Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners



Quotes of the Day:


“The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.” 
- Hannah Arendt

“Book give a soul to the universe, wings to the mind, flight to the imagination, and life to everything.” 
- Plato

“And last are the few whose delight is in meditation and understanding; who yearn not for goods, nor for victory, but for knowledge; who leave both market and battlefield to lose themselves in the quiet clarity of secluded thought; whose will is a light rather than a fire, whose haven is not power but truth: these are the men of wisdom, who stand aside unused by the world.”
- Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the World's Greatest Philosophers



1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 30, 2023

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1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 30, 2023


Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2023

Key Takeaways

  • Western, Ukrainian, and Russian sources continue to indicate that Russia is preparing for an imminent offensive, supporting ISW’s assessment that an offensive in the coming months is the most likely course of action (MLCOA).
  • Iranian state media reported that Iran and Russia established direct financial communication channels between Iranian banks and more than 800 Russian banks on January 29.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks to regain lost positions west of Kreminna as Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations northwest of Svatove.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentrations in rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
  • Russian forces continued to make marginal territorial gains near Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued measures to professionalize the Russian military as it faces continued backlash against these measures.
  • Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to target Crimean Tatars in an effort to associate anti-Russia sentiment with extremist or terrorist activity.


RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, JANUARY 30, 2023

Jan 30, 2023 - Press ISW


Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2023

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, George Barros, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

January 30, 8:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Western, Ukrainian, and Russian sources continue to indicate that Russia is preparing for an imminent offensive, supporting ISW’s assessment that an offensive in the coming months is the most likely course of action (MLCOA).[1] NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated on January 30 that there are no indications that Russia is preparing to negotiate for peace and that all indicators point to the opposite.[2] Stoltenberg noted that Russia may mobilize upwards of 200,000 personnel and is continuing to acquire weapons and ammunition through increased domestic production and partnerships with authoritarian states such as Iran and North Korea.[3] Stoltenberg emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin retains his maximalist goals in Ukraine.[4] Head of the Council of Reservists of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, Ivan Tymochko, relatedly stated that Russian forces are strengthening their grouping in Donbas as part of an anticipated offensive and noted that Russian forces will need to launch an offensive due to increasing domestic pressure for victory.[5] Stoltenberg’s and Tymochko’s statements support ISW’s previous forecast that Russian forces are setting conditions to launch an offensive effort, likely in Luhansk Oblast, in the coming months.[6] Russian milbloggers additionally continued to indicate that the Russian information space is setting conditions for and anticipating a Russian offensive. Milbloggers amplified a statement made by a Russian Telegram channel that the current pace and nature of Russian operations indicate that the main forces of the anticipated offensive and promised breakthrough have not yet “entered the battle.”[7] This statement suggests that Russian milbloggers believe that Russian forces have not yet activated the elements required for a decisive offensive effort.[8]

Russia and Iran continued efforts to deepen economic ties. NOTE: This item appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)’s January 30 Iran Crisis Update. Iranian state media reported that Iran and Russia established direct financial communication channels between Iranian banks and more than 800 Russian banks on January 29.[9] Iranian Central Bank Deputy Governor Mohsen Karami announced that Iranian and Russian banks have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on financial messaging, effective immediately. Karami added that Iranian banks abroad were also included in the MoU and would be able to exchange standard banking messages with Russian banks.[10] Iranian officials and state-affiliated media outlets framed the MoU as a means to circumvent Western sanctions on Iran and Russia and compared the messaging system to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which serves as the world’s largest financial messaging system.[11] ISW has previously reported on the deepening of economic and military ties between Tehran and Moscow.[12]

Key Takeaways

  • Western, Ukrainian, and Russian sources continue to indicate that Russia is preparing for an imminent offensive, supporting ISW’s assessment that an offensive in the coming months is the most likely course of action (MLCOA).
  • Iranian state media reported that Iran and Russia established direct financial communication channels between Iranian banks and more than 800 Russian banks on January 29.
  • Russian forces continued ground attacks to regain lost positions west of Kreminna as Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations northwest of Svatove.
  • Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentrations in rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
  • Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
  • Russian forces continued to make marginal territorial gains near Bakhmut.
  • Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued measures to professionalize the Russian military as it faces continued backlash against these measures.
  • Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to target Crimean Tatars in an effort to associate anti-Russia sentiment with extremist or terrorist activity.


We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine

  • Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort);
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive preparations northwest of Svatove on January 29 and 30. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 29 that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack in the Kuzemivka direction (13km northwest of Svatove), but Russian forces repelled the attack.[13] Another Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Ukrainian forces laid mines along bridges northwest of Svatove in case Russian forces attempted to cross the Oskil River.[14] The milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces transported materiel and personnel to the Kupyansk area.[15] Another Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) advanced one kilometer north and occupied a few unspecified forest belts near Svatove.[16]

Russian forces continued ground attacks to regain lost positions west of Kreminna on January 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 and January 30 that Ukrainian forces repelled assaults on Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast, and Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Russian forces made unspecified advances in the Dibrova area and attacked in the direction of Yampolivka.[18] Russian milbloggers posted footage on January 29 allegedly showing elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division (Western Military District), LNR 4th Territorial Defense Brigade, and 144th Motorized Rifle Division conducting offensive operations near Kreminna.[19] Geolocated combat footage posted on January 30 shows Ukrainian forces shelling unspecified Russian targets west of Dibrova on an unspecified date, indicating that Ukrainian forces have made marginal advances southwest of Kreminna.[20]

Ukrainian forces continue targeting Russian concentration areas in the rear of Luhansk Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on January 29 shows the aftermath of a purported Ukrainian HIMARS strike on a hospital in Novoaidar (55km east of Kreminna along the H21 Starobilsk-Luhansk City highway) in Luhansk Oblast.[21] The LNR People’s Militia claimed on January 30 that Ukrainian forces used HIMARS to strike Alchevsk (38km west of Luhansk City).[22] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Kadiivka (48km west of Luhansk City) with HIMARS on the night of January 29 to January 30.[23]


Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued making marginal advances during ground attacks around Bakhmut on January 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske (30km northeast), Rozdolivka (13km northeast), Sil (10km northeast), Blahodatne (7km north), Paraskoviivka (5km north), and Vasyukivka (15km north); and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km southwest), Klishchiivka (7km southwest), Kurdiumivka (13km southwest), and Ozerianivka (15km southwest).[24] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on January 28 that the Wagner Group took control of Blahodatne—a claim later confirmed by geolocated imagery published on January 29 showing Wagner Group fighters along the T1302 Bakhmut-Siversk highway south of Blahodatne.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters northeast of Bakhmut are continuing attacks on Krasna Hora (5km north of Bakhmut) and reached the outskirts of Sacco and Vanzetti village (10km north of Bakhmut).[26] Several Russian sources suggested that Russian advances northeast of Bakhmut along the T1302 are intended to push on Siversk from the south.[27] This claim is improbable given the focus on Wagner Group efforts on targets closer to Bakhmut and more immediately relevant to enveloping or encircling that city. A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Wagner fighters are storming urban areas in the Zabakhmutivka area in eastern Bakhmut.[28] Russian sources continued to discuss Wagner’s efforts south of Bakhmut to push northwest from the Klishchiivka area and cut the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway near Ivanivske.[29]

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on January 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Vodyane (on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and Marinka and Novomykhailivka (on the southwestern outskirts) on January 29.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 100th Brigade are operating near Nevelske, also on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.[31] Geolocated combat footage from Vodyane shows that Russian forces have likely occupied the settlement since January 16.[32] Russian sources continued to discuss fighting in the western part of Marinka on January 30.[33]

Russian forces continued ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on January 29 and 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Pobieda (8km southwest of Donetsk City along the T0524 Donetsk City-Vuhledar highway) and Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) on January 29.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Eastern Military District (EMD) occupied unspecified advantageous lines in this direction on January 30.[35] Russian milbloggers continued to discuss heavy fighting within Vuhledar on January 29 and 30, and one milblogger claimed that Russian naval infantry is advancing deep into Vuhledar as of January 30.[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian troops interdicted the T0524 highway near Vuhledar and are trying to capture the Pivdennodonbaska coal mine northeast of Vuhledar in order to encircle the settlement.[37] Russian sources posted footage of Russian offensive operations in the Vuhledar area between January 29 and 30.[38]


Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 29 and 30. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces Yevhen Yerin reiterated on January 30 that Russian forces are not conducting offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction and have not concentrated enough manpower and equipment for a full-scale offensive.[39] Yerin noted that Russian forces continue to conduct failed attacks in groups of 10 personnel in some unspecified areas to improve their tactical positions.[40] Some Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 29 and 30 that Russian forces occupied unspecified advantageous positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[41] Other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the area.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistics lines in rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against a rail bridge in Svitlodolynske on the T0401 Melitopol-Tokmak highway on January 29.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that the strike killed workers who had been repairing the damage on the bridge from prior Ukrainian strikes and that the rail bridge supplies Russian forces closer to the front line. [44]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck areas in southern Ukraine with incendiary munitions on January 29 and 30. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces used incendiary munitions to strike Beryslav, Kherson Oblast on January 29, and Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast on January 30.[45] A Ukrainian official posted footage of incendiary munitions detonating over Beryslav overnight on January 29.[46] Continued Russian usage of incendiary munitions to conduct what would otherwise be routine strikes in southern Ukraine supports ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces face a shortage of conventional artillery ammunition.[47]

Russian forces continued to fire on routine areas in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on January 29 and 30.[48]



Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued measures to professionalize the Russian military as it faces continued pressure from these measures. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on January 30 that the Russian MoD will take over the provisioning of Russian volunteer units with weapons, equipment, clothing, medical care, and food, supporting ISW’s prior assessments that Russian federal subjects (regions) bore the financial burden of provisioning these units during the heavy recruitment period in the late summer and fall.[49] The Russian MoD stated that this new measure will not require additional funds from the federal budget and also holds Russian volunteers accountable for equipment damaged through negligence. These measures indicate that these problems still occur frequently enough that the MoD feels a need to address them. A Russian milblogger speculated on January 29 that Shoigu is under pressure to make progress on professionalizing Russian forces and report back to Russian President Vladimir Putin by February 1.[50]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko warned on January 30 that Russian forces are redistributing their manpower and equipment in southwestern Donetsk Oblast. Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces deployed over 4,000 mobilized personnel to Bylosarayska Kosa and other villages north of Mariupol Raion along the border of Mariupol and Volnovakha raions.[51] Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces are also reprovisioning their forces in Luhansk Oblast with new weapons. Andryushchenko noted that Russian sources say that Russian forces are massing for an offensive against Vuhledar, and Andryushchenko noted that there are 3,000-5,000 Russian military personnel in Mariupol Raion who could participate in an offensive.

Russian officials continue to institute measures suggesting they are preparing for a second wave of mobilization. Head of the State Duma Committee on Defense Andrey Kartapolov stated on January 28 that the State Duma Committee on Defense is reviewing over 20 laws on mobilization deferrals, including those for families with disabled children or more than three children.[52] A Russian source claimed that Russian military recruiters in Ostrov, Pskov Oblast are attempting to recruit unemployed people into volunteer contract service.[53] Another Russian source reported that mobilization departments of universities in St. Petersburg, Omsk, and Vladimir oblasts demanded that students provide military registration data as part of preparations for a second wave of mobilization in February 2023.[54]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian forces and occupation authorities continue efforts to identify and arrest Crimean Tatars under allegations that they associate with a pan-Islamist political organization banned in Russia. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on January 30 that Russian forces searched 25 Tatar homes and arrested nine people under accusations that they associate with Hizb ut-Tahrir (a pan-Islamist political organization that has historically been active in Central Asia and in Crimea amongst the Crimean Tatar community and that is banned in Russia).[55] The Center also reported that Russian forces are conducting an ethnic cleansing campaign against Crimean Tatars under the guise of fighting terrorism.[56] Russian occupation authorities have historically targeted Crimean Tatar communities to consolidate social control of occupied Crimea, promoting the notion that anti-Russian sentiment is extremist or terrorist activity by affiliating it with Hizb ut-Tahrir.[57] ISW previously reported that the Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) conducted similar raids on Crimean Tatar households in Dzankoi, occupied Crimea, on January 24.[58]

Russian forces and occupation authorities are continuing to evict and deport Ukrainians from their homes in occupied territories under the guise of “evacuation.” Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported on January 30 that Russian occupation authorities are housing Russian and Wagner forces in abandoned homes after forcibly evicting residents from settlements along the frontlines in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[59]

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses it very unlikely that Russian or Belarusian forces will attack northern Ukraine in early 2023 and has thus restructured this section of the update to orient away from the previous most dangerous course of action warning forecast about a Russian offensive against northern Ukraine to report on significant activity in Belarus. ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus.)

There is still no indication that Russian forces are forming a strike group in Belarus as of January 30 despite continued Russian training rotations to Belarus. The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that it has not observed Russian forces in Belarus forming a strike group as of January 30.[60] A senior Ukrainian State Border Guard Service official stated on January 30 that the Russian military deployed new military units to Belarus and redeployed some Russian elements that trained in Belarus back to Russia and that there are 9,000 Russian personnel in Belarus.[61] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate stated that there are 5,800 Russian personnel in Belarus as of January 25.[62] Russia likely deployed more forces to Belarus after elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the Western Military District completed training in Belarus in late January and redeployed to Russia and Luhansk Oblast.[63]

Belarusian mechanized elements continue to deploy across Belarus for exercises. Logistics elements of the Belarusian 11th Mechanized Brigade conducted readiness tasks to support the joint Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV) in an unspecified location on January 30.[64] Footage posted on January 29 shows elements of the Belarusian 11th Mechanized Brigade conducting readiness tasks in Slonim, Grodno Oblast.[65] The Hajun Project reported that a column of at least 30 unspecified vehicles of the Belarusian 11th Mechanized Brigade deployed through Slonim in Grodno Oblast on January 27.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[5] https://suspilne dot media/369230-vijskovi-rf-vlucili-u-zitlovij-budinok-v-harkovi-ukrainski-tankisti-priihali-v-britaniu-341-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1675088762&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU&embeds_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fsu...

[9] https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/01/30/697253/Iran-Russia-financial-messaging-system-SWIFT

[10] https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14011110000319/Iranian-Rssian-Banks-Ink-MU-Braden-Cperain

[11] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/196774/Iran-Russia-banking-SWIFT-like-system-launched ; https://www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/01/30/697253/Iran-Russia-financial-messaging-system-SWIFT

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1620102674283892736

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1619963143685562369

https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1620097571581730817

https://twitter.com/auditor_ya/status/1620097571581730817

https://t.me/robert_magyar/382

[39] https://suspilne dot media/369550-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-vorog-ne-provodit-aktivnih-nastupalnih-dij-evgen-erin/

[40] https://suspilne dot media/369550-na-zaporizkomu-napramku-vorog-ne-provodit-aktivnih-nastupalnih-dij-evgen-erin/

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1619772090122657793; https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1619778986846076931?s=20&t=5F... https://t.me/boris_rozhin/76718; https://t.me/opersvodki/12757; https://t.me/izvestia/119803

[50] https://t.me/dva_majors/8433; https://rossaprimavera dot ru/news/9b4deb9b

[55] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/30/okupanty-znovu-provely-obshuky-v-pomeshkannyah-krymskyh-tatar/

[56] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/30/okupanty-znovu-provely-obshuky-v-pomeshkannyah-krymskyh-tatar/

[57] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2023/01/30/okupanty-znovu-provely-obshuky-v-pomeshkannyah-krymskyh-tatar/; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignAugust17

[61] https://suspilne dot media/369230-vijskovi-rf-vlucili-u-zitlovij-budinok-v-harkovi-ukrainski-tankisti-priihali-v-britaniu-341-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1675080314&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R5vvrb1YsqU

understandingwar.org



2. Ukraine Conflict Update - January 2023 | SOF News




Ukraine Conflict Update - January 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · January 31, 2023


Curated news, analysis, and commentary about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, tactical situation on the ground, in the air, and on the seas. Additional topics include NATO, aid to Ukraine, refugees, internally displaced personnel, humanitarian efforts, cyber, and information operations.

Image / Photo: Destroyed Russian tanks in the Sumy region, Ukraine. Photo by Irina Rybakova, press service of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, March 7, 2022.

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Top Story – Tanks for Ukraine

The biggest news of the past week is the announcement that Germany and the United States will be providing main battle tanks to Ukraine. The German Leopard 2 tank and the U.S. M1 Abrams tank on the battlefield will significantly increase the Ukrainian Armed Forces to defend against Russian offensives and provide more ‘punch’ to Ukrainian offensive operations. The announcement has generated a lot of media attention – one of the more informative and comprehensive news articles was penned by John Amble and John Spencer. “Leopards Into the Fray: How will German Tanks Affect the Battlefield Balance in Ukraine?”, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 27, 2023.

Leopard vs the Abrams. Most European nations have fielded the Leopard 2, so the delivery, maintenance, logistics, and training for the Leopard will be more easily done than the Abrams. The Leopards may very well be employed by late spring or early summer; while the Abrams are likely at least a year away from seeing combat in Ukraine. A lot of points were burned in the diplomatic effort of getting the Germans to this point; something that they will not forget, especially if they face economic reprisals from the Russians in the future.

Quality vs. Quanity. While the introduction of 100+ Abrams and Leopards will certainly give Ukraine a qualitative advantage, the fact that Russia has thousands of T-72s in storage that can be fielded over time is something to consider. Using waves of T-72s to take out the new tanks is one tactic the Russians can use; then follow with employment of the more modern and capable Russian T-90. Of course, along with the ‘quality’ of the Western tanks is the ‘long tail’ required for fuel, spare parts, maintenance, and logistics. Here is a look at some of the tanks that are found in Russia’s inventory. “Russian Heavy Metal: Putin’s Four Main Battle Tanks”, Soldier of Fortune Magazine, January 30, 2023.

