Quotes of the Day:

"The educated man, particularly the educated leader, copes with the fact that life is not fair. The problem for education is not to teach people how to deal with success but how to deal with failure. And the way to deal with failure is not to invent scapegoats or to lash out at your followers. Moreover, a properly educated leader, especially when harassed and under pressure, will know from his study of history and the classics that circumstances very much like those he is encounter­ing have occurred from time to time on this earth since the beginning of history. He will avoid the self-­indulgent error of seeing himself in a predicament so unprecedented, so unique, as to justify his making an ex­ception to law, custom, or morality in favor of himself. The making of such exceptions has been the theme of pub­lic life throughout much of our lifetimes. For 20 years, we’ve been surrounded by gamesmen unable to cope with the wisdom of the ages. They make exceptions to law and cus­tom in favor of themselves because they chose to view ordinary dilemmas as unprecedented crises."

-from Moral Leadership

By Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale, U. S. Navy (Retired)

September 1980 Proceedings Vol. 106/9/931

“Every moment I shape my destiny with a chisel. I am the carpenter of my own soul.” 

- Marcus Aurelius

“A man only becomes wise when he begins to calculate the approximate depth of his ignorance.” 

- Gian Carlo Menotti

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2023

2. Mongolia-SpaceX deal provokes a security stir in China

3. Fateful demise of the Taiwan-China ’92 Consensus

4. The Unintended Consequences of NATO's Drift Toward Asia

5. Why Kissinger Went to China — Again

6. Ukraine’s Lack of Weaponry and Training Risks Stalemate in Fight With Russia

7. As Taiwan Prepares for Anti-Invasion Exercises, China Sends Dozens of Warplanes Toward the Island

8. Weary Soldiers, Unreliable Munitions: Ukraine’s Many Challenges

9. U.S. in no hurry to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles

10. Booz Allen Hamilton to pay $377 million for false charges to U.S. government

11. US Indo-Pacific Strategy Showing Results, Ratner Tells Congress

12. The United States shifts gears in the Asia-Pacific

13. Opinion | China’s missing foreign minister exposes Beijing’s secrecy under Xi

14. Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe.

15. Chinese FM’s Disappearance Rumoured To Be Due To Affair With Double Agent

16. China Studies Nuclear Risk in the Context of the Ukraine War

17. Alpha (Book review - Subject: Navy SEALs)

18. Statement from President Joe Biden on Director Bill Burns

19. Opinion ‘Barbie’ and ‘Oppenheimer’ tell the same terrifying story

1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2023

Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel.
• Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign.
• Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull.
• Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to Russian leadership.
• Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space.
• Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area but did not make gains.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut areas and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances in the Kupyansk area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make advances.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances.
• Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for the conscription age while maintaining the lower limit of 18.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JULY 22, 2023

Jul 22, 2023 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2023

Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

July 22, 2023, 8:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) and Melitopol directions (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks south of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, and in the Bakhmut area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff did not publish a situation report about its counteroffensive operations on July 22.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel. Zelensky stated at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that Ukrainian forces had plans to launch counteroffensive operations in the spring but that a lack of munitions and military equipment, such as mine-clearing equipment and continued Ukrainian training abroad, necessitated a delay.[3] Zelensky noted that the delay in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations allowed Russian forces to establish minefields and multiple defensive lines.[4] ISW assessed in January 2023 that the provision of Western weapons and materiel to Ukraine has been essential to Ukraine’s previous ability to conduct successful counteroffensive operations and that delays between Western pledges to send higher-end Western systems to Ukraine and the arrival of those systems likely hinder Ukraine’s ability to initiate and sustain large-scale counteroffensive operations.[5] Zelensky stated that counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo due to ongoing mine-clearing operations.[6] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 21 at the Aspen Security Forum that it is too early to draw conclusions about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine will likely “make a profound difference” on the battlefield as Kyiv commits all of the forces that Ukraine prepared for the counteroffensive.[7]

Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor. Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff Colonel Serhiy Baranov stated on July 22 that Ukrainian missile and artillery units are responsible for approximately 90 percent of Russian losses.[8] Baranov stated that Ukrainian missile and artillery units have created a long-range “fire fist” thanks to Western high-precision missiles and artillery systems and that Ukrainian strikes are so powerful and accurate that Russian forces can no longer conduct effective counterbattery fire.[9] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on July 22 that Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition concentrations in deep rear areas are causing logistical issues for the Russian military.[10] Humenyuk noted that this trend is reflected in decreased Russian shelling in Kherson Oblast, which indicates that Russian forces are experiencing “shell hunger” in the area.[11] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi compared Ukraine’s counteroffensive to boxing on July 13 and stated that Ukraine intends to “hold the opponent at arm’s length” in order to avoid close combat because Ukraine can effectively defeat Russian forces from a long distance, likely referencing Ukraine’s continued interdiction campaign in eastern and southern Ukraine.[12] Baranov’s, Humenyuk’s, and Tarnavskyi’s statements suggest that the Ukrainian military is successfully carrying out this interdiction campaign. This campaign is a central aspect of Ukraine’s plan to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[13]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on July 22 that Ukrainian forces destroyed an oil depot and ammunition depot near Oktyabrske, Krasnohvardiiske Raion, Crimea.[14] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck an airfield near Oktyabrske where Russian forces have reportedly been stockpiling equipment for a month.[15] Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot, causing it to explode and prompting occupation officials to evacuate residents within a five-kilometer radius of the depot.[16] Aksyonov also stated that Russian authorities suspended rail traffic on the Kerch Strait bridge to minimize risk.[17] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two Storm Shadow cruise missiles, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used an unspecified number of drones for the strike.[18] ISW cannot confirm what kind of weapons Ukrainian forces used in this strike. A prominent Russian milblogger tied today’s strike to Ukraine’s previous strikes on Russian military warehouses in Crimea and the Chonhar and Kerch Strait bridges.[19] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian strikes are aimed at disrupting Russian logistics and creating “shell hunger” in Russia’s forces fighting in southern Ukraine.[20]

Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull. The intensity of Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine has steadily decreased since July 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched only five Shahed drones from the southeast direction – all of which Ukrainian air defense reportedly intercepted – on July 22.[21] In comparison, Russian forces launched 19 Shahed drones, four Iskander missiles, and three Kalibr missiles against Ukraine on July 21.[22] Russian forces launched seven Onyx cruise missiles, four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, three Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and 19 Iranian-made Shahed drones on July 20.[23] Russian forces fired even more ordnance at Ukraine on July 18 and 19, respectively.[24]

Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely had the backing of an unknown silovik, possibly within the FSB since Girkin was a former FSB officer and consistently used passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB.[25] Russian sources, including the Angry Patriots Club, amplified a document from Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, on July 22 purporting to show that FSB investigators initiated the criminal case against Girkin on July 18 and that the Moscow Department of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and Combating Terrorism (SZKSBT) provided the materials for the case.[26] Girkin previously suggested that the head of the SZKSBT’s Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS), Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhalo, censored Girkin’s July 9 speaking engagement at a bookstore in St. Petersburg.[27] Zhalo and Girkin have had a longstanding feud after Girkin publicly criticized Zhalo for the arrest of ultranationalist figures in 2018 and for failing to combat the Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s recruitment measures.[28]

The involvement of the SZKSBT in Girkin’s case may be indicative of this personal struggle, although it may also suggest a degree of factionalism within the FSB itself. The alleged document also states that the FSB’s Center for Criminalistics (TsST) formally assessed on July 17 that Girkin’s May 25, 2022 Telegram posts, likely referencing comments he made criticizing a lack of payments to Russian personnel, constituted a crime.[29] The TsST and SZKSBT may have approved the initiation of Girkin’s criminal case because FSB leadership decided to stop protecting Girkin as he increasingly became more adversarial towards the Kremlin. It is also possible that the two FSB entities acted on longstanding desires to arrest Girkin after a potential shift in the balance of power in the Kremlin to the FSB’s detriment. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov reportedly secured security guarantees for Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in negotiations to end Wagner’s June 24 rebellion and may have lost what appeared to be the Kremlin’s increasing backing for the FSB.[30] Girkin himself recently claimed that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin to favor factions hostile to the FSB and other Russian security organs.[31] Russian authorities’ recent initiation of criminal cases against other prominent Telegram administrators and ultranationalist figures with connections to the FSB and Russian security services suggests that select Russian officials may be trying to undermine the reputation of these security structures in the wake of a potential shift in the influence of Kremlin factions.[32]

Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to the Russian leadership. Angry Patriots Club members gathered at the Moscow Meshansky Court on July 21 and denounced the court’s charges against Girkin and its decision to remand Girkin at an unspecified pre-trial detention center until September 18.[33] Angry Patriots Club Chairman Pavel Gubarev stated in front of the court that the group would fight for Girkin’s release by any legal means and accused Russian leadership of using all of its resources to knock Girkin out of his “public work.”[34] Angry Patriots member and the coordinator for the Other Russia Party, Eduard Limonov, announced in front of the court that the Angry Patriots Club will launch a public campaign defending Girkin as a “political prisoner.”[35] Russian authorities detained Gubarev, Limonov, and Angry Patriots member Yan Sidorov for their demonstrations in front of the court, but later released them.[36] Girkin’s Telegram channel posted on July 22 a screed against Russian authorities for punishing Girkin, a “patriot... who gave his whole life to the service of the motherland,” while allowing those that took part in Wagner’s rebellion to escape punishment.[37] Girkin’s Telegram signed the post as “the Russian Movement in Support of Igor Strelkov” indicating that Girkin’s affiliates intend to galvanize widespread public support for Girkin.[38] It is unclear if Girkin’s affiliates, specifically those in the Angry Patriots Club, will succeed in this effort given that they represent a small, insular group within the wider Russian ultranationalist community.

Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space. Russian milbloggers notably did not express anger at Girkin’s arrest as they have in previous instances when Russian authorities have attempted to censor ultranationalist figures. Russian milbloggers recently decried Russian authorities charging pro-war Russian military doctor Yuri Yevich with discrediting the Russian military for offering a negative assessment of the state of Russian combat medicine.[39] The milbloggers defended Yevich and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone they deemed to be a Russian patriot. Outrage at Girkin’s arrest and the subsequent defense of his patriotism was limited to members and supporters of the relatively isolated and small Angry Patriots Club, which Girkin launched in April, by contrast.[40] Girkin’s critics in the Russian ultranationalist information space notably did not celebrate his arrest, however. The lack of widespread outrage among milbloggers suggests that Girkin’s arrest is unlikely to deeply agitate the majority of the Russian ultranationalist community and Russian military personnel, contrary to some Western reporting. The tepid response from Russian milbloggers concerning Girkin’s arrest and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers’ continued support for Prigozhin after the Wagner rebellion likely indicates an increasing fragmentation within the Russian ultranationalist community along factional affiliations and significant ideological differences about Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine.[41]

Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian insider sources claimed on July 22 that Russian Duma Deputy Oleg Matveychev recently submitted a report to the Russian Presidential Administration proposing to recognize Girkin as a foreign agent in support of an overall effort to encourage self-censorship among jingoistic patriots that criticize the Russian leadership.[42] ISW cannot verify these claims, although they suggest that the Kremlin may have been in active discussions about how it could silence the section of the ultranationalist community that Girkin represents. Putin has routinely sought to maintain relationships with select milbloggers in a bid to leverage their connections to the wider Russian ultranationalist community, and Girkin’s arrest does not likely portend a Kremlin effort to reverse course on courting the increasingly prominent ultranationalist milblogger community.[43] Girkin’s arrest does suggest that the Kremlin views those whose criticism passes certain not entirely clear boundaries as a threat, particularly following the Wagner Group rebellion that aimed to replace Russia’s military leadership.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel.
• Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign.
• Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull.
• Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to Russian leadership.
• Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space.
• Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area but did not make gains.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut areas and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances in the Kupyansk area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make advances.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances.
• Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for the conscription age while maintaining the lower limit of 18.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line without advancing on July 22. Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergey Zybinsky claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk) and Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[44] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces launched seven unsuccessful attacks near Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove), Novovodyane (15km southwest of Svatove), Kreminna, and Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna).[45] The Russian MoD also claimed that Ukrainian forces launched unsuccessful attacks near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna), Spirne (25km south of Kreminna), and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[46]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk area and advanced in the area on July 22. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted an attack near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), and a Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced near the settlement on July 21 after gaining a foothold at the Movchanove railway station (just north of the Senkivka rail station).[47] A Russian milblogger posted footage on July 22 claiming to show elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) division operating in an unspecified area in the Lyman direction.[48]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations north and south of Bakhmut without advancing on July 22. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Zaitseve (20km south of Bakhmut).[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian armored assault near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut) and a Ukrainian company-sized assault near Klishchiivka.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff did not publish its routine update on Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 22.

Russian forces continued counterattacks in the Bakhmut area but did not make any confirmed gains on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) and Spetsnaz elements unsuccessfully counterattacked near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) to regain previously lost positions near the E-40 (Bakhmut to Slovyansk) highway and near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[52] ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating on Bakhmut’s northern flank, elements of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff Main Directorate [GRU]) operating on Bakhmut’s southern flank, and elements of the 106th VDV Division operating on both flanks.[53]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on July 22 and made no confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka), Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka), and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[54] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack near Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka).[55]

Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Vadim Astafyev claimed that Russian elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks in an unspecified area along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front on July 22.[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area without advancing on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) direction.[57] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces launched three unsuccessful attacks near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[58] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces in small, maneuverable groups with armored vehicles attacked near Urozhaine but did not advance.[59] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the outskirts of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) but withdrew.[60] Geolocated footage published on July 21 shows Ukrainian forces attacking north of Staromayorske.[61] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Urozhaine and Staromayorske.[62]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not make any confirmed advances on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Blahodatne (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Pryyutne.[64]

Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast without advancing on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[65] Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekhov and several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[66] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces with armored vehicles conducted three attacks on Robotyne.[67]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for conscription while maintaining the lower limit of 18. Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov announced on July 21 that a new amendment will increase the upper limit of the conscription age range from 27 years old to 30 years old in the spring 2024 conscription cycle but will not change the lower limit of 18 years old as originally planned.[68] Federation Council Defense and Security Committee Head Viktor Bondarev claimed on July 22 that the Federation Defense and Security Committee did not receive the amendment to raise the upper age limit while maintaining the lower age limit and had not discussed the change.[69] Bondarev claimed Russian authorities should “not artificially prolong the draft age,” and therefore, not increase the upper age limit if Russian authorities refuse to raise the lower age limit.[70] Federation Council Constitutional Legislation and State Building Committee Head Andrey Klishas agreed with Bondarev and claimed that Russian authorities should allow 18-year-olds to voluntarily serve in the military if the lower conscription age limit increases.[71]

Russian forces continue to force foreign workers into joining the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces confiscated passports from Uzbek citizens who arrived in occupied Mariupol for construction work and forcibly impressed them to join Russian forces in Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast, as “volunteers.”[72] ISW has previously reported on Russian forces forcibly recruiting and coercing Central Asian citizens to join the Russian military.[73]

The Russian MoD is likely emphasizing Russian troop rotations to ease discontent among Russian soldiers and milbloggers following former 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s complaints about a lack of rotations. The Russian MoD posted footage on July 22 purportedly showing Southern Military District personnel conducting combat training exercises after a “planned relief.”[74] Russian milbloggers have continually criticized a lack of rotations since Popov’s dismissal with one prominent milblogger blaming a lack of rotations for Russian forces’ inability to recapture lost positions around Bakhmut and in Zaporizhia Oblast.[75]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 22 that Russian occupation authorities sent 100 children from Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast, to a sanitorium in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia, to participate in Russian cultural and educational events.[76]

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to coerce Ukrainians in occupied areas into joining the Russian military. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor reported that Russian officials at checkpoints in Novopskov, Luhansk Oblast are issuing military summonses to men attempting to pass through, citing the need to count the male population before the September 10 regional elections.[77]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus).

The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 22 that approximately 50 Wagner personnel are in Sosnovy, Belarus, (presumably the Sosnovy in Asipovichy Raion immediately adjacent to the known Wagner camp in Tsel, and not either of the two villages named Sosnovy in Gomel Oblast).[78] The Center also reported that a field camp for approximately 300 Wagner personnel appeared at the Domanovo Training Ground in Ivatsevitsky Raion, Brest Oblast, and that up to 30 Wagner instructors are training Belarusian forces across Belarus at the Asipovichy Training Ground in Mogilev Oblast, the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno Oblast, and the Brest Training Ground in Brest Oblast.[79]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly established a new Concord Management and Consulting LLC subsidiary in Belarus.[80] Wagner-linked sources posted pictures of a purported document for the registration of a new Concord company, dated July 22, 2023.[81] The document lists a phone number with a St. Peterburg area code and states that the company will be located in Tsel, Asipovichy Raion, Mogilev Oblast – the same location as Wagner’s main field camp in Belarus.[82] Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reported that the Belarusian Ministry of Justice Unified State Register of Legal Entities has records indicating that Prigozhin registered the new Concord LLC on July 19 under Prigozhin’s original Russian-registered Concord LLC, which Prigozhin reportedly still owns.[83] It is unclear why the Russian state has not yet nationalized the Russian-registered Concord company if Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty’s report is accurate.

CNN reported on July 21 that senior US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials have “no reason to doubt” Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 16 claim that Russia has moved a first batch of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus.[84] CNN reported that the DIA officials said they have no reason to doubt that Russian forces “have had some success” in transferring the weapons to Belarus.[85] CNN also reported that State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the US has “not seen any reason to adjust our own nuclear posture nor any indication Russia is preparing to use a nuclear weapon.”[86] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced on June 27 that Belarus had received an unspecified number of Russian nuclear weapons on a previous date.[87] Russia has long fielded nuclear weapons that are able to strike any target that tactical nuclear weapons launched from Belarus could also hit, and ISW continues to assess that Putin is extraordinarily unlikely to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine or elsewhere.[88]

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense reported that Russian officers oversaw tactical medical exercises for unspecified Belarusian troops at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno Oblast on July 22.[89]

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

2. Mongolia-SpaceX deal provokes a security stir in China

Are we exploiting this capability sufficiently?

Excerpts:

As of May this year, Starlink had built a fast-growing network of more than 4,000 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO). The company has plans to boost that number to 42,000 by mid-2027.

Its services have so far been adopted by at least 32 countries with holdouts including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Iran, according to a company map.

Mongolia-SpaceX deal provokes a security stir in China

Chinese commentators warn Starlink’s nearby satellites could support US military in a conflict and breach the Great Firewall of China

asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · July 22, 2023

Mongolia’s recent decision to adopt SpaceX’s Starlink internet services is stirring security concerns across the border in China, both as a potential military threat and a possible way around Beijing’s strict censorship regime on perceived as “harmful” foreign websites.

On July 6, the Communications Regulatory Commission of Mongolia issued special licenses for SpaceX, founded by American billionaire tycoon Elon Musk, to operate as a service provider using low-orbit satellites and for Starlink to provide internet services in the country.

The decision, part of the country’s ongoing digital transformation and New Recovery Policy, was announced ahead of the annual Mongolia Economic Forum 2023 held on July 9-10.

“A network of fiber optic cables already provides wide-reaching access to high-speed internet across Mongolia,” Minister for Digital Development and Communications Uchral Nyam-Osor said on July 7.

