Quotes of the Day:
"There is no friend as loyal as a book."
- Ernest Hemingway
“There was always a minority, afraid of something, and a great majority, afraid of the dark, afraid of the future, afraid of the past, afraid of the present, afraid of themselves and shadows of themselves.”
– Ray Bradbury
“When you are dead, you don't know you are dead. It's pain only for others.
It's the same thing when you are stupid”
— Richard Feynman
1. “North Korea could incite ‘4th North Korean nuclear crisis’ for leverage in US-North Korea negotiations”
2. Close the US Military Bases in Asia
3. Experts warn Trump’s tariff, troop cost plans may undermine US-South Korea alliance
4. UN aviation body to censure North Korea over GPS jamming near Incheon airport
5. China's envoy to N. Korea says 'blood-forged' bilateral friendship will reach new heights
6. Russia deploying North Korean 240mm rocket launcher in Ukraine, video suggests
7. Hackers exploit virtual assets to fund North Korean ballistic missile programs
8. South Korea places fourth military spy satellite in orbit to monitor North Korea
9. South Korea resumes artillery drills at US range on North Korea’s doorstep
10. Meet the Fayetteville-grown four-star general leading 3 different commands in Korea.
11. Will a Second Trump Presidency be Friendly to North Korea?
12. PPP shortlists 4 contenders for presidential election
13. Closest aide to N. Korean leader absent from public view for 2 months
14. Finance minister says will work to resolidify S. Korea-U.S. alliance
15. Senior S. Korean, U.S. Army officials discuss security cooperation in video talks
16. “North Korea gives up corn cultivation because it can’t stop thieves?”
1. “North Korea could incite ‘4th North Korean nuclear crisis’ for leverage in US-North Korea negotiations”
It fits the regime's M.O.
•Must align assumptions about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
–Political warfare to subvert South Korea and drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance to drive US forces from the peninsula
–Blackmail diplomacy – the use of threats, increased tension and provocations to gain political and economic concessions
–Advanced military tech (nuclear and missile) to support political warfare and blackmail diplomacy until Kim determines he can and must use force to achieve his objective
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“North Korea could incite ‘4th North Korean nuclear crisis’ for leverage in US-North Korea negotiations”
Seoul-Handohyeong hando@rfa.org
2025.04.22
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/22/north-seventh-nuclear-trump-leverage/
Anchor: Experts are analyzing that North Korea may instigate a fourth nuclear crisis, such as a seventh nuclear test, in order to enter negotiations with the United States with greater leverage. Reporter Han Do-hyung reports from Seoul.
A report titled 'Kim Jong-un's Policy toward Trump' released on the 21st by Park Hyung-jung, a visiting research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), a research institute under the Prime Minister's Office, through the East Asia Institute (EAI), a private research institute.
In his report, Park, a visiting researcher, said, “North Korea will view US President Donald Trump’s call for negotiations as an expression of the US’s weakness and lack of resolve.”
North Korea took this as evidence that their policy of “peace through power maximization” was effective, and said they could raise the bar on demands from the United States and impose a rigid stance.
It was observed that North Korea will continue to stall for time and explore what additional concessions it can obtain on top of past concessions, such as the suspension of joint US-South Korea military exercises.
Park, a visiting research fellow, said that North Korea will be paying particular attention to how Russian President Putin deals with U.S. President Trump in relation to the Russia-Ukraine armistice.
In a phone call with Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 22nd, Research Fellow Park explained that this includes Russian President Putin directly negotiating an end to the war with the United States while excluding Ukraine, a country affected by the war, and Russian President Putin slowing down the pace of negotiations and raising the level of his demands based on his advantage on the battlefield.
[Park Hyung-joong, Visiting Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Unification Studies (KINU)] For example, the party in the Russia-Ukraine war is Ukraine, but Russian President Putin is dealing directly with U.S. President Trump. North Korea’s basic policy goal is to bypass South Korea and deal directly with the U.S.
In addition, Research Fellow Park In-chul stated in the report that North Korea may believe that a show of overwhelming force and an escalation of the crisis atmosphere are inevitable in order to gain leverage in negotiations with the United States.
Although triggering a new crisis is a risky move for North Korea, it is possible that General Secretary Kim Jong-un judges that his chances of victory in another North Korea-U.S. contest of courage are much higher, given his country’s increasingly advanced nuclear missile capabilities and the changing East Asian political landscape that has become more favorable.
Meanwhile, Research Fellow Park said that North Korea could cause a so-called fourth North Korean nuclear crisis during the second term of the Trump administration by conducting a seventh nuclear test and conducting experiments to secure intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) atmospheric reentry technology and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology.
[Park Hyung-joong, Visiting Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Unification Studies (KINU)] First, the 7th nuclear test, then the atmospheric reentry technology, and then the MIRV. That’s basically it. North Korea will look for opportunities. So, it will see when it is most advantageous for it to act. From Kim Jong-un’s perspective, it may be a little painful if I am stubborn, but he has learned through experience that my stubbornness will eventually prevail.
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President Vladimir Putin and Chairman Kim Jong Un
President Vladimir Putin (L) and Chairman Kim Jong Un (R) walk together before a wreath-laying ceremony at the Liberation Tower in Pyongyang, June 2024. (AFP)
On the same day, Lee Ho-ryeong, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), a research institute under the Ministry of National Defense, stated in a report titled “Kim Jong-un’s Strategic Choices under the Second Trump Administration” published through the East Asia Institute (EAI) that “North Korea has no reason to negotiate denuclearization as bilateral cooperation between the two countries is progressing rapidly in all areas.”
A so-called small deal, such as a nuclear freeze or nuclear reduction negotiation, is possible when North Korea has something to receive from the United States. However, North Korea currently finds it much more profitable to solidify its bilateral relationship with Russia, which tolerates North Korea's nuclear weapons and circumvents sanctions, rather than to negotiate denuclearization with the United States.
“North Korea to Take Opportunistic Approach to US-North Korea Negotiations”
Regarding North Korea’s intentions regarding the US-North Korea negotiations, invited research fellow Park Hyung-joong speculated that “General Secretary Kim Jong-un will fundamentally not trust the US, especially President Trump,” and that “he will not be interested in agreements that must be observed beyond the Trump administration’s term.”
However, Research Fellow Park said that even if there is no mutual trust, it does not mean that fake negotiations are impossible, and in this case, North Korea will opportunistically approach the issue of one-time tactical gains, leaving open the possibility of US-North Korea negotiations.
Specifically, it is expected that General Secretary Kim Jong-un may seek to achieve the effect of elevating North Korea's international and domestic standing and driving a wedge between South Korea and the United States by making the meeting with President Trump (rather than concluding nuclear negotiations) a practical goal.
Meanwhile, Rep. Kim Gun of the People Power Party, who served as the head of the North Korea Nuclear Diplomacy Planning Team and the head of the Korean Peninsula Peace Negotiation Headquarters, also presented an analysis at a meeting of the People Power Party's study group "Tomorrow" held at the National Assembly on February 27 that North Korea will work to prove three capabilities that can threaten the United States ahead of the US-North Korea negotiations: intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) atmospheric reentry technology, nuclear warhead miniaturization technology, and multiple warhead technology.
On the 27th of last month, South Korea's Ministry of Unification diagnosed that North Korea is prioritizing strengthening close ties with Russia and seeking to improve relations with China in the first half of this year, while maintaining a hostile wait-and-see approach toward the United States and South Korea.
This is Han Do-hyung from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
Editor Yang Seong-won
2. Close the US Military Bases in Asia
History is important. It is valuable for understanding the past and present and what might be in the future. But not Professor Sach's historical analysis here. And the proposal for a security architecture through a regional security system including China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea without the US is pure fantasy.
I hesitated to send this but we must know the arguments from all sides. But it is difficult to take this professor's ideas seriously.
