Quotes of the Day:
"Never lose a holy curiosity."
– Albert Einstein.
"They who have no central purpose in life, fall an easy prey to petty worries, fears, troubles, and self-pity."
– James Allen.
“While thoughts exist, words are alive and literature becomes an escape, not from, but into living.”
– Cyril Connolly
1. Yoon denies insurrection charges, voices concerns about state of nation
2. North Korea tests cruise missile; warns US, South Korea on ‘provocation’
3. Suicidal tendencies and ’80s battlefield tactics: How North Korean soldiers are operating in Russia’s war on Ukraine
4. North Korea takes wait-and-see approach toward Trump
5. US pause on foreign aid already affecting North Korean human rights groups
6. The 23-year-old who infiltrated a North Korean laptop farm
7. Why South Korea Must Not Go Nuclear: A Small Arsenal Won’t Pay Off Like You Think
8. Sanctioned North Korean arms makers find new cover in Russia’s shadow
9. Heavy snow blankets S. Korea on Lunar New Year holiday
10. Satellite imagery reveals extensive upgrades at North Korean political prisons
11. Leader of Belarus says he plans to visit North Korea to ‘diversify’ ties
12. Experts: “South Korea’s own nuclear armament would undermine the US-ROK alliance” ∙∙∙ Opinions differ on the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons
13. Trump's 2nd term foreign affairs and defense chiefs confirmed… somewhat low interest in Korean Peninsula
14. US Department of Defense: “ROK-US joint training to be conducted as scheduled”
15. [Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Trump, Dispatch of Special Envoy to North Korea Possible Soon"
16. North Koreans ask: Why are our soldiers fighting Ukraine when ‘main enemy’ is US?
17. Ukraine Destroyed a Bizarre New DPRK Missile System
1. Yoon denies insurrection charges, voices concerns about state of nation
Yoon denies insurrection charges, voices concerns about state of nation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · January 28, 2025
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- Indicted over charges of leading an insurrection in December, President Yoon Suk Yeol defended his decision to declare martial law in a meeting with his legal representatives on Tuesday.
Seok Dong-hyeon, one of Yoon's lawyers, told reporters that Yoon wondered aloud how his decision to impose martial law on Dec. 3 could be considered an act of insurrection when "everything was done within the boundaries of the Constitution."
President Yoon Suk Yeol attends the fourth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in central Seoul on Jan. 23, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
Seok and other lawyers met with Yoon at the Seoul Detention Center on Tuesday, two days after Yoon became the first sitting South Korean president to be indicted under detention.
Yoon is accused of conspiring with former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun and others to incite an insurrection on Dec. 3 by declaring an unconstitutional and illegal state of emergency, despite the absence of any signs of war, armed conflict or a comparable national crisis.
Yoon is also alleged to have sent military troops to the National Assembly in order to keep lawmakers from voting down the martial law declaration and to have planned to arrest key political figures.
According to Seok, Yoon said he exercised his constitutional rights to declare martial law to inform the people of the crisis that the nation was facing, with the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) having taken over parliament.
Yoon also noted that he immediately lifted the martial law once the National Assembly voted down his declaration.
Yoon told his lawyers that his action could not constitute an act of insurrection because there had not been any bloodshed or casualties, nor had there been any arrest of politicians.
Seok said Yoon claimed that he had never intended to maintain martial law for an extended stretch of time because he had not prepared any manual on how to run the administrative and judicial branches in such a state, and because he had fully expected the National Assembly to promptly vote it down.
"He didn't say anything particular about spending the Lunar New Year holiday inside the detention center or about the situation he is in as the sitting president," Seok said. "But I could tell from his looks that a lot of things were going through his mind."
President Yoon Suk Yeol (C) attends the fourth hearing of his impeachment trial at the Constitutional Court in central Seoul on Jan. 23, 2025, in this photo provided by the court. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Seok added Yoon voiced his concerns about the future of South Korea.
"He said he was worried about many people struggling to make ends meet in these cold conditions," Seok relayed. "He was also concerned that young people who should be dreaming big dreams may grow frustrated and disenchanted with reality."
Seok noted that first lady Kim Keon Hee has been experiencing health problems of late. Yoon, who hasn't seen his wife since being detained on Jan. 15, was worried about Kim's condition, Seok said.
The DP fired shots at Yoon for worrying about the state of the nation when he himself had caused problems.
"He incited an insurrection and shook our constitutional order at its core. He has also destroyed our economy," Cho Seung-rae, the DP's senior spokesperson, said. "And he has the temerity to say he's worried about the future of the country. This is quite chilling.
"How could someone so concerned about the country deploy military forces to start an insurrection and incite his supporters?" Cho continued. "He has still not yet admitted to his wrongdoing in the face of legal judgment. There seems to be no end to his shamelessness."
On Kim's apparent health issues, Cho said Yoon "should forget about trying to make people feel sympathetic."
"People will only remember Kim and Yoon as a couple tainted with all sorts of corruption allegations," the spokesperson said. "If Yoon is worried about the country at all, he should stop trying to pull tricks to delay the legal process."
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · January 28, 2025
2. North Korea tests cruise missile; warns US, South Korea on ‘provocation’
Neither the South nor the US has conducted any provocation nor do they intend to. It is Kim Jong Un who is the master of provocations to support blackmail diplomacy (with the aim of coercing political and economic concessions).
North Korea tests cruise missile; warns US, South Korea on ‘provocation’
The return of Donald Trump as US president has raised speculation about an improvement in ties.
https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/01/27/north-cruise-missile-test/
By RFA Staff
2025.01.27
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un looks on during the test of what the Korean Central News Agency described as a strategic cruise missile, at an undisclosed location on Jan. 25, 2025. (KCNA via Reuters)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the successful test of a cruise missile system, North Korea’s state media reported, as it accused the United States and South Korea of provocations and vowed the “toughest counteraction” to defend itself.
The underwater-to-surface strategic cruise guided weapons traveled for 1,500 kilometers between 7,507 and 7,511 seconds in the Saturday test before “precisely” hitting targets, the North’s KCNA news agency reported.
“The test was conducted as a link in the whole chain of efforts for carrying out the plan for building up the defence capability of the country, aimed at improving the effectiveness of the strategic deterrence against the potential enemies in conformity with the changing regional security environment,” KCNA reported.
Kim was cited as noting that the North armed forces were perfecting ”the means of war deterrence.”
On Sunday, North Korea accused the United States and South Korea of “staging serious military provocations” with their military exercises.
“The U.S. and the ROK will never evade the responsibility for the aggravation of regional situation to be entailed by an increase in the visibility of military provocations”, a senior foreign ministry official said in a statement, referring to South Korea by the initials of its official name, the Republic of Korea.
“The DPRK Foreign Ministry is closely watching the military provocations of the U.S. and the ROK escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula and seriously warns them that such moves will entail a reflective counteraction,” the official said, referring to North Korea by the initials of its official name, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea.
“The DPRK will not permit the imbalance of strength imposed by the military nexus between the U.S. and the ROK and take the toughest counteraction to defend the sovereign right, security and interests of the state and thoroughly ensure peace and stability in the region.”
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The inauguration of President Donald Trump has led to speculation about an improvement in ties between the old foes.
During his first term, Trump embarked on unprecedented but ultimately unsuccessful engagement with North Korea to try to get it to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for sanctions relief and he has suggested he would be open to a new effort.
Last week, North Korea reiterated that it had no intention of giving up its nuclear program, blaming the United States for creating tensions.
North Korea has drawn closer to Russia since Trump’s first term and has sent large volumes of arms and ammunition, as well as some 12,000 soldiers, to help Russia in its war against Ukraine. Neither Russia nor North Korea has acknowledged the North Korean support.
Edited by RFA Staff.
3. Suicidal tendencies and ’80s battlefield tactics: How North Korean soldiers are operating in Russia’s war on Ukraine
Perhaps journalists would like to peruse this manual from July 2020 to help in their analyses of north Korean tactics.
NORTH KOREAN TACTICS
Headquarters, Department of the Army
https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/atp7-100-2.pdf
Suicidal tendencies and ’80s battlefield tactics: How North Korean soldiers are operating in Russia’s war on Ukraine
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/28/europe/north-korean-soldiers-fighting-for-russia-intl-cmd/index.html
By Nick Paton Walsh, Rebecca Wright, Daria Tarasova-Markina, Victoria Butenko and Brice Laine, CNN
6 minute read
Updated 4:20 AM EST, Tue January 28, 2025
‘They don’t take prisoners’: How North Korean soldiers are operating in Ukraine
04:24
Sumy, UkraineCNN —
Detonating a grenade under the chin rather than being captured. Using a fellow soldier to lure out attack drones. Removing body armor plates and helmets to enable faster attacks on foot. Writing pledges of allegiance to North Korea’s Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un.
These are the brutal and near-suicidal tactics of North Korean soldiers, who have, since November, been deployed to repel Ukraine’s incursion in the southern Russian border region of Kursk.
Up to 12,000 North Korean soldiers have been sent to Russia, according to Western intelligence reports, which say around 4,000 troops have been killed or injured.
Ahead of a likely escalation before any peace talks, Moscow is experiencing manpower shortages and Pyongyang is expected to send reinforcements, according to Ukrainian defense intelligence.
video
Related video
Ukraine releases footage of alleged North Korean soldiers captured in Kursk
CNN has gained a rare insight into the world of North Korean troops fighting for Russia in interviews with Ukrainian special operations forces who told CNN the North Koreans they faced in intense fighting did not surrender.
In one video, shared with CNN, a Ukrainian soldier approaches an injured North Korean soldier who was lying face down, during clashes. As the Ukrainian pulls the North Korean soldier’s leg to see if he is still alive, the North Korean lets out a scream in Korean before detonating a grenade next to his head.