“But Starlink’s technology will provide greater access to hard-to-reach areas of the country. Herders, farmers, businesses and miners living and working across our vast country will be able to access and use information from all over the world to improve their lives,” the minister said.

Currently, people in China cannot access foreign websites blocked by the Golden Shield Project, also known as the “Great Firewall of China,” unless they use virtual personal networks (VPNs). China has not adopted Starlink’s internet services due to national security concerns.

Some Chinese pundits have an alarmist view of the satellite deal.

“Mongolia is our neighbor. The satellite cannot provide its services to one area and sharply draw a line and stop providing them in another area,” Chen Jiesen, a Shanghai-based commentator, says in his vlog. “The network capacity can easily spill over to nearby places. Will it break our Great Firewall?”

Chen says even if Starlink promises not to cross the line, it has already planned to provide services in Mongolia and Pakistan, neighbors of China’s Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang regions, respectively. He writes if destabilizing social events happen in either neighbor, the related news may influence people in China through Starlink’s services.

He also says that, with Starlink’s autonomous services, countries that use its services cannot opt to shut down internet services in such situations.

Some Chinese commentators have said that Starlink’s dual-use satellites could pose a threat to China’s information and national security, especially during wartime.

A Falcon 9 rocket carrying Starlink 4-27 payload launches from Space Launch Complex 40 at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station on August 19, 2022. Photo: US Space Force / Joshua Conti

SpaceX did not immediately reply to Asia Times’ request for comment.

A spokesperson of the Mongolian Ministry of Digital Development and Communications asserted, however, that the use of Starlink’s services will not affect Mongolia’s relations with neighboring states.

“Cross-border communications infrastructure and connectivity are governed by international treaties that have been mutually agreed upon by all countries, including Mongolia and its neighboring states,” the spokesperson said. “These treaties serve as a foundation for fostering cooperation and understanding among the nations involved.”

He said Mongolia maintains friendly bilateral relations with its neighbors and holds the utmost respect for the sovereignty of all nations.

“As for China, it has established its own regulations and monitoring mechanisms concerning such technologies,” he said. “Consumers in China will be governed by their own jurisdiction in accordance with their country’s laws and regulations.”

He said the Mongolian government has openly extended an invitation to all low-orbit connectivity providers to explore market opportunities within the country and Starlink was chosen as it was the first to enter the market.

Beijing’s warning

As of May this year, Starlink had built a fast-growing network of more than 4,000 satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO). The company has plans to boost that number to 42,000 by mid-2027.

Its services have so far been adopted by at least 32 countries with holdouts including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Iran, according to a company map.

Starlink’s internet services will be available in most Asian countries, except China and North Korea. Photo: starlink.com/map

In May last year, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, a Chinese military-run newspaper, published an article entitled, “Beware of Starlink’s barbaric expansion and military applications.”

“Although Starlink says it provides high-speed internet services for civil use, it has a deep background related to the US military,” the article said. “One of its launch centers is located inside the US Vandenberg Air Force Base and it tested a secure connection between its satellites and the US Air Force’s fighter jets.”

The article said Starlink’s satellites can boost the US military’s combat power, including through satellite-enabled remote sensing, communication, navigation and positioning capabilities.

Last October, Musk told a Financial Times editor that Beijing had sought assurances that he would not sell Starlink in China.

“Starlink is the backbone of the Ukrainian army’s command and control system on the Ukrainian battlefield, and China also needs to have this capability,” a Jiangxi-based military writer says. The safety factor and communication capabilities that come with having tens of thousands of Starlink satellites are far superior to relying on a few large satellites, he says.

The writer stresses that, as high-speed data transmission is essential in wartime, China’s demand for communication satellites will continue to increase. He says China has built a 5G network locally and will develop a low-orbit satellite network to serve Belt and Road countries.

On July 9, China successfully launched its first low-orbit satellite that can provide internet services, Xinhua reported.

Mongolia’s ‘crazy idea’

Apart from Starlink, Mongolia is seeking to form a partnership with Musk’s Tesla, the world’s largest electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer.

On June 7, Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai asked Musk in a virtual meeting to start research on the use of Mongolia’s copper and rare earth elements to make Teslas in the country. He said that, although this idea may sound crazy for the moment, it could work.

He also suggested the establishment of a scholarship program to train Mongolia’s information technology (IT) engineers.

The Mongolian government said Starlink’s introduction is the first stage of its ambitious and wide-ranging program to develop a space economy. It said it is strengthening partnerships with G7 countries to explore space-related cooperation opportunities for peaceful purposes, including on communication satellites.

Mongolian Parliament Speaker Gombojavyn Zandanshatar told Asia Times in an interivew that during this year’s Mongolia Economic Forum the government also entered into a partnership with the London-based What3Words, which operates a geocode system that can help streamline postal services and highlight tourism spots.

Mongolian Parliament Speaker Gombojavyn Zandanshatar Photo: Mongolian government

To attract more foreign investment, the government will also set up a private partnership center and an investment and trade agency, Zandanshatars said, adding that Parliament is committed to revising the Draft Law on Investment.

“China is a particularly important trading partner for Mongolia, representing 82% of our exports in 2021,” he said. “Further investment in this partnership from our side will ensure the success of our long-term development policies.”

He stressed that Mongolia will continue to create an environment that welcomes responsible foreign investors in all sectors and ensures that they are given the same level of treatment as local businesses.

Read: Interview: Mongolian ministers have a revival plan

Read: Interview: Mongolia vows to break its corruption habit

Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3

Related

asiatimes.com · by Jeff Pao · July 22, 2023

3. Fateful demise of the Taiwan-China ’92 Consensus

Excerpts:

The bottom line for the red and blue communities is that Taiwan must acknowledge it is part of China. The green community’s bottom line is the exact opposite: it cannot abide any formulation that implies Taiwan is part of China.

The ’92 Consensus reputedly achieved a clever compromise. According to an August 1, 1992 statement by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China” but they “have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘One China’.” For Beijing, “China” means the PRC; for Taiwan “China” means the Republic of China (ROC).

The statement adds that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts of “China.” For the price of agreeing to China’s position that Taiwan is part of “one China,” Taipei seemingly got Beijing to accept that “China” could mean the ROC instead of the PRC.

...

The saga of the hollow consensus illustrates why the Taiwan Strait conflict is a wicked problem. Taiwanese nationalism is as immovable an object as is China’s insistence that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing continues to insist on a precondition that the green community cannot accept.

Recent history shows that refusing to deal with DPP governments while hoping for the KMT to return to power is not a viable strategy for China. The DPP has held the presidency since 2016, and DPP candidate Lai is currently the frontrunner for the 2024 election.

But even when Taiwan had a KMT government willing to accept the One China principle, Beijing was unwilling to relax even slightly its position that “China” can only mean the PRC. Instead, the Chinese government has deviously adopted Su’s term while neutering its content.

If Beijing would not compromise in 1992, it is less likely to compromise today, when it perceives a crisis over Taiwan independence and Xi is preparing China for war.

Fateful demise of the Taiwan-China ’92 Consensus

Once a foundation for cross-Strait peace, the ’92 Consensus is long dead as Beijing makes plans for annexing the democratic island

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · July 22, 2023

The major political parties in Taiwan have now selected their presidential candidates, kicking off the campaign season that will culminate in combined presidential and legislative elections on January 13, 2024.

For cross-Strait relations, this election may be the most significant in history. China is becoming militarily capable of attempting a forcible annexation of Taiwan, and Beijing seems convinced that the United States is pushing Taiwan toward permanent independence.

The Chinese government has committed itself to going to war if necessary to prevent the permanent political separation of Taiwan from China.

Taiwan’s presidential candidates are struggling to articulate a basis for reducing tensions with China. The “’92 Consensus,” which once seemed to offer hope for a stable cross-Strait peace, is still part of the political discussion in Taiwan.

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te, currently Taiwan’s vice president, rejects it, saying it implies that Beijing has sovereignty over Taiwan.

Kuomintang (KMT) candidate Hou You-yi, however, embraces it. So does billionaire and Foxconn founder Guo Tai-ming (Terry Gou), who is positioning himself to enter the race.

Taiwan People’s Party candidate Ko Wen-je says maybe: He pledges that, if elected, he will ask Beijing to clarify the Chinese interpretation of the ’92 Consensus.

This discussion is tragically futile. The ’92 Consensus is long dead, and its demise exemplifies the difficulty of achieving a cross-Strait rapprochement.

Three distinct communities – “red,” “blue” and “green” – live alongside the Taiwan Strait, each with a different view of the Taiwan-China relationship.

The red is the population of mainland China, which believes Taiwan is inherently a province of China, and therefore should be subject to rule by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government in Beijing. For mainlanders, Taiwan’s de facto independence from China is illegitimate and must not become de jure and permanent.

The blue community, mainly comprised of recent immigrants from mainland China (including families descended from the two million KMT government supporters who fled to Taiwan in 1949), believes Taiwan is part of China but not of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

They reject CCP rule, but would support unification if a non-communist, liberal democratic government controlled mainland China. Taiwan’s non-Chinese indigenous population tends to align politically with the blue community.

The green community, mainly the descendants of ethnic Chinese who immigrated to Taiwan before the Second World War, has developed a distinct national identity as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese.”

Members consider Taiwan a separate country from China, unable to enjoy international recognition of its rightful statehood solely because of China’s opposition.

The challenge for leaders on both sides of the Strait has been finding a description of the Taiwan-China relationship acceptable to all three communities. In truth, the task is impossible.

The bottom line for the red and blue communities is that Taiwan must acknowledge it is part of China. The green community’s bottom line is the exact opposite: it cannot abide any formulation that implies Taiwan is part of China.

The ’92 Consensus reputedly achieved a clever compromise. According to an August 1, 1992 statement by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China” but they “have different opinions as to the meaning of ‘One China’.” For Beijing, “China” means the PRC; for Taiwan “China” means the Republic of China (ROC).

The statement adds that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts of “China.” For the price of agreeing to China’s position that Taiwan is part of “one China,” Taipei seemingly got Beijing to accept that “China” could mean the ROC instead of the PRC.

The DPP argues, however, that the ’92 Consensus is fake because there never was a consensus. That argument has considerable merit. There is little if any evidence that the PRC ever acknowledged the part of the agreement that allows for different interpretations of “China.”

A US official reported that then-PRC leader Hu Jintao said during a March 26, 2008, telephone conversation with US President George W Bush that “the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of ‘the 1992 consensus,’ which says both sides recognize there is only one China but agree to differ on its definitions.”

President George W Bush is joined by his father, former President George H W Bush, during their visit with China’s President Hu Jintao Sunday, Aug. 10, 2008, at Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leaders’ compound in Beijing. PhotoL White House / Eric Draper

Two caveats about this report. First, KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou had just been elected as Taiwan’s new president to succeed DPP member Chen Shui-bian, good news from China’s point of view, which may have moved Hu to speak with unusual generosity.

Second, when he said the ’92 Consensus allows for differing definitions of China, it’s unclear if the US official was quoting Hu or relating his own understanding of the ’92 Consensus.

Moreover, the term “’92 Consensus” had not emerged before 2000. Outgoing National Security Council Secretary General Su Chi said he invented the term in reaction to the election of Chen as Taiwan’s president.

Su said the shorthand was preferable “because China didn’t like the ‘each side with its own interpretation’ part and the DPP government didn’t like the part that said ‘one China.’”

Beijing eventually accepted and even celebrated the term. It now calls the ’92 Consensus “the cornerstone of cross-Taiwan Strait relations.”

The DPP is right to point out that the ’92 Consensus does not mean what some KMT politicians think it means. On the other hand, the DPP incorrectly argues that China considers the ’92 Consensus another term for the thoroughly discredited “one country, two systems” idea.

Beijing endorses both the ’92 Consensus and one country, two systems but doesn’t consider them the same thing. Nevertheless, this defamation probably helped current ROC President Tsai Ing-wen win a second presidential term over KMT challenger Han Guo-yu in 2020.

Even if Beijing had accepted both parts of the KMT’s rendering of the ’92 Consensus, the notion suffers from a more serious flaw: It represents the sentiments of only two of the three Taiwan Strait communities. Thus it was seemingly successful only while the KMT controlled the ROC government.

In any case, Xi Jinping has killed off any basis for harboring even a residual illusion of a ’92 Consensus. In his 2019 speech to “compatriots in Taiwan,” Xi said the content of the ’92 Consensus is that “both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification.”

He mentioned nothing about different interpretations of what “China” means.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has spoken frequently about ‘reunifying’ Taiwan with the mainland. Photo: Twitter

A 2022 editorial in a CCP-run newspaper said it even more bluntly: “In the ‘1992 Consensus’ there is only ‘One China’ – there are no ‘different interpretations.’”

In reinterpreting the “consensus,” Xi undercut the politicians in Taiwan who agree with the PRC that Taiwan is part of China. Both current KMT Chairman Eric Chu and his predecessor Johnny Chiang tried to move on from the ’92 Consensus, but party elders such as Ma insisted on clinging to it.

Left hanging by Xi, Ma himself said Xi’s interpretation of the ’92 Consensus is different from the KMT’s interpretation – which would seem to be an admission there is no consensus.

The saga of the hollow consensus illustrates why the Taiwan Strait conflict is a wicked problem. Taiwanese nationalism is as immovable an object as is China’s insistence that Taiwan is part of China. Beijing continues to insist on a precondition that the green community cannot accept.

Recent history shows that refusing to deal with DPP governments while hoping for the KMT to return to power is not a viable strategy for China. The DPP has held the presidency since 2016, and DPP candidate Lai is currently the frontrunner for the 2024 election.

But even when Taiwan had a KMT government willing to accept the One China principle, Beijing was unwilling to relax even slightly its position that “China” can only mean the PRC. Instead, the Chinese government has deviously adopted Su’s term while neutering its content.

If Beijing would not compromise in 1992, it is less likely to compromise today, when it perceives a crisis over Taiwan independence and Xi is preparing China for war.

Denny Roy is a senior fellow a the East-West Center, Honolulu.

Related

asiatimes.com · by Denny Roy · July 22, 2023

4.The Unintended Consequences of NATO's Drift Toward Asia

ROK and Japan hedging?

Conclusion:

This dynamic, in which the US, NATO and its East Asian allies cement deeper military and political links, is unlikely to change anytime soon. In fact, if NATO’s policy documents are any indication, the strategy will accelerate in the near term. NATO invitations to South Korean and Japanese ministers on the heels of major Alliance summits, once a novelty, will become increasingly pro-forma. South Korea and Japan will embrace these invitations with open arms and work to deepen their respective coordination with NATO (and individual NATO member states), in part to hedge against a potential second Trump administration. South Korean and Japanese forces will engage in joint exercises with individual NATO countries with greater frequency, both to send a message to regional adversaries about the strength of their deterrent and as a practical way to improve their respective military capabilities in the event of a conflict. The notion that security is interconnected, and that Asia is no more immune from European security crises than Europe is from Asian ones, is fast becoming a core principle.

Closer relations between West and East, however, is not a cost-free proposition to the US, NATO, South Korea and Japan. This strategic alignment has already produced its share of complaints from China, Russia and North Korea, three states that have their own distinct disputes with Washington but share a similar threat perception on NATO’s activity in Asia. While Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang may be powerless to eliminate this development in its entirety—China’s complaints don’t receive much weight in Washington these days—the three powers have shown a shared desire to at least plan for it by conducting joint military drills amongst their forces, better coordinating their diplomatic positions in multilateral forums and demonstrating to the US and its NATO and Asian allies that the status-quo will be met with increased collaboration at the strategic level. In short, the more NATO works to get into the Asia security business, the more likely it will inadvertently enable the regional power-bloc confrontation it supposedly wants to discourage.

The Unintended Consequences of NATO's Drift Toward Asia - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea

38north.org · by Daniel R. DePetris · July 21, 2023

As one might expect, the July 11-12 National Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) leaders summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, concentrated predominately on the ongoing war in Ukraine, NATO’s continued military support to the Ukrainian army and how best to deepen the alliance’s strategic relationship with Kyiv. But as has become increasingly common over the last several years, NATO also spent time discussing ongoing security issues in Asia, a part of the world traditionally beyond the alliance’s Europe-focused remit. NATO, it seems, has made a concerted decision to, if not expand the alliance’s responsibilities to the Asia-Pacific theater, then at least transition itself into a regional player.

This years-long drift toward Asia, however, not only has the potential to distract the alliance at a time when Europe is still hosting its biggest war in nearly 80 years—it could also have destabilizing effects in Asia, a region that was already hardening into a collection of competing power blocs between China, Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on the one hand and Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the United States on the other. The notion that security in Europe is inextricably linked to security in Asia, and that what happens in Asia will ultimately have economic, political and perhaps even military ramifications for the European continent, is now conventional wisdom within NATO policy circles. The Biden administration has reinforced this paradigm as it continues to emphasize “the battle between democracy and autocracies” as a central plank of its foreign policy.

Washington’s allies inside and outside of NATO are taking notice. So are its competitors and adversaries. China, Russia and North Korea have all watched NATO’s slow but steady movement in Asia’s direction with alarm. The development is serving as adhesive for a deeper strategic relationship between the three powers. In essence, NATO is a driving force behind the very alignment it so often complains about in policy speeches and documents.

NATO Greets South Korea and Japan With Open Arms

Last week’s NATO summit produced an extraordinarily long and dense communique touching upon issues as varied as the alliance’s defense posture on the eastern flank, defense spending contributions, cybersecurity and nuclear nonproliferation. But some of the communique’s strongest words were reserved for China, an Asian superpower that the US Defense Department views as a “pacing challenge” undermining the rules-based international system that Washington and its allies constructed after World War II.” “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” the communique states, before outlining a series of actions, including Beijing’s lack of transparency with respect to its military modernization drive, the alliance takes issue with. Russia, NATO suggests, is a valuable partner for China, and the partnership itself is posing a risk to the rules of the road: “The deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.”

This isn’t the first time NATO has mentioned China or the Asia-Pacific writ large. After considerable debate between member states, the alliance agreed to add a single sentence into its December 2019 London communique noting “China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges” NATO has to work through. That generalized, mundane statement has since become more pointed; NATO mentioned China in its Strategic Concept last year, with special attention paid to Beijing’s “malicious” cyber operations negatively impacting the operational security of the alliance’s members. While nobody should expect NATO to authorize deployments to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea anytime soon, some of NATO’s more militarily strong members have engaged in occasional freedom of navigation operations in these areas. The German navy is scheduled to send a two-ship task force to the South China Sea in 2024, and British officials are debating the stationing of a Type-31 frigate in Indo-Pacific waters on a permanent basis.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has spoken about the globalization of security, or the idea that security crises in one region of the world can quickly reverberate in another. The fact that Japan and South Korea were invited to the NATO summit for the second year in a row reflects this construct. Japanese and South Korean officials have apparently bought into the construct as well, using language that is nearly identical to Stoltenberg’s in their public comments. “Something happening in East Europe is not only confined to the issue in East Europe, and that affects directly the situation here in the Pacific,” Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi remarked in May. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol had a similar assessment days before NATO’s July summit: “Just as incidents in Europe can have a substantial and consequential impact on the Indo-Pacific region, Indo-Pacific events can have immense ramifications for countries in Europe.”