Close the US Military Bases in Asia
With America’s 750 or so overseas military bases in around 80 countries, it’s high time to close these bases, pocket the saving, and return to diplomacy. Our bases across Asia are a good place to start.
https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-military-bases-asia
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Apr 22, 2025
Common Dreams
President Donald Trump is again loudly complaining that the U.S. military bases in Asia are too costly for the U.S. to bear. As part of the new round of tariff negotiations with Japan and Korea, Trump is calling on Japan and Korea to pay for stationing the US troops. Here’s a much better idea: close the bases and bring the U.S. servicemen home.
Trump implies that the U.S. is providing a great service to Japan and Korea by stationing 50,000 troops in Japan and nearly 30,000 in Korea. Yet these countries do not need the U.S. to defend themselves. They are wealthy and can certainly provide their own defense. Far more importantly, diplomacy can ensure the peace in northeast Asia far more effectively and far less expensively than U.S. troops.
The U.S. acts as if Japan needs to be defended against China. Let’s have a look. During the past 1,000 years, during which time China was the region’s dominant power for all but the last 150 years, how many times did China attempt to invade Japan? If you answered zero, you are correct. China did not attempt to invade Japan on a single occasion.
You might quibble. What about the two attempts in 1274 and 1281, roughly 750 years ago? It’s true that when the Mongols temporarily ruled China between 1271 and 1368, the Mongols twice sent expeditionary fleets to invade Japan, and both times were defeated by a combination of typhoons (known in Japanese lore as the Kamikaze winds) and by Japanese coastal defenses.
Japan, on the other hand, made several attempts to attack or conquer China. In 1592, the arrogant and erratic Japanese military leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched an invasion of Korea with the goal of conquering Ming China. He did not get far, dying in 1598 without even having subdued Korea. In 1894-5, Japan invaded and defeated China in the Sino-Japanese war, taking Taiwan as a Japanese colony. In 1931, Japan invaded northeast China (Manchuria) and created the Japanese colony of Manchukuo. In 1937, Japan invaded China, starting World War II in the Pacific region.
Nobody thinks that Japan is going to invade China today, and there is no rhyme, reason, or historical precedent to believe that China is going to invade Japan. Japan has no need for the US military bases to protect itself from China.
The same is true of China and Korea. During the past 1,000 years, China never invaded Korea, except on one occasion: when the U.S. threatened China. China entered the war in late 1950 on the side of North Korea to fight the U.S. troops advancing northward towards the Chinese border. At the time, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur recklessly recommended attacking China with atomic bombs. MacArthur also proposed to support Chinese nationalist forces, then based in Taiwan, to invade the Chinese mainland. President Harry Truman, thank God, rejected MacArthur’s recommendations.
South Korea needs deterrence against North Korea, to be sure, but that would be achieved far more effectively and credibly through a regional security system including China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, than through the presence of the U.S., which has repeatedly stoked North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and military build-up, not diminished it.
In fact, the U.S. military bases in East Asia are really for the U.S. projection of power, not for the defense of Japan or Korea. This is even more reason why they should be removed. Though the U.S. claims that its bases in East Asia are defensive, they are understandably viewed by China and North Korea as a direct threat – for example, by creating the possibility of a decapitation strike, and by dangerously lowering the response times for China and North Korea to a U.S. provocation or some kind of misunderstanding. Russia vociferously opposed NATO in Ukraine for the same justifiable reasons. NATO has frequently intervened in U.S.-backed regime-change operations and has placed missile systems dangerously close to Russia. Indeed, just as Russia feared, NATO has actively participated in the Ukraine War, providing armaments, strategy, intelligence, and even programming and tracking for missile strikes deep inside of Russia.
Note that Trump is currently obsessed with two small port facilities in Panama owned by a Hong Kong company, claiming that China is threatening U.S. security (!), and wants the facilities sold to an American buyer. The U.S. on the other hand surrounds China not with two tiny port facilities but with major U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, and the Indian Ocean near to China’s international sea lanes.
The best strategy for the superpowers is to stay out of each other’s lanes. China and Russia should not open military bases in the Western Hemisphere, to put it mildly. The last time that was tried, when the Soviet Union placed nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962, the world nearly ended in nuclear annihilation. (See Martin Sherwin’s remarkable book, Gambling with Armageddon for the shocking details on how close the world came to nuclear Armageddon). Neither China nor Russia shows the slightest inclination to do so today, despite all of the provocations of facing US bases in their own neighborhoods.
Trump is looking for ways to save money – an excellent idea given that the U.S. federal budget is hemorrhaging $2 trillion dollars a year, more than 6% of U.S. GDP. Closing the U.S. overseas military bases would be an excellent place to start.
Trump even seemed to point that way at the start of his second term, but the Congressional Republicans have called for increases, not decreases, in military spending. Yet with America’s 750 or so overseas military bases in around 80 countries, it’s high time to close these bases, pocket the saving, and return to diplomacy. Getting the host countries to pay for something that doesn’t help them or the U.S. is a huge drain of time, diplomacy, and resources, both for the U.S. and the host countries.
The U.S. should make a basic deal with China, Russia, and other powers. “You keep your military bases out of our neighborhood, and we’ll keep our military bases out of yours.” Basic reciprocity among the major powers would save trillions of dollars of military outlays over the coming decade and, more importantly, would push the Doomsday Clock back from 89 seconds to nuclear Armageddon
Jeffrey D. Sachs
Jeffrey D. Sachs is a University Professor and Director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, where he directed The Earth Institute from 2002 until 2016. He is also President of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network and a commissioner of the UN Broadband Commission for Development. He has been advisor to three United Nations Secretaries-General, and currently serves as an SDG Advocate under Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. Sachs is the author, most recently, of "A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism" (2020). Other books include: "Building the New American Economy: Smart, Fair, and Sustainable" (2017) and "The Age of Sustainable Development," (2015) with Ban Ki-moon.
3. Experts warn Trump’s tariff, troop cost plans may undermine US-South Korea alliance
Experts warn Trump’s tariff, troop cost plans may undermine US-South Korea alliance
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · April 22, 2025
South Korean soldiers keep watch during a Freedom Shield drill in Dongducheon, South Korea, on March 13, 2025. (Jameson Harris/U.S. Army)
The Trump administration will face credibility issues if it attempts, following the imposition of a 10% tariff on South Korea, to renegotiate the cost of stationing U.S. troops there, according to policy experts.
President Donald Trump proposed a streamlined, “one-stop shopping” deal on defense and trade after a 30-minute call on April 8 with acting South Korean President Han Duck-soo, according to a Truth Social post from Trump that day.
But any attempt to renegotiate the defense spending agreement reached in November is premature until South Korea elects a permanent replacement for former President Yoon Suk Yeol in June, said Hwang Jihwan, a University of Seoul professor of international relations, by phone Friday.
Yoon, impeached in December over his failed attempt to impose martial law, was formally removed from office on April 4 by the South Korean Constitutional Court.
The five-year Special Measures Agreement negotiated under former President Joe Biden set South Korea’s support for U.S. troops and bases at $1.2 billion annually starting in 2026, a $200 million increase over the current agreement.
Further complicating their relationship, the U.S. imposed a 25% tariff on South Korea, later reduced to 10%, as part of Trump’s fluctuating global tariffs unveiled on April 2.
“Realistically, it is hard for the decision makers to sign a package deal,” Hwang said. “We are currently struggling just talking about tariffs and that is what they are focused on. The people who are negotiating the tariffs do not have the authorization over defense spending.”
President Donald Trump speaks with service members at Osan Air Base, South Korea, in June 2019. (Stars and Stripes)
South Korean exports to the U.S. thus far in April have fallen 5.2%, a decline of roughly $2 billion, over the same period last year, according to a Korea Customs Service news release Monday.
