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Quotes of the Day:
“When you wake up in the morning, tell yourself: The people I deal with today will be meddling, ungrateful, arrogant, dishonest, jealous, and surely they are like this because they can’t tell good from evil… And so none of them can hurt me.”
– Marcus Aurelius
"I'm not going to rush anything. I'm not going to stress out or worry about how things will work out for me. Instead of overthinking, I will align my faith with divine timing and trust that everything belongs in my life is making its way toward me right now."
– Idil Ahmed
"People are not disturbed by things, but by the view they take of them."
– Epictetus
1. North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Final Blow to Korean Reunification?
2. Comparing Trust, Respect, and Communication Between the North Korea–Russia and South Korea–U.S. Alliances32. DoD can't confirm whether North Korean troops in Russia are 'gorging on pornography'
3. US approves sale of four E-7 early-warning planes to South Korea
4. HISTORICAL FACTORS THAT HAVE LED TO THE RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN NORTH KOREA
5. Analysis: South Korea's public distrust of U.S. grows amid spying allegations
6. Umerov confirms first battles between Ukrainian and North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast
7. Ukraine Attacking North Korean Troops in Kursk – What We Know
8. Presidential office says N. Korean troops in Russia have not yet engaged in full-fledged combat against Ukraine
9. S. Korea stages live-fire missile interception drills after N.K. missile launches
10. Websites of defense, environment ministries hit by cyberattack
11. Trump wins U.S. presidential election, foreshadows policy shift
12. N.K. leader may seek another summit with Trump, but chances for deal seen as slimmer
13. Trump likely to reshape U.S. policy on alliance, N. Korea under 'America First' credo: experts
14. Andy Kim wins Senate race, becomes 1st Korean American senator
15. North Korean miners defy order for mutual criticism sessions
16. News of North Korean military's Russia deployment spreads from border to interior
17. North Korea launches military-wide ideological campaign
18. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2024
1. North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Final Blow to Korean Reunification?
Sigh... this kind of thinking illustrates the total failure of imagination when it comes to thinking about Korean unification. Every single naysayer on unification is stuck in the past with old paradigms of "peaceful" unification that are based on the seemingly logical assumption that for there to be peaceful unification that both sides must agree to it and relinquish their system of government to the other. (Or the confederal system of one country two systems). Or worse they advocate for "peaceful co-existence" between north and South with a peace treaty (thereby sentence 25 million Koreans in the north to subjugation b y the regime and victims of the worst crimes against humanity since WWII - and an understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime would reveal that touch a peace treaty does not secure the South or the interests of the US)
"Planning for peaceful unification" versus "planning for negotiations to try to reach peaceful unification." There is a subtle difference here. Although they are not mutually exclusive and should actually be mutually supporting and reinforcing, we are only thinking about the latter and not the former with the former being more important. This is one of the major elements in our lack of imagination. We are stuck on thinking about the process to get there and do have the imagination for planning for what comes after negotiation (or an internally transformed north, or war, or regime collapse). Why is "planning for peaceful unification" more important than "planning for negotiations to try to reach peaceful unification?" Peaceful planning for unification will be applied in all paths to unification from negotiated, to internal regime transformation, to war, or regime collapse. Only planning for the negotiation to try to reach peaceful unification will not contribute to achieving the end state of the acceptable durable political arrangement that will sustain, project, and advance US and alliance interests).
And the real lack of imagination is in not recognizing the current conditions in north Korea combined with Kim Jong Un's statements and actions that provide an opportunity for creating the conditions for change on the peninsula. We stick to the same old policies and strategy and are actually very similar to the Chinese toward north Korea - simply maintaining the status quo and hoping there is no war or regime collapse. And in so doing we are ill-prepared for what happens when there is change inside north Korea or for what comes next after war or regime collapse.
I acknowledge it is unlikely we will be able to achieve peaceful unification in Korea unless there is a radical change in north Korea with new emerging leadership who will seek peaceful unification as the path to his own survival and that of the Korean people in the north. It is more likely the path to unification is through war or catastrophic regime collapse. But few (especially in the US) want to acknowledge what comes next. We hear all kinds of pablum: the Koreans in the South do not want unification, the Chinese or Russians (or even the Japanese) will not allow unification to happen (but no one can explain what actions they will take to prevent it). My favorite is that the UN recognizes the north and South as two sovereign nations so the UN will not support unification (and they overlook everything from paragraph 60 of the Armistice to UN General Assembly resolution 811 and numerous other statements calling for a resolution of the "Korean question" (and UNGA Resolution 811 calls for a free and democratic Korea).
The ROK/US alliances need a clearly defined end state (an acceptable durable political arrangement that will support, sustained, an davance US and alliance interests). So far I have heard no military or political leader clearly articulate one other than denuclearization (but we should understand the only sure path to denuclearization is through unification).
Planning for peaceful unification is complex and difficult because it requires planning for comprehensive integration of two vastly different economies, political systems, militaries, and even somewhat divergent cultures. Whenever we talk about peaceful unification the default midnet goes to how to negotiate a peaceful outcome. People do not think about all the complex work that must go into planning after the unification process begins (initiated by negotiation, or the result of new emerging leadership in the north, war, or regime collapse). Planning for peaceful negotiation is not about planning for how to reach agreement (although that is important it is not the exclusive aspect of peaceful unification planning). It is about all the detailed planning the must occur to make the unification process work. It is about the integration of Korea (not the absorption of the north by the South - that is one of the many elements that must be empshizised in the supporting information campaign).
Planning for peaceful unification not only gives the South the moral high ground and all those who support the ROK), but it is also the foundational element for the very necessary information campaign that must be executed now and through the entire process until a free and a unified Korea is established. It provides a way to openly discuss what is best for all Korean people
Planning for peaceful unification will also make a very important contribution to informing post-conflict operations planning should war or regime collapse occur. but most importantly planning for peaceful unification can provide the strategic framework for policy and strategy for all events on the Korean peninsula, from negotiated unification to internal regime transformation and to the outcomes of war or regime collapse.
North Korean Troops in Ukraine: The Final Blow to Korean Reunification?
North Korea’s deployment of troops to support Russia in Ukraine has solidified the split between North and South Korea, putting an end to any notion of peaceful reunification. While North Korea’s presence may not alter the battlefield, it has escalated geopolitical tension.
The National Interest · by Lake Dodson · November 5, 2024
Same Peninsula but Worlds Apart: North Korean Soldiers in Ukraine is the Nail in the Coffin for Peaceful Korean Reunification - Are the battle-hardened Ukrainian soldiers shivering in their boots, anxiously anticipating the arrival of the North Koreans side-by-side with their Russian compatriots? Is the next Admiral Yi Sun-sin among the ranks of the Hermit Kingdom’s horde? Is this the latchkey moment the Kim Dynasty was long anticipating, accumulating power to push their armies into a foreign land to show up their adversary: the conniving American Empire?
Likely not. The North Korean presence on the battlefields of Ukraine will serve to bolster numbers on the front and otherwise to keep the Russian war machine running as efficiently as possible, or at least, as it possibly can.
No, the North Koreans on the ground will probably not drastically change much, however, geopolitically, this changes everything.
New Pieces on the Chess Board
While nearly every country has taken a side in the Russo-Ukrainian war, either through government commitment or silently conforming towards their preferred hegemon's bloc, both of the countries comprising the Korean peninsula have entered the fray and destroyed the idea that this war is strictly “European.” As the average Russian soldier struggles with Korean vocab awaiting their new allies to arrive, South Korea threatens to up the ante and send weapons directly to Ukraine.
This tit-for-tat behavior with North Korea is typical of the current South Korean President Yoon’s administration, one that is currently in hot water with record levels of low approval ratings of his domestic and foreign policy being at under forty percent. Yoon’s party clings to a tried-and-true Conservative method of responding to North Korean aggression with an equal or greater amount of escalation, as detailed by Voice of America Seoul Bureau Chief William Gallo, “During periods of military tensions, South Korea has often embraced a policy of retaliating with at least three times as much force as North Korea. The “three-to-one” policy stretches back at least to 2010, when South Korea responded to North Korea’s deadly shelling of the frontline island of Yeonpyeong.”
The Trash Balloon incident, Kim Jong-un declaring South Korea to be an enemy nation and abandoning the goal of peaceful reunification, sending North Korean troops to aid Russia in Ukraine, and most recently conducting an ICBM test days before the U.S. election have led to both states to pull apart from one another.
This Rift Shows No Sign of Stopping
North and South Korea now act as aides towards opposing sides of a proxy war between the Russian Federation very, very loosely backed by the BRICS bloc, and the sovereign Ukraine backed by NATO and their allies, the same forces that fought against each other on the Korean Peninsula in what was also a proxy war over seventy years ago.
Korean Reunification looked to be just on the horizon after German reunification and the fall of the USSR, but ultimately, the window of opportunity slammed shut on the fingers of the hopeful.
The Sunshine Policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun presidencies, seeking cooperation with North Korea without the direct goal of absorption, looked to be just the forward-thinking route to take to lead inter-Korean relations to a more agreeable position, but North Korea only dangled a carrot-on-a-stick in front of South Korea, in turn, making an ass of themselves.
The 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyongyang was shaped up to be just as influential as the 1988 Seoul Olympics, which showed the nations of the world that South Korea was not some forgettable backwater country, but a serious, burgeoning Asian power. In the end, the Olympic fire was extinguished, and the ambition for substantial change died along with it.
Indeed, as the generation that remembers one unified Korea after liberation from Japanese colonialism fades away with age, so too does the interest and/or incentive to pursue that goal.
About the Author: Lake Dobson
Lake Dodson is an Assistant Editor for the National Interest. His interests are Korean-American relations, cybersecurity policy, and nuclear energy/weapons policy. He currently studies the Korean language and has completed courses on North-South Korean Relations and conducted various experiments on an AGN-201K Nuclear Reactor at the prestigious Kyung-hee University in Suwon, South Korea. His specific interests are effective nuclear energy policy, cyber-security, and the economy and politics of East Asia. He holds a BA from the University of Mississippi.
Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Lake Dodson · November 5, 2024
2. Comparing Trust, Respect, and Communication Between the North Korea–Russia and South Korea–U.S. Alliances
Comparing Trust, Respect, and Communication Between the North Korea–Russia and South Korea–U.S. Alliances
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/comparing-trust-respect-and-communication-between-the-north-korea-russia-and-south-korea-u-s-alli?postId=56a0a6e8-3d14-4100-b6a2-0f13580e41fa&utm
By David Maxwell - November 6, 2024
Introduction
As North Korean troops begin deployment to Russia with the prospect of fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, communication challenges are becoming evident. While military operations rely on clear communication, the relationship between Russian and North Korean forces goes beyond linguistic issues. To succeed on the battlefield, trust and mutual respect between the forces are equally crucial. Interpretation and translation can only bridge some of these gaps, and without trust, there is a risk of miscommunication and failure on the battlefield.
The Challenge of Language Interpretation and Cultural Understanding
Military communication is complex. Hand signals and tactical gestures can be universally understood across forces, conveying basic commands like "attack" or "stop." However, more intricate orders require interpreters with a deep understanding of both languages and cultures. A simple Google translation can convey words but lacks the nuance of military concepts and operational standards. Interpreters need to understand complex military tactics and the cultural context of the forces they are communicating between to ensure that orders are not merely understood but acted upon with clarity.
