Quotes of the Day:

“Korea is a divided nation, and the Korean War never truly ended.” 

– Ban Ki-moon

“A courageous spirit and a polite manner will lead you to great achievements in the wilderness, dear human.” 

- Rudyard Kipling.

“Books and all forms of writing are terror to those who wish to suppress the truth.” 

- Wole Soyinka.

​1. Biden Orders U.S. to Share Evidence of Russian War Crimes With Hague Court

2. Japan likely to come to Taiwan’s aid during a Chinese invasion

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2023

4. Sweden says it’s target of Russia-backed disinformation over NATO, Koran burnings

5. What We Know After 70 Years Of The Korean War Armistice

6. Qin Gang: Foreign minister's downfall leaves China red-faced

7. Main Thrust of Ukraine’s Offensive May Be Underway, U.S. Officials Say

8. China-Russia alliance poses a danger, Pacific commander warns

9. China Taking Hard Line on Military Flybys, Freedom of Navigation Operations, Says Panel

10. Selling the Army

11. 2023 Irregular Warfare Center Book Recommendations

12. The War That Defied Expectations

13. China suspected of building aircraft carrier base in Cambodia

14. The Dictator Myth That Refuses to Die

15. Inside Five Eyes, the World's Most Exclusive Intelligence Alliance

16. Ukraine war: Western armour struggles against Russian defences

17. Psychological Warfare: A Closer Look at its Role in Military Operations

18. Implications of China’s Nuclear Expansion for Strategic Stability

1. Biden Orders U.S. to Share Evidence of Russian War Crimes With Hague Court 

Major policy change. Should we really be afraid of the ICC?

Biden Orders U.S. to Share Evidence of Russian War Crimes With Hague Court - The New York Times

nytimes.com · by Charlie Savage · July 26, 2023

Biden Orders U.S. to Share Evidence of Russian War Crimes With Hague Court

The step signals a major shift in American policy and ends months of resistance by Pentagon officials who feared setting a precedent that could pave the way for the court to prosecute U.S. troops.

President Biden at the White House on Tuesday. In recent days, he ordered the government to begin sharing evidence of Russian war crimes with the International Criminal Court.Credit…Desiree Rios for The New York Times

By Charlie Savage

Reporting from Washington

July 26, 2023

President Biden has quietly ordered the U.S. government to begin sharing evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court in The Hague, according to officials familiar with the matter, signaling a major shift in American policy.

The decision, made by Mr. Biden in recent days, overrides months of resistance by the Pentagon, which had argued that it could pave the way for the court to prosecute American troops, according to the officials.

It was unclear why Mr. Biden let the impasse linger or what finally led him to resolve it, but he has been under mounting bipartisan pressure to act. Last week, for example, a Senate committee approved a government funding bill that had a provision stating that the president “shall provide information” to the court to assist with its investigations into war crimes in Ukraine.

American intelligence agencies are said to have gathered information including details about decisions by Russian officials to deliberately strike civilian infrastructure in Ukraine and forcibly deport thousands of Ukrainian children from occupied territory. Already, they have shared some of that evidence with Ukrainian prosecutors but had refrained from doing so with The Hague.

Since the International Criminal Court was created by a 1998 treaty to investigate war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, administrations of both parties have viewed it with wariness and sometimes hostility. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 has helped thaw those relations.

After the war began, American officials applauded the court’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, for his investigation into possible war crimes in Ukraine. In December, Congress eased restrictions that barred it from providing aid to the court for its investigation into Russian atrocities. And the Biden administration expressed support for the court when it issued arrest warrants in March for top Russian officials, like President Vladimir V. Putin, accusing them of orchestrating the abduction and deportation of Ukrainian children.

Behind the scenes, however, there was fierce internal debate over whether to share intelligence shedding light on the actions of Russian officials. While the Justice and State Departments supported doing so, the Pentagon resisted such a step, officials have said.

The dispute led the National Security Council to convene a cabinet-level “principals committee” meeting on Feb. 3 in an attempt to resolve the matter, officials have said, but Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III continued to object.

The White House has yet to announce the policy reversal or the assistance it will now provide, but it began notifying members of Congress on Tuesday, according to the people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

The Pentagon press office did not respond to a request for comment. Adrienne Watson, a National Security Council spokeswoman, expressed a broader commitment to holding Russia to account for atrocities but declined to address the International Criminal Court issue.

“We support a range of international investigations to identify and hold accountable those responsible,” she said in a statement. “On the I.C.C. specifically, we are not going to discuss the specifics on any cooperation, which is consistent with the court’s practice of treating requests for cooperation in a confidential manner.”

John Bellinger, a former top lawyer at the National Security Council and State Department during the George W. Bush administration who favored sharing evidence with the court, embraced word of the decision.

“It’s too bad that they are not announcing that publicly, because it’s the right thing to do,” he said.

Senators Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, and Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, the top lawmakers on the Judiciary Committee, have repeatedly sought to call attention to the impasse and shame the Pentagon for standing in the way. In a joint statement, they praised the shift as they recounted documented Russian war crimes.

“Ensuring that the United States is doing all that it can to hold the perpetrators of atrocities in Ukraine accountable is essential to help our Ukrainian friends and to send a clear message to Putin: The United States will not tolerate these horrific crimes,” they said. “After pressing the administration for months, we are pleased that the administration is finally supporting the I.C.C.’s investigation.”

American intelligence agencies are said to have gathered details about decisions by Russian officials to deliberately strike civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.Credit…Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times

In a letter to Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken released Wednesday, Senator Bob Menendez, Democrat of New Jersey and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, urged the administration to cooperate with the court when it came to the deportation of Ukrainian children, thousands of whom have been sent to Russia since the invasion. In an interview, he said he had not yet heard of the policy change but that it would be “welcome news,” calling the Pentagon’s stonewalling “unacceptable.”

The bipartisan legislation Congress enacted in December, embedded in a large appropriations bill, created an exception to prohibitions on funding and certain other aid to the court. It allows the government to assist with “investigations and prosecutions of foreign nationals related to the situation in Ukraine, including to support victims and witnesses.”

Despite that signal of support, Pentagon leaders had continued to oppose such a step. They wanted to maintain the position taken by previous administrations: that the court should not exercise jurisdiction over citizens from a country that is not a party to the treaty that created it, like the United States or Russia.

Some legal specialists, like Mr. Bellinger, have maintained that the United States can help the court with its investigation into Russian actions while arguing that it should not investigate American forces because the United States has military and criminal justice systems that investigate allegations of wrongdoing by its own personnel.

But Pentagon leaders are said to have argued that sharing evidence would set a precedent that would make it harder for the United States to argue that the court should not investigate and prosecute Americans.

Regardless, the move is a significant step, as the government has been changing its approach toward the court.

Before the International Criminal Court was created, the United Nations Security Council relied on ad hoc tribunals to address atrocities in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Many democracies welcomed the idea of creating a standing body at The Hague and signed the 1998 treaty, known as the Rome Statute, including close American allies like Britain.

But the United States has long kept its distance. President Bill Clinton signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but called it flawed and did not send it to the Senate for ratification. In 2002, President George W. Bush essentially withdrew that signature. And Congress enacted laws in 1999 and 2002 that limited what support the government could provide.

Relations began to ease under the Obama administration, which showed support by offering rewards for the capture of fugitive warlords in Africa whom the court had indicted.

But tensions again flared after top prosecutors for the court in 2017 tried to investigate the torture of detainees during the Bush administration as part of an inquiry into the war in Afghanistan. The Trump administration imposed sanctions on the court’s personnel, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo denounced it as corrupt.

In 2021, the Biden administration revoked President Trump’s sanctions, and the newly appointed prosecutor, Mr. Khan, dropped the investigation.

Julian E. Barnes contributed reporting.

is a Washington-based national security and legal policy correspondent. A recipient of the Pulitzer Prize, he previously worked at The Boston Globe and The Miami Herald. His most recent book is “Power Wars: The Relentless Rise of Presidential Authority and Secrecy.”

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Biden Orders Evidence of Russian War Crimes Be Shared With Hague Court. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

nytimes.com · by Charlie Savage · July 26, 2023

​2. Japan likely to come to Taiwan’s aid during a Chinese invasion

Excerpts:

But the Ukraine war has been a wake-up call to the possibility of a conflict breaking out on its doorstep, and the future of Taiwan is now foremost on Tokyo’s mind.

“If people all over the world have the will to support Taiwan, similar to the way they supported Ukraine when we witnessed Russia’s aggression, then, yes, it would be very possible that we will provide some kind of support to Taiwan,” Ino Toshiro told The Telegraph.

...

Pointing to concern over the growing assertiveness of regional neighbours such as Russia, China and North Korea, Mr Ino said: “The security environment of the world is becoming the most complicated in its history.”

Japan likely to come to Taiwan’s aid during a Chinese invasion

Ukraine war a wake-up call to the possibility of a conflict breaking out on Tokyo’s doorstep

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/23/japan-taiwan-aid-chinese-invasion/

By

Nicola Smith,

 ASIA CORRESPONDENT, JAPAN

23 July 2023 • 8:00am

Takuya Fukumoto, the station chief of Miyako’s coast-guard station, has seen a sharp spike in sightings of Chinese vessels CREDIT: Annabelle Chih

Japan would likely come to Taiwan’s aid if a Chinese invasion provoked the same outpouring in international support as for Ukraine, the country’s minister of state for defence has said.

Questions of whether and how Tokyo would support Taiwan in the event of an attack by China have risen up alongside mounting tensions over the democratic island, which Beijing claims as its own and has refused to rule out invading.

Japan has pursued a policy of de facto strategic ambiguity, refusing to publicly clarify how or if it would respond to a Taiwan-related contingency.

But the Ukraine war has been a wake-up call to the possibility of a conflict breaking out on its doorstep, and the future of Taiwan is now foremost on Tokyo’s mind.

“If people all over the world have the will to support Taiwan, similar to the way they supported Ukraine when we witnessed Russia’s aggression, then, yes, it would be very possible that we will provide some kind of support to Taiwan,” Ino Toshiro told The Telegraph.

He conceded, however, that Tokyo had not yet decided what form that support would take.

“I am not sure at this juncture whether it is going to be defence equipment support or whether it is going to be logistics support,” he said, adding that it would need the consensus of the Japanese people.

Officials in Tokyo are acutely aware of the parallels between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Beijing’s increasingly bellicose behaviour over Taiwan and other islands it claims as its own.

“Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow,” Fumio Kishida, the Japanese Prime Minister, said shortly after the war began.

China’s aggressive rearmament under Xi Jinping has also caused alarm. Tokyo is rushing to respond, with a 60 per cent hike in military spending planned over the next five years, including a radical overhaul of its national defence strategy.

“We consider it a threat that China is increasing its military budget and it is sharply increasing its assertiveness in the maritime zones. So far, we haven’t seen this level of threat before,” Mr Ino said.

But Japan has learned from President Putin’s disastrous invasion that it must boost its deterrence capabilities to prevent Chinese attempts to take Taiwan by force, while focusing on “constructive dialogue” with Beijing to avoid escalation in the first place, Mr Ino said.

“We think it is important to demonstrate that it will be difficult to invade Taiwan or make an aggressive move against Taiwan through military means,” he added.

At its westernmost point, Japan is just 70 miles from the Taiwanese coast. If Beijing attacked, any US response would likely come from the multiple military bases on the southern island of Okinawa that together host some 54,000 US troops.

The island of Okinawa would be the likely staging ground for any future US military operation in the area CREDIT: Annabelle Chih

Japan would have to choose whether to give its approval to Washington, an ally and its main security partner, while weighing up the risks of Chinese retaliation against its own territory and people.

Japan would also have to decide whether to actively join the fight. It may also seek defence cooperation with important allies such as the US and Britain, Mr Ino added​.

“If that kind of crisis is to occur, then obviously in order to deter any attempts to change the status quo by force we would like to request the maximum support.”

Pointing to concern over the growing assertiveness of regional neighbours such as Russia, China and North Korea, Mr Ino said: “The security environment of the world is becoming the most complicated in its history.”

While Japan’s political leaders pursue a policy of strategic ambiguity, the possibility of war hangs over those living on the islands stretching south towards Taiwan.

Already struggling with rising business costs, drought and devastating summer typhoons sweeping through his crops, the last thing sugar-cane farmer Nakazato Seihan needs is the threat of a potential conflict.

But the radar domes looming over the Air Self-Defense Force station some 200m from his home on the sleepy island of Miyako, in Japan’s Okinawa prefecture, are a stark reminder that his fields could one day end up on the front lines of a major conflict between China and the West.

Surrounded by turquoise waters and coral reefs, Miyako is a tourist paradise, but its strategic location about 300 miles from Taiwan and less than 100 nautical miles from the uninhabited Senkaku islands – the focus of a deepening territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing – have also turned it into a vital military outpost.

A former golf course on the tiny island that is home to 51,000 people has recently been converted into a Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force camp equipped with surface-to-ship missiles aimed at the Miyako Strait, a vital gateway for Chinese warships hoping to expand their reach into the Western Pacific.

Sugar-cane farmer Nakazato Seihan fears for his and fellow islanders' safety on Okinawa CREDIT: Annabelle Chih

Mr Nakazato, 70, fears that rather than offering islanders protection, such military facilities could invite war.

“Any place that has anything to do with force could and will be the target once conflict arises,” he said. “Why do forces with missiles have to be located in this peaceful rural community?”

Highly sensitive debate

Mr Nakazato’s question encapsulates the highly sensitive debate over how to build a more muscular defence policy within the limits of Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Bitter memories of Japan’s Second World War aggression run deep in Asia, while Japan’s public does not wish to be ensnared in a major conflict after more than 70 years of post-war peace.

The constitution, imposed by the US after the end of the conflict, prohibits Japan from maintaining the potential to wage war, permitting it to act only in self-defence. But a 2015 law, passed under then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, allows Japan to act militarily in “collective self-defence” if a close ally is attacked.

New national security and defence strategies, published last December, were viewed as a seismic shift in Tokyo’s approach to evolving geopolitical realities, including the widening gap between Japanese and Chinese military prowess.

Japan plans to invest heavily in long-range cruise and hypersonic missiles and to beef up its forces in the Nansei region, an island chain critical for the protection of Taiwan, and a natural barrier between the Chinese navy and the Pacific Ocean.

In line with Nato standards

Its new defence spending target, to reach 2 per cent of GDP by 2027, in line with Nato standards, will eventually push Japan’s annual defence budget to about £57 billion, the world’s biggest after the US and China.

“Back in 2005, the Japanese defence budget and the Chinese military budget were almost equal but now they spend four-to-five times more than us,” said Ken Jimbo, a professor at Tokyo’s Keio University.

“We are aiming to obtain enough capability to deny the Chinese the prospect of operational success in major scenarios such as Taiwan, the Senkakus and also in the South China Sea.”

The possibility of Japan joining the battle is key to deterring conflict over the Taiwan Strait.

The deployment of missiles with a 930-mile range in particular would be “a huge wild card for Chinese strategic thinking”, said Mr Jimbo.

Fears it could become warzone

In Okinawa, the site of pivotal but devastating Second World War battles and the likely staging ground for any future US military operation, there are fears the island could once again become a warzone.

Denny Tamaki, Okinawa’s governor, has long pushed for a reduction in the province’s burden in hosting US military bases, which have, at times, had a troubled relationship with the local population.

“Okinawa stands for only 0.6 per cent of the land of Japan but we have 76 per cent of the facilities used only by US forces. I think that is unusual,” Mr Tamaki said.

“Okinawan people are anxious because they are only seeing the effort to strengthen deterrence... we are worried that this is sending the wrong message to people in the Asia-Pacific region,” he added.

“I want the Japanese government to focus on the economy and regional exchanges to bring about peace.”

Missiles fell into water

In Okinawa’s outlying islands, others take a different view. When Beijing launched military drills last August to protest against the visit of Nancy Pelosi, then US house speaker, to Taipei, missiles fell into the waters near their shores.

Zakimi Kazuyuki, the mayor of Miyako, sees the benefit of bases on his island even if he is at pains to reassure the droves of visiting tourists.

“Seeing how Russia invaded Ukraine, we have a concern that China also shows its intent to unify Taiwan... so we always have to be prepared, we have to have a minimum readiness,” he said.

His office is already drawing up plans, alongside the government and other local authorities, for an emergency evacuation of islanders by air or sea. Contingency training exercises already began last year.

Meanwhile, tensions with China are impacting upon the local economy, he said. Local fishermen who once roamed the rich waters around the Senkaku islands no longer venture there for fear of harassment.

Miyako’s coast-guard station is one of two in the region that regularly patrols the disputed rocks, protecting Japan’s territorial waters and its fishing boats.

Sharp spike in Chinese vessels

Since 2008, it has recorded a sharp spike in sightings of Chinese coast-guard vessels in its contiguous zone (CZ) – an area up to 24 miles from Japanese shores where the country is legally allowed to enforce its territorial rights.

Since 2020, there have been more than 330 CZ sightings a year as Chinese vessels circle the zone.

For each incursion, the Japanese ask them by radio politely to leave. The Chinese contradict them, insisting they are sailing in their own territorial waters.

For now, the exchanges have been peaceful as the Japanese try to de-escalate and enforce international law.

“We have to be firm but calm,” said Takuya Fukumoto, the station chief. “We will not use an angry voice.”

This report was supported by the Foreign Press Center, Japan

3. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations:  https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv.
• Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear.
•  The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains.
• Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.
• A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporzhia Oblast on July 26 and have made advances in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 26 and have advanced in certain areas.
• Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces have begun using Russian-produced Shahed drones against Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied areas to facilitate the economic integration of occupied Ukraine into the Russian system.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 26, 2023

Jul 26, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2023

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 26, 2023, 8:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several prominent milbloggers, claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an intense frontal assault towards Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement.[1] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced to within 2.5km directly east of Robotyne during the attack before Russian forces employed standard doctrinal elastic defense tactics and pushed Ukrainian troops back somewhat, although not all the way back to their starting positions.[2]

Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear. The Russian MoD claimed that up to three battalions engaged in a “massive assault” near Orikhiv, but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that such a large number of personnel (a full brigade) were involved in the attack.[3] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used over 80 armored vehicles, and other milbloggers more conservatively claimed that the number was closer to between 30 and 40.[4] Various Russian milbloggers additionally made disparate claims about how many armored vehicles Russian forces destroyed.[5] ISW has also not yet observed a large number of heat anomalies from NASA’s FIRMS / VIIRs sensors in this area of the frontline of the sort that have historically accompanied large, mechanized pushes.[6] The disagreement amongst several prominent Russian sources, who have generally tended to offer more mutually consistent claims about the size of and losses resulting from previous Ukrainian attacks, indicates that the situation remains less than clear and that Ukrainian forces may have been more successful than assessed by Russian commentators.