The Ukrainians swiftly open fire and dive back. South Korean lawmakers were told by the country’s intelligence service, who have provided assistance to Kyiv, that the soldier in the video’s last words were: “General Kim Jong Un.”
“They use grenades, which means they can blow themselves up,” said Pokémon, the call sign of a commander with the 6th Special Operations Forces, who like the other Ukrainian soldiers CNN spoke to, did not want to give his name for security reasons.
“They can just brazenly go into battle until they are neutralized,” Pokémon said, adding: “Despite all attempts to call them to surrender, they will continue to fight.”
One Ukrainian commander, call sign Pokémon, said the North Korean soldiers seemed unprepared for modern drone warfare. Rebecca Wright/CNN
He added that the North Koreans were unprepared for Ukraine’s battlefield realities, where modern drone combat and archaic trench warfare have led to significant casualties.
While the North Korean soldiers are “all young, trained, hardy fighters,”Pokémon said, they would have not previously faced a UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) – which have transformed the war in Ukraine – in combat. “They are prepared for the realities of war in 1980 at best,” he said.
The Ukrainians CNN spoke with said the North Koreans persisted in frontal, mass assaults, often hitting the same place repeatedly, despite major losses.
Amur, a company commander, said some North Koreans removed their helmets and the heavy protective plates from their body armour, to make them lighter on their feet and enable a faster assault at Ukrainian positions.
“They’re very maneuverable and they run and move very quickly,” he said. “They’re hard to catch, especially with a drone,” Amur added, explaining that they often weave an indirect path towards Ukrainian defenses, as if trained to not run in a straight line.
North Korean troops train in Russia in footage circulated online on October 18, 2024. CNN geolocated the video to a training range in Sergeyevka, Primorsky Krai, Russia. EyePress News/Reuters
The North Koreans also leave anti-tank mines on roads as they go, Amur said. “Every shelter, every car they just destroy with anti-tank grenade launchers. They move very fast, (they) literally run,” he said.
Amur showed CNN military equipment obtained from a fallen North Korean soldier, including a new issue rucksack that Amur said contained the bare minimum for survival but was laden with ammunition.
“In their backpacks is the minimum of water, small bottles - up to a liter,” Amur said. “There are no additional warm clothes - no hats, no scarves, nothing.”
Amur said the North Koreans appear to have the more modern versions of Russian standard issue equipment, with most in possession of around 10 magazines, 5-10 grenades, machine gun ammunition and mines. The North Korean soldier was carrying an AK-12 assault rifle – the newer model of the standard issue AK-47, Amur said.
A handwritten note found on one of the North Korean soldiers who died fighting Ukrainian forces. Rebecca Wright/CNN
Notes, fake military ID found
Earlier this month, Ukraine captured two North Korean soldiers, and released video of the injured men, speaking Korean and receiving treatment, as evidence of Pyongyang’s robust military support for Moscow.
Ukrainian special operations forces shared footage with CNN of the moment one of the soldiers was captured. The video shows a visibly injured North Korean soldier, wincing in pain, being carried by Ukrainian soldiers through their razor-wire defenses and land mines to safety.
Russian shelling escalated as the soldier was captured, Ukrainian officials said, aimed at stopping the North Korean soldier from being taken alive.
Ukrainian troops have taken DNA samples – saliva swabs and locks of hair – from the dead, which they said showed them to be of East Asian extraction, and provided further evidence of North Korean involvement.
The North Korean soldier seen detonating the grenade in the video carried a fake Russian military ID which identified him as 29-year-old Ment Chat. The document said he joined the Russian army in October and was from the Russian border region of Tuva, near Mongolia.
A handwritten page found on one of the North Korean soldiers recorded acts of disloyalty by North Korean subordinates. Rebecca Wright/CNN
CNN saw several other notes and papers that Ukrainian soldiers found on the bodies of other North Korean soldiers.
One sheet of paper is peppered with pledges of allegiance to North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un and of victory in battle. It is unclear if the notes were meant to emphasize the soldier’s loyalty if killed in battle to protect their surviving families, or if it truly reflects their mindset.
Another note retrieved from the bodies extols North Korea’s prowess in combat and derides their enemy, Ukraine.
“The hammer of death to the unknown and the puppet trash is not far off. We wield the powerful force that makes them tremble in fear. An invincible and certain-to-win battle.”
Another note, from the collection said: “I will demonstrate unparalleled bravery to its fullest. World, watch closely.”
Acts of ‘disloyalty’ recorded
Ukrainian officials who reviewed the papers said the North Korean units consider their involvement in Russia’s war as an opportunity to gain battle experience to assist their leader in any future conflict nearer home.
While North Korea is one of the most militarized societies on earth - with an estimated 1.2 million armed service personnel and mandatory military service from age 17 - its troops have had very limited exposure to the battlefield since the Korean War, where an armistice brought hostilities to a halt in 1953.
Another document, likely written by an officer, recorded acts of disloyalty by North Korean subordinates - a common practice in the totalitarian state, where citizens are encouraged to inform on each other.
One note said a soldier had “engaged in an unimaginably disgraceful act by stealing supplies.” Another note said a different soldier had “failed to uphold the Supreme Commander’s dignity and placed his personal interests above all.”
Radio codes found on one of the North Korean soldiers. Rebecca Wright/CNN
Other papers contained the radio codes of the North Korean force, but also contained notes on new tactics to counter drone attacks, from which Amur said North Koreans had suffered major losses.
“My unit could take out about 30 enemy soldiers in a day’s work, just by throwing grenades on their heads. They didn’t understand what to do,” he said.
Labelled “How to destroy drones,” the handwritten North Korean note suggested using soldiers as bait.
“When a drone is spotted… at a distance of about 10-12 meters, one out of three people should unconditionally lure it, and the other two should take aim and shoot.
“Another method is, since shells will not fall again in the same crater, take cover in the crater…” it read.
A battalion commander, call sign Bandit, told CNN the North Koreans had shown good marksmanship when shooting down drones from about a hundred-meter distance, suggesting a high level of training in North Korea. “It’s one person who takes the hit. Two or three people stand on the side and shoot directly.”
Amur described a ruthless opponent. “They don’t take our prisoners. All of our servicemen we found are shot in the back of the head.”
4. North Korea takes wait-and-see approach toward Trump
Kim Jong Un's version of "strategic patience? Or is this really "maximum pressure" on the US? What is the "geopolitical sweetspot?"
North Korea takes wait-and-see approach toward Trump
Julian Ryall
01/27/2025January 27, 2025
https://www.dw.com/en/north-korea-kim-jong-un-donald-trump/a-71422516
In previous years, North Korea's People's Assembly was an opportunity to detail future international ambitions. This year, the US was not mentioned as Kim awaits indicators of Trump's attitude to Pyongyang.
https://p.dw.com/p/4pgG4
US President Donald Trump meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Hanoi in 2019
Kim felt betrayed when Trump failed to deliver on his promises during his first term from 2017 to 2021, according to expertsImage: Evan Vucci/AP Photo/picture alliance
At a recent two-day meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang, North Korea confirmed several routine matters — including the state budget for the year ahead and greater defense spending — but made no mention of any position toward the new US government under President Donald Trump.
Analysts suggest that Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, may be biding his time and waiting for Trump to make an opening move that might presage a return of the "bromance" that saw the two men meet on three occasions the last time Trump was in the White House.
On the other hand, Pyongyang may be pointedly ignoring the US given the failure of the 2019 North Korea-United States Hanoi Summit, a meeting that left Kim embarrassed as he had staked so much on a positive outcome.
At the same time, the North is in a significantly better economic and military situation after signing a series of agreements with Russia, meaning Kim is less desperate for a better working relationship with the US, analysts said.
Maximum pressure on the US
And while Pyongyang may not have used the meeting to state its intentions toward the US, the test launch of a series of sea-to-surface cruise missiles on Saturday, just days after Trump's inauguration as US president, spoke volumes.
It followed up the next day with a statement condemning joint US-South Korean air exercises, declaring that Pyongyang would maintain "the toughest counteraction" to the US for as long as Washington ignores its sovereignty and security demands.
"Two weeks ago, Kim said North Korea would take a policy of maximum pressure on the US, although he did not elaborate on what that pressure might include," said Moon Chung-in, a professor of politics and international relations at Yonsei University in Seoul and a special adviser to former President Moon Jae-in on national security and foreign affairs.
"For Kim, there has been a fundamental change in thinking when it comes to North Korea's relations with the US, and the position now is that they cannot go through with what they say," he told DW.
In December 2023, Kim stated that the US policy was still to overturn the North Korean regime, and he therefore saw no hope of a lasting deal with Washington, Moon said. He added that this realization was behind "the fundamental change in North Korean policy" announced in January last year that relations with the US were no longer the top priority for Pyongyang.
At that same People's Assembly, Kim declared that peaceful reunification with South Korea was no longer possible and that his government was making a "decisive policy change" on its relations with the South, which he described as the North's "primary foe and invariable principal enemy."
Kim also ordered his military to be prepared to act to occupy and pacify the South, with the North underlining the schism that has taken place by ripping up railway lines that symbolically crossed the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone that divides the two nations, destroying roads in the region and building additional defenses along the border.
Supreme People's Assembly short of bombast
Last week's 12th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly was held at the Mansudae Assembly Hall in central Pyongyang, the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported, but contained far less bombast and rhetoric. It's not even clear if Kim attended in person as KCNA made no mention of his presence.
"I believe there was no mention of the US or Trump, as Kim does not want to be the first to play a card at this new stage in North Korea-US relations," said Stephen Nagy, a professor of politics and international relations at Tokyo's International Christian University.
"By being less belligerent, he is providing an opening for Trump to perhaps employ some sort of unorthodox diplomacy," he told DW.