North Korean and Russian forces do not have a history of combined training or interoperability. By contrast, the U.S. and South Korean alliance has focused on living, working, and training together over the past 70 years. This integration has led to a deep-rooted understanding of military operations and the capability to conduct combined operations effectively. Programs such as the Korean Augmentees to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) are instrumental in fostering trust. This program, initiated in 1950, places Korean soldiers within U.S. Army units, facilitating better communication and shared understanding. The high level of interoperability at the command levels and the cross-pollination of doctrine in professional military education in both countries have strengthened the alliance and improved operational efficiency.
The Role of Trust in Combined Military Operations
A foundation of trust is essential in any successful military alliance. Trust is built over time through shared experiences, such as training exercises and even casual bonding among soldiers. You cannot “surge trust.”
One report suggests a ratio of one translator and three Russian officers per 30 North Korean soldiers. If these officers are expected to control the North Korean troops, the arrangement could lead to a breakdown in command structures. Without mutual trust, North Korean soldiers may feel subjugated or distrusted, potentially undermining their morale and cooperation with Russian forces.
There are two critical aspects of building trust between forces. First, soldiers must live, work, and train together to create a bond. Veterans often note that shared combat experiences, training hardships, and social interactions (e.g. sharing beer, soju, or vodka) help build camaraderie. However, given the lack of past cooperation between North Korean and Russian troops, there is minimal opportunity for such bonding to occur. To paraphrase one of the U.S. SOF truths, you cannot create the bonds of trust rapidly after emergencies occur. This is certainly an emergency for Russia. Instead of the unity that U.S. and South Korean forces experience through combined exercises and training, the Russian and North Korean forces are likely to encounter friction due to unfamiliarity with each other's military culture and operational expectations.
The second aspect required for trust is respect. Reports from Ukrainian intelligence reveal that Russian forces refer to North Korean troops in derogatory terms, suggesting a lack of respect for their Korean counterparts. Negative perceptions or cultural biases within the Russian forces could create resentment among the North Koreans, diminishing the potential for a cohesive military effort. To build a successful combined force, Russian leaders must acknowledge and respect the experience and contributions of the North Korean soldiers rather than viewing them as subordinates or expendable assets.
The Limitations of Basic Communication Tools
Recently, a booklet containing basic Korean military commands was reportedly distributed to Russian forces, suggesting a minimalistic approach to language training. These phrases include simple commands like “Attack!” or “Get down!” While these basic expressions might help Russian forces communicate in critical moments, they fall short of conveying complex military strategies or nuanced commands. This issue is exacerbated by the lack of trained interpreters capable of providing real-time, contextually accurate interpretations.
For instance, the South Korean and U.S. forces have spent decades refining their communication protocols. Interpreters and translators embedded in these forces are familiar with military jargon and the cultural nuances of both nations. Additionally, they undergo continuous training to ensure that they can handle the intricacies of operational planning and battlefield directives. In contrast, Russian efforts to teach a limited set of Korean phrases to their soldiers may prove ineffective on the battlefield, where rapid and precise communication is paramount.
Consequences of Inadequate Trust and Respect
The reliance on basic translations without building trust and respect could result in operational chaos. Military leaders and experts agree that trust between forces is necessary to execute effective combat operations. Without well-trained interpreters and a history of combined training, it will be challenging for North Korean and Russian forces to conduct coordinated operations. The U.S. and South Korea's combined forces have conducted interoperability training for decades, yet even with these established protocols, communication is continuously honed through joint and combined exercises.
With North Korean soldiers reportedly struggling to understand the Russian military’s combat terminology, the expectation of a seamless partnership may be unrealistic. Russian reports suggest that the North Korean military is finding it difficult to learn even the basics of military communication, further complicating operational effectiveness. An atmosphere of distrust, coupled with language barriers and cultural misunderstandings, could compromise the effectiveness of both forces in Ukraine.
Building a Sustainable Partnership for Battlefield and Strategic Success
If Russian and North Korean forces wish to build an effective alliance, they must address these foundational issues beyond language. Investing in comprehensive interpreter training, fostering mutual respect, and creating opportunities for joint training exercises would be more effective long-term solutions. Learning basic phrases might be a short-term fix, but without trust and respect, there is no foundation for the kind of cooperation that successful military partnerships demand.
Ultimately, if Russia views North Korean forces as expendable or subservient, it will be nearly impossible to build the trust needed for successful combined operations. Building effective partnerships requires time, commitment, and a genuine respect for each other’s capabilities. In this regard, the Russian and North Korean forces have a long way to go if they hope to work together as a cohesive and effective military unit.
Not only are trust, respect, and effective communication required for the battlefield they are required for effective policy making and strategy development. Fortunately, these relationships that have developed among the military have also been built among policy makers in South Korea and the U.S. This includes both professional civil servants and political appointees. There is nothing comparable between Russian and North Korea.
Conclusion
Although perhaps not apparent to the casual reader, this comparison has particular meaning for the outcome on the Korean peninsula. The differences between them are the reasons why one will achieve success and the other will not. The alliance based on trust and respect will always defeat a transactional alliance. If there is war or regime collapse on the Korean peninsula the South Korea–U.S. alliance will prevail in defending Korea and making the Korean peninsula safe for all Korean people. Now that the military alliance has publicly committed to a free and unified Korea in the 56th Security Consultative Meeting, showing the utmost respect for the desires of the Korean people, it will provide military support to achieving the political end state of a unified Korea, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).
David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society
3. DoD can't confirm whether North Korean troops in Russia are 'gorging on pornography'
Let's not jump to conclusions. Of course everyone wants to believe these reports but we must take them with a grain of salt. Remember the Ukainians have proven very adept at psychological warfare and there are target audiences beyond Russian and north Korean forces.
However, if at all accurate it means the troops are having access to outside information and that ability to access information, porn or otherwise, will be useful for psychological operations.
Even more important, if accurate, this means there is a breakdown of the three chains of control (for north Korea it is control and command with the emphasis on control. There is the traditional chain of command from general to private. There is the political officer chain of control like every communist military. And unlike any other military there is a security officer chain of control. So for each military unit there are three people in control.) If the troops are "gorging on porn" then these chains of control may be breaking down. Or maybe they are giving them some kind of "last rites benefits" before they are expended in battle.
The bottom line is we must take these reports with a grain of salt but they bear watching.
DoD can't confirm whether North Korean troops in Russia are 'gorging on pornography'
“As entertaining as that sounds, I can’t confirm any North Korean internet habits or virtual ‘extracurriculars’ in Russia,” a Defense Department spokesperson told Task & Purpose.
Jeff Schogol
Updated on Nov 5, 2024 2:44 PM EST
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
North Korean troops deployed to Russia may have discovered online pornography, and really gotten into it, the chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times newspaper posted on X.
“A usually reliable source tells me that the North Korean soldiers who have deployed to Russia have never had unfettered access to the internet before,” wrote Gideon Rachman. “As a result, they are gorging on pornography.”
Rachman did not specify who his source was or how this person would be in a position to know whether roughly 10,000 North Koreans deployed to Russia had figured out how to find such adult sites, considering the country’s tight controls on internet use, but this is social media, and “some guy” on Twitter (ahem, I mean ‘X’) posting about whether North Korean troops are spending their downtime watching porn is enough to drive 1.5 million people to read the post, as of publication time.
Now, as the puppet musical “Avenue Q” taught us, the internet is for porn. But if North Korean troops now in Russia are indeed spending their time away from home in that fashion online, who’s to say what damage that could cause to the computers in their tactical operations center, once they become overrun with pop-ads for erectile dysfunction medication?
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Given the enormous signals intelligence capabilities that the Defense Department has, one might assume that the Pentagon would have a good idea of whether horny North Korean troops are at risk of bringing down the entire Russian network.
Alas, a brave Pentagon spokesperson had little to say about the matter.
“As entertaining as that sounds, I can’t confirm any North Korean internet habits or virtual ‘extracurriculars’ in Russia,” Army Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz told Task & Purpose. “We’re focused on the more serious aspects of North Korea’s involvement, if any, in Russia’s military operations. As for internet access, that’s a question best directed to Moscow. Right now, our attention remains on supporting Ukraine and addressing the more significant regional security concerns.”
Task & Purpose decided not to ask the Kremlin if its North Korean allies were using the Russian internet to view pornography because this reporter has no desire to fall from the balcony of a tall building.
In any event, the second- and third-order effects of exposing North Korean troops to internet porn are not yet known. A reliable source tells Task & Purpose that the Korean People’s Army is considering curing its troops of their lustful desires by using a fiendish piece of technology that will crush all their emotions including the will to live itself: The Defense Travel System.
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
4. US approves sale of four E-7 early-warning planes to South Korea
Good news. An important capability for the ROK military that obviously supports alliance military capabilities.
Excerpt:
State said selling the Wedgetails to South Korea would improve the major ally’s security, and support the United States’ foreign policy goals and national security objectives. The Wedgetails would improve South Korea’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and airborne early warning and control capabilities, and improve how the South Korean air force interacts with the U.S. military.
US approves sale of four E-7 early-warning planes to South Korea
Defense News · by Stephen Losey · November 5, 2024
South Korea is cleared to buy four Boeing-made E-7 airborne early warning and control aircraft, often referred to as the Wedgetail, for nearly $5 billion under a foreign military sale the State Department approved Monday.
The purchase would also include 10 CFM56 jet engines — eight installed on the Wedgetails and two more spares — countermeasures and missile warning systems to help defend the aircraft, GPS navigation systems, transponders, and radio systems.
The E-7 provides airborne battle management and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, allowing operators to scan battlefields and track movements of friends, foes, and civilians. The Australian air force already flies the Wedgetail, and the U.S. Air Force wants to buy up to 26 of them to replace its aging E-3 Sentry AWACS fleet.
State said selling the Wedgetails to South Korea would improve the major ally’s security, and support the United States’ foreign policy goals and national security objectives. The Wedgetails would improve South Korea’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and airborne early warning and control capabilities, and improve how the South Korean air force interacts with the U.S. military.
Officials wrote that South Korea “will have no difficulty” folding the Wedgetails into its fleet, and that the $4.92 billion sale would not alter the basic military balance in the region, verbiage commonly found in similar congressional notifications of proposed weapon sales.
Unlike the E-3′s rotating “radome,” which takes a full 10 seconds to complete a rotation and refresh its view of the battlefield, the E-7′s advanced Northrop Grumman-made sensor will be able to fix its gaze on one or several targets and refresh its view rapidly.
Boeing officials told reporters in 2023 that “ability to stare” allows E-7 operators to have a continually updating picture of how targets are moving. That becomes particularly important when tracking high-speed or supersonic aircraft, which can move a mile or two in the time it takes an E-3 sensor to fully rotate.
E-7s are built from modified 737-700 airframes, which are first made by Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Kansas. Boeing takes the 737 tube to its facility in Renton, Washington, where it strengthens the infrastructure to bear the weight of its multirole electronically scanned array, or MESA. Boeing also adds stronger landing gear and wings with greater lift capability.
About Stephen Losey
Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.