Combined Arms Training Needed. The Abrams, Leopards, Challengers, and T-72s will add a good offensive punch to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it needs to integrate the tanks with artillery and infantry. This requires training in combined arms maneuver – being versed in strategy and tactics. And that requires practice – which will be hard to do to prepare for soon-to-arrive 2023 spring offensives. “Tanks Alone Won’t Turn the Tide of the War in Ukraine”, The New York Times, January 27, 2023. (subscription)

Bridges – a Problem? One concern of fielding these modern tanks (in addition to feul, training, ammunition, maintenance, and logistics) is the state of the bridges in Ukraine. Many bridges spanning rivers in Eastern Europe will have trouble bearing the weight of tanks exceeding 60 tons. There are a lot of rivers in Ukraine; maybe not in the part that is east of the Dneiper, but enough to be worth considering. One of the real challenges of tank warfare is getting them across rickety Soviet-era bridges. (Breaking Defense, Feb 6, 2020). Check out maps that depict the location of rivers in Ukraine. (National Security Info).

Ground Situation

Static Situation. For the most part, over the past several weeks the ground war has been mostly static, with the exception of Russian forces trying to take Bakhmut (Google Maps) and Ukrainian forces mounting an offensive near Kreminna. (Google Maps). The Russians have experienced heavy casualties in their efforts to take Bakhmut.

Soledar in Russian Hands? A long fight has taken place for a town in the eastern region of Donbas – with heavy casualties on both sides. Most reports indicate that the Russians have achieved a rare but modest victory in the capture of Soledar (Google Maps).

Massive Strike on New Year’s Day. Just two minutes past midnight on New Year’s Day the Ukrainian military launched a HIMARS strike on a vocational school in the town of Makiivka (Google Maps) in the Russian-controlled Donetsk region that was being used as an assembly area for newly mobilized Russian soldiers. Estimates vary, depending on the news source, on the number of killed and injured – ranging from 200 to 600 KIA and many more WIA. In additional, military material and ammunition stocks were destroyed in the strike.

Winter Fighting – Advantage Ukraine? Brian Frydenborg writes that with the onset of winter the Ukrainians will likely fare better than the Russians. He says that logistics, morale, supply lines, and home turf are factors that favor Ukraine over Russia. “Uneven Snows: Why Winter Will Hurt Russia’s Military Far More Than Ukraine’s”, Small Wars Journal, January 1, 2023.

Another Russian Offensive? Some national security observers believe that Russia is positioning itself for another big offensive – one to take place in the next few months. Many of the Russians mobilized in the Fall of 2022 were sent to the front very quickly – lacking sufficient equipment and training. However, some were held back and formed into units; providing more capable reinforcements in time for a late winter or spring offensive.

Ukraine’s Bohdana Howitzer. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will soon receive 155mm howitzers that they have manufactured in Ukraine. The 2S22 Bohdana is a NATO-caliber 155-mm self-propelled howitzer on a wheeled truck. The production of these new artillery systems began in the spring of 2022. “Ukraine organized manufacturing of indigenous 155mm self-proplelled howitzer Bohdana”, Euromaiden Press, January 27, 2023.

Fight for the Skies

Ukraine Conflict in the Air. One of the surprises of the conflict in Ukraine has been the failure of Russia’s Air Force to achieve many of the objectives that national security observers thought would happen within the first few days of the conflict in February 2022. Military analysts had assumed that Ukraine’s air defenses would be destroyed and its aircraft shot out of the sky. This has not happened. However, there has been some Russian success. They have established local air superiority over the eastern zone of Ukraine where their troops hold territory; and they have been able to mount devastating attacks against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure causing electrical power and energy shortages. But still, Russia’s Air Force has been underwhelming in its contributions to the overall war effort. “How Ukraine Fought Against Russia’s Air War”, Lawfare Blog, January 22, 2023.

A Fragile Russian Air Force. The Russian Air Force has struggled over the past year in the Ukraine conflict. It entered the war lacking fully trained pilots and used the ones it had poorly. The use of veteran instructor pilots in combat roles is leading to a diminished capacity to train new pilots and to less experienced instructors due to combat losses. “Prolonged fighting in Ukraine is revealing the Russian air force’s fragility, researches say”, Business Insider, January 1, 2023.

Defeating the Russians in the Sky. Lt. Gen. Mykhailo Zabrodskyi of the Ukraine defense forces explains how the enemy air operations can be degraded. “Patriotic War: The Rivalry is in the Air”, Ukrinform.net, December 21, 2022.

‘Closing the Sky’. There are a number of emergent actions that should be taken to stop the constant rain of Russian missiles on Ukrainian military and civilian targets. “Four things Ukraine needs to close the sky in 2023”, Euromaidan Press.

Drone Warfare. In the past few years it has become apparent that large nations are not the only countries that can employ drones in warfare. During the peak of the fight against ISIS in Iraq, drones were employed by the Islamic State. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw very effective use of small armed drones used on a large scale. The eyes of many in the national security world are focused on how drones are changing the nature of warfare in the Ukraine Russia conflict. Turkey comes out a winner with its Bayraktar TB2 drone proving to provide a very effective punch for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Read more in “Mass-market military drones have changed the way wars are fought”, MIT Technology Review, January 30, 2023. See also “Ukraine Building Strike Drone Units”, The Defense Post, Inder Singh Bisht, January 30, 2023.

And Now . . . F-16s. Ukraine has got the decisions made for the supplying of main battle tanks by NATO countries. Next up? We will hear a lot about the need to defeat the Russians in the air and the need of F-16s to do that. President Biden says no U.S. F-16s will go to Ukraine. That doesn’t mean that F-16s won’t go to a European country that will in turn pass off their older fighters to Ukraine. We shall see. Olaf Scholz says that Germany will not send fighters to Ukraine as well.

Maritime Activities

There has not been a lot of maritime activity in recent months. The Russians continue to use their naval ships to launch missile attacks against Ukrainian military targets and civilian infrastructure. In addition, blockade activity continues, depriving Ukraine access to the Black Sea. The threat from sea mines remains high.


Maps

Mine Awareness Map

https://mine.dsns.gov.ua/

The State Service for Emergency Situations of Ukraine has an interactive map of mined areas.

Situation Maps. War in Ukraine by Scribble Maps. View more Ukraine SITMAPs that provide updates on the disposition of Russian forces.

Maps of Ukraine

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/maps.html

General Information

New Russian Paramilitary Group. A new military group, reportedly affiliated with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, has been active in Ukraine. The private military group has been spotted near the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar in Donest Oblast. It is said that the Patriot private military company is in competition with the Wagner mercenary group. “Another Russian Private Army Joins Ukraine War”, International Business Times, December 28, 2022.

Ukraine’s ‘Q’ Course. U.S. Army Special Forces helped the Ukrainian military set up a version of the Green Beret Qualification course. The ‘Q’ course assesses candidates under stress and pressure and teaches them the basics of their profession. Special Operations Command Europe, using members of the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group, developed the course for the Ukrainians. “US special operators borrowed a unique part of Army Green Beret training to prepare Ukrainians to fight Russia”, Business Insider, January 24, 2023.

Refugees, IDPs, and Humanitarian Crisis. View the UNHCR Operational Data Portal – Ukraine Refugee Situation (Updated daily), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine.


World Response

More Military Equipment to Ukraine. In January the United States announced a $2.5 billion assistance package for Ukraine – featuring Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Stryker armored personnel carriers, ammunition, MRAPs, missiles, and more. Germany is providing Marder infantry fighting vehicles, France is providing AMX-10 light tanks, and Sweden is donating CV90 infantry fighting vehicles and howitzers. Many other European countries are also providing equipment – to include helicopters, UAVs, and more.

U.S. Financial Support. The Congressional Research Service has published a two-page brief entitled U.S. Direct Financial Support for Ukraine. PDF, January 10, 2023.

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12305

CRS Report on Ukraine. An updated Congressional Research Service report entitled U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine describes the U.S. programs to Ukraine since 2014, types of defensive equipment, and future U.S. assistance. CRS, January 26, 2023, PDF, 2 pages.

Oversight on U.S. Assistance to Ukraine. Billions of dollars have gone to assisting the Ukrainian government and its military in their fight against the Russians. Naturally, there is concern that the money, weapons, and equipment are being used for the purpose for which they were sent. The U.S. has a plan for monitoring this vast aid flowing into Ukraine. The Inspector Generals of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development are combining their efforts to provide oversight that is comprehensive, relevant, and transparent. Read more in JSOP-Ukraine Response: Joint Strategic Oversight Plan for Ukraine Response, DoS OIG, January 2023, PDF, 42 pages.


Commentary

Report – Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO? Courtney Herdt and Matthew Zublic have published an eight-page report about the Russian threat to the Baltic states. They outline the danger that Russia poses to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithania – as well as to other nations in the region. In addition, the authors provide recommended near-term, medium-term, and long-term actions that the Baltic region states and NATO should take to mitigate the Russian threat. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), November 2022, PDF, 8 pages. https://www.csis.org/analysis/baltic-conflict-russias-goal-distract-nato

Resistance in Ukraine. Otto C. Fiala, a retired USAR Civil Affairs officer with SOF experience, provides his thoughts on the use of irregular warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Fiala is one of the authors of Special Operations Command (SOCEUR) and partner nations of the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) that was developed after the Russian occupation of eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014. “Resilience and Resistance in Ukraine”, Small Wars Journal, December 31, 2022.

‘Peace Through Exhaustion’. Many wars and conflict end without a clear victory by either side. Some end with one side more ‘exhausted’ than the other; forcing it to make some concessions at the negotiation table. Some wars end with both sides equally ‘exhausted’. The war is being fought on Ukraine soil; infrastructure damaged, an economy in ruins, high unemployment, and a limited manpower pool. The Russians are suffering heavy losses within its military ranks but it has a manpower pool three times that of Ukraine. Read more in “Peace by exhaustion in Ukraine”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), January 25, 2023.

Three Scenarios Where War Ends. The Ukraine conflict could end sooner than many national security observers are forecasting. Read of a few ways that this could happen. “How the War in Ukraine Could End Sooner Than Expected”, The RAND Blog, January 17, 2023.

Russia, Manpower, and Reconsitution of Units. The Russians have taken significant losses over the past year in the Ukraine conflict. The mobilization of new recruits has not been a great success. Many have been sent to the frontlines with inadequate training and equipment as either replacements for depleted units or as members of an ad how unit haphazardly thrown together and pressed into the fight. There are lessons the U.S. Army could learn from Russia’s experience in fighting a protracted war with heavy casualties. Read more in “A People Problem: Learning From Russia’s Failing Efforts to Reconstitute Its Depleted Units in Ukraine”, by Michael G. Anderson, Modern War Institute at West Point, January 26, 2023.

Book Review – The Road to Unfreedom. Howard Ahmanson reviews a book by Timothy Snyder – a pub that intends to warn us about the threats to ‘freedom’ in America, Europe, and Russia. In his book, Snyder provides an early history of Russia and Ukraine and tries to explain something he refers to as ‘Christian fascist’ ruling ideology of ‘Holy’ Russia. “Timothy Snyder on the History Behind the Ukraine War”, Blog, January 3, 2023.

Resources about the Ukraine Conflict

UNCN. The Ukraine NGO Coordination Network is an organization that ties together U.S.-based 501c3 organizations and non-profit humanitarian organizations that are working to evacuate and support those in need affected by the Ukraine crisis. https://uncn.one

Ukraine Conflict Info. The Ukrainians have launched a new website that will provide information about the war. It is entitled Russia Invaded Ukraine and can be found at https://war.ukraine.ua/.

Ukrainian Think Tanks – Brussels. Consolidated information on how to help Ukraine from abroad and stay up to date on events.

Weapons of the Ukraine War.

https://www.national-security.info/ukraine/weapons.html

sof.news · by SOF News · January 31, 2023



3. Ukraine's battlefield success surprised Russia, but US troops who trained Ukrainians saw it coming, National Guard chief says


There is no better way to assess the capabilities and will of friends, partners, and allies than through sustained engagement.


Ukraine's battlefield success surprised Russia, but US troops who trained Ukrainians saw it coming, National Guard chief says

businessinsider.in · by Christopher WoodyJan 28, 2023, 04:57 IST

  • Many expected Russia's military to overwhelm Ukraine's forces when it attacked in February 2022.
  • Ukraine's success has been attributed in part to the skill of its noncommissioned officers.

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Ukraine's stiff but flexible defense in the days after Russia's invasion a year ago surprised the Russians, but US National Guard troops who trained those Ukrainians saw it coming, the head of the US National Guard said this week.

US and Ukrainian officials have emphasized the role of Ukraine's noncommissioned officers — higher-ranking enlisted troops who have not been commissioned as officers — as front-line leaders who were able to adapt and make decisions in the hectic early days of the war, contrasting their performance with that of Russian units reliant on senior officers for battlefield guidance.

After Russia's 2014 invasion, the US National Guard "worked very closely" with Ukraine's military "to identify those areas where they felt that they could really improve to prepare themselves if anything like that occurred again," US Army Gen. Daniel Hokanson, chief of the National Guard Bureau, told reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday, adding that one of those areas "was NCO development."

Army National Guard Sgt. Matthew Councill listens to a Ukrainian soldier brief his team before a drill at a Ukrainian base in May 2017.Oklahoma Army National Guard/Sgt. Anthony Jones

US National Guard units began rotating through Ukraine in 2015 to conduct training as part of the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine. "We've really focused on developing their noncommissioned officers, as well as a couple other areas that they really wanted to work on," Hokanson said of the training.

The program included sessions between US and Ukrainian NCOs to develop knowledge and skills out of the view of junior troops and officers. "You don't want to have to read from a book in front of the soldiers, so you read through and practice," an Oklahoma National Guard sergeant said in 2017.

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That training fostered "a competent non-commissioned officer corps that could feed initiative and make tactical decisions based on commander's intent," like NCOs in NATO militaries, Lt. Col. Todd Hopkins, deputy commander of the Florida National Guard's 53rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, said in May 2022, after a training rotation.

On Tuesday, Hokanson and his senior enlisted advisor, Chief Master Sgt. Tony Whitehead, said the effect of that NCO training was visible after Russia's attack.

Army National Guard Staff Sgt. Kevin Lawson speaks to Ukrainian NCOs after a drill at a base in Ukraine in May 2017.Oklahoma Army National Guard/Sgt. Anthony Jones

"When you look at the predictors when the war started, there were a lot of folks that said it would be a matter of days or weeks," Hokanson said, referring to expectations of a Russian victory. "Our Guardsmen that had trained the Ukrainians, they said not so fast, that they really felt that the training, that [the Ukrainians] had really taken it seriously, and we saw the impact."

US trainers withdrew from Ukraine on February 12, but the impact of their training was visible from afar, Whitehead said. Ukrainian NCOs "were able to lead from the front at the lowest level of supervision. That's where our NCOs really are effective because the things that our commanders empower them to do," Whitehead added.

Hokanson and Whitehead echoed Chief Master Sgt. of the Ukrainian Air Force Kostiantyn Stanislavchuk, who said in August that Ukrainian sergeants, "without waiting for instructions from the above, took the initiative" to conduct "independent, small operations" and act "independently and resourcefully."

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"In this way, the [Ukrainian] defense forces are comparatively different from the enemy, where generals are forced to personally raise their subordinates to attack," Stanislavchuk said at a summit in Washington DC.

A Ukrainian team leader takes part in a drill during junior leader training led by US and Canadian soldiers at a base in Ukraine in May 2017.Oklahoma Army National Guard/Sgt. Anthony Jones

Ukrainian troops' effectiveness and Russian troops' shortcomings also surprised US intelligence agencies, which expected Russia's attack to overwhelm Ukrainian forces. US intelligence officials have acknowledged that they failed to see that Russia's military was a "hollow force."

Other factors also shaped the first few days of fighting. While Russia surprised Ukraine at the operational level, Russian troops weren't expecting to do what Moscow ordered them to do, and Ukrainian troops, many of whom had fought Russia and its proxies in the Donbas region between 2014 and 2022, "had been psychologically and practically preparing for this fight for eight years," according to a Royal United Services Institute report on the first five months of the war.

But Ukraine's performance has generated more interest in NCO training among the National Guard's other foreign partners, Hokanson said Wednesday.

"After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we had a few of our state partners reach out and say, OK, these are areas that we feel like we should probably develop as well, and we've really tailored our engagement since then to address those concerns that each of these separate countries have," Hokanson said.

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businessinsider.in · by Christopher WoodyJan 28, 2023, 04:57 IST




4. U.S. military poised to secure new access to key Philippine bases


Recently someone mentioned there are some 400 deep underground natural caverns in the Philippines. I was unaware of this. Is it possible that some of these could be useful for storing war stocks for use in the region? Could these provide protection from attack? 


U.S. military poised to secure new access to key Philippine bases

The expansion is part of a broader push in the Indo-Pacific to buttress U.S. force posture, reinforce alliances and deter China

By Ellen Nakashima and  Rebecca Tan 

Updated January 30, 2023 at 11:17 p.m. EST|Published January 30, 2023 at 3:50 p.m. EST

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · January 30, 2023

The U.S. military is poised to secure expanded access to key bases in the Philippines on the heels of a significant revamp of U.S. force posture in Japan — developments that reflect the allies’ concern with an increasingly fraught security environment in the region and a desire to deepen alliances with the United States, according to U.S. and Philippine officials.

While negotiations are still ongoing, an announcement is expected as soon as this week when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin meets in Manila with his counterpart and then with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

The expansion involves access to Philippine military bases, likely including two on the northern island of Luzon — which, analysts said, could give U.S. forces a strategic position from which to mount operations in the event of a conflict in Taiwan or the South China Sea. They will also facilitate cooperation on a range of security concerns, including more rapid responses to natural disasters and climate-related events.

Extensive work has been done over the past few months in the Philippines to assess and evaluate various sites, and at least two of them have been pinned down, said a State Department official, who like other officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the deliberations.

A Philippine defense official said an agreement for the additional sites had “more or less” been made but would be formalized when the two defense secretaries meet. Aides from the two offices were continuing to iron out key details in recent days, and at least two of the new sites are in Luzon, he said.

U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan discussed the matter with his counterpart Eduardo Año earlier this month as part of a White House effort to step up cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies, a U.S. official said.