Trump may want to renegotiate the Special Measures Agreement, separately or as part of a trade package, as soon as possible, Lee Byong-Chul, a Far Eastern studies researcher at Kyungnam University in South Korea, said by phone Thursday.
“If [the amount] gets close to what Trump mentioned, it will be a worst-case scenario,” he said. “If we lower it much less than he expected, just a tiny increase from [Biden’s agreement], it would be a successful deal.”
During his first term, Trump demanded a 400% increase in the agreement, from less than $1 billion to $5 billion annually. He left office in 2021 with the negotiations unresolved and repeatedly misrepresented the provisional one-year agreement during his term and the five-year deal reached later under Biden.
Through the Special Measures Agreement, South Korea offsets the cost to station 28,500 U.S. troops throughout the country as a hedge against a conflict with North Korea. The money pays for construction projects on U.S. bases and the salaries of Korean employees working for U.S. Forces Korea.
Attaching a price tag to the 75-year U.S.-South Korea alliance or imposing a significant hike in Seoul’s contribution could cause a rift in their relations, both Lee and Hwang said.
“Of course, we need to maintain a secure alliance,” Hwang said. “But in this case, credibility issues might be created.”
If the two countries agree on a reasonable amount, “there would be a minimal effect” on the alliance, Lee said.
“But if it becomes too biased … it would have a huge negative impact,” Lee said. “If both sides only emphasize their own benefits, it would be a burden for our governments.”
Stars and Stripes · by David Choi and Yoojin Lee · April 22, 2025
4. UN aviation body to censure North Korea over GPS jamming near Incheon airport
north Korea's actions are very dangerous.
UN aviation body to censure North Korea over GPS jamming near Incheon airport
ICAO decision comes as Seoul accuses DPRK of endangering over 4K civilian planes from October to February
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/un-aviation-body-to-censure-north-korea-over-gps-jamming-near-incheon-airport/
Joon Ha Park April 22, 2025
South Korea's presidential airplane taking off from an airport in Seoul | Image: Presidential Security Service (2018), edited by NK News
The U.N. aviation authority will issue a warning to North Korea over its jamming of GPS signals near the inter-Korean border this year, after Seoul accused the DPRK of endangering more than 4,400 civilian aircraft.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted the decision during its 234th council session held in Montreal from March 10 to April 4, Seoul’s foreign ministry announced in a press release Monday.
The ICAO council will notify North Korea of its latest decision via a letter from its president, marking the second consecutive year that the U.N. authority has explicitly identified Pyongyang as the source of GPS signal interference.
While the ICAO adopted similar resolutions in 2012 and 2016 expressing concern over GPS jamming, those measures stopped short of directly naming North Korea as the responsible party.
The ICAO formally attributed the jamming to the DPRK for the first time in June 2024. The resolution condemned interference between May 29 and June 2 that year, during which time GPS disruptions linked to Pyongyang affected approximately 500 civilian aircraft from 20 countries.
According to Seoul’s foreign ministry on Monday, North Korea continued GPS jamming from Oct. 2, 2024, to Feb. 14, 2025, affecting at least 4,400 civilian aircraft from over 20 countries and regions.
“This ICAO Council decision not only sends a strong message to North Korea, which has repeatedly carried out GPS interference, but also demonstrates the international community’s shared awareness of the dangers of North Korea’s actions,” the press release states.
South Korea dispatched experts from its Ministry of Science and ICT and the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute to explain the scientific basis of its investigation to the ICAO, emphasizing that North Korea had intensified its disruptions just four months after the council’s previous warning last June.
The ICAO decision reaffirms serious concerns about GPS signal interference in violation of the Chicago Convention, strongly urging North Korea to comply with previous council decisions and demanding assurance that such incidents will not recur.
“The government will continue to closely monitor North Korea’s actions and work with the international community to ensure strict and unified measures against provocations such as GPS signal interference,” the ministry added.
North Korea’s GPS jamming tactics have posed significant risks to civilian infrastructure and international traffic in recent years.
In Jan. 2025, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that North Korea’s GPS jamming had persisted for over three months, concentrated around the ROK’s northwest islands, causing sporadic reception issues for ships and civilian aircraft.
Over 331 GPS disruptions were reported in South Korea in Nov. 2024 alone, affecting maritime vessels, particularly cargo and fishing ships with outdated navigation systems and commercial airlines that rely on GPS for navigation.
Similar attacks occurred in March 2024 near South Korea’s western border islands during the U.S.-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, followed by additional jamming in the Yellow Sea in May that disrupted maritime activity for two days.
Edited by Bryan Betts
5. China's envoy to N. Korea says 'blood-forged' bilateral friendship will reach new heights
Closer than lips and teeth.
China's envoy to N. Korea says 'blood-forged' bilateral friendship will reach new heights | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 22, 2025
SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- China's ambassador to North Korea has affirmed "the blood-forged" friendship between the two countries will be further developed to reach "new heights" during an event marking the recent birth anniversary of North Korea's founder, according to his embassy Tuesday.
Ambassador Wang Yajun made the remarks on Friday while attending an art exhibition by veteran North Korean artists in Pyongyang, commemorating the 113th birth anniversary of late North Korean founder Kim Il-sung.
Wang noted this year marks the 76th anniversary of the Chinese volunteer forces' entry into the 1950-53 Korean War, according to the website of the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang.
The ambassador also expressed confidence that the blood-forged bilateral traditional friendship will be carried forward and further developed, reaching new heights and contributing more to the maintenance of regional peace under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
At one particularly emotional moment, Choe Sok-kun, a 90-year-old senior North Korean painter present at the exhibition, joined Wang in singing the Chinese volunteer military song in Chinese, the embassy also said.
The Chinese embassy disclosed the envoy's visit amid signs that the two countries are working to mend their relationship, which had been strained by Pyongyang's military alignment with Russia over the war against Ukraine.
North Korea and China marked the 75th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations last year without any high-level meetings between officials from the two countries.
"Beginning this year, bilateral ties appear to be entering a phase of recovery," an official at South Korea's unification ministry told reporters Tuesday.
This image, captured from the website of the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, shows Ambassador Wang Yajun (R) speaking to senior North Korean painters on April 18, 2025, during his visit to an art exhibition in Pyongyang commemorating the birth anniversary of North Korean founder Kim Il-sung. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 22, 2025
6. Russia deploying North Korean 240mm rocket launcher in Ukraine, video suggests
"weapons to order."
Russia deploying North Korean 240mm rocket launcher in Ukraine, video suggests
Expert says DPRK may have made weapons to order for Moscow after repeatedly testing upgraded system in recent years
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/russia-deploying-north-korean-240mm-rocket-launcher-in-ukraine-video-suggests/
Jooheon Kim April 22, 2025
North Korean M1991 | Image: Yuriy Butusov via Telegram
A newly surfaced video has provided the first confirmed visual evidence of Russia deploying a North Korean 240mm rocket system in Ukraine, with an expert assessing that the weapons may have been made to order for the Kremlin.
The footage published by Ukrainian defense journalist Yuriy Butusov on Monday appears to show a 240mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) unit in a Russian storage area, and Butusov writes that Russian troops have upgraded the weapon with anti-drone defenses.
Military analyst Joost Oliemans confirmed that “the weapon itself can indeed be positively identified as a North Korean 240mm multiple rocket launcher.”
He described it as “a far newer type” of the older M1991 model that was showcased in May 2024 at North Korea’s Pyeonghwa Motor Factory. The DPRK has repeatedly tested its MLRS systems in recent years, which experts say may have served as a way to advertise the weapons for export.
“There’s a good chance that the 100 or so examples displayed at the time were made to order for Russia, and have all been shipped there since,” he said. “While this is the first confirmed sighting of the 240mm during the Ukraine conflict, there had been repeated intelligence suggesting such systems were being delivered.”