5. HISTORICAL FACTORS THAT HAVE LED TO THE RAMPANT CORRUPTION IN NORTH KOREA
Corruption can be both a survival mechanism and a threat to the regime and the people.
Excerpts:
The political and economic systems of both Koreas remain fundamentally different today: democracy versus authoritarianism, and capitalism versus a centrally-planned economy. There are notable differences in their socio-economic structures, such as the nature of bureaucracy, prevailing governance norms, rule of law and law enforcement, distribution of wealth, political party systems, and the stability of civil society. Institutional theory emphasizes these factors as a means of understanding how corruption might become entrenched in society.[40] Additional considerations include a country’s tolerance for corruption and the perception of corruption by officials and citizens.[41] Nevertheless, anti-corruption reforms do not happen naturally in accordance with a specific political or economic system and are not just a byproduct of economic development – they remain a gradual process that requires a change in both structural conditions and people’s perceptions.
In summary, pervasive corruption in North Korea has profound and extensive impacts on the human rights of its people. The lack of rule of law and the widespread need for bribery to access basic necessities like food, healthcare, and legal protection perpetuate a cycle of deprivation and repression.[42] High-ranking officials exercise broad discretionary powers, leading to systemic abuse and exploitation of ordinary citizens.[43] The absence of democratic institutions and transparent governance means there are no effective mechanisms to hold corrupt officials accountable or protect the rights of citizens. This environment of impunity allows corruption to flourish, undermining efforts to improve living conditions and human rights in North Korea.[44] Addressing corruption in North Korea requires not only structural reforms but also a fundamental shift in the perception and tolerance of corruption among both officials and citizens. International pressure and support for human rights initiatives can play a crucial role in advocating for these changes. Ultimately, the fight against corruption is essential for ensuring the dignity, freedom, and well-being of the North Korean people.
11/4/2024
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By Jiwoo (Katie) Choi, HRNK Research Intern
Edited by Diletta De Luca, Research Associate
https://www.nkhiddengulag.org/blog/historical-factors-that-have-led-to-the-rampant-corruption-in-north-korea?utm
Until the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, following the end of the Second World War, the people of North and South Korea were united by the same history and culture for thousands of years. Over the 70 years since the division, the two countries have taken almost opposite paths, resulting in their citizens living in completely different political, economic, and cultural environments. One of the most noticeable differences is the level of public corruption. According to the most recent corruption indices by Trace International and Transparency International, South Korea has consistently ranked between 20th and 40th place, while North Korea has been at the bottom of the list of 180-200 countries, making it one of the most corrupt countries in the world.
Evaluating the accurate status of corruption in North Korea is challenging. Over the decades, the measurement of corruption has evolved (e.g., perceptions, surveys, estimates from direct observation, graft estimation by subtraction, estimates from market inference). However, there remains little consensus about the magnitude of a country’s corruption due to the highly heterogeneous and multidimensional nature of these estimates.[1] Furthermore, objectively assessing the true extent of North Korea’s corruption is difficult due to the lack of available information for the international audience and the secretive nature of the country. Consequently, it seems inevitable to rely heavily on testimonies and experiences of North Korean defectors, even though perception-based measures may not accurately reflect the level of corruption.
1.Before the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s
It is widely known that autocrats often utilize corruption not only to accumulate wealth but also to reward loyalists and political supporters. Putative anti-corruption efforts are likely a cover for purging rivals and consolidating power.[2] In other words, autocrats can use anti-corruption policies as an excuse to eliminate their enemies and gain more control over the government. However, curbing corruption has been a major agenda item for some “high-performing” authoritarian regimes, such as China and Singapore, for economic development, political stability or international image, and their anti-corruption success is too common to be considered exceptional.[3]
At the end of the Second World War, Korea regained independence after 35 years of Japanese rule. However, in 1945, the Yalta Conference agreements divided the Korean Peninsula into two separate countries. Both were poor and characterized by rampant corruption. Newly independent countries often witness high levels of corruption due to underdeveloped governance and opportunities for individuals to exploit the system for personal gain in their politically unstable and developing environments.[4] After the Korean War (1950-1953), both North and South Korea focused on reconstruction of their war-torn countries while grappling with absolute poverty, each competing to prove the superiority of their respective systems.
Under these circumstances, political corruption was fairly well curbed under Kim Il-sung’s regime from the 1950s until the 1980s.[5] Kim Il-sung, the first autocratic leader of North Korea, eagerly pursued economic development, not only as part of his ideological commitment to creating a modern socialist state but also to win the inter-Korean competition.[6] He considered corruption a threat to the economy and fought it with the Anti-Corruption Campaign, Anti-Waste Campaign (1952), and the Self-Confession Campaign (1955).[7] In the 1950s, North Korea arguably battled corruption more successfully than its southern counterpart.[8] Anti-corruption campaigns by autocrats often become a means to eliminate their political enemies or to consolidate their own power. However, these developmental imperatives have the potential to stimulate highly authoritarian regimes to curb corruption. Kim Il-sung’s campaigns successfully contributed to post-war reconstruction and rapid development, resulting in higher economic development in North Korea compared to the South until the 1970s.[9] This suggests that structural factors such as regime type might be insufficient to predict a country’s tolerance for corruption. However, Kim Il-sung's anti-corruption policies had structural limitations as they did not rely on the conventional democratic approach such as the rule of law, checks and balances, elections, and government transparency.
In South Korea during the same period, political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992. Despite considerable efforts to achieve self-reliance through critical national industries such as chemicals and steel, the pervasive network of relationships facilitated corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners, granting them access to profitable contracts.[10] Conventional theories suggest that corruption is detrimental to economic growth, but it can sometimes counteract rigid procedures and bureaucratic governments.[11] This approach contributed to South Korea’s post-war prosperity, as business owners played a significant role in transforming a poor agrarian market into the world’s 10th-largest industrial economy despite the negative aspects of corruption.
2. After the Economic Collapse of the Mid-1990s
Since the economic collapse of North Korea in the 1990s, corruption has rapidly spread and penetrated the daily lives of its people. Bribery has become a common practice among North Koreans for various activities, such as moving residences, engaging in commercial activities, issuing documents, using medical facilities, receiving job assignments, entering schools, and seeking overseas assignments.[12] Bribery and corruption lead to significant human rights concerns in several ways, including access to basic necessities (food, healthcare, shelter, and work), arbitrary arrest and detention, inhumane treatment in detention facilities, vulnerability to exploitation (especially for women), and lack of rule of law. The kleptocratic government mandates and perpetuates corruption through centralized power, a patronage system, lack of transparency, forced labor and exploitation, leading to severe human rights concerns. As a result, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recognized corruption as a serious human rights problem in North Korea and analyzed the state’s kleptocracy as a form of corruption.[13]
While it is not possible to explain the corruption status of North Korea by analyzing a single theory or factor, it remains meaningful to compare the corruption in both Koreas from political, economic, and socio-cultural perspectives.
A. Authoritarianism versus Democracy / Centrally-planned Economy versus Capitalism
In the mid-1990s, the North Korean economy, including its state-run public distribution system, collapsed, partly due to “traumatic” events such as the sudden withdrawal of Soviet support after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1991) and a devastating famine (1994–1998). The death of Kim Il-sung in 1994 also triggered additional political instability in the country. These circumstances led to corruption becoming a ubiquitous and structuralized problem, rampant in many sectors of economic and social life.[14] Pyongyang’s leadership required new sources of revenue, resulting in the regime deeply engaging in illegal activities abroad, including cybercrime, crypto theft, counterfeiting, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking. Such activities continue today and represent major sources of revenue for the country’s leadership. These illegal activities are closely related to corruption, both as a symptom and a driver of the pervasive corruption within the regime. They involve high-ranking officials’ misuse of state power and resources, and they undermine the rule of law.
Low wages in the public sector have further contributed to corruption.[15] The crisis of the 1990s pushed even party officials to the brink of starvation, exacerbating bribery and embezzlement driven by desperation rather than greed. The breakdown of the public distribution system led to widespread embezzlement by citizens and officials with access to state resources. Jonathan Corrado, Director of Policy of the Korea Society stated, “The low salaries of state officials and a lack of oversight meant that people, especially those participating in the informal or market economy, are quite vulnerable."[16] For many, corruption has become a survival strategy, as their wages seldom reach the barest subsistence level.[17]
In the 1990s, North Korea was forced to accept de facto marketization, which facilitated corruption as beneficial to the regime, representing a major source of revenue for the leadership.[18] The regime initially tried to suppress marketization for maintaining control over economy and political stability, but failed due to undeniable economic necessity and its role in facilitating economic recovery.[19] In 2002, Kim Jong-il’s regime partly formalized economic liberalization through a set of agricultural and financial reforms[20] to impose post hoc control over the market.[21] In the marketized economy, various forms of corruption became financial wins for not only the regime and officials but also for the individuals involved in market activities. New wealthy entrepreneurs, called “donju”, are said to be an invisible hand of economic development. They have a corrupt symbiotic relationship with the regime and officials, allowing them to bypass restrictions on market activities and gain access to state assets. Pseudo-state enterprises, which are state-owned on paper but controlled by private interests in practice,[22] also tie themselves to the regime as their activities lack a legal framework.[23] From an economic point of view, the corruption of these actors seems to help grease the wheels of a highly regulated economy. Additionally, marketization forced citizens to work in informal black markets, known as jangmadang, and engage in illegal activities to survive. They often had to bribe officials to access and sell food and healthcare products.
According to a 2019 survey by the Korea Society, 68% of North Korean defectors spent 10-30% of their incomes on bribery.[24] North Korean people are trapped in a vicious cycle of deprivation and repression, with corruption being one of the few ways to escape this oppressive situation.[25] This reflects the desperate measures people must take to navigate an oppressive system that fails to uphold their basic rights and dignity. This economic burden exacerbates poverty and restricts their ability to improve living conditions, directly impacting fundamental human rights. It creates an environment where human rights are routinely violated, and citizens have little recourse to legal protection. Bribery entrenches social inequality, as those who cannot afford to pay bribes are denied essential services and face harsher treatment.[26] This disparity further marginalizes vulnerable populations, including women and children. Corruption in North Korea is both a symptom and a cause of the broader human rights crisis.