The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains. Geolocated footage from July 27 shows two Ukrainian Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and a T-72 tank either disabled or abandoned about 2.5km due east of Robotyne, which is a point that is about 2.5km south of the current frontline.[7] This geolocated point is beyond the forward-most pre-prepared Russian defensive fortifications in this area, indicating that Ukrainian forces managed to penetrate and drive through tactically challenging defensive positions. This kind of penetration battle will be one of the most difficult things for Ukrainian forces to accomplish in pursuit of deeper penetrations, as ISW has previously assessed. The defensive lines that run further south of Robotyne are likely less well-manned than these forward-most positions, considering that Russian forces have likely had to commit a significant portion of available forces to man the first line of defensive positions that are north and east of Robotyne.

Ukrainians appear to have rotated fresh forces into this area for the operation whereas Russian forces remain pinned to the line apparently without rotation, relief, or significant reinforcement in this sector. Russian milbloggers and unnamed Pentagon officials additionally noted that the Ukrainian units that participated in the July 26 attack are reserves that belong to older and more established Ukrainian brigades.[8] These reports indicate that Ukraine may now be employing fresh and generally more experienced units in the battle, whereas the same Russian 58th Combined Arms Army elements (particularly the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) have been engaged in defensive operations in this very area continually since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in early June without relief.[9]The introduction of fresh Ukrainian reserves to the effort, together with the geometry of Russian defensive lines and the likely degraded overall state of Russian forces in this area, may allow Ukraine to begin pursuing more successful advances south of Orikhiv in the coming weeks.

Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. The New York Times reported on July 27, citing two anonymous Pentagon officials, that the “main thrust” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun in earnest.[10] The Western officials noted that this is an opportune moment for Ukrainian efforts given recent gradual Ukrainian operations to clear Russian defensive positions, Russian command changes following the dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov, and continued Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian concentration areas in southern Ukraine, which are all elements that are consistent with ISW’s assessment on the state of play in southern Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also cryptically stated in his nightly address on July 27 that Ukrainian forces “had very good results today” and that he will provide more details at a later date.[12]

Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if the US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust. Even accepting the high estimate of three battalions as the Ukrainian force offered by the Russian MoD, three battalions comprise a single brigade, whereas Ukraine is known still to have in reserve multiple uncommitted brigades readied for the counteroffensive.

Western officials are unhelpfully raising expectations for rapid and dramatic Ukrainian advances that Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to meet, as well as offering forecasts of the likely Ukrainian avenues of advance that should probably not have been shared publicly. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can make significant gains in their counteroffensive operations, but that such gains are likely to occur over a long period of time and interspersed with lulls and periods of slower and more grinding efforts as the Ukrainians come to successive Russian defensive lines and themselves require relief and rotation.

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 40 missiles, including three Kalibr cruise missiles and four Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles.[13] Ukrainian air defenses shot down at least 36 missiles, including all three Kalibr missiles.[14] It is currently unconfirmed if Ukrainian air defenses shot down the four Kinzhals.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that missiles were recorded over Kharkiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Lviv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts.[16] Various Russian sources claimed that the strikes hit the Starokostyantyniv Air Base in Khmelnytski Oblast.[17]

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area. The Ukrainian Military Media Center and UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces are preparing vessels on the Black Sea to “enforce a blockade on Ukraine.”[18] The Ukrainian Military Media Center reported that the Black Sea Fleet is increasing combat training for its surface forces and naval aviation.[19] The Black Sea Fleet is unlikely to attempt a full blockade of Ukraine despite increased measures against civilian vessels, however. A full Russian blockade of Ukraine in the Black Sea would mean that Russian forces could fire on all vessels attempting to reach Ukraine. Russia is highly unlikely to attempt to enforce such a complete blockade lest it trigger military conflict with Black Sea littoral countries including NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey that the Kremlin has hitherto worked hard to avoid. Current Russian posturing in the Black Sea more likely suggests that Russia is setting conditions to search civilian and commercial vessels while posturing for a blockade as a means of gaining additional leverage. The UK MoD reported that the Russian corvette “Sergei Kotov” is patrolling the shipping lane between the Bosphorus Strait and Odesa Oblast and that the “Sergei Kotov” corvette may be part of a task group to intercept commercial vessels that Russian forces assess are headed to Ukraine.[20] The Russian MoD claimed on July 20 that Russian forces would consider all vessels en route to Ukraine as potential carriers of military cargo.[21] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 24 that the Russian State Security Service (FSB) announced that it searched a foreign cargo ship heading from Turkey to Rostov-on-Don and denied its passage through the Kerch Strait.[22] The FSB claimed that the ship could be delivering explosives to Ukraine because the ship’s crew included 12 Ukrainian citizens and announced that it would search other vessels crossing Kerch Strait.[23]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.[24] The DoD stated that the package will include ammunition for HIMARS, munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and other critical military equipment.[25]

Angry Patriots Club members may be attempting to align their movement to free former Russian officer and prominent ultranationalist milblogger Igor Girkin with outrage at an anti-war sociologist’s arrest in order to appeal to a broader audience. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 26 that Russian authorities arrested Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (which the Russian Ministry of Justice designated as a foreign agent in 2018) and professor at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences Boris Kagarlitsky on charges of “justifying terrorism” in a post on Telegram about the Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022.[26] The Angry Patriots Club published a Telegram post expressing solidarity with Kagarlitsky and claiming that both Girkin’s and Kagarlitsky’s arrests were politically motivated.[27] The Angry Patriots acknowledged that Girkin and Kagarlitsky hold different political views but called for the freedom of political prisoners.[28] Girkin’s supporters may be attempting to frame Girkin’s arrest as a fight against political repression in order to galvanize support for Girkin from beyond the narrow confines created by his ultranationalist ideology and difficult personality. ISW continues to assess that the Angry Patriots Club movement is relatively isolated in the Russian ultranationalist information space, and the Angry Patriots Club may be attempting to make Girkin’s arrest more palatable to a general audience in order to increase support for the movement to free him.[29]

Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov met in Moscow for bilateral and trilateral negotiations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on July 25.[30] Lavrov walked a careful balance between mediator and participant during the trilateral negotiations, signaling Russia’s support for various Armenian and Azerbaijani positions while continuing to delay any real discussion of a long-term, effective peace agreement. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger highlighted that an assistant was caught on a live microphone, likely intentionally, telling Lavrov not to refer to Nagorno Karabakh as the “former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” because the Azerbaijanis would not appreciate it.[31] The milblogger noted that this was a simple, yet effective manipulation tactic that signaled to Armenia Russia’s desire to please Azerbaijan.[32] Lavrov managed to cater to Armenia as well by stating the importance of “direct dialogue between Stepanakert and Baku” and “guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh” supporting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s most recent rhetoric about these issues.[33] It is likely Lavrov also secured Azerbaijan’s approval for the Armenian government to send 400 tons of humanitarian aid to the residents of Nagorno Karabakh through Russian peacekeepers during the July 25 trilateral negotiation.[34]

The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.[35] Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan.[36] The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project previously assessed that Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” towards the Caucasus.[37] The trilateral meeting may have been an attempt to reassert Russia’s influence over Armenia vis-à-vis Iran, influence that has become particularly fragile following Russia‘s redeployment of elements of its “peacekeeping force” from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine in March 2023.[38]

A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor. The milblogger expressed surprise at the West’s lack of progress in giving Ukraine F-16s, stating it is “not entirely clear why Washington is dragging its feet.”[39] The milblogger laid out at length several hypotheses and potential explanations for the lack of progress in approving the final policy on giving Ukraine F-16s.[40] The milblogger notably did not include the threat of Russian nuclear escalation or other deterrence factors in his list of hypotheses of why Western policymakers have not yet sent the fighters to Ukraine.[41] ISW continues to assess that the risk of nuclear escalation remains extremely low.[42]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv.
• Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear.
•  The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains.
• Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.
• A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporzhia Oblast on July 26 and have made advances in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 26 and have advanced in certain areas.
• Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces have begun using Russian-produced Shahed drones against Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied areas to facilitate the economic integration of occupied Ukraine into the Russian system.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and made claimed advances on July 26. Russian sources claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps, Baltic Fleet) conducted successful offensive operations in the direction of Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[43] The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) continued offensive operations near Serhiivka (12km southwest of Svatove) and advanced along a front three kilometers wide to a depth of 2,700 meters in the area.[44] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured Nadiia (16km west of Svatove), whereas another milblogger claimed that positional battles continue on the Nadiia-Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove) line and that there is no confirmation that Russian forces have taken Nadiia.[45] ISW has not observed visual confirmation to suggest that Russian forces have captured Nadiia. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations south of Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Kreminna and made gains on July 26. Geolocated footage posted on July 25 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced westward in the Serebryanske forest area (10km southwest of Kreminna) and that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian forces from Shypylivka (9.5km southeast of Kreminna) in the direction of Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles continue near the Zhuravka Balka gully (northwest of Kreminna) and the Torske ledge (15km west of Kreminna).[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Bakhmut and did not make any confirmed advances on July 26. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct successful offensive operations on the southern flank of Bakhmut.[50] Malyar and Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Pavlo Kyrylenko reported that fighting is ongoing near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[51] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing for the heights west of Klishchiivka, but that Russian forces still control the settlement itself.[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 25 that one-quarter of Klishchiivka is contested and that elements of the 83rd Airborne Assault Brigade (VDV), 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps), and Southern Military District artillery units continued to repel Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka.[53] The Russian MoD and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Bilohorivka (20km northeast of Bakhmut), Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[54]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks around Bakhmut and did not make any confirmed or claimed advances on July 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks north of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut), north of Klishchiivka, east of Stupochky (12km southwest of Bakhmut), near Dyliivka (15km southwest of Bakhmut), and east of Druzhba (18km southwest of Bakhmut).[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and Klishchiivka.[56] Geolocated footage published on July 26 purportedly shows Ukrainian forces striking an unspecified Chechen infantry unit north of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[57] Footage published on July 26 purportedly shows elements of the “Lynx” (Rys) Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) evacuating wounded Russian personnel near Bakhmut and elements of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army [DNR] Corps) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[58]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not make confirmed or claimed advances on July 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near Avdiivka and Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City).[59] A Russian milblogger posted footage on July 26 from an unspecified date and claimed that assault units of the 1st DNR Army Corps recently captured a Ukrainian position near Avdiivka.[60]

The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and that Ukrainian forces did not make any advances on July 26. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[61]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on July 26 and have made gains south of Velyka Novosilka. Geolocated footage of Ukrainian forces capturing prisoners from the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) in Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) shows that Ukrainian troops have advanced to the northeastern part of the settlement.[62] Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces have had success near Staromayorske, and Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian assault units advanced along the frontline near Staromayorske along a front half a kilometer in width and 750 meters in depth.[63] Russian milbloggers also reported that Ukrainian troops conducted assaults toward Staromayorske, but claimed that the situation is complicated and denied reports of Ukrainian advances.[64] The Russian “Vostok Battalion,” which is actively committed in western Donetsk Oblast, warned that there is a chance that Ukrainian forces could fully capture Staromayorske and use new positions to threaten to envelop Urozhaine (directly to the east).[65]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks to restore lost positions in western Donetsk Oblast on July 26 but did not make any claimed or confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attempts to regain lost positions near Staromayorske.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked towards Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) but failed to advance.[67] Another Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces immediately counterattacked following a Ukrainian attack near Staromayorske and pushed Ukrainian troops back to their original positions.[68]

4 Sweden says it’s target of Russia-backed disinformation over NATO, Koran burnings

.

Excerpts:

Earlier on Wednesday, Sweden’s security service, SAPO, warned that Sweden’s security situation had worsened as a result of the recent controversy over freedom of speech.

“The image of Sweden has changed. We have gone from being seen as a tolerant country to being a land that is anti-Muslim – that’s how we are seen … mainly the Muslim parts of the world,” Susanna Trehorning, a senior official at SAPO, told Swedish state broadcaster SVT.

Sweden’s security-alert level has not been changed, however, and is currently at 3 on a scale of 5, indicating “heightened risk”. Five is the highest level of threat.

Sweden says it’s target of Russia-backed disinformation over NATO, Koran burnings

https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/sweden-says-its-target-of-russia-backed-disinformation-over-nato-koran-burnings/

EURACTIV.com with Reuters

 Est. 3min

 13:48

Content-Type: News Service

Supporters of the Islamic political party Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) step on a mock Swedish flag during a rally against Sweden in Karachi, Pakistan, 23 July 2023. Muslim activists staged protests across Pakistan against Sweden for allowing an Iraqi man on 20 July to burn a copy of the Koran, in the Danish capital Copenhagen by an ultranationalist group. [EPA-EFE/SHAHZAIB AKBER]

 EURACTIV is part of the Trust Project >>>

Sweden is the target of a disinformation campaign by “Russia-backed actors” intended to hurt the image of the NATO-candidate country by implying it supported recent burnings of the Koran, its Minister for Civil Defence said on Wednesday (26 July).

Sweden’s bid to join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put it in the international spotlight, while a number of demonstrations at which protesters have burned copies of the Muslim holy book have angered Muslims around the world.

“Sweden is the target of a disinformation campaign supported by state and state-like actors with the aim of damaging Swedish interests and … Swedish citizens,” the minister, Carl-Oskar Bohlin, told reporters at a press conference.

“We can see how Russia-backed actors are amplifying incorrect statements such as that the Swedish state is behind the desecration of holy scriptures,” he said.

“That is, naturally, completely false,” Bohlin said, adding that such state actors tried to “create division and weaken Sweden’s international standing.”

There was no immediate reply from the Russian embassy in Stockholm to a request for comment about the minister’s remarks.

Swedish Premier Ulf Kristersson also commented on the topic in a post, saying he wanted to correct a common misunderstanding.

“The Swedish state does not issue permissions to burn copies of the Koran. However, the police issue permits for public gatherings – a right that is enshrined in Sweden’s constitution,” Kristersson wrote on Facebook.

He said Sweden had no tradition of burning books just because it was legal.

“The state guarantees the right to freedom of expression, but does not thereby stand behind any political messages,” he wrote.

Mikael Ostlund, a spokesman for Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency, said Russia was using the Koran burnings as opportunities to promote its agenda in the media.

“Obviously, one such ambition from Russia’s side is to be able to complicate our joining NATO.”

Freedom of speech

Copies of the Koran have been burned at several demonstrations in Sweden and Denmark this summer, causing outrage among Muslims and prompting protesters to storm and vandalize the Swedish embassy in Baghdad.

Denmark and Sweden have said they deplore the burning of the Koran but cannot prevent it under rules protecting free speech.

Turkey, which holds a veto over Swedish NATO membership, has condemned the protests and called on Stockholm to take action against the perpetrators.

Earlier on Wednesday, Sweden’s security service, SAPO, warned that Sweden’s security situation had worsened as a result of the recent controversy over freedom of speech.

“The image of Sweden has changed. We have gone from being seen as a tolerant country to being a land that is anti-Muslim – that’s how we are seen … mainly the Muslim parts of the world,” Susanna Trehorning, a senior official at SAPO, told Swedish state broadcaster SVT.

Sweden’s security-alert level has not been changed, however, and is currently at 3 on a scale of 5, indicating “heightened risk”. Five is the highest level of threat.

5. What We Know After 70 Years Of The Korean War Armistice

China technically did not sign the Armistice- The commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers signed it.

Excerpt:

After more than two years of truce talks and 158 meetings, an armistice was finally signed in July 1953 by North Korea, China and the UN Command.

What We Know After 70 Years Of The Korean War Armistice

Barron's · by AFP - Agence France Presse

AFP takes a look at what we know:

The United States and the former Soviet Union agreed to divide the Korean peninsula between them in the days after Japan's 1945 surrender ended the Second World War and Tokyo's rule over the territory, which it had colonised in 1910.

In the South's capital Seoul, the Harvard- and Princeton-educated Syngman Rhee led a US-oriented administration.

Moscow appointed Kim Il Sung, who had led a Korean contingent in the Soviet army, as head of the North. His son and grandson have since retained an absolute grip on power in Pyongyang.

Both the communist North and the capitalist South claimed to be the legitimate government of the entire peninsula and, in theory, still claim so to this day.

The North invaded the South on June 25, 1950, as Kim Il Sung attempted to reunify Korea by force.

The UN Security Council authorised armed intervention in support of the South; Moscow did not veto the resolution because it was boycotting the body at the time.

The South's forces crumbled before the Northern advance and Pyongyang's army seized Seoul just three days after crossing the 38th parallel.

Multinational UN forces, led by the United States, arrived in the South to help but they were pushed back to the Pusan Perimeter, a pocket on the peninsula's southeastern tip around the city now known as Busan.

The Incheon Landing -- a bold counter-offensive launched in the city to the west of Seoul -- recaptured the capital, split the North's forces and turned the tide.

UN units swept north, seized Pyongyang on October 19 and advanced almost to the Chinese border.

Pyongyang's allies reversed the war's course again as Beijing sent hundreds of thousands of troops to help.

Seoul fell to them again in January 1951, only for the UN coalition to recapture it once more two months later -- the fourth time the city had changed hands.

By June 1951, the front line had stabilised roughly where the Demilitarized Zone runs today, not far from the pre-war division along the 38th parallel.

Another two years of attrition followed -- accompanied by large-scale US bombing of the North, despite Moscow's own air power -- and the fighting ground to a stalemate.

After more than two years of truce talks and 158 meetings, an armistice was finally signed in July 1953 by North Korea, China and the UN Command.

But Rhee, who still wanted to defeat the North, refused to sign.

Exact numbers are impossible to establish, given the scale of the conflict and multiple contradictory accounts on all sides, but up to three million Koreans died, the vast majority of them civilians.

The war also separated families -- more than 133,600 South Koreans have registered themselves as "separated families", meaning they have relatives in the North, since 1988.

Some were lucky enough to be chosen to take part in occasional cross-border reunions, cramming a lifetime's relationships into three brief days. The last such reunion happened in 2018.

The meetings have long been subject to the vagaries of politics and are often used as a negotiating tool by Pyongyang, which constantly stresses the importance of unification despite the two countries' now wildly different societies and economies.

The ceasefire was meant to be replaced with a final peace settlement but that has never happened.

Washington still stations around 27,000 troops in the South, while the North -- which has the world's largest standing army -- has spent decades developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, saying it needs them to deter a US invasion.

It has been isolated internationally as a result and subject to multiple sets of UN Security Council sanctions.

Diplomacy between Pyongyang and Seoul has stalled and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has called for increased weapons development, including tactical nuclear warheads.