Ukrainian authorities reported in early December that North Korea had sent dozens of 240mm MLRS to Russia for the first time. Then in late March, a photo surfaced on Russian and Ukrainian war blogs showing a reloading vehicle for 240mm MLRS being transported through northern Crimea, presumably for deployment in southern Ukraine.
Satellite imagery has also captured 240mm rockets being stored at Russian ammunition depots, Oliemans said.
The expert explained that North Korea’s M1991 MLRS traces its lineage to the Soviet-style BM-27 Uragan, mirroring its 22-barrel configuration and elevation mechanism.
But the latest version represents a significant upgrade in both range and capability, Oliemans emphasized, stating that it resembles Russia’s Uragan MLRS and “boasts a superior maximum range of 67 kilometers and the ability to perform precision strikes.”
The apparent Russian soldier in the newly surfaced footage of the North Korean rocket system notably refers to it as a “Korean Uragan.”
According to a Ukrainian media report on Sunday, Russia has already received 120 units of the 240mm MLRS, with plans to deploy at least 120 more.
Russia is not the first foreign recipient of the North Korean MLRS. In his book, “The Armed Forces of North Korea,” Oliemans notes that the DPRK exported earlier models — the 240mm M-1985 and M-1989 — to countries including Iran, Angola and the UAE between the 1980s and 2000s. Myanmar also acquired M-1991 launchers in 2008.
Both Pyongyang and Moscow have denied any direct North Korean military involvement in the war in Ukraine, maintaining that their defense cooperation falls within the framework of the mutual defense pact signed in June and ratified in November.
But Ukraine and its allies say the DPRK has deployed thousands of troops to the war since last October, as well as large quantities of weapons and ammunition for Russia’s invasion. Pyongyang has reportedly earned an estimated $20 billion in economic benefits for this support.
Meanwhile, the footage from Butusov’s Telegram channel shows an unidentified figure — possibly a soldier or mannequin — atop the launcher. While mannequins have been used as decoys during the war, Oliemans said there appears to be little tactical rationale for their presence in this instance.
Edited by Bryan Betts
7. Hackers exploit virtual assets to fund North Korean ballistic missile programs
The all purpose sword is critical to Kim Jong Un's survival.
Hackers exploit virtual assets to fund North Korean ballistic missile programs
Cybersecurity experts highlight the need for collaboration to combat North Korea's hacking threats against the virtual asset industry.
https://biz.chosun.com/en/en-finance/2025/04/22/FD5W3JHF2VEXLMRMHAAEWR3Y5E/
By
Min Seo-yeon
Published 2025.04.22. 06:01
Updated 2025.04.22. 08:56
Andrew Pierman, Senior Analyst at Chainalysis. /Courtesy of Chainalysis
“North Korea utilizes virtual asset hacking as a means of funding military programs, including ballistic missile development. There is no country free from virtual asset hacking. South Korea must recognize this and prepare accordingly.”
Andrew Fierman, head of national security intelligence at the blockchain data analysis firm Chainalysis, mentioned in a written interview with ChosunBiz on the 21st, discussing the hacking group Lazarus of North Korea, which is identified as the culprit of the largest virtual asset theft incident in history that occurred in February. He said, “South Korea is not a safe zone either.” Lazarus attacked the virtual asset exchange Bybit based in Dubai, stealing approximately $1.46 billion (about 2.7 trillion won) worth of Ethereum.
In 2024, the total amount of hacking damage in the virtual asset industry is expected to reach about $2.2 billion (about 3.134 trillion won). Of this, approximately 61%, or about $1.4 billion (about 1.9944 trillion won), was stolen by Lazarus. Since Chainalysis began tracking in 2016, North Korean operatives have targeted global virtual asset wallets using increasingly diverse and sophisticated methods.
However, the notion that virtual assets and blockchain technology are vulnerable to hacking or primarily used for illegal activities is a misunderstanding. Whenever new technologies gain attention, there have always been forces looking to exploit them. Thanks to blockchain's characteristics of high liquidity and fast transactions, virtual assets have become targets for criminals, but at the same time, the transparency of blockchain makes it possible to identify hacks and trace stolen blockchains, Fierman explained.
Chainalysis was founded in 2014 and collaborates with regulatory agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The following is a question-and-answer session with Fierman.
─There are trends in virtual asset hacking and it’s changing, isn’t it?
“Recently, hackers are changing their primary targets in virtual asset hacking. From 2021 to 2023, decentralized finance platforms were the main attack targets in most quarters. However, there is a trend showing that starting in the second and third quarters of 2024, the primary attack targets are shifting from decentralized finance to centralized exchanges. Notable cases include the DMM Bitcoin hacking incident, which resulted in the theft of $305 million (about 500 billion won), and the WazirX hacking incident, which saw the theft of $234.9 million (about 340 billion won).”
─What kind of virtual assets are hackers targeting?
“Hackers do not target specific virtual assets exclusively. The presence of vulnerabilities to exploit determines the virtual assets they target. Additionally, hackers typically launder funds before cashing them out, so they are not limited to specific virtual assets. They convert unlawfully obtained funds into other virtual assets and launder their funds through mixers and bridges.”
─There are numerous hacks led by Lazarus in North Korea, aren’t there?
“North Korea is regarded as the most sophisticated and persistent threat in the current virtual asset ecosystem. During the early rise of virtual assets, it gained notoriety with the Sony Pictures and WannaCry cyberattack incidents and later focused on virtual asset crimes with high revenue potential. Since 2018, North Korea and Lazarus have stolen and laundered more than $200 million (about 290 billion won) in virtual assets annually. In the most significant incident prior to Bybit, they stole $615 million (about 900 billion won) in the Ronin Bridge hacking incident.”
Record of North Korea's hacking activities. /Courtesy of Chainalysis
─How are the virtual assets stolen by Lazarus used?
“According to the United Nations, North Korea utilizes virtual asset hacking as a primary means of funding military programs, such as the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, to evade international sanctions. Unlike ordinary cybercriminals who operate for personal gain, North Korea's hacking activities are operations supported at the state level, with North Korean cyber units utilizing government resources and strategic objectives to carry out sophisticated large-scale hacking attacks.
The Lazarus group and other North Korean-linked hacking organizations have repeatedly targeted centralized exchanges, decentralized finance protocols, and personal wallets to execute the largest virtual asset theft in history. The stolen funds attempt to conceal their origins through a complex money laundering process involving intermediate wallets, decentralized exchanges, mixing services, and cross-chain bridges, making recovery efforts more challenging.
─How do North Korean related hackers carry out their attacks?
“North Korean related hackers are highly skilled and sophisticated in all areas of hacking technology and laundering stolen funds. They infiltrate target organizations using phishing bait, code exploits, malware, and advanced 'social engineering techniques' to leak funds to addresses they control.
The social engineering techniques used in hacking operations refer to manipulating or deceiving personal information within the victim organizations to gain unauthorized access to systems. This method is employed multiple times to gather information, identify system vulnerabilities, and attack protocol flaws. The Bybit hacking incident is a representative example of an attack utilizing such social engineering techniques.”
─How is the stolen virtual asset laundered, and is it traceable?
“After stealing virtual assets, hackers use complex money laundering techniques to conceal their origins. They typically move funds to a number of intermediate wallets, dispersing them into thousands of small transactions for camouflage. They also exchange assets on decentralized exchanges to increase tracing difficulty and use immediate exchange services without customer verification procedures (KYC) to exchange assets, obscuring their sources and destinations in various ways.
However, even after multiple rounds of money laundering, transactions occurring on the blockchain can still be traced. This means that while tracing difficulty may increase, most transactions remain traceable. As of March, Chainalysis is tracking over 90% of the stolen funds. The majority of the stolen funds have been converted to Bitcoin and sent to thousands of addresses.