Right now, Kim could afford to be patient as his rivals and other significant players with a stake in the situation in Northeast Asia are fully occupied elsewhere, Nagy added.
The new US president has just come into office and has a full slate of issues to deal with, primarily on the domestic front. South Korea is fully preoccupied with its own political chaos. China also has economic concerns and is still weighing up the new US administration. Japan's leadership is weak, and Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine and trying to keep its economy afloat.
Geopolitical 'sweet spot'
"Kim is in something of a geopolitical 'sweet spot' at the moment, with everyone else around him wrapped up in their own problems, so he can afford to be patient and see what the US is willing to offer," Nagy said.
Kim also holds better cards than the last time Trump was president, thanks to his solid ties to Putin in Moscow, which is delivering military technology that was previously denied North Korea by international sanctions.
Yet, if Trump is genuinely keen on rekindling his ties with Kim and his plans for a permanent solution to the Korean situation, then Kim will listen, said Moon. But the North Korean leader may take some convincing, he added.
"Kim felt betrayed the last time when Trump failed to deliver on his promises," he said. "Unless Kim sees very clear and workable initiatives from Trump, then I do not think he will return to the dialogue," Moon underlined, adding that Kim has realized that his survival strategy is best served by getting closer to Russia.
North Korean defector: 'We are not traitors'
03:47
Edited by: Shamil Shams
DW-Porträt | Korrespondent Julian Ryall DW-Porträt | Korrespondent Julian Ryall
Julian Ryall Journalist based in Tokyo, focusing on political, economic and social issues in Japan and Korea
5. US pause on foreign aid already affecting North Korean human rights groups
I hope the new administration will provide funding to US human rights groups rather than foreign groups with susicpices ties to those who sympathize with the north. This is one area especially that I hope the Trump administration puts serious emphasis on - i.e., funding groups that are in reality hostile to US interests and there are likely some non-US NGOs that fit this description.
And as an aside, the previous administration provided zero funding to the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea which is an organization that works to advance US interests and supports every law the US Congress has passed regarding north Korea and in addition provides analytic support to the US State Department on north Korea. But the State Department denied all US funding for the past four years in favor of funding foreign groups with questionable reputation. I hope the Trump administration will remedy this.
US pause on foreign aid already affecting North Korean human rights groups
Trump order demands review of all funding, throwing into question DPRK-related initiatives that rely on US support
https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/us-pause-on-foreign-aid-already-affecting-north-korean-human-rights-groups/?t=1738009861
Ifang Bremer January 27, 2025
A North Korean man passing in front of a propaganda billboard | Image: Eric Lafforgue (2012)
A White House order suspending funding for U.S. foreign assistance programs is already affecting North Korean human rights organizations, while raising concerns about impacts on other DPRK-related initiatives that rely on U.S. government support.
President Donald Trump issued the executive order for an immediate 90-day pause on funding shortly after his inauguration last Monday.
Under the order, department and agency heads must review each program and make determinations on whether to continue, modify or cease them within 90 days, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and with concurrence from Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Programs may resume earlier if reviews are completed and approved.
“The United States foreign aid industry and bureaucracy are not aligned with American interests and in many cases antithetical to American values,” the executive order states. “They serve to destabilize world peace by promoting ideas in foreign countries that are directly inverse to harmonious and stable relations internal to and among countries.”
A notice sent to funding receivers and reported on Saturday states that grant officers will also issue “stop-work orders” to existing programs funded by the State Department.
”A lot of programs are funded in whole or in part by the U.S. government so this is unwelcome news,” one professional working on North Korean human rights told NK News. The individual requested anonymity as they were not authorized to speak publicly about funding.
“The hope is that North Korean programs get approved and resume quickly, although there is so much chaos in DC at present that it’s anyone’s guess when that might happen,” the professional said, adding that “the pause could have a real effect on efforts to send uncensored information to the North Korean people.”
The announcement leaves organizations in a state of uncertainty, as details about the scope and focus of the review remain sparse.
It’s also not yet clear whether the freeze affects funding by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a nonprofit that distributes grants from an annual appropriation by Congress through the State Department budget. NED did not immediately respond to NK News inquiries.
Daily NK, a South Korean news outlet focused on the DPRK that receives NED support, told NK News that it is “closely monitoring the situation” but refrained from further comment for now.
A Seoul-based North Korean human rights organization that asked not to be named while awaiting funding decisions said the U.S. had already suspended part of its funding since Friday and that the pause could affect staff salaries.
The executive order by the White House does not specify what the funding requirements will be under new President Donald Trump, only noting that “no further United States foreign assistance shall be disbursed in a manner that is not fully aligned with the foreign policy of the President of the United States.”
Also last week, Trump announced that the U.S. will withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO). The U.S. is one of the largest contributors to the WHO, one of few organizations that continues to provide aid to the DPRK.
In a separate press release, a State Department spokesperson said “President Trump stated clearly that the United States is no longer going to blindly dole out money with no return for the American people.”
What this all means for organizations working on North Korean human rights remains to be seen as Trump has not yet announced a detailed DPRK policy.
Trump last week signaled a willingness to resume diplomacy with Pyongyang, saying he will reach out to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un again in his second term, some five years after the breakdown of nuclear talks.
If Trump prioritizes a new summit, it could spell bad news for the human rights movement. An overt U.S. emphasis on human rights might stand in the way of efforts to engage Kim Jong Un, as the DPRK regime shuns any criticism of its dismal rights record.
Secretary of State Rubio has in the past voiced support for North Korean human rights initiatives, but he did not emphasize the issue in public comments ahead of his appointment.
To ROK-based rights groups, the U.S. funding pause comes as domestic funding schemes are also under pressure in the wake of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment for declaring martial law.
Last month, the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) attempted to cut funding for North Korean human rights programs, and the Ministry of Unification abruptly canceled a seminar to discuss policy recommendations for increasing North Koreans’ access to information.
Meanwhile, the human rights situation in North Korea has continued to deteriorate. Earlier this month, U.N. human rights experts called on Pyongyang to clarify whether it executed two women forcibly repatriated from China.
And last year, the DPRK regime continued to enforce restrictive laws intended to deter citizens from accessing outside information and increase ideological control over the population. It also took more steps to seal its borders throughout the year, likely to prevent defections.
Edited by Bryan Betts
6. The 23-year-old who infiltrated a North Korean laptop farm
We must dull and break the all-purpose sword of north Korean cyber.
The 23-year-old who infiltrated a North Korean laptop farm
Aidan Raney documented an operation to exploit U.S. businesses, one of the ways North Korea funds its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
https://sashaingber.substack.com/p/the-23-year-old-who-infiltrated-a
Sasha Ingber
Jan 26, 2025
Aidan Raney exposed how North Korean IT workers lure Americans with remote work opportunities, sharing a trove of images, video, and audio. (Courtesy Aidan Raney)
While the U.S. is entrenched in a litany of domestic disputes, North Korea is growing more dangerous. Aidan Raney got a rare glimpse into a scheme to fund their weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, from his home in Wisconsin.
“I found myself using technology to escape,” Aidan tells me. Because by the time he was 18, Aidan had lost both of his parents, spent time in juvenile detention for truancy and theft, and was considering buying sleeping pills so that he would never have to wake up to another day.
A small community in Wisconsin helped him put his life back together. And some of the hacker skills he picked up in that dark chapter helped him pull off a bold effort to infiltrate a North Korean IT operation. In fact, I learned as I was writing this that Aidan did not plan to stop until the very moment I hit publish on this article. “I'm an analyst at heart, what can I say?”
The 23-year-old sent me a trove of images, audio, and video. He had the innocence and audacity of youth, despite his hardships. But was he legit? I contacted Michael Barnhart, North Korea Operations Manager at Google’s cybersecurity firm Mandiant, to see what he thought.
Michael recalled thinking, when Aidan had first reached out to him, “Okay, the North Koreans have finally got me. This is one of them pretending to be ‘Aidan.’” But the two kept talking. “He's got my trust now,” Michael told me.
The same guys pushing fake Viagra
In 2023, Aidan started Farnsworth Intelligence, an intelligence consulting company. Last August, a client reached out with a frantic request. “Hey Aidan, Need your help ASAP,” the energy company wrote. “We have a developer candidate that just disclosed to us that they were working with a North Korean!” Who were these people and how did they do it?
The Department of Justice says that thousands of North Korean IT workers have defrauded hundreds of American businesses — including Fortune 500 companies —using witting and unwitting Americans. The latest indictment was announced Thursday.
For Pyongyang, remote work through American proxies offers rewards beyond financing its WMD and missile programs: Laptop farms give North Korea a way to conduct espionage, insert malware into U.S. companies, and generate revenue for Kim Jong Un’s regime despite international sanctions. American HR and recruiting teams are clearly unprepared.
“These are the same guys that were pushing fake Viagra, fake counterfeit hundred dollar bills” in the 1990s, says Michael. Now they are also getting into extortion —threatening to sell company data to competitors, on the Dark Web, or to other advanced threat actors for cyberattacks. They have the placement and access, the skills and capability. It’s just a question if they will act on it, Sony-style. “They're positioning themselves where if they ever need to pull the plug, they can.”
Gaining ‘the Bens’ trust
The energy company Aidan was working with learned how the North Koreans contacted the applicant on Fiverr, a platform for freelance services. (The platform did not respond to my request for comment.) So in September, Aidan took similar steps — starting with making an account on Fiverr. Then he messaged the profile that the North Koreans had used to contact the applicant, “pretending to be a friend,” Aidan said.
Within a day, he was messaging with “Benjamin_Core.” It was all talk of opportunity. “What I would get from that, how much I make. Basically trying to convince me it's worth it.” But notably, without a reason as to why they were giving Aidan the opportunity.