In contrast, South Korea inaugurated its first civilian government in 1992 and elected its first opposition president in 1997. Since then, institutional reforms have strengthened democracy, civil rights, and governance quality. The peaceful transition of governments through voting and programmatic competition between the two major political parties has continued. Good governance reforms (1993-2007) led to tangible improvements in transparency (including political finances), corruption control, and governance norms, replacing favoritism and nepotism.[27]
Even though South Korea exerted considerable effort to achieve economic development and self-reliance based on critical national industries, the vicious circle of close relationships continued to facilitate corruption. The growth of international trade and business made bribes highly beneficial to company owners by giving them access to profitable contracts. However, after the 1997 financial crisis, civil governments focused on economic reforms, partly due to pressure from the International Monetary Fund’s bailout loan, aimed at enhancing “rapid growth and reduced inequality”[28] in the corporate, labor, and financial sectors. Economic growth and well-established education systems expanded the middle class, while civil organizations and the vibrant civil society also played a significant role in restraining the malfeasance of corporations and officials.[29] These reforms also enhanced accountability and transparency in corporate governance and contributed to market competition and equitable wealth distribution.[30]
B. Rule of Law and Judicial Justice
Corruption tends to increase where the legal system fails to provide sanctions and penalties for bribed officials. For several years, North Korea has received the worst scores on Trace International’s assessment of ‘Anti-bribery Deterrence and Enforcement’. Due to the absence of the rule of law, high-ranking officials have broad discretionary powers, motivating their clients to gain and retain their goodwill by paying bribes.[31] Additionally, the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and prosecution provides law enforcement officials with opportunities to extort money from citizens desperate to avoid inhumane legal actions.[32] According to KINU’s 2019 white paper, there were many reports of bribery and corruption during investigations, preliminary examinations, and in detention facilities, as well as by judges and prosecutors during trials.[33] The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry report also states that “the vast majority of inmates are victims of arbitrary detention, since they are imprisoned without trial or on the basis of a trial that fails to respect the due process and fair trial guarantees set out in international law.”[34]
Ever since he took power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has launched several ‘merciless’ anti-corruption campaigns targeting party officials. However, these crackdowns exclusively focused on keeping mid-level officials from siphoning money that would otherwise flow to higher-ups.[35] There were no systematic efforts to control and curb corruption to ensure the protection and fair treatment of North Korean citizens. This indicates the extent to which tolerance for corruption can shift even within the same totalitarian regime, depending on changes in the economic situation and political needs. This is why simple theories based on regime type or culture cannot predict cross-national variations in corruption.
In this respect, North Korea and South Korea remain in stark contrast. The most impressive change after the governance reforms (1993-2007) in South Korea is the frequent prosecution and imprisonment of the political and economic elite. For example, four former presidents, as well as former members of the National Assembly and ministers, were sentenced to prison, and another former president committed suicide amid a corruption investigation into his family. The courts have also found many top executives guilty of corruption related to presidents and politicians. Despite concerns that some politicians have used corruption investigations for political revenge, South Korea has impressed the international community with its effective anti-corruption policy and a law enforcement system that is unprecedentedly responsive to public opinion.[36]
In addition, the South Korean government amended the Public Service Ethics Act in 2015 to ensure the fairness of official authorities by preventing conflicts of interest. They also enacted the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in 2015, which set low ceilings on financial benefits regardless of whether the benefits were related to official duties. These legal and institutional changes strengthened the anti-corruption stance by enhancing citizens’ perception and sensitivity to corruption, creating a virtuous circle of rule of law.
C. Other Conventional “Democratic” Factors
As mentioned above, the anti-corruption policies of the Kim family had structural limitations because they lacked conventional democratic approaches, unlike South Korea. Although political corruption was rampant under military governments until 1992 in South Korea, the seeds of improved political, economic, and social corruption control were sown and began to grow during this period. For example, land reforms in 1948-1950 changed the class structure by dissolving the landed aristocracy, contributing to a relatively equal distribution of wealth.[37] The rapid expansion of education also established the fundamentals of ethical awareness and integrity, leading to anti-authoritarian movements by students and intellectuals in the 1960s-1980s.[38] Gradual civil service reform, including the expansion of civil service examinations, enhanced merit-based bureaucratic recruitment and promotion from the 1950s to the 1990s.[39]
Unfortunately, the Kim family’s anti-corruption campaigns and efforts did not go beyond the framework of authoritarianism and failed to lay the basis for establishing systematic structures that suppress corruption. The absence of democratic factors in North Korea has resulted in systemic corruption, repression, and widespread human rights abuses, where human rights are routinely violated. In contrast, the seeds of fundamental changes have blossomed since the mid-1990s in South Korea, and the levels of corruption in the two countries have become completely different.
Concluding Remarks
The political and economic systems of both Koreas remain fundamentally different today: democracy versus authoritarianism, and capitalism versus a centrally-planned economy. There are notable differences in their socio-economic structures, such as the nature of bureaucracy, prevailing governance norms, rule of law and law enforcement, distribution of wealth, political party systems, and the stability of civil society. Institutional theory emphasizes these factors as a means of understanding how corruption might become entrenched in society.[40] Additional considerations include a country’s tolerance for corruption and the perception of corruption by officials and citizens.[41] Nevertheless, anti-corruption reforms do not happen naturally in accordance with a specific political or economic system and are not just a byproduct of economic development – they remain a gradual process that requires a change in both structural conditions and people’s perceptions.
In summary, pervasive corruption in North Korea has profound and extensive impacts on the human rights of its people. The lack of rule of law and the widespread need for bribery to access basic necessities like food, healthcare, and legal protection perpetuate a cycle of deprivation and repression.[42] High-ranking officials exercise broad discretionary powers, leading to systemic abuse and exploitation of ordinary citizens.[43] The absence of democratic institutions and transparent governance means there are no effective mechanisms to hold corrupt officials accountable or protect the rights of citizens. This environment of impunity allows corruption to flourish, undermining efforts to improve living conditions and human rights in North Korea.[44] Addressing corruption in North Korea requires not only structural reforms but also a fundamental shift in the perception and tolerance of corruption among both officials and citizens. International pressure and support for human rights initiatives can play a crucial role in advocating for these changes. Ultimately, the fight against corruption is essential for ensuring the dignity, freedom, and well-being of the North Korean people.
[1] Benjamin A. Olken and Rohini Pande. “Corruption in Developing Countries.” Annual Review of Economics, 2012. https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110917.
[2] Christopher Carothers. “Combating Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes.” Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, 2019.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Rajeev K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson. “Causes of corruption: History, geography and government.” Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 32, Issue 4, 2010.
[5] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.” Journal of East Asian Studies, 22(1), 2022.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[10] Tanzi, Vito. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.” International Monetary Found, May 1998. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp9863.pdf
[11] Bajpai, Rajni and Myers,C. Bernard. “Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption.” World Bank Group.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/235541600116631094/Enhancing-Government-Effectiveness-and-Transparency-The-Fight-Against-Corruption.
[12] Kyu-chang Lee, Sookyung Kim, Ji Sun Yee, Eun Mee Jeong, Yejoon Rim. “White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2020.” Korea Institute for National Unification, September 2020. https://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/module/report/view.do?idx=113738&nav_code=eng1674806000
[13] Joshua Stanton. “The Root of All Evil: Money, Rice, Crime & Law in North Korea.” The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2023. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Root_of_All_Evil.pdf.
[14] Changyong Choi and Balazs Szalontai. “The Challenge of Corruption Control in a Post-Unification Korea: Lessons from Germany and the Former Soviet Bloc.” SSRN, 2020.
[15] Vito Tanzi. “Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scop, and Cures.”
[16] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion(북한 부패인식지수 세계 최하위권, 뇌물 강요 만연),” VOA Korea. January 29, 2021. https://www.voakorea.com/a/korea_korea-social-issues_corruption-north-korea/6055808.html&sa=D&source=docs&ust=1688014176050971&usg=AOvVaw3Zghn3YahRFF7h3evkgOEF.
[17] Daily NK. “KPA Corruption: A Necessary Evil?.” April 6, 2015. https://www.dailynk.com/english/kpa-corruption-a-necessary-evil/; Daily NK, “In sanctioned North Korea, bribery problem worsens.” January 9, 2018. https://www.dailynk.com/english/in-sanctioned-north-korea-bribery/.
[18] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Marcus Noland. “Transition from the Bottom-Up: Institutional Change in North Korea.” Comparative Economic Studies, 48(2), February 2006.
[22] Andrei Lankov. “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia.” Oxford University Press, 2015.
[23] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
[24] Taeksung Oh. “North Korea's Corruption Perception Index ranks at the lowest in the world - the Prevalence of bribery compulsion.”
[25] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” May 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/KP/ ThePriceIsRights_EN.pdf.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea”. Australian National University. Jul 2015. https://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Process-Tracing-of-Corruption-Control-in-South-Korea.pdf.
[28] World Bank. “The East Asian Miracle.” Oxford University Press, 1993. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/pdf/multi-page.pdf.
[29] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[30] Ibid.
[31] Young-Ja Park. “Informal Political System in North Korea: Systematic Corruption of ‘Power-Wealth Symbiosis’.” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 24:1, 2015.
[32] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[33] U.S. Department of State. “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2020.
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/north-korea/.
[34] Report of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea - A/HRC/25/63. A.HRC.25.63.doc (live.com)
[35] Ethan Jewell. “North Korea the world’s most corrupt country for 3rd straight year: Report.” NK News. Nov 16, 2022. https://www.nknews.org/2022/11/north-korea-the-worlds-most-corrupt-country-for-3rd-straight-year-report/.
[36] Carothers C. “Corruption Control in Authoritarian South Korea. In: Corruption Control in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from East Asia.” Cambridge University Press. 2022.
[37] Jong-sung You. “Process-tracing paper: Development of Corruption Control in South Korea.”
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Knowledge tools for academics and professionals. Module Series on Anti-Corruption: Module 4 Public Sector Corruption.”
[41] Ibid.
[42] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. “The Price Is Rights: The Violation of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
[43] Ibid.
[44] Christopher Carothers. “The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea.”
6. Analysis: South Korea's public distrust of U.S. grows amid spying allegations
Ammunition for north Korean political warfare and those who want to damage the ROK/US alliance.
Excerpts:
The erosion of public trust could impact not only diplomatic relations but also the economic and military dimensions of the alliance, as support for joint initiatives may wane if the public’s concerns are not addressed. This could include:
Increased public and political scrutiny on government transparency in U.S.-South Korea agreements.
Rising anti-American sentiment, potentially influencing future elections and policy direction.
Greater support for policies promoting South Korean sovereignty and independence in international relations.
Diplomats should watch for shifts in public discourse, particularly narratives emphasizing South Korean sovereignty and independence. Policy adjustments that limit South Korea’s reliance on the U.S. or increase oversight of U.S. partnerships could signal a response to this public sentiment.
Analysis: South Korea's public distrust of U.S. grows amid spying allegations
Allegations of U.S. spying on South Korea are adding to a widening gap between the public and the Yoon Administration policy of strengthening South Korea - U.S. relations.
https://www.junotane.com/p/south-koreas-public-distrust-of-us-grows-amid-spying-allegations
Nov 04, 2024
Event or Trend: A recent investigation by a popular media program has revisited U.S. surveillance on South Korea, and sparked significant public concern about U.S. intentions, challenging Yoon Administration efforts to strengthen the relationship.
Significance: The alliance between the U.S. and South Korea is a cornerstone of regional security, particularly in countering North Korea. A recent NewsTapa program highlights an increasingly dissatisfied South Korean public, who are questioning the sincerity of U.S. support. This public skepticism adds a new layer of complexity for South Korean policymakers, as they balance Yoon Administration policy, longstanding alliance commitments, and growing domestic pressures. Public distrust of the U.S. will weaken political and popular support for the alliance, affecting both security policies and economic cooperation. The situation will become significantly enhanced if a Trump Administration is elected. For both governments, this situation demands careful management to prevent further erosion of trust at a time when regional stability depends on their cooperation.
Analysis: In April 2023, leaked documents disclosed that the U.S. may have monitored South Korean National Security Office officials, sparking public outrage in South Korea. The South Korean government initially attempted to downplay the incident, suggesting that the documents might be fabricated. However, further scrutiny has revealed that these documents are likely authentic, putting the administration in a difficult position.