The increased military cooperation with the United States “bodes well for our defense posture,” said the Philippine official. But, he emphasized, the Philippines’ push to bolster its security “is not aimed at any particular country.”

Marcos “realizes the dynamics of the region at the moment and that the Philippines really needs to step up,” said the official, adding that the president has been closely monitoring developments in the Taiwan Strait and in the West Philippine Sea. “We’ve already got incursions from multiple countries and the tensions are still expected to rise.”

While expanded base access is alone not the security linchpin for the region, “it’s a pretty big deal,” said Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “This is significant not just in terms of what it means for a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. This is a signal that the Philippines are all in on modernizing the alliance, and that they understand that a modern alliance means they have responsibilities, too.”

The Philippines, once a U.S. territory, has been a treaty ally since 1951. It hosted a massive U.S. presence after World War II, including the two of the largest American military facilities overseas — an arrangement that ended in 1991 when the Philippine Senate, asserting the country’s sovereignty was being violated, forced the Americans to relinquish all U.S. bases to the Philippines.

The mutual defense arrangement was further stressed under the administration of former president Rodrigo Duterte, arguably the Philippines’ most pro-Beijing and anti-American president. Duterte threatened to end the Visiting Forces Agreement, which gave legal protections to U.S. military in the Philippines. But after Austin visited in the summer of 2021, and in the face of increasing Chinese aggression in Philippine waters, Duterte withdrew the threat.

The election of Marcos last year continued a warming trend — President Biden was the first foreign leader to call to congratulate him. But the deepening of the alliance, officials say, is rooted in a recognition that the region is becoming a more dangerous place. In November, for instance, the Chinese coast guard forcibly seized Chinese rocket debris being towed by the Philippine navy near one of the Philippine-held islands. In December, Chinese militia ships were spotted swarming in the West Philippine Sea. And just last week, Chinese vessels drove Philippine fishermen away from one of the reefs at which the Philippines has exclusive fishing rights.

China is the Philippines’ largest trading partner and the Marcos family has historical ties to China: Marcos visited China in 1974 with his father, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and his mother, Imelda Marcos, and met Chairman Mao Zedong. Nonetheless, Marcos has made clear he sees the gathering threat. Asked at the Davos Economic Forum in January whether the South China Sea issue keeps him up at night, he responded, “It keeps you up at night. It keeps you up in the day. It keeps you up most of the time.”

He also said that “in terms of cross-strait tensions, we are at the very front line,” a reference to the fact that the Philippines’ northernmost islands are only some 200 miles from Taiwan and the likeliest place that refugees would flee in a conflict.

Marcos said that “whenever these tensions increase,” involving Chinese and American vessels, “we are watching as bystanders” and if something goes wrong, “we are going to suffer.”

But, he noted, the connection between the United States and the Philippines has “remained strong,” and that the only way to remain strong and relevant “is to evolve.”

Marcos said, “We have security arrangements with the United States, and that has come to the forefront … because of the increased tensions in our part of the world.”

Marcos made a trip to Beijing in early January in which, he said, he raised South China Sea concerns. Those include China’s navy and coast guard denying Filipino fishermen access to their traditional fishing grounds as well as the buildup of artificial islands in Philippine waters. Though he came away with more than a dozen agreements involving tourism, trade and e-commerce, his Davos remarks later in the month make clear the security issue prevails.

“The world has changed,” he said. “Now we are living within the context of all of these other forces that are coming out, especially around the region, around South China Sea.”

The United States has access to four air bases and one army base in the Philippines under a 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. EDCA allows the U.S. military to operate in agreed locations on a rotational basis. None of the five bases are in Luzon’s north.

In November, Vice President Harris became the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the Philippine province of Palawan, a thin but roughly 200-mile-long island abutting the contested South China Sea. At the time of her visit, a senior administration official noted that the two allies had identified new locations “to deepen our work together.”

That work would extend to security cooperation exercises, combined training activities, and allow the United States to more rapidly provide humanitarian relief in natural disasters, the official said. EDCA also provides economic benefits, the official said, noting that the United States has invested more than $82 million in existing bases, with the majority of contracts supporting the projects going to Philippine companies.

The expected EDCA expansion will follow an announcement earlier this month that the U.S. Marine Corps will be revamping a unit in Okinawa to be better able to fight in austere, remote islands by 2025. Under the plan, a new Marine Littoral Regiment would be equipped with advanced capabilities, such as anti-ship missiles that could be fired at Chinese ships in the event of a Taiwan conflict.

For over a decade the Pentagon has sought to disperse its presence across the island chains of the Western Pacific to make it harder for China to concentrate its attacks on U.S. bases. But this also helps countries like the Philippines ensure that China does not charge right through their archipelago to attack Taiwan or Japan, said Michael J. Green, chief executive of the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney.

“The Philippines are not necessarily signing on to U.S. war plans per se,” said Green, who handled Asia issues at the White House under President George W. Bush. “But it’s a big step forward that will be encouraging to the United States and allies like Japan, and a signal to China of the costs of coercion.”

Tan reported from Singapore.

The Washington Post · by Ellen Nakashima · January 30, 2023




5. What to make of Air Force general’s ‘gut’ feeling war with China is coming in two years



How many news cycles will continue to carry General Minihan's comments?


QUOTE OF THE DAY

“Lethality matters most. When you can kill your enemy, every part of your life is better. Your food tastes better. Your marriage is stronger.”
Gen. Mike Minihan, Air Mobility Command commander, speaking at the Air & Space Forces Association Air Space & Cyber Conference last year, as quoted by Task & Purpose

What to make of Air Force general’s ‘gut’ feeling war with China is coming in two years

by Jamie McIntyre, Senior Writer | 

 January 30, 2023 07:08 AM



What to make of Air Force general’s ‘gut’ feeling war with China is coming in two years

Washington Examiner · January 30, 2023

‘MY GUT TELLS ME WE WILL FIGHT IN 2025’: A two-page memo dated Feb. 1 from the four-star head of Air Mobility Command predicting war between the United States and China within two years ricocheted around the internet over the weekend, after being reported by NBC News on Friday. In the memo, Gen. Michael Minihan, orders his troops to prepare for war, including scheduling time with the base legal office to get their personal affairs in order.

“I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” Minihan wrote in his first paragraph. “[Chinese President Xi Jinping] secured his third term and set his war council in October 2022. Taiwan’s presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a reason. United States’ presidential elections are in 2024 and will offer Xi a distracted America. Xi’s team, reason, and opportunity are all aligned for 2025.”

Minihan, who oversees the fleet of Air Force transport and refueling aircraft, directed his airmen to “go faster. ... If you are comfortable with your approach to training, then you are not taking enough risk.”

“All AMC aligned personnel with weapons qualifications will fire a clip into a 7-meter target with the full understanding that unrepentant lethality matters most. Aim for the head,” he ordered. All commanders are ordered to submit a report on their “accomplishments preparing for the China fight” by the end of February.

“I alone own the pen on these orders, My expectations are high and these orders are not up for negotiation. Follow them,” he wrote.

AIR FORCE GENERAL WARNS TROOPS OF WAR WITH CHINA BY 2025, DISAGREEING WITH PENTAGON ASSESSMENT

‘COWBOY AGGRESSION’: While the Pentagon has foot-stomped the theme that China is America’s “pacing threat” and that the U.S. and its allies must build up forces in the region to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, a defense official, speaking on background, said the tone of Minihan’s comments “are not representative of the department’s view on China.”

On Fox News Sunday, the only regular Sunday show to discuss the Minihan memo, House Armed Services ranking member Adam Smith (D-WA) cautioned against creating a narrative that war with China is inevitable.

“It's not only not inevitable, it is highly unlikely," said Smith. “We have a very dangerous situation in China, but I think generals need to be very cautious about saying we're going to war. …Their job is to prepare for a wide range of eventualities.”

“We have to be in a position to deter China,” he said. “That's a very dangerous situation that we need to be prepared for, but I'm fully confident that we can avoid that conflict if we take the right approach.”

Retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey accused Minihan of “cowboy aggression” and “bad judgment,” tweeting, “This General officer needs to be placed on terminal leave.”

McCAUL: ‘I THINK HE'S RIGHT’: Republicans were less concerned about whether Minihan was being overly alarmist, instead focusing on the need to prepare for the worst while hoping for the best.

“I hope he's wrong as well. I think he's right though, unfortunately,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Mike McCaul (R-TX) told Fox News’s Shannon Bream.

“Wait, an actual war?” she interjected.

“Well, I think China's looking at reunification of Taiwan, right?” McCaul replied, arguing that if China can’t achieve its goals by influencing Taiwan’s presidential elections next year, its next option could well be the use of military force.

“We have to be prepared for this. And it could happen I think as long as Biden is in office, projecting weakness, as he did with Afghanistan that led to Putin invading Ukraine, that the odds are very high we could see a conflict with China and Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific,” McCaul said.

Other Republicans also endorsed the dire warning from Minihan. “Having just returned from Taiwan, I share and applaud General Minihan's urgency about the threat the Chinese Communist Party poses both to Taiwan and the world,” tweeted Sen. Todd Young (R-IN). “The DOD and our diplomatic community must be ready to address China's aggression.”

“Gen. Mike Minihan has the correct mentality — our bureaucracy needs to catch up,” tweeted Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR). “The U.S. military must be ready and able to respond at anytime to growing Chinese aggression.”

TOP DEMOCRATIC, GOP LAWMAKERS SPLIT ON AIR FORCE GENERAL'S FORECAST OF A COMING WAR WITH CHINA

Good Monday morning and welcome to Jamie McIntyre’s Daily on Defense, written and compiled by Washington Examiner National Security Senior Writer Jamie McIntyre (@jamiejmcintyre) and edited by Stacey DecEmail here with tips, suggestions, calendar items, and anything else. Sign up or read current and back issues at DailyonDefense.com. If signing up doesn’t work, shoot us an email and we’ll add you to our list. And be sure to follow us on Twitter: @dailyondefense.

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HAPPENING TODAY: Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin is in Seoul, South Korea, this morning (late Monday evening there) for high-level meetings with President Yoon Suk Yeol and South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup.

The visit comes as Yoon recently floated the idea that South Korea may have to develop its own nuclear arsenal to deter the growing threat from North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, who has made increasingly bellicose statements about building up the North’s nuclear strike capability.

“I look forward to meeting my counterpart and other senior government leaders to chart an ambitious path forward to advance our shared security priorities in the Indo-Pacific,” Austin said on Twitter.

It’s Austin’s sixth official visit to the region, a trip that will also take him to the Philippines to meet with recently elected President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.

STOLTENBERG: N. KOREA SUPPORTING RUSSIA: Austin’s arrival in Seoul coincides with the departure of NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who met with Yoon over the weekend.

In a speech to students, Stoltenberg said, “What happens in Europe matters to the Indo-Pacific, and what happens in Asia matters to NATO,” and in a meeting with Foreign Minister Park Jin, Stoltenberg condemned North Korea’s nuclear program and its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

“We also know that North Korea is providing military support to the Russian war efforts with rockets and missiles, and this just highlights how we are interconnected,” he said.

BLINKEN TO MIDDLE EAST: At the same time, Secretary of State Antony Blinken is in Jerusalem, the second stop on a three-day trip that began with a stop in Egypt and will conclude with a visit to the West Bank.

Blinken meets today with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his counterpart, Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, and will consult “on a range of global and regional priorities,” according to the State Department, “including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran, Israeli-Palestinian relations and preserving the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the protection of human rights and democratic values.”

Blinken’s visit to Israel comes as violence has flared with a Palestinian Jewish settlement in east Jerusalem that killed seven people and an Israeli raid in the West Bank city of Jenin last week that killed 10 people.

“We will be encouraging the parties to take steps to calm things down,” Blinken told reporters at a news conference in Cairo before departing for Israel.

CIA DIRECTOR BURNS TRAVELS TO ISRAEL AND WEST BANK AS VIOLENCE GROWS

ISW: DELAYS PREVENT UKRAINE FROM PRESSING ADVANTAGE: So far this winter, Ukraine has largely succeeded in blunting Russia faltering counteroffensive, but the long delays in getting fresh armaments from the West have squandered its battlefield advantage, according to the latest assessment from the Institute for the Study of War.

“Western reluctance to begin supplying Ukraine with higher-end Western weapons systems, particularly tanks, long-range strike systems, and air-defense systems, has limited Ukraine’s ability to initiate and continue large-scale counter-offensive operations,” the ISW said. “Delays in the provision to Ukraine of Western long-range fires systems, advanced air defense systems, and tanks have limited Ukraine’s ability to take advantage of opportunities for larger counter-offensive operations presented by flaws and failures in Russian military operations.”

“The speed of supply has been and will be one of the key factors in this war,” said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in his nightly video address. “Russia hopes to drag out the war, to exhaust our forces. So we have to make time our weapon. We must speed up the events, speed up the supply and opening of new necessary weaponry options for Ukraine.”

POLAND TO ADD 60 TANKS TO LATEST ROUND OF AID TO UKRAINE

The Rundown

Washington Examiner: US tanks will take ‘many months’ to reach Ukraine, White House says

Washington Examiner: The West is losing weapons production race to Russia, NATO ally says

Washington Examiner: Poland to add 60 tanks to latest round of aid to Ukraine

Washington Examiner: Ilhan Omar reveals some GOPs have privately said they will not vote to remove her from committee

Washington Examiner: Swalwell accuses McCarthy of 'political abuse' for removal from Intel committee

Washington Examiner: Air Force general warns troops of war with China by 2025, disagreeing with Pentagon assessment

Washington Examiner: Top Democratic, GOP lawmakers split on Air Force general's forecast of a coming war with China

Washington Examiner: West Point grad in Congress urges GOP to stop 'woke' accusations against military

Washington Examiner: CIA Director Burns travels to Israel and West Bank as violence grows

Washington Examiner: Iranian government contracted Russian mobsters to assassinate Masih Alinejad

New York Times: Battling Over Villages In East As Russia Strives To Encircle Bakhmut

19fortyfive.com: Thanks for the M1 Abrams Tanks, But Ukraine Wants F-16 Fighters

Politico: At the Pentagon, Push to Send F-16s to Ukraine Picks Up Steam

AP: How to Fix a Howitzer: US Offers Help Line to Ukraine Troops

New York Times: Mossad Conducted Drone Attack on Iran, Intelligence Officials Say

Business Insider: For The 2nd Year In A Row, Iran Is Sailing Its Biggest Warship Around The World To Show Off Its Growing Navy

Reuters: In Beijing's Backyard, U.S. Demonstrates Its Military Might

Wall Street Journal: Chinese Nuclear Lab Used U.S. Chips After Ban

The Hill: Top Armed Services Democrat: U.S. Military Readiness A ‘Huge Problem’

Air & Space Forces Magazine: New KC-46 Deficiency Revealed as Contract Is Signed for 15 More Tankers

Naval Technology: U.S. Navy Takes Delivery Of Future USS Carl M Levin (DDG 120)

Air & Space Forces Magazine: Hypersonic ARRW Missile Criticized for Lack of Test Plan

Air & Space Forces Magazine: Report: Despite Losses in Ukraine, Russia Remains a Threat in the Arctic

Defense News: U.S. Navy Suspends Work At Four West Coast Dry Docks Over Seismic Risks

AP: Nuclear Strike Chief Seeks Cancer Review of Missile Crews

Space News: L3Harris ‘Optimistic’ Aerojet Rocketdyne Acquisition Will Close in 2023

19fortyfive.com: Opinion: Should Space Force Look at the Moon or the Earth?