NATO, South Korea and Japan have all implemented these words to varying degrees. Japan’s National Security Strategy document, published in December, stated that Tokyo “will enhance security cooperation” with like-minded partners, including NATO, to strengthen deterrence. South Korea’s own National Security Strategy referenced President Yoon’s summit with NATO members in 2022 as an example of Seoul’s efforts to “strengthen solidarity with nations sharing universal values” and its attempt to form a global security network. After NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg’s January trip to Japan, the alliance and Tokyo both expressed an urgency to upgrade their partnership to a new level and promote cooperation on areas of mutual interest—cyber defense, maritime security and joint military exercises, to name just a few. Although French President Emmanuel Macron blocked the opening of a NATO liaison office on Japanese soil, NATO and Japan are nevertheless on the path toward more serious deliberation on sixteen priority issues. One of those issues is interoperability, ensuring NATO and Japanese forces can calibrate effectively with one another in the field.

These efforts are in addition to improvements in bilateral ROK-Japan relations as well as more durable trilateral military coordination among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. US, South Korean and Japanese defense officials agreed to regularize trilateral missile defense and anti-submarine exercises back in April. Part of this involves sharing real-time data on North Korean ballistic and cruise missile launches, which would serve a useful and practical function in the event of a war scenario on the Korean Peninsula.

China, Russia and North Korea Respond

NATO, South Korea and Japan have categorized their deepening relationship as an appropriate response to what they collectively describe as challenges to the rules-based international order. China’s expansionist sovereignty claims over disputed waterways, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and North Korea’s incessant ballistic missile launches have no doubt helped make the case (Pyongyang conducted a second test of its Hawsong-18 variant, a solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile that marginally strengthens the North’s ability to target the US homeland). Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang, however, interpret the burgeoning ties between NATO and Asian powers as a direct national security threat and clear evidence that the US, the driving force behind the alliance, is intent on bringing NATO to its doorstep. China, Russia and North Korea are cementing their own relations with each other in response to balance the so-called NATO-ization of Asia.

The North Koreans have been particularly incensed about NATO’s budding talks with adversarial neighbors like South Korea and Japan. In June 2022, shortly before President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida traveled to Madrid for the NATO summit, Pyongyang accused the US of trying to establish an Asian NATO as part of a plan to execute its long-term objective of overthrowing the Kim dynasty by force. Pyongyang slammed Kishida’s visit with NATO member countries seven months later, alleging that Tokyo was “introducing NATO…into the Asia-Pacific region” and heightening insecurity. A June 2 KCNA report used even harsher language: “The ‘war chariot’ NATO is dashing toward the Asia-Pacific region, not content with bringing a war calamity to Ukraine at the end of its ceaseless eastward advance.”

China and Russia have taken a similar tone, albeit with less rhetorical flourish. Last November, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that NATO wanted to “absorb” Southeast Asia, militarize the region and contain Russian and Chinese interests in the countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) community. Commenting on NATO’s’ concern about a strategic partnership between Beijing and Moscow on July 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin condemned the alliance’s communique and urged it not to “sow chaos” in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing and Moscow have operationalized those words by increasing the pace of joint military air and naval exercises between their militaries. Chinese and Russian forces are exercising this week in the Sea of Japan in what looks curiously similar to the joint drills US, South Korean and Japanese forces conduct regularly. This exercise occurs about one month after South Korean and Japanese fighter jets scrambled to respond to joint Russian-Chinese air patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea.

Beijing and Moscow are going beyond the military realm as well, coordinating more effectively at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent US-led initiatives from succeeding. Courtesy of Beijing and Moscow’s veto power, the Security Council is unable to do anything on the North Korea nuclear and missile file with the exception of a few meaningless statements of condemnation from the US, UK and France. While the Chinese and Russian delegations have argued since at least 2019 that US military drills with South Korea are responsible for Pyongyang’s missile testing spree—the Security Council hasn’t passed a North Korea sanctions resolution in about six years—it’s also true that Beijing and Moscow don’t have an incentive to change their position so long as both view the US as the architect of NATO’s creep toward Asia.

China, Russia and North Korea are also aiding each other in other discreet ways. The Chinese continue to shield its eyes from heavy oil deliveries bound for the North, effectively shredding the very UN sanctions regime it originally signed up to. If US intelligence is accurate, the North Koreans are at least flirting with the prospect of delivering munitions to Russia for use in Ukraine in exchange for Russian food aid. The Russians, meanwhile, have reportedly resumed oil exports to the North; according to commercial satellite imagery, the small DPRK-Russian border is also open to cargo rail after three years of COVID-related restrictions, a development first reported by Martyn Williams and Peter Makowsy in November. All of this is undoubtedly frustrating to the US and its allies in East Asia. But it’s also indicative of balancing behavior from a set of countries with similar complaints about US foreign policy and a mutual interest in counteracting US pressure.

North Korean alignment toward the Russia-China bloc is also notable. In the past, the North Koreans have attempted to minimize their dependence on any one major power in the region, if only to maintain maximum flexibility for themselves. Decent relations with Beijing aside, the Kim dynasty could never be certain that China would be an effective or willing ally in the event of a confrontation with Washington. Pyongyang’s long-established policy, first articulated by Kim Il Sung, to keep normalization with the US on the table is now being replaced with a policy of re-alignment toward the Chinese and Russians. How long this policy shift will last is difficult to say. But for the moment, it appears Kim Jong Un has concluded that throwing in its lot with Beijing and Moscow is currently the most effective tactic to counteract what it sees as a cold war-like order forming.

This isn’t to suggest that China, Russia and North Korea are perfectly aligned on every subject. They most certainly are not. While Beijing has protected Pyongyang from further sanctions at the Security Council, it remains sensitive to North Korean missile tests, particularly those of longer ranges, that could upset stability in its immediate environment and push the US into deploying even more military assets in Northeast Asia. In November 2022, China reportedly agreed to reiterate its prior position on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, voting for a draft resolution issued at the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security that condemned the North’s six prior nuclear tests and demanded Pyongyang denuclearize. Despite the so-called “no limits” partnership hashed out between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in February 2022, the Chinese don’t see eye-to-eye with Russia on the war and have repeatedly stressed their opposition to the use of a Russian tactical nuclear weapon under any circumstances. Yet given what it perceives as the threat of US encirclement in Asia, any differences Beijing has with Moscow and Pyongyang are not nearly as important as working with both to balance US power.

Conclusion

This dynamic, in which the US, NATO and its East Asian allies cement deeper military and political links, is unlikely to change anytime soon. In fact, if NATO’s policy documents are any indication, the strategy will accelerate in the near term. NATO invitations to South Korean and Japanese ministers on the heels of major Alliance summits, once a novelty, will become increasingly pro-forma. South Korea and Japan will embrace these invitations with open arms and work to deepen their respective coordination with NATO (and individual NATO member states), in part to hedge against a potential second Trump administration. South Korean and Japanese forces will engage in joint exercises with individual NATO countries with greater frequency, both to send a message to regional adversaries about the strength of their deterrent and as a practical way to improve their respective military capabilities in the event of a conflict. The notion that security is interconnected, and that Asia is no more immune from European security crises than Europe is from Asian ones, is fast becoming a core principle.

Closer relations between West and East, however, is not a cost-free proposition to the US, NATO, South Korea and Japan. This strategic alignment has already produced its share of complaints from China, Russia and North Korea, three states that have their own distinct disputes with Washington but share a similar threat perception on NATO’s activity in Asia. While Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang may be powerless to eliminate this development in its entirety—China’s complaints don’t receive much weight in Washington these days—the three powers have shown a shared desire to at least plan for it by conducting joint military drills amongst their forces, better coordinating their diplomatic positions in multilateral forums and demonstrating to the US and its NATO and Asian allies that the status-quo will be met with increased collaboration at the strategic level. In short, the more NATO works to get into the Asia security business, the more likely it will inadvertently enable the regional power-bloc confrontation it supposedly wants to discourage.

38north.org · by Daniel R. DePetris · July 21, 2023

5. Why Kissinger Went to China — Again

Excerpts:

Why the lovefest? Mostly because it was in both China’s and Kissinger’s mutual interests to play nice. For China, it was an opportunity to suggest that they would respond better to U.S. policies that harkened back to Kissinger’s time. For Kissinger, the visit represents an opportunity to do what he has been trying to do ever since he left public office: maintain his relevancy and influence.

To understand Beijing’s perspective, it is important to remember that the political climate in Washington has turned sharply against the Chinese Communist Party over the last decade. For all the talk of polarization of American foreign policy, one of the few areas of recent bipartisan consensus has been to view China as a rival rather than a partner. This began at the tail end of the Obama administration. The Trump administration ramped up the hostility, highlighting human rights abuses in Xinjiang, bolstering its support of Taiwan, and launching a trade war with China.

Why Kissinger Went to China — Again

Politico

There was something in it for both sides.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) talks to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during a meeting at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on Thursday, July 20, 2023. | Huang Jingwen/Xinhua via AP Photo

By Daniel W. Drezner

07/22/2023 07:00 AM EDT

Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a non-resident fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

The Biden administration has spent most of 2023 trying to restart high-level contacts with their Chinese counterparts after a wayward Chinese military balloon blew up relations beyond the control of both countries. Clearly, the Biden administration wants to see a return to regular diplomatic exchange. In recent months Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, and special presidential envoy for climate John Kerry have all trekked to Beijing.

Results have been mixed. China’s response to these visits has been correct but not warm. Austin was not allowed to meet his counterpart, and regular military-to-military contacts have not been reinstated. Of the four Biden policy principals who recently sojourned to Beijing, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping only met with Blinken.

China is not cool towards all Americans, however. Its leadership rolled out the red carpet this week for former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He not only met with Xi, but also with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, and defense minister Li Shangfu, the person Austin was not allowed to see. The praise coming from China’s collective leadership was fulsome. Wang said that Kissinger, “has made historic contributions to breaking the ice in China-U.S. relations, and played an irreplaceable role in enhancing understanding between the two countries.” Xi was even warmer with his words: “The Chinese people never forget their old friends, and Sino-U.S. relations will always be linked with the name of Henry Kissinger.” Kissinger reciprocated the warm vibe, telling his interlocutors that he was a “friend of China.” The BBC went so far as to suggest that, “given his outsized stature in China, [Kissinger] could act as a backchannel for U.S.-China negotiations.”

The State Department threw cold water on that last possibility in their daily briefing, stressing that Kissinger was traveling as a private citizen and not under the aegis of the U.S. government. Still, the contrast was striking between the warmth on display at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse with Kissinger compared to the chillier atmosphere at the Great Hall of the People, where Biden officials met with their counterparts.

Why the lovefest? Mostly because it was in both China’s and Kissinger’s mutual interests to play nice. For China, it was an opportunity to suggest that they would respond better to U.S. policies that harkened back to Kissinger’s time. For Kissinger, the visit represents an opportunity to do what he has been trying to do ever since he left public office: maintain his relevancy and influence.

To understand Beijing’s perspective, it is important to remember that the political climate in Washington has turned sharply against the Chinese Communist Party over the last decade. For all the talk of polarization of American foreign policy, one of the few areas of recent bipartisan consensus has been to view China as a rival rather than a partner. This began at the tail end of the Obama administration. The Trump administration ramped up the hostility, highlighting human rights abuses in Xinjiang, bolstering its support of Taiwan, and launching a trade war with China.

In its first two years the Biden administration has, if anything, accelerated the retreat from engagement and the turn towards strategic competition. This became evident in the first high-level meeting between Chinese and U.S. officials in Anchorage, Alaska in March 2021. The atmosphere inside the room was chillier than the temperature outside. After Chinese officials castigated their U.S. counterparts, Blinken responded in kind in front of television cameras, warning China that its actions would result in a “far more violent” world. For the next two years, the Biden administration made it clear that it took strategic competition with China seriously. The United States jumpstarted the Quad and launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, structures that were clearly designed to counter China. In his statements, President Joe Biden seemed to signal an end to U.S. “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, making it quite clear that the United States would step in to help defend the island from a PRC military attack. The administration imposed export controls that made the Trump administration’s measures seem picayune by comparison.

After 30-plus years of breakneck engagement — started by Kissinger’s first visit to China in 1971 — it is understandable that Xi and his leadership cadre feels nostalgic for a time when U.S. officials were more interested in opening up China’s market to American exports than closing the U.S. economy to Chinese exports. Fêting Kissinger allows Beijing to signal that relations would be so much better if Washington reverted back to the foreign policy of a decade ago.

It also evokes China’s preferred diplomatic style for managing relations with the United States. For decades, China liked it best when the U.S. administration assigned a point person to handle the China portfolio. During the latter years of the George W. Bush administration, it was Treasury Secretary Hank Paulsen; during much of Obama’s first term it was national security adviser Tom Donilon. There really has not been anyone similar for the past two administrations. Showering praise on Kissinger is a relatively subtle and painless way of signaling their preference for a return to what once was.

If the Chinese are attempting a nostalgia play for the Sino-American relationship of decades past, Kissinger’s motivations are entirely rooted in the present. Kissinger’s reputation has taken a hit in recent years, as his past policy mistakes and attempts to suck up to power have become clearer to the untrained eye. Great power politics, however, remains the one area where even Kissinger’s bitterest critics acknowledge that he had some juice. As U.S. relations with China sour, Kissinger can burnish his reputation by playing the role of senior statesperson just by showing up and wowing everyone with his intellectual acumen as a centenarian.

There is something more than that for Kissinger, however. This trip is a reminder of Kissinger’s one true innovation throughout his career: inventing the for-profit third act of a career in public service. Before him, former policy principals usually wrote a memoir, gave the occasional foreign policy speech, and maybe became the head of a nonprofit. Kissinger was always hungrier. As I wrote in The Ideas Industry, “The traditional route for ex-policy principals was to take a sinecure at a think tank. A successful for-profit consultancy, however, is far more lucrative than a think-tank fellowship. Henry Kissinger pioneered this approach in 1982 when he and Brent Scowcroft founded Kissinger Associates to offer advisory services for corporate clients.” Kissinger’s selling point to clients was his access to the corridors of power — not just in Washington, but Beijing. This also explains why Kissinger has resisted the hawkish turn in U.S. foreign policy towards Russia and China; such a turn threatens his privileged access to world leaders.

You know what corporate clients really want to hear? Exactly the kind of insider gossip that Kissinger trafficked in throughout his entire career. This means that his latest sojourn to Beijing will not just shower him with press coverage but with continued corporate support. He’ll be able to dine out on these latest meetings for months with CEOs. As a savvy media player, Kissinger will no doubt figure out a way to generate multiple media cycles from this trip. I expect no less than a prime-time TV interview and a high-profile magazine essay that might as well be titled, “How I Would Run American Foreign Policy Better.”

The Xi-Kissinger lovefest will not matter a whit when it comes to Sino-American relations. When Republicans are criticizing Biden for being soft on China, you know it’s an inhospitable political climate for China. Both Xi and Kissinger’s preference for a bygone era of Sino-American comity will matter little inside the Beltway. For at least a day, however, Chinese officials could reminisce about the era when the watchword was engagement, and Kissinger can smile that he has maintained his relevancy for yet another news media cycle.

POLITICO

Politico

6. Ukraine’s Lack of Weaponry and Training Risks Stalemate in Fight With Russia

As I have said if we (and NATO) were training the Ukrainian forces on large scale combat operations we should have ensured they had all the capabilities that our form of warfighting requires, namely air superiority to include close air support. We have not been able to sufficiently align political and military conditions, considerations, and capabilities.

Ukraine’s Lack of Weaponry and Training Risks Stalemate in Fight With Russia

U.S. and Kyiv knew of shortfalls but Kyiv still launched offensive

By Daniel MichaelsFollow

Updated July 23, 2023 12:04 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-lack-of-weaponry-and-training-risks-stalemate-in-fight-with-russia-f51ecf9?mod=hp_lead_pos7

BRUSSELS—When Ukraine launched its big counteroffensive this spring, Western military officials knew Kyiv didn’t have all the training or weapons—from shells to warplanes—that it needed to dislodge Russian forces. But they hoped Ukrainian courage and resourcefulness would carry the day.

They haven’t. Deep and deadly minefields, extensive fortifications and Russian air power have combined to largely block significant advances by Ukrainian troops. Instead, the campaign risks descending into a stalemate with the potential to burn through lives and equipment without a major shift in momentum.

As the likelihood of any large-scale breakthrough by the Ukrainians this year dims, it raises the unsettling prospect for Washington and its allies of a longer war—one that would require a huge new infusion of sophisticated armaments and more training to give Kyiv a chance at victory.

The political calculus for the Biden administration is complicated. President Biden is up for re-election in the fall of 2024 and many in Washington believe concerns in the White House about the war’s impact on the campaign are prompting growing caution on the amount of support to offer Kyiv.

Near the city of Bakhmut, a Ukrainian serviceman fires toward Russian troops. PHOTO: SOFIIA GATILOVA/REUTERS

Members of the State of Emergency Service inspect an area for mines and unexploded shells near the Ukrainian village of Blahodatne. PHOTO: BERNADETT SZABO/REUTERS

The American hesitation contrasts with shifting views in Europe, where more leaders over recent months have come to believe that Ukraine must prevail in the conflict—and Russia must lose—to ensure the continent’s security.

But European militaries lack sufficient resources to supply Ukraine with all it needs to eject Moscow’s armies from the roughly 20% of the country that they control. European leaders are also unlikely to significantly increase support to Kyiv if they sense U.S. reluctance, Western diplomats say.

The shift in trans-Atlantic political winds, evident in tensions between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. officials at the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in Lithuania, has come as Ukraine’s long-expected offensive appears stalled. Kyiv’s inability to make headway against Russian defenses has persuaded many Western military observers that Ukrainian forces need more training in complex military maneuvers, more-potent air defenses and much more armor.

Moscow’s military, meanwhile, is grappling with low morale because of exhaustion, poor supplies and infighting among Russian leaders, Ukrainian and Western intelligence indicates. Russia appears unable to seize the initiative and attack Ukrainian positions, but its forces remain robust enough to man hundreds of miles of fortifications and large numbers of aircraft, which are keeping Kyiv’s troops at bay.

The situation is a sharp change from last year, when Ukraine’s scrappy and at-times uncoordinated fighters stunned Moscow and the world by halting and then repelling a far greater number of Russian forces from around Kyiv, and then Kharkiv and Kherson.

In those battles, Ukraine used a highly mobile, decentralized defense against Russia’s larger but lumbering ground forces. Moscow made limited use of its formidable air forces, failing to gain air superiority, which in turn allowed Ukrainian ground forces to batter Russian troops and their supplies.

Now, Ukraine is on the offensive against Russian positions where troops have had months to build extensive defenses including minefields, barriers and bunkers. Western military doctrine holds that to attack a dug-in adversary, an attacking force should be at least three times the enemy’s size and use a well-coordinated combination of air and land forces.

Kyiv’s troops lack the mass, training and resources to follow those prescriptions.

“Ukraine really needs to be able to scale up and synchronize military operations if it wants to be able to break through Russian defenses,” said Franz-Stefan Gady, an independent military analyst who recently toured Ukrainian front lines.