─Is it possible to recover stolen virtual assets?
“Recovering and freezing stolen assets is indeed possible. Chainalysis has numerous asset recovery cases in collaboration with several international organizations. In 2022, they successfully seized $30 million (about 4.34 billion won) worth of virtual assets stolen by North Korean linked hackers in the Axie Infinity hacking case, in cooperation with law enforcement agencies and key stakeholders in the virtual asset industry. More recently, South Korean authorities succeeded in tracking and recovering $1 million (about 1.45 billion won) in stolen funds related to the Harmony Bridge hacking incident.
However, issues such as delays in cross-border law enforcement and the lack of cooperation between the industry and government still remain. Therefore, establishing a real-time data sharing system among virtual asset exchanges, regulatory bodies, and cybersecurity corporations is essential, as well as securing consistency in global regulations.”
─Are there ways for investors and financial authorities to prepare for virtual asset hacking?
“To quickly adapt to changing hacking techniques, cooperation between the public and institutional sectors is essential. In particular, key stakeholders should support the rapid identification and neutralization of malicious activities through data sharing initiatives, real-time security solutions, advanced tracking tools, and customized security training.
Furthermore, best security practices across the industry must evolve rapidly, and both prevention of security incidents and accountability must be taken into consideration simultaneously. Ultimately, it is crucial to strengthen cooperation with law enforcement agencies in each country and provide resources and expertise for quick responses to security teams.
※ This article has been translated by OpenAI. Share your feedback here.
8. South Korea places fourth military spy satellite in orbit to monitor North Korea
Compare South Korea's capabilities with north Korea's space launch failures.
South Korea places fourth military spy satellite in orbit to monitor North Korea
Launch aboard SpaceX rocket expands ROK’s recon constellation as DPRK’s satellite ambitions appear to stall
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/south-korea-places-fourth-military-spy-satellite-in-orbit-to-monitor-north-korea/
Jooheon Kim April 22, 2025
South Korea's reconnaissance satellite launches aboard a SpaceX rocket from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida. | Image: ROK Defense Ministry (April 22, 2025)
South Korea successfully placed its fourth military reconnaissance satellite in orbit on Tuesday, advancing the country’s independence surveillance capabilities for monitoring North Korea.
The satellite lifted off at 9:48 a.m. KST (8:48 p.m. EDT on Monday) aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida and entered its designated orbit, the Ministry of National Defense and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration said in a press release.
According to the press release, the latest launch enhances the country’s ability to detect signs of provocation from North Korea through the operation of a coordinated group of satellites — known as a satellite constellation. This approach enables more frequent data collection and a variety of observation angles.
Like its predecessors, the new satellite is equipped with a synthetic aperture radar system and is capable of capturing ultra-high-resolution images day and night, regardless of weather conditions.
“With the successful launch of the military reconnaissance satellite Unit 4, our armed forces have secured an additional independent surveillance and reconnaissance capability,” the ministry and state procurement agency said. “This marks a significant step in strengthening the Kill Chain system by enhancing one of the core assets underpinning South Korea’s three-axis defense system.”
Kill Chain is South Korea’s strategy for countering a DPRK missile strike. It focuses on detecting planned launches and carrying out preemptive strikes, defending against missile attacks with interceptor systems and retaliating with overwhelming force.
This satellite is the fourth in a planned series of five mid-to large-sized reconnaissance satellites that South Korea plans to launch under “Project 425.” The first satellite was launched in Dec. 2023 and became operational in Aug. 2024. The second and third satellites were launched in April and December last year and are currently being integrated into active service.
Meanwhile, North Korea has yet to make visible progress toward launching additional satellites of its own, more than a year and a half after putting its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit.
Leader Kim Jong Un originally called for placing three more spy satellites in orbit in 2024, but the only launch it attempted in May ended in failure, even as Pyongyang hinted that it was receiving Russian help.
However, the website 38 North reported in March that North Korea continued to expand road and rail infrastructure at its Sohae Satellite Launching Station, a clear sign of continued investment in the satellite program.
Edited by Bryan Betts
Inter-Korean
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Jooheon Kim
Jooheon Kim is a Correspondent at NK News. He previously worked at Aju News Corporation where he covered South Korea's economy and tech sectors, K-pop and inter-Korean politics.
9. South Korea resumes artillery drills at US range on North Korea’s doorstep
South Korea resumes artillery drills at US range on North Korea’s doorstep
ROK army fires some 60 rounds in first such exercise in 7 years, following suspension of 2018 inter-Korean military pact
https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/south-korea-resumes-artillery-drills-at-us-range-on-north-koreas-doorstep/
Jeongmin Kim April 22, 2025
A K9A1 self-propelled howitzer from the ROK 1st Artillery Brigade fires a shell during a live-fire drill at the Story Range in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, where training resumed for the first time in seven years on April 21, 2025. | Image: ROK army (Released April 22, 2025)
South Korea has resumed live-fire artillery drills at a high-profile U.S. range just miles from the North Korean border for the first time in seven years, a move that highlights growing military tensions following the collapse of a landmark inter-Korean agreement.
The drill, held Monday at the U.S. Story Live-Fire Complex in Paju, represents one of Seoul’s most high-profile drills in recent months and comes after last year’s breakdown of the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) aimed at reducing front-line tensions.
According to an army press statement released Tuesday, the drill mobilized six K55A1 self-propelled howitzers from the First Infantry Division and 12 K9A1 self-propelled howitzers from the First Artillery Brigade, firing around 60 rounds of artillery.
“This artillery drill was the first to take place following the reactivation of the Story Target Range under the ROK-U.S. memorandum of understanding signed on March 25, 2025, after the suspension of the CMA,” the ROK army said, adding that the goal was to demonstrate the military’s “readiness to respond with powerful firepower in case of enemy provocations.”
The inter-Korean agreement signed in Sept. 2018 introduced buffer zones on land, sea and in the air along the border, banning both Koreas from conducting artillery drills and large-scale military exercises near these areas. On land, both sides agreed to suspend all artillery fire and field exercises at the regiment level or higher within 3.1 miles (5 km) of the Military Demarcation Line.
According to the release, Monday’s exercise was based on step-by-step scenarios beginning with ROK counter-artillery radar systems detecting simulated enemy fire.
“Command posts then targeted the origin points of the provocations and issued firing orders through C4I systems,” the press release explained. C4I refers to Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence.
Artillery battalions positioned along the Imjin River then “executed precise counter-fire at the target range,” it added.
“This was an opportunity to gain confidence that we can immediately respond to any enemy provocation,” said Captain Do Jae-ho, a battery commander participating in the exercise. “We will maintain the highest level of firepower readiness so that we can fire quickly and accurately whenever and wherever orders are issued.”
Top defense officials of Seoul and Pyongyang signing inter-Korean military agreement on Sept. 19, 2018 | Image: Pyeongyang Press Corps
The Story Live-Fire Complex has been used for other types of training in recent years, such as mortar firing exercises by infantry units as part of a combined U.S.-ROK exercise in Aug. 2022.
However, the defense ministry told NK News that this week’s resumption marked the first time in seven years that artillery units’ howitzers fired at the Story Target Range itself, with the mortars in 2022 — classified as infantry support weapons — not reaching the actual artillery target area restricted under the 2018 agreement.
North Korea previously accused the U.S. and South Korea of firing “more than 30 shells” at the Story Target Range in March 2023, demanding that the allies stop “provocative military action” near the border, but Seoul denied that the alleged drills took place.
The ROK army in Tuesday’s release assessed that the resumption of artillery firing at the Story Live-Fire Complex “sufficiently resolves limitations that had hindered realistic training,” as it will now be able to “cultivate long-range firing capabilities and conduct firepower operations based on actual operational plans in the frontline areas.”