“Ben” said he was in Poland, and was even complaining about the weather with a little coaxing from Aidan. The conversation eventually moved off of Fiverr to Telegram and Discord, with video calls on Google Meet. (Full disclosure/reminder: I did a journalist entrepreneurship training program with the Google News Initiative in 2024.)
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Over time, Ben morphed into at least two other people without mentioning this inconvenient fact. Each Ben would speak and type differently, one with more broken English than the others. “If they were asking about something, oftentimes it was about something we had already talked about,” Aidan said. “Or something I asked just gets completely forgotten about.” They used cutesy photos of pigs and puppies for their avatars. Let them hereby be known collectively as the Bens.
Revise that resume
In the first video call on Google Meet, Ben No. 1 wore a tracksuit with a Mizuno logo, Japanese sportswear. He had selected a fake office background for the call. But at one point, the backdrop was broken by a man in beige walking by. “I think they had people supervising them that were in the room,” Aidan says.
I shared this video with a North Korean defector who agreed. He said the setting was consistent with how the IT teams typically operate. The man’s hairstyle was a common North Korean style. His casual sportswear “typical” of a North Korean IT worker. His face looked distinctly East Asian, “but not Japanese or Chinese.” He said the man’s English was much better than most IT professionals, but “if he has been outside of North Korea for a while, it is possible.”
On the video call, Ben explained what lay ahead. He wanted to start looking for jobs for Aidan in software development. But first, he needed to get Aidan’s resume ready. They wanted to modify his work experiences so it matched their own, Aidan said. “They asked, ‘Can we set up your LinkedIn a certain way? Can we get into it?’”
Aidan didn’t want the North Koreans to be able to access his genuine accounts, so he suggested they set up a second LinkedIn page. “They didn't seem to be set off by that,” he said, as though it was a request that others had made before him. Here’s the fake LinkedIn profile the Bens made him.
7. Why South Korea Must Not Go Nuclear: A Small Arsenal Won’t Pay Off Like You Think
Fundamental questions must be asked.
But first there must be a realization that while this discussion is justified and necessary, it is welcomed by Kim Jong Un because it supports his political warfare strategy to drive a wedge in the ROK/US alliance. The proponents and opponents of South Korean nuclear weapons should agree that their arguments, again while justified and necessary, that if conducted the wrong way, will provide support to Kim Jong Un. Both sides should agree that their intent is to strengthen the ROK/US alliance and most importantly to improve deterrence and the defense of South Korea. Once they do that publicly they can undermine Kim's ability to exploit their arguments to split the ROK/US alliance.
But we must ask:
What really deter's Kim Jong Un?
Will South Korea's possession of its own nuclear weapons (or a replyment of US nuclear weapons) improve deterrence in any appreciable way?
Will Kim be deterred by South Korean nuclear weapons?
What is the South Korean concept for employment of nuclear weapons?
What will be the command and control structure for South Korean Nuclear weapons?
What will be the doctrine for South Korean nuclear weapons (e.g., pre-emptive strike or no first use)?
What will be the targets for South Korean nuclear weapons?
And many more.
Simply possessing nuclear weapons is insufficient for deterrence. There must be a credible capability to employ them from a doctrinal and political perspective.
Why South Korea Must Not Go Nuclear: A Small Arsenal Won’t Pay Off Like You Think
- Commentary
- January 27, 2025
https://www.globalnk.org/publication/view.php?cd=COM000166&ctype=1
- Yang Gyu KIM
- Principal Researcher, EAI
- Lecturer, Seoul National University
Editor’s Note
Yang Gyu Kim, Principal Researcher at EAI and Lecturer at Seoul National University, challenges the assumptions that nuclear weapons are essential for South Korea’s security and that even a small nuclear arsenal could effectively counter North Korea’s advancing nuclear threat. Drawing on historical lessons from the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race and key theoretical frameworks, such as Clausewitz’s concept of “absolute war” and Jervis’s theory of the “nuclear revolution,” Kim underscores the immense financial and geopolitical costs of pursuing independent nuclear capabilities. He highlights the difficulties of establishing mutual assured destruction, which demands a credible second-strike capability and an ensuing intense nuclear arms race. Kim concludes that nuclear armament is not a cost-effective path to ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
I. The Return of Trump and Reignited Nuclear Debate in South Korea
Upon his return to office, U.S. President Donald Trump flaunted his rapport with Kim Jong Un, referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power.” This remark has reignited the ongoing debate over nuclear armament within South Korean political circles (Sung 1/22/2025). The argument advocating for South Korea to pursue its own nuclear weapons, which already enjoys substantial support, has gained additional momentum following Trump’s re-election. Major media outlets have featured in-depth interview series discussing the necessity of South Korea’s nuclear armament as part of their New Year’s coverage (Yoon 1/14/2025).
Public opinion polls conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) well reflect this notable shift in public sentiment. While 58.5% of South Koreans supported nuclear armament in 2023 following the adoption of the Washington Declaration, this figure increased to 71.4% by August 2024. Regression analysis attributes this change primarily to two factors: (1) the growing nuclear threat posed by North Korea in 2024, exemplified by Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric regarding the “annihilation of the Republic of Korea,” and (2) escalating public skepticism about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella (Kim 2024).
This commentary examines the underlying assumptions driving the rapidly expanding debate on nuclear armament in South Korea: (a) that nuclear weapons are unique in their power, rendering conventional weapons’ superiority ineffective, and (b) that possessing a small-scale nuclear arsenal can address security concerns. Specifically, it explores how the security threat posed by a state like North Korea, with its limited nuclear arsenal, should be assessed. Additionally, it also addresses the implications of South Korea pursuing nuclear armament to achieve direct nuclear balance with North Korea. These issues are examined through the lens of “first strike capability” and “second strike capability,” as well as Carl von Clausewitz’s theory of “absolute war” and Robert Jervis’s concept of the “nuclear revolution.”
II. Core Assumptions of the Nuclear Armament Argument: Even a Small-Scale Nuclear Arsenal Can Provide Enough Deterrence
The growing advocacy within South Korea for nuclear armament highlights several key arguments for why the country must develop its own nuclear capabilities (Cheong 2023; Kelly and Kim 2024). First, proponents argue that the “possibility of achieving North Korean denuclearization through negotiations is slim,” and that there are “clear limitations to countering nuclear threats with conventional military means.”
Second, while North Korea continues to advance its nuclear capabilities, concerns about the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence have intensified, particularly with the onset of the second Trump administration. If North Korea achieves its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability that can directly strike the U.S. mainland, public confidence in the U.S. extended deterrence will further erode. This concern is compounded by the transactional nature of the Trump administration, which has sought to reduce security commitments to allies, thereby rending South Korea’s reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella increasingly uncertain.
Third, North Korea faces significant structural constraints in times of war, including a lack of sustained warfighting capability, vulnerability to combined airpower from South Korea and the U.S., and its limited territorial size that restricts the possibility of retreat. These factors suggest that a decisive defeat in a singular conventional warfare could pose an existential threat to the North Korean regime, thereby increasing the likelihood that Pyongyang might resort to a preemptive nuclear strike in dire circumstances.
Based on these arguments, advocates assert that South Korea’s conventional weapons are insufficient in countering North Korea and that acquiring nuclear weapons is the only way to ensure the country’s national security. On top of this, they claim that such a move would alleviate the U.S. defense burden on the Korean Peninsula while allowing the U.S. to allocate its strategic assets to counter threats from China and Russia, ultimately serving broader American interests. Furthermore, given North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, proponents believe that South Korea’s possession of approximately 100 nuclear weapons would significantly contribute to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
III. The Vanity of Unsurvivable Nuclear Weapons: Insights from Clausewitz and Jervis
To evaluate the validity of the arguments advocating for South Korea’s independent nuclear armament, it is instructive to examine the evolution of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition during the early Cold War. This discussion is grounded in Clausewitz’s On War, which introduces the concept of “interactions in absolute war,” and Jervis’s The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, which addresses the notion of “mutual vulnerability.”
1. Clausewitz’s Three Interactions and the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Competition: First-Strike Capability, Second-Strike Capability, and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
The U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race in the 1960s and 1970s aligns with the three interactions of “absolute war” outlined by Clausewitz (1873): “utmost use of force,” “aims to disarm the enemy,” and “utmost exertion of powers.” The principles underlying nuclear strategy—first-strike capability, second-strike capability, and MAD—are intimately tied to his explanation of the dynamics of escalation and the interaction of force. Just as Clausewitz argued that “friction” and the practical constraints encountered on the battlefield inevitably transform absolute war into real war, with political elements intervening in the dynamics of war, the decade-long intensification of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race eventually culminated in the initiation of bilateral nuclear arms reduction negotiations by the 1970s.
First-strike capability not only refers to “a strike that was not only the opening volley of a nuclear war, but also directed against the nuclear capability of the enemy with the intention of crippling his means of retaliation” (Freedman 2003, 128). It is the ability to launch a preemptive strike that destroys the enemy’s nuclear capabilities, rendering retaliation impossible. This aligns with Clausewitz’s first two interactions: “utmost use of force” and “aims to disarm the enemy.” A state possessing first-strike capability could “compel one’s opponent to fulfill their will” by destroying its military forces and industrial bases. This dynamic leads strategists to regard nuclear weapons as the ideal tool of national strategy. However, this ideal state only existed briefly, from 1945 to 1949, when the U.S. held a nuclear monopoly.
