za-pervye-vosem-mesyatsev-voyny-grazhdanstvo-rf-poluchili-300-tysyach-ukraintsev-mnogie-sdelali-eto-vynuzhdenno

[81] https://zona dot media/article/2022/12/08/papers

[82] https://zona dot media/article/2022/12/08/papers; (https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[83] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/09/okupanty-namagayutsya-prodovzhyty-deportacziyu-ukrayincziv-z-hersonshhyny/)

[84] https://sprotyv dot mod dot gov.ua/2022/12/09/okupanty-namagayutsya-prodovzhyty-deportacziyu-ukrayincziv-z-hersonshhyny/

[86] https://meduza dot io/news/2022/12/08/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-ob-uzhestochenii-nakazaniya-za-diversii-plot-do-pozhiznennogo-lisheniya-svobody; http://duma dot gov.ru/news/55960/

understandingwar.org

3. Defense spending bill recognizes CIA's predecessor — the basis for a future national N. Va. museum

We have received recognition from Congress for our National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations (NMISO). It is an honor to be a part of this project. I have learned more about museums and museum design than I ever thought I would.

Defense spending bill recognizes CIA's predecessor — the basis for a future national N. Va. museum

https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2022/12/09/museum-cia-predecessor-bill-recognition.html

The proposed museum would be shaped like the tip of a spear, the symbol Gen. William "Wild Bill" Donovan came up with to represent his vision for the Office of Strategic Services as the nation's leading intelligence and research arm.

OSS

IN THIS ARTICLE

Travel & Tourism

Industry

Architecture & Engineering

Topic

By Daniel J. Sernovitz

Senior Staff Reporter, Washington Business Journal Dec 9, 2022

The group behind a planned Northern Virginia museum honoring the roots of the country’s intelligence gathering operations got a signiﬁcant shot in the arm this week when lawmakers included wording in a federal spending bill

oﬃcially recognizing the facility as the National Museum of Intelligence and Special Operations.

The recognition in the National Defense Authorization Act should help The OSS Society in its eﬀorts to raise about

$100 million to develop and launch the museum at the

K incora mixed-use development in Ashburn, per Charles Pinck, president of the Falls Church-based organization. The society was created to honor the eﬀorts of Gen.

William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan and his Oﬃce of Strategic Support Services, a precursor to the CIA, and it hopes to raise enough funds to break ground on the roughly 57,500- square-foot museum in time for completion in 2027.

“We’re very excited by the designation, and that should help with our capital

fundraising campaign,” Pinck said. “It’s something we’ve

wanted for a while.”

The House included wording in its initial version of the NDAA oﬃcially recognizing the privately funded museum.

The Senate's version of the bill excluded it, but a

s ubsequent House amendment added it back on Thursday, and that version is poised to make it through both chambers.

The bill's language honors the intelligence and special operations forces for their critical eﬀorts in “securing the Nation against enemies of the United States for nearly a century.” Those eﬀorts laid the groundwork for the nation’s modern-day intelligence gathering eﬀorts, work that continues “both in secrecy as well as openly” to keep the

U.S. and its values and way of life secure. The museum, per the measure, "may be recognized, upon completion, as the

``National Museum of Intelligence and Special

Operations."

The museum, with about 14,000 square feet of exhibit space, a 6,000-square-foot lobby and 200-seat educational space, has been designed to appear from the air as a spearhead — the logo for Donovan's OSS was meant to symbolize his vision for an intelligence-gathering agency at

the tip of the spear. There will also be a "Tip of the Spear Pavilion" for outdoor events and an "Oh So Social" Club bar inspired by the Bar Hemingway in the Hotel Ritz in Paris.

The museum will be situated along the ﬁght path from Dulles International Airport, which was designed by architect and O SS operator Eero Saarinen.

The proposed intelligence museum hopes to educate visitors on what it takes to gather intelligence and conduct special operations as well as recognize the people behind those eﬀorts in the past. "Great museums tell the story of great people," a fact sheet on the museum states. "We want the museum's visitors to understand the unique and rare human qualities that this profession demands — leadership, teamwork, creativity, innovation, determination, and bravery — by elucidating missions and people that embody them."

Designed by Curt Fentress, the museum has been in the works for several years and is planned for an 8.5-acre site by Routes 7 and 28 at Kincora. The larger, 424-acre development by Tritec Real Estate Co. is slated to include other elements including the proposed Children’s Science C enter that could break ground in late 2023 or early 2024. The two serve as cultural book-ends at either side of what will become Kincora's main retail corridor, Tritec spokesman Chris Kelly said.

"We are happy for the OSS in their designation and look forward to supporting them with their plans for the new museum," he said.

4. An Endgame in Ukraine: American Strategic Options

I will be on the lookout for the next two parts.

Excerpts:

International relations realists, like Henry Kissinger, argue that Russia, as the regional great power, must be appeased, since Russian power in its ‘near abroad’ cannot be denied. To do so, U.S. security guarantees provided to Ukraine, such as the Budapest Agreement, would need to be ignored or repudiated. In their analysis, the value of an accommodation with Russia far outweighs the value of Ukrainian territorial integrity and independence.

However, such a strategy neglects the character and values of the United States; the citizenry sees the U.S. as the defender of liberal and democratic values around the world, and this war has been promoted by the American political elite as a contest between an authoritarian invader and a democratically elected resistance. The idea that the U.S. might deliberately ‘sell out’ Ukraine to Russia will be met with dismay, contempt, and ridicule, leading to a further loss of legitimacy for the policy makers that occupy positions of power in Washington. Any administration pursuing such a strategy would be compared to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of the Nazi regime.

The harsh reality is that, for the foreseeable future, the current Russian regime will not become an ally of the United States, nor will the Russian kleptocratic autocracy be replaced with a liberal-democratic state that shares Western values. Russian political culture, the history of repeated invasions, and the geostrategy of threat to Russia’s long borders all militate against establishing a limited government. At best, Russia could be a client state to the U.S., sharing a suspicion of Chinese intentions, rather than an ally that shares both interests and values. It is far from clear that any level of capitulation in Ukraine would help turn Russia into a client, aligned against the threat from China.

An Endgame in Ukraine: American Strategic Options

By Michael Hochberg & Leonard Hochberg

December 10, 2022

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/12/10/an_endgame_in_ukraine_american_strategic_options_869474.html

Editor's Note: This is the first in a three part series seperated by the three strategic options for Ukraine.

“Justice is benefiting friends and harming enemies.”

- Polemarchus, Plato’s Republic

Introduction

Polemarchus, in Plato’s Republic, fully appreciated that, from a geopolitical perspective, knowing who your friends and your enemies are, and who they may be in the future, is a cardinal virtue. Considering what can be done to benefit friends and harm enemies in the international arena is a critical feature of strategic thought. Many Americans don’t appreciate the importance of strategic thought, particularly regarding the current conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine may not be the perfect ally. Its democratic institutions are newly formed, corruption is allegedly rampant, and the war with Russia has strained its commitment to classical liberal values. Nevertheless, its strategic interests do align with the United States as far as Russia, an autocratic regime that is seeking to overturn the rules-based international order, has once again invaded Ukraine to seize more territory and constrain Ukraine’s declared intent, as a sovereign state, to join the European Union and NATO. The United States, as the foremost maritime power, has an enduring interest in stopping Russia from dominating the Black Sea; therefore, the United States must seriously consider defending the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

What should the United States do in response to this Russian invasion? In any adversarial relationship, strategic thinking requires aligning means with ends. Any proposal of means–shipment of offensive and/or defensive weapons, economic sanctions, activation of alliances, supply of foreign aid, expressions of indifference, withdrawal of support, or other actions–should start with the articulation of the specific ends sought. The ends may include imposing one’s will on an enemy through a military victory, blunting an attack in preparation for a negotiated settlement on more or less equal terms, the restoration of status quo that existed prior to the conflict, a territorial conquest, rejoining an ethnic irredenta with a nation-state, forcing an adversary to change specific policies, restoring adherence to a rules-based international order, and myriad other outcomes dictated by politics.

Regarding Ukraine: What exactly is the goal of the U.S. intervention? What is the outcome that we believe serves our national interests? Regrettably, neither American nor allied Western politicians have clearly answered this question.

Pundits and analysts have spilt much ink (here, here, here, here, here as a few examples) attempting to predict what outcome might occur in Ukraine, but they rarely address what outcome would serve American interests. Their speculations instead focus on the changing disposition of Russian and Ukrainian forces, outcomes of battles and campaigns, the bite of economic sanctions, and support by the U.S. and NATO for Ukraine as compared with support by China and Iran for Russia. They view the conflict as if they were commenting from afar on a geopolitical game of Risk in which the most powerful player, the United States, cannot control, alter, or even influence the outcome. Pundits list all the probable outcomes—Ukrainian victory, Russian victory, stalemate, negotiated settlement, Russian collapse, regime change in Moscow—and how the war might arrive at each outcome, while excluding from their analysis from what outcome is in the national interest of the United States.

Their all-too-distant perspective on the conflict could not be further from reality; the actions of the United States government have already had a dispositive influence on events in Ukraine. While the U.S. cannot control the actions of Russia, Turkey, Iran, or China, the U.S. and its NATO allies have the capacity to influence the outcome, provided of course that there is agreement among the members of the alliance—something rarely achieved—to implement a coherent strategy articulated by the leader of that alliance. And therein lies the rub.

Given the fractured nature of American strategic culture, there are multiple, contradictory conceptions of the U.S. national interest, and thus of what our goals should be regarding the war in Ukraine. One challenge lies in connecting proposed actions to desired outcomes. However, the first task is to articulate the strategic goals that might be served by any given set of actions, with consideration of limited resources. Next is to consider the desirability of those goals in a world of unintended consequences.

This paper suggests several potential outcomes of the war in Ukraine and indicates which conception of U.S. interests each outcome serves. Given the competence, dedication, and strength demonstrated by the Ukrainians, it has become clear that the U.S. has the capacity to influence decisively the outcome of the war. So, the critical question is: What exactly do we believe serves our national interest, and what resources—material, prestige, attention, money, personnel, et cetera—are we prepared to commit to obtain the desired outcome? We present three outcomes as options for U.S. policy makers.

Option 1: Trade Ukraine for a Russian Alliance

U.S. and NATO support for Ukraine is clearly critical to their continued success. A number of authors, most prominently John Mearsheimer, have counseled that the risk of nuclear escalation with Russia is so great as to make the war in Ukraine foolhardy. Others have suggested that the war in Ukraine is a distraction from the primary conflict of our time, which is between the West and China.

If one believes that Ukraine is a distraction, and that the risk of escalation is so high as to make a fight foolhardy, then one is left with the question: What strategic gain could the U.S. achieve in Ukraine by allowing a Russian victory? It is possible for the United States to concede Ukraine—all or in large part—and, in exchange, secure a detente with Russia against China. Is a diplomatic negotiation possible—between the United States and Russia—out of which the West secures an ally against China while Putin and his kleptocratic regime emerge from the Ukraine conflict with their prestige and power enhanced?

Autocratic continental powers, such as the Soviet Union under Stalin, have allied with maritime democracies in the past to defeat those states, such as Nazi Germany, which threatened both. Putin is currently an adversary of the West, sharing neither our values nor a strategic interest, while he shares significant strategic interests with China. Both China and Russia share a desire to curb the influence of Western democracies and create a world in which the autocracies of Eurasia displace the United States and its allies as the dominant power. But what about their respective strategic interests? How closely aligned are they? The history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a proto alliance of many Eurasian autocratic regimes, suggests the possibility of substantial threat to the West.

However, China and Russia share a long, historically contested border. The Russian regime realizes that the CCP also views controlling the natural resources of Siberia as a considerable temptation. The Chinese want access to these resources but not at the cost of making their economy dependent on Russian goodwill. On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China is prepared to rely on Russian resources—food, natural gas, and minerals—provided the Russian state becomes a client of the Chinese regime. While these conflicts may create an opportunity to turn Russia into a Western client in the future, it seems most unlikely that this could be achieved in the near-term.

Conceding a substantial portion of eastern Ukraine to Russia and acceding to the neutralization of western Ukraine might well de-escalate the conflict–for now–but how would such a maneuver lead to a Russian alliance with the United States against China? Likely, such a deal would give Russia more grain, more offshore oil and natural gas, and more coal and iron to sell to China, while also enabling Russia to use that wealth to rebuild its military and become a more effective threat to the former Warsaw Pact countries. What guarantees would the United States and its NATO allies regard as acceptable from Russia, given the long history of Russian violation of agreements and treaties pertaining to what remained of Ukrainian territory and its claims to sovereignty? Turning Russia against China would be a considerable challenge, requiring both subsidies and continued appeasement vis-a-vis the states stretching from the Baltic Sea to the shores of the Black Sea.

Nevertheless, such an outcome could have at least one secondary benefit. A U.S. tie to Russia would demonstrate for our NATO allies that they must rely on their own wealth and power to defend themselves. However, such a maneuver would prompt the Baltic States, Poland, and other front-line NATO allies to wonder what national interests of theirs, if any, were sacrificed to turn Russia.

Should the United States threaten to withdraw support, the Ukrainians might then be forced to the negotiating table, trading land for peace, which would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the Zelensky government. A border west of the Dnieper River, or along the riverbank, would turn Ukraine into a failed state, ripe for Russian subversion and further military interventions. Should Odessa and the Black Sea littoral be absorbed into Russian territory, Ukraine would become landlocked. It would become a client state, almost entirely surrounded by Russian and Belarus, and would no longer be a viable independent power. Such a settlement would enable Russia to shut off Ukraine’s access to international markets on a whim.