The Russian Air Force conducts flight testing of a reconnaissance and attack helicopter. PHOTO: SERGEY PIVOVAROV/REUTERS

Russian helicopter crews destroyed this Ukrainian military hardware. PHOTO: RUSSIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY/ZUMA PRESS

Gady said that rather than concentrating forces in assaults involving many units firing volleys of rockets and artillery—supporting simultaneous waves of advancing ground forces—Ukraine is attacking sequentially, with shelling followed by company-level infantry advances. The tactic “often telegraphs to the Russians that they’re attacking,” he said.

The small-scale approach, which is easier for commanders to orchestrate than pushing ground forces under covering artillery, creates its own problems, such as reduced mobility. Safely removing wounded soldiers from the front and bringing in fresh ammunition is more treacherous in company-level operations because the medical and logistics corps are less protected.

Conducting synchronized large-scale attacks is difficult for any armed force—even Western ones with more and better equipment than Ukraine has—because integrating vast numbers of land and air troops in the fast, violent ballet of a frontal assault is enormously difficult.

No Western military would also try to breach established defenses without controlling the skies.

“America would never attempt to defeat a prepared defense without air superiority, but they [Ukrainians] don’t have air superiority,” said John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now an associate professor of warfighting studies at the U.S. Army War College. “It’s impossible to overstate how important air superiority is for fighting a ground fight at a reasonable cost in casualties.”

Zelensky acknowledged in an interview with The Wall Street Journal in May that Russia has air superiority at the front and that a lack of protection for Ukrainian troops means “a large number of soldiers will die” in the fight.

Ukraine had hoped to find gaps in Russia’s fortifications, flood troops through, and cause the kind of havoc that its forces achieved last year among enemy ranks. Instead, unexpectedly dense minefields slowed Kyiv’s initial attacking forces, leaving them exposed to strikes from Russian aircraft and rockets.

Russian drones and attack helicopters, particularly Kamov Ka-52 “Alligator” gunships, have proven particularly dangerous. Ka-52s, which are among Russia’s most modern aircraft, can remain far behind Russian lines and rely on targeting data from spotter drones scanning the front. Their laser-guided Vikhr missiles have a range of roughly 5 miles, which is more than twice the range of any portable antiaircraft missiles in Ukraine’s armory.

U.S. Defense Department analysts knew early this year that Ukraine’s front-line troops would struggle against Russian air attacks. A classified Pentagon assessment from February, allegedly leaked by Air National Guard Airman Jack Teixeira, tallied a tiny number of weapons in Ukrainian hands able to hit distant aircraft and cited the risk of “inability to prevent Russian air superiority.”

Kyiv lacks sufficient air-defense equipment—such as U.S.-made Patriot batteries or more mobile German Gepard systems—to deploy many near front lines. Patriots and other large, less-mobile systems are also vulnerable to Russian drone attacks.

Ukraine’s paucity of battlefield air-defenses and antiaircraft weaponry has allowed Russia to dominate skies along much of the front.

Ukrainian air defenses intercept a Russian drone in midair. PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS

As the Russian war in Ukraine continues, NATO member Poland has been investing in new military equipment. PHOTO: OMAR MARQUES/GETTY IMAGES

“The Russians are now able to make better use of their aviation assets,” said Douglas Barrie, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think tank in London. “Russia doesn’t have air-superiority over the whole of Ukraine, but from the defender’s perspective, they’re in a much better position.”

Countering Russian aircraft is a primary reason Zelensky and his team have for months lobbied Washington and its European allies to supply U.S.-made F-16 jet fighters. Ukraine has only a small air force of Soviet-made planes and helicopters.

F-16s, which are modern but not the latest U.S. jet fighters, could pose enough of a threat to Russian aircraft that they might be less dangerous to Ukrainian ground forces and civilian infrastructure, according to advocates for providing the planes.

Ukrainian pilots and mechanics are preparing to train to fly and maintain the complex jets, through a coalition of at least 10 European countries. But Biden hasn’t yet given the necessary permission for F-16s to be delivered to Ukraine, and establishing supply chains to support and repair the planes would take months. The soonest F-16s could appear on the battlefield is probably early next year, say analysts.

If Ukraine receives the planes, their impact on fighting would depend on many factors, including the number supplied, the sophistication of their onboard equipment and the weapons systems provided to arm them. Incorporating advanced jet fighters into battle plans is also extremely complicated, requiring another level of synchronization in Ukrainian operations.

“There’s no silver bullet in war,” said U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley in April, when asked about F-16s for Ukraine. “The outcomes of battles and wars are the function of many, many variables.”

 Isabel Coles contributed to this article.

Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

A Ukrainian serviceman looks up from a trench at a front-line position near the Ukrainian town of Siversk. PHOTO: ANATOLII STEPANOV/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

7. As Taiwan Prepares for Anti-Invasion Exercises, China Sends Dozens of Warplanes Toward the Island

As Taiwan Prepares for Anti-Invasion Exercises, China Sends Dozens of Warplanes Toward the Island

military.com · by 22 Jul 2023 Associated Press · July 22, 2023

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — China sent dozens of warplanes, including fighter jets and bombers, toward Taiwan, the island's Defense Ministry said Saturday, marking a forceful display days before the democracy plans to hold military exercises aimed at defending itself against a possible invasion.

Taiwan is due to hold its annual Han Kuang exercise next week, during which its military will hold combat readiness drills for preventing an invasion. It will also conduct the annual Wan’an exercises aimed at preparing civilians for natural disasters and practicing evacuations in case of an air raid.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army sent 37 aircraft and seven navy vessels around Taiwan between 6 a.m. Friday and 6 a.m. Saturday, the ministry said in a statement. Among them were J-10 and J-16 fighters and H-6 bombers, and 22 of the detected warplanes crossed the midline of the Taiwan Strait — an unofficial boundary that had been considered a buffer between the island and mainland — or entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone near its southern part, the statement said.

Taiwan and China split in 1949 following a civil war that ended with the ruling Communist Party in control of the mainland. The island has never been part of the People’s Republic of China, but Beijing says it must unite with the mainland.

In recent years, China has shown displeasure at political activities in Taiwan by stepping up the number of military planes sent toward the island.

China held huge military drills in response to former United States House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August. It fired missiles over the island in a significant escalation that disrupted trade lanes in the Taiwan Strait and forced airplanes to reroute flights.

In April, the PLA also held large-scale combat readiness drills in the air and sea around the island in response to Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen meeting with current U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy.

military.com · by 22 Jul 2023 Associated Press · July 22, 2023

8. Weary Soldiers, Unreliable Munitions: Ukraine’s Many Challenges

TM Gibbons-Neff is one of our very best war reporters.

Excerpts:

Those visits showed the Ukrainian military facing a litany of new and enduring challenges that have contributed to its slow progress.

Ukraine has done well to adapt a defensive war — wiring Starlink satellite internet, public software and off-the-shelf drones to keep constant tabs on Russian forces from command points. But offensive operations are different: Ukraine has made marginal progress in its ability to coordinate directly between its troops closest to Russian forces on the so-called zero line and those assaulting forward.

The funeral of Ruslan Serenkov, 37, who was killed fighting near Bakhmut, in June. “We’re trading our people for their people and they have more people and equipment,” said one Ukrainian commander.

A Ukrainian medical evacuation team waits at their front-line bunker for a call from comrades as explosions are heard nearby, in Lyman in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian infantry are focusing more and more on trench assaults, but after suffering tens of thousands of casualties since the war’s start, these ranks are often filled with lesser trained and older troops. And when Russian forces are driven from a position, they have become more adept at targeting that position with their artillery, ensuring Ukrainian troops can’t stay there long.

Ammunition is in short supply and there is a mixture of munitions sent from different countries. That has forced Ukrainian artillery units to use more ammunition to hit their targets, since accuracy varies widely between the various shells, Ukrainian soldiers said. In addition, some of the older shells and rockets sent from abroad are damaging their equipment, and injuring soldiers. “It’s a very big problem now,” said Alex, a Ukrainian battalion commander.

Finally, in the summer months, camouflage and greenery remain crucial factors on whether a battlefield operation will be successful. Defending forces almost always have the advantage, whether it’s because of unseen trenches or hidden electronic warfare units that use deceit and concealment to throw off attacking forces.

Weary Soldiers, Unreliable Munitions: Ukraine’s Many Challenges

By Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Natalia Yermak, Dzvinka Pinchuk and Yurii ShyvalaPhotographs by Mauricio Lima

Reporting from outside Avdiivka, Ukraine

• July 23, 2023
• Updated 8:36 a.m. ET

The New York Times · by Yurii Shyvala · July 23, 2023

Soldiers from Ukraine’s 53rd Mechanized brigade monitor drone footage of Russian positions from a command center near Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine, this month.

A month of reporting by New York Times journalists found the fighting mostly stalemated and Ukraine facing an array of obstacles against a determined foe.

Soldiers from Ukraine’s 53rd Mechanized brigade monitor drone footage of Russian positions from a command center near Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine, this month.Credit...

By Natalia Yermak, Dzvinka Pinchuk and

Photographs by Mauricio Lima

• July 23, 2023Updated 5:57 a.m. ET

OUTSIDE AVDIIVKA, Ukraine — The headquarters of one of the battalions in Ukraine’s 53rd Mechanized brigade smells of fresh cut pine trees. The scents are from the wooden support beams in the labyrinth of trenches that make up most of the unit’s rudimentary base outside the embattled town of Avdiivka.

In the main command room, flat-screen televisions, computers and satellite internet pipe in images from small drones, as a cadre of Ukrainian soldiers keeps tabs on their portion of the front line.

What they mostly see is a violent stalemate.

As the war enters its 17th month, the fighting has developed a noticeable rhythm. Russia and Ukraine are locked in a deadly back and forth of attacks and counterattacks. Russian artillery no longer has the clear advantage and Ukrainian forces are struggling with staunch Russian defenses, grinding on in their southern offensive, slowed because of dense minefields.

Small territorial gains come at an outsized cost. Field hospitals that were closed after the battle for the eastern city of Bakhmut have been reopened, volunteers said, and Ukrainian soldiers described a determined foe.

Ukrainian soldiers collect empty artillery shells after firing from a self-propelled howitzer near a field in Donetsk region in June.

A Grad rocket firing in Donetsk region. The varied mix of munitions sent from different countries has at times proved troublesome for Ukrainian forces.

“We’re trading our people for their people and they have more people and equipment,” said one Ukrainian commander whose platoon has suffered around 200 percent casualties since Russia launched its full scale invasion last year.

This New York Times analysis of the war is based on a dozen visits to the front line and interviews in June and July with Ukrainian soldiers and commanders in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions, where many of the battles are being fought.

Those visits showed the Ukrainian military facing a litany of new and enduring challenges that have contributed to its slow progress.

Ukraine has done well to adapt a defensive war — wiring Starlink satellite internet, public software and off-the-shelf drones to keep constant tabs on Russian forces from command points. But offensive operations are different: Ukraine has made marginal progress in its ability to coordinate directly between its troops closest to Russian forces on the so-called zero line and those assaulting forward.

The funeral of Ruslan Serenkov, 37, who was killed fighting near Bakhmut, in June. “We’re trading our people for their people and they have more people and equipment,” said one Ukrainian commander.

A Ukrainian medical evacuation team waits at their front-line bunker for a call from comrades as explosions are heard nearby, in Lyman in eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainian infantry are focusing more and more on trench assaults, but after suffering tens of thousands of casualties since the war’s start, these ranks are often filled with lesser trained and older troops. And when Russian forces are driven from a position, they have become more adept at targeting that position with their artillery, ensuring Ukrainian troops can’t stay there long.

Ammunition is in short supply and there is a mixture of munitions sent from different countries. That has forced Ukrainian artillery units to use more ammunition to hit their targets, since accuracy varies widely between the various shells, Ukrainian soldiers said. In addition, some of the older shells and rockets sent from abroad are damaging their equipment, and injuring soldiers. “It’s a very big problem now,” said Alex, a Ukrainian battalion commander.

Finally, in the summer months, camouflage and greenery remain crucial factors on whether a battlefield operation will be successful. Defending forces almost always have the advantage, whether it’s because of unseen trenches or hidden electronic warfare units that use deceit and concealment to throw off attacking forces.

Getting the Coordinates, and Firing

The setup the soldier named Valerii was watching in the command center is common among a majority of Ukrainian units fighting in the east. Unlike the United States and other NATO countries that use intricate military communication equipment to monitor the battlefield, Ukrainian troops use less sophisticated, but easier-to-use programs like smartphone messaging apps, private internet chat rooms and small Chinese-made drones to watch the goings on along the front line.

It’s an ad hoc, but effective, communication suite that is overlaid with homegrown Ukrainian software, providing the location of Ukrainian units and suspected positions of Russian forces.

The downside of this system is that it’s almost entirely tethered to Starlink satellite internet. That means when Ukrainian units are assaulting — absent a Wi-Fi router — it takes longer to communicate important information such as artillery targets because attacking troops have to reach someone with an internet connection to call for support.

Ukrainian soldiers test a drone at their compound near Lyman. Small Chinese-made drones are used to watch movements along the frontline.

Ukrainian soldiers from the 53rd Mechanized Brigade carry supplies to their position on the front line, near Avdiivka.

Ukrainian troops are also contending with Russian forces jamming the radios soldiers are using to try to reach their comrades with internet.

“Mostly we receive coordinates via the internet — it is secure, and as soon as they are transmitted to us, we use them immediately,” said Anton, the head of an automatic grenade launcher unit.

In one case in the country’s south earlier this year, soldiers fighting for Ukraine tried to wire Starlink internet to an armored troop transport as they assaulted a Russian position, but the antenna was shot by friendly fire during the attack.

This month, the system worked as intended. A Ukrainian drone watched as the dirt from a Russian soldier’s shovel piled up next to a trench he was digging: it was a priority target. A new trench meant Russian forces were getting that much closer to Ukrainian lines and would be one more fortification for Ukrainian forces to assault.

The coordinates for the trench were sent via smartphone, and minutes later explosions from a Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher erupted on either side of the Russian soldier.

Trench Clearing: Dangerous and Essential

The squad of Ukrainian soldiers from the 59th brigade were soaked through with sweat. It was the end of June and they had performed the same drill — assaulting a trench used for training, just miles from the front line — countless times, navigating through the overgrown grass, fake-firing their Kalashnikovs, resting and doing it all over again.

The aim of the repetition was to make the process mechanical, so when the new group of mobilized soldiers, whose ages ranged between 25 and 40, finally made it to the front line, they wouldn’t flinch when it came time to attack a well-defended Russian trench.

“We haven’t been in active combat yet but we are preparing for it,” said Mykola, one of the younger soldiers in the group.

With the war in its second year and both armies well-versed in constructing and defending fortifications, assaulting trenches has become one of the most dangerous and necessary tasks for Ukrainian troops trying to retake territory. Training for more specialized skills, such as for snipers, has been sidelined in favor of trench attacks.

Ukrainian soldiers who recently returned from deployment on the front lines undergoing combat training at an undisclosed location in eastern Ukraine.

Neighbors of the Ukrainian soldier Ruslan Serenkov, 37, who was killed in fighting near Bakhmut, watch his funeral procession.

Around the eastern city of Bakhmut, which was captured by the Russians in May, Ukrainian forces have made progress on the city’s flanks because Russian forces have had less time to dig in. Some elite Ukrainian units in the area are proficient in attacking Russian trenches with good communication and coordinated assaults.

But other Ukrainian formations elsewhere on the front have had trouble filling their ranks with the caliber of soldiers capable of carrying out successful trench attacks, given that months of fighting have exhausted their ranks. New replacements are often older recruits who were forced into action.

“How can you expect a 40 year old to be a good infantry soldier or machine-gunner?” asked the Ukrainian commander who’s platoon had taken dozens of casualties. Youth not only means better physical prowess, but younger soldiers are less likely to question orders.

In recent days around Bakhmut, Ukrainian casualties have mounted, a byproduct of Ukraine’s strategy to tie up Russian forces around the city to complement the ongoing counteroffensive in the country’s south. Russian forces have rushed more artillery units to the area so that even if they lose a trench to a Ukrainian assault they can quickly shower their lost fortifications with shells, forcing Kyivs troops to retreat from newly recaptured ground.

‘The Green Zone’

Outside the eastern town of Siversk, a team of Ukrainian troops manning a U.S.-supplied 105 mm howitzer listened to its “neighbor,” a self-propelled howitzer, fire several rounds. Then the 105 mm’s team received their own fire mission, via smartphone and Starlink internet, targeting a Russian mortar team.

The crew peeled back its camouflage netting, fired twice, and then concealed again.

The fire mission was successful. But for many Ukrainian artillery units it’s not that simple.

Ukrainian artillery crews are navigating an assortment of munitions delivered from countries such as Pakistan, Poland, Bulgaria and Iran, forcing gun crews to adjust their aim based on which country the ammunition comes from, and sometimes how old they are, even though they are all the same caliber.

Frequent artillery fire almost always brings retaliation. Twenty minutes after a Ukrainian 105 mm fired a salvo, the Russians fired back, showering the area with cluster munitions, a class of shells and rockets that explode and distribute smaller explosives over a wide area. Both Russia and Ukraine have used the weapons, though many countries banning them.

A Ukrainian soldier rides self-propelled artillery system through a residential neighborhood in Siversk.

One of several homes destroyed by Russian shelling in a residential neighborhood in Siversk.

The Russians used cluster munitions, the gun crew said, because they didn’t know exactly where the Ukrainians were, so they opted instead to blanket the area with the small exploding bombs with the hopes of hitting their target somewhere among the trees.

One of the defining features of summer combat in eastern Ukraine is the foliage. Covering a tank or artillery piece with camouflage is called “masking” by the Ukrainians, and the routine is critical to avoid detection from drones and the artillery fire that is sure to follow. Around Bakhmut the fields and tree lines are known among Ukrainian troops as the “green zone.”

Outside the Russian-held town of Kreminna, farther north, where pine forests dominate the terrain, Russian forces there frequently shell the trees with incendiary munitions to burn through the foliage, soldiers from the 100th Territorial Defense Brigade said. On that front line, Ukrainian troops often go so far as to bury their trash to stay hidden from drones.

Often, to fire or maneuver, Ukrainian combat vehicles have to forego any type of camouflage, exposing them to another weapon that has proliferated across the front line in recent months: Russian GPS-guided Lancet drones.

Often called “kamikaze” drones, they have forced Ukrainian artillery and tank crews to take extensive measures at concealing their positions. Some tank crews have even welded homemade armor to their turrets to stop the self-exploding machines.

Ukrainian soldiers of the 67th Mechanized Brigade talk to one another as they wait for a fire mission.

The gun crew make adjustments on a howitzer to fire artillery shells toward Russian positions near Kreminna.

Roughly 40 miles away, on another portion of the front line, soldiers from the 15th separate artillery reconnaissance brigade were monitoring a range of radio frequencies from their computer screens, and trying to figure out how to deal with the Lancets. Jamming them was impossible, at least for now.

Lancets are hard to shoot down because they operate more like guided bombs than drones, the Ukrainian soldiers said. Instead their electronic warfare radar, known as a NOTA, tries to jam the nearby Russian drone presumably sending coordinates to the Lancet. But it’s a difficult science, the soldiers said.

“We don’t know exactly how they communicate,” said Marabu, a junior sergeant working inside the NOTA.

Another electronic warfare soldier added that they can only see Lancets briefly on their screen when it turns on its connection to stream video, but that usually only lasts around 15 seconds.