The U.S. nuclear monopoly ended when the Soviet Union acquired second-strike capability, which is a “force capable of ensuring effective retaliation even after absorbing an enemy first strike” (Freedman 2003, 128). The key lies in securing the survivability of strategic assets, even after a nuclear attack from the adversary. Following the Soviet Union’s successful development of nuclear weapons, both superpowers embarked on an arms race to secure second-strike capabilities, leading to the development of underground silos and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). By the 1970s, the Soviet Union began to match the U.S. in ICBM and SLBM capabilities. Although the U.S. and the Soviet Union theoretically achieved MAD by both maintaining second-strike capabilities capable of guaranteeing each other’s total destruction, uncertainty about whether their current weapons systems could reliably ensure adequate retaliatory power led to a prolonged competition. This exemplifies Clausewitz’s “utmost exertion of powers.”
Even superpowers, however, could not sustain an “open-ended process” of nuclear arms racing. As the Soviet Union caught up with U.S. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in May 1972 and initiated the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Moscow, marking the first steps toward arms reduction (Freedman 2003). The culmination of the “utmost exertion of powers” by both sides resulted in the establishment of MAD, a state in which neither side could eliminate the other’s second-strike capability. As predicted by Clausewitz’s theory, political considerations reemerged once the military competition reached a point where second-strike capabilities became unassailable.
2. Jervis’s “Nuclear Revolution” and Its Preconditions: Establishing Mutual Vulnerability
The U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition escalated dramatically through Clausewitzian interactions during the 1960s and 1970s, before transitioning into a period of détente in the latter decade. The mechanisms driving this shift can be better understood through Jervis’s concept of the “nuclear revolution” and “mutual vulnerability” (Jervis 1989, 1–43).
Nuclear weapons possess unparalleled destructive power, capable of threatening the survival of an adversary’s society and population within a short timeframe. Consequently, there can be no “winner” in a nuclear war. The only viable strategy to ensure national security is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by imposing costs on an adversary that far exceed any potential benefits they might gain. Drawing on Glenn Snyder’s research, Jervis categorizes deterrence into two types. Deterrence by denial is to prevent the attacker from achieving its objectives by neutralizing the potential gains of aggression. Deterrence by punishment seeks to discourage aggression by threatening massive retaliation that imposes unacceptable costs on the attacker.
Deterrence by denial can theoretically be achieved in two ways: (1) through first-strike capability, which preemptively neutralizes an adversary’s nuclear arsenal, or (2) through strategic defensive systems like the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which aim to intercept and neutralize incoming missiles. Historically, however, first-strike capability was only feasible during the U.S. nuclear monopoly era, while missile defense systems capable of achieving a 100% interception rate remain undeveloped and unlikely in the foreseeable future. This leaves deterrence by punishment, ensuring credible second-strike capability, as the sole viable strategy.
When two competing states gain credible second-strike capabilities, a “balance of terror” emerges, wherein the fear induced by each side’s nuclear arsenal is offset by the equal fear of retaliation. This balance functions analogously to an exchange of hostages: it can only be leveraged while the hostages are alive, but can be terminated if the consensus is violated. Therefore, MAD, which is made possible by possessing mutual second-strike capability, requires both parties to have the capacity to inflict the complete destruction of the enemy’s citizens, while such deployment should be refrained from.
Jervis argues that the foundation of the nuclear revolution lies in the shared mutual vulnerability resulting from both sides possessing reliable second-strike capabilities. This mutual vulnerability was the primary reason the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a political strategy centered on this balance, rather than relying on conventional military superiority. He further asserts that when both sides possess credible second-strike capabilities, revolutionary effects emerge, including peace, the preservation of the status quo, and a reduced frequency of conflicts.
Therefore, nuclear revolution only operates under specific conditions: both parties must have survivable nuclear forces capable of retaliating after a first strike. These forces must be able to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on the adversary under any circumstances. Not all nuclear assets need to survive; rather, as long as “some part of a force” remains intact despite an enemy's nuclear attack, it creates the effect that “all of the force is invulnerable” (Waltz 2009, 402). In this sense, “a weapon that can hurt only people, and cannot possibly damage other side’s striking force, is profoundly defensive.” (Schelling 1960, 233). Paradoxically, weapons capable of causing greater destruction of human lives tend to promote peace and stability, while systems designed to neutralize nuclear arsenals often foster war and instability.
A critical challenge in maintaining the balance of terror lies in the innate uncertainty of war: until a nuclear conflict actually occurs, it is impossible to guarantee that one’s nuclear forces can survive and retaliate effectively. The development of a nuclear-powered submarine capable of deploying SLBMs armed with nuclear warheads could facilitate the maintenance of a highly stable state of MAD, much like the stability maintained by the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, advances in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and AI-enhanced autonomous weapon systems, such as precision underwater drones, could threaten the survivability of SLBM-based second-strike forces.
Due to this uncertainty, the balance of terror had to be “respected” among states engaged in nuclear competition (Freedman 2003, 195). A “consensus” on the balance of second-strike capabilities between these states was essential, and maintaining this balance was crucial. This is why missile defense had become the primary focus in nuclear arms reduction discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. If this tacit agreement were disrupted, the states would inevitably find themselves compelled to re-enter a nuclear arms race. For example, while China maintained a modest nuclear arsenal of approximately 200–300 warheads for decades, it has rapidly expanded its stockpile in recent years, reaching an estimated 500 warheads in 2024 and aiming for 700–1,500 warheads by 2035 (Kristensen, Korda, Johns, and Knight 2024).
In short, nuclear competitors have historically shifted from the “utmost exertion of powers” to a stability based on MAD, as the further accumulation of nuclear capabilities no longer altered the balance of terror. This indicates that without credible second-strike capabilities, political negotiations are unlikely to occur. The prolonged nature of this competition—strategic bombers, qualitative and quantitative missile advancements, nuclear defense systems, and ASW capabilities—remains unavoidable until both sides achieve a consensus on the balance of nuclear power that must be mutually respected.
IV. The Misconception of Nuclear Armament: The Futility of Small-Scale Nuclear Arsenal Development
The various benefits cited by proponents of nuclear armament in South Korea—such as preventing nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, addressing diminished trust in U.S. extended deterrence, enhancing South Korea’s autonomy and diplomatic stature, alleviating anxiety over North Korea’s nuclear threat, and reallocating resources to social welfare and education—cannot be realized through the development of a small number of nuclear warheads alone. These outcomes can only be realized if a mutually agreed-upon nuclear balance with North Korea is established and maintained stably.
However, ensuring the survivability of nuclear weapons to maintain credible second-strike capabilities entails immense costs. For instance, hardening missile silos and aircraft hangars to protect nuclear delivery systems, concealing these systems to evade detection (e.g., SLBMs and transporter erector launchers (TELs)), and stockpiling redundant assets to ensure survivability despite an adversary’s attack are all projects requiring national budgets on the scale of trillions of won (Congressional Budget Office 2021). Moreover, unlike the U.S. or the Soviet Union, South Korea’s small territory poses a significant challenge to constructing and maintaining second-strike capabilities (Lieber and Press 2017).
China, which has entered a nuclear arms race with the United States, possesses approximately 500 nuclear warheads and an almost fully developed nuclear triad in terms of delivery capabilities. Nevertheless, China continues to expand its nuclear arsenal at a rapid pace, underscoring the immense challenge of achieving credible second-strike capabilities against an overwhelmingly nuclear-capable United States. In comparison, North Korea, with its limited territory, underdeveloped delivery systems, and an estimated stockpile of only about 50 nuclear warheads (SIPRI 2024), is far from achieving credible second-strike capabilities against the United States. Thus, arguments suggesting that the U.S. would not trade San Francisco for Seoul, or that South Korea must pursue its own nuclear armament to counter North Korea’s advancing capabilities, are not grounded in realistic analysis.
Moreover, the assumption that gaining approval from the Trump administration would somehow make the costs of nuclear development negligible for South Korea, or that the period of instability and high costs during the initial nuclear development phase would be short-lived, is a highly irresponsible claim. Choosing the path of independent nuclear armament over U.S. extended deterrence would place the two Koreas in a direct nuclear arms race. Until both sides achieve mutually agreed-upon levels of second-strike capability, they would inevitably undergo a prolonged period of “utmost exertion of powers,” as Clausewitz described.
Whether this competition would end with 100 warheads, escalate to 1,000 warheads, or reach a compromise over a specific balance in nuclear delivery systems is entirely uncertain. During this period, there is a significant risk of unintentional escalations leading to all-out military conflict or even a nuclear war, making it difficult to ensure stable progress toward a new equilibrium. This uncertainty underscores why the development of a small nuclear arsenal is unlikely to provide a definitive solution to South Korea’s security concerns or to stabilize the broader geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula.
References
Cheong, Seong-Chang. 2023. Why We Should Become a Nuclear Power (in Korean). Seoul: Medici Media.
von Clausewitz, Karl. 1873. “Chapter 1. What is War?” in On War, trans. James John Graham. London: N. Trübner. https://clausewitzstudies.org/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html#a. (Accessed: January 27, 2025)
Congressional Budget Office. 2021. “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2021 to 2030.” May 21. https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57240. (Accessed: January 24, 2025)
Freedman, Lawrence. 2003. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jervis, Robert. 1989. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kelly, Robert E. and Min-hyung Kim. 2024. “Why South Korea Should Go Nuclear.” Foreign Affairs. December 30. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/north-korea/why-southkorea-should-go-nuclear-kelly-kim. (Accessed: January 25, 2024)
Kim, Yang Gyu. 2024. “2024 Analysis of Koreans’ Support for Nuclear Weapons: Does the Washington Declaration’s Relief Effect Go Away? (in Korean).” EAI Issue Briefing. October 22. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=22784&board=k. (Accessed: January 24, 2025)
Kristensen, Hans M., Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight. 2024. “North Korean Nuclear Weapons, 2024.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 80, 4: 251-271.