Meanwhile, before conducting the drill, the army implemented its Army Risk Assessment System (ARAS) to reduce the possibility of accidents such as forest fires, the release emphasized, with the drill coming weeks after the most devastating wildfire in South Korean history.
Edited by Alannah Hill
10. Meet the Fayetteville-grown four-star general leading 3 different commands in Korea.
Meet the Fayetteville-grown four-star general leading 3 different commands in Korea.
Rachael Riley
Fayetteville Observer
fayobserver.com
- Gen. Xavier Brunson, a Fayetteville native, currently commands U.S. Forces Korea, Combined Forces Command, and the United Nations Command.
- Brunson recently testified before Congress regarding North Korea's growing weapons programs and the importance of U.S. military presence in South Korea.
- Brunson's has deep ties to Fayetteville.
Wherever Gen. Xavier Brunson is in the world, he knows he can always call Fayetteville home.
Brunson, a 1985 Reid Ross graduate, before it became a classic school, is commander of U.S. Forces Korea, the Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command.
Brunson was stateside this month to testify before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees with Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, about force requirements, capabilities and budget needs.
He was also at Fort Bragg on April 15 at a promotion ceremony for one of his former 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade comrades.
“I was born at Womack Army Hospital, and that’s now the soldier support center. That's obviously where it starts, but my grandmother and my grandfather and my great-grandfather are from the other side of Cape Fear River on Deep Creek Road, and so my association has always been that this is home,” Brunson told The Fayetteville Observer on April 15.
Memories of Fayetteville and Fort Bragg
Brunson said he remembers when there were three drive-in movie theaters on Bragg Boulevard; his grandfather purchasing a car at M&O Chevrolet in downtown Fayetteville; watching “The Jungle Book” at the Cardinal Theater; and riding his bicycle past where Cross Creek Mall was being built.
“I often tell people that before it became Benjamin Martin Elementary School, it was called Reilly Road Elementary, and Ben Martin was my principal,” he said.
Brunson grew up as a military child and watched his father, retired Sgt. Maj. Albert Brunson, spend his formative years at Fort Bragg.
From an early age, Brunson said, he knew he wanted to follow in his father’s footsteps to join the Army and become a paratrooper.
“I never wanted to be anything else,” he said. “I didn’t want to be a lawyer or a doctor or a teacher or anything else other than just being a soldier.”
For nearly 35 years, he’s done just that.
His earlier assignments have also included serving with the 82nd Airborne Division; as commander of the 525th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade; and within Fort Bragg's special operations community.
Brunson is a former commander of the 7th Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, was chief of staff for the 18th Airborne Corps, is a former deputy commander of operations for the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, and is a former assistant commander of support for the 1st Special Forces Command and commanded I Corps commander at JBLM.
Receiving his fourth star
As he rose through the ranks, his first star was pinned on him at the Airborne and Special Operations Museum downtown. This past December, his fourth star was pinned on him at the Museum of the United States Army.
“I can remember my wife saying when she pinned my fourth star on, when she and my mom were doing it, they both said, ‘We told you,’” Brunson said. “And I can remember when I was dating my wife that I gave her a ring in the old rose garden at FTCC. And so it takes me from that bench that we sat on all the way forward to the Army museum, and my first star was pinned on … It’s that big of leap from Fayetteville to being up in northern Virginia near Washington, D.C.”
Brunson said his career accomplishments have been made possible by the support of his family, mentors and soldiers he’s served alongside.
Taking care of people and leading commands in Korea
Those soldiers, and the people, Brunson said, are what’s kept him in the Army. He considers it his responsibility to take care of people.
As commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Brunson is responsible for maintaining the armistice between North and South Korea.
As commander of the Combined Forces Command, he is responsible for all forces, or about 700,000 troops on the Korean peninsula, and as commander of U.S. Forces Korea, he is responsible for protecting the U.S. and its people, along with the Korean people.
“I have tremendous folks that I get to work alongside, and whether it’s Fayetteville or Pyeongtaek, (South) Korea — that’s never changed from Fort Bragg,” Brunson said.
Fayetteville native reaches the pinnacle — is now a four-star general
'He shaped us into the men we are:' Fayetteville family's military service spans decades
Environment in Korea
During his April 10 testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Brunson said that North Korea continues to grow its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs, which pose a threat to U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific and allied nations.
He said the presence of 28,500 American servicemembers stationed in the Republic of Korea “is critical in a region that remains significant to U.S. national interests,” according to his testimony.
Brunson told The Fayetteville Observer that giving policy makers insight into what American troops are doing in Korea and what’s changed in the operating environment was a valuable interaction.
“It’s one thing to say, ‘Hey I’m in Korea,’ but it’s another thing entirely to be able to talk to leadership about things that we’re doing there,” Brunson said. “I also had the opportunity to sit with the secretary of defense on this trip, and that was invaluable to understand some of his thoughts on the military at large and the department and where we’re going. So, it was a good trip.”
Staff writer Rachael Riley can be reached at rriley@fayobserver.com or 910-486-3528.
fayobserver.com
11. Will a Second Trump Presidency be Friendly to North Korea?
I do not think so.
President Trump did something during his first term that no president had done: “He gave it a shot.” He met Kim and he offered him a future. But it was Kim Jong Un who failed to appreciate the opportunity he had. Now in his second term President Trump has the opportunity to implement new elements of policy and strategy that have never before been attempted. These include a human rights upfront approach that keeps human rights on all agendas, a sophisticated and holistic information campaign, and the support of the Korean people's pursuit of a free and unified Korea. There are few pundits who see the opportunities that both the South Korean 8.15 Unification Doctrine and Kim Jong Un with his new hostile policy toward the South are providing to the U.S. and ROK/U.S. alliance. It is time to recognize that the only path to denuclearization is through unification. Most importantly, the prevention of war and nuclear use, and the long term outcome on the Korean peninsula are important to the national security and national prosperity of the U.S.
Will a Second Trump Presidency be Friendly to North Korea?
April 21, 2025
By: Sangsoo Lee
nationalinterest.org
Will a Second Trump Presidency be Friendly to North Korea? - The National Interest
The U.S. distances itself from European allies in NATO, U.S. president Trump and Russian president Putin have an uneasy but tangible stream of communication, and Chinese cooperation with Japan and South Korea is raising eyebrows worldwide. Given these global changes, how will Trump approach North Korea in his second term?
The global security landscape of 2025 and beyond is evolving rapidly, challenging traditional alliance diplomacy in Northeast Asia. As great powers adjust their strategies in a multipolar world, ideological cohesion within alliances is weakening, giving way to interest-driven partnerships that will increasingly shape the international order.
This transformation will have profound implications for potential U.S.-North Korea talks, raising critical questions about whether diplomacy will prioritize peace and denuclearization or be dominated by the strategic interests of major Northeast Asian powers.
North Korea’s Survival Strategy before Trump
Northeast Asia’s security structure was viewed mainly through the “new Cold War” paradigm. This framework was grounded in strengthening the U.S.-South Korea-Japan alliance, which sought to reinforce collective deterrence against common adversaries by emphasizing value-based superiority, including democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law.
In response, China, Russia, and North Korea increasingly perceived this as a security challenge and began coordinating more closely to counterbalance this pressure.
Following the collapse of U.S.-DPRK talks in 2019, North Korea recalibrated its foreign policy by deepening ties with China and Russia, seeking economic and security support to withstand external pressure. In particular, with the outbreak of the Ukraine War in 2022, Pyongyang’s growing military cooperation with Moscow reflects a strategic alignment in the emerging new Cold War, aimed at counterbalancing the U.S. and its allies.