Stars and Stripes: Let It Grow: Sailors, Marines Disgruntled By Beard Ban Find Favorable Reception To Challenges

Wall Street Journal: Editorial: Telling the Truth About War Over Taiwan

Calendar

MONDAY | JANUARY 30

10 a.m. — Washington Post live virtual discussion: "New Western Aid for the War in Ukraine and Russian Military Shake-up," with retired Gen. David Petraeus, former CIA Director, partner at KKR, and chairman of the KKR Global Institute https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live

10 a.m. — German Marshall Fund of the U.S. virtual discussion: “Troubled Water — Navigating the Black Sea," with Iulian Chifu, state counselor and adviser to the Romanian prime minister; former U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Robert Cekuta, president of Hudson Partners; Yoruk Isik, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute; and Alina Inayeh, adviser to the GMFUS president https://www.gmfus.org/event/troubled-water-navigating-black-sea

12 p.m. — Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft virtual discussion: "Blinken's Trip to Beijing: U.S.-China Relations at a Crossroads," with Kendra Schaefer, partner at Trivium China; Michael Davidson, assistant professor at the University of California, San Diego; Michael Swaine, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute's East Asia Program; and Jake Werner, research fellow at the Quincy Institute https://quincyinst.org/event/blinkens-trip-to-beijing

12:30 p.m. — Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies virtual discussion: “The Russian War in Ukraine: What Was Accomplished in Minsk 2014-2022 and Why Did the Peace Process Ultimately Fail?" with Wolfgang Sporrer, member of the adjunct faculty at the Hertie School https://sais.jhu.edu/campus-events

12:30 p.m. 300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW — Wilson Center Kennan Institute and Ukraine Friends discussion: “Bucha After Russian Occupation," with Bucha, Ukraine, Mayor Anatolii Fedoruk; Bucha, Ukraine, Deputy Mayor Mykhailyna Skoryk-Shkariska; former USAID Administrator Mark Green, president, director, and CEO of the Wilson Center; and former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Robin Quinville, director of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/bucha-after-russia

1 p.m. — Government Executive Media Group virtual briefing: “Readying Defense for the Future of Work," with James Sumpter, chief enterprise architect at the Air Force Research Laboratory; Brian Lau, HP future of work product manager; and Stephen Pieraldi, HP technologist https://events.govexec.com/defense-future-of-work

4 p.m. — Center for Strategic and International Studies conference call briefing: “Previewing Secretary Blinken's China Visit," with Bonny Lin, director of the CSIS China Power Project; Jude Blanchette, CSIS chairman in China studies; and Scott Kennedy, CSIS chairman in Chinese business and economics. RSVP required to Paige Montfort at pmontfort@csis.org

5 p.m. 1521 16th St. NW — Institute of World Politics lecture: "Lessons Learned From the Russo-Ukraine War and How They Can be Applied to a U.S. China Conflict," with Robert Roseberry, IWP Masters candidate https://www.iwp.edu/events/lessons-learned

7 p.m. — Henry L. Stimson Center virtual discussion: “A South Korean Nuclear Program? Assessing the Risks,” with Siegfried Hecker, distinguished professor of practice, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Robert Gallucci, distinguished professor, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; Jamie Kwong, fellow, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Jenny Town, senior fellow, Stimson Center, and director, 38 North https://www.stimson.org/event/a-south-korean-nuclear-program

TUESDAY | JANUARY 31

8 a.m. — Center for Strategic and International Studies virtual discussion: “Assessing the Future Trajectory of China-Japan Relations," with Rumi Aoyama, director of the Waseda Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies; Bonny Lin, director of the CSIS China Power Project; Christopher Johnstone, CSIS Japan chairman; and Jude Blanchette, CSIS China studies chairman https://www.csis.org/events/assessing-future-trajectory-china-japan-relations

9 a.m. — Atlantic Council virtual discussion: “The real impact of Western sanctions on Russia," with Vladimir Milov, vice president of international advocacy at the Free Russia Foundation; Elina Ribakova, deputy chief economist of the Institute for International Finance; and Leonid Volkov, head of the Network of Regional Headquarters for Alexei Navalny https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/the-real-impact-of-western-sanctions-on-russia/

11 a.m. — German Marshall Fund of the U.S. virtual discussion: “A Tale of Two Winters: How Winter is Shaping the War in Ukraine," with Lesia Vasylenko, member of the Ukrainian Parliament; Kateryna Stepanenko, Russia analyst at the Institute for the Study of War; Jonathan Katz, director of democracy initiatives at GMFUS; and Sudha David-Wilp, director of the GMFUS Berlin office https://www.gmfus.org/event/tale-two-winters

12:30 p.m. 1201 Pennsylvania Ave. NW — Hudson Institute discussion: "Moving Beyond Tragedy; Bucha's Mayor and Deputy Mayor Look to the Future," with Bucha, Ukraine, Mayor Anatolii Fedoruk; Bucha, Ukraine, Deputy Mayor Mykhailyna Skoryk-Shkarivska; and Peter Rough, director of the Hudson Center on Europe and Eurasia https://www.hudson.org/events/moving-beyond-tragedy

4:30 p.m. 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW — Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies discussion: "A New Atlanticism for a Transitory International Order?" with Heather Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund https://sais.jhu.edu/campus-events

6 p.m. 1717 Massachusetts Ave. NW — Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies discussion: "Holding Russia Liable for Invading Ukraine — Can It Be Done?" with Chiara Giorgetti, professor of law at the University of Richmond School of Law, and Brian Egan, partner at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom and former legal adviser at the State Department https://sais.jhu.edu/campus-events

WEDNESDAY | FEBRUARY 1

9 a.m. — Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress in-person book discussion: No Limits: The Inside Story of China’s War with the West, with author Andrew Small. Register at sophie.williams@thepresidency.org

10 a.m. 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW — Wilson Center Refugee and Forced Displacement Initiative discussion: "Responding to the Ukrainian Refugee Plight: The EU and US Perspectives," with Rep. Gerald Connolly (D-VA), president emeritus of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Julieta Valls Noyes; Michael Koehler, acting director-general for European civil protection and humanitarian aid operations at the European Commission; and former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe Robin Quinville, director of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/responding-ukrainian-refugee-plight

10:45 a.m. — Defense Innovation Board meeting, chaired by Michael Bloomberg. Public portion livestreamed on defense.gov

11:30 a.m. — Atlantic Council virtual discussion: "Sustaining support to Ukraine,” with former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/conversation-with-boris-johnson

1 p.m. — Washington Post live virtual discussion: "Ukraine, China, and the International World Order,” with former Defense Secretary Robert Gates https://www.washingtonpost.com/washington-post-live

4 p.m. — George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs discussion: "Putin's War or Russia's War?" with Leonid Volkov, chief of staff for Alexei Navalny; and Sam Greene, director for democratic resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis https://calendar.gwu.edu/putins-war-or-russias-war

THURSDAY | FEBRUARY 2

10:30 a.m. 1744 R St. NW — German Marshall Fund of the U.S. discussion: "The Foreign Policy of Technology." with U.S. Ambassador for Cyberspace and Digital Policy Nathaniel Fick; David Ignatius, columnist at the Washington Post; and former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Karen Kornbluh, director and senior fellow at the GMFUS's Digital Innovation and Democracy Initiative and former deputy chief of staff at the Treasury Department https://www.gmfus.org/event/foreign-policy-technology-ambassador-nate-fick

1 p.m. 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace discussion: "One Year On: Germany's Foreign Policy Shift and the War in Ukraine," with German Ambassador to the U.S. Emily Haber; Ukrainian Ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova; Steven Sokol, president of the American Council on Germany; Dan Baer, director of the CEIP Europe Program; and Sophia Besch, fellow at CEIP's Europe Program https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/02/one-year-on-germany-s-foreign-policy-shift

FRIDAY | FEBRUARY 3

12 p.m. — George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs virtual discussion: "NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and Efforts to Reduce Risk and Build Public Trust in Artificial Intelligence," with Elham Tabassi, chief of staff of the NIST Information Technology Laboratory https://calendar.gwu.edu/nist-and-efforts-reduce-risk-and-build-public-trust-ai


QUOTE OF THE DAY

“Lethality matters most. When you can kill your enemy, every part of your life is better. Your food tastes better. Your marriage is stronger.”

Gen. Mike Minihan, Air Mobility Command commander, speaking at the Air & Space Forces Association Air Space & Cyber Conference last year, as quoted by Task & Purpose

Washington Examiner · January 30, 2023


6. What the chances of a war between the US and China actually look like, according to experts




What the chances of a war between the US and China actually look like, according to experts

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 30, 2023

The head of Air Mobility Command’s recent memo predicting that the United States and China will be at war in 2025 underscores how divided the national security community is on whether a conflict with China is likely – or even inevitable.

For the past two presidential administrations, defense officials have stressed that China poses the greatest threat to U.S. national security in the long run.

The Defense Department “will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department,” a Pentagon fact sheet from March 2022 about the latest National Defense Strategy says.

In his memo forward-dated Feb. 1, AMC commander Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan went one step further by writing he feels China cannot be deterred from Invading Taiwan.

“I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” Minihan wrote adding that all airmen with weapons qualifications under his command must go to the firing range and expend a “clip” while practicing taking head shots from seven meters away.

“Aim for the head,” Minihan wrote.

Air Force Brig Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, has described Minihan’s statements about a likely war over Taiwan as “not representative of the department’s view on China.”

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A recent war game conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, D.C., found that the U.S. military would suffer heavy losses if it were ever called upon to defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion.

Despite the tremendous costs of such a war, Minihan appeared to argue in his memo that a conflict with China is a foregone conclusion.

A Chinese military special operations team conducts target identification, January 29, 2023, Jiangxi, China. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

Former Democratic Congressman Elaine Luria said that Minhian’s comments were inappropriate and provocative. While China’s military has been growing, it is still not clear to the U.S. government what their intentions are, Luria told Task & Purpose on Monday.

China’s forces are strong enough to harass Taiwan, which the Chinese consider to be a renegade province, but it is unclear whether China’s leaders have decided to invade the island nation, she added.

“China’s future actions are an unknown path,” Luria said. “We can observe what they’re doing; we can infer things from that and act or react based off of that. But, I would say that if the Chinese are looking at us, it’s not very clear. Obviously, we have a stated policy of strategic ambiguity, with neither saying that we will or we won’t come to the defense of Taiwan. But I think that our policy, broadly, is very muddled in regards to China.”

In various national security documents, the United States has pledged to “promote” and “ensure” and “preserve” a free and open Indo-Pacific region, and each of those three words means something different, Luria said.

Further confusing the issue, President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the U.S. military would come to Taiwan’s assistance if the Chinese invaded the island nation even though the United States is not obligated to defend Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

The message from top U.S. defense officials on whether China can be deterred from invading Taiwan has been somewhat confusing. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during a Jan. 11 meeting between U.S. and Japanese government officials that he doubts that an invasion of Taiwan is imminent despite increased Chinese air and naval activity in the region.

Army Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also said in November that China would be making a strategic mistake by trying to invade Taiwan and any such military operation would fare just as poorly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Chinese people’s armed police officers use a flamethrower in Nanning, South China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region, Jan. 30, 2023. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

However, retired Adm. Philip Davidson, then head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned in 2021 that China could invade Taiwan by 2027. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said in October that China could move against Taiwan even sooner.

“When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window,” Gilday said at a virtual event hosted by the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington, D.C. “I can’t rule that out. I don’t mean at all to be alarmist by saying that; it’s just that we can’t wish that away.”

Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va) told Task & Purpose that he believes in Davidson’s assertion that China will try to seize Taiwan by 2027. That is why he opposes the U.S. military’s efforts to divest vessels, such as Freedom-variant Littoral Combat Ships along with older aircraft in order to invest in newer weapons systems.

“As Congress reviews the force structure implications of the Davidson window, I believe that it is imperative that we maintain existing capacity, particularly for our air and maritime forces, and provide the weapons necessary to dissuade potential conflict that could occur later this decade in the Indo-Pacific,” said Wittman, vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee.

Ultimately, a war between China and the United States would largely arise from political decisions that Chinese Communist Party leaders make, especially China’s President Xi Jinping, said retired Navy Capt. Thomas Shugart, a military innovation expert with the Center for a New American Security think tank in Washington, D.C.

Shugart has long argued that the mid-to-late 2020s will be a dangerous time for the United States, during which its efforts to deter China from using military force against Taiwan may no longer be effective.

During that time frame, the U.S. military is expected to retire Cold War weapons systems en masse, including F-15 and F-16 fighters, Los Angeles-class attack submarines, and Guided Missile Submarines, Shugart told Task & Purpose.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military will continue and grow and become a more modern capable force, so its leaders will become more likely to tell top members of the Chinese Communist Party that they can forcibly take Taiwan with an acceptable risk of mission failure, he said.

Chinese officers and soldiers train in multiple courses in Nanning City, South China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous region, Dec. 27, 2022. (CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images)

The Defense Department is taking steps to prepare for war with China if deterrence fails. The Marine Corps, for example, is conducting a massive reorganization to make it flexible enough to fight China.

As part of Force Design 2030, the Marines will have three littoral regiments on Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam, which are intended to set up firebases on remote Pacific islands and use anti-ship missiles to destroy Chinese vessels.

However, Elbridge Colby, a former defense official who is now with The Marathon Initiative think tank in Washington, D.C., has warned that the U.S. military is still not prepared to act if China invades Taiwan.

In an August 2022 article for Foreign Affairs, Colby argued that the Defense Department is not buying munitions in large enough quantities for a war with China. He also wrote that the Navy lacks anti-ship and SM-6 missiles, and the service’s shipbuilding plan doesn’t envisage producing enough vessels to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before the 2040s at the earliest.

“We simply do not know whether China will attack Taiwan in this decade,” Colby wrote. “But it is a reasonable presumption that Beijing is much more likely to strike if it concludes it would succeed, and significant factors indicate that it may judge this decade to be the most propitious one.”

Update: 1/30/2023; This article was updated after publication with comments from Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.), vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol · January 30, 2023



7. ‘It was all for nothing’: Chinese count cost of Xi’s snap decision to let Covid rip


Insight into Xi and CCP decision making?



‘It was all for nothing’: Chinese count cost of Xi’s snap decision to let Covid rip

After three years of lockdowns, the country was ill prepared for its abrupt ‘freedom’. Now, with some estimating 1m deaths, public anger is growing


Helen Davidson in Taipei, Verna Yu, and Chi Hui Lin

Sun 29 Jan 2023 11.00 GMT

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · January 29, 2023

When Sunny* thinks back to March last year, she laughs ruefully at the ordeal. The 19-year-old Shanghai student spent that month locked in her dormitory, unable to shop for essentials or wash clothes, even banned from showering for two weeks over Covid fears. In April, the entire city locked down.

It was the beginning of the chaos of 2022, as local Chinese authorities desperately tried to follow President Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid decree while facing the most virulent strain of the virus yet: Omicron. “Everyone was panicking, no one was ready,” she tells the Observer.

By the end of the year, zero-Covid was gone. Sunny says she felt instantly “relieved” that lockdowns were over but her feelings soon turned to anger as it became clear China’s government had opened up the country, knowing it wasn’t ready. “I felt it was all for nothing,” Sunny says.

Over the last two months, the virus has rapidly spread through the country. Up to 10,000 critical cases were registered in hospitals every day. Morgues were overwhelmed, pharmacies reported shortages of basic medications, and supply of antiviral drugs was held up by protracted negotiations with foreign suppliers. Online and in the streets, people spoke of almost everyone they knew having caught Covid, and of elderly relatives dying.

Sunny’s grandfather was among those who died in that wave. “It was the morning, and my mum walked into my room and said: your grandpa is in the emergency room,” she recalls. “A few hours later, he passed away. My grandmother was in tears, saying he had left her behind.”

Xi’s extraordinary backflip left analysts alarmed and confused. China was not the only country to choose a zero-Covid strategy, and certainly not the only one to “let it rip” once it dropped it. But it was the last, and global health experts say there were plenty of lessons it could have heeded – primarily, making sure vaccinations and health resources were high before the tsunami of cases hit.

“All governments had to decide to open up at some stage or risk the consequences of lockdowns far outweighing the problems of Covid,” says Professor Emma McBryde, an epidemiologist at James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia.

“Most models suggest that it would be better for the health system to open up slowly. Although there would be little change in how many people get infected, it could mean some lives are saved if the health system can function well.”

But Xi threw the gates open. Right up until the day of repeal, local governments were still developing and enforcing zero-Covid measures and infrastructure. The city of Chongqing was building a 21,000-bed quarantine centre.

Experts on health and Chinese politics have told the Observer they believe the local authorities were hamstrung. Any preparations for ending zero-Covid would be seen as a vote of no confidence in both the policy and Xi – an act of political suicide.


China’s President Xi Jinping delivers a speech at a spring festival reception in Beijing earlier this month. Photograph: Xinhua/Rex

So when cases spread, there weren’t enough doctors, nurses, intensive care beds, fever medication or antiviral drugs, and vaccination rates and options were inadequate. According to Chinese government data, the first 55,000 deaths recorded in this wave were at an average age of about 80. In China, the vulnerable elderly are also the most likely to be unvaccinated.

“My sense is there is no strategy in this critical area,” says Professor William Hurst, deputy director at the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge, about China’s vaccines. “I’m surprised by how quickly they are moving, but more so by the apparent lack of attention to basic measures with vaccines.”

Chinese writer Murong Xuecun, who interviewed Wuhan residents in the first lockdown in 2020, says China’s abrupt U-turn “was a rash, one-man decision” made without consultation. “Within 24 hours we saw a total turnaround – we had no idea what happened in those 24 hours, what changed Xi Jinping’s mind, why there was a 180-degree change from one extreme to another.”

There is a lot of debate about the impact of the November protests against zero-Covid on his decision. Some experts say there were probably so many cases already – the numbers hidden – that Xi just realised the policy had to end. Other theories feature financial considerations, because China’s economy has been battered by zero-Covid.

Chen Daoyin, a former associate political science professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, said Xi probably acted when he felt the economic situation was no longer sustainable. “When the leader is acting on a whim, there is no predictability and no certainty.”

One oft-shared suspicion is that Xi wanted to speed up economic recovery by quickly building herd immunity with one massive wave. This theory was bolstered by Chinese health authorities claiming last week that 80% of the population had been infected, and so the possibility of a second wave was “very small”. Some health experts have cautioned against this assumption.

Protecting lives was never the motor behind zero-Covid. Power was. Now the Chinese people also see it

Melody, Chinese woman living abroad

“Herd immunity seemed to be occurring for the original strain and for Delta, but seems to be much less applicable to the Omicron strain,” says McBryde.

Other countries, including the UK, have previously hung hopes on herd immunity, and Professor Chi Chun-huei, director of the centre for global health at Oregon University, says there’s nothing inherently wrong with aiming for herd immunity if you do it right. “Ideally, if you are going to take this 180-degree, you have to be prepared … and the goal should be minimising deaths and severe symptoms.

“This was a common problem of countries that practised zero-Covid - they were overconfident … and underprepared.” In one example, Taiwan took note of Hong Kong’s hospital system collapse and was better prepared than it might have been when Omicron arrived.

Estimates of Covid fatalities in China range from the official count of about 75,000 to more than a million. The picture is clouded by a lack of transparency, rigid definitions in attributing a Covid-related death, and data collection failures.

China claims Covid wave has peaked with severe cases, deaths falling fast

Read more

Often when there are mass deaths, families struggle with their relative being reduced to a statistic. In China, few were even given that courtesy.

Among dozens of Chinese people who contacted the Guardian and Observer about their experience, Ms Chen, a young Shanghai resident, tells of the friend who died of Covid, a teacher in his 30s who she describes as a “treasure of a human”.

Melody, a Chinese woman living abroad, wrote of her “selfless and generous” uncle. After recovering from a stroke last year, he died at home of what she believes was Covid. “I’m astonished that the three years of Covid haven’t been used for a humane exit strategy. It shows me: protecting lives was never the motor behind zero-Covid. Power was. Now the Chinese people also see it.”

Across China, hundreds of thousands of families are in mourning. Many are now questioning their faith in the government. The episode has seemingly not affected Xi’s power but it has dented his reputation. A 32-year-old man in Guangzhou says he was once a patriot but is now disillusioned. “Maybe I should thank Covid for making me clearly see through the whole political and economic system.”

Sunny was already sceptical but says even her grandmother, who always believed the government worked for the people, is now complaining about it. “It’s kind of in our culture that we just endure the hardships that come at us,” she says.

“But we realise how much our lives can change on the whim of policymakers, and we are angry. This fight was about politics and power, but it was always the Chinese people who would pay.”

* Some names of people in China have been changed on request for anonymity

The Guardian · by Helen Davidson · January 29, 2023



8. Recalibrating Special Operations Risk Tolerance for the Future Fight



A lot of food for thought here. Ponder the "seven deadly norms."