Lieber, Keri A. and Daryl G. Press. 2017. “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence.” International Security 41, 4: 9-49.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 2024. “The SIPRI Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.” https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2024/07. (Accessed: 2025.01.24)
Sung, Ji-won. 2025. “Revitalized Support for Nuclear Armament with Trump’s ‘Nuclear State’ Remarks… Hong Joon-pyo, Na Kyung-won and Yoo Seung-min Call for ‘Nuclear Balance’ (in Korean).” Joongang Daily. January 22. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25309417. (Accessed: January 24, 2025)
Waltz, Kenneth. 2004. “Nuclear Stability in South Asia.” In The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, 394-405. Rowman & Littlefield.
Yoon, Keunyoung. 2025. “South Korea Capable of Manufacturing 3 to 6 Nuclear Bombs Every Year … Can Surpass North Korea within Five Years (in Korean).” Yonhap News. January 14. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250105013200546?section=search&sit=mappinghyperlink.(Accessed: January 24, 2025)
■ Yang Gyu KIM is the Principal Researcher and Executive Director at EAI, and a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.
8. Sanctioned North Korean arms makers find new cover in Russia’s shadow
Excerpts:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent shifting of international geopolitics has opened a new door for North Korean arms dealers that the country may be trying to exploit. Shunned by much of the international community, North Korea and Russia have grown closer in recent years, and Moscow has used its position in the Security Council to shield Pyongyang from any new sanctions – and to roll back enforcement of existing measures.
North Korean state enterprises and even government departments are often tasked with paying for their own operation and making money for the regime at all costs, said Shaw, of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “If I were an exec with one of those corporations, I would see this as a huge opportunity,” he said, referring to the budding “strategic partnership” between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Last year, Russia vetoed the continued existence of the United Nations’ panel of experts that had tracked North Korea’s sanctions evasion and WMD procurement efforts for over a decade and whose reports, published every half year and routinely hundreds of pages long, contributed significantly to shedding light on Glocom’s and other North Korean activities.
Russia itself increasingly came into the crosshairs of the reports as the country forged a military partnership with Pyongyang and started buying large quantities of North Korean weapons for its war in Ukraine.
Sanctioned North Korean arms makers find new cover in Russia’s shadow
Defense News · by Linus Höller · January 27, 2025
BERLIN – A notorious North Korean military manufacturer selling its wares internationally remains active and is expanding its catalog despite international sanctions, a Defense News investigation shows.
It is just the tip of a vast, global network of obscure front companies that Kim Jong Un’s regime uses to sell weapons abroad and procure components for his military programs at home. Following a Russian veto in the Security Council, North Korea may be trying to expand these operations significantly.
Global Communications Co., or Glocom, has been in the crosshairs of the United Nations and many Western governments since 2016. The company sells advanced military radio equipment, missile components and command-and-control systems. More significantly, it has also been identified by the UN as a front for Pyongyang’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea’s central intelligence agency.
The website remains online today, continues to see changes, and, in 2024, was updated with a new product: a telemetry system for missiles. The product page boasts of the device’s technical specifications and presents a photograph of the aluminum-colored device superimposed over a stock photo of a rocket blasting off into space.
In a May 10, 2024, press release, Glocom referenced lessons learned in the Ukraine war as being crucial to the development of the new data transmitter. “In particular, as we can see from the war in Ukraine, surveillance and reconnaissance using various unmanned surveillance means, as well as attacks by drones and missiles, are becoming essential processes in all military operations,” the company wrote.
“Reflecting these demands, the GR-8422 broadband data transmitter was introduced.” According to the makers, “This data transmitter can be installed on various platforms such as fighter jets, drones … and ships, launchers, tanks, armored vehicles, etc.”
Nowhere, of course, is there any mention of the North Korea connection. In promotional materials, Glocom went to great lengths to expunge any signs of its true origin, even blurring Korean script on product photos and using fictional locations.
The North Korean regime operates a web of likely hundreds of similar entities stretching around the world to get around sanctions imposed by the international community, including the UN Security Council, in service of the Kim family’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
The target markets are countries embroiled in active conflict and are often themselves under arms embargoes, with North Korea supplying governments that quickly need cheap gear. Insurgency groups and even private military contractors are also would-be customers, said Robert Shaw, program director for the Export Control and Nonproliferation Program at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
“My impression is that the North Korean government has made an effort to increase its arms trade,” he added.
Branching out
Obtaining hard cash is assessed to be one of the regime’s top priorities, and the state runs various enterprises dabbling in arms sales, construction work in places such as Zambia, IT services for unwitting U.S. companies through impersonation of American citizens, or organized crime that involves hacking banks and making and selling drugs like heroin.
Shaw said Glocom’s new message of advertising high-tech devices is a significant step and a whole new ball game from assembling relatively simple radios. “Who are they marketing this to? This opens up a whole set of questions,” he wondered. “This is getting more into major customer territory.”
Glocom’s website claims that the company was founded in 1996, though this date is impossible to independently verify. According to the official chronology, it started out with the aim of modernizing antiquated radar systems at home. The company appears to be connected with an enterprise by the name of Pan Systems, operating out of Singapore and founded in the same year, according to a UN investigation and sanctions databases.
Pan Systems Singapore soon opened an office in the North Korean capital city of Pyongyang. In an interview by UN experts, cited in a 2017 report, as well as in public statements, the company’s owner said he had been approached by a North Korean representative in the late 90s and thought that it seemed like a good idea at the time to facilitate trade. Back then, North Korea was not yet subject to the extensive international sanctions that were imposed on it following its first nuclear test in 2006.
Pan Systems in 2017 claimed that it no longer had any ties to the North Korean office and had exited North Korea when sanctions were imposed in 2007. Indeed, experts assessed that Pan Systems Pyongyang is run by the North Korean intelligence agency RGB. However, Glocom’s director, Ryang Su Nyo – a woman in her sixties and herself an agent of the RGB – traveled to Singapore repeatedly from 2010 to 2016 to meet with Pan Systems’ boss, also making stops in Malaysia to meet with other representatives of Glocom, the 2017 UN report revealed, suggesting that a certain level of cooperation likely still existed around that time.
According to a UN panel of experts, which was established by the Security Council to investigate North Korea’s sanctions evasion and WMD programs, the head of Pan Systems said that Ms. Ryang’s visits to Singapore were related to a health condition.
Malaysian authorities have told the panel that “Glocom has never operated in Malaysia,” despite the company’s claimed address in Kuala Lumpur’s Little India district. However, the UN said it and Malaysian authorities tracked down several North Korean citizens connected to Glocom who were active in Malaysia at the same time, as well as associated front companies that were registered at the same address and had made bank transfers on Glocom’s and North Korea’s behalf.
Malaysia has served as a hotbed for North Korean sanctions evasion in the past. The countries historically had comparatively warm ties, and many DPRK nationals and front companies were based there. MKP, one of the largest networks of North Korean overseas companies doing everything from construction to running hospitals, was based in Kuala Lumpur.
However, in recent years, especially following the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half-brother with a nerve poison in Kuala Lumpur’s international airport in 2017, relations between the countries have cooled markedly. Malaysia has cracked down on North Korean activity within its borders since and implemented state-of-the-art export control laws to counteract illicit trade.
For a while in 2016, after the United Nations had reached out to Glocom’s front companies in Malaysia for information, it seemed like the company might descend into the wastebasket of history. Like many other North Korean front companies before it and since, its website was taken down and mentions of it were erased from the internet. Unusually, however, it returned just a year later with an updated product catalog and a revamped design. In the official company chronology, it is written that the “year 2016 was the most difficult, but innovative year for Glocom.”
Red flags
Glocom differs from other North Korean front companies in its persistence and the quality of its international presence. It has participated in trade fairs in Southeast Asia since 2006 and maintains a polished website, product catalogs written in reasonably good English, and, at one point, even had Twitter, Facebook and YouTube accounts – until the respective platforms suspended them as part of a crackdown on North Korean profiles. Its promotional videos, since deleted, showed dynamic animations of battlefield scenarios with explosions and military vehicles and touted the products’ advanced capabilities.
In contrast, many other North Korean front companies’ websites look dated, are riddled with spelling errors and broken links, lack depth and raise other red flags.
“I suspect many of the actual deals and transfers are being developed and conducted through personal networks and possibly with the assistance of embassy personnel,” Shaw said.
What purpose websites like Glocom’s serve is unclear, he added, saying that perhaps it was political signaling for domestic forces, or to show defiance on the world stage.
Over the years, Glocom managed to land a number of sales, including to Eritrea, Syria and Ethiopia, the latter as recently as 2022. It seems likely that more sales have occurred but simply flown under the radar thanks to North Korea’s extensive use of convoluted shipping and payment networks to obscure the origin of wares and the destination of money. Similar North Korean arms deals have occurred with Yemen, Cuba, Egypt, Russia, Myanmar, Sudan, Iran and others.
In the 2022 sale of military radios to the Ethiopian army, an Indonesian company by the name of Advanced Technology Facility was involved with training the recipients in the equipment’s use. ATF had previously been exposed by the United Nations’ experts for selling Glocom’s equipment on their website under a different brand name, EDSAT. A photo published in Ethiopian media in November 2022 showed the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, using what appears to be one of the North Korean military radios.
Neither Ethiopia nor Advanced Technology Facility responded to the UN’s request for further information.
More sales may be forthcoming. Aside from the website being recently updated, in 2024, South Korea informed the UN that “Glocom persists in selling Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-manufactured military telecommunications equipment.”
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent shifting of international geopolitics has opened a new door for North Korean arms dealers that the country may be trying to exploit. Shunned by much of the international community, North Korea and Russia have grown closer in recent years, and Moscow has used its position in the Security Council to shield Pyongyang from any new sanctions – and to roll back enforcement of existing measures.