Seoul and Washington have ramped up defence cooperation in response, with South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol warning Pyongyang it would face the "end of the regime" if it attacked the South with nuclear weapons.

kjk-sh-cdl/ceb/pbt/lb

Barron's · by AFP - Agence France Presse

6. Qin Gang: Foreign minister's downfall leaves China red-faced

Is China really red-faced or is that just some kind of our wishful thinking?

Qin Gang: Foreign minister's downfall leaves China red-faced

BBC · by Menu

• Published
• 2 hours ago

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Image source, Reuters

Image caption,

Despite his "wolf warrior" reputation, Mr Qin was also capable of a softer touch

By Tessa Wong

Asia Digital Reporter, BBC News

As mystery swirls over the removal of China's foreign minister Qin Gang, questions have also arisen over what his downfall means for China's diplomacy.

Following weeks of unexplained absence, Mr Qin this week was decisively rooted out by the Chinese leadership - even all mention of him was scrubbed off the foreign ministry website.

Analysts say that while this episode is unlikely to have a huge impact on foreign relations, it nevertheless has left Beijing red-faced.

Despite his "wolf warrior" reputation, Mr Qin showed he was also capable of a softer touch. This came out particularly during his tenure as ambassador to the US.

He not only urged for a more nuanced relationship between the two superpowers but also famously shot hoops at NBA games and threw pitches at baseball games, wooing the Americans in one of the languages they understood best - sport.

His appointment as foreign minister last December was seen by some as a sign that Beijing was dialling down its aggressive image by sending more even-tempered figures to the frontlines of its diplomatic corps.

But while Mr Qin helped to present a more moderate image of China to the world, he had little say on its actual foreign policy.

While he was foreign minister, he still had to answer to Wang Yi, who as the head of the Communist Party's foreign affairs commission occupied the top diplomatic position in China's party-centric power hierarchy. Mr Wang has now taken on Mr Qin's job.

And ultimately, both had to follow their president's political ideological playbook.

"Xi handpicked Qin Gang not to make foreign policy but to serve as the implementer-in-chief of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy," Neil Thomas, a fellow in Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the BBC.

"It is Xi and his inner circle who make major foreign policy decisions."

Image source, Twitter/Qin Gang

Image caption,

Mr Qin had tweeted a picture of himself in September throwing a pitch at a US baseball game

Mr Wang is now swiftly stepping into his old role, in addition to retaining his current position.

With the veteran diplomat fully holding the reins, Beijing appears keen to signal continuity and wants to reassure the global community that it is still business as usual.

• Who is China's new foreign minister Wang Yi?
• The swift rise and mysterious fall of China's missing minister

Mr Wang is a well-known face on the international circuit, responsible for some of China's recent international charm offensives over major issues such as the Ukraine war.

He is likely to focus on ensuring the US-China relationship returns to an even keel after months of hostility, with Mr Xi's possible November visit to the US a top priority, analysts say.

Some have also noted his experience in handling cross-strait relations as the former director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, which would be crucial as the Taiwan presidential elections - usually a source of friction between Taipei and Beijing - loom ahead in January 2024.

But while Mr Wang is seen as a safe pair of hands there are doubts he will be foreign minister for long. Many believe he is a placeholder while Mr Xi hunts for someone to ease Mr Wang's workload.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Mr Wang is seen as a safe pair of hands

Mr Wang now has to juggle the top two roles in Chinese diplomacy just as Beijing fills up its diplomatic diary to make up for three years of Covid isolation.

Experts say Beijing may have less capacity to meet foreign officials from smaller countries - not ideal as it tries to woo the so-called global south.

Mr Wang's dutiful substitution also cannot obscure the fact that abruptly pulling Mr Qin off the pitch with no explanation sends out a troubling message.

It calls into question Mr Xi's judgment, given that he had clearly regarded Mr Qin as a star player who deserved to quickly rise up the ranks.

"The Qin Gang affair is not good for the Chinese Communist Party's image abroad and even internally," Jean Pierre Cabestan, a senior research fellow at the Asia Centre think tank, told the BBC.

"It highlights a certain level of instability in the leadership, possible policy disagreements, unprofessional high-level official promotion methods and a degree of political opacity that does not fit well with China's ambition to become a global power."

James Palmer, deputy editor of Foreign Policy, said that reappointing Mr Wang to signal continuity "makes no sense" as "Beijing has now reminded these partners that not only can Chinese officials disappear at any minute, but the government will also pretend they never existed. Any achievements or discussions with Qin… now amount to nothing."

The Qin Gang episode shows "the Chinese diplomats foreign governments and companies often interact with are usually a long way from the centre of power", said Mr Thomas.

It is, in the end, "another reminder that Xi Jinping is the decisive actor in Beijing".

Additional reporting by Sylvia Chang.

7. Main Thrust of Ukraine’s Offensive May Be Underway, U.S. Officials Say

Excerpts:

Speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, officials at the White House and Pentagon said on Wednesday that they were watching the increased activity with keen interest, and that Ukrainian officials had told them the new operation, if successful, would last one to three weeks.

“This is the big test,” said one senior official.

Administration officials and analysts said it might be only a matter of days to assess whether the attacks might be successful. “It will be clear soon whether this attack will allow Ukraine to change the current dynamic,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ukrainian officials declined to confirm that the assaults took place.

Main Thrust of Ukraine’s Offensive May Be Underway, U.S. Officials Say

By Eric Schmitt, Matthew Mpoke Bigg and Carlotta Gall

July 26, 2023

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · July 27, 2023

After holding back many of its units trained and armed by the West, Ukraine is now committing them, the officials said, but it remained unclear whether a full-scale assault was taking place.

A member of the 24th Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Army firing a mortar at a frontline position in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine on Tuesday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

July 26, 2023

Ukraine has launched the main thrust of its counteroffensive, throwing in thousands of troops held in reserve, many of them Western-trained and equipped, two Pentagon officials said on Wednesday, hours after Russian officials reported major Ukrainian attacks in the southern Zaporizhzhia region.

A spokesman for Russia’s Defense Ministry, Igor Konashenkov, said the Ukrainians had mounted a “massive” assault with three battalions, reinforced with tanks, south of the town of Orikhiv, and then another a few miles farther south near the village of Robotyne, according to the state news agency Tass. Both were repelled, the ministry said.

Other American officials cautioned that the latest Ukrainian attack might be preparatory operations for the main thrust or perhaps just reinforcements to replenish war-weary units.

The challenge for the Ukrainians, since they began their counteroffensive in early June, has been to blast open a gap in the deep Russian defense network, and then try to pour through a much larger force.

Speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, officials at the White House and Pentagon said on Wednesday that they were watching the increased activity with keen interest, and that Ukrainian officials had told them the new operation, if successful, would last one to three weeks.

“This is the big test,” said one senior official.

Administration officials and analysts said it might be only a matter of days to assess whether the attacks might be successful. “It will be clear soon whether this attack will allow Ukraine to change the current dynamic,” said Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ukrainian officials declined to confirm that the assaults took place.

The force cited by the Kremlin — three battalions, roughly up to 3,000 troops — is relatively small. A Russian occupation official describing the attack referred on the Telegram app to Ukrainian “brigades,” and in a later post to “battalions,” a major difference. A brigade typically has three to five battalions.

An artillery unit from the 17th Tank Brigade at a position in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region on Monday.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times

The United States and other Western allies have trained about 63,000 Ukrainian troops, according to the Pentagon, and have supplied more than 150 modern battle tanks, a much larger number of older tanks, hundreds of infantry fighting vehicles and thousands of other armored vehicles. All of those figures continue to rise, and much of that manpower and gear had been held in reserve until now, as Ukrainian forces fought to find — or create — a strategic vulnerability they could exploit.

The American officials said most of the remaining reserves were now being committed.

In villages all along the southern front line on Wednesday, unusually heavy artillery fire could be heard as Ukrainian guns thundered from hidden positions and Russian artillery and mortars targeted former Russian positions and villages now occupied by Ukrainian soldiers. Ukrainian troops deployed along that part of the front say they are steadily pushing the Russian troops back in what they describe as step by step, rather than breakthrough, movements.

Since seizing Ukrainian territory in last year’s invasion, the Russians have built a dense defensive web of minefields, trenches, bunkers, tank traps and obstacles along a front line that curves and winds hundreds of miles through the Zaporizhzhia region in the south and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions to the east. That has made the counteroffensive slow going, frustrating both Ukrainians and their Western backers.

The area around Orikhiv is one of three main axes of the assault, and the westernmost one. Ukrainian leaders hope for a breakthrough to the town of Tokmak and then as far as the city of Melitopol, more than 50 miles south, near the Sea of Azov. Both are highway and railroad hubs, and driving a wedge that deep would effectively split the Russian-held territory in two, making resupply and coordination more difficult for Moscow’s forces.

Workers clearing debris in Odesa after a Russian missile strike on Tuesday.Credit...Emile Ducke for The New York Times

Some of Ukraine’s newly trained and equipped brigades have been engaged in fighting there alongside long-established units of marines and mechanized infantry. The strength of Russian firepower and defenses has forced the Ukrainians to adjust their tactics, but before Wednesday they had broken through the first line of Russian defenses in some places, capturing a handful of settlements.

Vladimir Rogov, a Russian occupation official in the region, said on the Telegram app that fierce battles were waged on Wednesday south of Orikhiv, involving Western-trained Ukrainian troops equipped with “more than 100” armored vehicles, including an unspecified number of German-made Leopard tanks and American-made Bradley Fighting Vehicles.

The Ukrainian military’s general staff, in its daily update, said only that Russian forces were engaged in defensive operations in the Zaporizhzhia region. A spokesman for the general staff, Andriy Kovalev, said that Russian forces had unsuccessfully tried to restore lost positions northeast of Robotyne.

“The enemy continues to put up strong resistance, moves units and actively uses reserves,” he said.

A Ukrainian soldier at a frontline position in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine on Tuesday.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said on Telegram that he had met with Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, the commander of the armed forces, and discussed offensive and defensive fighting on the front line, but he gave no specifics about military operations. “We believe in our boys,” he said. “We continue to work.”

But it is the Russians who are on the offensive in other contexts — at sea and in the air.

On Wednesday evening, Russia launched a large-scale and complex aerial bombardment of Ukraine, firing cruise and ballistic missiles at targets across the country, including the western city of Starokostiantyniv, far from the front, the Ukrainian Air Force said. Many of the missiles suddenly changed course during flight to evade Ukrainian air defenses, it said.

The Ukrainians said that Russian warplanes had fired 36 cruise missiles and four ballistic missiles, and that they had been able to shoot down 33 of the cruise missiles. It was unclear how much damage was done, and whether the barrage was tied to the offensive on ground.

Members of Ukraine’s 24th Mechanized Brigade at a frontline position in the Donetsk region.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Since July 17, when Russia withdrew from a deal allowing ships to carry exports of grain and other foodstuffs from Ukraine, it has repeatedly bombarded Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, particularly facilities used to store and move grain. The Kremlin, whose navy dominates the Black Sea, has also said that any vessel moving to or from Ukraine would be treated as hostile.

Kyiv, in turn, has said it would step up its own naval attacks, and it has used maritime drones packed with explosives against Russian ships and infrastructure. The Russian military said on Tuesday that it had thwarted an attack on one of its warships by Ukrainian drones; the claim could not be independently confirmed.

The threats and escalations have raised fears of a clash at sea involving neutral shipping. The United States has warned that Russia might attack a civilian vessel and blame it on Ukraine.

The collapse of the grain deal is of worldwide interest, because it chokes off a significant fraction of the global food supply, particularly for parts of the Middle East and Africa. The United Nations Security Council met on Wednesday for the third time since then to discuss the matter, though with Russia holding veto power, no action was expected.

Britain’s military intelligence service said on Wednesday that the Russian fleet had taken a more aggressive posture to tighten its blockade against Ukraine. A modern Russian warship has been deployed to the shipping lanes linking Odesa, Ukraine’s biggest port, to Turkey, the destination for grain exports under the deal, and it could be part of a plan “to intercept commercial vessels.”

Eric Schmitt reported from Washington, Matthew Mpoke Bigg from London and Carlotta Gall from the Zaporizhzhia region of Ukraine. Reporting was contributed by Marc Santora from Kyiv, Ukraine, and Farnaz Fassihi from New York.

Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who has traveled the world covering terrorism and national security. He was also the Pentagon correspondent. A member of the Times staff since 1983, he has shared four Pulitzer Prizes. More about Eric Schmitt

Matthew Mpoke Bigg is a correspondent covering international news. He previously worked as a reporter, editor and bureau chief for Reuters and did postings in Nairobi, Abidjan, Atlanta, Jakarta and Accra. More about Matthew Mpoke Bigg

Carlotta Gall is a senior correspondent currently covering the war in Ukraine. She previously was Istanbul bureau chief, covered the aftershocks of the Arab Spring from Tunisia, and reported from the Balkans during the war in Kosovo and Serbia, and from Afghanistan and Pakistan after 2001. She was on a team that won a 2009 Pulitzer Prize for reporting from Afghanistan and Pakistan. More about Carlotta Gall

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Main Thrust of Ukraine’s Offensive Is Underway, U.S. Officials Say

14

The New York Times · by Carlotta Gall · July 27, 2023

8. China-Russia alliance poses a danger, Pacific commander warns

Analysis also on these issues:

Congress looks at Agency for Global Media corruption

China promotes propaganda in ‘Barbie’

China-Russia alliance poses a danger, Pacific commander warns

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

By - The Washington Times - Wednesday, July 26, 2023

NEWS AND ANALYSIS:

Military forces from China and Russia have engaged in operations in the Pacific since last week, prompting the commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific to call the emerging alliance “dangerous.”

Chinese state media reported Wednesday that as part of joint military exercises, Chinese and Russian warships will conduct a third joint maritime patrol in the western and northern Pacific. China’s Defense Ministry said in a written statement the operations do not target any third party and are unrelated to current and regional affairs, which Chinese leaders have described as particularly tense.

The warships were operating in the Sea of Japan last weekend as part of the Northern/Interaction 2023 exercise as part of an annual program. Those operations ended July 23, and the next phase is a joint patrol.

In addition to the naval vessels, warplanes also took part in what Chinese state media called “joint fire strike training” and a “coordinated maritime operation.”

The warships last week conducted what were termed highly concentrated strategic passages through three waterways, transiting through the Tsushima Strait between Japan and Korea; the Tsugaru Strait between Japan’s two main islands; and the Soya Strait, between Russia’s Sakhalin Island and Japan’s northernmost island, Hokkaido.

The official People’s Liberation Army website, China Military Online, noted that the joint exercises in the Pacific took place a week after a NATO summit meeting in Vilnius, Lithuania, declared that China and Russia are threats.

“The Northern/Interaction-2023 demonstrated a high level of political and military mutual trust between China and Russia, whose strategic coordination, especially in the military domain, guarantees global security and stability, and whose bilateral relations have regional and global significance,” the website article stated.

The article was written by Wu Dahui, an academic at Tsinghua University, who insisted the joint operations were not part of an anti-Western alliance.

But that’s not how Adm. John Aquilino, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, sees the growing military cooperation between the two countries.

“I don’t know what this partnership is, [but] I’ll use their words: It’s a ‘no limits’ relationship,” the four-star admiral said at a security conference last week in Colorado. “And we’ve seen a lot of things that lead us to believe that it’s truly real despite their long historical and cultural differences.”

In the Pacific, China and Russia have expanded and increased joint training, joint exercises and joint demonstrations of power, he said.

“Just a month ago, bombers from both Russia and China [exercised], Russian bombers landed in China,” Adm. Aquilino said. “And then they flew a joint mission into the Philippine Sea towards Guam,” a major U.S. military hub.

On the day he spoke to the Aspen Security Forum, a Chinese and Russian maritime task force conducted a combined patrol.

“We’ll see where that ends up, whether it’s off the Aleutian Islands, whether it’s in the Philippine Sea, whether it goes to Guam, whether it goes to Hawaii, or whether it goes off the west coast of the United States,” he said. “So, their exercises have increased, their operations have increased. I only see the cooperation getting stronger, and, boy, that’s concerning. That’s a dangerous world.”

Retired Navy Capt. Jim Fanell said the joint exercises highlighted the growing military threat to chokepoints in Northeast Asia and posed “a clear and unambiguous threat to Japan’s west coast.”

“The military alliance between China and Russia represents an unambiguous message to both Washington and Tokyo that any effort to defend Taiwan will be diverted due to defense of the main island of Honshu in Japan,” Capt. Fanell said.

“American leaders should understand this dynamic and recognize that the 7th Fleet and 5th Air Force need immediate reinforcement.”

Congress looks at Agency for Global Media corruption

The House Foreign Affairs Committee is moving forward with a major investigation into suspected corruption at the U.S. Agency for Global Media, or USAGM, the government unit that oversees U.S. official and semiofficial radio broadcasts.

Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, Texas Republican, said in a statement Monday that the panel’s two-year inquiry had uncovered “alarming evidence of misconduct and negligence at the senior-most levels of the agency,” which has an annual budget of $840 million. “The agency has confirmed that high-ranking officials were aware of questions that remained unresolved even after an internal investigation of employee misconduct.”

But “rather than pursuing the matter further,” the lawmaker said, “officials shelved credible allegations, including instances of waste of taxpayer funds, credentialing fraud and abuse of office, and offered not so much as a slap on the wrist for relevant actors.”

Mr. McCaul said he will demand answers as to why the agency apparently failed to act. “I will keep working until the agency stops rewarding misconduct, improves its vetting practices, and tells the American people the truth,” he said.

A USAGM spokesman did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Last year, the Voice of America, the main U.S. government-funded broadcaster, canceled two Chinese-language programs focused on the standoff between China and Taiwan. Critics said the action signaled a softening of broadcasts on China.

The website USAGM Watch has reported on numerous instances of financial impropriety and corruption at the agency and its broadcast components, including issues related to coverage of China, Cuba, Iran and Russia, as well as promoting pro-Iranian and pro-Russian journalists.

China promotes propaganda in ‘Barbie’

The summer blockbuster film “Barbie” is an example of China promoting its worldview through movies, according to the newsletter The Wire China.

Isaiah Schrader, a Washington-based writer and doctoral student studying China’s legal system at Harvard University, wrote in a recent article that the film’s brief showing of a vague world map with two curved broken lines next to a land mass labeled Asia had political overtones, effectively supporting China‘s expansive maritime claims in the disputed South China Sea.

The map drew pre-release political fire from the governments of both Vietnam and the Philippines, which questioned whether the line was code for China’s illegal “Nine-Dash Line” underlying claims to sovereignty over about 90% of the strategic sea.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled the Nine-Dash Line was invalid under international law. China rejected the ruling.