Initial Russian war aims were clear: Destroy Ukraine by encircling Kyiv and forcing the Ukrainian government to capitulate to Russian demands. When the attack on the Ukrainian capital city failed, Russian strategists turned to creating a strategically located land bridge from the Donbas region (famous for its industrial activity) to the Crimean Peninsula, where the Russian Black Sea fleet is based in Sevastopol. The Donbas and Crimea were where Russian speaking populations were concentrated prior to Russia’s conquest of these areas in its 2014 military campaign. Any negotiated settlement allowing Russia to hold both the 2014 conquests and territory conquered in 2022 would include provisions denying Ukraine the right to join the EU and become a NATO ally. These are critical Russian strategic goals.

Nor can the economic consequences of such a deal be discounted. As the maritime democratic powers increasingly decouple economically from autocratic continental ones, NATO powers would lose access to Ukraine grain, steel, rare earth minerals, and technical expertise. Such an outcome would also demonstrate that an electoral democracy in eastern Europe cannot provide security, thereby raising the threat to NATO allies in central Europe. A disarmed or neutralized Ukraine would achieve many of the same Russian goals, but perhaps with less diplomatic embarrassment to the West. However, short of a full military defeat, it is hard to imagine the Ukrainians accepting territorial dismemberment or disarmament.

International relations realists, like Henry Kissinger, argue that Russia, as the regional great power, must be appeased, since Russian power in its ‘near abroad’ cannot be denied. To do so, U.S. security guarantees provided to Ukraine, such as the Budapest Agreement, would need to be ignored or repudiated. In their analysis, the value of an accommodation with Russia far outweighs the value of Ukrainian territorial integrity and independence.

However, such a strategy neglects the character and values of the United States; the citizenry sees the U.S. as the defender of liberal and democratic values around the world, and this war has been promoted by the American political elite as a contest between an authoritarian invader and a democratically elected resistance. The idea that the U.S. might deliberately ‘sell out’ Ukraine to Russia will be met with dismay, contempt, and ridicule, leading to a further loss of legitimacy for the policy makers that occupy positions of power in Washington. Any administration pursuing such a strategy would be compared to Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement of the Nazi regime.

The harsh reality is that, for the foreseeable future, the current Russian regime will not become an ally of the United States, nor will the Russian kleptocratic autocracy be replaced with a liberal-democratic state that shares Western values. Russian political culture, the history of repeated invasions, and the geostrategy of threat to Russia’s long borders all militate against establishing a limited government. At best, Russia could be a client state to the U.S., sharing a suspicion of Chinese intentions, rather than an ally that shares both interests and values. It is far from clear that any level of capitulation in Ukraine would help turn Russia into a client, aligned against the threat from China.

Michael Hochberg earned his PhD in Applied Physics from Caltech and is currently the President at Luminous Computing, a company building supercomputers for machine learning. He founded four companies, representing an exit value over a billion dollars in aggregate, spent some time as a tenured professor, and started the world’s first silicon photonics foundry service. He co-authored a widely used textbook on silicon photonics, and has published work in Science, Nature, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Fast Company, etc.

Leonard Hochberg taught at Stanford University (among other institutions), was appointed a Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and co-founded Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (i.e., STRATFOR). He has published work in Social Science History, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Orbis, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, etc. He is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and serves as the Coordinator of the Mackinder Forum-U.S. (www.mackinderforum.org).

5. Is Putin Ready to Flee Russia if Defeated in Ukraine?

Is Putin Ready to Flee Russia if Defeated in Ukraine?

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · December 9, 2022

Is Putin ready to bail?

Last year I published a novel, Pitun’s Last Stand, which imagined Russia’s descent into civil war and its leader’s flight to Nice on the Riviera.

Vladimir Pitun was of course a thinly disguised stand-in for Russia’s real president and dictator, Vladimir Putin.

Little did I know that life would imitate my fantasies.

Not only is Russia embroiled in a genocidal war that threatens to lead to its collapse, but a reliable Russian source has just reported that Putin actually has plans to flee Moscow in case he loses the war against Ukraine!

According to Abbas Galliamov, Putin’s speechwriter in 2008-2010 and currently a political commentator and consultant in Russia, Putin would escape to either Argentina or Venezuela.

The scheme, informally known as Noah’s Ark, was apparently developed in the spring of this year, presumably when Russia’s prospects for a quick victory had evaporated and the very real possibility of defeat suddenly loomed on the horizon.

The original idea was for Putin to hightail it to China, but that was dropped because the Russians decided the Chinese didn’t like losers. That may or may not be true, but it’s certain that Putin would have felt uncomfortable playing third fiddle in Beijing.

If Galliamov’s Telegram report is accurate, then Venezuela, as one of the few countries in the world to have maintained friendly relations with Moscow, is the likely destination for Putin.

And he’s not the only one. According to one report, high-ranking Russian officials are apparently buying real estate in Venezuela, which could portend a mass exodus of war criminals to that unfortunate country.

If Putin does indeed flee after Russia suffers defeat, he wouldn’t be the first dictator to seek refuge abroad. Uganda’s Idi Amin fled to Saudi Arabia. The Central African Republic’s Emperor Jean-Bédel Bokassa wound up in France. Anastasio Somoza left Nicaragua for the United States and Paraguay. The Shah of Iran fled to France. Germany’s Kaiser Wilhelm II settled in the Netherlands. The Soviet Union’s Leon Trotsky went to Mexico.

Once abroad, former potentates usually engage in émigré politics and plot their returns. Some refugees, like Vladimir Lenin and Ayatollah Khomeini, return victorious. Most former bigwigs fade away, becoming increasingly irrelevant to goings-on in the countries they once ruled with an iron fist.

Whether or not Putin flees will depend on the extent of Russia’s, probably inevitable, defeat.

As long as he can position himself as the defender of Mother Russia and the protector of the nation, he is likely to be able to survive, even if Russia suffers continual setbacks.

But there are two scenarios under which flight would become imperative. If Ukraine smashes the Russian armed forces and succeeds in driving them out of all its territory, including the Crimea and Donbas, Putin is unlikely to survive such a huge humiliation. If elites and masses then turn against him, Venezuela’s warm climes may be Putin’s only way out. It’s also possible that Putin may be the victim of a coup d’état well before defeat sets in. Were such a coup to take place, Putin’s only hope for survival would be flight.

Galliamov’s report is uncorroborated, but it does make sense. After all, other dictators have been removed for far lesser crimes and debacles than Putin. And Putin knows that, regardless of which scenario turns out to be accurate, he will, sooner or later, be tried for war crimes and genocide at The Hague. And who better to betray and testify against him than his current inner circle?

Putin reportedly has scores of bunkers, some apparently quite lavish, in which he hides—from COVID-19, from the people he claims to serve, and the elites he has implicated in his crimes. He is already in exile and leaving Russia for Latin America would only be a logical next step.

In my novel, Pitun’s Last Stand, the dictator plans a triumphant return to Russia, with the assistance of dubious emigres and European hangers-on. He eventually makes it to St. Petersburg, only to be humiliated before an adoring crowd.

Like Pitun, the real Putin will, if exiled, probably attempt a come-back. That won’t be easy from distant Venezuela, and unlike Lenin and the Ayatollah, Putin is likely to meet his alter ego’s deservedly sad fate.

A 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Dr. Alexander Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia, and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires, and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, including Pidsumky imperii (2009); Puti imperii (2004); Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (2001); Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities (1999); Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine after Totalitarianism (1993); and The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929 (1980); the editor of 15 volumes, including The Encyclopedia of Nationalism (2000) and The Holodomor Reader (2012); and a contributor of dozens of articles to academic and policy journals, newspaper op-ed pages, and magazines. He also has a weekly blog, “Ukraine’s Orange Blues.”

19fortyfive.com · by Alexander Motyl · December 9, 2022

6. It Could Cost $1 Trillion to Rebuild Ukraine. Russia Must Pay

As an aside, Ukraine is a place where a real Marshall plan would be effective along the lines of the execution of the original Marshall Plan after WWII.

But in Ukraine extract reparations from Russia after Russia is defeated?

It Could Cost $1 Trillion to Rebuild Ukraine. Russia Must Pay

19fortyfive.com · by James Fay · December 9, 2022

A very high bill is due when it comes to Ukraine. Who is going to pay?

A recent article in The Economist noted that the preliminary cost to rebuild Ukraine would be between 220 and 540 billion dollars. The UK-based Investment Monitor goes further. It estimates that the reconstruction cost will rise to one trillion dollars. This sum will snowball as the war drags on because the Ukrainians will have to rebuild entire cities.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines reparations as “the act of making amends, offering expiation, or giving satisfaction for a wrong or injury.” War is the ultimate injury that one nation can inflict upon another. The fact that the Russian assault on Ukraine was unprovoked adds gravity to the wrongs inflicted on Ukraine.

Regardless of the result of the war, as the instigator, Russia and its elites will be responsible for indemnification. This indemnification will include compensation in money or materials for damages to Ukraine and its people.

Of course, we can’t forget that, at Yalta in 1945, Stalin set a precedent by demanding billions in war reparations from Germany.

Reparations issues have roiled Europe and America for a century. The Allies exacted heavy reparations from Germany because of its role in instigating WWI. Germany, however, paid only a tiny fraction of these reparations. After WWII, both Germany and Switzerland paid modest reparations to holocaust survivors. In addition, the United States paid reparations to 60,000 surviving Japanese-Americans interned in WWII. And the United States also paid Switzerland $4 million for the accidental bombing of the town of Schaffhausen during World War II.

Now everyone in the West is looking at Russia as the brutal and unprovoked aggressor. Can Russia be made to pay reparations, and if so, how?

With or without Putin, Russia is unlikely to compensate Ukraine voluntarily for the damage it has inflicted. However, if Russia desperately wants to save its economy by partially reengaging with the West, it might be coerced into paying reparations as part of the price of reintegration.

If Russia refuses to pay reparations, it will be up to Western governments, private organizations, and individuals to identify Russian assets in the West and seize them to benefit Ukraine and its citizens. According to the Wall Street Journal, only $30 billion of such assets have been seized.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), approved by almost all U.N. members, including the United States, the U.K., and the E.U., provides for the seizure of ill-gotten foreign assets. The E.U., the U.K., and the United States may need to pass special enabling legislation specifying that, without a criminal conviction, their police and courts could fast-track the seizure of assets of identified Russian oligarchs and government officials. The burden of proof in any court proceedings should be on the Russian oligarch, government official, family member, or associate to prove that they acquired the asset by legitimate means. The word legitimate would have to be defined by the “reasonable person” standard as commonly used in the West.

Police and courts in the West have recent experience confiscating criminal, drug, and terrorist-related funds. Such knowledge could be used in crafting a solution to the seizure of ill-gotten Russian assets.

However, discovering a large portion of the foreign assets of President Putin, his government, and his cronies will be a lengthy and arduous task. Even with years of experience, American and European government investigators, lawyers, and accountants will find it challenging to discover Russian assets hidden in dozens of countries under layers of phony and obscure individual and corporate names.

To deal with this problem, NATO, as the key military and strategic defender of the West, should create a Special Ukraine Reparations Commission to oversee the identification of Russian assets. Such a commission could allocate responsibility for asset identification to various allied governments and private organizations. Once assets have been identified, appropriate legal proceedings should commence to seize them.

Finding offshore Russian properties and wealth will often be difficult because the Russians have tried to hide their locations and ownership. But concealing any asset inevitably leaves an evidence trail.

Hiding financial assets like currency, stocks, or gold requires the assistance of lawyers, accountants, and bankers. Secretaries, filing clerks, document processors, and others may know or have a strong suspicion about the actual owner of a hidden asset. Spouses, ex-spouses, children, relatives, and friends may be part of the conspiracy or know some key details.

The hiding of physical assets is also a complex and costly effort. It requires hiring real estate agents, architects, interior and landscape designers, or boat builders to assist in buying and improving the asset. Then bankers, lawyers, accountants, and clerks would need to hide the actual ownership by transferring the assets to a corporation or a third party. In exotic locations, travel agents, pilots, drivers, boat captains, maids, and crew may hear bits and pieces of relevant information. The buyer of an asset must typically file legal papers with appropriate government agencies in different countries. Every transaction has someone’s figurative fingerprints on the paperwork.

The United States, as the most formidable member of NATO, should take a leadership role in identifying and seizing Russian assets for the benefit of the Ukrainian people. But, to find these hidden assets, the United States and its NATO allies would also have to enlist assistance from the thousands of insiders who know who owns what. But how should the American government enlist the help of these legal, banking, clerical, or real estate insiders when we don’t even know their names?

If the reward was large enough, many insiders might cooperate with the U.S. government or private investigators. For example, insiders who provide vital information that leads to asset seizure should be awarded a generous percentage of the seized asset on a sliding scale. Perhaps, fifty percent of the value of a seized asset up to $1 million, thirty percent of a seized asset up to $10 million, etc. In addition, the seizure award should be both confidential and tax-free to increase the incentive’s value and minimize any unwanted publicity or paper trail surrounding the award.

Those courageous insiders who provided essential information that led to Russian asset seizures should also be legally immunized against the threat of prosecution for violations of confidentiality agreements or statutes. Likewise, attorneys should also be immunized from discipline or prosecution for any breach of the attorney-client privilege.