An investigation by online media entity NewsTapa (YouTube 1.36m subscribers) released 30 October now has 250k views, and is spreading on social media. This shows a growing rift in public trust, as citizens question both the intentions of the U.S. and their government’s response, which some perceive as overly accommodating to the U.S.
The Yoon administration now faces a significant challenge in maintaining public support for its U.S.-aligned policies.
The U.S.-South Korea alliance is experiencing a shift, with public distrust increasingly overshadowing official diplomacy. While both governments continue to publicly emphasize alliance strength, South Koreans are questioning U.S. motives, fueled by these recent surveillance allegations. Many citizens see the incident as a breach of sovereignty, expecting a stronger stance from their government. The Yoon administration’s subdued response has not resonated well, with critics arguing that the government prioritizes alliance optics over national integrity.
While the surveillance might be seen as routine, the public perception differs significantly. This sentiment risks undermining the alliance, as popular support is essential for sustained military cooperation and policy alignment. South Korea’s progressive and conservative parties alike now face pressure from a public that feels alienated by its government’s approach.
The situation will deteriorate further if Trump wins the election. The Trump Administration will pay less attention to the alliance, negotiate independently with North Korea (and neglect Yoon Administration policy), and seek to increase South Korean contributions to the maintenance of U.S. forces in Korea.
The erosion of public trust could impact not only diplomatic relations but also the economic and military dimensions of the alliance, as support for joint initiatives may wane if the public’s concerns are not addressed. This could include:
- Increased public and political scrutiny on government transparency in U.S.-South Korea agreements.
- Rising anti-American sentiment, potentially influencing future elections and policy direction.
- Greater support for policies promoting South Korean sovereignty and independence in international relations.
Diplomats should watch for shifts in public discourse, particularly narratives emphasizing South Korean sovereignty and independence. Policy adjustments that limit South Korea’s reliance on the U.S. or increase oversight of U.S. partnerships could signal a response to this public sentiment.
Outlook: In the short term (0-12 months), the Yoon administration will continue policies that depend upon the promotion of a strong U.S. alliance and will seek to downplay the situation. In the medium term (1-5 years), regardless of the next administration, distrust will lead to a recalibration of South Korea’s foreign policy, with more independent or regionally balanced stances. In the long term (5-10 years), persistent public skepticism will compel future administrations to adopt a more cautious approach to the U.S. alliance, possibly pursuing alternative diplomatic partnerships to meet both security and public trust needs.
7. Umerov confirms first battles between Ukrainian and North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast
From this report it appears that the nKPA forces are being deployed in support of Russian units across the front. Are they being used as individual replacements or "fillers" for Russian units or are they maintaining unit coherency while being deployed in support of larger Russian units? It is still not clear to me.
Excerpts:
The minister added that the DPRK soldiers were "disguised as Buryats" (an Asian people group inside Russia's borders) and mixed with Russian soldiers, so all the identities need to be checked to confirm the exact number of their losses and prisoners.
Kyiv expects five units of 3,000 people each to be deployed along the 1,500-kilometer front line. This will bring the total number of North Koreans involved in the war to 15,000.
The Russian border region has seen heavy battles since Ukraine launched a cross-border offensive in early August. Moscow has deployed North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast to reinforce lines there while its most experienced units continue advancing in Ukraine's east.
Umerov confirms first battles between Ukrainian and North Korean soldiers in Kursk Oblast
by Kateryna Hodunova and
The Kyiv Independent news desk
November 5, 2024 4:59 PM
2 min read
kyivindependent.com · by Kateryna Hodunova · November 5, 2024
The first clashes between the Ukrainian Armed Forces and North Korean soldiers have already taken place in Russia's Kursk Oblast, Ukraine's Defense Minister Rustem Umerov confirmed on Nov. 5 in an interview with South Korean TV channel KBS.
North Korea deployed 11,000 troops in Kursk Oblast, President Volodymyr Zelensky said the day before, citing Ukraine's intelligence report.
Andrii Kovalenko, head of the counter-disinformation department at Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, also claimed on Nov. 4 that the first North Korean soldiers stationed in this area have come under fire.
"We are identifying clashes with North Korean forces, but we believe there will be more fighting in the next few weeks, and we will continue to analyze and revise accordingly," Umerov said.
The clashes were small-scale, according to Umerov.
The minister added that the DPRK soldiers were "disguised as Buryats" (an Asian people group inside Russia's borders) and mixed with Russian soldiers, so all the identities need to be checked to confirm the exact number of their losses and prisoners.
Kyiv expects five units of 3,000 people each to be deployed along the 1,500-kilometer front line. This will bring the total number of North Koreans involved in the war to 15,000.
The Russian border region has seen heavy battles since Ukraine launched a cross-border offensive in early August. Moscow has deployed North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast to reinforce lines there while its most experienced units continue advancing in Ukraine's east.
President Volodymyr Zelensky said that if Ukraine had permission to use Western long-range weapons on Russian territory, it could preemptively target "every camp" in Russia where North Korean troops are gathering.
According to Zelensky, Russia has confirmed to the West the involvement of Pyongyang's forces in the war.
As Russian losses in Ukraine pass 700,000, Putin runs low on non-mobilization options
Russian losses in Ukraine have passed the 700,000 mark, according to figures released by Kyiv on Nov. 4, just 77 days after they hit 600,000, according to the same source. According to Kyiv, casualty rates among Moscow’s forces have surged in recent months — October saw an average of
The Kyiv IndependentChris York
kyivindependent.com · by Kateryna Hodunova · November 5, 2024
8. Ukraine Attacking North Korean Troops in Kursk – What We Know
A lot of circular reporting which I think is based on very few reports.
Excerpts:
According to Ukraine's intelligence directorate (HUR), Russia has armed the North Korean forces with mortars, assault rifles, anti-tank weapons, night-vision devices, and thermal imagers, while a few hundred special forces have also been deployed. Ukrainian officials and analysts question the combat readiness of the North Korean troops, with most being inexperienced and low-ranking.
Russian troops stationed in the Kursk region were reported to be discussing the challenges of trying to integrate with North Korean soldiers, particularly due to language and cultural barriers, as Kyiv Post reported earlier, citing an intercepted call released by the HUR.
The call, reportedly between members of Russia’s 810th Separate Marine Brigade, reveals a Russian soldier describing the North Koreans as “already here, learning with a translator.” The Kremlin reportedly plans to assign one translator and three Russian officers for every 30 North Korean troops, but the soldiers on the call doubted whether there were enough Russian personnel to support this setup.
Ukraine Attacking North Korean Troops in Kursk – What We Know
kyivpost.com · by Julia Struck · November 5, 2024
With estimates that the number of North Korean troops now supporting Russian efforts has grown to 12,000, the US and its allies have condemned the deployment.
by Julia Struck | November 5, 2024, 3:50 pm
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits the training base of the Korean People's Army's special operations forces at an undisclosed location in September. Photo: Korean Central News Agency
The Financial Times (FT) and other media outlets have reported that Ukrainian forces have fired on North Korean troops deployed to Russia’s western Kursk region, marking the first known combat engagement with foreign soldiers since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Andriy Kovalenko, Ukraine’s top counter-disinformation official on the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), confirmed the development on Telegram on Monday, Nov.4, saying, “The first military units of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] have already come under fire in Kursk.”
South Korea’s public broadcaster KBS reported on Tuesday that Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov had also indicated that the Ukrainian military had been involved in its first engagement with North Korean troops. In an interview with KBS, Umerov described the encounter as a “small-scale” engagement that took place on Monday.
Umerov provided limited details about the timing and location of the clashes but noted that approximately 3,000 North Korean soldiers had been deployed across northeastern, eastern, and southeastern positions along the 1,500-kilometer (930 miles) front line.
He added that this engagement effectively marked North Korea’s official entry into the Russia-Ukraine war.
A senior Ukrainian intelligence official also verified the clash to the FT, once again withholding specifics on the engagement, but said the incident took place within Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukraine currently controls around 600 square kilometers (232 square miles). This is just over half of the area Kyiv initially held after its surprise August incursion.
Other Topics of Interest
Expressing his appreciation for Trump’s “peace through strength” approach, Zelensky voiced optimism that this policy could help bring about a "just peace" in Ukraine.
For many the direct involvement of a foreign army marks a significant escalation of the war, introducing and broadening the scope of Europe’s largest land war since World War II, the FT’s report says.
The US condemned Russia and China at the UN Security Council on Monday, accusing them of “shamelessly protecting” and enabling North Korea. South Korea and the European Union joined in denouncing North Korea’s presence, with concerns that Moscow may reciprocate by providing Pyongyang with nuclear and ballistic technology.
A Ukrainian official told the FT that Russia is allegedly supplying North Korea with military technology and funding to support its missile programs.
In Moscow, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, delivering greetings from Kim Jong-un, who supports Russia’s war in Ukraine and signed a security pact with Putin in June.
Choe reaffirmed Pyongyang’s support, saying that North Korea had full confidence in Putin’s leadership and believed that the Russian military and people would achieve victory in their struggle “to defend the country’s sovereign rights and security.”
While Putin hasn’t confirmed North Korea’s deployment, he hinted last month it might fall under the June treaty's security provisions.
U.S. and South Korean officials confirmed Ukraine’s assessment that about 8,000 North Korean troops arrived in Russia’s Kursk region last month to support Russian forces in pushing back Ukrainian advances. Senior Ukrainian intelligence officials told the FT that the troops were stationed 50 kilometers (31.25 miles) from the Ukrainian border and expected to join the fighting within days.
In total, Kyiv, Washington, and Seoul estimate North Korea has deployed around 12,000 troops to Russia, including 500 officers and three generals. Most are reported to be stationed in Russia’s far east for training.
The White House stated that North Korean soldiers would become “legitimate military targets” if they engaged in combat against Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in his Monday address, reported that 11,000 North Korean soldiers were now in Kursk, expressing frustration over the lack of response from Ukraine’s allies.
According to Ukraine's intelligence directorate (HUR), Russia has armed the North Korean forces with mortars, assault rifles, anti-tank weapons, night-vision devices, and thermal imagers, while a few hundred special forces have also been deployed. Ukrainian officials and analysts question the combat readiness of the North Korean troops, with most being inexperienced and low-ranking.
Russian troops stationed in the Kursk region were reported to be discussing the challenges of trying to integrate with North Korean soldiers, particularly due to language and cultural barriers, as Kyiv Post reported earlier, citing an intercepted call released by the HUR.
The call, reportedly between members of Russia’s 810th Separate Marine Brigade, reveals a Russian soldier describing the North Koreans as “already here, learning with a translator.” The Kremlin reportedly plans to assign one translator and three Russian officers for every 30 North Korean troops, but the soldiers on the call doubted whether there were enough Russian personnel to support this setup.
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Julia Struck
Julia Struck is a news writer and Kyiv Post correspondent who has previously worked as a parliamentary editor, journalist, and news editor. She has specialized in covering the work of Ukrainian parliament, government, and law enforcement agencies.
kyivpost.com · by Julia Struck · November 5, 2024
9. Presidential office says N. Korean troops in Russia have not yet engaged in full-fledged combat against Ukraine
Presidential office says N. Korean troops in Russia have not yet engaged in full-fledged combat against Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 6, 2024
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- The presidential office said Wednesday that North Korean troops in Russia's western front have not yet engaged in full-fledged combat with Ukrainian forces.