Electronic warfare is a hidden hand behind much of the war, with Russian capabilities outmatching that of the Ukrainians. Russian forces can detect cellphone signals, jam GPS and radio frequencies and are often looking for Starlink Wi-Fi routers to target with their artillery.

“It’s a very big problem for us,” said Marabu, referring to the Russian forces’ ability to switch the frequency output of their drones. That makes it harder for the NOTA to tell where the drones are on the front line.

Earlier this month, Marabu watched a Russian surveillance drone somewhere over the town of Svatove. Out of range from the NOTA’s jamming radar, all Sgt. Marabu could do was look as red dots cascaded down a blue background on his screen: the Russian drone was communicating back to its operator, sending grainy footage of the war below.

A driver passes by a destroyed bridge in Kupiansk in northeastern Ukraine.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff is a Ukraine correspondent and a former Marine infantryman. More about Thomas Gibbons-Neff

The New York Times · by Yurii Shyvala · July 23, 2023

9. U.S. in no hurry to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles

Damn.

Excerpts:

The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts.

The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries.

Ukraine has said that the ATACMS, with a range of 190 miles, is essential for destroying command posts and logistics areas far behind Russian front lines.

“Without long-range weapons, it is difficult not only to carry out an offensive mission but also to conduct a defensive operation,” Zelensky said at a July 7 news conference in Prague.

The ATACMS would allow Ukrainian forces to target the farthest reaches of Russian-occupied Crimea from their own current front lines, including the 12-mile Kerch Bridge and the Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

Asked at the Aspen Security Forum on Thursday what is at the top of Ukraine’s list of security needs, Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelensky’s presidential office, said: “My answer will be very simple. At this point, it’s very clear and understandable. We need and are waiting for decisions on ATACMS.”

U.S. in no hurry to provide Ukraine with long-range missiles

Kyiv says it needs ATACMS, but the Pentagon says it doesn’t have enough to spare and Ukraine doesn’t really need them

By Karen DeYoung and Missy Ryan

Updated July 22, 2023 at 1:06 p.m. EDT|Published July 22, 2023 at 12:52 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · July 22, 2023

The Biden administration is holding firm, for now at least, on its refusal to send long-range Army missiles to Ukraine despite mounting pressure from U.S. lawmakers and pleas from the government in Kyiv, according to U.S. officials.

Disappointment at the slow pace of Ukraine’s counteroffensive against entrenched Russian forces and a newly equivocal tone by President Biden have led to widespread speculation that the missiles will soon follow the path taken by other U.S. weapons systems that were first denied but ultimately approved during the 17 months of the war.

In late May, Biden appeared to alter his previously firm “no” on the possibility of ATACMS, the Army Tactical Missile System, saying for the first time that it was “still in play.” Two weeks later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that he and Biden had spoken about the missiles at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania but that no decision had been made.

But U.S. defense and administration officials familiar with the issue said that despite what one called a growing public perception of “some sort of slow, gravitational pull” toward approval, there has been no change in U.S. policy and no substantive discussion about the issue for months. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to address the sensitive subject.

The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts.

The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries.

Ukraine has said that the ATACMS, with a range of 190 miles, is essential for destroying command posts and logistics areas far behind Russian front lines.

“Without long-range weapons, it is difficult not only to carry out an offensive mission but also to conduct a defensive operation,” Zelensky said at a July 7 news conference in Prague.

The ATACMS would allow Ukrainian forces to target the farthest reaches of Russian-occupied Crimea from their own current front lines, including the 12-mile Kerch Bridge and the Russian naval base at Sevastopol.

Asked at the Aspen Security Forum on Thursday what is at the top of Ukraine’s list of security needs, Andriy Yermak, the head of Zelensky’s presidential office, said: “My answer will be very simple. At this point, it’s very clear and understandable. We need and are waiting for decisions on ATACMS.”

Kyiv has asked for hundreds of the missiles.

Ukraine has appealed to its supporters in Congress — many of whom have visited Kyiv or met elsewhere with Zelensky and other Ukrainian government officials — and U.S. lawmakers have made increasingly loud demands for the Biden administration to approve the transfer of missiles.

Last month, the House Armed Services Committee included funds to send ATACMS to Ukraine in its draft of the defense budget, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a bipartisan resolution calling for the United States to “immediately” provide the missiles.

“There’s no reason to give Ukraine just enough to bleed but not enough to win,” Committee Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Tex.) said. “If we’re going to be helping them, either go all in or get out.” The resolution was backed by the committee’s chief Democrat, Rep. Gregory W. Meeks (N.Y.).

Early this month, Sens. James E. Risch (Idaho) and Roger Wicker (Miss.), the ranking Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees, respectively, joined McCaul in a statement that said transfer of ATACMS, along with cluster munitions and F-16 aircraft, was “critical” to Ukraine’s success.

Since last year, the administration has cited several reasons for holding back. Refusal initially centered on concerns that Ukraine might fire the long-range missiles into Russian territory, escalating the conflict into a U.S.-Russia confrontation. Even supplying the weapons, Moscow has said publicly, would cross a red line.

Whatever Moscow’s threats, those worries seem to have abated. The Biden administration has said it is satisfied with public statements and written pledges from Kyiv not to use U.S.-supplied weapons to target Russians beyond the border. Although officials privately concede there have been some breaches, Ukraine is said to have largely complied with those promises.

Britain and France have recently supplied cruise missiles with a range of about 140 miles — nearly three times as far as what was previously available to Ukraine, but about 50 miles short of the range of the ATACMS — after coordinating their decisions with the United States.

“We are confident that these weapons will be used by Ukraine in accordance” with agreements “not to attack Russian soil,” a senior European official said.

The recent arrival of British Storm Shadow and French SCALP missiles means Ukraine has even less need for ATACMS, Colin Kahl, until early this month the Pentagon’s undersecretary for policy, said during the same Aspen panel at which Yermak appeared.

“The problem now is not their ability to strike deep” into Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, Kahl said. “They have that ability. They are doing it now. The Russian command and control, their logistics, have been disrupted in the deep.”

“The problem is not a hundred kilometers away, it’s one kilometer in front of them with the minefields” the Russians have laid, along with rows of trenches and tank traps, in defensive lines along the 600-mile front line, Kahl said.

The minefields are the primary cause of delay in the Ukrainian offensive, according to Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Right now, [the Ukrainians] are preserving their combat power and they are slowly and deliberately and steadily working their way through all these minefields. And it’s a tough fight. It’s a very difficult fight,” Milley said after Tuesday’s virtual meeting of the 50-plus group of Ukraine’s international backers.

“The various war games that were done ahead of time have predicted certain levels of advance and that has slowed down,” he said. “Why? Because that’s the difference between war on paper and real war. These are real people in real machines that are out there really clearing real minefields and they’re really dying.”

Not only would the ATACMS be game changers in Ukraine, in the view of the administration, but they also would “limit the use of HIMARS or the GMLRs,” a defense official said, referring to the U.S. High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System and the Guided Multiple Launch Rockets it is capable of firing six at a time with a nearly 50-mile range. The ATACMS are also fired from HIMARS, but only one at a time.

“There’s a very limited number [of ATACMS] available to export, and for distances longer than the GMLR can reach, the Ukrainians have been given Storm Shadows and SCALPS,” the defense official said. This fall or winter, Ukraine also will receive U.S. GLSDB, or Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs, with a range of 93 miles and the ability to fire on a 360-degree trajectory.

ATACMS are nearly two-ton guided missiles. Each one is 13 feet long, 2 feet in diameter, and costs nearly $1.5 million. First designed in the 1980s, they were used in combat by the Army in both the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The Ukrainians believe the ground-launched missiles would provide a capability beyond the cruise missiles, which are launched from aircraft.

The limited number of ATACMS is the U.S. military’s most pressing concern. While the exact number in the U.S. arsenal is classified, Lockheed Martin has made only about 4,000 since production began, many of them used by the U.S. Army in combat, exercises and periodic testing.

At the same time, nearly 900 have been sold to allies and partners abroad in the past decade — including 211 since the beginning of the Ukraine war, according to the State Department’s list of foreign military sales. They have gone to NATO allies, Persian Gulf countries and as far afield as Taiwan and Australia, usually in conjunction with the sale of HIMARS. The administration notified Congress in April of the pending sale of 40 of the missiles to Morocco.

To fulfill those and future foreign orders, the Army has signed at least three contracts with Lockheed Martin since 2018, totaling about $1 billion, for ongoing manufacture of ATACMS, which are “currently in full-rate production ... at a rate of about 500 per year” at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Camden, Ark., according to a company spokesperson, who declined to be named. All are destined for foreign sales.

Alex Horton contributed to this report.

The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · July 22, 2023

10. Booz Allen Hamilton to pay $377 million for false charges to U.S. government

Booz Allen Hamilton to pay $377 million for false charges to U.S. government

The resolution in Justice Dept. case represents one of the largest financial settlements for a defense company under the federal False Claims Act

By David Nakamura and Aaron Gregg

Updated July 21, 2023 at 9:34 p.m. EDT|Published July 21, 2023 at 6:01 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by David Nakamura · July 21, 2023

Defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton has agreed to pay $377 million to settle a long-standing Justice Department lawsuit alleging that the Northern Virginia-based company overcharged the U.S. government to help cover losses in other areas of its business, federal authorities announced Friday.

The resolution, coming six years after the Justice Department opened its investigation into the allegations, represents one of the largest financial settlements for a defense company under the federal False Claims Act, officials said.

“This settlement, which is one of the largest procurement fraud settlements in history, demonstrates that the United States will pursue even the largest companies and the most complex matters where taxpayer funds are alleged to have been pilfered,” Matthew M. Graves, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, said in a statement.

A related federal criminal investigation into the company was closed in 2021 without charges, while a separate probe from the Securities and Exchange Commission in the matter remains open.

Details in the case had remained under court seal until Friday. But Booz Allen Hamilton officials had publicly disclosed the federal probe in 2017, stating that investigators were examining “highly technical elements of the company’s cost accounting and indirect cost charging practices with the U.S. government.”

The publicly traded company signaled to stockholders in May that it was anticipating a costly settlement, booking a $226 million write-down pegged to the case and warning that the final amount could be much higher.

A Booz Allen Hamilton spokeswoman said the company has always believed it acted lawfully and responsibly, but decided to settle for “pragmatic business reasons” to avoid the delay, uncertainty, and expense of protracted litigation.

“The company did not want to engage in what likely would have been a years-long court fight with its largest client, the U.S. government, on an immensely complex matter,” said Jessica Klenk, a Booz Allen Hamilton spokeswoman.

She added that the company “fully cooperated with the government and is pleased to move forward.”

Jacob T. Elberg, a former federal prosecutor, said the settlement was among the largest financial awards in cases outside of the health care industry. But he said companies are not necessarily required to admit misconduct and suggested Booz’s stock price could rise if investors believe the legal uncertainty around the case has been resolved.

“There’s a very real debate about whether the consequences here are significant enough for deterrence,” Elberg said.

The Justice Department opened the investigation in 2016 after receiving complaints from a whistleblower, Sarah Feinberg, who had resigned from the company that year. She claimed the company was overcharging the federal government to mitigate millions of dollars in annual losses related to its work with the private sector and foreign governments.

Booz “has been, and remains, desperate to grow that part of its business to re-diversify, in part to appease public investors,” according to the complaint, which was filed in July 2017. They alleged that Booz had knowingly collected more than $250 million in fraudulent fees from the United States and was projecting twice that amount in 2019.

Feinberg is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer whose first stint with Booz focused on helping the military draw down forces in Afghanistan. The lawsuit stated that she returned to the company in 2015 to work for the chief financial officer and was assigned to a three-person team responsible for improving the company’s accounting.

Feinberg discovered two things, according to the complaint.

First, Booz appeared to be lowballing the financial cost of its work with corporations and foreign governments, in some cases on the order of tens of millions of dollars, the complaint alleges. Second, it was lumping together the costs it incurred in performing government contracts with costs from its work for corporate clients and foreign governments. Then Booz fraudulently billed the U.S. government for excess fees that helped cover the financial losses for the unrelated work.

“When at the close of a fiscal year Booz’s costs in a particular Cost Center/Band exceed its revenue … Booz occasionally goes back to its U.S. government client demanding additional reimbursements to further subsidize its unexpectedly large, and unallowable, costs,” the complaint reads.

Feinberg resigned in August 2016 after supervisors disregarded or played down her warnings of compliance risks and did not support her push for changes, according to the complaint. She later filed a “qui tam” lawsuit, which is a type of whistleblower case in which plaintiffs can be rewarded financially for exposing wrongdoing.

In a resignation letter dated Aug. 8, 2016, Feinberg wrote that the company was “currently incurring more financial and compliance risk than I feel comfortable defending as a member of the Corporate Finance team.”

Feinberg, who later worked as a finance manager for The Washington Post, stands to be personally awarded nearly $70 million of the overall settlement, although much of that amount will go to lawyer fees and taxes.

“It is encouraging to see that there is some level of accountability for Booz Allen’s actions,” Feinberg said in a statement to The Post. “I hope this situation inspires more people to stand up for justice and expose truth. And I hope this settlement encourages more whistleblowers to come forward when their companies refuse to do the right thing.”

The Washington Post · by David Nakamura · July 21, 2023

11. US Indo-Pacific Strategy Showing Results, Ratner Tells Congress

US Indo-Pacific Strategy Showing Results, Ratner Tells Congress

eurasiareview.com · by DoD News · July 20, 2023

By Jim Garamone

The Defense Department is clear-eyed about the challenge to the international rules-based order from the People’s Republic of China, Ely Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs told the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party Thursday.

Ratner testified before the committee alongside his counterparts from the State and Commerce departments.

The Defense Department has called China the “pacing challenge” to the United States for years and that challenge is now getting the attention and resources it deserves, Ratner said. “China is the only country in the world with the will … and increasingly the capability to refashion the international order in ways they would deeply undermine vital U.S. interests,” he told the committee.

DOD has put in place strategies, doctrines, policies and resources to counter China and, “these efforts are starting to deliver in meaningful ways,” Ratner said.

Chinese leaders have stated often that they seek to match and surpass the United States in the coming years. “No doubt this challenge is serious, but so too has been our response,” Ratner said. “In fact, over the past two years, the administration and Congress have worked together to ensure that we have a U.S. military that is more capable, more distributed across the region and more deeply integrated with our allies and partners.”

Chinese Communist Party officials plan for the long run, and U.S. strategic thinking is is working to stay a step ahead. “The department is investing in critical capabilities to maintain deterrence and prevail as necessary in this decade and beyond,” Ratner said. “The U.S. military is the most capable and credible fighting force in the world, and for decades that basic fact has formed the heart of deterrence throughout the Indo-Pacific.”

Maintaining deterrence requires investment today and consistent investment for the future. “These investments strengthen our warfighting advantages, exploit adversary vulnerabilities and address critical operational challenges in the Indo-Pacific,” he said. “They provide capabilities that will serve to strengthen our combat credible deterrent by ensuring we can prevail.”

DOD is also investing in research and development to develop and deploy breakthrough technologies to deter conflict in the decades ahead. These include hypersonics, artificial intelligence, stealth technology, new ways of moving, shooting and communicating and more.

DOD is also moving toward a regional force posture that is more mobile, distributed, resilient and lethal. “In the past year alone, we have announced new force posture initiatives with some of our closest allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific,” the assistant secretary said.

In Australia, the United States is increasing rotations of bombers and fighters through Australian bases. “With Japan, we have agreed to station the Marine Corps most advanced formation forward for the first time ever in 2025,” he said. “With the Philippines, U.S. forces will have access to four new strategic locations across the country as part of our Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.”

The United States is reaching out to new partners, and Ratner cited the defense cooperation agreement with Papua-New Guinea, where Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III will visit next week. Austin will discuss the agreement that will increase regional stability by deepening bilateral security cooperation, Ratner said.

The trip to Papua-New Guinea highlights another leg of the U.S. strategy in the region: the outreach to allies, partners and friends. “We are leveraging one of our greatest strategic advantages, by deepening our alliances and partnerships … that in almost every instance are stronger than they have ever been,” Ratner said. “The department is supporting our Indo-Pacific allies and partners as they invest in themselves, in their own strength, in their relationships with each other and in their relationships with the United States.”

This outreach manifests itself in different ways with different countries. The United States supports Japan’s efforts to acquire new counter strike capabilities. DOD has launched a major new technology initiative with India. The department is also working with countries across Southeast Asia to acquire asymmetric capabilities to counter Beijing’s coercive activities.

“Consistent with long-standing U.S. policy, we are also supporting Taiwan self-defense in the face of the [Chinese] threats of aggression and ongoing pressure campaign,” he said.

All this symbolizes progress, but much more must be done. “It is critical that we continue moving forward with urgency, and with resolve,” Ratner said.

eurasiareview.com · by DoD News · July 20, 2023

12. The United States shifts gears in the Asia-Pacific

Excerpts:

With its targeted incentives, including a battery production tax credit and purchase incentives for EVs assembled in the United States, the IRA underscores President Joe Biden’s administration’s commitment to stimulating sustainable growth and bolstering its domestic manufacturing.

But the IRA will also have far-reaching global effects, as evidenced by the US–Japan agreement in March 2023. This accord, which allows metals sourced or processed in Japan to qualify for IRA subsidies, is a strategic manoeuvre and a signal flare. It could mark the initiation of a series of strategic alliances forming across the Asia-Pacific region. Australia, another resource-rich nation, recently jumped on the IRA subsidy initiative, and Indonesia, which has vast nickel reserves, seems ready to follow suit.

Other recent policy changes in the United States will amplify the impact of the IRA. The Biden administration’s ambitious new tailpipe emissions standards, in tandem with the directives proposed in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, accelerate the IRA’s push towards greener transportation.

The United States shifts gears in the Asia-Pacific | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Hiroshi Matsushima · July 21, 2023

Author: Hiroshi Matsushima, NYU

The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a milestone on the path towards the electric vehicle (EV) era — a monumental shift with the potential to remodel not just the US automotive industry, but the global landscape. Washington is working to establish alternatives to China’s control over critical mineral resources within the Asia-Pacific region, potentially recalibrating the global EV industry.

With its targeted incentives, including a battery production tax credit and purchase incentives for EVs assembled in the United States, the IRA underscores President Joe Biden’s administration’s commitment to stimulating sustainable growth and bolstering its domestic manufacturing.

But the IRA will also have far-reaching global effects, as evidenced by the US–Japan agreement in March 2023. This accord, which allows metals sourced or processed in Japan to qualify for IRA subsidies, is a strategic manoeuvre and a signal flare. It could mark the initiation of a series of strategic alliances forming across the Asia-Pacific region. Australia, another resource-rich nation, recently jumped on the IRA subsidy initiative, and Indonesia, which has vast nickel reserves, seems ready to follow suit.

Other recent policy changes in the United States will amplify the impact of the IRA. The Biden administration’s ambitious new tailpipe emissions standards, in tandem with the directives proposed in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, accelerate the IRA’s push towards greener transportation.

Government projections suggest that under the full thrust of this multifaceted policy framework, EVs, which accounted for just 5.8 per cent of new vehicle sales in the US in 2022, could reach as much as 67 per cent of new vehicle sales in the United States by 2032. Collectively, these policy measures outline a comprehensive strategy for nurturing a resilient supply chain, encompassing both US and Asia-Pacific allies, ideally positioned to meet the escalating demand for critical minerals — the linchpin of emerging clean energy technologies.