Excerpts:

Finally, it is important to expand the discussion of risk tolerance beyond ground special operations. Maritime special operations and special operations aviation are not immune from the same calcified and complacent risk norms. Since many maritime special operations units like the Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders have largely been used on land during the Global War on Terror, they might benefit from rethinking some of these same norms. However, they also have maritime expertise that other special operations units do not, which have their own norms related to risk tolerance. Similarly, many special operations aviation units have been intimately involved with combat operations against non-state actors over the past twenty years. However, the risk acceptable to aircraft, manned or not, and the tactics used in contested airspace all call for careful consideration.
The risk the Green Light teams assumed in training matched their conflict environment. Today’s U.S. military is wholly unaccustomed to suffering casualties and takes extraordinary lengths to avoid them. This was possible when fighting non-state actors, but it won’t be in future conflicts. No one will ever want to see unnecessary casualties. But leaders across the military and particularly in special operations should recognize that against a strategic adversary, the American military will take significant losses in personnel and equipment. This means a different degree of risk will be required to successfully complete military objectives. Not all tactical risk is capable of being mitigated. For example, losing multiple aircraft or a naval surface ship seems unfathomable when fighting non-state actors, but all too likely when fighting a strategic adversary. If special operations leaders are expected to succeed in future conflicts with strategic adversaries, they should begin by rethinking their tolerance for risk.



Recalibrating Special Operations Risk Tolerance for the Future Fight - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Spencer Reed · January 31, 2023

During the Cold War, U.S. Special Operations Forces accepted extreme levels of operational risk during routine training exercises. The Green Light teams, for instance, would practice parachuting into “enemy territory” with live Small Atomic Demolition Munitions. Today, however, the tactical risks of modern special operations missions to rescue American citizens or capture terrorists pale in comparison.

Special operations forces have been successful on the battlefield over the past twenty years. Yet those tactical successes are poor preparation for the dangers they will face during large-scale combat operations against a strategic adversary. Due to the consistent, limited nature of the conflict environment during the “Global War on Terror,” modern U.S. ground special operations have allowed a set of risk-averse tactical norms to ossify. While the 2018 National Defense Strategy has helped the Department of Defense focus on great power competition rather than low-intensity conflict, its approach to risk has not changed. For U.S. ground special operations leaders, attitudes toward risk tolerance remain shaped by the last two decades of war in the Middle East and Africa. But if these leaders are to offer utility to the joint force or their parent services in the future fight, they should reframe and reassess how they view risk now, ahead of a future armed conflict with a great power adversary.

Seven Deadly Norms of Risk Avoidance

In a larger conflict against strategic adversaries, U.S. ground special operations will support the conventional services and the Geographic Combatant Commands. But despite some U.S. Army Warfighter Exercises over the past few years, Division and Corps headquarters are still struggling to understand how to effectively employ special operations during large-scale combat operations. In recent exercises, special operations has shifted from the supported force to a peripheral and supporting force. Moving forward, special operations will be focused on the hard problems for which few others have the time or capacity. They will also be used for deep operations on behalf of conventional commanders to fix and delay uncommitted enemy forces. As the types of missions carried out by special operations change, so will the technology they require and the tactics, techniques, procedures, and standard operating procedures they use. With this in mind, special operations leaders should begin by rethinking seven fundamental tactical norms of risk avoidance that emerged from the Global War on Terror.

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Requiring intelligence surveillance reconnaissance aircraft overhead during risky missions

While requiring intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft overhead during risky dynamic missions provides vital information to leaders and the ground force, it also demands conditions that will only be present when fighting non-state actors. More information allows for better decisions, thereby reducing risk to forces. However, having these intelligence-gathering aircraft overhead during an operation also assumes U.S. air superiority. This is not a given when fighting a strategic adversary. Additionally, the aircraft’s loitering presence in fairly small portions of airspace will alert an adversary to a ground team’s potential location. This can be problematic for special operations units conducting special reconnaissance or other long-duration missions. If Al Qaeda can publish a how-to about detecting and avoiding U.S. drones in Africa in 2013, certainly future strategic adversaries could go a step further and narrow down potential U.S. ground unit locations in real-time.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft should only be required overhead when the mission truly depends on it. Despite the number of these craft tripling between 2007 and 2017, the U.S. Air Force was only able to fulfill 66 percent of the requests for them. If left unchecked, the increasingly unscrutinized requirements for these assets in an armed conflict against a strategic adversary will make both the aircraft and the ground units using them especially vulnerable because of their overt signature and lack of air defense capabilities.

Ensuring that higher level medical treatment is available within the Golden Hour

The Golden Hour concept undoubtedly saved hundreds if not thousands of lives in Iraq and Afghanistan by decreasing the time between injury and medical care. However, the concept assumes the existence of resources and access that will not be present during a future fight with a strategic adversary. In 2009, then-Secretary of Defense Gates implemented the so-called Golden Hour Mandate, cutting in half the previous goal of two hours from point of injury to a higher level of medical care, and prescribing helicopter transport to the hospital. The results were positive, decreasing deaths and mitigating wounds. As a result, U.S. military medical intervention timelines are now largely based on this expectation.

However, this norm also relies on the assumptions of air superiority and distributed advanced medical care facilities that allow helicopters to fly wherever needed in a combat theater. In a larger conflict, even the radar signature of the helicopters would prove problematic for those in need of medical care, whether the helicopters were at a laager site or airborne. As a result, special operations leaders should grow more comfortable with relying on only the highly trained medical personnel in their formations when fighting strategic adversaries.

Only executing missions during low-illumination windows

Conducting missions during low illumination periods in the lunar cycle may be preferable, but it relies on the assumption that the enemy is largely lacking basic night vision technology. Against non-state actors, special operations generally have a significant advantage using night vision devices when the night is darkest and the unaided human eye is weakest. But these advantages disappear against an adversary with better technology. In this situation, insistence on a specific lunar cycle window would simply make special operations units predictable. Further, a special operations unit that assumes night superiority can easily take common infrared light standard operating procedures for granted. But many of these, like using infrared light beams to point out potential enemy locations to other friendly forces, would prove disastrous when used against an adversary with night vision capabilities.

Always wearing body armor regardless of mission type

Every combat force is issued body armor and expected to wear it because of the protection it provides. However, there are situations where wearing body armor makes members of a unit less effective. And some of these situations are particularly likely to occur during ground special operations. They include traveling in armored vehicles for long periods, designated marksman-style rifle engagements beyond 200 meters, certain types of jump operations, certain hot, humid, or maritime operational environments, and sensitive operations where the bulky silhouette of body armor showcases true affiliations to an adversary. In some scenarios, wearing body armor inhibits mission accomplishment or degrades the performance of ground troops to the point of ineffectiveness. For example, if a special operations unit were forced to wear body armor in a humid jungle environment, heat injuries would certainly be a problem. If a special operations team employs designated marksmen or snipers from a concealed position, analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School indicates they will be more effective in shooting over 200 meters without body armor. Finally, it is also possible that other countries develop new cartridges and weapons to defeat current body armor. The U.S. Army is already working to do just this with their Next Generation Service Weapon competition and should assume adversaries are doing the same.

Defaulting to improvised explosive device-resistant vehicles for all missions

Since the mid-2000s, the ubiquitous threat from improvised explosives has caused the U.S. military and its special operations units to default to using improvised explosive device-resistant vehicles for the protection they offer from the low-technology weapons commonly used by non-state actors. Yet these vehicles have some drawbacks when used in environments not populated by improvised explosives or where agile maneuver is needed. They often differ from standard armored Humvees in that they have a V-shaped armored hull that directs blast energy away from the occupants. At the tactical level, it’s easy to see that any kind of large v-hull armored vehicle does not blend into normal traffic. They are big, heavy, slow, and unwieldy when compared to modern civilian vehicles. Their use made sense at a time when improvised explosive devices were the number one killer of U.S. forces and accounted for 45 percent of wartime deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against a strategic adversary, though, improvised explosives are unlikely to be as much of a threat. This leaves U.S. forces free to use more mobile and agile vehicles.

Refusing to operate in communications-denied areas

Over the past twenty years, U.S. forces have seldom had to operate in areas where communications were denied by the enemy. As a result, they have made a practice of avoiding these areas. Moreover, with myriad ways to contact other units, supporting assets, and headquarters, U.S. forces have come to count on constant communication. This will change if they have to face the communications jamming and denial capabilities that strategic adversaries could deploy. Moreover, both sides in the current Russia-Ukraine war are using communication transmissions to locate enemy forces with enough precision for an artillery or rocket attack. This means that special operations units will increasingly be forced to operate under both communications-degraded and communications-denied conditions. Instead of declaring these conditions too risky to consider, U.S. special operations units must be trained and better prepared to conduct missions without the current comfort blanket of constant communications.

Refusing to operate in global positioning system-denied areas

A strategic adversary should be expected to employ relatively low-cost global positioning system jammers to wreak havoc on incoming and outgoing signals, increasing the prevalence of Global Positioning System-denied areas. Operation Desert Storm highlighted the huge advantage of Global Positioning Systems for military operations in areas where navigation is difficult or where pinpoint accuracy of munitions is required. Since that time, the U.S. military’s reliance on global positioning systems has only grown. In future conflicts against strategic adversaries U.S. forces will not be able to simply avoid global positioning system-denied areas. Analog skills like celestial navigation and paper map reading should be developed. Missions in which a global positioning system cannot be relied upon might even require ground special operations to return to a Son Tay-style cycle of exhaustive preparation for a single mission instead of conducting multiple missions a night, as was common during the surge in Iraq.

Further Steps

Beyond these seven specific instances, special operations leaders should continually evaluate their tactical norms related to risk and the future scenarios in which they might be used. Evaluations should cover the spectrum of U.S. Special Operations Command’s twelve core activities. Some of these, like foreign humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, or military information support operations are longstanding or peripheral to active armed conflicts. Other core activities like counterinsurgency or counterterrorism are central to low-intensity conflict but would be rare during major combat operations. However, core activities like direct action, special reconnaissance, and countering weapons of mass destruction will be in much higher demand going forward. These will need to be rethought, requiring extensive testing and evaluation in anticipation of changing risk norms in new conflict environments.

Finally, it is important to expand the discussion of risk tolerance beyond ground special operations. Maritime special operations and special operations aviation are not immune from the same calcified and complacent risk norms. Since many maritime special operations units like the Navy SEALs and Marine Raiders have largely been used on land during the Global War on Terror, they might benefit from rethinking some of these same norms. However, they also have maritime expertise that other special operations units do not, which have their own norms related to risk tolerance. Similarly, many special operations aviation units have been intimately involved with combat operations against non-state actors over the past twenty years. However, the risk acceptable to aircraft, manned or not, and the tactics used in contested airspace all call for careful consideration.

The risk the Green Light teams assumed in training matched their conflict environment. Today’s U.S. military is wholly unaccustomed to suffering casualties and takes extraordinary lengths to avoid them. This was possible when fighting non-state actors, but it won’t be in future conflicts. No one will ever want to see unnecessary casualties. But leaders across the military and particularly in special operations should recognize that against a strategic adversary, the American military will take significant losses in personnel and equipment. This means a different degree of risk will be required to successfully complete military objectives. Not all tactical risk is capable of being mitigated. For example, losing multiple aircraft or a naval surface ship seems unfathomable when fighting non-state actors, but all too likely when fighting a strategic adversary. If special operations leaders are expected to succeed in future conflicts with strategic adversaries, they should begin by rethinking their tolerance for risk.

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Spencer Reed is a career special operator with six combat deployments over the course of 14+ years in the community. He has been a leader at all tactical levels. He has worked with nearly every U.S. special operations component, both in training and downrange, informing his views and observations. These views do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, Special Operations Command, or any particular service branch.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Spencer Reed · January 31, 2023


9. If China Cracked U.S. Encryption, Why Would It Tell Us?



Perhaps because they know that we know? If they know we know then maybe they are trying to achieve a psychological win? 


Or maybe they have not accomplished this at all.


Or, since all warfare is based on deception, they are actually hiding other capabilities and think we are foolish enough to focus on what they are telling us?


An important warning in the conclusion:


Regardless of why the paper was published, the day is rapidly approaching when quantum computers will break today’s encryption. America and its allies must reach this milestone first while also raising security and encryption standards to protect against an adversary with advanced, encryption-breaking capabilities. Both of these steps require government and private investment in quantum research and development and in cultivating the skilled workforce needed to conduct this research and realize solutions.

If China Cracked U.S. Encryption, Why Would It Tell Us?

Assuming the math works (which it doesn’t), why would China sacrifice significant strategic advantage for academic bragging rights?

by Georgianna Shea Annie Fixler

The National Interest · by Georgianna Shea · January 28, 2023

When Alan Turing cracked the Enigma code during the Second World War, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States immediately published a paper announcing the achievement. Instead, they kept it to themselves so they could keep reading Nazi messages encrypted using Engima machines. Last month, in contrast, Chinese academics from government-run laboratories and research organizations published a paper claiming to have developed a new mathematical strategy to break RSA encryption, today’s standard.

If the Chinese government can crack RSA encryption, then they can break into every U.S. government and private sector system, seeing and exfiltrating anything and everything, achieving true information dominance over Washington and its allies and partners.

There are reasons to doubt the accuracy of the paper’s claims, however, and even more reasons to question why Chinese researchers would show their hand if they really cracked our codes.

Some day, computer scientists will break RSA encryption. But before that happens, they will need to have the right tools. Based on the current understanding of math, breaking RSA encryption will require quantum computers, which harness the principles of quantum physics to accelerate problem-solving exponentially.


The race to quantum computing is well underway. In November, IBM launched the largest quantum computer yet, the Osprey. This milestone “brings us a step closer” to “the coming era of quantum-centric supercomputing,” IBM’s director of research said. But the Osprey cannot yet solve the complex mathematical problems facing those who want to break RSA encryption. Beijing, however, claims it can break RSA encryption with a hybrid approach combining classical computing and quantum computing using a smaller quantum computer.

If China really broke RSA encryption, they wouldn’t tell us. Perhaps China is trying to get a seat at the table, seeking invitations to collaborate with quantum research facilities overseas. These invitations may have dried up after Washington enacted a series of policies blocking quantum technology sharing with China because of quantum’s military applications. If invitations were the goal, however, the Chinese paper’s authors may have shot themselves in the foot by revealing they are lagging years behind foreign competitors. The approach the researchers take in their paper is similar to one described in another paper published five years ago by an American quantum software company, explains Kevin Kane, the CEO of American Binary, a cybersecurity company focused on security in the quantum era.

Beijing has previously published what appears to be cutting-edge research in efforts to garner praise, only to have that research debunked later. This seems to be the case yet again. Numerous quantum and computer science experts have already raised doubts about the new paper’s findings. The mathematical strategy the paper explores is not scalable to very large numbers, explains Kane. Nevertheless, he warns if the paper is truthful, it indicates China is further ahead than we thought and is making important progress. University of Austin computer science professor Scott Aaronson, meanwhile, pans the Chinese academics for misleading claims that their approach is faster than classical computing when in fact it appears not to be.

Given the scale of the threat, however, dismissing the Chinese claims as mere boasting would be dangerous. For a moment, set aside the question of whether or not the math works. Why would China sacrifice significant strategic advantage for academic bragging rights?

Perhaps the Chinese government is trying to convince the world that it has cracked RSA encryption to build a kind of deterrence. If one repeats false information often enough, others may start believing it, especially if they are scared to begin with. The quantum paper could be part of a series of efforts to convince the United States that China has obtained unsurpassable technological dominance. Beijing may be betting that, facing a stronger adversary, American decisionmakers will acquiesce to China’s will on various global issues.

Discerning Beijing’s motivations may be challenging, but one should recall Sun Tzu’s words: “Those skilled in warfare move the enemy and are not moved by the enemy.” Beijing’s strategic planners are no doubt watching to see how America and its allies respond—how much handwringing Washington engages in, how much reactive behavior, and how much resignation. The Chinese academics may have revealed their hand, but Washington should not. Part of America’s assessment of its next actions should be an evaluation of what lessons China might learn from how the U.S. government reacts.

Regardless of why the paper was published, the day is rapidly approaching when quantum computers will break today’s encryption. America and its allies must reach this milestone first while also raising security and encryption standards to protect against an adversary with advanced, encryption-breaking capabilities. Both of these steps require government and private investment in quantum research and development and in cultivating the skilled workforce needed to conduct this research and realize solutions.

Dr. Georgianna Shea is the chief technologist of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

Annie Fixler is the director of CCTI and an FDD research fellow. Follow Annie on Twitter @afixler.

Image: Flickr/IBM Research.

The National Interest · by Georgianna Shea · January 28, 2023



10. In diplomatic coup, Taiwan president speaks to Czech president-elect




In diplomatic coup, Taiwan president speaks to Czech president-elect

Reuters · by Ben Blanchard

  • Summary
  • Pavel won Czech presidential election on Saturday
  • Pavel, Taiwan's Tsai stress their shared values in call
  • China opposes other countries dealing with Taiwan
  • Beijing views Taiwan as renegade province

TAIPEI/PRAGUE, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen held a telephone call with Czech President-elect Petr Pavel on Monday, a highly unusual move given the lack of formal ties between their countries and a diplomatic coup for Taipei that is sure to infuriate China.

The two leaders stressed their countries' shared values of freedom, democracy and human rights during their 15-minute call, their offices said, and Pavel said he hoped to meet Tsai in the future.

Most countries avoid high-level public interactions with Taiwan and its president, not wishing to provoke China, the world's second largest economy.

Beijing views Taiwan as being part of "one China" and demands other countries recognise its sovereignty claims, which Taiwan's democratically-elected government rejects.

In 2016, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump spoke by telephone with Tsai shortly after winning the election, setting off a storm of protest from Beijing.

Tsai said she hoped that under Pavel's leadership the Czech Republic would continue to cooperate with Taiwan to promote a close partnership, and that she hoped to stay in touch with him.

"Bilateral interaction between Taiwan and the Czech Republic is close and good," her office summarised Tsai as having said.