The U.S. and other Western governments should enforce the highest level of secrecy to protect the identity of the informants. Revealing their names might be a death sentence. One way to hide the insider names would be to keep the informant’s identity off all government documents, replacing actual names with elaborate codes. In addition, contact information for the informants should never be entered into any online database but would be sequestered offline in a hyper-secure location such as Fort Knox.

The President might sponsor a worldwide contest to identify Russian assets to publicize the Treasury Department’s search for those assets. There is a historical precedent and legal basis for such action. Article One, Section 8 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress to grant Letters of Marque. During the Revolutionary War, such letters empowered American ship captains to seize British ships.

Congress could authorize President Biden to issue a limited Letter of Marque to anyone who provides evidence that leads to the seizure of a broad range of Russian assets. These assets could then be seized and used as partial payment for the enormously expensive reconstruction of Ukraine. The limited Letter of Marque would only authorize an individual to identify the asset to be seized and its location. The seizure itself would be up to the U.S. or other NATO governments.

Congress wouldn’t necessarily have to issue a Letter of Marque to seize Kremlin-related assets. Instead, it could simply authorize the President by statute to create a system of incentives. Those incentives would encourage insiders to inform the Treasury Department of hidden Russian assets and thereby become eligible for a generous portion of the asset when it was seized and sold.

The United States would not be alone in its effort to seize Russian assets. The former British deputy prime minister, Dominic Raab, said he supports using seized Russian property in the U.K. to benefit Ukrainian refugees.

As they resist the Russian invasion, Ukrainians will suffer greatly in the next few months and years. However, they would be comforted in their suffering if they knew that at least some of Russia’s ill-gotten wealth would be seized to reconstruct their country.

James S. Fay is a semi-retired California attorney, political scientist, and college administrator. His articles have appeared in social science and law journals, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, 19fortyfive, and Real Clear Education. In addition, he has published articles on the Helsinki Accords, presidential emergency powers, and NATO funding. He served as an intelligence officer in the U. S. Army, 3rd Armored Division.

19fortyfive.com · by James Fay · December 9, 2022

7. How the Decades-Long Chinese Espionage Campaign "Stole" US Military Technology

Excerpts:

One potential consideration may be that China’s leadership was thinking decades into the future in the late 80s and 90s, during a time when China may have seemed less threatening. However, at this time decades ago, China may have at the time been thinking about, planning and pursuing global military dominance decades ago, and taking deliberate steps in that direction. This planning and execution appears to have been planned at a time when the scope or understanding of the Chinese threat and extend of China’s global ambitions may have been lesser known, understood or recognized within the US.

It appears that may be changing as awareness regarding the scope of this challenge becomes more accurately understood. In recent years, China's ambition for global dominance has become both more pronounced and explicit, as cited in numerous Pentagon China reports. An interesting essay from the US State Department explains how some of China's efforts can be supported and expedited through the country's well-known Military Civil Fusion.

"The CCP is developing and acquiring key technologies through licit and illicit means. These include investment in private industries, talent recruitment programs, directing academic and research collaboration to military gain, forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and outright theft," the State Dept. essay says.

How the Decades-Long Chinese Espionage Campaign "Stole" US Military Technology

Many US-driven technological advances may have been stolen by Chinese spies

https://warriormaven.com/china/chinese-espionage-stole-us-military-technology

KRIS OSBORN, WARRIOR MAVEN - CENTER FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATIONUPDATED:20 HOURS AGOORIGINAL:DEC 7, 2022

warriormaven.com · by Kris Osborn, Warrior Maven - Center for Military Modernization

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

(Washington D.C.) Paradigm-changing deep-penetrating warheads, new hardened, heat resistant nano-composite materials enabling hypersonic weapons flight, vertical take-off-and-landing drones and a new generation of submarine “quieting” technologies are all massively impactful breakthrough technology of vital significance to cutting-edge and future US weapons systems.

All of these areas of innovation and scientific exploration, some of which involved the discovery and development of “disruptive” or breakthrough technologies, were heavily focused upon in recent decades at the well known, prestigious US Los Alamos National Laboratory. However, to put things simply and clearly, many of the US-driven technological advances in these critical areas appear to have been stolen by Chinese spies.

Chinese Espionage

Technologically driven Chinese espionage at Los Alamos hit the news in a very public way earlier this year, following a private counterintelligence investigation. The discoveries shined additional light on the concerning and well-documented problems arising from Chinese cyber attacks, espionage and deliberate efforts to “steal” sensitive US military technology. Much of this was of course known and certainly became much more widely understood when Chinese operations at Los Alamos were exposed publicly. What is lesser known, yet perhaps of greatest significance, is that China’s infiltration and theft of sensitive US military technologies is a result of a deliberate, multi-decade elaborate campaign to develop, recruit and mature “talent” for the specific purpose of learning and “stealing” impactful technological discoveries under the guise of collaborative scientific exploration.

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An interesting and extremely significant report from a strategic intelligence firm Strider, called “The Los Alamos Club” used open-source research to learn that, between 1987 and 2021, at least 162 scientists who had worked at Los Alamos returned to China to support a variety of domestic research and development programs.

“Fifteen of those scientists worked as permanent staff members at Los Alamos. Of those fifteen, thirteen were recruited into PRC government talent programs; some were responsible for sponsoring visiting scholars and postdoctoral researchers from the PRC, and some received U.S. government funding for sensitive research,” the text of the Strider report states.

The Strider findings, supported by substantial, detailed open source documentation, reveal a massive, decades-long deliberate effort to find, cultivate, place and ultimately leverage scientific expertise acquired through critical and often highly sensitive scientific and technological exploration. Some of the scientists investigated for the report returned to China after holding a highly-sensitive “Q Clearance” allowing access to Top Secret Restricted Data and National Security Information.

The Strider Report reveals that indeed the Chinese effort was far more elaborate, long-standing and deliberate than may have previously been realized or even suspected by some. Under the auspices of a cooperative sensibility in support of scientific discovery, Chinese scientists with ties to the Chinese government essentially recruited additional scientists with critical technology area expertise and access to US-driven scientific innovation of military significance during their time at Los Alamos.

For instance, the Strider report specifies that as many as 59 scientists of the 162 who returned to China after working at Los Alamos were part of a special Chinese “talent recruitment program” called the Thousand Talents Program and its youth branch called the Youth Thousand Talents Program.

While the Strider report is quite clear to say it is not assigning “blame” to Los Alamos, its findings are specific, quite detailed and of potentially enormous consequence. “This report documents the ambitions of the PRC’s talent strategy and its exploitation of Western commitments to global scientific collaboration. It does not argue that Los Alamos National Laboratory bears responsibility for, or was complicit, in the PRC’s recruitment of former Los Alamos affiliates,” the report writes.

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The text of the report is filled with specifics related to particular scientists and impactful areas of weapons exploration. Specifically, the report says the work of Chinese scientist Dr. Chen Shiyi, an expert who worked at Los Alamos throughout the 90s, “made important contributions that allowed the PRC to surpass the US in air breathing hypersonic vehicle research and development.”

After spending the 90s at Los Alamos, Shiyi returned to China where, as President of the Southern University of Science and Technology (SUSTech), he succeeded in recruiting scientists with ties to Los Alamos. SUSTech is a Chinese-government funded institution said to operate with the ambition of becoming “China’s Stanford.”

Hypersonic Weapons

What might the impact of this Chinese effort have been? What might it continue to be in the coming years? Senior US weapons developers repeatedly say publicly that the US became “number 3” in the world behind Russia and China in the realm of hypersonics weapons development. While the US is fast-closing this gap and progressing with rapid success to test, develop and ultimately deploy its own hypersonic arsenal, China’s hypersonic weapons testing has certainly been the focus of much attention and hype. The report specifically details US-led innovations in the realm of hypersonic weapons which “made important contributions” to what became China’s ability to “surpass” the US in certain critical areas such as air breathing hypersonic vehicle research and development. Essentially, it appears entirely possible if not even likely that China’s Los Alamos directed Thousand Talents Program played a major role in creating a “gap” between China and the US in the realm of hypersonic weapons.

One of Shiyi’s most significant moves, the report says, was to recruit Zhao Yusheng, a Chinese scientist who spent 18 years at Los Alamos.

“In a 2004 edition of a Los Alamos publication, Nuclear Weapons Journal, Zhao described how research on superhard nanocomposites was “highly promising for hypersonic high-speed penetration” and noted that “superhard materials in warhead penetrators [would] significantly enhance technological advantages of U.S. weaponry,” the report states. Three years after publishing this in 2004, Zhao filed a national defense patent in China for an “ultra-thick penetrating warhead.”

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Key portions of the hypersonic weapons research performed by the Los Alamos club was involved with Hypersonic Quiet Wind Tunnel experimentation wherein projectiles were assessed for aerodynamic properties, thermal management and boundary layer phenomenology. These areas are essential to hypersonic weapons development because weapons need to be constructed with special kinds of heat-resistant composite materials and “shaped” with contours to enable stable air-boundary flow at hypersonic speeds to maintain precision guidance and flight-path trajectory.

A “turbulent” air flow surrounding a projectile, for example, can cause great movement and turbulence surrounding the hypersonic weapon, causing instability and disrupting or destroying its intended flight path. For years, the biggest challenge for weapons developers had not so much been an ability to demonstrate hypersonic speeds but rather an ability to “sustain” hypersonic speeds throughout an entire flight path. This relies heavily upon air-flow boundary layer dynamics and thermal management. Materials able to ensure a hypersonic projectile maintains its flight path without exploding or fragmenting due to intense heat may have been a breakthrough “catalyst” in the maturation of hypersonic weapons. Discoveries related to “superhard” nanocomposites for hypersonic flight outlined by Zhao in the Los Alamos publication may have been brought to China to help the PRC quickly achieve breakthrough superiority in the area of hypersonic flight.

Drones

Other critical areas of technological discovery potentially stolen by Chinese scientists working at Los Alamos pertain to jet-engine propulsion, vertical take off drones and “quieting” technologies for submarines. In recent years, Chinese weapons developers have been integrating a new WS-10 C domestically built engine into its J-20 5th-generation stealth fighter, something which could have been informed to some extent by technologies stolen by the Los Alamos Club.

Vertical take off drones is yet another area of technological progress which the Strider report associates with espionage at Los Alamos. Through platforms such as the US Navy’s FireScout drone which features a helicopter-like ability to take-off and land vertically, the US has been a leader for many years in the deployment of ship-launched drones such as the Fire Scout. Vertical take-off ability (VTOL) for drones is extremely critical as they need to operate in austere areas without runways and take-off at sea without needing a carrier deck. The US Navy’s application of this kind of technology allowed for the deployment of the VTOL FireScout drone on destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Strider report says that sure enough in 2019, a Los Alamos connected Chinese Scientist helped China produce its own VTOL prototype drone.

Submarine quieting technology was also targeted by Chinese scientist-spies at Los Alamos, an area of pressing relevance to the US Navy in the Pacific. The Strider report explains how research involving Chinese scientists at Los Alamos proved essential in the development of new submarine “noise reduction technology.” This is an area of critical significance to the US Navy as it continues to develop and integrate new “quieting” technologies into its submarine fleet to ensure its continued undersea superiority. This is a pressing challenge given that US Navy attack submarines are now used more fully as clandestine reconnaissance nodes able to patrol and search high-risk enemy waters and coastlines and no longer more narrowly restricted to forward protecting firepower with weapons such as Tomahawks and Torpedoes.

In recent years, for instance, the US Navy integrated a new series of quieting technologies into its fleet of Virginia-class submarines with new coating materials, antennas and propulsion applications designed to enhance the “stealth” properties of the attack submarine fleet. Could some of these critical innovations have been stolen by Chinese submarine developers and applied to China’s fleet of submarines? These US Navy quieting discoveries were first integrated 7-to-8 years ago on a prototype Virginia class Block III boat the USS South Dakota. The USS South Dakota has since deployed successfully with these technological enhancements and the quieting technologies continue to be integrated across the entire US Navy attack submarine force.

These upgraded submarines could possibly enable a quiet, stealthy group of forward operating attack submarines to discover a Chinese amphibious attack on Taiwan at its inception near Chinese shores and destroy the fleet with torpedoes and Tomahawks while remaining undetected. While many of the specifics regarding these Navy technologies are not available for security reasons, leaders have often cited them publicly in a general way. Many of these applications are likely of great significance to US Navy undersea dominance. It is entirely realistic to posit that US Navy undersea superiority could potentially “save” Taiwan in the event of a Chinese amphibious attack. However, in light of the Strider report, one cannot help but wonder if the Chinese also have these “quieting” enhancements, in part due to scientific espionage at Los Alamos.

Following its detailed exploration of these instances of potential Chinese espionage and “stealing,” as evidenced to some extent in China’s new weapons platforms, the Strider report calls for the need to intensify vigilance and critical measures to protect US innovation centers.

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One potential consideration may be that China’s leadership was thinking decades into the future in the late 80s and 90s, during a time when China may have seemed less threatening. However, at this time decades ago, China may have at the time been thinking about, planning and pursuing global military dominance decades ago, and taking deliberate steps in that direction. This planning and execution appears to have been planned at a time when the scope or understanding of the Chinese threat and extend of China’s global ambitions may have been lesser known, understood or recognized within the US.

It appears that may be changing as awareness regarding the scope of this challenge becomes more accurately understood. In recent years, China's ambition for global dominance has become both more pronounced and explicit, as cited in numerous Pentagon China reports. An interesting essay from the US State Department explains how some of China's efforts can be supported and expedited through the country's well-known Military Civil Fusion.