A senior presidential official shared the assessment after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed the first combat engagement between North Korean troops and Ukrainian forces and some 11,000 North Korean soldiers were already in Russia's Kursk region.
"A large number of North Korean troops deployed to Russia have already moved to the western front lines, but full-fledged combat has not yet begun," the senior presidential official told reporters on condition of anonymity.
There may have been minor incidents for reconnaissance or preparatory actions, but further monitoring is needed to draw conclusions on whether the actual combat started with Ukrainian forces, the official said.
The official said South Korea is mulling sending a monitoring team to Ukraine to assess potential joint operations between North Korea and Russia in Ukraine.
"If North Korea and Russia launch joint combat operations, it will be critical to monitor their tactics, weapons, and any North Korean casualties, as this information could be crucial for South Korea's security and collaboration with Ukraine," the official said, noting a small monitoring team could be deployed without requiring parliamentary approval.
Talks have been under way over Ukraine's sending a special envoy to South Korea to discuss the battlefield situation and joint responses, the official added.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 6, 2024
10. S. Korea stages live-fire missile interception drills after N.K. missile launches
S. Korea stages live-fire missile interception drills after N.K. missile launches | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 6, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- South Korea conducted live-fire missile interception drills Wednesday in a show of its air defense capabilities, a day after North Korea fired ballistic missiles into the East Sea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.
The drills, involving the Cheongung-II and Patriot air defense systems, took place in a western coastal area after the North fired multiple short-range ballistic missiles Tuesday, according to the JCS.
The Air Force's Air & Missile Defense Command mobilized two Cheongung-II and Patriot units each to fire surface-to-air missiles and intercept simulated targets under a scenario of an enemy missile attack, the JCS said.
A surface-to-air missile is fired from a Cheongung-II air defense system during live-fire drills in an unspecified western coastal area on Nov. 6, 2024, in this photo provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
"This exercise took place to demonstrate our military's capabilities and posture and firm resolve to respond immediately and overwhelmingly to increasing North Korean missile threats," the JCS said in a release.
South Korea operates the homegrown Cheongung-II mid-range surface-to-air missile system and the U.S.-made Patriot system to strike down incoming targets at altitudes of up to 40 kilometers.
On Tuesday, North Korea fired the ballistic missiles from the Sariwon area in the western province of North Hwanghae, and they flew about 400 km before splashing into the sea.
The launches apparently involved the North's KN-25 super-large 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers, which is believed to be capable of striking anywhere in South Korea when fired from Sariwon.
North Korea's latest saber-rattling came five days after it launched the new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile into the East Sea on Thursday.
A surface-to-air missile is fired from a Patriot air defense system during live-fire drills in an unspecified western coastal area on Nov. 6, 2024, in this photo provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 6, 2024
11. Websites of defense, environment ministries hit by cyberattack
The regime's all purpose sword is hard at work.
(LEAD) Websites of defense, environment ministries hit by cyberattack | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 6, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with attack on environment ministry's website; CHANGES headline)
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- The websites of the defense and environment ministries suffered service disruptions this week after being targeted by a cyberattack, officials said Wednesday, following the South Korean cybersecurity watchdog's warning of North Korea's possible hacking attacks.
The distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack took place first on the defense ministry's website at about 5:30 p.m. Tuesday, prompting the military to take response measures, a ministry official said, adding the website is currently back online.
This undated captured image shows the defense ministry's website. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
A separate attack on the environment ministry's website was detected Wednesday morning, according to the ministry. The website was down for a period in the morning before being restored.
"Not just the environment ministry but several ministries have been hit by DDoS attacks," said an official of the National Information Resources Service, which is affiliated with the interior ministry. "The attacks seem to have died down for now, but we're continuing to defend against them as they are not over."
The website of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also appeared to be suffering connection instability as of Wednesday morning, leading the Cyber Operations Command to look into the issue.
A DDoS attack refers to a situation where a large number of infected devices are used to overwhelm a target server or website with a massive volume of traffic.
A military official said authorities have blocked the IP addresses of the source of the attack on the defense ministry's website, noting that such attacks are uncommon on the ministry's website.
Authorities are currently looking into who might have been behind the attack.
On Monday, South Korea's cybersecurity watchdog called on local organizations and businesses to increase their data protection readiness, citing rising risks of hacking attacks related to North Korea's troop dispatch to Russia.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 6, 2024
12. Trump wins U.S. presidential election, foreshadows policy shift
The question is who has been and who will be advising the President-elect on Korea policy? I honestly do not know who has been advising him (or who will be). But that is important information to know to be able to assess what might be the way forward on Korea policy (in addition to the President-elect's own pronouncements).
(4th LD) (US election) Trump wins U.S. presidential election, foreshadows policy shift | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in paras 17-20, 22)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- Republican flag-bearer Donald Trump has won the U.S. presidential election, the Associated Press reported Wednesday, amid expectations that his victory could reorient America's approach to the alliance with South Korea, North Korea's military threats, trade and other key policy issues.
Former President Trump crossed the Electoral College threshold of 270 votes as he clinched victories in key battleground states, including Pennsylvania, Georgia and North Carolina, in Tuesday's general election showdown against Vice President Kamala Harris.
As of 6:30 a.m., EST, he garnered 277 electoral votes, compared with Harris' 224. The Republican Party secured 51 of the 100 Senate seats, reclaiming control of the upper house of Congress.
His triumph marked a stunning political comeback that followed two attempts on his life, a felony conviction in a "hush money" trial, nagging questions over his alleged link to the Jan. 6 attack on Capitol Hill and a defeat in the Oval Office race four years ago.
Trump emerged victorious after he and Harris had been caught in an extremely tight race that highlighted the United States' deep national polarization. Trump and his vice presidential running mate J.D. Vance are to take office on Jan. 20.
Republican flag-bearer Donald Trump speaks at an election night watch party in West Palm Beach, Florida on Nov. 6, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
Shortly before the race was called for him, Trump declared a "magnificent" victory in the election and called for national unity.
"It's a political victory that our country has never seen before, nothing like this," he told a cheering crowd of supporters. "I want to thank the American people for the extraordinary honor of being elected your 47th president and your 45th president."
He also stressed that he will be fighting for Americans and will not rest until a "strong, safe and prosperous" America is delivered.
"This will truly be the golden age of America," he said.
He stressed the need for people to be united after a bruising campaign period.
"It's time to put the divisions of the past four years behind us. It's time to unite," he said, claiming that America's future will be "bigger, better, bolder, richer, safer and stronger."
Republican flag-bearer Donald Trump dances as former first lady Melania Trump watches at the Palm Beach County Convention Center during an election night watch party in West Palm Beach, Florida, on Nov. 6, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
Trump will be only the second president to serve non-consecutive terms after Grover Cleveland, a Democrat who was elected president in 1884, defeated by Republican rival Benjamin Harrison in 1888 and reelected four years later.
During his campaign, he tied Harris to unpopular aspects of President Joe Biden's policy, tapping into public anxieties about still-high prices, illegal immigrants and a series of geopolitical and security challenges, including Russia's war in Ukraine, North Korea's nuclear threats and deepening instability in the Middle East.
His much-trumpeted slogan of "Make America Great Again" had resonated through his rallies in key battleground states, while his pledge to bring factories back to the United States under his "manufacturing renaissance" vision also struck a chord with American workers.
South Korea has been carefully watching developments in the U.S. election as a new occupant of the White House could bring a shift in America's foreign policy that affects the Seoul-Washington alliance as well as the way Washington handles Pyongyang's evolving nuclear and missile threats.
Once back into the Oval Office, Trump is expected to highlight his "America First" credo that is expected to put pressure on allies and partners to take greater responsibilities for their own security and curtail America's costly involvement overseas.
Concerns have persisted that when he returns to the White House, he could call for renegotiation of a recent defense cost-sharing deal between Seoul and Washington. During his campaign, Trump called South Korea a "money machine" and a "wealthy country" in an apparent call for Seoul to raise its financial contributions for the stationing of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea.
On North Korea, expectations are high that Trump could revive his personal diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to put a coda to the unfinished business of addressing the recalcitrant regime's nuclear quandary. But it remains uncertain whether Pyongyang would return to dialogue at a time when it is deepening ties with Russia.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol offered a congratulatory message to Trump, voicing hopes that he will work closely together with the president-elect.
"Under your strong leadership, the future of the ROK-U.S. alliance and America will shine brighter. Look forward to working closely with you," Yoon wrote on X, referring to South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.
Also in the general election, Rep. Andy Kim, a third-term congressman, won a Senate seat for New Jersey, becoming the first Korean American elected to the chamber.
This year's election cycle has been marked by a raft of unprecedented events, including assassination attempts against Trump, President Joe Biden's surprise exit from the White House race and Harris' bid to become the nation's first female and first Asian American to occupy the Oval Office.
Supporters watch returns at a campaign election night watch party for Republican flag-bearer Donald Trump at the Palm Beach Convention Center in Florida on Nov. 6, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
13. N.K. leader may seek another summit with Trump, but chances for deal seen as slimmer
I am skeptical that Kim would seek another summit. I am not sure he thinks he could manipulate it to his benefit.
(US election) (News Focus) N.K. leader may seek another summit with Trump, but chances for deal seen as slimmer | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 6, 2024
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may seek another summit over its nuclear program with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump following his second-term win, but the chances for a meaningful deal appear to be lower, given the North's enhanced nuclear capabilities, analysts said.
During his first term, Trump hosted the first-ever summit between American and North Korean leaders with Kim in Singapore in 2018, followed by another summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, the next year. But they failed to produce a deal to curb North Korea's nuclear program.
U.S.-North Korean relations have since remained moribund under the Biden administration's effective return to the Obama administration's "strategic patience," which prioritizes strengthening alliances and increasing international pressure over dialogue to address North Korea's growing nuclear threats.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un lock eyes during a meeting at the Panmunjom truce village along the inter-Korean border on June 30, 2019. (Yonhap)
Experts said returning to the presidency, Trump may dust off his diplomacy toolbox and pursue another summit with Kim, but the chances of reaching a deal are lower this time than during his first term due to Kim's apparent pursuit of nuclear state status.
Following its test-firing of the new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month, North Korea affirmed that the country's policy of bolstering nuclear forces will never change, claiming that it has secured an "irreversible hegemonic position" in the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems.
In 2023, North Korea amended its constitution to reinforce its policy of strengthening nuclear forces, claiming its status of a nuclear state remains "irreversible."
For the first time in nine years, North Korea's denuclearization was omitted as a shared goal in a joint statement issued after last month's Security Consultative Meeting between the defense chiefs of South Korea and the U.S., a possible indication that denuclearizing the North is no longer realistically achievable.
If Kim were to sit down with Trump, he would attempt to negotiate the U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state and seek subsequent concessions for "nuclear disarmament," rather than "denuclearization," which was on the table during their previous summits.
Trump, in turn, might have to settle for a "small deal" that deters threats of North Korean missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland in exchange for recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state, rather than pursuing denuclearization, said Nam sung-wook, director of the Convergence Institute for National Unification at Korea University.