Pavel, a former army chief and high NATO official who won the Czech presidential election on Saturday, said on Twitter that the two countries "share the values of freedom, democracy, and human rights".

'ONE-CHINA' PRINCIPLE

Earlier, China's foreign ministry had said it was "seeking verification with the Czech side" on media reports that the call was to take place.

"The Chinese side is opposed to countries with which it has diplomatic ties engaging in any form of official exchange with the Taiwan authorities. Czech President-elect Pavel during the election period openly said that the 'one-China' principle should be respected," the ministry said.

Pavel will take office in early March, replacing President Milos Zeman, who is known for his pro-Beijing stance.

Zeman spoke with Chinese President Xi Jinping this month and they reaffirmed their "personal friendly" relationship, according to a readout of their call from Zeman's office.

The Czech Republic, like most countries, has no official diplomatic ties with Taiwan, but the two sides have moved closer as Beijing ratchets up military threats against the island and Taipei seeks new friends in Eastern and Central Europe.

The centre-right Czech government has said it wants to deepen cooperation with democratic countries in the India-Pacific region, including Taiwan, and has also been seeking a "revision" of ties with China.

In 2020, the head of the Czech Senate visited Taiwan and declared himself to be Taiwanese in a speech at Taiwan's parliament, channelling the late U.S. President John F. Kennedy's defiance of communism in Berlin in 1963.

Reporting by Robert Muller and Jason Hovet; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard and Yimou Lee in Taipei; editing by Gareth Jones

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Ben Blanchard





11. China contacts Prague over Czech president-elect speaking to Taiwan president


What will be the blowback for the Czech Republic?

China contacts Prague over Czech president-elect speaking to Taiwan president

Reuters · by Reuters

BEIJING, Jan 30 (Reuters) - The Chinese foreign ministry said on Monday it was in touch with Prague over President-elect Petr Pavel's scheduled call with Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-Wen.

Pavel is due to speak with Tsai on Monday, Pavel's spokeswoman said, a highly unusual move given the lack of formal ties and a diplomatic coup for Taipei that is likely to anger China.

China claims the self-ruled island of Taiwan as a province and most countries' leaders avoid high-level public interactions with Taiwan and its president, not wishing to provoke China, the world's second largest economy.

In Beijing's first response to what could become a full-blown diplomatic row with Prague, the Chinese foreign ministry said Pavel had previously said during his election campaign that the One-China Principle should be respected, according to a statement sent to Reuters.

"The Chinese side...is currently seeking verification with the Czech side, (we) hope the Czech side strictly upholds the One-China Principle," the foreign ministry said.

Reporting by Eduardo Baptista, editing by Ed Osmond

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters


12. Covid cases explode in Beijing leaving city streets empty and daily life disrupted




Covid cases explode in Beijing leaving city streets empty and daily life disrupted | CNN

CNN · by Simone McCarthy,Selina Wang,Cheng Cheng,Wayne Chang · December 14, 2022



Here's why streets are empty in Beijing despite ease of Covid restrictions

- Source: CNN


Editor’s Note: A version of this story appeared in CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.

Beijing CNN —

Empty streets, deserted shopping centers, and residents staying away from one another are the new normal in Beijing – but not because the city, like many Chinese ones before it, is under a “zero-Covid” lockdown.

This time, it’s because Beijing has been hit with a significant, and spreading, outbreak – a first for the Chinese capital since the beginning of the pandemic, a week after leaders eased the country’s restrictive Covid policy.

The impact of the outbreak in the city was visible in the upmarket shopping district Sanlitun on Tuesday. There, the usually bustling shops and restaurants were without customers and, in some cases, functioning on skeleton crews or offering takeout only.

Similar scenes are playing out across Beijing, as offices, shops and residential communities report being understaffed or shifting working arrangements as employees fall ill with the virus. Meanwhile, others stay home to avoid being infected.


Video Ad Feedback

Expert: China has failed to prepare residents when zero-Covid policy ends

02:46 - Source: CNN

One community worker told CNN that 21 of the 24 workers on her Beijing neighborhood committee office, tasked with coordinating residential matters and activities, had fallen ill in recent days.

“As our superiors are mostly infected, there’s not much work being given to us,” said the employee, Sylvia Sun. “(The usual) events, lectures, performances, parent-child activities will definitely not be held.”

Beijing, which prior to the new rules was already experiencing a small-scale outbreak, is now on the front lines of a new reality for China: not since the early days of the pandemic in Wuhan have Chinese cities dealt with an outbreak without hefty control measures in place.

But for a place that until earlier this month assiduously tracked every case, there is now no clear data on the extent of the virus’ spread. China’s new Covid rules significantly rolled back the testing requirements that once dominated daily life, and residents have instead shifted to using antigen tests at home, when available, leaving official numbers unreliable.


Customers queue at a pharmacy in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, December 13. 2022.

Stringer/Bloomberg/Getty Images

‘Impossible to grasp’

On Wednesday, China’s National Health Commission (NHC) gave up trying to keep track of all the new Covid cases, announcing it would no longer include asymptomatic infections in its daily count. It had previously reported these cases, albeit in a separate category from “confirmed,” or symptomatic ones.

“It is impossible to accurately grasp the actual number of asymptomatic infections,” the NHC said in a notice, citing reduced levels of official testing.

Authorities on Wednesday morning reported 2,249 symptomatic Covid cases nationally for the previous day, 20% of which were detected in the capital. Those figures are also thought to be impacted by reduced testing. CNN reporting from Beijing indicates the case count overall in the Chinese capital could be many times higher than recorded.

In a Twitter post, Beijing-based lawyer and former American Chamber of Commerce in China chairman James Zimmerman said about 90% of people in his office had Covid, up from around half a few days ago.


Health workers carry barricades inside a residential community that reopened following a Covid-19 lockdown in Beijing on December 9, 2022.

Noel Celis/AFP/Getty Images

China scraps virus tracking app as country braces for Covid impact

“Our ‘work at home’ policy is now ‘work at home if you’re well enough.’ This thing came on like a runaway freight train,” he wrote on Wednesday.

Experts have said the relatively low number of previously infected Covid-19 patients in China and the lower effectiveness of its widely-used inactivated-virus vaccines against Omicron infection – as compared with previous strains and mRNA vaccines – could enable the virus to spread rapidly.

“The current strains will spread faster in China than they have spread in other parts of the world because those other parts of the world have some immunity against infection from previous waves of earlier Omicron strains,” said University of Hong Kong chair professor of epidemiology Ben Cowling.


A closed Covid testing booth in Beijing, China, on Tuesday, December 13.

Stringer/Bloomberg/Getty Images

The impact

The extent of severe disease or death in Covid-19 outbreaks typically takes time to become clear, but there are signs of an impact on the health care system – with authorities in Beijing urging patients who are not seriously ill not to seek the help of emergency services.

The city’s major hospitals recorded 19,000 patients with flu symptoms from December 5 to 11 – more than six times that of the previous week, a health official said Monday.

The number of patients visiting fever clinics was 16 times greater on Sunday than a week prior. In China, where there isn’t a strong primary care system, visiting the hospital is common for minor illness.

So far, however, there were only 50 severe and critical cases in hospitals, most of whom had underlying health conditions, Sun Chunlan, China’s top official in charge of managing Covid, said during an inspection of Beijing’s epidemic response on Tuesday.


Covid-19 control workers move away barriers used during virus screening at a railway station in Hangzhou in east China's Zhejiang province on Monday.

MU CHEN/Feature China/Future Publishing/Getty Images

As China moves away from zero-Covid, health experts warn of dark days ahead

“At present, the number of newly infected people in Beijing is increasing rapidly, but most of them are asymptomatic and mild cases,” said Sun, who also called for more fever clinics to be set up and made assurances that supply of medicines – which have been hit by a surge in purchases in recent days – was being increased.

Prominent Shanghai physician Zhang Wenhong warned that hospitals should do everything they could to ensure that health workers were not getting infected as quickly as the people in the communities they serve. Such a situation could result in a shortage of medical staff and infections among patients, he said, according to local media reports.

Concerns about scarcity and access to medicines and care have been palpable in public discussion, including on social media. There, a Beijing reporter’s account of her time in a temporary hospital for Covid-19 treatment triggered a firestorm on social media, with a related hashtag getting more than 93 million views on China’s Twitter-like platform Weibo since Monday.

Social media users questioned why the reporter, who showed her two-bed room and access to fever medicine in a video interview posted by her employer Beijing Radio and Television Station on Sunday, received such treatment while others were struggling.

“Awesome! A young reporter gets a space in a temporary hospital and takes liquid Ibuprofen for children that is hard-to-find for parents in Beijing,” read one sarcastic comment, which got thousands of likes.

Another popular response complained that “ordinary people” stay at home with kids and elderly with high fevers.

“Could you give (her) bed to me if I called (the hospital)?” the Weibo user asked.

Amid fears of the virus, residents have rushed to buy canned peaches, following rumors the vitamin C-loaded snack could prevent or treat Covid. Chinese state media has since warned people the preserved fruit is not a Covid remedy nor a substitute for medicine.

CNN · by Simone McCarthy,Selina Wang,Cheng Cheng,Wayne Chang · December 14, 2022



13. Denial May Bring War - Punishment May Keep it at Bay



I think is is a thought provoking comment from the comments section to this essay:



Bryan McGrath
Writes The Conservative Wahoo
20 hr ago
Conventional deterrence by punishment as practiced by the modern USA means "save your shit for the war you can't deter".




Denial May Bring War - Punishment May Keep it at Bay

don't threaten the PRC with an easy war

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/p/denial-may-bring-war-punishment-may?publication_id=247761&post_id=99835194&isFreemail=true&mc_cid=fd5a79f6f5


CDR Salamander

20 hr ago

15


11


Does your opponent respond the same - or to the same degree - to identical incentives and disincentives than you do? 

Are you mirroring? 

Do you want your opponent to think a certain way because it is convenient to you and your priors?

Are you doing your best to structure your actions such that they are conveniently aligned with your peacetime path of least resistance, or are they mindfully structured with your opponent’s view of warfighting?

That kept coming to mind yesterday during our conversation with our guest Toshi Yoshihara on Midrats discussing his new book Mao's Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China's Navy, and for the second half of the hour while we discussed related topics from his CSBA study, Chinese Lessons From the Pacific War: Implications for PLA Warfighting.

Two of the take aways from our discussion were the People's Republic of China's (PRC) institutional habits at war shaped by two predilections; 

(1) A quick sneak attack to negate an opponent's military strength. 

(2) Incremental attacks against a stronger opponent's isolated outposts where local superiority can be obtained at the moment of contact.

When they see these two opportunities, they are more predisposed to offensive action. If we want to deter the PRC from starting a new war in the Western Pacific, then we should not provide them tempting targets that feed their two preferred options.

While we may think many forward deployed bases - which this decade are now well inside the PRC's rocket artillery as in the above graphic - will deter the PRC from action against Taiwan, we may actually create conditions to encourage PRC aggression.

It would seem to me if we want to take the PRC's mindset and preferences in to account, a much greater way to deter them would be in two ways:

First, Taiwan and Japan cannot move, so they must be as strong as possible - long quilled porcupines - who are clearly positioned to thwart and survive any offensive action by the PRC in line with (1) and (2) above.

Second, the USA must maintain a strong, long ranged, and safely based offensive force well outside the range of a PRC quick strike - homeported/based at diverse locations - and supported by logistics capabilities in depth to reach and sustain at range combat operations. Both must be structured assuming not insignificant combat loss rates. We cannot be 2-ships away from being operationally defunct.

As part of my morning read, this article from Emma Helfrich came across as ... well ... worrisome; 

The U.S. Marine Corps has activated a new base camp on the strategic island of Guam in the Pacific, and, at least according to the Marines, it will serve as the first newly constructed base for the service in 70 years. Named Camp Blaz, the installation’s location is not only steeped in Marine Corps history dating back decades, but the activation also reflects the U.S. military's evolving posture in the increasingly tense region over which China looms.

How many more assets can we really put on Guam that just encourages PRC targeting with existing conventional precision strike missiles? The island doesn't need to tip over for those densely packed capabilities to be taken off the board at D+1.

I keep coming back to our requirement to refocus on USA based, long ranged, robust logistically supported forces that demonstrate on a regular basis at peace substantial global reach in support of front-line allied nations.

Smarter move if we assume war is coming - and if robust enough, might prevent that war from coming at all.  



14. A letter to the next US president: Here’s how you can fix our military


From the disgruntled former Marine officer.


A letter to the next US president: Here’s how you can fix our military

marinecorpstimes.com · by Stuart Scheller · January 30, 2023

Sport teams ironically illustrate what the military has forgotten: The best players always should be selected from a diverse population after a performance-based selection process.

The NFL’s combine is a great example. While it doesn’t always predict the best performers, it’s hard to imagine the NFL only picking players based on subjective recommendations from college coaches or external needs for inclusion.

Why are sports teams inherently better at designing a system for screening and selecting performance when outcomes for predictive failures do not result in the deaths of young talent entrusted by America’s mothers and fathers?

Leadership determines organizational performance more than all other characteristics. Thus, the criticality of organizational screening, training and selection of senior leadership is of the upmost importance.

But in the current U.S. military system ― other than influence from the president, Congress and political secretaries within the Defense Department ― the American people are relegated to military leaders internally produced within a nepotistic system.

RELATED


The Marine Corps’ debate with its generals is amusing, but dangerous

Stuart Scheller has a different answer for the current fight over the direction of the Corps.

By Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller (Resigned)

U.S. military leaders have many good qualities, to be sure, but aggregate shortfalls in courage and performance are well-documented since the creation of the post-World War II national security model. Recent sensational examples, like Benghazi, Libya, or Afghanistan aside, the military’s inability to achieve political objectives in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, Kosovo, Libya, Iraq or Syria should clearly indicate a team needing new leadership.

In any other business model, consistent failure would result in new leadership, but this has not been the case for the American military.

Problems have festered for so long that simply changing out top level leaders no longer fixes the military’s foundational problems. Is it even possible for the American military system to produce senior leaders capable of superior performance?

Fundamentally changing how the military system produces leaders must be explored by the next presidential administration.

Moral courage in our current system

The American military system is influenced by many historical literary works, but none more important than Prussian Gen. Carl von Clausewitz’s book, “On War.”

In a chapter on military genius, Clausewitz described military leaders’ need for courage: “Courage is of two kinds: courage in the face of personal danger, and the courage to accept responsibility, either before the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of one’s own conscience.”

Unfortunately, Clausewitz specifically stated he would not explore the second quality, moral courage, in his book. He didn’t understand or didn’t care to explore a military system’s influence on leadership quality, or, by extension, the military’s overall performance. Said succinctly, there can be no military genius if the system doesn’t allow it.

The problem with the current military system is that it degrades moral courage over time.

It compels subordinates to please superiors for high subjective evaluations, many times at the expense of performance and honesty. This people-pleasing system is further weakened by a need for fairness, inclusion and timecard punching instead of performance.

It’s worth noting that the term “general” officer literally denotes that an officers’ background is irrelevant. These officers theoretically are generalists possessing a war-fighting ability superior to all others.

A “general” officer is someone graduating from military apprenticeship by demonstrating mastery in all aspects of military warfare.

However, reality demonstrates that America’s general officers are selected for an infinite number of reasons other than war-fighting performance. The need for inclusion and fairness affects all things.

The next U.S. president must dramatically reshuffle this entire process. A needed shock to the dying system would be a performance-based war game for all general officers, which would determine continued military service and advancement.

The first round of losers should be sent home to retirement. The subsequent rounds should determine the most prestigious positions for America’s general officers.

The details of the competition no doubt would be heavily debated: No artificial competition would perfectly replicate the requirements of a general officer in war. But, ultimately, any war-fighting competition illustrating performance is better than the current system.

The American people and junior service members cannot expect military leadership to embrace my proposed reforms. Asking current military leaders to acknowledge the system’s shortfalls would marginalize their own leadership ascension while simultaneously threatening their personal power accumulation. Only strong political leadership and direction will break the grasp.

When military leaders rise to positions of power based on performance, in critical moments, they are more likely to rely on their instincts than antiquated rules or opinions. These instincts, screened by performance, are expected by the American people.

If an opinion-based system degrades moral courage, a performance-based system strengthens it.

In the antiquated system, military leaders conditioned to patiently wait, please superiors and respect fairness over talent are far more likely to fold than fight.

While Clausewitz may not have fully explored the need for a performance based military system or what that meant in terms of moral courage, he clearly understood the critical nature of moral courage in military leadership.

Can the American military system, pulling from a large, diverse and talented American population, produce senior leaders of a higher quality? Yes.

But it will require that the next president demonstrate a courage and performance currently missing from America’s senior military leadership.

Stuart Scheller is a best-selling author and former lieutenant colonel infantry officer.




15. China’s Indo-Pacific Folly


Excerpts:


Although Beijing may finally be waking up to the enormous damage its diplomacy has done, no one should expect more disciplined statecraft during Xi’s third five-year term. The consequences of Beijing’s grievance-driven behavior on the strength of U.S. alliances have been clear for some time now. If Xi and his comrades were eager to facilitate different outcomes, they would have changed tact long ago. That they didn’t suggests Beijing was genuinely more interested in reclaiming lost lands and thirsting for deference than it was in undermining U.S. alliances.
Perhaps Chinese diplomats will walk back the most abrasive elements of their Wolf Warrior diplomacy, but Beijing is unlikely to subordinate its territorial objectives or quest for dominance to a disciplined strategy for splitting the United States from its Indo-Pacific allies. Just this month, after Japan and South Korea established new pandemic-related travel restrictions for Chinese tourists, Beijing stopped issuing short-term visas to Japanese and South Korean citizens—a retaliation that was widely rebuked in Tokyo and Seoul. China’s apparent need to punish those that cross it is unlikely to disappear, even if this tendency undermines Beijing’s long-term strategic aspirations.
All of this is good news for the United States. Beijing’s diplomatic record suggests that China doesn’t pose nearly the threat to U.S. alliances that many in Washington fear. Instead of pursuing a farsighted strategy to undermine American alliances, it has prioritized other objectives—even when they have backfired. Chinese statecraft is likely to continue to provide opportunities for Washington to deepen its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, solidifying the United States’ presence there over Beijing’s objections.