"The CCP is developing and acquiring key technologies through licit and illicit means. These include investment in private industries, talent recruitment programs, directing academic and research collaboration to military gain, forced technology transfer, intelligence gathering, and outright theft," the State Dept. essay says.

Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

warriormaven.com · by Kris Osborn, Warrior Maven - Center for Military Modernization

8. Recruited for Navy SEALs, Many Sailors Wind Up Scraping Paint

I have heard it sarcastically described as the SEALs are used for the bait and switch recruiting effort by the Navy. The SEALs attract good people and when they wash out they can be reassigned to fill the needs of the Navy. (Not my description, just what I have heard).

Recruited for Navy SEALs, Many Sailors Wind Up Scraping Paint

The high failure rate of the elite force’s selection course shunts hundreds of candidates into low-skilled jobs.

nytimes.com · by Dave Philipps · December 9, 2022

Credit...Mason Trinca for The New York Times

NAVAL BASE KITSAP, Wash. — A sailor fresh out the elite Navy SEAL selection course slung his gear over his broad shoulder and clomped down a steel ladder into the guts of a Navy ship to execute a difficult, dayslong mission specifically assigned to him: scrubbing the stinking scum out of the ship’s cavernous bilge tank.

Hardly the stuff of action movies, but it’s how many would-be SEALs end up.

The Navy attracts recruits for the SEALs using flashy images of warriors jumping from planes or rising menacingly from the dark surf. But very few make it through the harrowing selection course, and those who don’t still owe the Navy the rest of their four-year enlistments. So they end up doing whatever Navy jobs are available — often, menial work that few others want.

The recruits are almost all hyper-motivated overachievers, often with college degrees, who have passed a battery of strength and intelligence tests. But many find themselves washing dishes in cramped galleys, cleaning toilets on submarines or scraping paint on aircraft carriers.

Unlike civilian workers, they cannot quit. To walk away would be a crime. Until the enlistment is done, they are stuck.

“I’m just thrown away here — a nobody,” the sailor who was assigned to clean the bilge said in an interview. “My supervisor doesn’t even know my name.”

Like other sailors who were interviewed for this article, he requested that his name not be used because he was not authorized to speak publicly and feared retribution.

“Almost everyone I know who tried out ended up the way I did,” the sailor said. “Basically, we’re all scraping paint.”

Relegating promising candidates who don’t quite clear the bar to years of drudgery would be a harsh arrangement even if the SEAL selection course were running as designed. But, lately, it hasn’t been. Classes that were always hard became dangerous. A number of sailors were hospitalized. Others were forced to quit if they wanted medical care. And, in February, one sailor died.

The course, known as BUD/S, is meant to simulate the extreme stress of special-operations combat missions. Recruits who can’t take the long days of struggle and cold announce their decision to quit by voluntarily ringing a brass bell near the beach where they train.

SEAL recruits who do not complete the force’s demanding selection course often wind up as “undesignated” sailors, eligible only for low-skilled work in the fleet. Credit...Mason Trinca for The New York Times

The Navy is now conducting a high-level investigation into what happened. A spokesman said he could not comment on the causes until the investigation concluded. But in interviews, Naval officers, SEALs and sailors who attempted the course say instructors started pushing it beyond what safety regulations allow: kicking and punching recruits, making already grueling tasks hazardous and, at times, denying medical care to injured sailors unless they first dropped out of the course.

Some candidates turned to illegal performance-enhancing drugs just to get through. Others were pushed to the breaking point.

Classes that started with 150 recruits were finishing with fewer than 10. In Navy records, nearly all the dropouts appeared to be voluntary, but sailors said that, in reality, a majority were sick or injured. It was not unusual, they said, to see men carried to the bell because they could not walk.

After the death in February, the service disciplined three officers and made changes to rein in instructors and provide better medical care. Graduation rates improved. And the Navy says it is working to offer better alternatives for recruits who drop out.

This week, Congress passed an amendment requiring the Defense Department to conduct an independent review of the training.

But little has been done to give the sailors who rang the bell when the course was at its most brutal, and are now deckhands, janitors or dishwashers, a second chance at becoming a SEAL or a quick exit from the Navy.

“We all wanted to do something extraordinary, and are now doing what feels like the farthest thing from it,” said a sailor who arrived at the selection course in 2021 with a marketing degree and good civilian job prospects, but who quit after a leg injury that required hospitalization. He now sweeps the hangar deck of an aircraft carrier.

He and others have asked to transfer to the Army or Marines, hoping to do the kind of intense work they signed up for with the SEALs. But he said his chain of command seemed determined to keep him a deck sweeper.

“It feels like prison,” he said. “I don’t feel like there is any way out. Honestly, I’ve contemplated jumping off the boat.”

What can feel like punishment is mainly just a flawed process. The SEALs created a selection course that prioritized identifying the toughest handful of candidates, while casting aside the vast majority who attempted it. The SEAL leadership treated those who left the course as an afterthought, and did little to put them on a meaningful career path. Instead, the bell-ringers were hurried off into a vast military system that often had no obvious place for them, and plugged them into whatever low-level job needed filling at the moment.

Navy officials say they are working to improve the process. But every few months, the SEALs still send scores more sailors to scrape paint and sweep decks.

Things were different before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In those days, sailors were required to train for a regular Navy profession, known as a rate, before they could attempt the SEAL course. Dropouts from the course could return to the rate they had trained for.

But, in 2006, faced with a mandate to drastically expand the SEALs, the Navy began allowing new recruits to go into the course directly. That helped fill the training pipeline, but it also produced thousands of “undesignated sailors” — washed-out SEAL recruits with no rate, eligible only for low-skilled labor.

Sailors who went through the course said that what separated bell-ringers from newly minted SEALs was, at times, little more than luck — whether a wrong step led to a sprained ankle, or if high bacteria counts in the ocean caused sickness. But the reverberations last for years.

Sailors said they knew going into the course that ringing the bell might mean serving out their enlistments in low-skilled work below decks. What they didn’t know, they said, was that they would attempt the course when SEAL instructors were striking students and blocking medical care, and when other sailors were using drugs to get ahead.

Not all bell-ringers end up in work they hate. A spate of suicides in 2016 prompted the Navy to improve the options for them. Many are now trained to become divers, rescue swimmers or explosives experts. But paradoxically, sailors say, the first few to give up in each class have seemed to get the best opportunities, while those who stick it out the longest are left with the dregs.

Many go to new assignments hauling the weight of dashed dreams. They can feel cheated, angry or consumed by blame. In October, a sailor threw himself from the fifth-floor window of his barracks shortly after ringing the bell, according to two military officers with knowledge of the suicide attempt who spoke on condition of anonymity. The sailor lived, but sustained serious injuries.

Members of Congress are now asking whether fundamental changes are needed. In November, Representative Jackie Speier, Democrat of California, who chairs the House Armed Services subcommittee on military personnel, spent two days in Coronado, Calif., where the course is held. In an interview, she said she was concerned about how some were being treated.

“It’s painful to watch,” she said of the course, noting that one sailor was hospitalized while she was there. “I know it has to be tough. But there must be some way to get the talent they need without ruining people.”

Ms. Speier called for an outside audit to examine how many students were being injured, and how many were winding up in menial jobs.

“Truly, these are committed young men you want to see succeed,” she said. “We don’t want to just discard them.”

Candidates who drop out of the SEAL course are usually given a few days to choose a new Navy job from what they say is generally a very short list. Their civilian skills and qualifications, they say, rarely get much weight. One sailor had a nursing degree; another spoke Russian. Both are now swabbing decks.

A spokeswoman for the Chief of Naval Personnel said in a statement that only a minority of sailors who quit the course end up undesignated, while many go on to fulfilling careers. The spokeswoman, Capt. Jodie Cornell, added that “the Navy has made substantial efforts over the last couple of years to work with sailors reassigned from BUD/S in order to place them in specific ratings to the benefit of the Navy and the sailor.”

In the fleet, former SEAL candidates are often labeled “BUD/S duds” and have a reputation for showing up riddled with physical and mental health problems from their time with the SEALs, and for harboring toxic resentment toward the Navy, two Naval officers said.

The service has tried for decades to improve graduation rates. It standardized curriculums meant to limit overzealous instructors. The course is now meticulously scripted in three-ring binders, and physical abuse is forbidden.

The Navy also has tried better vetting and more preparation. To get into the course today, candidates must pass a demanding physical conditioning course that weeds out dozens of hopefuls.

Even so, graduation rates have not improved. And, in the beginning 2021, they took a dive.

Why the course suddenly got so much tougher is a mystery to sailors who attempted it in that period. The Navy says it can’t comment while investigations are in progress. Whatever the reason, sailors say, the course took a vicious turn.

One sailor — a 27-year-old with a computer engineering degree and top physical fitness scores — was carrying a 300-pound log up a steep sand berm with six other men when, he and other witnesses said, an instructor lunged at him, kicking him in the back with both feet, knocking the whole team to the sand with the log on top of them. When they got up and hefted the log again, the sailor said, the instructor punched him in the head.

The sailor never complained about the beating. He kept going, determined to make the cut. A week later, a crashing wave threw another sailor’s helmet into his face, breaking his jaw and giving him a concussion that left him bleary-eyed and vomiting. When he asked to go to the medical clinic, he said, the instructor who had hit him told him that he was making excuses because he was weak and that he would have to quit the course to see a doctor. He rang the bell.

Desperate to avoid years of mind-numbing toil, he refused to be vaccinated against Covid-19, and the Navy discharged him. A few sailors told The New York Times that they sought similar exits. Others attempted suicide and were discharged on medical grounds.

Those who serve out their enlistments often face bleak years of low pay and slim chances for promotion.

The sailor cleaning bilge tanks was in a SEAL selection class in the winter of 2021, when the ocean was especially cold. By Week Two, his lungs were so full of bloody fluid that friends told him they could hear gurgling. When he asked to go to the medical clinic, he said, an instructor ordered him to do push-ups — as punishment. The next day, the sailor said, he nearly blacked out on a run that would have been easy for him when healthy. Unable to catch his breath, he rang the bell.

A few months later, the sailor was mopping floors on a ship. He was so ashamed of washing out, he said, that on the rare occasions when he could bring himself to look in the mirror, he called himself a quitter, a coward and worse. One night, he decided to drive his truck off a bridge, telling himself, “Time to ring the bell for real.”

Seconds before crashing over the edge, he said, he saw his mother’s face and jerked the truck back onto the road. In the light of the dashboard, his cheeks were streaked with tears.

After nearly two years, he has still not advanced in rank, but he has found a slightly better job — night guard duty on a dry-docked ship. It is oppressively dull work, but at least it isn’t the bilge.

He says he sometimes dreams of trying out for the SEALs again. Part of him thinks it’s a bad idea. But he also knows that he would go back in a second if given the chance — and do anything he could to make it through, including drugs.

nytimes.com · by Dave Philipps · December 9, 2022

9. Why NATO shouldn’t align against China

Excerpts:

Finally, NATO policymakers need to be cognizant of the broader geopolitical implications of making China a central component of any strategic doctrine. Beijing wouldn’t stand still if NATO proceeded down this path. Instead, China would likely double down on its strategic partnership with Russia in an attempt to balance against any NATO shift toward Asia.

This could cause all sorts of issues for the alliance, including but not limited to greater Chinese-Russian military and intelligence collaboration, joint gray-zone operations in Europe itself, and a higher probability of a great power clash the US should be trying to subvert rather than incite.

NATO has a lot on its plate already. The last thing it needs is to get distracted from its core mission, especially at a moment when the alliance has become relevant again.

Why NATO shouldn’t align against China

China would likely double down on its already uneasy strategic partnership with Russia to balance against any NATO shift to Asia

asiatimes.com · by Daniel DePetris · December 10, 2022

NATO foreign ministers meeting in Bucharest, Romania, for a two-day summit last week had the ten-month-old war in Ukraine at the top of their agenda. China, however, was also the center of the NATO talks, thanks to prodding by the Biden administration, which sought to close ranks within the alliance on the challenges emanating from Asia’s biggest power.

The Biden administration succeeded, at least in part, with US and NATO officials stating that member states will try to reduce dependency on China for supply chains and better coordinate export restrictions of critical technologies to Beijing.

Yet despite the growing awareness of China’s power, it would be a mistake for NATO to transform itself into a security player in Asia. China shouldn’t be a top priority for the alliance—especially at such a unique time for Europe’s security environment.

There’s no question that NATO has become increasingly attuned to China’s growing economic, military, and diplomatic capacity over the last several years. Member states are increasingly concerned about the trajectory of Chinese foreign policy under leader Xi Jinping, who just solidified his control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a third five-year term in office.

The same countries in the alliance who once believed robust trade ties with Beijing would eventually open up its political system and translate into greater freedom and democracy in China now admit that the theory was, as UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said, “naive.”

NATO, traditionally resistant to treating China as an adversary, is also transitioning toward a more skeptical, if not antagonistic, position vis-a-vis Beijing. In 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg referred to the rise of China as presenting challenges as well as opportunities; the alliance’s 2022 Strategic Concept was far different, devoting a paragraph to Beijing’s “coercive policies” and its burgeoning partnership with Russia.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg gives a press conference in Brussels on June 14, 2021. Photo: AFP / Olivier Hoslet

Diverting an ever-greater share of NATO planning and capability to the China issue is a costly enterprise in more ways than one. While there is no disputing that the CCP under Xi represents a more ambitious, even aggressive, entity, NATO is not the ideal format to address it.