"There seems to be a growing acceptance of North Korea's nuclear possession as a fact in the international community and among power circles in the U.S., including IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi's reference to the North as a 'de facto' nuclear weapons state," Nam said.
This image, captured from the White House's Twitter account, shows President Donald Trump (L) shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un for their summit at the Sofitel Legend Metropole Hanoi in Vietnam on Feb. 28, 2024. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Another obstacle to a potential breakthrough in a future Trump-Kim summit is expected to be the U.S. preoccupation with more urgent international issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gaza-Israel conflict and intensifying rivalry with China, which could push the North Korean nuclear issue to the back burner.
"The negotiating price for North Korea has risen, while it appears difficult for the U.S. to focus on North Korean nuclear issues due to other pressing concerns," the Korea Institute for National Unification predicted in its recent publication.
"Even if they dramatically reach a compromise, it is difficult to say it could last," it said.
In any case, North Korea may not easily turn away from its military adventurism, including ICBM launches and the deployment of troops to support Russia in its war in Ukraine.
Instead, the country is expected to escalate its military provocations to a critical level in the initial phase of the second Trump term in a bid to increase its bargaining power in anticipation of potential dialogue with the U.S., analysts said.
Experts raised a possibility that South Korea could be excluded from the potential engagement process between Washington and Pyongyang, given Kim Jong-un's animosity toward the South.
North Korea has been erasing unification references and disbanded inter-Korean agencies after Kim defined inter-Korean relations as those between "two states hostile to each other" during a year-end party meeting.
"Speaking from past experiences, South Korea has been able to actively play its part in dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. only when inter-Korean relations were good," said Choi Jong-kun, who served as vice foreign minister.
"But now, inter-Korean relations are at zero level," he said. "If North Korea's denial (of South Korean participation) is combined with the U.S. belief that South Korea is no help, the country could be completely excluded."
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 6, 2024
14. Trump likely to reshape U.S. policy on alliance, N. Korea under 'America First' credo: experts
There is actually an opportunity to strengthen the alliance and reassure the Koreans if President Trump acknowledges that US forces are in Korea and the mutual defense treaty exists to support US interests first and foremost. It is in US interests to prevent war on the Korean peninsula because of the damage such a war will do to Americans at home not only from the possibility of a north Korean ICBM attack of the homeland but also because of the immense economic damage (and thus suffering of the American people) that will be caused by any conflict in Northeast Asia - in either Korea or Taiwan.
Yes we want to HELP defend our blood ally but the number one US interest of concern is to prevent war due to the effects it will have on the American people. And of course if Kim Jong Un miscalculates or his regime collapses we want to HELP South Korea win the war as rapidly as possible as well as mitigate the effects of collapse which would surely create nearly as severe economic difficulties for the US and the world. This needs to be part of the messaging for the new Trump administration. A deep understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime will reveal why the US needs to remain engaged in Korea for US interests and to support our blood ally.
(US election) (News Focus) Trump likely to reshape U.S. policy on alliance, N. Korea under 'America First' credo: experts | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 (Yonhap) -- President-elect Donald Trump is expected to reorient America's approach to the alliance with South Korea, North Korea's nuclear quandary, trade and other key policy issues, experts said, as he is poised to put his "America First" credo front and center.
Trump's second-term administration would return to a diplomatic playbook that could put pressure on U.S. allies to jack up their defense spending and take greater security responsibilities, and curtail the United States' costly overseas involvement, they said.
His policy approach will take concrete shape following a policy review and the formation of his security and foreign affairs team at a time when the world is beset by a grab bag of major geopolitical and security challenges, including North Korea's nuclear threats, China's maritime assertiveness, Russia's war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East.
U.S. allies and partners have already set in motion efforts to navigate looming uncertainties stemming from what could be an unconventional brand of Trump's diplomacy that focuses on the transactional nature of state-to-state relations.
In particular, South Korea has been trying to figure out what Trump's second term would mean for the U.S.' nuclear deterrence pledge, its diplomacy with a provocative North Korea, the presence of the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and bilateral trade to name a few.
Former President Donald Trump speaks during a campaign rally at First Horizon Coliseum in Greensboro, North Carolina on Nov. 2, 2024, in this photo released by AP. (Yonhap)
Andrew Yeo, the SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, said that the road for South Korea-U.S. relations may be "more bumpy and unpredictable" under Trump for several reasons.
Among the reasons, the scholar pointed out Trump's desire to see South Korea increase its financial contributions for the stationing of USFK.
In an interview with Bloomberg News last month, Trump said if he were in the White House, South Korea would be paying US$10 billion per year to help maintain the USFK personnel. He also portrayed South Korea as a "money machine."
Trump's remarks came less than two weeks after Seoul and Washington struck a defense cost-sharing deal in early October. Under the deal for the 2026-2030 period, Seoul is to pay 1.52 trillion won (US$1.10 billion) in 2026, up from 1.4 trillion won in 2025.
"Trump has stated repeatedly that he would charge South Korea more for U.S. troops deployed to South Korea, which could cause friction with Seoul," Yeo said.
The president-elect also suggested in a Time magazine interview in April that the U.S. could pull out its forces if South Korea does not pay more to support USFK.
On North Korea, expectations have persisted that Trump could revive his direct diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Some observers pin hopes on the possibility that Trump could create a rare diplomatic opening to encourage Pyongyang's return to dialogue.
On the campaign trail, he has repeatedly boasted about his "love letters" and personal ties with Kim, even anticipating that the reclusive leader might like to see him return to office.
"I got along with him, and we stopped the missile launches from North Korea. Now, North Korea is acting up again, but when we get back, I get along with him," he said during a speech to accept the GOP presidential nomination in July.
"He'd like to see me back too. I think he misses me," he added, noting that it is "nice to get along with somebody who has a lot of nuclear weapons."
During his time in office, Trump employed a direct leader-to-leader approach to the North, leading to three in-person meetings with Kim, including the first-ever bilateral summit in Singapore in 2018, though serious nuclear talks have been stalled since the no-deal summit in Hanoi in February 2019.
At the Hanoi summit, the North Korean leader offered to dismantle the mainstay Yongbyon nuclear complex, but Trump apparently wanted more concessions as the U.S. saw the complex as only a part of the North's sprawling nuclear program.
This AFP file photo shows U.S. President Donald Trump (R) shaking hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un after signing a joint statement at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. (Yonhap)
"Trump has an affinity for strongmen like Kim and Putin. Trump mentioned he gets along well with Kim. Although this view is not shared by traditional Republicans, or those in the U.S. national security establishment, this perception may affect his decision-making on North Korea policy," Yeo said.
"In particular, if Kim or Putin decide to reach out to Trump to strike a deal on Ukraine or on risk mitigation, Trump may offer concessions without consulting allies and undermine regional security for allies like South Korea," he added.
It remains uncertain whether North Korea would accede to diplomatic feelers from Washington.
Observers believe that Pyongyang's appetite for reengagement with Washington might have dwindled as it has bolstered ties with Russia and maintained its long-standing friendly partnership with China.
Even if nuclear negotiations with North Korea resume, bargaining could be much tougher than before given that Pyongyang has apparently made much headway in its efforts to improve nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles.
But many anticipate that Trump might be eager to put a coda -- befitting his "deal-making" finesse -- to the unfinished business of addressing the North's nuclear conundrum.
"Trump has made a big deal of his ability to negotiate with Kim Jong-un. But Kim was furious with Trump after the Hanoi summit in 2019," Bruce Bennett, a senior analyst at the RAND Corp., told Yonhap News Agency via email. "It is not at all clear that Kim will agree to meet with Trump unless Trump offers Kim some major concessions."
Whether bilateral and trilateral security cooperation would continue under Trump remains to be seen.
If the past is any guide, Trump is not fond of institutional frameworks. During his first term, his foreign policy stance was seen as an "isolationist" approach that saw the U.S. withdraw from various global institutions, including the Paris Climate Agreement, the then Trans-Pacific Partnership and UNESCO.
But some observers said that given the cost effectiveness of leveraging alliances in tackling security challenges, Trump could retain such cooperative partnerships.
After all, Trump's security policy will be informed and guided partially by a newly minted team of his advisers, analysts said.
"While many people assume that policies Trump has advocated in the past will be what he does in the future, I think it is entirely possible that Trump will reevaluate a number of things he has said in the past," Bennett said.
"But that will depend upon who his senior appointees are for national security, including the secretary of defense, the secretary of state and the national security adviser."
Yeo echoed the view.
"A lot of what happens under Trump may be determined by who Trump chooses to surround him in his cabinet. If conservative, mainstream Republicans with hawkish views towards illiberal regimes have Trump's ear, a Trump administration would likely lean on the U.S.-ROK alliance to maintain regional security," he said, referring to South Korea by its official name, the Republic of Korea.
"If he's surrounded by MAGA-wing Republicans who want to disengage from global affairs, we will see a major shift away from liberal engagement with allies and partners."
On the trade front, Trump's pursuit of tariffs on foreign goods is expected to be a source of concern.
Trump has said he might slap tariffs of up to 20 percent on all U.S. imports while proposing a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods.
He has also been pursuing what he calls the "manufacturing renaissance" under his "new American industrialism." His policy proposals could affect South Korean firms doing business with America.
"You will see a mass exodus of manufacturing from China to Pennsylvania, from Korea to North Carolina, from Germany to right here in Georgia," Trump said in a campaign speech in September. "They're going to come to Georgia from Germany and other places."
Former President Donald Trump waves at a campaign rally in Lititz, Pennsylvania, on Nov. 3, 2024, in this photo released by the Associated Press. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
15. Andy Kim wins Senate race, becomes 1st Korean American senator
But his influence in the Senate will be somewhat limited as he is a member of the minority party there.
(LEAD) (US election) Andy Kim wins Senate race, becomes 1st Korean American senator | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
(ATTN: RECASTS lead, paras 2-3; ADDS more info)
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Nov. 5 (Yonhap) -- Andy Kim, a third-term congressman, won a Senate seat for New Jersey in the U.S. general election Tuesday, the Associated Press reported, making history as the first Korean American elected to the upper chamber of Congress.
Kim, 42, bested his Republican rival Curtis Bashaw to secure the seat for the Garden State, raising expectations that he could play a greater role in Congress for the Korean American community, the Seoul-Washington alliance and joint efforts to address North Korea's nuclear quandary.
Kim's victory was highly anticipated as New Jersey has not elected a Republican as its senator since 1972. The New Jersey seat was up for grabs as former Sen. Bob Menendez resigned in August following his conviction on bribery charges.
This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows Rep. Andy Kim (D-NJ) speaking during the Democratic National Convention in Chicago on Aug. 21, 2024. (Yonhap)
Unlike a House representative, a senator would have a greater voice in America's foreign and security policy as he or she has a vote on every single ambassador position and confirms Cabinet posts and general and flag officers of the Armed Forces among various Senate roles.
Kim boasts a prominent foreign policy career, having served at the White House National Security Council, the Pentagon, the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and as a civilian adviser to Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. John Allen in Afghanistan.
"I hope I can be someone that can be a bridge between the U.S. and South Korea, someone that can try to show how beneficial that relationship is to both countries," Kim said in response to a question from Yonhap News Agency during a public event in Washington in September. "It's really a win-win."