China’s Indo-Pacific Folly

Beijing’s Belligerence Is Revitalizing U.S. Alliances

By Andrew D. Taffer and David Wallsh

January 31, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Andrew D. Taffer and David Wallsh · January 31, 2023

In December 2022, Japan released its first national security strategy in nearly ten years. The document committed Tokyo to strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance “in all areas.” And Japan is not alone. Over the last half decade, almost all U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific have deepened their partnerships with Washington and formed new networks with one another.

At first blush, this might seem puzzling. Chinese President Xi Jinping has voiced his desire for the United States to withdraw from the Indo-Pacific, and his government has upheld China’s long tradition of expressing hostility toward Washington’s alliances, which form the foundation of the U.S. presence in the region. Many analysts, including Rush Doshi and Elizabeth Economy, have argued that Beijing has a disciplined and coherent strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. But far from a well-executed campaign, Beijing’s effort to erode U.S. alliances has been incoherent and undisciplined, strengthening, rather than weakening, U.S. alliances in the region and producing an energized U.S.-led coalition poised to constrain Beijing for years to come.

Beijing’s ambition to isolate Washington from its Asian allies has been derailed in large part by its desire to redress more immediate grievances—namely, to reclaim what it sees as lost territory and punish countries that offend its sensibilities. Instead of staying focused on its long-term strategic objectives, China has grown preoccupied with achieving near-term tactical gains in both its territorial disputes with its neighbors and its quest for deference from other countries. These impulses have resulted in major strategic errors and suggest that Beijing is not nearly as adept at planning and executing long-term strategy as many believe.

EYES OFF THE PRIZE

Nowhere has China’s pursuit of territorial advantage more clearly undermined its efforts to weaken U.S. alliances than in the South China Sea. In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte’s election as president of the Philippines gave Beijing a prime opportunity to pick off a long-standing U.S. ally. After months of expressing hostility toward the United States and admiration for China, Duterte declared a “separation” from Washington and an intention to “realign” the country. China moved to capitalize, reducing trade barriers with the Philippines and pledging large amounts of investment in the country. Beijing also initially sought to reduce friction over disputed territories in the South China Sea, the most combustible issue in its relationship with the Philippines. And in early 2020, China seemed on the verge of a major diplomatic win when Duterte announced his intention to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement, which facilitates the presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines.

But in the lead-up to the agreement’s official termination, China proved unwilling to restrain itself in the South China Sea. Among other provocations, Beijing publicly reasserted its authority to administer the contested areas, and one of its naval vessels threatened a Philippine ship. Such conduct irked Duterte and generated discord at precisely the moment that China should have sought to smooth over these disputes. And Beijing paid a price for its actions. In June 2020, Manila initiated the first of three suspensions of the process for terminating the U.S. agreement, and the following year, Duterte fully restored it. Beijing gained nothing of significance in the South China Sea through its provocations, but it squandered a golden opportunity to dismantle a central element of the U.S.-Philippine alliance.


The same counterproductive tendency to prioritize territorial interests over strategic objectives can be seen in China’s relationship with Japan. Over the last decade, China has established a near-permanent paramilitary presence around the disputed Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands), a collection of uninhabited rocks and islets with nationalistic significance but almost no strategic value. In so doing, Beijing has fed Japan’s suspicions of China and pushed Tokyo closer and closer to Washington. In 2014, Japan reinterpreted its pacifist constitution to expand the conditions under which it could militarily aid the United States in an armed conflict. A year later, Tokyo and Washington adopted new defense guidelines to facilitate closer military coordination. Tokyo now describes the U.S.-Japanese alliance as “stronger than ever,” and Japan’s transformational 2022 National Security Strategy calls for, among other measures, increasing the defense budget, acquiring counterstrike capabilities, and further deepening its alliance with Washington and its security partnerships with U.S. allies.

China’s pursuit of territorial advantage has also helped produce a new type of proto-alliance by pushing nonaligned India into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, a loose coalition that also includes Australia, Japan, and the United States. Beijing’s persistent assertiveness along its disputed border with India led to a major standoff in Doklam in 2017, a deadly clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020, and additional confrontations in 2021 and 2022. Such conduct has prompted New Delhi to shed its former ambivalence about the Quad, agreeing to elevate it to the summit level and deepen defense ties with its members.

THIRSTING FOR DEFERENCE

Another hallmark of Chinese statecraft that has undermined its efforts to drive a wedge between the United States and its Asian allies is its desire to punish states that fail to accommodate Beijing’s preferences. This tendency was most evident in the combative “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy China pursued early in the pandemic, but it predates COVID-19. China’s recent history with South Korea is illustrative. Beginning in 2013, Beijing made a concerted and initially successful effort to cultivate newly elected South Korean President Park Geun-hye. It did so by adopting a cooperative diplomatic posture toward Seoul and working to restrain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. When Park appeared in 2015 on a dais in Tiananmen Square flanked by Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin to observe a Chinese military parade, some in Washington began to fret that Seoul was leaning too far toward Beijing.

Xi’s charm offensive also helped divide the United States and South Korea over the proposed deployment of a THAAD antimissile system in the South, a deployment supported by Washington and opposed by Beijing as a supposed threat to its nuclear security. For a year and a half after the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea broached the idea in 2014, Park declined to hold formal talks with Washington for fear of upending her newly improved relationship with China and losing its support in dealing with the North.

But true to form, Beijing promptly squandered its influence with Seoul following a North Korean nuclear test in January 2016. The test compelled Park to begin discussions with Washington on deploying the THAAD system, prompting Beijing to begin threatening Seoul and to eventually initiate a sweeping campaign of economic punishment. Although U.S. officials sought to assuage China’s concerns about nuclear security by offering to brief their Chinese counterparts on the system’s technical details, Beijing rejected the offer and continued to penalize Seoul. Not only did this behavior fail to halt the system’s deployment but it dramatically soured the South Korean public’s perception of China: according to one 2021 public opinion survey, South Koreans view China even less favorably than they view Japan, their former imperial master and traditional regional foe. During South Korea’s 2022 presidential election, both major candidates embraced the public’s anti-Chinese sentiment, and Yoon Suk-yeol won on the more pro-American platform. Since taking office, Yoon has moved to deepen missile defense cooperation with the United States and Japan, a development China has long sought to avoid.


China doesn’t pose nearly the threat to U.S. alliances that many in Washington fear.

China’s punitive statecraft has generated even more blowback in Australia. Ten years ago, Canberra was at pains to strike a balance between China, its largest trading partner and an important source of investment, and the United States, its principal security partner. Australia’s economic relationship with China even caused some friction between Washington and Canberra when a Chinese company signed a 99-year lease to operate an Australian port just miles from where U.S. Marines have a rotational presence.


But China’s relationship with Australia began to unravel after journalists broke a series of stories revealing the disturbing extent of Chinese interference in Australian society and politics. One of the most brazen episodes involved a senior Chinese official threatening Australian politicians to accommodate Beijing by supporting an extradition treaty with China. When Canberra passed anti-interference legislation in 2018, Chinese punishments followed. Beijing forbade Chinese firms from buying Australian minerals and held up Australian wine at Chinese ports. As relations with China deteriorated, Canberra moved to strengthen ties with Washington, deepening defense cooperation and working to counter Chinese influence in the Pacific Island countries. Australia also reengaged with the Quad—a notable change, since Canberra had backed away from the grouping in 2007, largely out of concern for China.

In 2021, after Australia advocated for an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19, Beijing responded with an even more aggressive campaign of political and economic punishment. Chinese belligerence drove the two countries’ relationship to its lowest ebb in decades, spurred Canberra to find ways of limiting China’s involvement in the Australian economy, and facilitated a historic deepening in the U.S.-Australian alliance with the formation of the AUKUS partnership. AUKUS will enable the United States and the United Kingdom to share with Australia some of their most sensitive military technologies and will eventually provide Canberra with nuclear submarines. When announcing the partnership in September 2021, then Prime Minister Scott Morrison described AUKUS as a “forever partnership” and “the single greatest” national security initiative since the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty.

WASHINGTON’S OPPORTUNITY

Although Beijing may finally be waking up to the enormous damage its diplomacy has done, no one should expect more disciplined statecraft during Xi’s third five-year term. The consequences of Beijing’s grievance-driven behavior on the strength of U.S. alliances have been clear for some time now. If Xi and his comrades were eager to facilitate different outcomes, they would have changed tact long ago. That they didn’t suggests Beijing was genuinely more interested in reclaiming lost lands and thirsting for deference than it was in undermining U.S. alliances.

Perhaps Chinese diplomats will walk back the most abrasive elements of their Wolf Warrior diplomacy, but Beijing is unlikely to subordinate its territorial objectives or quest for dominance to a disciplined strategy for splitting the United States from its Indo-Pacific allies. Just this month, after Japan and South Korea established new pandemic-related travel restrictions for Chinese tourists, Beijing stopped issuing short-term visas to Japanese and South Korean citizens—a retaliation that was widely rebuked in Tokyo and Seoul. China’s apparent need to punish those that cross it is unlikely to disappear, even if this tendency undermines Beijing’s long-term strategic aspirations.

All of this is good news for the United States. Beijing’s diplomatic record suggests that China doesn’t pose nearly the threat to U.S. alliances that many in Washington fear. Instead of pursuing a farsighted strategy to undermine American alliances, it has prioritized other objectives—even when they have backfired. Chinese statecraft is likely to continue to provide opportunities for Washington to deepen its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, solidifying the United States’ presence there over Beijing’s objections.

  • ANDREW D. TAFFER is a Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the National Defense University and an Associate with the Harvard Kennedy School’s International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
  • DAVID WALLSH is a Research Scientist in the Strategy, Policy, Plans, and Programs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses.
  • The views expressed here are their own.

Foreign Affairs · by Andrew D. Taffer and David Wallsh · January 31, 2023



16. Russia Freed Prisoners to Fight Its War. Here’s How Some Fared.




Russia Freed Prisoners to Fight Its War. Here’s How Some Fared.

By Anatoly Kurmanaev, Alina Lobzina and Ekaterina Bodyagina

Jan. 30, 2023

The New York Times · by Ekaterina Bodyagina · January 31, 2023

Tens of thousands of inmates have joined a mercenary group fighting with the Kremlin’s decimated forces in Ukraine. Some of them are returning to civilian life with military training and, in many cases, battlefield traumas.

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A poster showing a member of the Russian military near the headquarters of the Wagner private military company in St. Petersburg, Russia.

By Alina Lobzina and

Jan. 30, 2023

He was released from a Russian prison and thrown into battle in Ukraine with a promise of freedom, redemption and money. Now, Andrei Yastrebov, who was among tens of thousands of convict soldiers, is part of a return from the battlefield with potentially serious implications for Russian society.

Mr. Yastrebov, 22, who had been serving time for theft, returned home a changed man. “We all feel like he is in some sort of hypnosis, like he is a different person,” said a relative of his, who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals. “He is without any emotions.”

Thousands of convicts have been killed, many within days or even hours of arriving at the front, Russian rights advocates and Ukrainian officials say. Those who live and return home largely remain silent, wary of retribution if they speak out.

President Vladimir V. Putin’s decision to allow a mercenary group to recruit Russian convicts in support of his flagging war effort marks a watershed in his 23-year rule, say human rights activists and legal experts. The policy circumvents Russian legal precedent and, by returning some brutalized criminals to their homes with pardons, risks triggering greater violence throughout society, underlining the cost Mr. Putin is prepared to pay to avoid defeat.

Since July, around 40,000 inmates have joined the Russian forces, according to Western intelligence agencies, the Ukrainian government and a prisoners’ rights association, Russia Behind Bars, which combines reports from informers across Russian jails. Ukraine claims that nearly 30,000 have deserted or been killed or wounded, although that number could not be independently verified.

Most of the enlisted men were serving time for petty crimes like robbery and theft, but records from one penal colony seen by The New York Times show that the recruits also included men convicted of aggravated rape and multiple murders.

“There are no more crimes, and no more punishments,” said Olga Romanova, the head of Russia Behind Bars. “Anything is permissible now, and this brings very far-reaching consequences for any country.”

The IK-2 penal colony in Pokrov, Russia. The founder of Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has promised inmates a pardon for six months fighting in Ukraine.Credit...Maxim Shemetov/Reuters

More than six months ago, Russia’s largest private military company, Wagner, and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, began systematically recruiting convicts on a scale not seen since World War II to bolster a bloody assault on the Ukrainian city of Bakhmut. Yet the operation remains largely cloaked in secrecy and propaganda.

Wagner has been able to avoid oversight by exploiting the most marginalized Russian citizens, the 350,000 male inmates of its harsh penal colonies, said human rights activists and lawyers.

The State of the War

Dozens of survivors from the first inmate assault units began filtering back to Russia this month with medals, sizable payouts and documents that Wagner claims grant them freedom. The releases are likely to accelerate as Wagner’s six-month service contracts expire, potentially confronting Russian society with the challenge of reintegrating thousands of traumatized men with military training, a history of crime and few job prospects.

“These are psychologically broken people who are returning with a sense of righteousness, a belief that they have killed to defend the Motherland,” said Yana Gelmel, a Russian prisoner rights lawyer who works with enlisted inmates. “These can be very dangerous people.”

Neither Mr. Prigozhin, through his press office, nor Russia’s penal service provided comment.

To document the recruitment drive, The Times interviewed rights activists, lawyers, legal workers, relatives of recruited inmates, deserters and prisoners who decided to remain behind bars but maintain contact with companions on the front lines.

They described a sophisticated system of incentives and brutality built by Wagner, with the Kremlin’s support, to refill Russia’s decimated military ranks using questionable, and possibly illegal, methods.

Andrei Medvedev said he joined Wagner within days of finishing his prison term for theft in southern Russia. A former convict with military experience, he says he was put in charge of a detachment of prisoners who were dispatched on nearly suicidal missions around Bakhmut.

“We were told: ‘Keep going until you’re killed,’” Mr. Medvedev said in a phone interview from Russia after deserting in November. He has since escaped to Norway and applied for political asylum.

Andrei Medvedev showing his Wagner dog tag in November.

The campaign to recruit convicts began in early July, when Mr. Prigozhin started appearing in prisons around his native St. Petersburg with a radical proposal for the inmates: paying their debt to society by joining his private army in Ukraine.

What we consider before using anonymous sources. Do the sources know the information? What’s their motivation for telling us? Have they proved reliable in the past? Can we corroborate the information? Even with these questions satisfied, The Times uses anonymous sources as a last resort. The reporter and at least one editor know the identity of the source.

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In videos published on social media, Mr. Prigozhin promised the prisoners they would receive 100,000 rubles a month — the equivalent of $1,700 at the time, and nearly double Russia’s average monthly wage. He also offered bravery bonuses, $80,000 death payouts and, should they survive the six-month contract, freedom in the form of a presidential pardon.

Those who ran away, used drugs or alcohol or had sexual relations, he warned, would be killed.

“There are no chances of returning to the colony,” Mr. Prigozhin said in a speech to inmates published in September. “Those who get there and say ‘I think I’m in the wrong place’ will be marked as deserters and shot.”

former inmate himself, Mr. Prigozhin understood prison culture, skillfully combining a threat of punishment with a promise of a new, dignified life, according to rights activists and families.

“He didn’t go for the money, he was too proud for that,” said Anastasia, about a relative who enlisted with Wagner as a prisoner. “He went because he was ashamed in front of his mother, he wanted to clear his name.”

Graves of Wagner group fighters, most of them prison conscripts, in a cemetery near the village of Bakinskaya, Russia, this month.Credit...Reuters

Mr. Prigozhin’s prison visits immediately raised legal questions. Mercenary recruitment is illegal in Russia, and until last year Mr. Prigozhin had denied that Wagner even existed.

On paper, the prisoners never went to war, but were merely transferred to Russian jails near the Ukrainian border, according to information requests filed by their relatives.

When Anastasia, who asked that her last name not be used, tried to find the whereabouts of her enlisted relative at his prison, she said the guards merely told her that he was unavailable.

Mr. Prigozhin at a funeral for a Wagner fighter outside St. Petersburg in December. He began recruiting prisoners for Wagner around the city, his hometown, last summer.Credit...Associated Press

Igor Matyukhin was a convicted thief who decided to join.

A 26-year-old Siberian orphan, Mr. Matyukhin said he was serving his third sentence in the remote Krasnoyarsk region when Mr. Prigozhin arrived by helicopter in November, offering eventual freedom in return for enlistment.

Driven by the chance of a new life, Mr. Matyukhin immediately signed up. Days later, he was at a training camp near the occupied Ukrainian city of Luhansk. What he found there, he said, was very different from the patriotic band of brothers he had been led to expect.

Mr. Matyukhin described a climate of fear instilled by Wagner to keep convicts fighting. He said they were threatened with summary executions, and at least one man in his unit was taken away after disobeying orders and never returned.

When his training camp came under a surprise Ukrainian attack, Mr. Matyukhin seized the opportunity to escape in the confusion. He said he has since been trying to return to his prison from a hiding place in Russia.

A relative of Mr. Matyukhin confirmed that he had enlisted in Wagner, but other aspects of his war account could not be independently verified.

To lift declining recruitment numbers, Wagner has lately been playing up the rewards for survivors, releasing videos of returned prisoners being granted freedom.

“I needed your criminal talents to kill the enemy in the war,” Mr. Prigozhin said in one video. “Those who want to return, we are waiting for you to come back. Those who want to get married, get baptized, study — go ahead with a blessing.”

Soldiers with the Russian-backed separatist forces of Luhansk Province preparing to fire a shell toward Soledar, in eastern Ukraine.Credit...Alexander Ermochenko/Reuters

In some videos, the inmates are given papers described as pardons or annulments of convictions. However, none of these documents have been made public, raising questions about their legitimacy. Rights advocates say pardons are rare, time-consuming and complex legal procedures that have never been issued in Russia on anywhere near the scale advertised by Wagner.