First, an increasingly China-centric NATO would entail a vast expansion of the alliance’s remit—an expansion so large that it would make the alliance’s raison d’être unrecognizable. At its core, NATO is an organization created to ensure the collective defense of its European member states, first against the threat of an external Soviet attack during the Cold War and against Russia today.

As the North Atlantic Treaty specifically states in its preamble, the alliance is a means to “promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” China is more than 2,500 miles from the alliance’s eastern front; geographically speaking, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military threat to the territorial integrity of NATO members is limited, if not nonexistent.

A second and equally critical reason why NATO should avoid going out-of-area: there is an ongoing conflict in Europe right now. The war in Ukraine, less than a year old, is already the continent’s deadliest and most destructive in over 75 years.

According to US defense officials, Ukraine and Russia have each endured at least 100,000 casualties, and this tally doesn’t include the tens of thousands of civilians who have perished as a result of the fighting.

With no peace talks between Kiev and Moscow remotely on the horizon, the fighting will likely continue well into 2023, which could include even more escalation from the Russians as Ukrainian forces actively prepare operations to regain Crimea.

Taking this into account, now is an especially inopportune time for NATO to try to do much. And that is precisely what it would be doing if it elevated China to the top of its agenda.

The alliance is already plagued by a number of problems, from disproportionate military contributions (nearly 70% of NATO’s defense expenditures this year come from the US) and unmet defense spending obligations to a persistent lack of political will from some of its wealthiest members.

Outside of Washington, very few NATO members actually possess the military capacity to contribute to a major military operation in a meaningful way; the alliance had difficulty sustaining a bombing campaign against a third-rate Libyan army in 2011, so the notion it could fight and win a hypothetical conflict with a much more potent China, which is in the midst of a military modernization campaign, is simply unbelievable.

China’s military has been growing rapidly and modernizing. Photo: WikiCommons

Finally, NATO policymakers need to be cognizant of the broader geopolitical implications of making China a central component of any strategic doctrine. Beijing wouldn’t stand still if NATO proceeded down this path. Instead, China would likely double down on its strategic partnership with Russia in an attempt to balance against any NATO shift toward Asia.

This could cause all sorts of issues for the alliance, including but not limited to greater Chinese-Russian military and intelligence collaboration, joint gray-zone operations in Europe itself, and a higher probability of a great power clash the US should be trying to subvert rather than incite.

NATO has a lot on its plate already. The last thing it needs is to get distracted from its core mission, especially at a moment when the alliance has become relevant again.

Daniel R DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune and Newsweek.

asiatimes.com · by Daniel DePetris · December 10, 2022

10. Why India Can’t Replace China

Excerpts:

In other words, India faces three major obstacles in its quest to become “the next China”: investment risks are too big, policy inwardness is too strong, and macroeconomic imbalances are too large. These obstacles need to be removed before global firms will invest, since they do have other alternatives. They can bring their operations back to ASEAN, which served as the world’s factory floor before that role shifted to China. They can bring them back home to advanced countries, which played that role before ASEAN countries. Or they can maintain them in China, accepting the risks on the grounds that the Indian alternative is no better.

If the Indian authorities are willing to change course and remove the obstacles to investment and growth, the rosy pronouncements of pundits could indeed come true. If not, however, India will continue to muddle along, with parts of the economy doing well but the country as a whole failing to reach its potential.

Indian policy makers may be tempted into believing that the decline of China ordains the dizzy resurgence of India. But, in the end, whether or not India turns into the next China is not merely a question of global economic forces or geopolitics. It is something that will require a dramatic policy shift by New Delhi itself.

Why India Can’t Replace China

The Barriers to New Delhi’s Next Boom

By Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman

December 9, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman · December 9, 2022

With China’s status as the “workshop of the world” marred by rising political risks, slowing growth, and increasingly untenable “zero COVID” policies, no country seems more poised to benefit than India. In May, The Economist ran a cover story about India, asking whether this was the country’s moment—and concluded that yes, it probably was. More recently, Stanford economist and Nobel laureate Michael Spence declared that “India is the outstanding performer now,” noting that the country “remains the most preferred investment destination.” And in November, Chetan Ahya, Morgan Stanley’s chief Asia economist, predicted that the Indian economy will account for one-fifth of global growth over the next decade.

Without a doubt, India could be on the cusp of a historic boom—if it manages to increase private investment, including by attracting large numbers of global firms from China. But will New Delhi be able to seize this opportunity? The answer is not obvious. Back in 2021, we provided a sobering assessment of India’s prospects in Foreign Affairs. We pointed out that popular assumptions about a booming economy were inaccurate. In fact, the country’s economic rise had faltered after the 2008 global financial crisis and stalled completely after 2018. And we argued that the reason for this slowdown lay deep in India’s economic framework: its emphasis on self-reliance and the defects in its policymaking process—“software bugs,” as we called them.

One year later, despite the exuberant press, India’s economic environment remains largely unchanged. As a result, we continue to believe that radical policy changes are needed before India can revive domestic investment, much less convince large numbers of global businesses to move their production there. An important lesson for policymakers is that there is no inevitability, no straight line of causation, from the decline of China to the rise of India.

Promised Land?

In some ways, India looks like a promised land for global companies. It has structural advantages, its potential rivals have serious drawbacks, and the government is offering large investment incentives.

Start with the structural advantages. Commanding a territory that is nine times larger than Germany and a population that will soon overtake China’s as the world’s largest, India is one of the few countries that is big enough to house many large-scale industries, producing initially for global markets and ultimately for the burgeoning domestic market. Moreover, it is an established democracy with a long legal tradition and a notably young, talented, and English-speaking work force. And India also has some considerable achievements to its credit: its physical infrastructure has improved dramatically in recent years, while its digital infrastructure—particularly its financial payments system—has in some ways surpassed that of the United States.

China’s turn toward authoritarianism makes India look more inviting.

Beyond these advantages, there is the matter of alternatives. If international firms do not go to India, where else might they go? A few years ago, other South Asian countries might have been considered attractive candidates. But that has changed. Over the past year, Sri Lanka has experienced an epochal social, political, and economic crisis. Pakistan has been ravaged by an environmental shock that has aggravated its perennial macroeconomic vulnerability and political instability. Even Bangladesh, long a development darling, has been forced to borrow from the International Monetary Fund after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused commodity prices to soar, depleting the country’s foreign exchange reserves. Amid this South Asian “polycrisis,” as the economic historian Adam Tooze has called it, India stands out as a haven of stability.

More significant still is the comparison with China, India’s most obvious economic competitor. Over the past year, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s regime has been buffeted by multiple challenges, including slow economic growth and a looming demographic decline. The Chinese Communist Party’s draconian COVID-19 lockdowns and assault on the private sector have only made things worse. In recent weeks, Beijing has confronted an increasingly restive population, including the most widespread antigovernment protests the country has witnessed in decades. This turn toward authoritarianism at home and aggression abroad—and the inept governance that has taken the sheen off the fabled “China model”—have made democratic India look even more inviting.

Finally, India has taken steps that, on paper, should sweeten the deal for international firms. In early 2021, the government introduced its Production-Linked Incentives (PLI) scheme to provide economic inducements to both foreign and domestic manufacturing firms who “Make in India.” Since then, the PLI initiative—which offers significant subsidies to manufacturers in advanced sectors such as telecom, electronics, and medical devices—has had a few notable successes. In September 2022, for example, Apple announced that it plans to produce between five and ten percent of its new iPhone 14 models in India; and in November, Foxconn said it plans to build a $20 billion semiconductor plant in the country in conjunction with a domestic partner.

Rhetoric vs. Reality

If India really is the promised land, however, these examples should be joined by many others. International firms should be lining up to shift their production to the subcontinent, while domestic firms boost their investments to cash in on the boom. Yet there is little sign that either of these things is happening. By many measures, the economy is still struggling to regain its pre-pandemic footing.

Take India’s GDP. It is true—as enthusiastic commentators never cease to point out—that growth over the past two years has been exceptionally rapid, higher than any other major country. But this is largely a statistical illusion. Left out is that during the first year of the pandemic, India suffered the worst contraction in output of any large developing country. Measured relative to 2019, GDP today is just 7.6 percent larger, compared with 13.1 percent in China and 4.6 percent in the slow-growing United States. In effect, India’s annual growth rate over the past three years has been just two and a half percent, far short of the seven percent annual rate that the country considers to be its growth potential. The performance of the industrial sector has been weaker still.

And forward-looking indicators are hardly more encouraging. Announcements of new projects (as measured by the Center for the Monitoring of the Indian Economy) have again fallen off after a brief post-pandemic rebound, remaining far below the levels achieved during the boom in the early years of this century. Even more striking, there is not much evidence that foreign firms are relocating production to India. Despite all the talk about India as the investment destination of choice, overall foreign direct investment has stagnated for the past decade, remaining around two percent of GDP. For every firm that has embraced the India opportunity, many more have had unsuccessful experiences in India, including Google, Walmart, Vodafone, and General Motors. Even Amazon has struggled, announcing in late November that it was shutting three of its Indian ventures, in fields as diverse as food delivery, education, and wholesale e-commerce.

Why are global firms reluctant to shift their China operations to India? For the same reason that domestic firms are reluctant to invest: because the risks remain far too high.

Bugs in the Software

Of the many risks to investing in India, two are particularly important. First, firms still lack the confidence that the policies in place when they invest will not be changed later, in ways that render their investments unprofitable. And even if the policy framework remains attractive on paper, firms cannot be sure that rules will be enforced impartially rather than in favor of “national champions”—the giant Indian conglomerates that the government has favored.

These problems have already had serious consequences. Telecom firms have seen their profits devastated by shifting policies. Energy providers have had difficulty passing on cost increases to consumers and collecting promised revenues from the State Electricity Boards. E-commerce firms have discovered that government rulings about allowable practices can be reversed after they have made large investments according to the original rules.

At the same time, national champions have prospered mightily. As of August 2022, nearly 80 percent of the $160 billion year-to-date increase in India’s stock market capitalization was accounted for by just one conglomerate, the Adani Group, whose founder has suddenly become the third richest person in the world. In other words, the playing field is tilted.

Nor can foreign firms reduce their risks by partnering with large domestic firms. Going into business with national champions is risky, as these groups are themselves seeking to dominate the same lucrative fields, such as e-commerce. And other domestic firms have no wish to tread in sectors dominated by groups that have received extensive regulatory favors from the government.

The Price of Entry

Apart from elevated risks, there are several other reasons why international firms are likely to remain gun-shy about India. One of the key elements of the PLI scheme, for example, is raising tariffs on foreign-made components. The idea is to encourage firms relocating to India to purchase inputs in the domestic market, but the approach significantly hinders most global enterprises, since advanced products in many sectors are typically made of hundreds or even thousands of parts sourced from the most competitive producers worldwide. By attaching high tariffs to these parts, New Delhi has provided a powerful disincentive for firms contemplating investment in the country.

For companies such as Apple that plan to sell their products in India, high import tariffs may be less of an issue. But these firms are few and far between, since India’s market of middle-class consumers remains surprisingly small—no more than $500 billion compared with a global market of some $30 trillion, according to a study by Shoumitro Chatterjee and one of us (Subramanian). Only 15 percent of the population can be considered middle class according to international definitions, while the rich who account for a large share of GDP tend to save a large share of their earnings. Both factors reduce middle-class consumption. For most firms, the risks of doing business in India outweigh the potential rewards.

Recognizing the growing tension between its protectionist policies and its goal of enhancing India’s global competitiveness, New Delhi has recently negotiated free trade agreements with Australia and the United Arab Emirates. But these initiatives—with economies that are smaller and less dynamic—pale beside those of India’s competitors in Asia. Vietnam, for example, has signed ten free trade agreements since 2010, including with China, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as with its regional partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Dangerous Deficits

In any country, a well-known prerequisite for economic take off is having key macroeconomic indicators in reasonable balance: fiscal and external trade deficits need to be low, as does inflation. But in India today, these indicators are off kilter. Since well before the pandemic began, inflation has been above the central bank’s legally mandated ceiling of six percent. Meanwhile, India’s current account deficit has doubled to about four percent of GDP in the third quarter of 2022, as it struggles to increase exports while its imports continue to grow.

Of course, many countries have macroeconomic problems, but India’s average of these three indicators is worse than in any other large economy, save the United States and Turkey. Most worrisome, India’s general government deficit, at around 10 percent of GDP, is one of the highest in the world, with interest payments alone accounting for more than 20 percent of the budget. (By comparison, debt payments account for just eight percent of the U.S. budget.) Aggravating the situation is the plight of India’s state-run electricity distribution companies, whose losses are now about 1.5 percent of GDP, over and above the fiscal deficits.

India’s middle-class market remains surprisingly small.

A final barrier to growth is a deep structural shift that has undermined the dynamism and competitiveness of private enterprise. India’s very large informal sector has been especially hard hit: first by the 2016 demonetization of large-denomination notes, which dealt a devastating blow to smaller firms that kept their working capital in cash; then by a new goods-and-services tax the following year; and finally by the COVID-19 pandemic. As a result, employment of low-skilled workers has fallen significantly, and real rural wages have actually declined, forcing India’s poor and low-income population to cut back their consumption.

These labor market vulnerabilities are a cautionary reminder that the country’s vaunted digital sector—whose promise does seem almost unbounded—employs high-skilled workers who constitute a small fraction of the workforce. As such, India’s rise as a digital powerhouse, no matter how successful, seems unlikely to generate sufficient economy-wide benefits to effect the broader structural transformation that the country needs.