Vietnam banned domestic showings of “Barbie” over the map flap, and the Philippine government allowed distribution only after a lengthy film review, despite calls from a lawmaker for the film to be banned.

Warner Bros. defended the movie. The studio told Reuters in a statement that the map had no political significance.

“The map in Barbie Land is a whimsical, child-like crayon drawing,” the studio said in a statement. “The doodles depict Barbie’s make-believe journey from Barbie Land to the real world. It was not intended to make any type of statement.”

Conservative critics panned the summer blockbuster for its portrayal of a doll infused with “woke” radical feminism, while male characters are depicted as wimps.

Mr. Schrader said the uproar over the infusion of Chinese propaganda in a major movie highlights broader concerns that Hollywood is overeager to give in to Beijing’s demands on content, given the size of China‘s multibillion-dollar domestic movie market.

China restricts showing American films to a handful a year and rejects any that contain content that Communist Party censors oppose.

Film producer and consultant Robert Cain, who has worked with studios that seek access to China, told the newsletter that many studios succumbed to Chinese censorship demands early in the relationship. As a result, “as long as China has an authoritarian government … these changes will remain in place,” he said.

By contrast, in the 1990s, Hollywood was unafraid to make movies violating Chinese draconian censorship, including “Seven Years in Tibet,” “Kundun” and “Red Corner.” All three directors of the films were banned from traveling to China.

Chinese investment also influences studios. Beijing spent $3.3 billion on U.S. entertainment, media and education, according to the Rhodium Group China Investment Monitor. The Chinese conglomerate Dalian Wanda bought Legendary Studios in 2016 for $3.5 billion. Earlier, the company bought a major stake in the AMC Theatre chain.

American businesses in China increasingly are being pressured by authorities following Beijing’s crackdown on foreign companies over spying concerns. Some U.S.-based data firms and financial due diligence companies operating in China were targeted by investigators under a new counterspy law that went into effect July 1.

• Contact Bill Gertz on Twitter @BillGertz.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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9. China Taking Hard Line on Military Flybys, Freedom of Navigation Operations, Says Panel

China Taking Hard Line on Military Flybys, Freedom of Navigation Operations, Says Panel - USNI News

news.usni.org · by John Grady · July 26, 2023

A fighter jet attached to an aviation brigade of the PLA Air Force soars into the sky during a high-intensity flight training exercise in early Feb. 2023. PLA Photo

Dialing back Western Pacific freedom of navigation operations and military flights runs a “very high risk” of sending the wrong message to Beijing about U.S. intentions in the Indo-Pacific, security experts said Wednesday.

“Beijing would see this as… our hard-line worked,” Josiah Case, a research analyst specializing in China at the Center for Naval Analyses, said Wednesday at the Brookings Institution.

By publicly announcing its intercepts at sea and in the air, Beijing is sending messages not only to the United States and its allies and partners but also to the Chinese public. The Chinese Communist Party “is really concerned in sending the right message to its people,” Case said.

That message often includes pledges to “resolutely safeguard China’s sovereignty and security,” as it did when a Chinese warship cut across the bow of guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG-93) while transiting the Taiwan Strait with a Canadian frigate in June.

The Defense Department said the change of course that brought the two vessels within 150 yards of each other, as captured in a video, showed the Chinese were operating in “an unsafe manner.”

In 2018, a PLAN destroyer carried out a series of “increasingly aggressive maneuvers” within 45 yards of USS Decatur (DDG-73). The American destroyer was operating near a recently militarized artificial island created by the Chinese in the Spratlys in 2018.

By claiming to expel ships or aircraft from territory it claims, the CCP is resurrecting memories of its “century of humiliation” that ended with Communists taking power in 1949, Case said.

Roderick Lee, director of research at the China Aerospace Studies Institute at the Air University, said operations by other nations close to its shores is a “very, very historically sensitive topic for China.” He cited American air reconnaissance missions along the coast in the late 1940s and Taiwan’s flying reconnaissance missions from the island to Beijing as examples the CCP can use in denouncing American and others activities at sea or in the air.

“China sees this [flights in international air space near its borders] as U.S. reconnaissance operations,” Lee said.

Beijing’s views haven’t deterred U.S. military flights in international air space as a matter of policy. He added, “we have regular air presence in the first island chain” that Beijing monitors.

Case said the message in the at sea and air intercepts is “China was exploited and repressed [and those Western powers] are still trying to repress” its people. “The CCP deserves to be in charge” because it protects the nation’s sovereignty.

The 2023 incidents “are not the first time the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] has bas behaved in an unprofessional manner,” he said at the Brookings Institution event.

Whether the intercepts have actually increased is a difficult question to answer, both said. China has established a blue-water navy, built a modern air force and created better air defense warning systems, which could explain the number of U.S. reported incidents, both said. Lee said the Chinese are conducting the intercepts on “an increasingly regular basis.”

“We’re not seeing the full scope” of the intercepts, he added.

What is different, Case said is the incidents “are being talked about in the public domain by both sides” in “a battle for the narrative.”

“The Chinese have gotten a lot better” at conducting the intercepts, from the professionalization of pilot training to better technology and developing doctrine for “non-military activities.” Lee said the doctrine calls for the Chinese aircraft to “push out” the intruder using chaff or maneuver to do it when ordered. He contrasted that to the 2001 incident when a Chinese fighter collided with a Navy EP-3 Aries, killing the Chinese pilot and forcing the P-3 to land on Hainan Island. The signals surveillance aircraft was operating 70 miles off the Chinese coast. He termed the collision “pilot error.”

Increased Chinese proficiency has allowed Beijing to up its pressure on transits, Lee added. They also are in no hurry to establish direct communications with the United States military to prevent escalation after an incident. The Chinese believe each side understands what the other is doing,” Lee said. “They think we’re really good at non-verbal communication” in those situations.

In space, there is no defined territory in the competition between the United States and China or anyone else, Robin Dickey, space policy and strategy analyst at Aerospace Corp., said. Space “is open to all countries, all actors.”

Yet at the same, there are no commonly agreed upon “rules of the road,” providing “norms and governance” to cover activities in space, Dickey said. For space, “the biggest trend line is the [increasing] number of satellites and actors [including private companies].”

While incidents in space “can be happening more and more” with objects including debris colliding with military or civilian satellites and space stations, there is no direct communication between nations to de-escalate. To connect one operator to another would require a phone call or sending an email, even for the military, Dickey said. Like incidents at sea and in the air, “very often China doesn’t answer the phone.”

“If we can’t de-conflict the easy cases, how are we going to de-escalate the hard cases,” he said.

Complicating discussions about space, Dickey said, “you can’t know what’s in a satellite” whether it has dual-use technology. She said it was possible for a maneuverable satellite sent up to remove debris could also be used to disable or destroy another satellite.

Related

news.usni.org · by John Grady · July 26, 2023

10. Selling the Army

Excerpts:

Much more can and ought to be said about the strength and health of the AVF as it embarks on its next half century, and the worrisome challenges that it is facing both at home and from abroad. But we can surely celebrate the enormous improvement of the AVF since the 1970s. We must celebrate it for doing more with less—for having defended America for the past fifty years throughout an uptick in the pace of missions with fewer and fewer servicepeople. And we can and must further celebrate the families of the nation that have given their sons and daughters to this task.

When Dwight Elliott Stone reluctantly answered his draft summons in 1973, he was not really interested in serving the nation. But once out of the service and established in a civilian career, he was thankful for that service and for the training and characteristics he had learned through it. His eldest son even volunteered to serve before going off to college. Stone’s story proves that serving in the AVF is not simply an economic choice, but remains a choice of citizenship as well, one that must be explained and cultivated with every succeeding generation.

Selling the Army

americanpurpose.com · by Rebecca Burgess · July 26, 2023

On June 30, 1973, a young California pipe fitter named Dwight Elliot Stone reluctantly answered his summons to serve his country and was inducted into the United States Army as “the last man”—Uncle Sam’s last draftee. The next day, July 1, 1973, the United States officially did away with conscription by initiating the all-volunteer force (AVF).

Ending the draft had been a 1968 presidential campaign promise of Richard Nixon’s, as part of both his political strategy to win the presidency and the broader need to quell the Vietnam War protests that were rocking society by the late Sixties. But Nixon’s proposal had also been encouraged by a prominent group of free-market economists, including most notably Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan, who argued that only the labor market logic of supply and demand could procure the better-quality soldiers needed for the complexities of modern warfare.

Fifty years later, it’s worth reconsidering those economic swaddling bands, as it were, of the AVF. While the free-market approach has arguably helped shape one of the most professional and skilled military corps on the planet, the massive, two-years-long recruiting crisis enveloping the U.S. Armed Forces necessitates a reexamination of the foundations of the AVF—in particular at a time of heightened geopolitical complexity.

Every branch of the U.S. military is struggling to meet its recruitment targets. The U.S. Army, for instance, has fallen 25 percent short of its target. Service branches are variously offering signing bonuses of up to $75,000 (the Navy) and reenlistment bonuses of up to $100,000 (the Air Force). But any hordes of takers have yet to materialize.

In other words, the recruitment crisis seems to reflect a flawed assumption of the Nixon crowd—that volunteer recruits would make a decision to serve based solely on the pay scale. That assumption has proven to come at the expense of understanding the civic values at the heart of military service—values that have undeniably nourished the AVF for many years. On this fiftieth birthday of the AVF then, one part of the celebration entails a re-embracing of those civic values.

The free-market economists, many of whom became members of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (more commonly known as the Gates Commission) in 1969, also argued that conscription had proven too dangerous for democracy because, in the words of Barry Goldwater, it undermined “respect for government by forcing an individual to serve when and in the manner the government decides, regardless of his own values and talents.”

Nonetheless, when the Gates Commission published its unanimous endorsement of the move to an all-volunteer force in 1970 and Nixon announced it would be a fait accompli in 1973, much caution, concern, and even opposition to it still existed, especially in the Army—the branch that would be most impacted by the redesign. Would a volunteer military really be able to man a force adequate to its obligations and needs? Would volunteers be of high enough quality? Would the costs associated with the requisite pay increases and added benefits be prohibitive? Would a volunteer military truly be more fair and more representative of the nation in socioeconomic terms than a conscription model one? Finally, what might the ramifications be for the broad understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship, and not just the rights of citizenship?

The fears were not unwarranted, and some of the challenges initially identified—such as high costs and recruiting difficulties—remain. But on the whole, fifty years later most consider the AVF to be one of America’s great success stories. Now a professional military, the U.S. Armed Forces are routinely celebrated as being the most professional, educated, and capable in history.

The move to the AVF had some unintended consequences, for those keeping track of such things: For one, the emphasis on ensuring fairness with previously underrepresented groups, including minorities and women, resulted in policymakers placing much more emphasis on increasing the number of women in military service (admittedly in part to offset the loss of draftees), as William Taylor has written about in Military Service and American Democracy (2016).

Second, the conditions of military life improved—marketing requirements alone showed the necessity of improving living conditions. This was done by way of removing “irritants” (or “Mickey Mouse Rules,” as they were often called) like morning reveille formations, relaxing grooming standards, allowing beer in the barracks, and providing more comfortable furniture.

Image courtesy N.W. Ayer Advertising Agency Records, Archive Center, National Museum of American History, Behring Center, Smithsonian Institution

Third, increasing pay and benefits to a “living wage” standard meant that the young men and women joining the military felt that they could afford to have a spouse and even children while in the service. Whereas the military had been heavily composed of “singles,” we now regularly talk about “total force families.”

Fourth, the military had to fully embrace the concept of large-scale paid commercial advertising, moving from public service announcement-style radio ads preceding the 5:30 a.m. farm reports to mass-market TV campaigns, as Beth Bailey details in “The Army in the Marketplace: Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force.” Recruits suddenly became the “market” and the Army the “product” that required significant financial outlays to “sell.”

Fifth, that “product” did improve—after a rough first decade, which had then-Army Brig. Gen. Colin Powell likening the military to a “tumbledown shack with a BMW in the driveway.” The AVF adapted and overcame difficulties in cooperation between the service branches in its first test, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, a joint operation. And it performed brilliantly in the Persian Gulf War, displaying “in one hundred hours the amazing effectiveness of highly trained, high quality soldiers operating with high tech equipment under highly competent leadership,” in the words of one U.S, Army War College professor. By the time the nation was embarking on its second decade of the post-9/11 “forever wars,” individual American men and women were still volunteering to join and serve their country, despite the very real risks to life and limb.

Much more can and ought to be said about the strength and health of the AVF as it embarks on its next half century, and the worrisome challenges that it is facing both at home and from abroad. But we can surely celebrate the enormous improvement of the AVF since the 1970s. We must celebrate it for doing more with less—for having defended America for the past fifty years throughout an uptick in the pace of missions with fewer and fewer servicepeople. And we can and must further celebrate the families of the nation that have given their sons and daughters to this task.

When Dwight Elliott Stone reluctantly answered his draft summons in 1973, he was not really interested in serving the nation. But once out of the service and established in a civilian career, he was thankful for that service and for the training and characteristics he had learned through it. His eldest son even volunteered to serve before going off to college. Stone’s story proves that serving in the AVF is not simply an economic choice, but remains a choice of citizenship as well, one that must be explained and cultivated with every succeeding generation.

Rebecca Burgess is senior editor at American Purpose, a visiting fellow at Independent Women’s Forum, a consultant for the George W. Bush Presidential Institute’s Veterans and Military Families program, and a 2021 FDD National Security Fellow.

Image: Soldiers assigned to the 3d U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard), participate in the National Memorial Day Parade in Washington D.C., May 29, 2023. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Josue Patricio)

americanpurpose.com · by Rebecca Burgess · July 26, 2023

11.  2023 Irregular Warfare Center Book Recommendations

2023 IWC Book Recommendations

Provided by:

Kevin D. Stringer, PH.D. - Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Madison Urban - IWC Analyst

Book Recommendations

irregularwarfarecenter.org

Provided by:

Kevin D. Stringer, PH.D. - Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired

Madison Urban - IWC Analyst

In the spirit of the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s reading list and the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program, the leadership of the Irregular Warfare Center offers its irregular warfare reading recommendations for 2023. A host of scholars and practitioners have written innumerable books about irregular warfare (IW) and its constituent historical, cultural, economic, tactical, and diplomatic components. Like many areas of human endeavor that are more art than science, the practitioner or researcher faces the challenge of searching through a vast literature reservoir in the quest for irregular warfare knowledge and enlightenment. This IWC Insights paper provides ten selected titles that support the exploration of the IW sphere and establish a cornerstone for dialogue on the nexus of IW and great power competition. While the following recommendations are by no means a comprehensive or conclusive list, they represent a medley of foundational IW texts, both historical and directional. Each title highlights a certain aspect of IW that promotes further research, challenges assumptions, or instigates debate about the dynamic nature of conflict and the best means for the United States to conduct irregular operations. Each selection has a short overview of the content plus a brief explanation why it is on the list. Where possible, substantive reviews for each book are cited in the endnotes.

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon above.

1. Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s Special Operations Executive

Author: A.R.B. Linderman

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016

In this slim and well-written volume, A.R.B. Linderman traces the development of British Special Operations Executive (SOE) organization and doctrine by following the biography of Major General Colin Gubbins, the founder of SOE and an understudied figure in the history of modern irregular warfare. The doctrine, training structure, and tactics developed and utilized by SOE were foundational for the development of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor to the modern Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Army Special Forces. Linderman, through the lens of Gubbins—his writings, public documents, and career experiences—illustrates the establishment and growth of the SOE. Gubbins in fact, presents an excellent example of an officer whose unconventional career path provided him the foundational knowledge needed for leading the SOE effectively. His career history importantly highlights key conflicts that are often overlooked by modern scholars in the study of IW, including the Irish War of Independence and tribal wars in British India during the 1920s, which were both formative to Gubbins’ development as the leader of a pioneering irregular warfare organization.[1]

The following three titles constitute the Stejskal Trilogy, whose author James Stejskal served with the U.S. Army Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. These concise volumes contribute individually to the study and practice of irregular warfare in the areas of advising irregulars and proxies, unconventional warfare, and resistance. The recommended reading sequence would be in historical chronological order.

2. Masters of Mayhem: Lawrence of Arabia and the British Military Mission to the Hejaz

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2018

While there have been many books written about T.E. Lawrence’s actions in the Middle East during World War I, in Masters of Mayhem, James Stejskal provides a fresh perspective on the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the Great War. This concise work details the evolution of an early example of a combined special operations campaign in the modern era. Taking the lessons of the history of T.E. Lawrence and General Edmund Allenby’s Palestinian operations, Stejskal concludes “War is more than the science and art of disposing and maneuvering forces in combat. It consists of continuous innovation, adaptation and modification of techniques, tactics, and procedures. It is a process of merging new with old. What works is kept, what doesn’t is disposed of.” Through the storytelling of this IW effort, this short history highlights the importance of an agile irregular warfare campaign plan that allows for the melding of innovative tactics with new technology, including armored cars and aircraft, while never wavering from the overall goal of the campaign. The book also provides essential insights for modern advisors tasked with working with proxies and irregulars. For a perceptive and concise overview of this pioneering British military mission and its irregular contributions, it’s a must-read for all students of irregular conflict.

3. No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2021

No Moon as Witness is a brief history and overview of the development and deployment of British SOE and American OSS during World War II (WWII). It serves as a primer for those who want to later read the more detailed histories of the SOE and OSS by M.R.D. Foot and others. While both the British and the Americans had fought in guerrilla wars before WWII, the military institutional memory was weak and the capability to conduct irregular war was largely invented as the war went on. Through the detailing of early assessment and training processes, descriptions of the research and development efforts that produced new innovations, and the storytelling of various operations, this work provides a short, easy-to-read introduction to the origins of the United Kingdom and United States’ efforts to develop intelligence and military irregular warfare capabilities in a great power war.[2]

4. Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990

Author: James Stejskal

Havertown: Casemate, 2017

With the current Russo-Ukraine War ongoing and the threat of further Russian aggression possible on the Eastern Front, James Stejskal’s book chronicles the timely history of a little-known special forces unit that applied the concepts of stay-behind forces, clandestine operations, and intelligence tradecraft against the Soviet Union in its heyday. The Special Forces Detachment-Berlin was one of the first units tasked with urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and intelligence operations in the event of war in Europe. Interestedly, the formation would later evolve to assume early counterterrorism functions now centralized with Joint Special Operations Command. The book tracks the evolution of the tactics, personnel, foreign partnerships, and mission set across four decades of service. It highlights the importance of developing cultural expertise and language proficiency as well as the benefits of developing training relationships with other countries and units.[3] An added value is that the author is a veteran of the unit, which provides a unique historical perspective.