As countries embark on the transition to EVs, a high-stakes global competition is emerging. Amid the contest for EV market share and industry leadership, the economic consequences of this rivalry are set to reverberate globally. Heightened competitive dynamics may compel legacy automakers and their home countries, including Japan and South Korea, to grapple with a vortex of challenges. These challenges include surging research and development investment needs, shrinking profit margins due to fierce competition from both new and established players, tightening regulations and the spectre of trade barriers.

Yet this flux of changes also creates opportunities. Manufacturing hubs like Thailand and resource-rich territories such as Australia and Indonesia stand to benefit. By capitalising on increased demand for resources and parts, these countries could stimulate their economic growth and expand their global influence, provided they leverage their comparative advantages and make strategic investments in infrastructure and innovation.

But outcomes hinge on a range of variables that pose potential risks, such as price volatility, supply disruptions, environmental or social impacts and geopolitical tensions. The most potent variable in this landscape is China, whose dominance in the EV supply chain is deep-rooted. The dominance is deeply entrenched in the upstream and midstream phases — from raw minerals through battery production. Yet it is China’s vast and rapidly expanding EV market that could further fortify this grip. This holistic control will continue to empower China to steer global markets even amid potential disruptions and escalating US-China tensions.

China, with such a vast influence over the EV supply chain and its capacity to leverage political pressure, is well-positioned to adroitly exploit shifts in supply-demand dynamics. The strategies that China might employ, drawing from historical precedents, include controlling prices and supply or even engaging in tactical diplomacy, such as strategically influencing trade agreements or imposing economic sanctions to exert pressure.

The United States, through its recent policy initiatives, is striving to gain control over a global market that is as geographically dispersed as it is vertically integrated — a Herculean task. In this pursuit, any strategic US endeavour to decouple from China will likely face intense pushback. Such pushback, combined with China’s potential to escalate its strategies, may inadvertently create opportunities for China to consolidate its market presence. This narrative underscores the intricacies of the high-stakes global competition and the nuanced balance required to navigate the future of EVs.

The Biden administration’s actions could reshape market dynamics and redefine the industry’s competitive landscape. The IRA — with the resulting subsidy initiatives stretching across the Asia-Pacific region — is altering the outlook for the global auto industry. A multifaceted array of opportunities and challenges lies ahead. For Asia-Pacific nations, this isn’t merely a challenge — it’s an opportunity to counterbalance China’s dominance in this emerging technology. The key to unlocking this potential lies in strategic foresight, regional cooperation and thoughtful policy calibration.

The journey into the uncharted territory of the EV era will be fraught with economic and political complexity. Yet each strategic step brings closer the vision of a balanced global EV industry and a future less dependent on a single player.

Hiroshi Matsushima is Economic Fellow at the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law.

eastasiaforum.org · by Hiroshi Matsushima · July 21, 2023

13. Opinion | China’s missing foreign minister exposes Beijing’s secrecy under Xi

Excerpts:

What’s worse, China is exporting this model of secrecy and unaccountability. In its dealings with international organizations and countries where it has influence, the Chinese government is trying to co-opt others into accepting extreme secrecy as a new normal in governance.

“Countries striking deals with Beijing are discovering that they are expected to follow China’s lead, limiting transparency and accountability just as Chinese leaders do at home,” National Endowment for Democracy Vice President for Studies and Analysis Christopher Walker wrote in Foreign Affairs. “The result of this pattern of engagement is a gradual erosion of global norms of transparency and open government — and the rise of new ones of concealment and opacity.”

Ultimately, the fate of Qin Gang is inconsequential; Xi can always elevate another one of his yes men. But what is very consequential is that Xi doesn’t seem to feel compelled to explain to the world what’s going on. The CCP’s growing secrecy adds more risk to dealing with China on every level.

​This is in line with my China thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, and displace democratic institutions.

Opinion | China’s missing foreign minister exposes Beijing’s secrecy under Xi

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · July 21, 2023

In most countries, it would be unthinkable for a top government official to vanish for 26 days with no explanation. But that’s exactly what has happened in China, where Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s disappearance highlights just how secretive Xi Jinping’s regime has become. This is a problem not only for China itself but also for all who engage with the government in Beijing.

Qin, a close confidant of Xi who rose swiftly through the diplomatic ranks, hasn’t been seen in public since June 25. After he missed several high-level diplomatic meetings, China’s foreign ministry said in a July 11 news conference that Qin was suffering from “a physical condition.” That explanation is missing from the ministry’s transcript of the news conference. Responding to reports that Qin was caught having an extramarital affair with a Chinese reporter while he was ambassador to Washington, a foreign ministry spokesperson said on July 17, “I have no information to offer.”

On Wednesday, China’s new ambassador to Washington, Xie Feng, told the Aspen Security Forum he couldn’t say if Qin would see Henry Kissinger, who was in Beijing meeting with his “old friend” Xi and several other top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials. Pressed on Qin’s whereabouts, Xie referred questioners back to the foreign ministry’s non-answer.

Inside the U.S. government there is a lot of speculation and intrigue about the issue but little hard information. U.S. officials initially guessed Qin had caught covid, but now he’s been gone longer than any bout of the illness would normally last. Several U.S. officials told me they thought the allegations of Qin’s affair were credible but not confirmed. Several said that, either way, he likely fell victim to infighting inside China’s top leadership clique, which is notoriously fratricidal.

“Qin has a huge number of enemies inside the government,” one senior U.S. official told me. “He was a marginally talented person, who, just through being close with Xi, catapulted up.”

Many of Qin’s rivals had good reason to be jealous of his meteoric rise. After Qin’s wife gave Xi’s wife homemade mooncakes, the story goes, Qin won entrance into Xi’s inner social circle. He was elevated from ambassador to foreign minister and made a member of the Politburo last year, and this year appointed state councilor as well. That made him one of the most powerful people in China. Qin’s predecessor as state councilor Wang Yi, now director of the CCP’s Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission, is seen as Qin’s top rival. He did meet with Kissinger this week.

“The question is who released this information, accurate or not, and who benefits? Wang Yi is at the top of that list,” another U.S. official told me.

Officially, Beijing has not given the Biden administration any explanation for Qin’s absence. And the Biden team isn’t pressing for one because they don’t believe the CCP would tell them the truth anyway. After all, Beijing never explained why Xi himself vanished from public view for large periods during the pandemic.

Typically, in cases where top Chinese officials are accused of sexual impropriety, the party circles the wagons and goes after the woman. When Chinese tennis champion Peng Shuai’s relationship with a top official was exposed, she was the one who was disappeared and harshly punished. But last month, a top Chinese executive was forced to resign in the face of public outrage after being caught on video with his mistress.

Qin’s prolonged absence may indicate that he’s being set up to take the fall this time. He may be ultimately brought up on corruption charges, which would allow Xi to get rid of Qin without establishing a precedent that the CCP will now start punishing officials for extramarital affairs. Or he might just reappear and pretend like nothing happened. There’s no way to know. But now the world will get to see what Xi does when one of his handpicked allies gets into trouble.

Qin’s case also reflects a bigger problem: Xi’s government is not just secretive about officials and their scandals. Beijing is also pulling back on basic transparency across the board — and that has huge implications for the U.S. government, international businesses and anyone else who needs information from inside China.

The Chinese government is now restricting the release of basic economic and financial data that businesses and governments depend on. U.K. Foreign Secretary James Cleverly recently warned of a “tragic miscalculation” unless Beijing lifts the veil of secrecy over its military and nuclear weapons expansion. The Chinese government initially concealed the outbreak of the covid-19 virus and continues to withhold crucial covid-related information from the world. China’s persecution of journalists and academics who tell unapproved truths has skyrocketed.

What’s worse, China is exporting this model of secrecy and unaccountability. In its dealings with international organizations and countries where it has influence, the Chinese government is trying to co-opt others into accepting extreme secrecy as a new normal in governance.

“Countries striking deals with Beijing are discovering that they are expected to follow China’s lead, limiting transparency and accountability just as Chinese leaders do at home,” National Endowment for Democracy Vice President for Studies and Analysis Christopher Walker wrote in Foreign Affairs. “The result of this pattern of engagement is a gradual erosion of global norms of transparency and open government — and the rise of new ones of concealment and opacity.”

Ultimately, the fate of Qin Gang is inconsequential; Xi can always elevate another one of his yes men. But what is very consequential is that Xi doesn’t seem to feel compelled to explain to the world what’s going on. The CCP’s growing secrecy adds more risk to dealing with China on every level.

The Washington Post · by Josh Rogin · July 21, 2023

14. Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe.

No whataboutism here. Yes both sides use mines. But the reason Ukraine must use mines is to defend itself from Putin's war. The responsibility for all mines lies on the shoulders of Putin. And the blood is on his hands.

Maps and graphics at the link. The format is must better there: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/07/22/ukraine-is-now-most-mined-country-it-will-take-decades-make-safe/?utm

Ukraine is now the most mined country. It will take decades to make safe.

By Eve Sampson and Samuel Granados

July 22, 2023 at 3:00 a.m. EDT

Mines and unexploded rockets next to a destroyed bridge on the way to Kherson, Ukraine, in November. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post )

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In a year and a half of conflict, land mines — along with unexploded bombs, artillery shells and other deadly byproducts of war — have contaminated a swath of Ukraine roughly the size of Florida or Uruguay. It has become the world’s most mined country.

Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for the latest updates on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

The transformation of Ukraine’s heartland into patches of wasteland riddled with danger is a long-term calamity on a scale that ordnance experts say has rarely been seen, and that could take hundreds of years and billions of dollars to undo.

Efforts to clear the hazards, known as unexploded ordnance, along with those to measure the full extent of the problem, can only proceed so far given that the conflict is still underway. But data collected by Ukraine’s government and independent humanitarian mine clearance groups tells a stark story.

“The sheer quantity of ordnance in Ukraine is just unprecedented in the last 30 years. There’s nothing like it,” said Greg Crowther, the director of programs for the Mines Advisory Group, a British charity that works to clear mines and unexploded ordnance internationally.

Ordnance contamination

HALO Trust used open-source information to track more than 2,300 incidents involving ordnance and mines in Ukraine from the start of Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24, 2022, up to July 11, 2023.

LAND MINES

OTHER

BELARUS

RUSSIA

POLAND

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Lviv

UKRAINE

SLOV.

Dnipro

Luhansk

Zaporizhzhia

Donetsk

HUNG.

Area held by

Russia-backed

separatists

since 2014

MOL.

Mariupol

Mykolaiv

ROMANIA

Odessa

Sea of Azov

Black Sea

Illegally annexed

by Russia

in 2014

Note: Data is from open-source research only and does not include the results of surveys on the ground by HALO Trust or other organizations.

Source: HALO Trust

Size

of Ukraine

233,030 sq miles

Size of

Florida

53,652 sq miles

Contaminated area

67,181 sq miles

The biggest obstacle to Ukraine’s counteroffensive? Minefields.

Staggering scale

About 30 percent of Ukraine, more than 67,000 square miles, has been exposed to severe conflict and will require time-consuming, expensive and dangerous clearance operations, according to a recent report by GLOBSEC, a think tank based in Slovakia.

Though the ongoing combat renders precise surveys impossible, the scale and concentration of ordnance makes Ukraine’s contamination greater than that of other heavily mined countries such as Afghanistan and Syria.

HALO Trust, an international nonprofit that clears land mines, has tracked, using open-source information, more than 2,300 incidents in Ukraine in which ordnance requiring clearance was discovered. Though events are greatly underreported and the data does not include the results of on-the-ground surveys by HALO Trust or other organizations, it gives a harrowing outline of the problem.

This week’s deployment by Ukrainian forces of U.S.-made cluster munitions, which are known to scatter duds that fail to explode, can only add to the danger.

Evidence mounts for use of banned mines by Ukrainian forces, rights group says

Human cost

The explosives have already taken a heavy toll. Between the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and July 2023, the United Nations has recorded 298 civilian deaths from explosive remnants of war, 22 of them children, and 632 civilian injuries.

Injuries and deaths caused by unexploded ordnance

BELARUS

RUSSIA

POLAND

Kyiv

Kharkiv

Lviv

UKRAINE

SLOV.

Luhansk

Dnipro

Zaporizhzhia

Donetsk

HUNG.

Area held by

Russia-backed

separatists

since 2014

MOL.

Mariupol

Mykolaiv

ROMANIA

Odessa

Sea of Azov

Illegally

annexed by Russia

in 2014

Black Sea

Note: Incidents collected by HALO Trust using open-source information. HALO Trust emphasizes that civilian casualties

are vastly underreported and many events may not be included in the map due to data availability.

Source: HALO Trust

Civilian deminers, who clear unexploded ordnance and mines from liberated territories, are highly trained and use safety gear. But they are not immune from catastrophic accidents.

Vladislav Sokolov, a deminer for Ukraine’s emergency service, told The Washington Post that one of his friends, a fellow deminer, lost a leg while working in a Kramatorsk minefield in 2022. Sokolov and his friend reunited at a meeting of ordnance disposal professionals after he received a prosthetic.

He was “trying to learn to walk” again, Sokolov said.

Dmytro Mialkovskyi, a Ukrainian military surgeon, has been operating on mine injuries since the beginning of the war. On Friday, at a hospital in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, he had to make a gut-wrenching call to save the life of a mine blast patient who was dying of his injuries.

“I realized that this leg is killing him and there is another leg with a tourniquet, too,” Mialkovskyi said. “So I had to do a quick amputation of both legs. In 10 minutes.”

“I still don’t know if he’ll survive,” he said.

Minefields flooded by Ukraine dam breach pose new risk to civilians

Hidden killers

Both sides use mines. Russia heavily mined its front lines in anticipation of Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive, and has made far more extensive use of widely banned antipersonnel mines.

Small, deadly antipersonnel mines, triggered by the weight of the human body, cannot discriminate between combatants and noncombatants.

Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines, as well as victim-activated booby traps, Human Rights Watch investigations found. Evidence suggests Ukraine has also used at least one type of antipersonnel mine, a rocket-delivered PFM blast mine, around the Ukrainian city of Izyum in summer 2022.

Antitank mines, which usually require immense weight to detonate, are not internationally banned, though any explosive device that could be detonated unintentionally by a civilian can be considered an antipersonnel mine under the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, to which Ukraine, but not Russia or the United States, is a party.

Antipersonnel mines

PFM-1S

Intended to self-destruct over a period of 1 to 40 hours. The small size and innocuous appearance of these mines of Soviet and Russian manufacture can lead to children or other civilians handling them unknowingly.

Length: 4.7in

11lb of pressure

is enough to detonate

the device.

The blast has an effective range of 3 feet.

Plastic “butterfly” wing

Explosive capsule

A thin plastic wing makes it easier

to manipulate.

The mine is normally colored green,

khaki brown or sand-brown

to avoid detection.

Filled with more than

an ounce of liquid explosive.

PMN-4

Soviet-manufactured PMN-4 mines are armed with a delay. They have been found in southern Syria and Ukraine.

OZM-72

Black pressure plate with a reddish brown or khaki body.

11lb Soviet-manufactured mine.

Diameter: 3.7in

2 ounces explosive charge, total weight 10 ounces.

Diameter: 4.2in

The OZM-72 comes with a spool of tripwire to be strung up between stakes.

When the trip wire is triggered, the mine explodes upward, releasing over 2,400 steel fragments.

Metal

stake

Wooden stakes

Trip wire

Rope with snap links

Antitank mines

TM-62

Family of Soviet-manufactured circular blast mines typically loaded with over 16lb of explosives.

It requires 330-1,212 pounds of pressure to detonate.

Diameter: 12.6in

Fuse

It can be laid manually

or by using mine-laying machines

Length: 13.3in

PTM-1

Russian anti-vehicle mine scattered by aircraft or rocket systems. It requires 330-881 lb of pressure to detonate.

Green plastic outer shell,

with nearly 2.5lb of liquid

explosive

Cannot be neutralized or disarmed after it has been emplaced. The Russian military recommends destroying the mine by “projectile attack,” such as shooting it with a machine gun mounted on a vehicle.

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used anti-vehicle mines.

The United States included two types of mines in its aid packages to Ukraine: the Remote Anti-Armor Mine System, which uses 155-milimeter artillery rounds to create temporary minefields programmed to self-destruct, and M21 antitank mines, which require hundreds of pounds of force to detonate but do not self-destruct, leading to concerns about later removal.

Mines are not the only type of explosive that pose a threat. Mortars, bombs, artillery shells, cluster munitions and others also become hazards if they do not explode when deployed.

Undoing the damage

Russia’s heavily mined defenses, built up over months of stalemate along the front lines, are slowing down the Ukrainian counteroffensive that began last month, damaging Western-supplied battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.

Though specialized mine-clearing vehicles are in use, front-line mines are so concentrated that specialized soldiers, called sappers, have had to resort to clearing paths by hand.

Humanitarian clearance operations, which return denied land to local populations after conflict, are extremely slow, tedious and expensive. They are underway across parts of Ukraine, including around Kyiv, the capital, and other areas West of the front lines, where the battle has receded.

Volunteers and veterans of the Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces get a briefing on various types of mines on Feb. 5, 2022, on the outskirts of Kyiv. (Michael Robinson Chavez/The Washington Post)

Ukraine’s contaminated territory is so massive that some experts estimate humanitarian clearance would take the approximately 500 demining teams in current operation 757 years to complete.

Demining teams crawl inch by inch across the terrain, using metal detectors and sometimes explosive-sniffing dogs, excavating every signal, not knowing whether they will uncover a harmless nail or deadly mine.

Humanitarian mine clearance

BASIC EQUIPMENT

Teams of manual deminers use handheld metal detectors, at great danger, to locate and investigate possible mines.

ARMTRAC 100-350 MK2

An armored vehicle intended to counter mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), manufactured by Armtrac, a British firm.

Visor

Body armor

A detector on the front robotic arm finds IEDS and marks them with paint.

Handheld metal

detector

A vegetation cutter attaches to the rear robotic arm.

Combat mine clearance

UR-77 METEORIT

The UR-77 is equipped

with a rocket-propelled explosive line charge system called the MDK-3.

It is based on the chasis of the 2S1 tracked self-propelled howitzer.

The system works by launching a line charge filled with explosives over a minefield.

Once the line charge is in place, it is detonated, creating a shockwave that neutralizes or detonates any mines near the explosion and clears a safe path up to 6 meters wide and 90 meters long.

LEOPARD 2R MINE-CLEARING

The Leopard 2R mine-clearing tanks that Finland has transferred to Ukraine are developed on the basis of the Leopard 2A4 tank.

These tanks are equipped with mine plows, a bulldozer bucket and an automated marking system.

GLOBSEC estimates that one deminer can only clear 49 to 82 square feet per day, depending on the terrain and concentration of explosives.

The short window for clearance in the spring, after the ground thaws and before farmers plant, leaves little room for disasters like the Kakhovka dam breach in early June, which drastically disrupted clearance efforts.

Farmers in heavily contaminated regions such as Kherson have resorted to visual inspections and rigging tractors with armored plates while planting this year’s harvest.

There is a steady market for “dark deminers,” who offer hasty and often unreliable clearance without official certification, to clear some of the more than 19,000 square miles of unusable agricultural land.