India’s Choice

In other words, India faces three major obstacles in its quest to become “the next China”: investment risks are too big, policy inwardness is too strong, and macroeconomic imbalances are too large. These obstacles need to be removed before global firms will invest, since they do have other alternatives. They can bring their operations back to ASEAN, which served as the world’s factory floor before that role shifted to China. They can bring them back home to advanced countries, which played that role before ASEAN countries. Or they can maintain them in China, accepting the risks on the grounds that the Indian alternative is no better.

If the Indian authorities are willing to change course and remove the obstacles to investment and growth, the rosy pronouncements of pundits could indeed come true. If not, however, India will continue to muddle along, with parts of the economy doing well but the country as a whole failing to reach its potential.

Indian policy makers may be tempted into believing that the decline of China ordains the dizzy resurgence of India. But, in the end, whether or not India turns into the next China is not merely a question of global economic forces or geopolitics. It is something that will require a dramatic policy shift by New Delhi itself.

ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN is a Senior Fellow at Brown University and served as Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India from 2014 to 2018.
JOSH FELMAN is a Principal at JH Consulting and was the International Monetary Fund’s Senior Resident Representative in India from 2006 to 2008.

Foreign Affairs · by Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman · December 9, 2022

11. Hicks Says U.S. Strengthening Indo-Pacific Alliances

Hicks Says U.S. Strengthening Indo-Pacific Alliances

defense.gov · by David Vergun

Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen H. Hicks spoke at the 2022 Aspen Security Forum yesterday about the DOD's pacing challenge.

Sea Ops

Members of the Japan Self-Defense Force Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade return in an assault amphibious vehicle to the forward-deployed amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans’ well deck in the East China Sea, Nov. 9, 2022.

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VIRIN: 221109-N-XB010-1023

The 2022 National Defense Strategy names the People's Republic of China as the most comprehensive and serious challenge to U.S. national security.

Spotlight: National Defense Strategy

This, Hicks said, "is the centerpiece of what I work on every day."

That work involves getting forward, combat-credible capabilities to the warfighter as fast as possible despite the bureaucracy, in order to deter PRC aggression, she said.

The Defense Department is also investing in military-to-military activities with allies and partners in that region.

For example, in the past year, the department landed F-35 aircraft on a Japanese helicopter carrier and on a United Kingdom aircraft carrier, she said.

Sea Ops

A sailor scans for surface contacts on the bridge wing as the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville conducts routine operations in the South China Sea, Nov. 29, 2022.

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Another example, is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, India, Japan and the United States, along with bilateral activities with a number of other nations in the Indo-Pacific region.Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific

Hicks said the United States is beefing up its defense industrial base, which will be critical for support to Taiwan, and U.S. allies and partners in the region.

U.S. military "support for Ukraine is in no way negatively affecting our ability to conduct foreign military sales or otherwise support Taiwan," Hicks said, mentioning Javelin and Stinger missiles being shipped to both countries.

Spotlight: Support for Ukraine

Beijing sees the will of Ukrainians, combined with their capability and training to stall Russia's campaign of aggression, she said, noting that she hopes this will help dissuade the PRC from invading Taiwan.

Hicks also noted strong U.S. bipartisan support for both Ukraine and Taiwan.

China Military Power Report China Military Power Report: https://www.defense.gov/CMPR/

defense.gov · by David Vergun

12. Russia is providing 'unprecedented' military support to Iran in exchange for drones, officials say

Russia is providing 'unprecedented' military support to Iran in exchange for drones, officials say

“This partnership poses a threat not just to Ukraine, but to Iran’s neighbors in the region,” a senior administration official told NBC News.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee · December 9, 2022

Russia is now providing an "unprecedented level" of military and technical support to Iran in exchange for Tehran supplying weapons for the war in Ukraine, senior Biden administration officials say.

As part of the enhanced partnership, Russia may be providing Iran with advanced military equipment and components, including helicopters and air defense systems. In the spring, Iranian pilots trained in Russia to fly the Sukhoi Su-35, a Russian fighter jet, which the officials say indicates Iran “may begin receiving the aircraft within the next year.”

The White House had previously said it believes that Iran was supplying drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, but the relationship between the two nations is transforming into “a full-fledged defense partnership" with weapons and military expertise flowing in both directions, the officials said.

Russia is looking to collaborate with Iran on weapons development, including possibly establishing a joint production line for drones in Russia, according to the officials.

“This partnership poses a threat not just to Ukraine, but to Iran’s neighbors in the region,” one senior administration official said. “We have shared this information with partners in the Middle East and around the world.”

An undated image showing the wreckage of what Ukrainian officials described as an Iranian-made Shahed drone downed near Kupiansk.AP

On Friday, the Biden administration is expected to designate three Russia-based entities that have been involved in the transfer of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, for use in Ukraine, the officials said. Those entities include the Russian Aerospace Forces, which receives the UAVs, and Russia’s 924th State Center for Unmanned Aviation. Personnel from the 924th traveled to Iran to receive training in how to operate the Iranian weapons.

The officials said the U.S. is also “looking at options to bring together a group of like-minded countries to discuss Iran-Russia military cooperation," and is working with other nations to ensure Russia and Iran cannot move equipment, weapons or money through their countries to support this new partnership.

“We are imposing costs on the actors involved in the transfer of Iranian UAVs to Russia for use in Ukraine,” one official said. “We are assessing further steps we can take in terms of export controls to restrict Iran’s access to sensitive technologies.”

Since the invasion of Ukraine, Iran has become Russia’s top military supporter, selling several hundred UAVs to Moscow since August alone. Russia has used these drones to attack Ukraine’s energy and critical infrastructure in strikes that have killed civilians.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei receives Russian President Vladimir Putin in the presence of his counterpart Ebrahim Raisi in Tehran, on July 19, 2022. SalamPix / Shutterstock file

The U.S. believes Iran is considering the sale of hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia, the senior administration officials said. And they expect Iranian support for the Russian military to continue to grow in the coming months.

“We urge Iran to reverse course and not to take these steps,” one official said. “We are using the tools at our disposal to expose and disrupt these activities — and we are prepared to do more.”

Later Friday, the Biden administration is expected to announce the next security assistance package for Ukraine. The package, valued around $275 million, will include more ammunition for the advanced rocket launchers known as HIMARS and for Ukrainian artillery.

NBC News · by Courtney Kube and Carol E. Lee · December 9, 2022

13. Iran Surpasses 500 Executions in 2022

Iran Surpasses 500 Executions in 2022

fdd.org · December 8, 2022

Latest Developments

Tehran executed a prisoner today for allegedly wounding a paramilitary officer during nationwide protests, the first formal execution of a demonstrator since the unrest began in September. The sentence reportedly followed a brief trial devoid of due process in which the conviction rested on a confession elicited through torture. Iran has executed more than 500 people to date in 2022, constituting “the highest rate in five years,” according to the Norway-based nonprofit Iran Human Rights (IHR). This figure does not include the more than 450 protesters whom security forces have killed since September.

Expert Analysis

“Tehran’s frequent executions have rightly earned it the enmity of the Iranian people. The United States should explicitly endorse the Iranian people’s call for regime change and state that no nuclear agreement with Iran is on the table so long as the regime continues its systematic violations of human rights.”

– Tzvi Kahn, FDD Research Fellow and Senior Editor

Criteria for Death Sentences

Under Iranian law, the number of crimes subject to capital punishment ranks among the world’s highest, including adultery, sodomy, apostasy, drug use, and moharebeh (waging war against God) — a nebulous charge the regime mainly employs to punish those whom it perceives as opponents of its radical Islamist ideology. “There are extensive, vague and arbitrary grounds in Iran for imposing the death sentence, which quickly can turn this punishment into a political tool,” said Javaid Rehman, the UN special rapporteur on human rights in Iran, in October 2021.

Lack of Due Process

Tehran often executes defendants without any semblance of due process. In a July 2022 report, Rehman said he “remains extremely concerned at the continued use of interrogation methods that do not conform to international standards, including denial of access to counsel of choice, prolonged interrogations, extraction of confessions under torture or other forms of ill-treatment.” Iran regularly broadcasts forced confessions on state media.

Executions of Juvenile Offenders

Iran is the world’s top executioner of juvenile offenders. An October 2022 report by UN Secretary-General António Guterres found that 85 minors remain on death row. “Islamic law allows for the execution of juvenile offenders starting at age nine for girls and age 13 for boys, the legal age of maturity,” according to the State Department’s 2021 annual report on human rights in Iran.

A Biased Judiciary

Tehran’s extensive use of the death penalty reflects the will of Iran’s supreme leader, who directly appoints the head of the judiciary, who in turn appoints all judges. In 2010, the United States imposed human rights sanctions on the current judiciary head, Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei, who previously served as Iran’s repressive minister of intelligence (2005-2009), attorney general (2009-2014) and deputy judiciary chief (2014-2021).

Related Analysis

“Torture TV: The Case for Sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s State-Run Media,” by Toby Dershowitz and Talia Katz

“Iran’s Executions Continue After Rouhani’s Reelection,” by Tzvi Kahn

fdd.org · December 8, 2022

14. Neither Here Nor There – Jordan and the Abraham Accords

Neither Here Nor There

Jordan and the Abraham Accords

fdd.org · by Jonathan Schanzer Senior Vice President for Research · December 8, 2022

The Middle East witnessed remarkable change in August and September 2020 with the Abraham Accords. It began with decisions taken by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain to enter into peace agreements with Israel. Sudan and Morocco followed soon thereafter. Seemingly overnight, a rare sense of optimism washed over the Middle East.

These agreements were certainly not the first of their kind. In 1979, Egypt made peace with Israel. In 1993, the Palestinians entered the Oslo diplomatic process with Israel, initiating more than a decade of attempted peacemaking. In 1994, Jordan made its own peace with Israel.

For the two decades that followed, observers referred to Jordanian-Israeli ties as the “warm peace,” particularly compared to the frosty ties Israel maintained with Egypt and the collapse of Oslo. However, since 2020, if not before then, the Jordanian peace has turned decidedly cold. It is especially frigid now compared to the rapidly growing ties between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Even relations between Israel and Egypt have improved. With rhetoric that increasingly echoes the sentiments of rejectionist Arab nationalists or even Islamists, Jordan’s current policies appear to run counter to the current trendlines of the Middle East.

After the recent electoral victory of Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu, along with other right-wing Israeli politicians, Jordan issued an unprovoked and blistering statement warning Israel not to alter the status quo on the Temple Mount, invoking its role as custodian of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. The statement signaled the likely renewal of acrimonious ties between the king and Israel’s longest-serving prime minister.

All of this should come as unwelcome news to the United States and to America’s Middle East allies. In anticipation of intensifying great power competition with China, and perhaps to a lesser extent Russia, it is crucial for Washington to project unity among allies in the Middle East. No less important for the Middle East is the prospect of stability, prosperity, and positive change, which will require Jordan as a willing partner. This is especially the case amidst the continued havoc that the Islamic Republic of Iran is exporting across the region.

The following memo assesses Jordan’s recent and escalating antagonism toward Israel. It also explores the regional friction created by Jordan’s abstention from the Abraham Accords alliance structures. The memo concludes with recommendations to tackle this challenge, which could hinder U.S. national security interests if not addressed.

Regional Changes

Several events led to the profound regional change in the last decade. The first was the Arab Spring, which began in 2011. While the first waves of unrest initially challenged the corrupt and ossified authoritarian regimes that dominated the region, Israel and several Arab governments stood opposed to the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood movements that sought to hijack the protests. Concerns about regional stability deepened in 2013, with the announcement of the interim Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). The Israelis, under the leadership of then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, were stridently opposed to this U.S.-led effort. In many ways, Israel’s active public diplomacy gave voice to the concerns of the rest of the region, which is traditionally less vocal. Israel further inspired some of the surrounding states when it began to wage the “war between wars,” an asymmetric campaign targeting Iranian military assets across the region.

Israel also emerged in recent years as a regional (if not a global) power in the realms of technology, intelligence collection, missile defense, desalination, agriculture, life sciences, cyber, and more. The Arab world increasingly seeks to benefit from Israel’s capabilities. Israel’s natural gas discoveries, which could serve to provide additional funds for these advancements, only make a stronger case for integration.

Concurrently, Arab governments have grown less zealous about the Palestinian cause. This does not mean that the Arab world has given up on the idea of Palestinian state. But a growing number of Arab states are exasperated with the ineffectual Palestinian leadership that has squandered Arab financial and political support. Slowly and steadily, Arab countries have deprioritized the Palestinian cause and are now increasingly pursuing their own national interests. With leading Arab states stressing “stability and prosperity,” there are clear opportunities for other normalization agreements to follow. Jordan appears to be ambivalent about this.

The Benefits of Peace

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was opposed to the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. Jordan joined the Arab war against Israel and conquered the West Bank and East Jerusalem during that clash. Conflict between the two countries simmered for the next two decades before erupting again in 1967, when Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem. What followed were decades of public enmity but secret diplomacy. In 1963, King Hussein established a direct channel with a senior Israeli diplomat in London. Seven years later, Israel mobilized to thwart Syrian aggression against the Hashemite Kingdom during the Black September crisis. In 1973, King Hussein even warned Israel of an impending Arab attack on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. Even though the two countries harbored severe political disagreements, they came to see one another as assets. In 1987, they nearly reached a peace agreement, but the First Intifada scuttled that opportunity. When the Palestinians entered into the Oslo Accords in 1993, that was the last barrier to agreement for Hussein. He made peace with Israel in 1994.