In June 2024, Pyongyang and Moscow formalized their security ties by signing a mutual defense agreement, pledging military assistance if a third party attacks either side. Following this, North Korea provided weapons and military personnel to support Russia’s war effort, while Moscow responded with economic aid and possibly advanced military technology. This cooperation has bolstered North Korea’s strategic position as South Korea deepened its military collaboration with the U.S. and Japan, reinforcing Pyongyang’s need to secure alternative security and economic backers.
Trump’s Changes to America’s Foreign Policy on North Korea and Russia
Trump’s foreign policy goals are rooted in his Make America Great Again (MAGA) vision, prioritizing U.S. strategic and economic interests over traditional alliance commitments. This approach has gradually reshaped the international order, accelerating the shift toward a multipolar world where other major powers assert more significant influence and pursue their strategic ambitions.
To end the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Trump stated that he would discuss “dividing up certain assets,” including land and power plants, with Putin during their call in March Just as U.S.-Russia power dynamics have largely dictated Ukraine’s peace negotiations, often sidelining Ukraine itself, this trend suggests that future global diplomatic processes will be shaped more by the strategic interests of major powers in a multipolar world than by genuine conflict resolution efforts.
During ceasefire negotiations on Ukraine, Putin and Trump emphasized the need to improve U.S.-Russia relations and discussed broader global security issues, including conflict management and nuclear non-proliferation. For Trump, renegotiating treaties like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) can reassert U.S. leadership in deal-making, while for Putin, direct talks with Washington bolster Russia’s global standing by sidelining Europe in global security discussions.
If U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations take shape, North Korea’s nuclear issue could become an area of mutual interest. For Moscow, leveraging its influence over Pyongyang to enhance its role in Northeast Asian security, Washington views engagement with Russia and North Korea as a strategy to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence.
To maximize its strategic autonomy, North Korea will exploit great-power rivalries in this evolving power dynamic. It will ensure that its partnerships with Russia and China remain advantageous without becoming overly dependent on either power.
The Future of U.S.-North Korea Relations in Trump’s Second Term
While the feasibility of U.S.-North Korea negotiations under Trump remains uncertain, he may seek a diplomatic “win” similar to his 2018 Singapore summit with Kim Jong Un.
For Washington, a U.S.-Russia rapprochement could either enhance or undermine its leverage over North Korea, depending on whether Trump accommodates Russia’s role in diplomacy or insists on direct bilateral engagement with Pyongyang.
The key policy challenge for the United States is to ensure that Russian involvement does not marginalize Washington’s strategic priorities on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if Trump views diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang as a means to counterbalance Beijing’s regional influence, this could serve as an additional incentive for renewed U.S.-North Korea negotiations.
For North Korea, engaging the United States remains a strategic maneuver rather than a shift in policy goals. Pyongyang may explore diplomatic outreach to Washington to balance its reliance on Beijing and Moscow and maximize its strategic flexibility in an evolving global order.
However, given the persistent lack of trust, Pyongyang will likely maintain close coordination with Beijing and Moscow throughout potential negotiations. It will leverage their support to strengthen its position against Washington while ensuring that its nuclear deterrent remains the regime’s ultimate security guarantee.
Ultimately, U.S.-North Korea relations will be shaped less by traditional diplomacy and more by Northeast Asia’s evolving balance of power. While diplomatic engagement may continue, it will function more as a strategic recalibration within great-power competition rather than a genuine pathway to resolving the Korean Peninsula’s long-standing security challenges.
While complete denuclearization remains unrealistic, Washington should pursue a phased diplomatic approach, offering targeted economic and security incentives in exchange for verifiable commitments. This strategy would discourage Pyongyang from increasing its reliance on Moscow and Beijing.
About the Author: Sangsoo Lee
Sangsoo Lee is an Associated Fellow at the European Center for North Korea Studies at the University of Vienna and a founder of Strategic Linkages (SL). Dr. Lee was the Deputy Director and head of the Stockholm Korea Center at the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP). His areas of interest are Security and Conflict issues in Northeast Asia, focusing on the North Korean nuclear crisis and inter-Korean relations. Dr. Lee holds a PhD in Northeast Asian Studies from Peking University and has been a Visiting Researcher at the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (2007) and at the London School of Economics (LSE) (2011).
Image: Shutterstock/ Rawpixel.com.
nationalinterest.org
12. PPP shortlists 4 contenders for presidential election
(2nd LD) PPP shortlists 4 contenders for presidential election | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 22, 2025
(ATTN: RECASTS headline, lead with latest; ADDS more info in paras 2-4, new photo)
SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- The People Power Party (PPP) on Tuesday shortlisted four contenders in the first round of its presidential primary, ahead of the June 3 election.
The four candidates are former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo, former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon, former Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo and lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo, according to the party's election commission.
The results were determined based on surveys conducted by five polling agencies from Monday to Tuesday, covering a combined total of 4,000 respondents.
The PPP originally had eight presidential primary candidates, which also included PPP lawmaker Na Kyung-won, Incheon Mayor Yoo Jeong-bok, North Gyeongsang Gov. Lee Cheol-woo and former Democratic Party (DP) Rep. Yang Hyang-ja.
This composite file photo shows the four contenders in the first round of the People Power Party's (PPP) presidential primary -- (from L to R) former Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo, lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo, former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon and former Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo. (Yonhap)
In the second round, two candidates will be selected through a process that equally combines party member votes and public opinion polling. The party will confirm its candidate on May 3.
The presidential election will be held on June 3 after former President Yoon Suk Yeol was ousted on April 4 over his shocking martial law bid.
The posters of potential presidential candidates of the People Power Party are attached on the wall of the National Assembly in Seoul on April 20, 2025. (Yonhap)
According to a Realmeter poll released early this week, Rep. Lee Jae-myung, former DP leader, kept a strong lead with 50.2 percent support.
Trailing Lee was Kim with 12.2 percent. Han received 8.5 percent and Hong garnered 7.5 percent.
While the conservative contenders have intensified political attacks against the former DP leader Lee, the PPP seemed to be perplexed by Lee's strong lead in opinion polls.
Last week, a plan to create a new political party in support of Yoon was put on hold.
Rep. Lee Yang-soo of the PPP told SBS radio that such a plan would have a negative impact on the party in the face of the presidential election.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Oh Seok-min · April 22, 2025
13. Closest aide to N. Korean leader absent from public view for 2 months
This has happened with many offiicals. Sometimes they are gone for good and other times they reappear, perhaps after some rehabilitation.
Closest aide to N. Korean leader absent from public view for 2 months | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 22, 2025
SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- Jo Yong-won, a North Korean party secretary considered one of the closest aides to leader Kim Jong-un, has not appeared in public for nearly two months, prompting speculation about a possible change in his status.
Jo, who also serves as director of the organization and guidance department of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea, was last seen in North Korean media on Feb. 28 while attending groundbreaking ceremonies of regional industrial factories, and has not appeared in any media reports since.
Having often been seen next to Kim, Jo has been widely considered one of his closest aides, and his prolonged absence from public view "requires special attention," an official at South Korea's unification ministry told reporters Tuesday on condition of anonymity.
Additionally, Ri Il-hwan, another high-profile party secretary, has also remained out of the public eye since his last appearance on Jan. 2, when he was reported to have attended an official photo session with workers and national contributors.
The names of both Jo and Ri were absent from the list of top North Korean officials reported by state media as having visited the mausoleum of national founder Kim Il-sung on the anniversary of his birth on April 15.
The unification ministry official said the government is "keeping tabs" on relevant developments, keeping in mind the possibility of changes in the two officials' social status.
The official recalled that, in the past, other key North Korean officials similarly disappeared from public view, mostly due to retirement from old age or illness, correctional "revolutionary education" or purges.
In early 2025, Kim emphasized strengthening work ethics and discipline, with North Korean media reporting that he reprimanded irregularities involving regional officials, calling them a "mega crime" during an enlarged meeting of the party's secretariat.