North Korean state enterprises and even government departments are often tasked with paying for their own operation and making money for the regime at all costs, said Shaw, of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “If I were an exec with one of those corporations, I would see this as a huge opportunity,” he said, referring to the budding “strategic partnership” between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Last year, Russia vetoed the continued existence of the United Nations’ panel of experts that had tracked North Korea’s sanctions evasion and WMD procurement efforts for over a decade and whose reports, published every half year and routinely hundreds of pages long, contributed significantly to shedding light on Glocom’s and other North Korean activities.
Russia itself increasingly came into the crosshairs of the reports as the country forged a military partnership with Pyongyang and started buying large quantities of North Korean weapons for its war in Ukraine.
About Linus Höller
Linus Höller is a Europe correspondent for Defense News. He covers international security and military developments across the continent. Linus holds a degree in journalism, political science and international studies, and is currently pursuing a master’s in nonproliferation and terrorism studies.
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Defense News · by Linus Höller · January 27, 2025
9. Heavy snow blankets S. Korea on Lunar New Year holiday
(2nd LD) Heavy snow blankets S. Korea on Lunar New Year holiday | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · January 28, 2025
(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with latest figures, forecast in paras 2-4)
SEOUL, Jan. 28 (Yonhap) -- Heavy snow blanketed South Korea for the second consecutive day Tuesday, disrupting transportation services and causing traffic congestion for people heading to their hometowns for the Lunar New Year holiday.
As of 4 p.m., 130 centimeters had piled up on Mount Halla on the southern resort island of Jeju since Monday, while some counties in the eastern province of Gangwon had 40 cm of snow over the same period. Cities of Anseong and Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province, about 60 kilometers south of Seoul, had received about 25 cm of snow. In Seoul, the southwestern ward of Gwanak had 13.7 cm of snow.
For Wednesday, the Korea Meteorological Administration forecast an additional 5 to 15 cm of snow in the mountainous areas of Jeju and about 5 to 10 cm of snow in the Chungcheong and Jeolla provinces.
Several regions have been placed under cold wave warnings, with the morning lows expected to sit around minus 15 C in parts of Gangwon Province on the east coast.
The heavy snow led to car accidents across the nation Tuesday, while a light-rail train operating in Yongin, south of Seoul, was disrupted for 2 1/2 hours before resuming service at 11:10 a.m.
Cars move at a reduced speed on a section of the Gyeongbu Expressway near Osan, south of Seoul, on Jan. 28, 2025. (Yonhap)
In Jeju, major roads crossing Mount Halla were fully closed.
A total of 111 flights were canceled at airports across the nation as of 11 a.m., including 68 that were due to leave from the country's main international airport in Incheon, west of Seoul, according to the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters.
Fishing vessels and passenger ships connecting islands to inland ports were also suspended, causing inconvenience for those traveling to their hometowns.
Some KTX high-speed train services were running slower than usual for passenger safety amid heavy snow and cold weather, the railway operator said.
The affected train lines are the Gyeongbu, Honam, Gangneung and central services, according to the Korea Railroad Corp.
The entrances to 20 national parks across the country were also cordoned off for safety, officials said.
An electronic board at Seoul Station shows schedule delays for KTX high-speed trains on Jan. 28, 2025, after the railway operator said trains will be slowed due to heavy snow. (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Yoo Jee-ho · January 28, 2025
10. Satellite imagery reveals extensive upgrades at North Korean political prisons
This is the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Satellite imagery reveals extensive upgrades at North Korean political prisons
NK Pro analysis reveals two facilities rebuilt and a third expanded, likely to improve security and handle more inmates
Colin Zwirko | Ifang Bremer January 28, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/pro/satellite-imagery-reveals-extensive-upgrades-at-north-korean-political-prisons/
The newly rebuilt Sinuiju kyohwaso (left) and North Koreans working construction (right) | Images: Airbus via Google Earth (Sept. 13, 2024), Eric Lafforgue (April 2010)
North Korean authorities have demolished and completely rebuilt at least two political prisons and expanded a third, new high-resolution satellite imagery reveals, providing evidence that the DPRK is increasing its capacity to detain citizens.
The reconstruction of detention facilities in Sinuiju, Sariwon and Chonnae since late 2023 is the latest in ongoing efforts by the DPRK regime to upgrade and expand its prisons and concentration camps.
NK Pro was first to report on the upgrades at the three “kyohwaso” facilities last June based on low-resolution imagery, detailing simultaneous new construction in Sinuiju on the Chinese border in the northwest, Sariwon in the southwest and Chonnae on the east coast.
Now, new Airbus high-resolution imagery, taken in Sept. and Oct. 2024 and accessed via Google Earth, shows that the Sinuiju prison, known as Kyohwaso No. 3, has received the most extensive upgrades of the three, likely resulting in increased prisoner capacity.
SINUIJU
The position of the outer walls at Kyohwaso No. 3 has not changed, but old, low-lying buildings inside the 6-hectare (15-acre) compound were demolished to make way for several new multi-story buildings and even underground facilities.
There are now three identical three-story buildings each covering a footprint of about 1,400 square meters (15,000 square feet), as well as a square two-story building covering about 2,725 square meters (30,000 square feet) with a large inner courtyard.
Construction moved fast on the project, with many new large buildings almost complete by last September | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Sept. 13, 2024), edited by NK Pro
An apparent underground section was covered with a new raised foundation by October | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Oct. 11, 2024), edited by NK Pro
The Sinuiju kyohwaso prior to the new upgrade project | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Sept. 6, 2022), edited by NK Pro
Demolition was well underway inside the compound by Feb. 2024 | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Feb. 15, 2024), edited by NK Pro
This closeup shows the H-shaped buildings at the top, apparently for prison cells, as well as the large square building with courtyard on the left and other new structures | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Sept. 13, 2024), edited by NK Pro
Imagery taken on Sept. 13 also reveals a grid of walls built underground and later covered by a raised land section by Oct. 1, pointing to the construction of subterranean structures. By Oct. 20, Planet Labs high-resolution imagery shows roads surrounding these new buildings starting to take shape.
New circular guard towers were built on the perimeter wall, and a new inner partition wall was also built to effectively split the prison into two sections. The larger section, described above, likely houses prisoners and the smaller one possibly contains workshops. New buildings have also been built in this smaller section since the project started at the end of 2023.
South Korean outlet Daily NK previously claimed that authorities ordered upgrades to the Sinuiju facility because the prison was outdated, seeking to prevent escapes and improve detention conditions. But the renovation likely also expands the facility’s capacity.
Yvonne Jewkes, an expert in prison design and architecture at the University of Bath told NK Pro that based on the imagery, “extensive building and reconfiguring have clearly gone on, probably to accommodate more inmates and do so more efficiently.”
“The older photo suggests that the buildings were originally constructed for a different purpose, while the more recent one shows a more conventional prison design, which would be recognizable around the globe,” Jewkes said.
The expert said that it’s hard to tell the exact purpose of each building based on satellite imagery alone, but speculated that “the long arms of the ‘H’ construction could be accommodation, with central services in between.”
SARIWON
Like in Sinuiju, the Sariwon prison (Kyohwaso No. 6) has maintained the same size — 1.1 hectares (2.7 acres) — while demolishing and rebuilding structures inside and building a new guard tower on the outer walls.
The new two-story building inside is not significantly larger than the one it replaced, suggesting the purpose may simply be to establish better quality and more secure facilities.
New construction on the Sariwon kyohwaso does not drastically change its capacity but likely improves security conditions. Other new construction next to the compound is likely related to prison labor or administration. | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (Aug. 28, 2024), edited by NK Pro
New construction on the Sariwon kyohwaso does not drastically change its capacity but likely improves security conditions. Other new construction next to the compound is likely related to prison labor or administration. | Image: Airbus via Google Earth (June 1, 2022), edited by NK Pro
New construction has also taken place right outside the walls, which could be for administrative purposes or related to the forced labor the prisoners are reportedly subjected to.
The 2014 COI report found that the Sariwon facility “has 3,000-4,000 prisoners who are forced to engage in farming and the production of clothing and shoes,” citing interviews with North Korean escapees. It said less is known about the Sinuiju and Chonnae prisons.
CHONNAE
The facility in Chonnae on the east coast, north of Wonsan, is the only one of the three to involve the expansion of prison grounds, with imagery showing its footprint and possibly prisoner capacity has doubled. The name of the prison is unknown.
Old structures within the walls were demolished and new walls were built to increase its size from 1.2 to 2.8 hectares (3 to 7 acres). Six new multi-story rectangular blocks have been built inside the walls, each covering around 1,000 square meters (10,700 square feet), though higher resolution imagery is required to determine their precise height and size.
The Chonnae kyohwaso is the only one of the three projects to involve significant expansion of the walled prison area. The project appeared mostly complete by Jan. 2025. | Image: Planet Labs (Oct. 25, 2024), edited by NK Pro
The Chonnae kyohwaso is the only one of the three projects to involve significant expansion of the walled prison area. The project appeared mostly complete by Jan. 2025. | Image: Planet Labs (Jan. 17, 2025), edited by NK Pro
The Chonnae kyohwaso is the only one of the three projects to involve significant expansion of the walled prison area. The project appeared mostly complete by Jan. 2025. | Image: Planet Labs (Nov. 21, 2023), edited by NK Pro
The Chonnae kyohwaso is the only one of the three projects to involve significant expansion of the walled prison area. The project appeared mostly complete by Jan. 2025. | Image: Planet Labs (June 20, 2024), edited by NK Pro
Since NK Pro’s last report in June 2024, there does not appear to have been new construction at the dozen or so other known comparable facilities around the country besides the above three, though it’s possible new ones have been built at locations not yet discovered.
As of late January, Planet Labs medium-resolution imagery suggests the Sinuiju, Sariwon and Chonnae projects are nearly but not yet complete.