5. Non-State Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias

Author: Stephen Biddle

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021

Current deliberations of national security strategy encourage a shift away from irregular warfare with non-state actors to great power competition with state actors. However, in Non-State Warfare, Stephen Biddle laments that “There is a widespread assumption that state and nonstate warfare are profoundly different phenomena,” when in fact they are not.

Relying on his years as a scholar and strategist, he articulates a continuum of operations that both state and non-state actors employ, often in ways that mimic one another. In challenging irregular warfare assumptions, Biddle helps to articulate a vision for how the American experience and the lessons learned fighting non-state actors in the Middle East can be best understood and properly adapted to great power competition. Amid dramatic pronouncements and calls for drastic changes, Biddle provides a thoughtful, historically grounded approach that emphasizes points of continuity and pushes against siloing the study of conflicts based on the opponent’s status as a state or non-state actor.[4] In fact, he rightly rejects the “widespread assumption that conventional and irregular warfare constitute autonomous, exclusive categories of distinct military conduct,” and challenges the U.S. Department of Defense to think differently and address warfare as a unified whole.

6. The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder

Author: Sean McFate

New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2019

Sean McFate is a veteran of the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division and is a former private military contractor who now serves as a professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Written from a practitioner-scholar perspective, his book is framed by the diagnosis that the West loses wars because “we do not know what war is, and if we do not understand it, then we cannot win it.” Seeing this deficit, coupled with idealistic projections about future conflicts that are grounded in the wisdom of conventional war, McFate provides ten rules to describe today’s strategic environment which he argues should provide the basis for realistic planning. McFate’s articulation of the future of warfare confronts assumptions and is primarily descriptive, aimed at outlining the contours of warfare without necessarily prescribing specific solutions. He gives a nod to a challenge his book raises: the temptation for democracies “to sacrifice their values in the name of victory” in light of the complexities of conflict that intentionally subvert the ethics and norms the West promotes. This provocative book is accessible and written to engage a variety of readers–a must-read for both policymakers and practitioners.[5]

7. The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir

Author: Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel

Santa Monica: Rand, 2020

Lieutenant General (LTG), Retired Charles Cleveland’s analytic memoir is unique among biographies and reports alike. Taking his years of direct experience campaigning in Latin America and commanding the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, LTG (R) Cleveland exposes and diagnoses the United States’ failure to achieve strategic victories in irregular conflicts. He describes his bibliographic memoir as “a story of the waxing and waning of interest and support for IW and the vulnerability that this lack of commitment created. It is a story of strategic successes and failures that have their root, at least in part, in the strengths and weaknesses of that IW capability. It is a story of what the American way of irregular war might look like and how that would enable us to contest the threats that we face today.” Each chapter follows his deployments in Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, includes six observations from his career, and concludes with recommendations for how the United States should develop IW capability. With decades of experience in IW campaigning, supported by credible research sources, LTG (R) Cleveland provides critical insights into the United States’ failures with a practitioner’s perspective on how to increase its IW capability.[6]

8. The Coming Anarchy

Author: Robert Kaplan

New York: Random House, 2000

Written after the fall of the Soviet Union and amid rosy predictions of peace, democracy, prosperity, and Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history,” Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy” cautions against complacency in peacetime or growing overly optimistic about a peaceful future. This work is a collection of long-form articles and essays that predict a complex world full of socio-political challenges driven by crime, disease, tribalism, limited wars, and economic and resource rivalries. After observing the wars in the Balkans, the enduring autocracies in the post-Soviet space, and deep poverty and tribalism in the developing world, Kaplan calls for a realist approach to foreign policy. Like other books on this list, he warns about an overturning of democratic norms, a world where nation-states do not dominate, and conflicts over natural resources. This book remains a valuable reference for IW researchers and practitioners.[7]

9. The Sling and the Stone

Author: T.X. Hammes

St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2006

In this foundational IW book, T.X. Hammes argues that the U.S. and its allies are unprepared for fourth-generation warfare (4GW). Written in the early years of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hammes paints a picture of innovative, low-tech, human-centric warfare that is the antithesis to the overwhelming conventional, high-tech military force upon which the U.S. military’s success is based. While a book about the impact of insurgent forces defeating conventional military capabilities may appear irrelevant as the Department of Defense’s reorients to state-on-state conflict, the likelihood of small, messy, and overwhelmingly irregular conflicts is not diminishing. Furthermore, Hammes provides a framework for understanding the social, economic, and political factors that shape the evolution of warfare and illuminates the factors that contributed to prior strategic shifts. Analyzing why conventional force has failed in the past, Hammes offers an enduring perspective with important lessons for navigating future geopolitical conflict.

10. The Transformation of War

Author: Martin van Creveld

New York: The Free Press, 1991

Written by one of the foremost Israeli military historians and strategists in 1991, The Transformation of War challenges the traditional Clausewitzian view of war. van Creveld examines the nature of future conflict and the changes in the fundamental questions that undergird war. He argues that traditional answers to these questions are shaped by a world that is fading away or no longer exists, and that when the presumptive answers are wrong, strategies and planning efforts fail. At a macro level, he suggests that the assumption that nation-states fight is an anachronism, and that ethnic and religious tensions will dominate world politics and warfare. He also argues that military tactics will change given this new world. In essence, van Creveld offers “a non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war, while…trying to look into its future.” In light of these projections, van Creveld challenges his readers to resist complacency, adjust expectations, and to innovate to prepare for the transformation of war.

Footnotes

[1] Substantive Review: Simon Anglim, review of Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s Special Operations Executive, by A.R.B. Linderman, British Journal for Military History 2 no. 3 (2016): 122-123, https://bjmh.gold.ac.uk/article/view/670/792.

[2] Substantive Review: John Friberg, review of No Moon as Witness: Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II, byJames Stejskal, SOF News, July 15, 2021, https://sof.news/books/no-moon-as-witness/.

[3] Substantive Reviews: David Oakley, review of Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990, by James Stejskal, Parameters 51 no. 3, (2021) 147-148, doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3085; James Crabtree, review of Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956-1990, by James Stejskal, Army University Press, August 7, 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Reviews/August-2020/Book-Review-002/.

[4] Substantive Reviews: Andrew Maher, review of Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerrillas, Warlords, and Militias, by Stephen Biddle, Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies 3, no. 2 (2021): 278-282, https://defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/AJDSS/documents/volume3-number2/review-nonstate-warfare.pdf; Lionel Beehner, review of Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias by Stephen Biddle, Stephen, Political Science Quarterly 137 (2022): 189-192, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/polq.13283.

[5] Substantive Reviews: Albert Palazzo, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Australian Army Research Centre, November 18, 2020, https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/land-power-forum/book-review-new-rules-war-victory-age-durable-disorder; Reed Bonadonna, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Carnegie Council for Ethics & International Affairs, December 3, 2019, https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2019/the-new-rules-of-war-victory-in-the-age-of-durable-disorder/; Jared Helle, review of The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, by Sean McFate, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 20 no. 3 (2021): 121-125, https://jmss.org/article/view/72877/54983.

[6] Substantive Reviews: Dave Maxwell, review of The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir, by Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel, Small Wars Journal, July 30, 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/american-way-irregular-war-ltg-charles-cleveland-and-daniel-egel; Lt. Col. Gregory Banner, review of The American Way of Irregular War: An Analytical Memoir, by Charles Cleveland & Daniel Egel, Association of the United States Army, April 21, 2021, https://www.ausa.org/articles/may-2021-book-reviews.

[7] Substantive Review: Richard Bernstein, “‘The Coming Anarchy’: Dashing Hopes of Global Harmony,” New York Times, February 23, 2000, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/books/022300kaplan-book-review.html.

irregularwarfarecenter.org

12.  The War That Defied Expectations

Excerpts:

The war in Ukraine has been a learning experience for the Ukrainian military, which has had to study how to operate new weapons systems in rapid order. It has, to a lesser extent, also been a learning experience for Russia, which is figuring out how best to fortify its positions. But it should be a learning experience for defense analysts as well. The conflict shows that many variables determine whether complex military systems function properly, and that the odds of failure are very high. The invasion, in other words, indicates that states need more than good weapons for their operations to have a chance of succeeding. Experts must therefore think twice before predicting that a war will be fast, or that one state will have an overwhelming advantage.

This lesson applies to almost any conflict. But it is especially important as analysts ponder a war between China and the United States over Taiwan—easily the most concerning potential global conflict. A war in the Pacific involving the two powers might seem like it would end relatively quickly, with either a successful Chinese seizure of Taiwan or a devastating rebuff. But when looking at how complex the operations would be and accounting for human variables, it become clear that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely be protracted. For the Chinese, attacking Taiwan would mean attempting, with no experience whatsoever, a major air-sea campaign and even a historically large amphibious assault—arguably war’s most difficult operation. They would do so in the face of some of the most advanced defensive systems in the world and against a population that, as with the Ukrainians, would be galvanized by a desire to save its country. It would be so difficult, in fact, that the Chinese might very well opt for an extended air-sea blockade around the island.

Whether it went for a blockade or an outright invasion, the fighting then would likely extend over large amounts of the Pacific Ocean, and the logistical challenges would be immense on all sides. The war would be as difficult for Washington as it would be for Beijing. The United States would have some of the longest supply lines in the world, stretching across the entire Pacific Ocean, making them difficult to protect. American forces would have to operate relatively closely to China’s mainland, making U.S. troops vulnerable to attack. And the United States would be battling against an enemy that could not be conquered and that has the industrial and technological resources to keep up a fight for years and years.

A U.S.-Chinese war, then, would not be fast or straightforward. It would not be decided by a battle here or a battle there, or by which country has the fanciest weapons. Instead, it would be decided by the ability of each side to operate complex military systems and staff its forces with well-trained and motivated personnel—potentially for a very long time. Any state contemplating military action in the region should realize these facts, and then think twice before launching a conflict.

The War That Defied Expectations

What Ukraine Revealed About Military Power

By Phillips O’Brien

July 27, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Phillips O’Brien · July 27, 2023

The Russian military was fast. So fast, analysts said, that the Ukrainian military stood little chance of resisting it in a conventional war. Moscow, after all, had spent billions of dollars upgrading the armed forces’ weapons and systems, reorganizing their structure, and developing new attack plans. The Russian military had then proved its worth by winning battles in small states, including during its invasion of Georgia and its air campaign in Syria. Experts believed that if Ukraine was attacked by Russia, Russia would quickly overwhelm Ukraine’s air defenses and launch a sweeping ground campaign that would rapidly envelop Kyiv. They thought that Russia would shatter Ukraine’s supply lines and isolate most of the country’s forces. Ukraine’s inability to resist this onslaught appeared so obvious that some analysts suggested Kyiv might not be worth arming for a standard interstate war. As Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told the British Parliament in early February 2022, Ukraine could not hold off Russia even if it were given “very capable” Western weapons. “If they get into a conventional fight with the Russian military,” Lee argued, “they are not going to win.”

Eighteen months later, it is clear that these expectations were wildly off the mark. Ukraine fought back with determination and smarts against Russia, halting Moscow’s advances and then driving Russian troops back from roughly half of the territory they seized in the last year and a half. As a result, Ukraine’s military looks far more powerful and Russia’s looks far weaker than virtually everyone expected.

In fact, the entire shape of the war is very different from what experts imagined. Rather than the fast-moving conflict led by phalanxes of armored vehicles, supported by Russia’s advanced piloted aircraft, that the analytical community imagined, the invasion was chaotic and slow. There has never been a quick armored breakthrough by the Russians and only one by the Ukrainians—last September’s surprise advance in the province of Kharkiv. Instead, almost all of the war’s gains have come gradually and at great expense. The conflict has been defined not by fighter jets and tanks but by artillery, drones, and even World War I–style trenches.

Ukraine’s successes and Russia’s losses have prompted experts to intensely reevaluate both countries’ military prowess. But given the unexpected shape of the conflict, military analysts must also reconsider how they analyze warfare in general. Defense experts tend to think of conflicts in terms of weapons and plans, yet the invasion of Ukraine suggests that armed power is as much about a military’s structure, morale, and industrial base as it is about armaments and blueprints. Russia, for instance, fell down not because it lacked sophisticated weapons but because it could not properly operate its systems. The country faltered because its military logistics—the process by which an armed force equips itself with the materiel needed to conduct attacks—were poor, and because its forces have low levels of motivation.

These lessons are important for thinking about the future of the Russian-Ukrainian war. But they are also critical for thinking about other conflicts, including the one that might erupt between China and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Many military analysts have tried to game out such a war by looking at the weapons and strategies that China, Taiwan, and the United States deploy. But if Ukraine is any guide, a battle over the region would have as much to do with logistics and people as with guns and plans. And these factors suggest that a U.S.-Chinese war would be neither decisive nor quick. It would, more likely, be a global catastrophe even greater than what is happening in Ukraine.

SYSTEMS AND SHOCKS

One of the main reasons experts believed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine would be fast is that they focused mostly on what would happen when the Russian and Ukrainian armies exchanged fire on the battlefield. In doing so, they put a huge emphasis on the weapons that each side had at its disposal—an area where Russia had a clear advantage. Moscow’s firepower exceeded Kyiv’s in quantity and, before the conflict began, in quality. The Russian military had world-leading electronic warfare capabilities, modern aircraft, and advanced armored vehicles: all weapons considered much more capable than most anything the Ukrainians possessed. As the military analysts Michael Kofman and Jeffrey Edmonds wrote in Foreign Affairs, just days before the start of the full-scale invasion, Russia would attack Ukraine with hundreds of bombers, masses of missiles, and other systems that would provide Russian forces with “overwhelming firepower.” Russia, they said, “would have the advantage along every axis of attack.”

Indeed, some analysts indicated that Russia’s military was a near-peer to that of the United States. Particularly after Russia’s success in Syria and in Ukraine’s east in the years after it annexed Crimea in 2014, Russian troops were thought capable of undertaking operations that were similar to the ones American forces had carried out. The U.S. government itself repeatedly described Russia’s military as a near peer and close competitor to its armed forces.

But rosy assessments assumed that Moscow was honest about the quality of its weapons and that Russia would operate its systems efficiently. Neither premise proved true. Rather than being in top shape, many of Russia’s weapons systems were poorly maintained or stripped down by corruption. According to Ukrainian observers, for example, Russia may have sold off the reactive armor that is vital to protecting many military vehicles, making it far easier for Ukrainians to destroy its enemy’s tanks. The country also did not do enough to train its troops in proper tank warfare.

A U.S.-Chinese war would be neither decisive nor quick.

Russia has made mistakes in almost every military domain. But it might have been in its inability to operate advanced systems where it failed most. For instance, Moscow has done a particularly bad job of using airpower. Russia’s aircraft perform decently as individual pieces of equipment, and in theory they should have been capable of establishing air superiority and helping Russian ground troops advance. Its commanders could have done what the U.S. Air Force does and begun their campaign by targeting its adversary’s antiaircraft systems. As the U.S. Air Force would have, Russia could then have gone about enforcing control over the area of battle by flying missions that destroyed, disrupted, or otherwise harassed enemy units.

The Russian air force has struggled to do any of this. It could not operate its planes as part of a complex system by using various military capabilities to quickly locate, prioritize, and then attack Ukrainian antiaircraft systems. As a result, it did not eliminate Ukraine’s defenses. In fact, the Russians have done such a bad job of protecting their aircraft or operating mutually supportive systems that most of the time their planes fly far back from the frontline in order to stay far away from Ukrainian defense rockets. As a result, with a few rare exceptions, Ukrainian forces behind the frontlines have been able to move freely on open roads in broad daylight.

It makes sense that analysts failed to predict Russia’s aerial shortcomings, as well as many of the country’s other military failures; it is hard to say how forces will perform until they are put to use. But defense scholars could have done a much better job. Military analysts like to say that amateurs discuss tactics whereas experts discuss logistics, but compared to the amount of time spent chronicling the quantities of Russian airpower and armor, there was little talk among experts about whether Russia could properly supply, maintain, and regenerate these forces in war. In fact, some detailed reports that explored how a Russian invasion of Ukraine might progress almost entirely neglected to consider logistics. Instead of discussing how far and to what extent Russian supplies could be transported and maintained in the face of Ukrainian fire, experts seemed content to study what Russian systems could do in battle.

Ukraine’s talents have defied expert predictions.

Analysts also spent little time considering how each side would regenerate lost resources. It has proved to be a critical question, particularly when it comes to ammunition. Both Russia and Ukraine have used far more ammunition than reports predicted, and so both have been left trying to source bullets, shells, and rockets from outside states. Russia, for instance, has turned to Iran and North Korea for supplies. Ukraine, meanwhile, has become reliant on NATO countries. As of April 2023, the United States alone had shipped 1.5 million 155-millimeter shells to Ukraine, prompting Washington to begin increasing its own military production. The European Union has also drawn down its stockpiles, and on July 7, it announced plans to invest over $500 million in ammunition manufacturing. But for now, no outside party can sate Kyiv’s or Moscow’s appetites.

Ammunition constraints are not unique to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In virtually every large interstate war, the demand for bullets, rockets, and shells vastly outstrips prewar estimates, and countries run low after, at most, a few months. During World War I, for example, all the combatants found themselves facing an acute shell crisis by the end of 1914 as artillery systems consumed much more ammunition than prewar analysts expected and as soldiers struggled to hit targets inside trenches. Yet despite this history, analysts did not account for stockpiles and production when making predictions about Russia’s invasion. Moscow, they assumed, would win so quickly that ammunition levels would not matter.

Military analysts also neglected to account for the broader industrial, technological, and economic strength of the warring parties. They didn’t, for instance, take note of the fact that Ukraine has traditionally been one of Europe’s biggest weapons producers, or that—despite its size—Russia’s economic and technological base is not one of a major power. (Russia’s economy is smaller than Canada’s.) Conventional interstate wars have never just been tests of militaries; they also always involve entire economies. Experts, then, could have at least acknowledged that Russia was not economically powerful and better worked that fact into their calculations.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

The invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that states need good logistics and strong economies if they want to defeat large adversaries. But to win a major war, those two factors are not enough. States also need their militaries to be staffed by highly motivated and well-trained soldiers. And Ukrainian troops have repeatedly proved that they are far more determined and skilled than their Russian opponents.

As with the rest of the war, Ukraine’s talents have defied expert predictions. Even though Ukraine was the country being invaded, many analysts believed that the Ukrainian people would be divided and that Ukrainian resistance would be compromised from the start. Plenty of Ukrainians, experts argued, were pro-Russian, because they were educated in the Russian language, came from ethnically Russian families, had many personal contacts in Russia, or some combination thereof. Some experts even thought that these connections meant that Ukrainians would struggle to mount an insurgency against Moscow. (It is easier to conduct an insurgency than to win an interstate war.) In a February 2022 article for The Week, for example, Lyle Goldstein, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, argued that because “the Russian and Ukrainian cultures are rather similar,” any Ukrainian rebellion would struggle to succeed. Observers seemed especially skeptical that Ukrainians in the country’s east would fight hard—particularly once Russia’s military had shocked them into submission. By contrast, few analysts argued that Russia’s military lacked the morale needed to carry out a full-scale invasion. In fact, they rarely probed the motivation of the average Russian soldier.