This image from the Korean Central News Agency shows Jo Yong-won, a North Korean party secretary. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · April 22, 2025
14. Finance minister says will work to resolidify S. Korea-U.S. alliance
(LEAD) Finance minister says will work to resolidify S. Korea-U.S. alliance | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 22, 2025
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 4 paras, photo)
SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok said Tuesday that his upcoming trade talks with the Donald Trump administration will help pave the way for renewed discussions on strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
Choi, who doubles as deputy prime minister for economic affairs, made the remark as he headed to the United States for talks over various issues, including the U.S.' new tariff schemes that include 25 percent country-specific import duties for South Korea.
"I will return after opening the door for discussions on resolidifying the alliance between South Korea and the United States," Choi told reporters at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, before departing for Washington.
Choi is scheduled to attend a series of key economic meetings in the U.S. capital, including the meeting on U.S. tariffs that will mark the first high-level trade talks between the two allies since Trump took office in January.
He will be accompanied by Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun for what the government has described as "2+2 trade consultations."
The high-level talks, set for Thursday (U.S. time), will also include U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Jamieson Greer.
Earlier in the day, the ministry said the agenda for the 2+2 trade consultations is still being coordinated with the U.S. side and has not been finalized.
South Korea is among the first countries to hold trade negotiations with Washington following the Trump administration's implementation of reciprocal tariffs on all its major trading partners. Seoul, whose economy relies heavily on exports, was hit with a 25 percent tariff, temporarily lowered to 10 percent for a 90-day period.
Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok speaks to reporters at Incheon International Airport, just west of Seoul, on April 22, 2025, before departing for Washington. (Yonhap)
Ahn, who is set to depart for Washington on Wednesday, said the government seeks to achieve a "win-win" outcome in tariff talks with the U.S.
"We will closely negotiate with the U.S. administration to minimize the impact (of U.S. tariffs) on Korean companies," he noted in a press release.
Following the planned "2+2" trade consultations, Ahn plans to hold a separate one-on-one meeting with Greer.
In addition to the finance and industry ministers, officials from the foreign affairs, science, agriculture and other government ministries will also visit Washington as part of the South Korean delegation to the trade talks, according to the government.
U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks on tariffs in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington on April 2, 2025, in this photo released by Reuters. (Yonhap)
khj@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Na-young · April 22, 2025
15. Senior S. Korean, U.S. Army officials discuss security cooperation in video talks
Senior S. Korean, U.S. Army officials discuss security cooperation in video talks | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 22, 2025
SEOUL, April 22 (Yonhap) -- Senior South Korean and U.S. Army officials held video talks Tuesday to discuss ways to bolster bilateral security cooperation, the armed services said.
Acting Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ko Chang-jun and Gen. Ronald Clark, head of the U.S. Army Pacific, discussed expanding high-level exchanges and combined drills to maintain the combined defense posture, according to the Army.
They also stressed the importance of regional multilateral security cooperation to deter North Korean provocations and for peace, stability and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region as they noted the role of their alliance for regional peace, it said.
Ko pledged to "closely" cooperate with the U.S. Army Pacific as he also thanked the U.S. Army for deploying helicopters to fight recent wildfires in South Korea's southeastern region.
Meanwhile, Clark stressed the importance of multinational drills and high level-exchanges to ensure multilateral security cooperation in the region, it said.
Acting Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ko Chang-jun (R) and Gen. Ronald Clark, head of the U.S. Army Pacific, hold virtual talks on April 22, 2025, in this photo released by Ko's office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · April 22, 2025
16. “North Korea gives up corn cultivation because it can’t stop thieves?”
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
“North Korea gives up corn cultivation because it can’t stop thieves?”
Seoul-Moon Seong-hui xallsl@rfa.org
2025.04.22
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in-focus/2025/04/22/north-korea-corn-wheat-farming/
Anchor: North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong-un strongly promoted the cultivation of wheat and barley instead of corn while saying that he was changing the grain production structure. However, it turns out that he changed the grain type to wheat and barley because he could not stop corn thieves. Reporter Moon Seong-hui has the inside story from North Korea.
North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong-un first emphasized wheat and barley farming in his policy speech at the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly in September 2021. In this speech, General Secretary Kim instructed to focus efforts on improving seeds and double the existing wheat and barley sowing area.
Since then, North Korean authorities have drastically reduced the area of corn cultivation and instead increased the area of wheat and barley, but there is still ongoing debate among farmers about this.
Recently, multiple sources in Yanggang Province revealed that even cadres were surprised when it became known why Kim Jong-un gave up corn farming and encouraged wheat and barley cultivation.
A source in the agricultural sector of Yanggang Province (requesting anonymity for safety reasons) said on the 18th, “Over the past few years, corn fields have been turned over to grow wheat and barley, and the damage is gradually becoming apparent.” He continued, “Wheat and barley require a lot of effort in selecting seeds, so their yields are lower than corn’s, and they also require a lot of fertilizer and pesticides, which hastens the acidification of the soil.”
“Due to these issues, the Cabinet Agriculture Committee is not making a big deal about wheat and barley farming this year,” the source added. “In the ‘New Year’s Farming Guidelines’ sent down to each provincial rural economy committee at the end of February, they even stated their position that ‘cultivating wheat and barley does not mean giving up corn farming. ’”
The source added, “The reason Kim Jong-un encouraged wheat and barley farming instead of corn was because he judged that there was no longer a way to stop corn thieves,” and “all the cadres who should know the reason Kim Jong-un gave up corn and planted wheat and barley instead are well aware of it.”
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A cornfield in Nampo, North Korea.
A cornfield in Nampo, North Korea. (AP)
In relation to this, a senior official source in Yanggang Province (requesting anonymity due to personal safety) also reported on the 20th, “In August 2021, when the COVID-19 situation was at its peak, Kim Jong-un received a report on the expected grain harvest and became so angry that he dissolved the Ministry of Agriculture of the Cabinet.” He added, “This is because residents who could not do business due to the COVID-19 situation were starving to death with nothing to eat, but the Ministry of Agriculture of the Cabinet could not come up with any measures.”
The source explained, “In 2020 and 2021, when COVID-19 was at its peak, the national corn harvest was less than 500,000 tons for two consecutive years.” He added, “Due to the COVID-19 situation, residents who were on the verge of starvation immediately rushed into farm fields and stole corn, forcing many fields to give up on harvesting altogether.”
“Corn is easy to steal, so farms are lucky if they can harvest 60 percent of their crop every year,” the source added. “Thieves only steal the largest and most ripe corn.”
Another source said, “This phenomenon has continued for nearly 20 years since the ‘Arduous March,’ but the Cabinet Ministry of Agriculture has not been able to come up with a solution,” adding, “Kim Jong-un strongly demanded measures to protect corn when he organized a new Cabinet Agriculture Committee in September 2021.”
“The alternative that the executives of the Cabinet Agriculture Committee, who were racking their brains in response to Kim Jong-un’s instructions, came up with was to plant wheat and barley instead of corn, which are less likely to be stolen,” the source said. “The Cabinet Agriculture Committee advised that wheat and barley can be grown in two crops, so [the yield] could be better than corn,” the source added.
Kim Jong-un also followed the advice of the Agriculture Committee
The source said, “Kim Jong-un decided to follow the opinion of the Agricultural Committee, judging that he could not stop the thieves unless the food shortage was resolved,” and pointed out, “This is how wheat and barley farming began, but the problem is that wheat and barley are being forced on the northern mountainous regions where the growing environment is not suitable.”
The source added, “This story was recently made known to local officials through the Cabinet Agriculture Committee and central officials,” and “the officials who heard the story of giving up growing corn because of thieves couldn’t help but laugh.”
This is Moon Sung-hui of RFA's Free Asia Broadcasting in Seoul.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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