The personal relationship between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein was key to the initial warm ties. By 1997, however, there were signs of strain. One reason was the attempted assassination of Hamas official Khaled Meshaal by the Israeli Mossad in Amman. The attempt on Meshaal’s life sparked a diplomatic crisis that forced Israel to provide the antidote (and the release of Hamas founding leader Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison) in exchange for Jordan’s release of the captured Israeli spies. Tensions also spiked that year when a Jordanian soldier opened fire on a group of Israeli students visiting the “Island of Peace” — land leased to Israel as part of the 1994 arrangement. In a dramatic moment, King Hussein visited Israel and knelt before the victims’ families.

After the death of King Hussein and the ascension of his son, Abdullah, in February 1999, ties began to deteriorate more significantly. The new king appeared to harbor more overt distrust for Israel. This is abundantly clear in Abdullah’s 2011 autobiography, in which the monarch asserts that “Israeli policies are mainly to blame for [the current] gloomy reality.” Tensions soared with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. This campaign of terrorism, carried out by scores of Palestinian terrorist groups, was met with zero tolerance by the Israeli government. Protesting the Israeli response, Jordan recalled its ambassador. Diplomatic ties were not restored until 2005, after the violence subsided.

Fortunately, what followed was nearly a decade of relatively stable relations. The commitment to an enduring peace has benefitted both Israel and the Hashemite regime. Military, intelligence, economic, and other cooperation have undeniably helped both sides. For Israel, the predictability and relative stability along its longest border certainly enables the military pivot toward more pressing concerns.

For Jordan, the economic perks are particularly clear. As an inducement to enter the peace agreement, President Bill Clinton promised to forgive $700 million of Jordan’s debt (though the sum was later reduced as it passed through Congress). In November 1997, the U.S. established a Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) in Jordan. Goods manufactured in the QIZ could be exported to the United States duty free, provided they had Israeli inputs. The agreement helped create 60,000 jobs and facilitated substantial growth in trade. Jordanian exports to the United States are now more than $1 billion.

In 2001, Washington signed a free trade agreement with Jordan, America’s first with an Arab country, which came into effect in 2010. Trade between the U.S. and Jordan increased by more than 30 percent between 2009 and 2013 alone. Today, the United States is Jordan’s largest supplier of aid. While not all of this resulted directly from the 1994 agreement, Washington unquestionably intended to provide perks for maintaining peace with Israel.

Israel also contributed to Jordan’s economic growth following the 1994 agreement. Tourism in Jordan expanded significantly following the peace agreement. This includes a marked uptick in visitors from the United States and Israel. Currently, Israel and Jordan are negotiating the construction of the joint Jordan Gateway Industrial Park to create more jobs and to strengthen both economies.

Israel has likewise contributed significantly to Jordan’s well-being through the provision of water and energy. The 1994 accords stipulated that Israel sell Jordan a specified amount of water annually. Israel, a world leader in desalination technology, has held up its end of the bargain and last year even agreed to double its contribution. Meanwhile, in 2014, after discovering gas off its Mediterranean coast, Israel agreed to export $500 million worth of gas to Jordan. Texas-based Noble Energy and Jordan’s National Electric Company signed a 15-year, $10 billion gas deal in 2016. The deal provides for 40 percent of Jordan’s electricity needs. Noble sent its first shipment of gas to Jordan in 2020. Israel and Jordan also agreed to a water-for-energy deal in November 2021, whereby Israel will provide Jordan with 200 million cubic meters of water in exchange for solar energy. The two countries reaffirmed the agreement at the United Nations COP27 climate conference in the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh in November 2022. At the conference, Jordan and Israel also signed an agreement to mitigate pollution of the Jordan River, which borders both countries.

Israel and the United States have also cooperated closely with the Jordanians on a wide range of security-related issues. Not all of this activity has been made public. But the training, intelligence-sharing, and other military activity has been hailed by all three militaries. In 2015, Jordanian pilots flew alongside their Israeli counterparts in a Red Flag exercise (advanced aerial combat training hosted by the United States Air Force). This was the first time the parties publicly acknowledged joint air force training. Last year, Jordan also participated in an Israeli-hosted Blue Flag exercise, air force training designed to simulate realistic combat scenarios.

Increasingly Open Hostility

Despite all of this, Jordan remains relatively poor and somewhat unstable. Of course, the country’s perennially tenuous economic and political challenges would have undeniably been far worse without the assistance made possible by the 1994 agreement. But this offers little consolation.

Driven by a combination of domestic political considerations, unrealistic expectations, and both legitimate and illegitimate grievances, Amman has pulled away from Israel in recent years. The official rhetoric about Israel has grown increasingly negative, if not vitriolic. The same can be observed in Jordan’s government-censored media. And despite the ongoing cooperation on a range of challenges, diplomatic ties are in a deep freeze. Israeli officials are keenly aware of this dynamic. They have shared their frustration in closed-door meetings.

In recent years, senior Israeli officials quietly attributed tensions to a personality conflict between King Abdullah II and Benjamin Netanyahu. Trump administration policies that Israel welcomed did not sit well with Jordan, either. Specifically, Jordanian officials warned that moving the American embassy to Jerusalem was a “red line” that would have “catastrophic” impact. Ties were strained further when Netanyahu prepared to annex portions of the West Bank in 2020, with Abdullah warning of a “massive conflict” as a result.

When Netanyahu left office in 2021, officials in Jerusalem expected ties to improve. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett claimed that Netanyahu “destroyed” Israel’s relationship with Jordan and declared that his government was “fixing the relationship.” Alternate Prime Minister Yair Lapid similarly acknowledged Jordan’s role as “an important strategic ally for Israel” and pledged to “work with” Abdullah to “strengthen the relationship between our two countries.” According to Israeli officials, relations improved during the Bennett/Lapid government’s time in office. However, Jordanian rhetoric toward Israel did not markedly improve. New tensions are now expected with the return of Netanyahu, given the king’s unabashed distaste for the Israeli leader. Ties could be further strained with reports that Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has been spending more time in Jordan with the approval of the Hashemite Kingdom.

The Palestinian Issue

In an oversimplification of the current dynamics, Jordanian officials invariably blame Israel’s ongoing military presence in the disputed West Bank for the recent tensions. Officials in Amman have grown sharply critical of policies they associate with the “Israeli occupation.” Of course, the status quo has not changed dramatically since Jordan entered into its agreement with Israel in 1994. Moreover, if it were simple to fix the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it would have been solved long ago. Nevertheless, Jordan blames the failure of the Palestinians to achieve statehood on Israeli policy. The Israelis dispute this, insisting that a combination of Palestinian corruption, poor governance, irredentism, disunity, and extremism have made this file even more challenging to address.

The Palestinian issue is undeniably the driving force behind Jordan’s rhetoric. An estimated 50 percent of Jordan’s population of 10 million is Palestinian, owing to migration from the 1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence (or the Palestinian “Nakba,” depending upon one’s view of history). Jordanian politicians and diplomats will cite this figure behind closed doors, but the government has in the past attempted to adjust this figure downward. The Palestinian Authority-run Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics estimated in 2015 that 2.2 million Palestinians were living in Jordan. Whatever the precise number, the Palestinians make up a substantial portion of the population in Jordan.

While Jordanian officials may not say so explicitly, the animosity harbored by Jordan’s Palestinian population toward Israel has a significant influence on the kingdom’s foreign policies. Despite its reliance upon Israel for security, intelligence, and a range of products and services, and despite the trilateral relationship with Israel and the United States that is a core pillar of Jordan’s relationship with Washington, Amman simply cannot embrace Israel openly. This has become abundantly clear in recent years.

In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 2016, King Abdullah placed the blame for the lack of diplomatic progress between Israel and the Palestinians entirely on Israel. “No injustice has spread more bitter fruit than the denial of a Palestinian state,” he said. “Peace is a conscious decision. Israel has to embrace peace or eventually be engulfed in a sea of hatred in a region of turmoil.”

In 2017, a Jordanian stabbed an Israeli security guard at the residential complex at the Israeli embassy compound in Amman. The guard — Ziv Moyal — shot his attacker in self-defense. The Jordanian landlord was also shot and eventually died from his wounds. A standoff ensued after the shooting. Invoking diplomatic immunity, Israel would not permit Jordanian authorities to question Moyal. Jordan, however, would not allow Moyal to leave the country without being investigated. The impasse ended after diplomatic interventions by U.S. officials. The warm public reception that Prime Minister Netanyahu gave Moyal did not help improve matters.

Notably, that incident occurred amidst the tensions that flared at the Temple Mount compound, where Israel had installed metal detectors after Israeli-Arab gunmen killed two Israeli policemen. The move unleashed a wave of public outrage, including a direct intervention by King Abdullah, invoking his role as custodian of the religious authorities on the Temple Mount, pursuant to the 1994 peace agreement. After Moyal returned to Israel, Israel removed the metal detectors. After that, Israel reopened its embassy in Amman and agreed to pay reparations.

The frictions between Jordan and Israel were far from settled after this. In fact, disagreements over the Temple Mount were just heating up. Jordan, citing its role of custodian over the Temple Mount, continues to assert itself. Israel, which has sovereignty over the holy site that holds great significance for Jews and Muslims alike, continues to coordinate with Jordan. But it refuses to cede full control. This should come as no surprise. Israel has legitimate security concerns. And the Israelis want to convey that they maintain full control over their capital. Jordan, which lost Jerusalem to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, understands this dynamic full well. Nevertheless, Israel’s security presence, the role and numbers of Jordanian personnel assigned to monitor the compound, and other related issues continue to irk officials in Amman, who openly express their frustrations.

But it is the fate of the Palestinian national project that remains the focus of Jordanian officials. In 2020, amidst reports that Israel might annex parts of the disputed West Bank, the king effectively warned that he was considering nullifying the 1994 peace agreement. “I don’t want to make threats and create an atmosphere of loggerheads, but we are considering all options,” he stated. What is notable here is that the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were equally opposed to such an Israeli move. However, the UAE and Bahrain leveraged Israel’s desire to deepen ties with the Arab world to thwart the move. Indeed, the UAE secured Israeli guarantees to prevent annexation by entering into the Abraham Accords.

During the 2021 war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Jordan effectively took Hamas’ side in the global battle for public opinion. Just before the eruption of conflict, a government statement accused “Israeli police and special forces” of being “barbaric.” Amidst coordinated unrest on the Temple Mount, including rock-throwing and other forms of violence, Jordan “rejected and condemned” the responding Israeli security forces for what it described as “violations against the mosque to attacks on worshippers.” When war broke out several days later, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi slammed Israel at the Arab League, saying the Jewish state was “playing with fire.” At the Arab League’s emergency meeting, Safadi said, “The Israeli Occupation authorities will not enjoy security if the Palestinians do not enjoy it.”

When tensions flared between Palestinians and Israelis during Ramadan in 2022, including actions taken by Israel to neutralize extremist group activity, Safadi again claimed that Israel was trying to change the status quo in Jerusalem and that this amounted to “playing with fire.”

During the king’s speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 20, 2022, King Abdullah made the disputable claim that, “Christianity in the Holy City is under fire. The rights of churches in Jerusalem are threatened.” The statement drew contestations and condemnations from a range of Christian groups.

More recently, the Jordanian government has excoriated Israel for actions in lawless pockets of the West Bank. Secretary-General of the Royal Committee for Jerusalem Affairs Abdullah Kanaan condemned Israel in harsh terms for its ongoing battle against extremists. The Jordan Times, a government-censored outlet, cited a litany of purported Israeli crimes: “killing, imprisonment, confiscating lands, expelling Palestinians from their lands, raiding Palestinians’ Islamic and Christian holy sites, and imposing restrictions on the freedoms of worship and culture.”

Jordan’s concerns may be sincere. However, such rhetoric has failed to solve any of the region’s problems. If anything, it may be exacerbating them.

Diplomatic Rejectionism

Jordan has made no attempt to hide its rejection of the new regional order marked by Israeli peace agreements with surrounding Arab states. Shockingly, despite its peace agreement with Israel and its warm relations with the UAE and Bahrain, Jordan refused to send diplomatic representatives to the White House ceremony marking the Abraham Accords.

After the deal was announced, Safadi stated: “If Israel considers the agreement as a means to end the occupation and meet the Palestinians’ rights to freedom and the creation of a viable independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital on the pre-1967 borders, the region will move ahead towards realizing peace, or else Israel will deepen the conflict that will jeopardize the entire region’s security.”

After the 2021 war between Israel and Hamas, relations between Jordan and Israel were sufficiently tense that a senior Emirati official told a Washington audience that the UAE was actively urging a “reconnection” between the two countries. The official underscored the need for a “channel to influence Israel positively.”

In March 2022, Amman sent a jarring message: it declined to participate in the Negev Summit, a diplomatic conference held in Israel with its peace partners. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt all attended, along with the United States. The goal was to formalize collaboration across a range of fields. Efforts to that end are ongoing.

Under increased scrutiny for eschewing regional peace efforts, Jordanian officials have provided two different reasons for declining to join the Negev Summit. The first was a scheduling conflict. Several articles attribute Jordan’s absence to Safadi’s schedule. The Jerusalem Post claimed that Safadi was in a “pre-scheduled meeting in Doha” and that he was “more likely to attend future meetings.” Later, it was reported that Safadi had instead accompanied the king to a meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah.

The second explanation for Jordan’s failure to participate in the Negev Summit was its insistence that the Palestinians be included. Then Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was apparently hesitant to agree for fear that the Palestinian issue would upstage the broader, regional priorities. The UAE reportedly had similar concerns.