Demining is not just slow, it’s also expensive. The World Bank estimates that demining Ukraine, which costs between $2 and $8 per square meter, will cost $37.4 billion over the next 10 years.

The United States has committed more than $95 million to Ukraine’s demining, according to a 2023 State Department report.

A mine warning sign in a cemetery in Chernihiv, Ukraine, in April 2022. (Wojciech Grzedzinski for The Washington Post)

How Ukraine compares

Mines as a dark legacy of conflict all over the world, from Cambodia to Kosovo, hint at the challenges Ukraine could face as it rebuilds.

Cambodia, riddled with millions of land mines after decades of conflict, has been subject to ongoing clearance operations for 30 years. Crowther estimates there at least five years of work remains. Tens of thousands of people have been maimed by Cambodia’s mines.

Kosovo saw armed conflict in 1998 and 1999. “Kosovo was a six-month war that was a fraction of the scale of this conflict,” Crowther said of the war in Ukraine. “It’s taken decades.”

What to know about Ukraine’s counteroffensive

The latest: The Ukrainian military has launched a long-anticipated counteroffensive against occupying Russian forces, opening a crucial phase in the war aimed at restoring Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and preserving Western support in its fight against Moscow.

The fight: Ukrainian troops have intensified their attacks on the front line in the southeast region, according to multiple individuals in the country’s armed forces, in a significant push toward Russian-occupied territory.

The front line: The Washington Post has mapped out the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces.

How you can help: Here are ways those in the United States can support the Ukrainian people as well as what people around the world have been donating.

Read our full coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war. Are you on Telegram? Subscribe to our channel for updates and exclusive video.

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UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

HAND CURATED

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• What just happened in Russia? The Wagner crisis, explained.June 27, 2023
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• Follow the 600-mile front line between Ukrainian and Russian forcesFebruary 21, 2023
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By Eve Sampson

Eve Sampson is an intern for The Washington Post reporting on the International desk. She previously covered breaking news for the Detroit Free Press and served in Syria and Kuwait as an engineer officer. Twitter

By Samuel Granados

Samuel Granados works as a graphics assignment editor at The Washington Post. Previously, he worked as a senior graphics editor at Reuters covering Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and as the head of graphics at La Nación in Argentina.

15. Chinese FM’s Disappearance Rumoured To Be Due To Affair With Double Agent

Beware the honey pot. I have pasted the Asian Sentinel article below as well.

Chinese FM’s Disappearance Rumoured To Be Due To Affair With Double Agent

thecitizen.in · by P.K.BALACHANDRAN · July 18, 2023

Rumours abound about the missing Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang. The most prominent among them is that the 57-year-old Qin was having an affair with a prominent TV anchor Fu Xiaotian, who is suspected to be a double agent.

Phoenix Television is a Chinese state-owned broadcaster headquartered in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. Anchor Fu Xiaotian is said to be an international celebrity feted by the Italian government and Cambridge University. According to Asia Sentinel 40-year-old Fu Xiaotian is alleged to have links to British intelligence.

On May 10, 2019, a garden was named after Fu Xiaotian at Churchill College, Cambridge University, where she previously studied. This was announced by the Chinese foreign ministry.

The ‘Asia Sentinel’ noted that it was unusual for an august British university like Cambridge to name a garden after a person unless that person was a major international figure. “China pulled the strings at Churchill College,” a professor told the website.

On June 12, 2017, Ettore Sequi, the Italian ambassador to China, awarded Fu the “Order of the Star of Italy” in Beijing. This prestigious award was given for her work with senior political figures and her promotion of strong links between Italy and China.

Commenting on this, Churchill College said: “Xiaotian has built a successful media career in China encouraging international cooperation and engagement as host of the Phoenix Television program Talk with World Leaders – featuring interviews with world political leaders, which has an audience of over 200 million people.”

Foreign Minister Qin was last seen in the media on June 25. When asked about his whereabouts or fate, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokespersons have been evasive, asking questioners to see the ministry website. But the website has no update about Qin though he is still mentioned as Foreign Minister.

However, the London Times said that there are widespread rumours that Qin is currently under investigation for having an affair with Phoenix TV anchor Fu Xiaotian. The Times also reported that Fu and her baby son have also disappeared from public view.

Asked about this on Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said, "I have no information to provide. China’s diplomatic activities are proceeding normally."

Radio Free Asia noted that the spokesperson’s answers were omitted from the official record of the briefing in the foreign ministry's website, further fuelling speculation.

Qin Gang was handpicked to head the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January this year though he was not in politics. He was a diplomat of 20 years standing and an Ambassador to the US.

He was a prominent “wolf warrior”, aggressively promoting the policies of Xi Jinping’s government.

Qin’s absence since June 26 was made all the more conspicuous by the flurry of diplomatic activity in the Chinese capital in recent weeks, including high-profile visits by senior US officials Janet Yellen and John Kerry.

Qin was supposed to meet European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell earlier on July 5 in Beijing but the meeting was pushed back after China informed the EU that the dates were “no longer possible.”

Qin also failed to show up at an annual foreign ministers’ meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia last week. Instead, Wang Yi attended it.

A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry told a regular news briefing last Tuesday that Qin could not attend the ASEAN meeting “because of health reasons.”

Media reports say that such sudden disappearances have become a common feature of Xi Jinping’s anti-vice, anti-adultery and anti-corruption campaign.

In 2014, the ‘Washington Post’ quoted the ‘China Daily’ saying that an anti-corruption watchdog was leading the "fight on adultery". The Chinese government was embarrassed by numerous public cases, as in China, adultery was synonymous with corruption.

Therefore, few people were surprised when Chinese state media announced that the disgraced railways boss Liu Zhijun had 18 mistresses, "including actresses, nurses and train stewards".

The Chongqing Beibei District Party Secretary Lei Zhengfu's 13-year sentence for corruption was preceded by a sex tape that became a grim Internet sensation, the ‘Washington Post’ said.

thecitizen.in · by P.K.BALACHANDRAN · July 18, 2023

POLITICS

Scandals Believed to Wrack Chinese Leadership

Foreign minister’s affair rumored with suspected double agent, senior rocket officers reportedly purged

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/scandals-wrack-chinese-leadership

OUR CORRESPONDENT

JUL 17, 2023

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4

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The disappearance of Chinese foreign minister Qin Gang and the recent fate of senior Chinese officers in the country’s strategic missile command suggests all is not well in China. The Chinese government has not denied rumors of an affair between Qin and a high-powered and well-connected Phoenix Television reporter, Fu Xiaotian, who is suspected of being a double agent. Phoenix Television is a Chinese state-owned broadcaster headquartered in Hong Kong and Shenzhen.

At a press conference of the Chinese foreign ministry in Beijing on July 17, a reporter cited a story in the Times that Qin was under investigation for his affair with Fu. The ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning replied she did not understand the situation.

The 40-year-old Fu is alleged to have links to British intelligence, a source told Asia Sentinel. On May 10, 2019, Chinese charge d’affaires Chen Wen attended the opening ceremony of a garden named after Fu at Churchill College, Cambridge University, where she previously studied, the Chinese foreign ministry announced. It is unusual for an august British university like Cambridge to name a garden after a person unless that person was a major international figure.

“China pulled the strings at Churchill College,” a professor told Asia Sentinel.

On June 12, 2017, Ettore Sequi, the Italian ambassador to China, awarded Fu the Order of the Star of Italy in Beijing, announced Churchill College. “This prestigious award was given for her work with senior political figures and her promotion of strong links between Italy and China.”

“Xiaotian has built a successful media career in China encouraging international cooperation and engagement as host of the Phoenix Television program Talk with World Leaders - featuring interviews with world political leaders, which has an audience of over 200 million people,” Churchill College added.

During the Chinese foreign ministry press conference on July 17, when a reporter asked about Qin’s status as Chinese foreign minister, Mao referred the reporter to the ministry’s website and said she had no further information.

Currently, the website of China’s foreign ministry lists Qin as its foreign minister, but not among its list of main officials. Other Chinese ministries like the finance ministry and commerce ministry list their minister among their main officials. For Qin not to be listed among the top officials of the Chinese foreign ministry is “very, very abnormal,” said the professor, who declined to be named.

On July 11, the Chinese foreign ministry announced Qin would not attend an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) meeting in Indonesia for health reasons. However, his prolonged absence has stirred speculation that the reason for his absence is more than health issues. Qin’s latest activities announced on the Chinese foreign ministry website occurred on June 25, making him absent for 22 days.

On July 15, Victor Shih, an associate professor of China studies at UCSD, tweeted, “Qin Gang’s absence is curious. (The ministry of foreign affairs) can easily have him issue a letter of congratulations or something to dispel to the rumors but I haven’t seen anything since the “health issue” comment.”

During a Chinese foreign ministry press conference in Beijing on July 14, a reporter asked the ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin whether Qin’s absence was entirely due to health reasons and when he would return. Wang paused for 16 seconds and then replied that he had earlier answered a similar question.

Missile commanders’ mishaps

Apart from the absence of the Chinese foreign minister, lieutenant general Li Yuchao, the commander of China’s rocket force was conspicuous by his absence at a promotion ceremony of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in late June. China’s rocket force oversees the country’s tactical and strategic missiles including nuclear missiles. Li’s absence has sparked speculation that he might be under investigation by the Chinese authorities.

A former Chinese lieutenant colonel, Yao Cheng, tweeted on June 29 that “the current commander of the Rocket Force, Li Yuchao, was taken away from his office on the morning of the previous day!”

Yao made another tweet on June 29 saying, “Reports suggest that Li Yuchao’s son is studying in the United States, where he is feared to have sold China’s military secrets.”

Many senior officers in the rocket force are implicated for corruption or leaking military secrets, said an article in Ming Pao, a Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper, on July 13. On July 5, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, which is China’s equivalent of the attorney general’s office in some countries, announced that Zhang Fusheng, a former deputy chief of the National Fire and Rescue Administration, was arrested on suspicion of taking bribes. Zhang was previously an officer in the rocket force.

On July 7, an official internal report from the CCP was leaked online, stating that Wu Guohua, a former deputy commander of China’s rocket force, passed away in Beijing on July 6 due to cerebral hemorrhage, according to a media report. On social media and the Internet, there is speculation that Wu’s demise was a suicide linked to a possible investigation of Li.

A little over a decade ago, China only possessed around 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), of which only 30 ICMBs could reliably reach the US mainland, said a report of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey on July 3. After Chinese President Xi elevated China’s missile forces into a full branch of the People’s Liberation Army in 2015, the number of missile launchers deployed by China has increased rapidly, said the report. The rocket force is on track to deploy more than 1,000 ballistic missile launchers by 2028, the report added.

16. China Studies Nuclear Risk in the Context of the Ukraine War

Excerpts:

One should not exaggerate the meaning of the above analysis for Chinese nuclear strategy. Indeed, China’s nuclear forces are hardly mentioned in the article and there is no discussion of the Taiwan issue or any other potential conflict scenarios involving China. Still, the article is noteworthy since such issues have generally not been taken up publicly in Chinese military discourse – at least since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In fact, there are a variety of other hints that Chinese strategists are thinking very hard about the meaning of the Ukraine War for the future of deterrence and concerning China’s nuclear strategy, in particular. For example, a recent Chinese academic study, which incidentally does mention the Taiwan issue explicitly, endeavors to explain how the United States “failed” to deter Russia in the Ukraine situation. Another academic article suggests that recent developments “are pushing China to rethink the relationship between its conventional and nuclear forces.”

As a whole, it is a bit shocking to realize that nobody truly knows whether or not nuclear weapons might be used in a hypothetical Taiwan conflict involving China and the United States. Indeed, a recent and extremely thorough report on a series of war games by the Center for Strategic and International Studies concludes with respect to the nuclear question: “No one knows what those escalation dynamics would be.” Studying China’s lessons regarding the nuclear shadows in the Ukraine conflict could help, but in circumstances of such startling uncertainty, extreme caution is warranted on both sides of this potentially catastrophic conflict.

China Studies Nuclear Risk in the Context of the Ukraine War​

What lessons does Russia’s nuclear signaling hold for a prospective Chinese war to force unification with Taiwan?

thediplomat.com · by Lyle Goldstein · July 21, 2023

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In shaping patterns of future warfare, there is little doubt that militaries across the world will be seeking to absorb the key lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War, ranging from the employment of tanks to the use of anti-ship cruise missiles and the ubiquitous drones. For the Chinese military, these lessons might even assume a greater importance, since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) both lacks major, recent combat experience, and has also leaned heavily on Russian weapons and doctrine for its rapid modernization over the last few decades.

Chinese media coverage of the war in Ukraine has been extensive. The close nature of the China-Russia “quasi-alliance” means that Chinese military analysts have not engaged in the ruthless critiques of Russian military performance that have been commonplace in the West. Yet, Chinese military analyses are still probing deeply for lessons to understand the shape of modern warfare. They have taken particular interest in the U.S. employment of novel weapons and strategies.

To fully grasp the scope and depth of these Chinese analyses it is important to take assessments from a full range of Chinese military media, which is more extensive than is often appreciated in the West. These articles are generally associated with research institutes that are directly involved in the Chinese military industrial complex.

This exclusive series for The Diplomat will represent the first systematic attempt by Western analysts to evaluate these Chinese assessments of the war in Ukraine across the full spectrum of warfare, including the land, sea, air and space, and information domains. Read the rest of the series here.

Few issues are more salient to evaluate than how Beijing views the nuclear shadows surrounding the present bloody conflagration in Eastern Europe. There is some reasonable hope that Chinese pressure could cause the Kremlin to completely rule out nuclear escalation, and this indeed may have been a major theme of Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow back in March 2023.

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Just as important is another looming question: What lessons does Russia’s nuclear signaling hold for a prospective Chinese war to force unification with Taiwan? Although China’s nuclear arsenal is nowhere near as large and advanced as Russia’s, a Taiwan scenario could involve war between two nuclear powers, so issues related to nuclear escalation are germane. Moreover, China is rapidly building up its nuclear capabilities at present. Therefore, these questions could become more and more acute in the context of China-U.S. strategic interaction.

The original article in this series cited a January 2023 PLA Daily assessment noting that Russia was relying heavily on its nuclear deterrent to balance against NATO’s superiority in conventional arms. In this piece, we explore the issue in much greater detail through the lens of a spring 2023 Chinese-language article entitled “Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons?” from the magazine “Ordnance Industry Science and Technology” (兵工科技). While such discussions are reasonably commonplace in Western discourse, such a direct discussion is extremely unusual in the Chinese defense media discourse and so merits closer scrutiny.

This Chinese article says that “the situation is evolving [in the Ukraine War], such that it will not reach the level of requiring Russia to use nuclear weapons.” But at the same time, the article observes, “There is little doubt that the longer the war goes on, the greater the risk of escalation.” It notes recent decisions by the United States and its Western allies to take the major step of providing Ukraine with main battle tanks, as well as longer-range missiles, followed by serious discussions about providing combat aircraft.

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At the outset, the piece repeats the ominous nuclear warning issued by the Kremlin on February 24, 2022, at the start of the war, and also Russian President Vladimir Putin’s order three days later that Russian nuclear forces be put on a “special state of readiness.” The Chinese analysis says that despite these warnings, the United States and its allies have provided Kyiv with precision targeting information, aided in the killing of Russian military leaders, and helped to limit Russia’s advantage in airpower.

The analysis goes so far as to say that the U.S. is actually seeking “regime change” in Russia, but notes that American officials have recognized repeatedly that “if Putin’s regime is threatened, then Russia might resort to the use of nuclear weapons.”

The article observes that these tensions seemed to become more acute during fall 2022, when the Ukrainian offensive surprised many with its impressive advances. The article highlights Putin’s statement from September 21, 2022, when he said that Russian territory would be defended by all necessary means. The Russian president’s emphatic emphasis, “This is not a bluff,” is duly noted. But taking a reasonably objective approach, this Chinese analysis also reports Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s comment shortly thereafter, suggesting that Russia was not preparing to employ nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

The article discusses how the issue has returned to the fore during 2023, as nuclear signaling continued. A RAND report from January is cited in this assessment as noting the real possibility of nuclear escalation. The article emphasizes warnings from the Kremlin from February 2023, including Putin’s statement that Russia has the means to respond to NATO’s decision to send tanks to Ukraine. Also noted is the threat by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who asserted starkly, “We do not need a world without Russia.”

At the same time, the Chinese analysis also observes that Russia has also tested its new highly advanced ICBM Sarmat and even brandished its Il-80 nuclear command and control aircraft, termed the “doomsday plane,” during the spring of 2023.

A somewhat disturbing theme in this Chinese analysis is the focus on the balance of tactical nuclear weapons. The article reviews available data in some detail and concludes, citing a 2019 estimate from the U.S. intelligence community, that Russia may possess 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, that number was projected to be increasing, according to the Chinese rendering. By contrast, the United States is said to have 230 such weapons, of which 100 are deployed in Europe.

The Chinese assessment points to a potentially unstable paradox: “Therefore, if we say that there is a relatively large gap between Russia and NATO in terms of conventional military power, then in terms of the number and types of non-strategic nuclear weapons, Russia may have a considerable advantage.”

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Appearing to defend Russia’s nuclear saber rattling, the piece asserts at one point, “Nuclear states have an extremely cautious attitude toward the use of nuclear weapons, and Russia is no exception.” The Chinese assessment does examine the June 2020 Russian doctrinal statement regarding the Kremlin’s conditions for resorting to nuclear use and explains that the final point might be relevant: if “the adversary’s attack with conventional weapons threatens the survival of the Russian state.” The piece also notes that many Western experts have dismissed or at least downplayed Moscow’s nuclear threats.

In addition, the Chinese article discusses various related concerns, including the threat of a “dirty bomb,” the possibility of an attack on the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, as well as even a potential use of chemical weapons.

The end of the Chinese article aims to make an overall assessment of possibilities for Moscow’s potential employment of nuclear weapons in the context of the Ukraine War. Its conclusions imply a disturbingly wide scope for Russian nuclear use, unfortunately. The first and most obvious of the conditions concerns a “battlefield reversal that implies defeat.” A second condition cited in the Chinese discussion is a possible “diminishing of the effectiveness of deterrence,” and in this context the much-discussed “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is mentioned. Most disturbing perhaps is the mention of tactical nuclear weapons to “probe the bottom line of U.S. extended deterrence” and thus “break the NATO alliance.”

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One should not exaggerate the meaning of the above analysis for Chinese nuclear strategy. Indeed, China’s nuclear forces are hardly mentioned in the article and there is no discussion of the Taiwan issue or any other potential conflict scenarios involving China. Still, the article is noteworthy since such issues have generally not been taken up publicly in Chinese military discourse – at least since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In fact, there are a variety of other hints that Chinese strategists are thinking very hard about the meaning of the Ukraine War for the future of deterrence and concerning China’s nuclear strategy, in particular. For example, a recent Chinese academic study, which incidentally does mention the Taiwan issue explicitly, endeavors to explain how the United States “failed” to deter Russia in the Ukraine situation. Another academic article suggests that recent developments “are pushing China to rethink the relationship between its conventional and nuclear forces.”