It is difficult to say exactly how much Ukrainian skill and high morale—and Russian disenchantment—has shaped the battlefield. But these factors have clearly made a difference. Motivated Ukrainians quickly learned how to use a vast array of newer, NATO-standard equipment and then integrated it into their militaries, despite the fact that they had little or no previous experience with such weapons. Ukrainian determination has also allowed the country’s military to trust and frequently empower its forces. Moscow, by contrast, has been stuck with a rigid, dictatorial method of military control, making its units far less flexible. Its troops also tend to lack initiative and keep their heads down.

High morale is not enough to win the war for Ukraine, and low morale will not lose it for Russia; weapons do matter. When determined Ukrainians attempted to break through Russian defenses in mid-June, their tanks and other vehicles proved vulnerable to a range of Russian systems—including mines, handheld air-defense systems, artillery, and unmanned aerial vehicles. As a result, after weeks of trying, the Ukrainians stopped these direct vehicle-led assaults.

But the country’s superior talent and dedication is allowing it to degrade Russia’s fighting strength. The Ukrainian armed forces, for instance, have figured out how to integrate drones, artillery, and rocket systems so they can strike Russian military instillations. To identify a target, Ukraine sends out scouting drones or conducts an infantry assault that triggers Russian artillery systems and therefore expose their positions. Ukrainian analysts then determine whether the Russian instillation is worth hitting, and if so, what system they should use to attack it. This process would be difficult under the best of circumstances, and Ukrainians must execute it while under heavy fire. But despite the complexities and obstacles, they have destroyed countless Russian artillery launchers, ammunition depots, and command posts—damage that could enable Ukraine to advance later in the summer. Clearly, Ukrainians’ training, dedication, and talent is one of the reasons Kyiv retains the advantage.

REALITY CHECK

The war in Ukraine has been a learning experience for the Ukrainian military, which has had to study how to operate new weapons systems in rapid order. It has, to a lesser extent, also been a learning experience for Russia, which is figuring out how best to fortify its positions. But it should be a learning experience for defense analysts as well. The conflict shows that many variables determine whether complex military systems function properly, and that the odds of failure are very high. The invasion, in other words, indicates that states need more than good weapons for their operations to have a chance of succeeding. Experts must therefore think twice before predicting that a war will be fast, or that one state will have an overwhelming advantage.

This lesson applies to almost any conflict. But it is especially important as analysts ponder a war between China and the United States over Taiwan—easily the most concerning potential global conflict. A war in the Pacific involving the two powers might seem like it would end relatively quickly, with either a successful Chinese seizure of Taiwan or a devastating rebuff. But when looking at how complex the operations would be and accounting for human variables, it become clear that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would likely be protracted. For the Chinese, attacking Taiwan would mean attempting, with no experience whatsoever, a major air-sea campaign and even a historically large amphibious assault—arguably war’s most difficult operation. They would do so in the face of some of the most advanced defensive systems in the world and against a population that, as with the Ukrainians, would be galvanized by a desire to save its country. It would be so difficult, in fact, that the Chinese might very well opt for an extended air-sea blockade around the island.

Whether it went for a blockade or an outright invasion, the fighting then would likely extend over large amounts of the Pacific Ocean, and the logistical challenges would be immense on all sides. The war would be as difficult for Washington as it would be for Beijing. The United States would have some of the longest supply lines in the world, stretching across the entire Pacific Ocean, making them difficult to protect. American forces would have to operate relatively closely to China’s mainland, making U.S. troops vulnerable to attack. And the United States would be battling against an enemy that could not be conquered and that has the industrial and technological resources to keep up a fight for years and years.

A U.S.-Chinese war, then, would not be fast or straightforward. It would not be decided by a battle here or a battle there, or by which country has the fanciest weapons. Instead, it would be decided by the ability of each side to operate complex military systems and staff its forces with well-trained and motivated personnel—potentially for a very long time. Any state contemplating military action in the region should realize these facts, and then think twice before launching a conflict.

PHILLIPS O’BRIEN is Chair of Strategic Studies and Head of the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews.

Foreign Affairs · by Phillips O’Brien · July 27, 2023

​13. China suspected of building aircraft carrier base in Cambodia

China suspected of building aircraft carrier base in Cambodia

Satellite images of Ream Naval Base show new pier capable of accommodating one of China’s carriers

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 27, 2023

China may have built its second overseas military facility, this one in Cambodia, centered on a pier that can host one of its aircraft carriers, enabling power projection and helping to resolve its “Malacca Dilemma.”

This month, Nikkei reported that China had made significant progress on building a naval base in Cambodia and was close to completing a pier that could berth an aircraft carrier. That report said that satellite images taken by BlackSky, a US commercial imagery company monitoring the construction at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, shows a nearly complete pier that closely resembles China’s pier at its only acknowledged overseas base in Djibouti.

In April, Asia Times reported China’s construction of an air defense center and expanded radar system near Ream Naval Base. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen allocated 157 hectares for the project in September 2022, and an additional 30 hectares were earmarked for a naval radar system.

A Cambodian Defense Ministry official said there would be no Chinese funding, support, or presence in those facilities amid persistent allegations that Ream Naval Base is being secretly developed as China’s surveillance hub for the South China Sea and its first foreign military base in the Indo-Pacific region.

Previously, Asia Times reported in January 2022 on China’s dredging projects at Ream Naval Base to enable the docking of larger vessels, with Cambodian officials confirming that China had funded the project and other infrastructure construction at the facility. China’s dredging project represents a significant upgrade as, at the time, the base’s shallow waters only allowed it to host smaller patrol vessels and not substantial warships.

Nikkei’s new report says the first signs of the Ream pier construction were reported in July 2022, with China making rapid progress. The source says that the piers at Ream and Djibouti both have a 335-meter section could be used to berth an aircraft carrier.

Nikkei notes that in a confrontation, the US could bomb Chinese military facilities in the South China Sea, but attacking Ream would mean bombing Cambodia. Despite that, the source cites a Chinese Embassy official in the US that Cambodia’s constitution bans foreign military bases on its territory and that construction at Ream strengthens Cambodia’s capacity.

Myanmar activity

China may have been behind similar projects in Myanmar, enabling it to secure a foothold in the Andaman Sea to bypass its long-running strategic conundrum wherein its over-dependence on the Malacca Strait makes it vulnerable to a naval blockade by the US and its allies.

In April, Asia Times reported on renewed construction activities on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island, with satellite imagery showing a freshly lengthened 2,300-meter runway and signs of increased activity in recent months, such as the construction of hangars and a radio station.

Since 2014, there have been reports of Chinese signal intelligence (SIGINT) facilities in the Andaman Sea, including at Manaung, Hainggyi, Zadetkyi, and the Coco Islands, while Chinese technicians have worked on radar stations and naval bases near Yangon, Moulmein and Mergui.

From Ream, China could counter US naval presence in the Malacca Strait chokepoint, secure its emerging interests in the Gulf of Thailand, and establish a southern flank in the South China Sea.

Conversely, Cambodia depends on China as an economic lifeline and a possible security insurance against its larger and militarily stronger neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam.

Also, China’s SIGINT facility on Myanmar’s Great Coco Island may serve as a forward defensive position for Kyaukpyu Port, the maritime terminus of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which ends south of China’s Yunnan province.

It may also give China an advantage against the Indian Navy, as Myanmar can conduct surveillance flights from Great Coco Island to monitor Indian operations from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

China could then bargain with Myanmar to share intelligence from those flights in exchange for economic and political support, which the latter badly needs, embroiled in an ongoing civil war and dealing with Western sanctions.

However, China’s moves to establish a foothold near the Malacca Strait, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean are far from a done deal, as unreliable relationships, unstable host countries, and limited near-term naval power in the Indian Ocean have prevented China from establishing a dependable network of naval bases to secure its sea lanes of communication in the event of a military conflict.

Changes in Cambodian policy

Further, Cambodia may not be China’s “yes man,” contrary to its previous behavior and expectations.

In a March article in Fulcrum, Melinda Martinus and Chhay Lim report that Hun Sen’s January 2022 visit to Myanmar was viewed as Cambodia acting on the behest of China, with the July 2022 execution of pro-democracy activists by Myanmar’s junta marking a turning point for Cambodia, leading it to re-engage with ASEAN counterparts and disinvite the junta from ASEAN meetings during its chairmanship.

Martinus and Lim also note that Cambodia has condemned Russia’s February 2022 Invasion of Ukraine and provided humanitarian assistance to the latter. They note that Cambodia’s moves were a surprise, as it was expected to follow China’s position of refusing to condemn Russia for its actions and considering its cordial relations with the latter.

Martinus and Lim also say that during its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Cambodia made notable efforts to steer itself away from China’s direct influence, especially when doing so is perceived to be relatively cost-free.

The writers say Cambodia is diversifying its relationships to lessen its dependence on China. They report that Western approval of its condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was seen as a preparatory move for the incoming Hun Manet cabinet, which may reset ties with the West.

In addition, they noted that Cambodia signed a free-trade agreement with South Korea last year, which could lessen economic over-dependence on China.

In the case of Myanmar, Sudha Ramachandran wrote last month in an article for the Jamestown Foundation that China’s decision to back the Myanmar junta is fraught with risk, as resistance groups target Chinese nationals and projects.

Ramachandran cites that of the 7,800 recorded nationwide clashes since the February 2021 coup, 300 occurred in areas where major Chinese projects are located, with 100 happening in 19 townships where China’s oil and natural-gas pipelines run.

He also says that Myanmar’s military may not be the formidable fighting force it is believed to be, as it is much smaller than previously thought. He notes that Beijing’s pumping the junta with weapons can only serve to deepen anti-China animosity by resistance groups, putting Chinese projects and nationals in Myanmar at greater risk.

Ramachandran also states that while Myanmar’s civil war is at a stalemate and the junta has a tenuous grip on power, the military’s hold on the territory is expected to decline.

Related

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · July 27, 2023

14. The Dictator Myth That Refuses to Die

Except for north Korea (yet). But if it does it will really fall apart.

Excerpt:

Eventually, though, dictatorships tend to fall apart. And when they collapse, they really collapse. Elections in democracies change governments, not regimes. Personalist dictatorships, by contrast, often implode. When Qaddafi was killed, Libya disintegrated. He had deliberately designed the political system to function only with him at its center. The same could be true of Putin’s Russia. When he is toppled or dies, the country won’t have a smooth, peaceful transition.

The often-disastrous demise of autocrats creates a negative feedback loop. Nearly seven in 10 leaders of personalist dictatorships end up jailed, exiled, or killed once they lose power. While in power, many despots are aware of this grim fact, and so they use violence to stay in power, often growing more extreme as they lurch toward their downfall. The effect can hardly be called “stability,” even if the same person occupies the palace for decades.

For anyone who still clings to the illusion that dictatorships are likely to be prosperous, strategically wise, or internally stable, I propose a simple test. Imagine that someone wrote down the names of all the countries in the world on little slips of paper and then separated them into two hats: one for democracy, one for dictatorships. You would select one of the two hats, draw a slip of paper from it, look at the name, and then spend the rest of your life living in that country. Who knows, maybe you’d get lucky and end up in an authoritarian regime that seems stable and is producing steady growth. But I know which hat I would choose. And even if you fantasize about finding the unicorn that is a benevolent strongman, I suspect you do too.

The Dictator Myth That Refuses to Die

Authoritarians would have you think that they can do certain things better than their counterparts who have to deal with checks, balances, and public opinion. Don’t believe it.

By Brian Klaas

The Atlantic · by Brian Klaas · July 26, 2023

Last week, at a Fox News town hall (where else?), former President Donald Trump called China’s despot, Xi Jinping, a “brilliant” guy who “runs 1.4 billion people with an iron fist.” Lest anyone doubt his admiration, Trump added that Xi is “smart, brilliant, everything perfect. There’s nobody in Hollywood like this guy.”

Trump is not alone. Many in the United States and around the globe see the allure of a dictator who gets things done and makes the trains run on time, no matter the rules or laws that stand in the way. According to repeated polling, roughly one in four Americans agrees with the statement that a “strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with Congress and elections” is desirable. A much higher proportion of citizens agrees with that sentiment elsewhere, including in some of the most populous democracies: 55 percent of Indians, 52 percent of Indonesians, 38 percent of Nigerians, and 31 percent of Japanese.

This grass-is-greener view of authoritarian rule tends to emerge most often where governments are failing to meet popular expectations. When democracy delivers, dictatorship doesn’t seem like a rosy alternative. Only 6 percent of Germans and 9 percent of Swedes are seduced by strongmen.

Brian Klaas: Democracy has a customer-service problem

Admiration for autocracy is built on a pernicious lie that I call the “myth of benevolent dictatorship.” The myth is built on three flimsy pillars: first, that dictators produce stronger economic growth than their democratic counterparts; second, that dictators, unswayed by volatile public opinion, are strategic long-term thinkers; and third, that dictators bring stability, whereas divided democracies produce chaos.

Two decades ago, the United States and its Western allies became embroiled in Iraq and later blundered into the financial crisis, leading think tanks to begin praising the “Beijing Consensus,” or the “China Model,” as an alternative to liberal democracy. Critiques of democracy surged in popularity in the era of Trump and Brexit. In the United States, intellectual publications ran articles arguing that the problem was too much democracy. In 2018, The Times of London published a column titled “Our Timid Leaders Can Learn From Strongmen.” China’s state media, capitalizing on the West’s democratic woes, argued that democracy is a “scary” system that produces self-inflicted wounds.

But events and new research in the past several years have taken a wrecking ball to the long-standing myth of benevolent dictatorship. All three pillars of the lie are crumbling. Every fresh data point proves Winston Churchill right: “Democracy is the worst form of Government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

Let’s start with the myth that dictatorships produce stronger growth. This falsehood arose from a few well-known, cherry-picked examples, in which despots oversaw astonishing transformations of their national economy. Starting in the late 1950s, Lee Kuan Yew helped transform Singapore from a poor, opium-filled backwater into a wealthy economic powerhouse. And in China, per capita GDP rose from nearly $318 in 1990 to more than $12,500 today. Those successes are eye-popping.

But a systematic evaluation of the overall data reveals another reality. Even with these outliers of strong growth, most rigorous studies have found limited or no evidence that authoritarian regimes produce better economic growth than democratic ones. Some researchers, such as the political economists Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson, have found compelling evidence that the inclusive political institutions of democracy are one of the strongest factors in producing stable, long-term growth.

When authoritarian regimes do succeed economically, they often do so at a cost, because even booming dictatorships are prone to catastrophic busts. As the political scientist Jacob Nyrup has written: “China has within a 50-year time frame both experienced a famine, where 20-45 million people died, and an economic boom, where hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty.” The rosiest interpretation of the authoritarian economic data, then, is that autocrats may sometimes preside over marginally higher growth, but with a much greater risk of economic collapse. That’s not a wise trade-off.

However, the myth of strongmen as economic gurus has an even bigger problem. Dictators turn out to have manipulated their economic data for decades. For a long time, they’ve fooled us. But now we have proof: The reason their numbers sometimes seem too good to be true is that they are.

Every government has motivation to fudge its economic data. But democracies have institutions that provide oversight and block politicians from that impulse, ensuring accurate figures. No such checks exist in dictatorships.

That difference led Luis Martinez, an economist at the University of Chicago, to test whether despots were overstating their growth rate. He did so with an ingenious method. Previous studies have verified the presence of a strong, accurate correlation between the amount of nighttime light captured by satellites and overall economic activity. When economies grow, they emit more nighttime light (which is why you can clearly pick out cities on a nighttime satellite image, and why the density of light is so much lower in Africa than, say, in Europe or on the American East Coast). High-resolution images allow researchers to track changes in nighttime illumination over time, and the detailed, granular data these images produce are nearly impossible to manipulate. Martinez discovered an astonishing disparity suggesting that dictators have been overstating their GDP growth by about 35 percent.

And the more the numbers are checked, the more manipulation is exposed. In Rwanda, where The New York Times has named President Paul Kagame “the global elite’s favorite strongman” because of his apparently brilliant record of economic growth, the government claimed that it had decreased poverty by 6 percent from 2010 to 2014. Researchers found that the inverse was true: Poverty had actually surged by 5 to 7 percent. Fittingly, the notion that Benito Mussolini made the trains run on time was a lie; he built ornate stations and invested in train lines used by elites, but the commuting masses got left behind.

Read: The undoing of China’s economic miracle

Even China, the apparent authoritarian economic miracle, is showing signs of slowing down, its growth model no longer so well matched to the global economy. Such cracks in growth are an innate feature of autocracy. Because dictatorships criminalize dissent, normal mechanisms of economic feedback are broken, and the system doesn’t self-correct when blundering into economic mistakes. Beijing’s quixotic quest to maintain perpetual “zero COVID” was a case in point. Autocrats are adept at building ports and roads and mines. But thriving modern economies are sustained less by open mines than by open minds, of which dictatorships, by design, have a limited supply.

Advocates for the myth of benevolent dictatorship conveniently ignore a crucial fact, which is that much of the growth in autocracies comes either from manufacturing products that were invented in the more open societies of the democratic West, or from exporting goods to rich democracies. (The top destinations for Chinese exports are the United States, Japan, and South Korea.) In that way, even the outliers of autocratic growth depend for their success on the innovation and consumer wealth of democracies. Would China have lifted millions out of poverty through export-led growth quite so fast if democratic America hadn’t become an economic powerhouse first?

The myth’s second pillar turns out to be no less rickety than the first. It holds that dictators are more strategic long-term thinkers than democrats because they’re not beholden to fickle public opinion. But this lie is believable only if you don’t understand how most dictatorships actually work.

Over more than a decade, I’ve studied and interviewed despots and the henchmen who surround them. One conclusion I’ve drawn is that making decisions based on bad information is an intrinsic feature of the systems dictators run. The longer despots cling to power, the more likely they are to fall into what I call “the dictator trap,” in which they crush dissent, purge anyone who challenges them, and construct their own reality through propaganda, all to maintain control. Speaking truth to power in such a system can literally be deadly. As a result, dictators are told only what they want to hear, not what is true, and they begin to believe their own lies. Vladimir Putin’s catastrophic war in Ukraine is a tragic illustration of the dictator trap: Putin got high on his own supply, and innocent Ukrainians are the victims of his power trip.