Only Mr. Putin can issue a pardon under the Russian Constitution, and the Kremlin has not published such decrees since 2020. In 2021, Mr. Putin pardoned just six people, according to the Kremlin.

Mr. Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri S. Peskov, on Friday told reporters that Wagner’s enlisted convicts are being pardoned “in strict adherence to Russian law.” He declined further comment, implying the procedure was a state secret.

“There are open decrees and decrees with various degrees of secrecy,” he said.

Under Russian law, all pardon petitions are evaluated by specialized regional committees before arriving at the Kremlin. However, two members of such commissions said they had not received any petitions from enlisted convicts. One of those officials represents the city of St. Petersburg, the residence of Mr. Yastrebov.

Rights activists say the returning inmates’ ambiguous legal status undermines Russia’s justice system and ties their fate to Wagner.

After spending just three weeks at home, Mr. Yastrebov said he was already getting ready to return to the front, despite the extraordinary casualty rates suffered by his prison’s unit, according to Russia Behind Bars.

“I want to defend the Motherland,” he said in a brief interview on Friday. “I liked everything over there. The civilian life is boring.”

The New York Times · by Ekaterina Bodyagina · January 31, 2023



1​7.  How US Navy SEALs train new special-operations units to make the seas into 'our playground'





How US Navy SEALs train new special-operations units to make the seas into 'our playground'

Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou


Croatian ZSS and US Naval Special Warfare personnel conduct an over-the-beach exercise in Split in April 2022.

US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

  • US Navy SEALs travel around the world to train with other countries' special-operations forces.
  • In 2022, SEALs in Europe trained with Croatia's ZSS, a relatively new special-operations unit.
  • Through such deployments, SEALs help partners become proficient in new missions and skill sets.

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In 2022, a platoon of US Navy SEALs traveled to Croatia and trained with the country's maritime special-operation unit.

Through these training deployments, US Navy SEALs help new special-operations units to become proficient in new missions and skill sets.

Teaching the ropes to foreign commandos


A member of Croatia's ZSS provides security during diving ops with members of US Naval Special Warfare in Split in April 2022.

US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

Established in 2000, the Zapovjedništvo Specialjalnih Snaga — roughly translated as the Special Forces Command — is Croatia's elite commando force.

Major "Marko," commander of the ZSS, expanded on the joint training with the US SEALs, saying in a NATO press release that because about 70% of earth is covered by water, proficiency in maritime special operations in critical.

"The water will become our playground," Marko said.

The joint training, which mainly took place along the Adriatic Sea, included practice in several missions and skill sets. The frogmen conducted long-distance underwater swims with special rebreathers that don't emanate bubbles, seized bridges by infiltrating from the water, and simulated clandestine landings on enemy beaches.


US Naval Special Warfare personnel conduct maritime Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure training with Croatian ZSS in Split in April 2022.

US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

Probably one of the hardest mission sets they practiced was maritime counterterrorism — rescuing hostages from a ship captured by terrorists.

"What we teach after depends on the foreign partner in question and what is their strong and weak points," a former Navy SEAL officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the nature of his current job, told Insider.

The former frogman said that if a special-operations partner wants to work on Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure operations, then "the [SEAL] platoon will help them with that," but there is usually a combination of marksmanship, close-quarters combat, static-line or freefall parachute jumps, combat dives, explosive breaching, and over-the-beach training.

"We will usually also train with other [special-operations force] units in the country and not just their frogmen," the former SEAL officer added.

When it comes to progression of training, SEALs use the same "crawl, walk, run" approach they employ in their own training. They have to make sure that their foreign partners are first proficient in the basics before advancing into more complex — and dangerous — skill sets.


A US Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Europe member climbs a ladder during diving ops with Croatia's ZSS in Split in April 2022.

US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

"We have to be careful not to offend our foreign partners by seeming to be treating them as amateurs," the former SEAL officer said, adding that can often be tricky at times because the material can be easy for the US special operators.

But US special operators learn a lot too from these partnerships, which often evolve into an opportunity to share lessons learned.

"The people and the units we work with overseas are already among the best in their militaries. They might not have the same high-tech gear or training as us, but they usually have the same mentality. That makes our job so much easier and rewarding," a former SEAL officer told Insider.

Same training philosophy


A member of US Naval Special Warfare Task Unit Europe during maritime Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure training with Croatia's ZSS in Split in April 2022.

US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt

Several of those units share the same training and philosophy as the US Navy SEAL teams, the result of relationships that go back decades.

For example, the Hellenic Navy's Underwater Demolition Teams, who frequently train with Navy SEALs and Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, go through the exact basic training to become a frogman as their American counterparts.

In the 1950s, the Hellenic Navy sent two officers to San Diego to go through the US Navy's Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training. When they graduated with their American classmates, the officers returned to Greece and set up the same training course to become a frogman.

These relationships with foreign special-operations units give US special operators access to almost any region of the world.

Amid ongoing competition with China or Russia, or indeed if there is a conflict with those countries, those ties and that access can truly be golden, giving US commandos easier entry to a country and partners with native understanding of the battlespace.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.


Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou



18. If ‘Independent’ were a party, it could dominate American politics


The problem is Independents are unlikely to join a political party as most (like me) may be followers of George Washington.


"However [political parties] may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion."
FAREWELL ADDRESS | SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1796
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/past-projects/quotes/article/however-political-parties-may-now-and-then-answer-popular-ends-they-are-likely-in-the-course-of-time-and-things-to-become-potent-engines-by-which-cunning-ambitious-and-unprincipled-men-will-be-enabled-to-subvert-the-power-of-the-people-and-to-usurp-for-th/



If ‘Independent’ were a party, it could dominate American politics

BY DANIEL DE VISÉ - 01/31/23 6:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/3836562-if-independent-were-a-party-it-could-dominate-american-politics/


If the nation’s political independents somehow formed a party, polls suggest, they could dominate American politics.

Two-fifths of Americans identified as independent in 2022, far more than stood with either party, according to Gallup. As a political identity, “independent” has polled better than Democrat or Republican since 2009.

It wasn’t always so. Going back to the era of former President Reagan, voters have generally identified as Democrat, Republican or independent in roughly equal measure. Independents pulled ahead in the Clinton ‘90s, faded in the Bush ‘00s, then surged anew after the election of former President Obama in 2008.

The rise of the independents comes at a time of widespread public disillusion with both parties: the polarization, the vitriol, the sheer illogic of a binary system so broad that it puts Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, the left-wing New York congresswoman, and Joe Manchin, the right-leaning West Virginia senator, under the same Democratic tent.


And consider the word itself. “Independent” sounds so empowering, so liberating, so … American.

“As things get really nasty, it feels kind of virtuous to be above it all,” said Richard Arenberg, a political scientist and senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.  

Independents outnumber Republicans and Democrats in many states that report party affiliation. (Not all do.) As of October 2022, according to Ballotpedia, independents made up roughly 35 percent of the electorate in North Carolina and Oregon, 40 percent in New Hampshire and Connecticut, 45 percent in Colorado and Rhode Island, 60 percent in Massachusetts and Alaska, and 90 percent in Arkansas.

The share of registered independents is rising at a time when more than two dozen states offer open primaries, enabling unaffiliated voters to cast ballots for either party. North Carolina, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Colorado, Rhode Island and Arkansas are all among the states with open primaries.

As a voting bloc, independents can be hard to pin down. In a nation with two broad — and broadly unpopular — political brands, “independent” describes a growing swath of the public that chooses not to identify with either one.

“We slap the label of ‘independent’ on anybody and anything that isn’t a registered Democrat or Republican,” Arenberg said. “There’s all sorts of dogs and cats in that category.”

Across nearly three decades of polling, Pew Research has found that most self-proclaimed independents lean Democrat or Republican, in roughly equal shares.  

Most independents, in fact, are Democrats or Republicans in all but name. They vote for their party as reliably as the party faithful.

“They’ll often say, ‘I don’t vote for the party, I vote for the candidate, and I’ve never voted for a Republican in my life,’” said Samara Klar, an associate professor at the University of Arizona School of Government and Public Policy.

A small subset of independents, representing less than one tenth of the voting public, claim no partisan leaning at all. These true independents tend not to care much about politics — they’re not big on C-SPAN.

Energize them, political scientists say, and you can turn an election.

“We’ve been locked into a very long era of close political contests between the parties,” said William Galston, a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program. In a nail-biter election, “a change in the behavior of even a small percentage of the population can have a huge impact on the outcome.”

Independents skew slightly male. They tend to be young. Gallup polling finds that a majority of both Generation Z and millennials identify as independent, with boomers and the Silent Generation gradually shedding the label as they age.

“Younger voters, you know, they haven’t made up their mind yet,” said Timothy Hagle, a political scientist at the University of Iowa. “Over time, folks will usually pick a party.”

Or not. Gallup found millennials and Gen Xers clinging to political independence as they age. Among millennials, some of whom are entering their forties, the share who identify as independent has risen steadily over the past two decades, from 42 percent in 2002 to 52 percent in 2022.

In Generation X, a cohort now firmly ensconced in midlife, the share of independents rose from 39 percent in 2002 to 44 percent in 2022.

That trend, coupled with a strong independent streak in Generation Z, could explain why independents are rising as a share of the full electorate.

And why are middle-aged Americans rebuffing the nation’s political parties?

Simply put, they don’t like them. Only two-fifths of Americans have a favorable opinion of Democrats or Republicans, as of 2022, according to Gallup. The last time both parties enjoyed majority favor was 2005.

“The record of the two established political parties in governing the country over the last two decades has not been a great one,” Galston said. “If that’s your formative political experience, then your willingness to affiliate with the political parties that contributed to this mess is not going to be very strong.”

Countless surveys show the American public eyeing the political sphere with growing disdain. Most Americans disapprove of how Congress is doing its job. Each of the past two presidents, Biden and Trump, has struggled with low approval ratings. Partisan squabbling dominates the daily news cycle. Both parties have an image problem.

“There’s been a growing stigma about partisanship among the American public,” said Klar, coauthor of a recent book on independent politics.

“We’ve seen a lot of open hostility among our leaders, and that doesn’t convey how Americans themselves feel. Most Americans are moderates. Most Americans don’t like to talk about politics a lot. Most Americans don’t want to think about politics a lot.”

If “Democrat” and “Republican” carry a partisan stigma, “independent” surely does not. Voters may identify as independent in an act of electoral defiance, or simply to assert that they are capable of independent thought.

“In American culture, when you call something ‘independent,’ it’s a moral category,” Galston said. “It’s a term of praise: ‘I’m thinking for myself. I’m not an automaton.’”

Such is the allure of the independent label that 36 percent of New Jersey voters chose not to affiliate with either party, as of last fall, even though the state has closed primaries.

“It’s kind of the ideological mood of the state,” said Ashley Koning, assistant professor and director of the Eagleton Center for Public Interest Polling at Rutgers University. “It’s kind of an expression of their belief that there needs to be some kind of change, that they’re not satisfied with the status quo.”

Roughly 70 percent of Americans wish they had more than two parties to choose from, according to Pew surveys.    

Third parties and alternative candidates haven’t made much of a dent in American politics since the 1800s. One recent challenge comes from the Forward Party, formed in 2021 and identified with former Democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang and former Republican New Jersey Gov. Christine Todd Whitman, both centrists.


Forward Party leaders advocate for open primaries and ranked-choice voting, which allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference and might help third-party candidates compete.

If every self-proclaimed independent joined the Forward Party, the two-party system might soon be history. But that’s not how most independents operate.


“At the end of the day,” Koning said, “independent voters just kind of go back to the parties to which they lean.”


19. Opinion | Donald Trump Isn’t the Only One to Blame for the Capitol Riot. I’d Know.


I offer this not from a partisan perspective. This is actually insightful about the loss of trust in government and the impact on our republic. Every politician of both parties should read and ponder this.


Again, Waashiongton's quote is germane here and I think explains the problem:


"However [political parties] may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion."
FAREWELL ADDRESS | SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1796
https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/past-projects/quotes/article/however-political-parties-may-now-and-then-answer-popular-ends-they-are-likely-in-the-course-of-time-and-things-to-become-potent-engines-by-which-cunning-ambitious-and-unprincipled-men-will-be-enabled-to-subvert-the-power-of-the-people-and-to-usurp-for-th/




Opinion | Donald Trump Isn’t the Only One to Blame for the Capitol Riot. I’d Know.

The New York Times · by James Sasso · January 30, 2023

Guest Essay

Donald Trump Isn’t the Only One to Blame for the Capitol Riot. I’d Know.

Jan. 30, 2023


Credit...Jason Andrew for The New York Times

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Mr. Sasso served as senior investigative counsel for the Jan. 6 committee and worked on drafting its final report.

I spent 12 months holed up in a windowless cubicle den or locked in my home office investigating the Jan. 6 attack on the United States Capitol and working on a report that my fellow investigators and I thought would blow open the story. When it was released, the press described it as “monumental.” This paper called it “damning.” And it was — for former President Donald Trump, since he bears primary responsibility for the attempted insurrection. But the report could only tell part of the story.

Other political, social, economic and technological forces beyond the former president had a hand, whether intentionally or not, in radicalizing thousands of people into thinking they needed to attack the seat of American democracy. Only by understanding how those people lost faith in our governing institutions can we as a country figure out how to protect our democracy from threats like the attack on the Capitol.

As an investigative counsel for the Jan. 6 Committee’s “Red” Team, which investigated the people who planned and attended the riot, as well as the domestic extremist groups responsible for much of the violence, I tracked more than 900 individuals charged by the Department of Justice with everything from parading in the Capitol to seditious conspiracy. We interviewed roughly 30 of those defendants about their motives. What my team and I learned, and what we did not have the capacity to detail with specificity in the report, is how distrust of the political establishment led many of the rioters to believe that only revolution could save America.

It wasn’t just that they wanted to contest a supposedly stolen election as Mr. Trump called them to do, they wanted to punish the judges, members of Congress, and law enforcement agencies — the so-called political elites — who had discredited Mr. Trump’s claims. One rioter wondered why he should trust anything the F.B.I., D.O.J., or any other federal entity said about the results. The federal government had worked against everyday Americans for years, the rioters told us, favoring entrenched elites with its policies. For many defendants — both those awash in conspiracy theories, as well as some of the more reasonable Trump supporters at the Capitol that day — a stolen election was simply the logical conclusion of years of federal malfeasance.

With the legitimacy of democracy so degraded, revolution appeared logical. As Russell James Peterson, a rioter who pleaded guilty to “parading, demonstrating, or picketing” in the Capitol, said on Dec. 4, 2020, “the only way to restore balance and peace is through war. Too much trust has been lost in our great nation.” Guy Reffitt, who earned seven years in prison for leading the charge up the Capitol steps while carrying a firearm, made a similar case later that month: “The government has spent decades committing treason.” The following week, he drove 20 hours to “do what needs to be done” because there were “bad people,” “disgusting people,” in the Capitol. Oath Keepers convicted of seditious conspiracy and other crimes, like their leader Stewart Rhodes, had long believed that a corrupt group of left-wing elites was preparing to upend American freedoms and that only militias like themselves could save the Constitution. Their loss of faith in the federal government had led them to the delusion that their seditious behavior to keep Mr. Trump in power was patriotic.

Strikingly, these comments came not only from domestic violent extremists; some came from people who appeared to be ordinary Americans. Dona Sue Bissey, a grandmother and hair salon owner from Indiana, said shortly after the attack that she was “very glad” to have been a part of the insurrection; Anthony Robert Williams, a painter from Michigan, called Jan. 6 the “proudest day of my life.”

Since the 1960s, political scientists have surveyed Americans and measured the steady decline of public faith in the federal government. Again and again, they have described the predictable consequences of people believing that the deliberative system has lost its legitimacy; almost always, they will turn to alternative means to get what they want, even if it means destroying their government in the process. The attack on the Capitol was a perfect example. William Dunfee, an Ohio pastor facing felony and misdemeanor charges, told his congregation on Dec. 27, 2020, that settling “your differences at the ballot” did not work, so they should make the “government, the tyrants, the socialists, the Marxists, the progressives, the RINOs” in Washington “fear” them.

Some have criticized our report because it focused on Mr. Trump and his Big Lie instead of diving more deeply into other causes, such as declining faith in government or racial resentment or economic inequality, which pushed people to believe patriotism required storming the Capitol. Far from ignoring those concepts, we have released many of our documents publicly and archived the rest so that historians, political scientists, sociologists and many others can scrutinize our findings in ways we could not, examining the causes and consequences of Jan. 6 with a longer time horizon than we had.

Our report proposed several straightforward fixes to prevent another sitting president from contesting a fair election. But solving the core problem — lost faith in government — will take more time and a battery of far more complex remedies.

The most important step elected officials can take — aside from choosing not to undermine our institutions for their own political gain — is to advance a comprehensive set of election and campaign finance reforms to make politicians more responsive to their constituents than to the money and voices of the few. Congress could also create universal election rules that encourage all citizens to vote while reassuring a skeptical public that the elections are secure. But beyond that, our leaders need to build trust broadly by tackling economic inequality and reinvesting in communities devastated by globalization and technological changes. At the most basic level, politicians should refocus locally on building roads, lowering crime and revitalizing small business districts, instead of looking for votes by harping on divisive national topics.

Such reforms would not be a silver bullet. A few of the defendants we interviewed complained of being misled by social media, which seems to have pushed them into conspiracy theory rabbit holes like QAnon. Many also had not-quite-veiled racial resentments that drove their lack of faith in government. But at the very least, these reforms might begin to convince citizens that their government works for them, not just the rich and powerful. Once we can restore that baseline trust, we can better avoid future attacks, both physical and intangible, on our democracy.

Mr. Trump did not appear out of a vacuum to upend democracy. His presidency was the culmination of years of political degradation during which voters watched our political institutions rust to the point of breaking. Like any good liar, Mr. Trump succeeded by building his lies off a truth; people no longer trust the federal government because they see its corroded institutions as corrupted for the few against the many. Until we fix that problem, we will not free ourselves from the threat of future political violence and upheaval worse than Jan. 6.

James Sasso served as senior investigative counsel for the Jan. 6 committee.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

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The New York Times · by James Sasso · January 30, 2023





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcastForeign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."


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