As a whole, it is a bit shocking to realize that nobody truly knows whether or not nuclear weapons might be used in a hypothetical Taiwan conflict involving China and the United States. Indeed, a recent and extremely thorough report on a series of war games by the Center for Strategic and International Studies concludes with respect to the nuclear question: “No one knows what those escalation dynamics would be.” Studying China’s lessons regarding the nuclear shadows in the Ukraine conflict could help, but in circumstances of such startling uncertainty, extreme caution is warranted on both sides of this potentially catastrophic conflict.​

Lyle Goldstein

Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia Engagement for the Washington think tank Defense Priorities. He is also visiting professor at the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University.

GUEST AUTHOR

Nathan Waechter

Nathan Waechter is a recent graduate of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, he lived in China for close to a decade, working in the quantitative market research industry.

thediplomat.com · by Lyle Goldstein · July 21, 2023

17. Alpha (Book review - Subject: Navy SEALs)

Excertps:

First, what is the role of company grade officers in elite units? In Alpha, the SEAL platoon leader is physically strong, seemingly brave under fire, but devoid of moral courage. Gallagher’s failure to exercise leadership allows him and his toxic culture to flourish. Where does responsibility rest for this moral failure? With the junior officer, the training, the SEAL culture he joined, or all the above? Understanding and addressing this leadership shortcoming is essential not only to the development of future SEAL officers but also to determining the extent to which they shape the organization they ostensibly lead.

Second, closely tied to this leadership issue is a cultural one. Reading Alpha, we sense that SEALs are more akin to a professional sports team than a military unit—except kills, not goals, are the measure of the team’s performance. This cultural nihilism belongs to the SEAL “pirate” subculture that dates to the Vietnam War. Pirates believe they are the true SEALs, who do the Nation’s dirty work by rule-breaking, secrecy, and excessive killing. They are challenged at times by SEALs belonging to another, smaller subculture, the “boy scouts,” who believe they must operate under a code of law and order. Using Gallagher’s case to highlight this tension, Philipps argues every SEAL must choose to belong to one subculture or the other; and since the 1970s, SEALs, including Gallagher, overwhelmingly have chosen the pirate culture. For the joint force, even discussing this construct is instructive. Some informal conversations with special operators indicate Philipps’s characterization is on the mark. Others suggest that SEALs must simultaneously be pirates and boy scouts—a difficult task indeed. Thus, we must ask, where does, and should, the SEAL community’s cultural epicenter rest, and what is the best way to nurture it?

Third, as a corollary, what are the SEALs doing to help young team members understand and develop moral courage to match their physical prowess? If a small fraction of the time devoted to rigorous physical training focused instead on this moral component, it could weaken the barrier between the pirate and boy scout subcultures. As important, it could better prepare young team members to deal with their own invisible wounds and help others do the same. If the SEALs, and special operators overall, want stronger organizational cultures, they need to pay heed to this moral dimension.

Alpha

ndupress.ndu.edu

Download PDF

Brigadier General Paula G. Thornhill, USAF (Ret.), is Associate Director of the Strategic Studies program in the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University and author of Demystifying the American Military: Institutions, Evolution, and Challenges Since 1789 (Naval Institute Press, 2019).

Alpha: Eddie Gallagher and the War for the Soul of the Navy SEALs

By David Philipps

Crown, 2021

399 pp. $24.49

ISBN: 9780593238387

Reviewed by Paula G. Thornhill

Alpha is a fast-paced, brilliantly written, and ultimately disturbing book about the health of the Navy SEAL community. Using the infamous Eddie Gallagher case for its core narrative, Alpha weaves together Gallagher’s actions and the larger developments in Naval Special Warfare during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The SEALs emerge from this era as a troubled organization, full of first-rate special operators willing to take on the toughest direct-action missions but largely devoid of a higher moral code to guide their actions and dismissive of any oversight beyond that of the insular world of special operations.

David Philipps approaches his topic with a keen reporter’s eye. A Pulitzer Prize winner and New York Times correspondent, he meticulously pieces together the Gallagher story, starting with how Gallagher overcame “bad karma” to build an aggressive, seemingly cohesive unit prior to deploying to Iraq. Once in theater, however, Gallagher malevolently used the unit to launch senseless attacks and kill innocent civilians. This steroid-dependent chief petty officer also rides roughshod over his platoon commander and assistant platoon commander throughout the deployment, denying the unit of any officer leadership and further undermining unit morale.

Once back from Iraq, some of the SEAL team members reflected on what happened and concluded that Gallagher had to be held accountable. This decision set into motion the subsequent investigation, trial, and eventual Presidential pardon that, at times, consumed not only the platoon and the SEALS but also the entire Navy.

Needless to say, Alpha is an uncomfortable read, bringing to light some troubling cultural issues in a loosely supervised, largely autonomous part of the U.S. military. By telling this story, it provides invaluable insights into how an insular culture can be built, sustained, and ultimately abused by those entrusted to protect it. Some SEALs argue that Philipps unfairly implies that the SEAL cultural problems are more profound and widespread than the community assesses. Even if this is the case, and readers must judge for themselves, he compels joint force members to think more holistically about the building, maintenance, and oversight of small, elite units. In particular, three major issues for the joint force to address emerge in Alpha.

First, what is the role of company grade officers in elite units? In Alpha, the SEAL platoon leader is physically strong, seemingly brave under fire, but devoid of moral courage. Gallagher’s failure to exercise leadership allows him and his toxic culture to flourish. Where does responsibility rest for this moral failure? With the junior officer, the training, the SEAL culture he joined, or all the above? Understanding and addressing this leadership shortcoming is essential not only to the development of future SEAL officers but also to determining the extent to which they shape the organization they ostensibly lead.

Second, closely tied to this leadership issue is a cultural one. Reading Alpha, we sense that SEALs are more akin to a professional sports team than a military unit—except kills, not goals, are the measure of the team’s performance. This cultural nihilism belongs to the SEAL “pirate” subculture that dates to the Vietnam War. Pirates believe they are the true SEALs, who do the Nation’s dirty work by rule-breaking, secrecy, and excessive killing. They are challenged at times by SEALs belonging to another, smaller subculture, the “boy scouts,” who believe they must operate under a code of law and order. Using Gallagher’s case to highlight this tension, Philipps argues every SEAL must choose to belong to one subculture or the other; and since the 1970s, SEALs, including Gallagher, overwhelmingly have chosen the pirate culture. For the joint force, even discussing this construct is instructive. Some informal conversations with special operators indicate Philipps’s characterization is on the mark. Others suggest that SEALs must simultaneously be pirates and boy scouts—a difficult task indeed. Thus, we must ask, where does, and should, the SEAL community’s cultural epicenter rest, and what is the best way to nurture it?

Third, as a corollary, what are the SEALs doing to help young team members understand and develop moral courage to match their physical prowess? If a small fraction of the time devoted to rigorous physical training focused instead on this moral component, it could weaken the barrier between the pirate and boy scout subcultures. As important, it could better prepare young team members to deal with their own invisible wounds and help others do the same. If the SEALs, and special operators overall, want stronger organizational cultures, they need to pay heed to this moral dimension.

By flagging these issues, Philipps more than delivers to the joint force audience a well-written, infuriating account of Gallagher and a rogue SEAL platoon at war. Indeed, Alpha offers the reader a cautionary tale about how even the most elite units can lose their way when toxic culture, security classification, and lavish praise collectively undermine unit effectiveness and accountability. Joint force leaders at all levels will finish this book powerfully reminded that high military effectiveness, healthy organizational culture, and leadership accountability are inextricably intertwined. Philipps did the joint force a huge service by creating such a vivid reminder of this crucial interrelationship. JFQ

ndupress.ndu.edu

18. Statement from President Joe Biden on Director Bill Burns

Statement from President Joe Biden on Director Bill Burns | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · July 21, 2023

I am pleased to announce that I have invited the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Bill Burns, to serve as a member of my Cabinet.

As Bill says: “Good intelligence, delivered with honesty and integrity, is America’s first line of defense.” Since his first day on the job, Bill has demonstrated the meaning behind those words. Working in lockstep with Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, Bill has harnessed intelligence to give our country a critical strategic advantage. Under his leadership, the CIA is delivering a clear-eyed, long-term approach to our nation’s top national security challenges—from tackling Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine, to managing responsible competition with the People’s Republic of China, to addressing the opportunities and risks of emerging technology.

Bill has always given me clear, straightforward analysis that prioritizes the safety and security of the American people, reflecting the integral role the CIA plays in our national security decision-making at this critical time.

With quiet courage, deep humility, and extensive expertise, Bill has earned the respect of the brave women and men of the CIA. He leads with dignity and represents the very best of America, and I look forward to continuing to work with him in the years ahead.

###

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · July 21, 2023

19. Opinion ‘Barbie’ and ‘Oppenheimer’ tell the same terrifying story

Wow. The author's take the opportunity to write an OpEd to support their agenda (that reaches the conclusion that we are bad human beings)

Please go to the link to read this in its proper high gloss format. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/19/barbie-oppenheimer-movies-anthropocene/

Note they may be right in some or many of their ideas. However, this is one of the slickest propaganda pieces I have read on an OpED page.

Conclusion:

The widespread introductions of plutonium and plastic into the geological record are deeply intertwined. Perhaps the most substantial difference between “Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” lies only in their respective approaches toward their common subject matter — a difference in attitude that ultimately reflects our own. As war rages in Eastern Europe and we find ourselves, again, living in the shadow of the bomb, renewed nuclear anxiety has wrestled with climate anxiety for our collective attention. On one hand, we have the spectacular visibility and exceptionalness of the bomb — its mushroom cloud occupies the fuzzy boundary between the sublime and the satanic. On the other, we have a climate crisis spurred in part by the everydayness of oil-saturated plastic products such as Barbie, goods so omnipresent in our lives that their harms are almost invisible to us — unlike the bomb, they produce delight rather than dread.

In the new “Barbie” film, an older woman imparts a piece of wisdom to Margot Robbie’s titular character: “Humans have only one ending; ideas live forever.” The recent news that scientists have selected a lake in the Canadian wilderness — riddled with traces of pollution, waste and radioactive fallout — as the proposed start to the Anthropocene signals that the immortality of ideas is more than just a pretty thought: It’s a reality in a world where humanity has baked its worst vices into the Earth’s geological record. Despite their apparent differences, both “Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” tell the story of core ideas of the 20th century: accelerating militarism and unbounded consumption, ideas that might well outlive our species in the form of plastic and plutonium’s lingering traces across our fragile planet.

Opinion  ‘Barbie’ and ‘Oppenheimer’ tell the same terrifying story

By Tyler Austin Harper and graphics by Amanda Shendruk

July 19, 2023 at 8:48 a.m. EDT

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/07/19/barbie-oppenheimer-movies-anthropocene/

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Tyler Austin Harper is an assistant professor of environmental studies at Bates College. Amanda Shendruk is a Post visual opinions journalist.

For months, the looming box office war between “Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” has provided endless social media fodder. The flood of jokes, which have taken the form of Twitter threads and movie poster mash-ups, cash in on the supposedly radical difference between these two films: One is a grave, highly stylized biopic of the man who helped invent nuclear weapons, while the other is a whimsical live-action movie about a child’s toy. “Barbenheimer,” as the internet phenomenon has been dubbed, has generated its own Wikipedia page, not to mention an entire cottage industry of merchandise.

(Images from Redbubble, Twitter and Teepublic)

As an unabashed enthusiast of all things lowbrow, I’ve delighted in the campy, mindless confection of Mattel-meets-mushroom-cloud content that this nuclear meet-cute has produced. As an environmental studies professor who has spent a lot of time studying the history of science and technology, however, I’ve found “Barbenheimer” strikes a darker chord.

The underlying premise of all the jokes — that these films come out on the same day but are about hilariously different subjects and have wildly different tones — is misguided. The two movies actually have a fundamental, and disturbing, common ground. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the man behind our nuclear age, and Barbie — a toy that takes more than three cups of oil to produce before it lingers in landfills around the world — both tell the story of the dawn of our imperiled era.

“Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” each offer a window into the creation of the Anthropocene, the suggested term for our present geological epoch, in which human beings have become the most significant influence on the natural environment at a planetary scale.

That story began 4.5 billion years ago, when Earth formed into a rocky mass from a swirling mixture of dust and gas. Those rocks now hold important markers of our planet’s history.

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But we don’t need to go that far back. The Cambrian period, when multicellular life started to proliferate, began only a few hundred million years ago. The start of the Cambrian — or any geological time frame — is decided when there’s a clear change in the physical characteristics of rock layers. This change is called a stratigraphic marker.

About 542 million years ago, a worm-like organism dug burrows around the Earth. The fossilized remains of those burrows are the stratigraphic marker of the Cambrian period.

EXAMPLES OF STRATIGRAPHIC MARKERS

WHAT’S HAPPENING

GEOLOGICAL PERIODS

Fossilized burrows

CAMBRIAN

Vast life

forms

appear

500 million years ago

ORDOVICIAN

Fossils of small sea colonies mark

the start of the Devonian period.

SILURIAN

Land

plants

evolve

Floating colonies

DEVONIAN

400 million

A type of horrifying jawless eel notes the beginning of the next period ...

Jawless eels

CARBONIFEROUS

... and the next ...

300 million years ago

Another jawless eel

PERMIAN

... and the next.

Yes. More creepy eels

TRIASSIC

Pangea

breaks

apart

200 million

JURASSIC

Dinosaurs

rule the

Earth

CRETACEOUS

100 million

Iridium from an asteriod marks

the end of the Cretaceous period.

Non-avian

dinosaurs

go extinct

Asteroid leftovers

PALEOGENE

NEOGENE

QUATERNARY

Our current geological period is just this little stretch on the timeline.

Periods are divided into smaller time scales — also by stratigraphic markers — called epochs. The Quaternary period has two: the Pleistocene and Holocene.

2.6 million years ago

PLEISTOCENE

End of the last ice age

12,000 years ago

HOLOCENE

Our current epoch

Today

Microplastics or

radioactive isotopes?

Now, experts are debating whether things like microplastics

or radioactive isotopes could be the stratigraphic markers

of a new epoch: the Anthropocene.

The age of nukes and plastic

The Atomic Age began in the red pre-dawn of New Mexico. A group of scientists and soldiers gathered in the barren landscape of the Jornada del Muerto to behold the “Gadget.” Jornada del Muerto — or when literally translated, the “Route of the Dead Man” — is the name bequeathed by the conquistadors to describe this 90-mile stretch of waterless desert. Unknown to the colonizing Spanish, that name would prove prophetic centuries later. At 5:29 a.m. on July 16, 1945, the “Gadget” exploded half an hour before sunrise. Watching a spectacle worthy of a god, Oppenheimer worried that man had become one. Exactly three weeks later, a ball of light consumed the cloudless Hiroshima skyline. That summer marked the first significant introduction of plutonium-239 into the atmosphere.

In the years to follow, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom conducted an additional 456 atmospheric nuclear tests, 67 of which took place at the Marshall Islands.

On July 25, 1946, a mushroom cloud rose above Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands after one of the many atomic tests by the U.S. military in the region. (AP)

This included the largest U.S. nuclear test ever conducted, code-named Castle Bravo, which hollowed out a mile-wide crater in the Bikini Atoll’s reef. Across the island chain, vaporized radioactive coral descended as fallout, leaving many Marshallese — some of whom had already been evacuated from their homes — with health consequences that continue today.

On Aug. 5, 1963 — 18 years after that day in New Mexico, and one day before the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing — the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom banned atmospheric nuclear testing.

Pacific Ocean

Castle Bravo crater

1.5 miles

BIKINI ATOLL

(Marshall Islands)

(Copernicus Sentinel Data 2017/Gallo/Getty Images)

Half a century later, members of the Anthropocene Working Group — a body of scientists tasked with identifying the start of a new, human-influenced geological epoch — began studying the viability of radioactive isotopes produced by nuclear testing as potential stratigraphic markers. They found plutonium-239, which tends to both endure and penetrate the darkest recesses of the ocean, to be a strong candidate.

Sign up for Unboxed, a pop-up newsletter on the best memes, coverage and buzz around the “Barbie” movie.

Yet, the 1950s was not only the decade of plutonium. It was also the decade of plastic.

The war was over, and Americans were being promised “better things for better living … through chemistry.” Only days before Hiroshima was consumed by a second sun, the president of DuPont advised his employees that Americans, drunk on peace and whose homeland was largely untouched by the war, would crave new trinkets and luxuries.

In the 1940s, DuPont had played a part in bringing about the war’s end, producing the plutonium required to make the atomic bomb at its Hanford, Wash., facility. Now that the global conflagration had ended thanks to that plutonium, DuPont turned its attention to plastics and the mass production of consumer goods. The company had begun making polyethylene at scale in 1944, which was soon hailed by Fortune as “the fastest growing plastic on the market.” By 1951, polypropylene would join its ranks as a new wonder material that would help bring about the transformation of consumer manufacturing in that decade.

In the spring of 1959, one of the most famous consumer goods in world history emerged at a New York City toy fair. Produced from polyvinyl chloride — colloquially known as PVC — the inaugural Barbie came in blonde and brunette. More than a quarter of a million dolls were sold in the first year.

A boy walks through tons of plastic waste near Badhwar Park in Mumbai, in June. (Bhushan Koyande/Hindustan Times/Getty Images)

Almost 65 years later, Barbie remains one of the most recognizable American brands on the planet, with approximately 100 dolls being sold every minute. Polyethylene, polypropylene and polyvinyl chloride remain the three most common variants of synthetic plastics in the world, and are among the primary “techno-fossils” that help distinguish the Anthropocene from prior epochs in Earth’s past.

Plastic production and nuclear testing took off after 1950

Global plastics production

Million tons

Plutonium fallout

PBq m-2

400

2.0

1.5

300

1.0

200

Radioactive plutonium

in the environment as

a result of nuclear tests.

Polymer resin

and fibers

0.5

100

0

0

1950

2020

1950

2020

Sources: Our World in Data based on Geyer et al. (2017) and the OECD Global Plastics Outlook;

C. N. Waters et al. (2016), Science.

The widespread introductions of plutonium and plastic into the geological record are deeply intertwined. Perhaps the most substantial difference between “Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” lies only in their respective approaches toward their common subject matter — a difference in attitude that ultimately reflects our own. As war rages in Eastern Europe and we find ourselves, again, living in the shadow of the bomb, renewed nuclear anxiety has wrestled with climate anxiety for our collective attention. On one hand, we have the spectacular visibility and exceptionalness of the bomb — its mushroom cloud occupies the fuzzy boundary between the sublime and the satanic. On the other, we have a climate crisis spurred in part by the everydayness of oil-saturated plastic products such as Barbie, goods so omnipresent in our lives that their harms are almost invisible to us — unlike the bomb, they produce delight rather than dread.

In the new “Barbie” film, an older woman imparts a piece of wisdom to Margot Robbie’s titular character: “Humans have only one ending; ideas live forever.” The recent news that scientists have selected a lake in the Canadian wilderness — riddled with traces of pollution, waste and radioactive fallout — as the proposed start to the Anthropocene signals that the immortality of ideas is more than just a pretty thought: It’s a reality in a world where humanity has baked its worst vices into the Earth’s geological record. Despite their apparent differences, both “Barbie” and “Oppenheimer” tell the story of core ideas of the 20th century: accelerating militarism and unbounded consumption, ideas that might well outlive our species in the form of plastic and plutonium’s lingering traces across our fragile planet.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com