Despots often use their power not for long-term planning, but for short-term self-glorification, as no end of examples can attest. Turkmenistan’s former dictator Saparmurat Niyazov blew millions to build, in his own honor, a golden statue that would rotate to always face the sun. In another stroke of genius, he closed all rural hospitals so that the sick could have the privilege of being treated in his pristine marble capital of Ashgabat. Most of the population lived outside the city, and countless thousands likely died because they couldn’t reach a hospital in time. His successor erected an enormous golden statue of his favorite breed of dog. Thankfully, democracies have checks and balances to suppress such narcissistic whims.

The most persistent pillar of the myth, however, is the one that holds that dictators produce stability. Some dictators have hung on to power for decades. Before his death, Muammar Qaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years. Paul Biya of Cameroon, an 89-year-old despot who had no idea where he was during a recent event, took office during the Vietnam War. Putin has been in power for more than two decades; Xi has ruled for only one so far, but he appears prepared to retain his position indefinitely.

To stay in power, authoritarian leaders face constant trade-offs. If they strengthen military or paramilitary leaders, they face the risk of a coup d’état. But if they weaken their men under arms, then they can’t protect themselves from external invasion. To keep their elites happy, despots need to make them rich through corruption—usually at the expense of the population. But a ruling class awash in ill-gotten gains could inspire a revolution, or a wild card: assassination. Autocrats appear stable, but they’re not. They’re constantly vulnerable, forced to make every decision based on what will stave off threats to survive in power.

The stability that does exist in autocracies is, ironically, derived partially from the trappings of democracy. Recent research has made clear that dictators have developed mechanisms to “mimic democracy to prolong autocracy.” Most authoritarian leaders now hold elections, but rig them. Some use parliaments or courts to enact unpopular decisions while avoiding blame.

From the December 2021 issue: The bad guys are winning

Eventually, though, dictatorships tend to fall apart. And when they collapse, they really collapse. Elections in democracies change governments, not regimes. Personalist dictatorships, by contrast, often implode. When Qaddafi was killed, Libya disintegrated. He had deliberately designed the political system to function only with him at its center. The same could be true of Putin’s Russia. When he is toppled or dies, the country won’t have a smooth, peaceful transition.

The often-disastrous demise of autocrats creates a negative feedback loop. Nearly seven in 10 leaders of personalist dictatorships end up jailed, exiled, or killed once they lose power. While in power, many despots are aware of this grim fact, and so they use violence to stay in power, often growing more extreme as they lurch toward their downfall. The effect can hardly be called “stability,” even if the same person occupies the palace for decades.

For anyone who still clings to the illusion that dictatorships are likely to be prosperous, strategically wise, or internally stable, I propose a simple test. Imagine that someone wrote down the names of all the countries in the world on little slips of paper and then separated them into two hats: one for democracy, one for dictatorships. You would select one of the two hats, draw a slip of paper from it, look at the name, and then spend the rest of your life living in that country. Who knows, maybe you’d get lucky and end up in an authoritarian regime that seems stable and is producing steady growth. But I know which hat I would choose. And even if you fantasize about finding the unicorn that is a benevolent strongman, I suspect you do too.

The Atlantic · by Brian Klaas · July 26, 2023

15. Inside Five Eyes, the World's Most Exclusive Intelligence Alliance

Inside Five Eyes, the World's Most Exclusive Intelligence Alliance

Several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including India, Israel, Germany, and South Korea.

globelynews.com · by Joshua Holzer · July 26, 2023

After the recent NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, it is anticipated that Sweden will soon become the alliance’s 32nd member.

The heart of this alliance — which was established in the aftermath of World War II to promote the collective security of its mostly Western European members — is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which requires that if one member is attacked, then all of the other members will respond as if they themselves had been attacked.

Its most recent addition came in April 2023, when Finland became the 31st country to join.

At present, NATO currently recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine as aspiring members.

But NATO isn’t the only alliance that countries across the globe are eager to join.

For more than 75 years, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S. have been sharing intelligence with one another as part of what they call the Five Eyes alliance.

I am a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst who now studies and teaches political science. I know from personal experience that the Five Eyes is still very active in the 21st century, even though it’s not as well known as its younger sibling NATO.

The Origins of Five Eyes

A 1941 document in which U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill approved sharing key intelligence secrets with the U.S. Image courtesy of America’s National Churchill Museum, CC BY-ND

In 1940, during the prime ministership of Winston Churchill, a secret effort by U.K. codebreakers to deconstruct Germany’s Enigma machine succeeded, allowing the British to read German military messages. These messages ended up being a major source of intelligence throughout World War II, providing much-needed information about German troop numbers, military maneuvers, and technological developments.

British mathematician Alan Turing is probably the most widely recognized person who worked to help crack the Enigma machine. But in reality, it was the collective effort of hundreds of men and women, including mathematicians, linguists, and even chess champions.

Parallel to these developments, U.S. codebreakers were able to successfully crack diplomatic codes used by the Japanese.

In February 1941, an American military delegation was invited to visit the U.K. codebreaking operation, based on an estate called Bletchley Park. However, when “approving the visit, Churchill … prohibited any British discussion of their success against the Enigma” machine, according to a 2016 speech by Richard Ledgett, then the deputy director of the U.S. National Security Agency.

Upon their arrival, the American officers “explained how to break the Japanese codes,” Ledgett said, going on to observe that the information “caused the British to re-examine their initial decision” to keep their Enigma success a secret.

Afterward, Churchill approved a request to reveal “to our American colleagues the progress … made in probing German Armed Force cryptography.”

Throughout the remainder of the war, the U.K. and U.S. continued working together to enhance their codebreaking capabilities. In 1943, this informal relationship was formalized with the Britain-United States of America, or BRUSA, agreement.

This intelligence alliance was further strengthened by the UKUSA agreement signed on March 5, 1946. That same day, Churchill was at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri — the college where I now teach — giving his “Iron Curtain” speech.

In 2010, this top-secret agreement was declassified and made publicly available for the first time.

Canada joined the UKUSA agreement in 1948. Australia and New Zealand joined in 1956. Thus, the Five Eyes was born.

Recent Developments

To address the rising power of China, members of the Five Eyes have recently expanded the scope of the alliance beyond intelligence sharing into the realm of policy. Five Eyes attorneys general now regularly meet, as do finance members and defense ministers.

In November 2020, the once-secretive Five Eyes alliance took the bold step of publicly issuing a joint statement condemning China’s National Security Law for “undermin[ing] Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy.”

China responded by warning that “attempts by certain countries to meddle in Hong Kong politics … are futile and doomed to fail.”

Notably, China is New Zealand’s largest export market. At the time, New Zealand was also hoping to conclude an upgraded free trade deal with China.

In January 2021, the Five Eyes countries — except New Zealand — issued a joint statement condemning “the mass arrests of 55 politicians and activists in Hong Kong for subversion under the National Security Law.” That same month, China and New Zealand signed the upgraded free trade deal.

Since that time, New Zealand has continued to avoid taking as strong a position as the rest of the Five Eyes. As a result, the U.S. has sought to circumvent New Zealand’s reluctance by formalizing other agreements without the Kiwis.

For example, in September 2021, Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. announced the AUKUS partnership. Under this agreement, the three countries “will expand and accelerate [the] sharing of sensitive information.” Canada has expressed a desire to join the AUKUS partnership. This would leave New Zealand as the only Five Eyes member outside of the pact.

The Five Eyes alliance has had to deal with other internal difficulties as well. For example, the U.S. has had several notable intelligence failures, including the leaks of classified documents by Edward Snowden and former President Donald Trump’s alleged hoarding of classified documents. Both of those events undermine U.S. assurances to its allies that it can keep a secret.

Looking Ahead

Over the years, several countries have been considered as potential candidates to join the Five Eyes, including India, Israel, Germany, and South Korea.

Currently, the most likely candidate is probably Japan. At the end of 2016, Australia and the U.S. signed a trilateral agreement with Japan to deepen their covert security cooperation. As of 2020, Japan’s minister of defense was enthusiastically in favor of joining the Five Eyes. In 2021, Japan’s ambassador to Australia argued that “in terms of interests and capability, Japan is the best candidate” to consider for enlarging the Five Eyes.

In 2022, the U.S. House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations “acknowledge[d] that the threat landscape has vastly changed since the inception of the Five Eyes arrangement, with primary threats now emanating from China and Russia.” It recommended “expanding the Five Eyes arrangement to include … Japan.”

Regardless of whether Japan — or others — ends up joining the alliance, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman warned in 2020 that “no matter how many eyes they have, five or 10 or whatever, should anyone dare to undermine China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests,” they should “be careful not to get poked in the eye.”

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Joshua Holzer

Joshua Holzer is an assistant professor of political science at Westminster College.

• Joshua Holzer
• https://globelynews.com/author/joshua-holzer/
• Nationalism vs. Patriotism: There’s a Big Difference Between Them

globelynews.com · by Joshua Holzer · July 26, 2023

1​6. Ukraine war: Western armour struggles against Russian defences

Ukraine war: Western armour struggles against Russian defences

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66306150

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IMAGE SOURCE,MOOSE CAMPBELL/BBC

Image caption,

Tanks hit by Russian mines are either being quickly repaired or scavenged for parts

By Jonathan Beale

Defence correspondent, southern Ukraine

The general in charge of Ukraine's stuttering counter-offensive in the south has said Russian defences are making it difficult for military equipment, including Western tanks and armoured vehicles, to move forward.

Gen Oleksandr Tarnavskyi says his forces are struggling to overcome multi-layered minefields and fortified defensive lines.

"That is why most of the tasks have to be performed by troops."

He says Russia's military has displayed "professional qualities" by preventing Ukrainian forces from "advancing quickly".

"I don't underestimate the enemy," he adds.

Latest unconfirmed reports from the US suggest the main thrust of the counter-offensive has begun. The Institute for the Study of War says Ukrainian forces appear to have broken through "certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions".

But so far there's little evidence that Western supplied tanks and armoured vehicles have been able to tip the balance decisively in Ukraine's favour.

Several Leopard tanks and US Bradley fighting vehicles were damaged or destroyed in the first days of the offensive, near the city of Orikhiv.

Ukraine's 47th Brigade, which had largely been trained and equipped by the West to try to break through Russian lines, were soon stopped in their tracks by mines and then targeted by artillery.

Russia released multiple videos of the incident claiming Ukraine's offensive had already failed. In reality it was an early setback rather than a decisive blow.

IMAGE SOURCE,RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Image caption,

Russia released footage of tanks it said it had destroyed in the early days of the offensive

We visited the same brigade's outdoor workshop, hidden in a forest behind the front line, where they are now trying to repair more than a dozen armoured vehicles - most of them US Bradleys.

They first arrived unscathed but now bear the scars of battle. Broken tracks and buckled wheels - the tell-tale signs that several have hit Russian mines.

Serhii, one of the engineers, says: "The faster we can repair them, the faster we can get them back to the front line to save someone's life."

But he also admits that some are beyond repair and will have to be either scavenged for spare parts or "returned to our partners" to be rebuilt.

While Western armour has provided Ukrainian troops with better protection, it has not been able to punch through the rows of Russian mines - one of the biggest barriers for Ukraine's advance.

Travelling the southern front we also saw British supplied Mastiff armoured vehicles damaged and destroyed.

• Russia’s network of trenches and minefields in Ukraine
• Ukraine war in maps: Russia targets grain facilities

IMAGE SOURCE,MOOSE CAMPBELL/BBC

Image caption,

Maksym, a tank commander near the front line, says Russian lines are defended by rows of minefields

The 47th Brigade is now using some of its older, Soviet-era tanks to clear minefields. But they too can't escape the explosives hidden in the ground, even when fitted with specialist mine-clearing equipment.

Nearer the front line, tank commander Maksym showed us his recently-damaged T-64 tank. It's been fitted with two rollers on the front to deliberately set off the mines. He lost one of the rollers the night before as he was trying to clear a path for troops.

"Normally our rollers can withstand up to four explosions," he says. But the Russians, he adds, have been laying mines on top of each other to destroy their mine clearing equipment.

"It's very hard because there are too many mines," Maksym says, adding that there were often more than four rows of minefields in front of the Russian defensive lines.

It's been painful to watch the battle unfold for Doc and his drone reconnaissance team from Ukraine's Volunteer Army.

IMAGE SOURCE,MOOSE CAMPBELL/BBC

Image caption,

Ukrainian drone pilot Doc says Russia is increasingly using remote-controlled mines to slow them down

Doc, his call sign, took part in last year's successful offensive on Kherson. But he says this time it's proving to be much tougher. For the first time in the war, he says, soldiers are being injured by mines more than artillery: "When we go forward we meet minefields everywhere."

Doc shows me a video he recently filmed from one of his drones while Ukrainian troops advanced towards a Russian trench.

There's a massive explosion as soon as the soldiers enter. The trench was empty but rigged with mines. Doc says Russian forces are now using remotely controlled mines. "When our soldiers get to the trenches they push a button and it blows up, killing our friends." He says he's seen the tactic being used over the past two weeks and calls it "a new weapon".

There is a military logic to Ukraine's offensive in the south. It's seen as key to dividing Russian forces and reaching the occupied cities of Melitopol and Mariupol - all the way to Crimea. But the focus on this axis means that Ukraine is also now attacking Russian defensive lines where they're strongest.

Moose Campbell

Slow or not, the offensive is taking place and it will definitely reach its goal

Gen Oleksandr Tarnavskyi

In charge of Ukraine's south offensive

Gen Tarnavskiy said his forces were doing "hard and painstaking work". He said "any defence can be broken but you need patience time and skilful actions".

Ukraine was slowly wearing down their enemy, he said. Russia didn't care about losing men, and recent changes in their military leadership "means everything is not OK", he added. He insisted that Ukraine had yet to commit its main strike force.

"Slow or not, the offensive is taking place and it will definitely reach its goal," he says.

I ask Gen Tarnavsky how we can judge whether it's a success or a failure?

He smiles and replies: "If the offensive were not successful, I wouldn't be talking to you now."

​17. Psychological Warfare: A Closer Look at its Role in Military Operations

Psychological Warfare: A Closer Look at its Role in Military Operations

By SOFREP sofrep.com5 min

July 25, 2023

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How exactly does psychological warfare play a role in military operations? / SOFREP original art

In a world where consumerism is our religion and Ikea catalogs are our bibles, the subject of psychological warfare in the military might seem far removed, if not wholly irrelevant. 

Psychological warfare, it’s not just for soldiers on some distant battlefield, no. It’s playing out every day in boardrooms and on social media. Whether we realize it or not, we are in the constant crossfire of psychological warfare.

The military? They’re just the masters of the game, having been at it longer, honed it into fine art. They’ve learned to manipulate minds, bend their enemies’ will, and control entire populations without firing a single bullet.

SOFREP original art

Understanding psychological warfare is not just about dissecting military strategies or the spoils of war. It’s about understanding how to influence the human mind, control it, and even weaponize it. It’s about understanding our world and the unseen forces that shape it.

The Art of War: Psychological over Physical

We all know Sun Tzu, the famous name behind ‘The Art of War.’ He understood that the mind was the ultimate battlefield.

To conquer your enemy, you need to conquer his mind first. 

In military warfare, it’s not always about who has the bigger guns but who can manipulate minds more effectively. The power of influence can dismantle an enemy from within, leaving them vulnerable, distracted, and disoriented. 

So while you’re learning to throw punches in your grimy basements, the real pros are up top, playing 3D chess with the human psyche.

Take Operation Bodyguard, the grand illusion that ensured the success of D-Day. The Allies deceived the Germans into believing the main attack would come at Calais, not Normandy. 

They used dummy tanks, fake radio chatter, and even a faux army commanded by General Patton. The enemy was expecting a right hook, and they got a left jab instead. They manipulated the perception and controlled the narrative.

The Puppeteers of Perception in Psychological Warfare

Welcome to the world of information and misinformation. It’s a dance, a delicate tango of truth and lies where perception is everything. Here, everyone plays puppet masters, shaping what you see, believe, and fear.

Take a look at Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. That guy knew how to play the game. He went on live TV and got a bunch of British hostages on a “guided tour” of an apparent bomb site. 

He was there, all smiles, acting friendly, trying to show the world he was just a nice guy caught in a tough spot. Classic move from the puppeteer’s playbook.

Then there’s ISIS. These guys took the puppet game to a new level with their gruesome beheading videos. Their goal: create fear, panic, and chaos. And it worked. The world was terrified. That’s perception manipulation at its finest.

SOFREP original art

But it’s not just the enemies pulling the strings. The military is in on it too. Look at the US during the Cold War. Propaganda films, radio broadcasts, newspaper articles – all spreading the ‘American Dream’ while painting the Soviets as the ‘Red Threat.’ It’s all part of the dance.

Read Next: Decoding the Evolution of Military Strategy Through the Ages

Read Next: Decoding the Evolution of Military Strategy Through the Ages

Modern-Day Trojan Horses: Cyber Warfare

Cyber warfare is the new frontier of psychological warfare. A potent tool in the military arsenal, it offers a subtle way to infiltrate enemy lines, disrupt communications, and create chaos. 

It’s the perfect stage for psychological operations, where hackers aren’t just tech geeks but strategic soldiers, penetrating minds and databases alike.

Remember the Arab Spring? That wasn’t just some random uprising. Social media fueled the whole thing. Twitter, Facebook, the works. It was like a domino effect, one post after another. Before you knew it, these social media efforts had already brought governments to their knees. 

Take a look at the Chinese too. They’ve got this whole thing they call the “50 Cent Army.” Not the rapper. It’s like an army of internet trolls reportedly paid to manipulate online discussions. They flood the web with pro-China sentiment and drown out any criticism. Talk about a slick operation.

And then, of course, there’s good old Uncle Sam. The U.S. isn’t sitting this one out. Sure, they’ve got the Cyber Command, fighting off attacks, but you’d be a fool to think we’re not playing offense as well.  

When Psychological Warfare Meets Strategy

At its core, psychological warfare is all about the human element. Understanding human behavior, predicting responses, and exploiting weaknesses. In other words, it’s all about getting inside the enemy’s head.

Psychologists and behavioral scientists are as vital to military strategy as generals and soldiers. They study patterns, develop profiles, and help devise tactics designed to demoralize the enemy and manipulate public opinion. 

In psychological warfare, understanding the human mind is the key to victory.

Think back to World War II. The Allies, they weren’t just duking it out on the battlefield. They had this Ghost Army squad comprising artists, actors, and designers. Their job: to fool the enemy. 