As a key politician of Korean descent, Kim has mentioned his sense of responsibility to "lift up the voice, hopes and concerns" of the Korean-American community. He was born in Boston in 1982 to a family of South Korean immigrant parents -- his father being a medical researcher and his mother a nurse.
"The Koreans have been in America now for a little over 120 years, and I think that there is this growing sense of belief that we deserve a seat at the table," he said during an interview with Yonhap News Agency in May.
"You see strength of Korean Americans in the entertainment, arts, business, technology, medicine and law fields. And it feels like now, we are starting to get there when it comes to politics."
Kim has described his life as not just a Korean-American-only story, but that of an American story, a land of opportunities. On the campaign trail, he has also vowed to serve Americans with integrity and a sense of public service.
His commitment to "serve" the nation was on full display when a media photo showed him picking up trash that was strewn across Capitol Hill when the center of America's democracy came under attack by rioters in January 2021.
In 2004, Kim earned a political science degree from the University of Chicago. He was awarded a prestigious Rhodes Scholarship and a Harry S. Truman Scholarship, which led him to earn a master's degree and a doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford.
This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows Rep. Andy Kim picking up trash at Capitol Hill in Washington after an attack on the legislature on Jan. 6, 2021. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 6, 2024
16. North Korean miners defy order for mutual criticism sessions
Another indicator of potential resistance and internal instability that Kim views as his primary threat. We must be watchful and wary of the internal conditions in the north.
North Korean miners defy order for mutual criticism sessions - Daily NK English
Workers defied mandatory criticism sessions by demanding equal attendance from "8.3 workers" who pay to skip work
By Eun Seol - November 5, 2024
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · November 5, 2024
Equipment at work at Musan Mining Complex (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
Workers at North Korea’s Hyesan Youth Copper Mine have pushed back against orders to intensify mandatory criticism sessions, according to a source in Ryanggang province recently.
The mine’s elementary party committee recently ordered affiliated workers’ groups, including the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea (GFTUK), to strengthen their regular “struggle sessions” by requiring mutual criticism among workers.
These struggle sessions, a common practice in North Korea, typically involve workers criticizing their own behavior and work attitudes. The new order would require workers to openly criticize their colleagues as well, effectively turning them into workplace monitors.
On Oct. 26, the mine’s GFTUK committee head ordered members to increase attendance at Saturday struggle sessions and implement the mutual criticism requirement. The workers responded with passive resistance – each of the roughly 10 attendees only criticized themselves before sitting down, refusing to criticize others.
Workers challenged the order, pointing to absent “8.3 workers” – those who pay fees to skip work. “Some don’t show up even once a year,” the source said, noting that these paid absences breed resentment among regular workers. The workers said they would only engage in the sessions when “100%” of the workers attend them.
The confrontation escalated when workers criticized the committee head for not requiring 8.3 workers to attend the sessions. Unable to respond, the committee head left the scene.
While the incident was reported to the mine’s party committee, they quietly dismissed it as the committee head’s incompetence. The party committee’s hands were tied – they couldn’t discipline the rebellious workers without addressing the 8.3 worker issue, which they themselves had enabled by accepting payments for absences.
“People can’t make a living, and they’re edgy, so they don’t follow the party’s orders to the letter anymore,” the source said.
Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Eun Seol · November 5, 2024
17. News of North Korean military's Russia deployment spreads from border to interior
Like the bomber, information will always get through. Despite the regimes' attempt to isolate the families of soldiers, the general population is going to learn about what is going on with Kim's support for Putin's War. The people are going to learn about Kim's "mercenary" activity of selling or renting the nKPA to Putin. But just wait until there are mounting casualties. Kim will not be able to prevent that news from spreading. We should help it to spread.
News of North Korean military's Russia deployment spreads from border to interior - Daily NK English
North Korean parents curious about how their children are doing in the military usually try to reassure themselves that no news is good news
By Lee Chae Eun, Jeong Seo Yeong - November 5, 2024
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun, Jeong Seo Yeong · November 5, 2024
The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on Mar. 7 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had visited important bases of the Korean People’s Army used for operations and training on the western front and toured the training facilities. The photograph shows North Korean soldiers in a military exercise. (Rodong Sinmun, News 1)
Parents of North Korean soldiers are growing increasingly anxious over reports of troop deployments to Russia, with many unsure whether their children in the military will be among those sent abroad. Concerns are particularly acute in Hyesan, where news of the deployments has spread rapidly through the border town.
According to a source in Ryanggang province recently, North Korean authorities have not informed the public about the deployment of troops to Russia. But in Hyesan and other border areas, people using Chinese-made cell phones to communicate with the outside world often alert the public to news the regime would rather keep secret.
In fact, Hyesan citizens using Chinese-made cell phones spread the news that North Korea had sent soldiers to help Russia in its ongoing war with Ukraine, and the information spread quickly from person to person.
However, in the absence of accurate information about which units were sent to Russia, rumors abound.
Some say that special forces have been deployed because North Korea hopes to achieve great things in Russia. Others, however, argue that ordinary soldiers with only moderate training have been deployed because the war has little to do with North Korea.
Parents of North Korean soldiers have no way to confirm if their children will be sent to Russia, as military personnel are currently barred from leaving their bases or receiving visitors. Unable to contact their children during this period of heightened tensions, these parents are spending sleepless nights worrying about possible deployments.
“My mind went blank the moment I heard about the deployment. I’m so worried that I keep getting the urge to go straight to my son’s base. But then I remember, to my bitter disappointment, that base visits are not allowed,” a Hyesan resident in her 40s said.
Another Hyesan resident in her 40s expressed her displeasure with the deployment. “It’s bad enough that people have to spend ten years in the army, but it’s absurd that our soldiers are being sent to Russia. Nobody knows how many of them will come back alive. And those who do return are not guaranteed to be in good health.”
News of the troop deployment has also reached residents of the border area in North Hamgyong province. Here, too, parents with children doing military service were greatly disturbed by the news, according to a source.
“Since the news of the deployment was spread by people using Chinese-made cell phones, people with children in the military have been suffering from mental anguish. Given the lack of information about which military units are being deployed, parents are doing everything they can to find out the whereabouts of their children. Some parents have paid unannounced visits to their children’s units, while others have consulted fortune tellers,” said a source in North Hamgyong province.
News of deployment reaches inner reaches of country
News of North Korean troop deployments to Russia has spread from border regions to the country’s interior through two main channels: local merchants’ trade networks and border officials monitoring their sons at military bases inland. State security and party officials in border areas have been particularly active in seeking information about service members stationed at interior bases.
“News of the deployment has been spreading among the people of the province since Oct. 25,” a source in South Pyongan province said. “At first people thought it was an unfounded rumor. But when they heard the same story from several sources, they became convinced that it’s true. The mood has turned sour, and parents with sons in the military are reeling from the news.”
North Korean parents curious about how their children are doing in the military usually try to reassure themselves that no news is good news. But parents of soldiers are now desperately trying to find a way to confirm that their children are safe, the source added.
Parents in South Pyongan province are particularly anxious because of unfounded rumors that the troops being sent to Russia are not soldiers from the border area, but only soldiers with clean records from inland provinces such as South Pyongan and South Hamgyong.
“So far, the Workers’ Party and the state security apparatus have done nothing to clear up all the rumors being spread. Some officials have tried to bribe people to keep their children off the draft rolls. But less privileged people can only sigh and hope for the best,” the source said.
The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Lee Chae Eun, Jeong Seo Yeong · November 5, 2024
18. North Korea launches military-wide ideological campaign
In north Korea there is nothing more important than ideological indoctrination. It will always be the priority.
North Korea launches military-wide ideological campaign - Daily NK English
The military-wide lecture series comes as North Korea has been heightening tensions following a reported drone incident in Pyongyang
By Jeong Seo-yeong - November 5, 2024
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · November 5, 2024
North Korean soldiers conducting training drills. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)
North Korea is conducting special ideological lectures across its military units, emphasizing the need for strong ideological armament.
A source in South Pyongan province told Daily NK recently that special lectures are being held across army corps “to prepare the Korean People’s Army as an ideologically strong force” and “to aggressively promote education that reinforces the military’s awareness of the enemy.”
On Oct. 26, a lecturer from the General Political Bureau delivered a presentation at the 11th Corps headquarters in Deokcheon, South Pyongan Province. The 11th Corps, known as the “Storm Corps,” has been deployed to Russia recently.
The lectures began with high-ranking officers and gradually expanded to include all military personnel, including junior officers and enlisted soldiers.
The lecturer explained the complex international situation and emphasized “the importance of revolutionary armed forces” while “inspiring pride and sense of mission among all soldiers.”
The source said the lectures stress that ideological preparation must precede all military training and emphasize establishing a clear understanding of who the enemy is.
The military-wide lecture series comes as North Korea has been heightening tensions following a reported drone incident in Pyongyang. The lectures appear to be an attempt to strengthen military discipline by stoking anti-South sentiment among troops.
The lectures are expected to continue across different army corps for several weeks.
While the Storm Corps has been sent to Russia recently, the deployment was not specifically addressed during these lectures.
The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · November 5, 2024
18. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2024
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2024
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2024
The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated in an interview with South Korean national broadcaster KBS on November 5 that Ukrainian forces engaged in "small-scale" clashes with North Korean troops in Kursk Oblast but emphasized that it will take more time for the entire contingent of North Korean forces to deploy to Kursk Oblast and enter combat. A source in Ukraine's special services also told Ukrainian outlet Suspilne that the first combat clashes between Ukrainian and North Korean forces have occurred but stated that these are not "large connections" between Ukrainian and North Korean forces. Umerov noted that it would be difficult for Ukrainian forces to quickly ascertain North Korean casualty counts from the initial fighting because North Korean soldiers have been "mixed in" with the Russian army and are "disguised" as soldiers from the Republic of Buryatia, which notably suggests that the Russian military is trying to integrate North Korean combat power into the Russian force structure, as opposed to maintaining separate North Korean units fighting under Russian command. North Korean force structure under Russia’s command remains unclear, however. Umerov forecasted that more North Korean personnel will finish deploying within a few weeks once they complete training in the Russian Far East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky estimated on November 4 that there are already 11,000 North Korean personnel in Kursk Oblast, although the majority of this number is likely not yet on the frontline. ISW continues to assess that Russia will likely leverage North Korean manpower to first and foremost repel the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, and that in return North Korean troops hope to gain combat and military-technical experience in the conditions for a contemporary and technologically driven war.
Key Takeaways:
- The first North Korean forces have likely officially engaged in combat against Ukrainian troops in Kursk Oblast.
- The Kremlin appointed the first-ever "Time of Heroes" program participant to a federal-level position, furthering its ongoing effort to staff government positions with pro-war veterans and set long-term conditions for the militarization of Russian government bodies from local to federal levels.
- Russia launched two Iranian-made satellites into orbit on November 5 via a Russian space-launch vehicle, furthering a trend of Russian-Iranian bilateral space cooperation.
- Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Kupyansk, northwest of Kreminna, in Chasiv Yar, near Toretsk, southeast of Pokrovsk, northeast of Kurakhove, near Vuhledar, and north of Robotyne.
- Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions south of Chasiv Yar.
- The Russian military is struggling to maintain a sufficient number of quality personnel within traditionally elite forces.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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