Domestic conditions may have also contributed to Jordan’s decision. Days before the Negev Summit convened, Jordanian officials arrested dozens of political activists commemorating the anniversary of the Arab Spring. Other sources suggest that the government feared political instability, particularly from Islamists and the dominant Palestinian population but also among East Bankers (Jordan’s traditional tribal power brokers not of Palestinian origin) if Jordan participated.

Not Only Israel

The Jordanian government is not only potentially imperiling its valuable relationship with Israel. It has also, at times, snubbed the pragmatic Arab states that have either entered into alliances with Israel (the UAE) or are taking steps to mitigate hostilities with the Jewish state with an eye toward regional stability (the Saudis).

While Jordan has not come out and directly challenged the UAE for its decision to normalize with Israel, the absence of closer cooperation between the three countries reveals a fault line. Until now, the UAE and Israel have exhibited patience toward Jordan. That patience appears to have paid off. In November, the three countries announced plans to move ahead with a deal involving water and solar energy.

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Jordan have been more obvious at times. Friction emerged in 2021 amidst a purported coup plot involving the king’s half-brother Hamza that was allegedly disrupted by Jordanian authorities. One figure arrested was Bassem Awadallah, a former Jordanian official with ties to senior Saudi leadership, feeding unsubstantiated suspicions that Saudi Arabia was behind the plot. Saudi officials denied their involvement. But ties were strained enough to spur a Saudi delegation to travel to Amman to “refute in person” whatever charges were being leveled.

Based on background conversations with informed figures in Jordan this summer, the Royal Court may still be adjusting to a new generation of Arab leaders. Figures like Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ) of the UAE and Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) of Saudi Arabia are peers of King Abdullah. Yet, because their countries enjoy greater wealth and stability, they have leapfrogged him to emerge as the new leaders of the region. Jordan certainly does not appear to resent their wealth or success. Still, a complicated triangle has formed. While MBZ enjoys warm ties with Abdullah, the king’s relationship with MBS is decidedly cooler. MBZ has reportedly worked to help bridge the differences between the Jordanian and Saudi rulers.

Jordan’s Economic Challenges

If Jordan is indeed ambivalent about the wealthier Gulf states and their ties to Israel, this is the wrong time to articulate that. Even with their assistance, Jordan’s economy has not performed well. In 2019, Jordan’s GDP growth rate hovered at roughly 2 percent for the fourth year in a row. This is a marginal decrease from 2010–2015, when Jordan’s GDP grew by an average of 2.6 percent, and significantly lower than 2000–2009, when the average growth rate was 6.4 percent. In 2019, Jordan’s public debt reached 99 percent of GDP and then ballooned to 113 percent in 2021.

Some of this is due to the impact of a series of regional crises. Turmoil in Iraq and Syria has caused critical trade routes to close. The Arab Spring severely disrupted the country’s energy supply. Jordan has also suffered from a massive influx of refugees, as many as 1.3 million, seeking to escape the civil war in Syria. Covid-19 further battered Jordan, causing the economy to contract by 1.6 percent in 2020. The economy has bounced back, but economic growth is still expected to hover at a meager 2 percent. And despite this growth, unemployment in Jordan rose from 18.6 percent in 2018 to 23.3 percent last year.

In September 2022, Jordan and the U.S. signed a seven-year memorandum of understanding, allocating $1.45 billion annually to Jordan beginning in 2023. The aid may help Jordan tackle some of the above challenges, but Jordanian officials admit that it will likely be insufficient to meet the country’s economic and military needs.

The Saudis and Emiratis serve as Jordan’s most important Arab financial patrons. In 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Saudi Arabia and the UAE, established a $5 billion development program for Jordan. Other Saudi investments in 2015 included $50 million for the construction of a fiber optic internet network and $30 million to support industrial cities in Tafilah, Madaba, Jerash, and Al-Salt.

In 2018, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait pledged an additional $2.5 billion to help revive Jordan’s economy. Fulfillment is another story, of course. In 2019, the UAE provided $500.2 million in aid to Jordan, primarily through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development. The UAE also deposited $333 million in the Jordanian Central Bank to address Jordan’s budget deficit. That was converted into a soft loan in 2022.

In 2020, the UAE sent several shipments of medical aid to help Jordan combat the pandemic. In 2022, Jordan, the UAE, and Egypt established the Industrial Partnership for Sustainable Economic Development — a $10 billion investment fund backed by the Abu Dhabi holding firm ADQ. The three countries signed an agricultural agreement under which the UAE will invest in grain production in Jordan at a time of possible grain shortages stemming from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Jordanian Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship and ADQ launched a $100 million technology investment fund in 2022.

Recently, Saudi Arabia ramped up its investments in Jordan. In June, the Saudi Public Investment Fund took a $185 million stake (23.97 percent) in the Capital Bank of Jordan. Jordanian and Saudi companies also signed several agreements at a convention organized by the Amman Chamber of Commerce and the Council of Saudi Chambers. The Saudi Jordanian Investment Fund backed a $400 million healthcare project for an academic hospital and a medical school in Amman.

Some in Jordan believe the Gulf states are still holding back in terms of total amounts and fulfillment, but they are still unquestionably important for Jordan’s economic well-being. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and the UAE rank among Jordan’s top partners in energy, as well as other products and services.

External Security Challenges

To the extent that the UAE and Saudi Arabia are well positioned to buttress Jordan economically, Israel is the natural partner to help combat some of the country’s security threats.

Chief among the kingdom’s threats right now is the influx of Captagon. Jordan sits at the nexus of trafficking routes between Syria and the Gulf. Shipments of the illicit drug increased by 87 percent between 2013 and 2018 and have since accelerated. In 2020, the Jordanian army seized 1.4 million Captagon pills. Seizures for 2022 reached a whopping 17 million pills. And while Jordan was once considered just a transit point for pills destined for the Arabian Gulf, the drugs have become increasingly popular among Jordanian youth, with addiction cases on the rise.

In 2022, amidst several reports of violent incidents, a clash along the Jordan-Syria border left 27 smugglers dead. King Abdullah blamed Iran-linked militias for the uptick in violence. Smuggling operations are reportedly backed by the Syrian military’s Fourth Division, led by Maher al-Assad. Several Iran-aligned militias are also complicit.

Drugs are only part of Jordan’s Iran problem. In a May 2022 conversation with former U.S. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, King Abdullah voiced concerns that Iranian forces in Syria could soon destabilize his country. With Russia expected to redeploy assets and forces from Syria to the mired war effort in Ukraine, the monarch expressed concerns that Iran could seek to fill the void. “That vacuum [left by the Russians] will be filled by the Iranians and their proxies. So unfortunately, we are looking at maybe an escalation of problems on our borders,” Abdullah said. Jordan also faces a threat from Iran-backed militias in Iraq to the north. Additional threats loom in the south, with Iranian assets reportedly operating in the Red Sea.

The close military cooperation between Jordan and Israel is not always made public. But officials in both countries (and in Washington) attest to the fact that these ties are both wide and deep. Cooperation must continue, or even increase, particularly as Iran’s malign activity grows across the Middle East. Closer ties would likely require a shift in Jordan’s approach toward Israel.

Conclusion

King Hussein was willing to test the boundaries of the contract between sovereign and subjects, particularly as it related to Israel. Under Abdullah, this is increasingly not the case. If anything, Abdullah appears to want to validate the concerns of the Palestinians living in Jordan. He may be trying to placate the country’s Islamist, Palestinian, and other opposition groups as well after a decade of political and economic challenges. This could come at a cost.

This is not to say that Jordan’s concerns are not occasionally worth voicing. Israeli policies sometimes justify such rhetoric. No country is perfect. However, Israel is not alone in encumbering the path to Middle East peace. The Palestinians, the Iranians, and other malign actors deserve plenty of blame. Nor is Israel to blame for some of the recent violent episodes on the Temple Mount. Palestinian rejectionist groups are too often responsible, both historically and recently.

The motivation for Jordan to advocate urgently for a two-state solution is certainly understandable. The frustration among Jordanians of Palestinian descent threatens Jordanian stability. But it is not at all clear that openly clashing with Israel, a guarantor of Jordan’s regional stability, will solve Jordan’s Palestinian problem. If anything, harsh rhetoric could make conditions worse.

Moreover, there has been little consideration of the security threats that a West Bank Palestinian state could pose, should one be created. The Palestinian Authority lacks the ability to govern, let alone to secure its own borders. The current Palestinian Authority chairman, Mahmoud Abbas, took power in 2005 and has refused to hold elections ever since, raising troubling questions about political legitimacy. Jordan rarely, if ever, voices these concerns.

In fact, there is insufficient Jordanian criticism of the Palestinian Authority, let alone the violent terrorist groups Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Whereas the role of Jordan was once seen as a bulwark against the extremism that was all too common across the Middle East, the Hashemite Kingdom increasingly ranks among the region’s more strident voices as it relates to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

To be sure, Jordan should not be counted among the Iranian axis that actively calls for Israel’s destruction (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon). However, Jordan today does not fit within the bloc of pragmatic states, such as the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, and even Saudi Arabia. Instead, it appears to have found its place among the nonaligned states of the Arab world (for example, Algeria and Kuwait). These are states that advocate stridently for the Palestinian cause and reject normalization. But there is one difference between Jordan and the other states that fit this description: The others do not urgently require sustained assistance from America, Israel, or the Gulf states. This should give the Hashemite Kingdom pause.

Historically, political and diplomatic independence has not been a deleterious thing for Jordan. This fierce sense of independence has steered the kingdom away from toxic nationalist, religious, and ideological trends, such as Islamism and Nasserism. However, in this case, it is difficult to discern what Jordan gains, apart from appeasing some of its own subjects at the expense of greater regional instability and increased prosperity.

A pragmatic bloc of allied states beckons. These states seek a better future for the Middle East.

For the sake of a stable and prosperous future, the continued influence of the United States in the Middle East, and strong governments in both Amman and Jerusalem, stronger ties between Jordan and Israel must be restored. Multiple actors have roles to play in this regard:

The United States: Washington must work to restore better ties between Israel and Jordan. This relationship is important to the success of broader normalization efforts, Iran containment policies, and great power competition. Washington must therefore convey to Amman that while privately expressed opprobrium is well within bounds, needlessly hostile public rhetoric is not helpful. Such statements are rare in Washington, where officials often view Jordan as beyond reproach thanks to a prevailing view, based on Jordan’s geopolitical position, that it is “too weak to fail.” Washington must change this paradigm while also identifying ways to encourage economic and military ties between the two countries. This can be done in ways that strengthen America’s position globally, such as encouraging jointly produced products that bypass China and create more trustworthy supply chains. Pharmaceuticals is one obvious place to start. In the meantime, the U.S. should also encourage the parties to create mechanisms to maintain calm on the Temple Mount and to better monitor the borders of both countries to counter the flow of the weapons and narcotics that threaten both nations.

Israel: Jerusalem should coordinate more closely with Jordan on matters concerning the Temple Mount. Jordan takes its role as custodian of the Al-Aqsa Mosque seriously. Granting Jordan what it requests to regulate the holy site (admitting agreed-upon numbers of religious authorities, guards, and other officials) is smart policy, so long as Jordan respects Israel’s right to intervene during events that threaten Israeli security. A three-way mechanism with the United States should be considered. In the meantime, Israel must continue to look for ways to continue to strengthen Jordan, both militarily and economically. The Jordan Gateway project, the Blue Green Prosperity project, and efforts to grant Jordan more access to West Bank markets deserve support. Military and intelligence cooperation should continue apace. Jordan remains a vital ally to Israel, and it should be treated as such. This does not grant Jordan the right to whip up anti-Israel sentiment around the region. When this occurs, Israel should address that activity through the appropriate channels.

The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt: All four countries must continue to find ways to encourage Jordan to integrate into the Abrahamic architecture in the Middle East. Jordan’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation with these countries, and perhaps even its economic ties, should be contingent, at least in part, upon its participation in these regional constructs. They are crucial to the future of the region, and they should not be held hostage by Palestinian maximalist demands.

Saudi Arabia: Riyadh is not a party to the Abraham Accords. Nor is it an avowed enemy of Israel any longer. The Saudis can demonstrate to Jordan (and the rest of the Arab world) that Arab governments can maintain a principled position on the Palestinian issue while tempering public criticism and quietly cooperating on common threats. The Saudis should work with Amman to identify ways to deepen the trilateral relationship, even if a solution to the Palestinian issue is delayed.

Jordan: The status quo, one in which Jordan enjoys the perks of peace while simultaneously excoriating Israel for real and imagined transgressions, does not portend stability in the region. Nor does it bode well for Jordan, given its dependence upon Israel or the other countries that have committed to a fundamental transformation of the Middle East. The Hashemite Kingdom must conduct a strategic review of its peace with Israel, with an eye toward openly acknowledging and further strengthening the security and trade ties that are indispensable for Jordan. Such a review should also assess the potential dangers of allowing ties with Israel to deteriorate, particularly as Jerusalem loses patience with such scathing public rhetoric. Jordan should also conduct a review of the benefits of joining Abraham Accords structures, with the goal of pursuing stability, security, and prosperity.

Ties between Jordan and Israel are currently at a low point. But they have certainly not deteriorated beyond repair. The structures stood up by Washington, not to mention by Amman and Jerusalem, remain firmly in place. A return to the fundamentals, with a concurrent embrace of the new regional order, are key to a prosperous and secure future for both American allies. Moreover, they are key to the continued security of a U.S.-led Middle East.

fdd.org · by Jonathan Schanzer Senior Vice President for Research · December 8, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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