They’d set up fake tank installations, play soundtracks of marching soldiers, and send out false radio transmissions, all to make the Nazis think they were facing a colossal force. It was a beautiful setup, all based on knowing how to spook the enemy.

Even today, this game is still going strong. Look at China’s ‘Three Warfares’ strategy – psychological, media, and legal warfare. They’re not just aiming to win on the battlefield. They’re aiming to succeed in the minds of their enemies. 

They spread disinformation, manipulate international laws, and control the narrative. It’s all about understanding the opponent’s mind and knowing how to push the right buttons.

The Mind is the Battlefield

In psychological warfare, it’s about the sharpness of your mind. True warriors know how to pull the strings and understand the dance of doubt and perception. 

It’s a wild world out there, and the actual battlefield? It’s in the mind. 

In this game of shadows and illusions, the sharpest weapon is a keen understanding of the human psyche. That’s the long and short of it. Welcome to the real world.

18. Implications of China’s Nuclear Expansion for Strategic Stability

Excerpts:

This analysis suggests three implications for U.S. nuclear policy and planning. First, it is possible to maintain first-strike stability and arms race equilibrium among three major nuclear powers, even if they incorporate counterforce targeting in their strategies. Doing so requires that each maintains a sufficient fraction of its deployed forces in a survivable posture. The United States must continue to ensure a high degree of survivability in its deployed forces, and in future arms control arrangements it should consider measures that favor the more survivable platforms.

Second, while it makes sense to favor survivable platforms over silo-based missiles, to the extent Russia and China will nonetheless field silo-based systems the United States should not attempt to dissuade the fielding of multiple-warhead variants in that element of their nuclear forces. Contrary to traditional interpretations, concentration of targetable warheads enhances rather than degrades strategic stability among major nuclear powers that maintain survivability for significant portions of their nuclear forces. It does so by helping to ensure that even opponents who incorporate counterforce targeting in their strategies will retain an assured second-strike capability.

Third, for any side that incorporates counterforce targeting, maintaining strategic stability does not require matching the combined force of potential adversaries. China’s nuclear expansion does not mean the United States necessarily needs a larger nuclear force. Rather, it must ensure and posture survivable forces sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on both potential adversaries, even after or as part of a counterforce exchange.

Finally, astute readers will note the dubious (yet in some sense longstanding) strategic logic of insisting on targeting all vulnerable adversary forces while at the same time encouraging those same adversaries to prioritize deployment of more survivable platforms. One way out of this contradiction would be to abandon nuclear arms limitations and pursue a three-sided arms race. The other two options are to abandon any embrace of comprehensive counterforce targeting for major nuclear adversaries or embrace with abandon this curious feature of the bizarro world of nuclear strategy.

Implications of China’s Nuclear Expansion for Strategic Stability - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Miles · July 27, 2023

The looming prospect of the United States facing two peer nuclear adversaries raises serious questions about whether significant changes to U.S. nuclear strategy and forces are necessary, and whether it is possible to maintain strategic stability in such a system. Will China’s dramatic nuclear expansion, including more than 300 new silos for intercontinental-range ballistic missiles require a counter-expansion of U.S. nuclear capabilities, or posturing existing forces differently? Will the dynamics of a three-sided system undermine strategic stability by creating first-strike incentives that drive nuclear escalation in crisis, and by driving a new arms race spiral that would make limits on strategic nuclear arms untenable? Does the longstanding U.S. policy of maintaining nuclear counterforce capabilities for targeting adversary nuclear forces make these challenges unmanageable?

Fortunately, the worst outcomes are avoidable if each peer maintains a high degree of survivability for a sufficient portion of its forces. The United States does not necessarily need to build more nuclear weapons, as some analysts have called for, and can trust that certain long-held tenets of nuclear stability remain applicable to future challenges. It is possible to maintain first-strike stability and avoid qualitatively new arms race dynamics among three major power nuclear adversaries, even if one or more incorporates elements of nuclear counterforce into its strategy.

Furthermore, possession of sufficient survivable force elements reverses the traditional idea that concentrating warheads for silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles onto a smaller number of multi-warhead missiles drives instability. The same holds for the bipolar case, but in the three-peer problem this becomes more important. In the interest of maintaining strategic stability, the United States should welcome rather than seek to dissuade Chinese and Russian moves to concentrate their silo-based warheads on multiple-warhead missiles.

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These are bold claims, and the idea of welcoming multi-warhead missiles in adversary forces borders on heretical. But the basic rationale is as sound as it is tautological, namely, that counterforce strategies can only involve targeting those adversary forces that are targetable. If each side’s targetable portion is sufficiently small, then each can cover the targetable forces of multiple adversaries with a fraction of its own forces.

This leaves the balance for other purposes, including the assured second-strike capability that is at the heart of maintaining strategic stability. And this situation is further improved if targetable adversary forces are concentrated on fewer missiles.

A simple mathematical model analysis shows how this works, and why maintaining “enough” survivability across nuclear forces can avoid any meaningful “use or lose” pressures that might otherwise undermine stability. Testing these claims involves a bit of math, but nothing beyond high-school algebra. Parsing the equations is not necessary to follow the arguments below but can enhance them for those not inclined to skip over, so please bear with me.

First-Strike Stability in a Multi-Adversary System

Math can make people go cross-eyed. However, it has a long history of shaping how nuclear planners think about targeting — and measuring the basics of nuclear deterrence. First-strike stability among two or more nuclear adversaries means that after a counterforce exchange, in which each side uses segments of its own nuclear forces to target those of its opponent(s), each can still impose “unacceptable damage” that would outweigh any conceivable benefit of initiating the attack. Stating this stability condition mathematically allows analysts to test assumptions and illustrate implications for force planning. For each side, first-strike stability means satisfying the expression N – NCFexc≥Du, where N is the initial number of deployed warheads, DU is the sum total of unacceptable damage for all adversaries, and NCFexch is the number of warheads lost in the counterforce exchange, including any expended and any destroyed on the ground.

What constitutes unacceptable damage for leaders in different countries is a matter of great subjectivity. Some believe delivering a single or few warheads is sufficient, while others argue the answer is adversary dependent and could in some circumstances require destruction and damage corresponding to the use of at least hundreds of warheads. Ultimately, this type of deterrence strategy always involves trying to identify some threatened response that will convince an adversary not to attack. It generally assumes that threatening a greater scope or level of damage, if the threat is credible, will be more likely to succeed.

While it is possible to proceed with the analysis without quantifying “unacceptable damage,” there is another fundamental question that analysts cannot easily defer: Why would any rational strategy plan to engage in nuclear counterforce targeting (which focuses nuclear strikes on an opponent’s nuclear forces) if all sides understand that such strikes cannot deny the ability to impose unacceptable damage in return? One explanation developed and reviewed in recent years is that full confidence in survivability will always remain elusive, and therefore counterforce and other forms of nuclear competition are unavoidable. Another explanation is that targeting nuclear forces can itself contribute to imposing unacceptable damage, both directly because adversaries value their nuclear forces and indirectly because strikes on nuclear forces will likely cause damage that extends beyond those targets. Put simply: If adversaries expect that being on the receiving end of nuclear counterforce strikes will also mean the incidental destruction of other things they value, military, industrial, or civilian, then threatening such strikes may have significant deterrent value even if they cannot prevent a devastating counter-response.

Weapons allocated for counterforce might then decrease or even eliminate remaining requirements for unacceptable damage. Furthermore, wherever nuclear counterforce can contribute to imposing unacceptable damage, it may be preferable on moral and legal grounds to deliberate targeting of civilian populations and infrastructure.

Accepting that for whatever reason some states will incorporate nuclear counterforce into their strategies, the simplest case involving two adversaries with identical arsenals can show why fielding multiple-warhead missiles is traditionally considered destabilizing. If a country initiates and expends its entire force in a counterforce attack, the attacked side loses a fraction of its forces equal to the average number of warheads that each attacking warhead destroys. I will call this the counterforce efficiency parameter C =NCFexc IN. For a single target such as a missile silo, it is the number of warheads per target (warhead concentration) divided by the number of attacking warheads required to destroy the target (target hardness). In simple terms: If you cluster multiple warheads on each missile (resulting in a high value of the parameter c), you risk losing a greater percentage of deployed warheads in one strike than if those same warheads were dispersed across a larger number of missiles.

From the defender’s perspective, the condition for first-strike stability becomes 1 – C≥DuIN. If on average each delivery vehicle carries more warheads than are required to destroy it (c > 1), the stability condition cannot be satisfied. A disarming attack is then achievable, and a resulting first-strike incentive makes crises unstable. Even before reaching this limiting value, there is a threshold for counterforce efficiency above which the opponent’s surviving forces are insufficient to impose unacceptable damage. One critically important note is that this instability arises not just because one side risks losing its nuclear weapons if it does not use them first, but because that first use can provide the initiating side with some meaningful strategic benefit, namely, to disarm its opponent and save itself from the threat of destruction.

Major nuclear powers endeavor to avoid this outcome by maintaining a survivable posture for a significant portion of their deployed forces. Submarines at sea and mobile land-based missiles are especially important in this regard because they are difficult to target. Possessors field these force elements to reduce the overall counterforce efficiency their adversaries might achieve. This makes stability possible even if some portion of their force consists of highly concentrated soft targets.

Accounting for survivable force elements within a simplified model that treats such elements as perfectly survivable, the most stressing scenario for the defender is one in which the attacker uses no more warheads than are necessary to destroy the defender’s vulnerable forces. The condition for first-strike stability with survivable force elements is then

(1)

In this expression, fS is the survivable fraction of the force, the sum (indicated by ∑i) is over all adversaries, and the last term on the left applies if the defender can avoid targeting adversary forces that were used in the initial attack. If counterforce strategy incorporates more than direct targeting of deployed forces, such as command and control or non-deployed weapons, these requirements could enter either as a fixed additive term or by adjusting counterforce efficiency parameters.

To more clearly illustrate first-strike stability among three peers, we can again simplify to the fully symmetric system in which all have the same force size, structure, posture, and strategy. Assuming further than one side expends the vulnerable portion of its arsenal in an initial counterforce attack, expression (1) becomes

(2)

One key result of expressions (1) and (2) is that when targetable portions of adversary forces are concentrated through approaches such as placing multiple warheads on a single missile and/or unhardened (high values of c), it is easier rather than harder to maintain first-strike stability. This is because targeting the vulnerable portion of adversary forces requires fewer warheads, leaving more available for the assured response role.

States may and have endeavored to hold at risk more survivable elements of adversary forces, but among those with developed arsenals, these efforts focus more on finding hidden forces than overcoming them with greater numbers of counterforce nuclear weapons. If such efforts succeed, they increase nuclear counterforce requirements by an amount that could be large (e.g., if nuclear capabilities are the only reliable means of targeting a large force of dispersed mobile missiles) but could also be small or even wholly insignificant (e.g., if conventional torpedoes can target ballistic missile submarines). To put it simply: Acquiring greater ability to target adversary nuclear forces does not create a need to allocate a bunch of additional nuclear weapons to counterforce if those new targets are concentrated and/or if conventional weapons are well suited to the task.

Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of expression (2). The dashed line denotes the boundary between a region below that is always first-strike unstable because survivable forces are insufficient to impose unacceptable damage, and a region above where first-strike stability is possible even if opponents incorporate comprehensive nuclear counterforce into their strategies. For any opponent that does not incorporate nuclear counterforce, which might remain the case for China despite its ongoing nuclear expansion, the entire region above and including the dashed line is stable.

Figure 1. First-strike stability in a fully symmetric three-peer system with counterforce targeting. The vertical axis is the fraction of forces that are survivable, and the horizontal axis is the fraction of the total force required to impose unacceptable damage on both adversaries. The counterforce efficiency parameter c indicates how many targetable warheads on average each attacking counterforce warhead can destroy.

Shaded regions in Figure 1 indicate regions of stability for particular values of the counterforce efficiency parameter c. For example, if one-third of a side’s initial deployed force is required to impose unacceptable damage on both adversaries (DU/N = 1/3), and if on average each attacking warhead can destroy two targetable warheads (c = 2), then first-strike stability is attainable if at least 56 percent of each side’s force maintained in a survivable posture (for example, on submarines and mobile missiles). If, on the other hand, all targetable missiles carry single warheads (m = 1) in hardened silos (h = 2), maintaining first-strike stability is more challenging, requiring that nearly 80 percent of forces are survivable.

The United States maintains survivability across a significant fraction of its forces, potentially sufficient to enable first-strike stability with counterforce strategy against two peer adversaries. Notifications under the New START Treaty enable a rough estimate of U.S. force survivability. Neglecting heavy bombers as concentrated soft targets that unless dispersed are targetable with a small number of warheads, the United States deploys approximately 1300 warheads. Treating the 400 U.S. ICBM warheads as targetable and the remainder as survivable sea-based warheads, roughly 70 percent of U.S. forces are survivable.

Russia might have approximately the same fraction of its deployed strategic warheads on more survivable mobile long-range missiles and submarines, based on public estimates of force structure. For China, that fraction may currently be closer to 80 percent, based on public estimates of Chinese force structure. Based on those same estimates, China’s survivable force fraction would fall to a much lower level of roughly 35 percent if it achieves rough numerical parity with the United States and Russia by fielding intercontinental range ballistic missiles in 300 new silos and replacing existing single-warhead missiles across its force with multiple-warhead variants already existing or under development. As shown in Figure 1, maintaining strategic stability with lower levels of survivable force fraction is possible for countries like China that do not emphasize nuclear counterforce in their strategies.

The United States (like Russia and in the future perhaps China) retains the ability to further increase survivability by alerting bombers and launching long-range silo-based missiles under attack. Day-to-day survivability is lower, though, since only a portion of the submarine fleet is at sea at any given time. Assuming roughly half of U.S. submarines are at sea at any given time, day-to-day survivability is less than 40 percent. In the fully symmetric model situation, maintaining first-strike stability in peacetime with comprehensive counterforce targeting might only work if targetable forces are very highly vulnerable and concentrated. Of course, that is precisely the case for submarines in port. Writing off submarines in port as well as off-alert bombers suggests a relatively high day-to-day survivability above 50 percent.

Critics of missiles with multiple warheads (and of land-based intercontinental-range missiles in general) might argue that silo-based long-range missiles are nonetheless the first weapons one would use in a first strike, and are therefore inherently destabilizing. It is true that in the event of a first strike a possessor is likely to use such weapons, but that does not mean they make a first strike any more rational and more likely. As long as the existence of assured response capability means that a first strike cannot deliver a strategic benefit to the attacker, multiple-warhead missiles do not actually pose a “use-or-lose” dilemma. If an adversary is prepared to undertake an attack that no rational logic can support, then in the absence of multiple-warhead-carrying long-range missiles analysts should only expect to see some other element of the force used instead.

Arms Race Stability in a Multi-Adversary System

In a multi-peer system with comprehensive counterforce targeting, satisfying the condition for first-strike stability is necessary but not necessarily sufficient for maintaining arms race stability or even equilibrium. For an arms race equilibrium to exist, any such state might also require enough warheads postured for potential use in a counterforce strike (which I will call NFS) to cover any combination of adversaries’ targetable forces:

Like first-strike stability, this kind of arms race stability is possible among adversaries that maintain survivability for significant portions of their forces. For a major nuclear power, the number of warheads suitable for a first strike might be at least as large as the sum of deployed intercontinental-range missile warheads and submarine-launched warheads postured under continual at-sea deployment.

In the simplified case of identical arsenals and strategies, the condition for arms race equilibrium becomes:

Just as for first-strike stability, vulnerability and concentration of targetable forces make it easier rather than more difficult to achieve this type of arms race equilibrium.

In one sense, this equilibrium is unstable because adversary moves to disperse or harden targetable forces, or to expand that segment of the force, increase targeting requirements for an adversary determined to maintain comprehensive counterforce as an element of its strategy. However, incentives for such moves and countermoves are tempered if all can maintain confidence that the survivable segments of their forces provide the capability for assured response.

Figure 2 is a graphical depiction of expression (3). It shows, for example, that if half of the attacker’s deployed force is available for a counterforce strike and each attacking warhead can destroy on average two targetable warheads (c = 2), arms race equilibrium is achievable if at least 50 percent of each side’s force is survivable. If, on the other hand, all targetable missiles carry single warheads (m = 1) in hardened silos (h = 2), nearly 90 percent of the forces must be survivable for the same attacking force to execute a comprehensive counterforce strike against targetable forces.

Figure 2. Arms race equilibrium in a fully symmetric three-peer system with counterforce targeting. The vertical axis is the fraction of forces that are survivable, and the horizontal axis is the fraction of the total force available for employment in a counterforce strike.

For nuclear powers like the United States that maintain forces with relatively high survivability fractions and counterforce suitability, it should be possible to avoid an arms race even while retaining counterforce options against two peer adversaries.

Implications for U.S. Policy

This analysis suggests three implications for U.S. nuclear policy and planning. First, it is possible to maintain first-strike stability and arms race equilibrium among three major nuclear powers, even if they incorporate counterforce targeting in their strategies. Doing so requires that each maintains a sufficient fraction of its deployed forces in a survivable posture. The United States must continue to ensure a high degree of survivability in its deployed forces, and in future arms control arrangements it should consider measures that favor the more survivable platforms.

Second, while it makes sense to favor survivable platforms over silo-based missiles, to the extent Russia and China will nonetheless field silo-based systems the United States should not attempt to dissuade the fielding of multiple-warhead variants in that element of their nuclear forces. Contrary to traditional interpretations, concentration of targetable warheads enhances rather than degrades strategic stability among major nuclear powers that maintain survivability for significant portions of their nuclear forces. It does so by helping to ensure that even opponents who incorporate counterforce targeting in their strategies will retain an assured second-strike capability.

Third, for any side that incorporates counterforce targeting, maintaining strategic stability does not require matching the combined force of potential adversaries. China’s nuclear expansion does not mean the United States necessarily needs a larger nuclear force. Rather, it must ensure and posture survivable forces sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on both potential adversaries, even after or as part of a counterforce exchange.

Finally, astute readers will note the dubious (yet in some sense longstanding) strategic logic of insisting on targeting all vulnerable adversary forces while at the same time encouraging those same adversaries to prioritize deployment of more survivable platforms. One way out of this contradiction would be to abandon nuclear arms limitations and pursue a three-sided arms race. The other two options are to abandon any embrace of comprehensive counterforce targeting for major nuclear adversaries or embrace with abandon this curious feature of the bizarro world of nuclear strategy.

Become a Member

Dr. Aaron Miles is a fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. He is currently serving on assignment as a senior advisor in the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, and served previously in senior nuclear policy positions at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. His policy interests include deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation.

The views expressed herein are the author’s alone, and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization or entity.

Image: Wikipedia

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Aaron Miles · July 27, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com