North Korea’s penal system consists of three types of facilities: pre-trial detention centers (kuryujang), reeducation facilities (kyohwaso) and long-term prison camps (kwalliso).
North Korea has always denied the existence of kwalliso camps but has acknowledged the operation of kyohwaso, describing them as detention facilities where criminals undergo labor-based reform.
NK Pro previously reported that under Kim Jong Un the DPRK has not only upgraded its kyohwaso but in recent years also expanded and renovated at least two kwalliso camps — the most extreme concentration camps where families can be detained for generations.
While the North Korean government has not reported on its efforts to overhaul its detention facilities, the upgrades come as Kim Jong Un has stressed efforts to crack down on “anti-socialist” crimes such as enjoying foreign cultural materials.
Leaked videos have shown mass trials of young students, with the goal of the crackdown to safeguard Kim’s dictatorial rule for years to come.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. Leader of Belarus says he plans to visit North Korea to ‘diversify’ ties
This is diversity in the axis of chaos - DEI for the tyrannies. (note sarcasm)
Leader of Belarus says he plans to visit North Korea to ‘diversify’ ties
Statement by Lukashenko comes after DPRK leader’s sister denied that Pyongyang had proposed a summit
https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/leader-of-belarus-says-he-plans-to-visit-north-korea-to-diversify-ties/
Anton Sokolin January 27, 2025
ALexander Lukashenko during a press conference on Jan. 26, 2024 | Image: Press Service of the President of Belarus
Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko has announced plans to visit North Korea in a bid to “diversify” trade, shortly after the DPRK leader’s sister denied that Pyongyang had proposed a top-level summit between the two countries.
“In the near future, we are planning visits — we will settle on the timing later — to the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and many other countries,” Lukashenko told journalists on Sunday as the country held a presidential election.
The autocratic leader once again won the popular vote by a landslide of 87%, securing his seventh term in office since coming to power in 1994. But the EU has decried the election as a “sham,” stating that there were only “pro forma” candidates to challenge Lukashenko and accusing him of violating human rights and democratic principles.
At Sunday’s press conference, Lukashenko said that his international trips aim to “safeguard” the Belarusian economy and “diversify” ties in expectation of a tough year ahead.
He acknowledged Belarus’ dependence on Russia, stating that the war in Ukraine negatively impacts the Russian economy. He also noted the West’s pressure on China — the country’s other key trading partner.
The Belarusian economy will likely face difficulties this year regardless of progress in ending the Ukraine war, he said, stressing the need for diversification.
“The foreign trade turnover is colossal, amounting to billions of dollars. Enterprises have expanded and are producing everything from integrated circuits to agricultural machinery and foodstuffs,” he said, likely hinting at the items Belarus seeks to market abroad, including to North Korea.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, said that Lukashenko is “famous for his wily maneuvering,” noting that Belarus has received “large benefits such as subsidized natural gas” as Russia’s ally “without actually doing much in return.”
“Lukashenko has refused to provide any military support for Putin’s efforts in Ukraine,” the expert told NK News. “By contrast, North Korea has done much more for Russia, but so far received less.”
The DPRK has sent ballistic missiles, artillery shells and troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine in recent years.
The Belarussian leader’s announcement came less than a week after Kim Yo Jong, an unofficial spokesperson for the DPRK leader, rebuked him for claiming that North Korea was seeking to hold “highest-level meetings” with Minsk.
On Jan. 17, Lukashenko said that the summit would aim to discuss joint cooperation, including issues of “mutual settlements, supplies of our military products [and] firefighting equipment,” according to his website.
Kim said she was aware of Belarus’ aspirations to hold “the top-level contact” with North Korea “from at least two years ago,” but stressed that Minsk had to clarify its “intention correctly” and demonstrate “veracity and frankness.”
Leaving the door open for dialogue, Kim expressed North Korea’s readiness to “welcome with joy the Belarusian side” if Minsk is interested in “friendly and cooperative relations.”
Monday assessed that North Korea is signaling that it expects concrete benefits from Lukashenko’s visit and is uninterested in “just photo ops” that could jeopardize its ties with Russia and China.
“North Korea plays the same kind of diplomatic maneuvering games as Belarus and so is not so naive as to let Lukashenko get away with an empty PR trip,” he explained. “With Trump in power, the price has gone up for meetings with Kim.”
Belarus and North Korea maintain bilateral ties, though only Pyongyang has an embassy in Minsk. Belarus sent a foreign minister to visit North Korea for the first time last July.
In 2023, Lukashenko called for launching trilateral cooperation with Russia and North Korea in talks with Vladimir Putin, right after the Russian president held a summit with Kim Jong Un at a spaceport in the Russian Far East.
Meanwhile, Moscow and Pyongyang have continued humanitarian exchanges into the new year, with North Korea sending a delegation from Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology to Russia last week.
Edited Bryan Betts
12. Experts: “South Korea’s own nuclear armament would undermine the US-ROK alliance” ∙∙∙ Opinions differ on the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons
This is a Google translation of a VOA report.
My previous comments on support to Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy still apply.
Experts: “South Korea’s own nuclear armament would undermine the US-ROK alliance” ∙∙∙ Opinions differ on the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons
2025.1.28
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7952306.html
Since President Trump referred to North Korea as a “nuclear state,” US experts have predicted that the growing debate over South Korea’s own nuclear armament will have a negative impact on the US-ROK alliance and regional stability. Regarding the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into the Korean Peninsula, there have been mixed views, with some saying that the Trump administration will consider the necessity amidst growing threats from China and North Korea, while others say that the actual feasibility is low. Reporter Ahn Jun-ho reports.
Robert Peters, Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
Robert Peters, a researcher at the Heritage Foundation's Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense Research Center and former special adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Defense on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), said on the 27th regarding South Korea's own nuclear armament, "It would cause serious tension in the South Korea-U.S. alliance," and "the U.S. government will not support it."
“The United States has opposed nuclear proliferation since the 1960s,” Peters said in a telephone interview with VOA that day. “The United States has opposed new countries becoming nuclear powers, and that trend will not change.”
He continued, “If South Korea pursues independent nuclear armament, it could trigger other countries to follow the same path, which could worsen the security situation in Northeast Asia,” and “More broadly, it could potentially worsen the security situation throughout the Western Pacific.”
[Recording: Researcher Peters] “And so the concern is that if South Korea went to get its own independent arsenal, it may well trigger other countries to do the same and worsening the security situation in Northeast Asia but then also potentially the Western Pacific writ “large.”
“Not only North Korea, but also China will not sit idly by and watch South Korea become an independent nuclear-armed state,” said Peters. “There is a possibility that they will take some kind of dramatic action.”
He then warned that it would take time for South Korea to acquire combat-ready nuclear weapons, and that if it did decide to arm itself with nuclear weapons, it would likely become an even bigger target.
Since US President Donald Trump referred to North Korea as a “nuclear power” immediately after his inauguration on the 20th, calls for a “North-South nuclear balance” have spread among South Koreans, and demands for South Korea’s own nuclear armament or the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons have also spread.
Na Kyung-won, a member of the ruling People Power Party, recently argued, “Now that the U.S. is attempting to recognize North Korea as a de facto nuclear state, our choice is clear,” and “Now is the time for a nuclear balance strategy and South Korea’s own nuclear armament.”
“Possibility of Discussing Reintroduction of US Tactical Nuclear Weapons into the Korean Peninsula”
Researcher Peters predicted that while the Trump administration would oppose South Korea's push for its own nuclear armament, the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula would soon be discussed by the new administration.
“There is a recognition within the new administration that America’s global nuclear deterrence posture is inadequate to meet the challenges we face today,” said Peters. “The question of redeploying American nuclear weapons to South Korea will be something the new administration will absolutely have to consider.”
[Recording: Researcher Peters] “But I think that there's a sense that the US nuclear deterrence posture globally it is not sufficient for the challenges that we see today. And so as a consequence, I think that these are going to be issues in particular for stationing US nuclear weapons potentially in Korea that the new administration is going to have to exam.”
In order to respond to the growing threats from China and North Korea, it is necessary to reexamine the US nuclear deterrence posture in Northeast Asia, and to this end, the US government will consider redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula.
“The reintroduction of US non-strategic nuclear weapons into the region will strengthen the US-South Korea alliance, which will help resolve the security situation,” said Peters.
“Self-nuclear armament raises concerns about the spread of nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia”
Former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Harry Harris
Harry Harris, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea who served as commander of the Pacific Command, said that South Korea's own nuclear armament and redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is not a good idea.
In a written response to VOA's inquiries that day, former Ambassador Harris stated that her position on this issue has not changed.
Former Ambassador Harris said at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April last year, “Neither independent nuclear armament (by South Korea and Japan) nor the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is a good idea,” and “We need to convince them that the U.S.’s extended deterrence promise is credible.”
Former Ambassador Harris has also maintained the position that South Korea's pursuit of its own nuclear armament could trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia and have a negative impact on global nonproliferation efforts.
Former Ambassador Harris emphasized on the day, “This all has to do with the Washington declaration on extended deterrence,” adding, “Ultimately, it is a question of trust.”
Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, said in response to VOA's question on the same day that "the U.S. government will oppose South Korea's own nuclear armament," and predicted that pursuing its own nuclear armament would have a ripple effect on the U.S.-South Korea alliance and security in the region.
It also diagnosed that South Korea's own nuclear armament could weaken the Korea-US alliance and lead to the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.
“US tactical nuclear weapons are limited in quantity and have no storage facilities”
Bruce Bennett, Senior Researcher, RAND Corporation
Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at the Rand Corporation, pointed out that the reintroduction of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula would not be easy either.
In a phone call with VOA that day, Senior Researcher Bennett said, “The U.S. has decided to drastically reduce the size of its tactical nuclear weapons, which it currently possesses are around 200, 100 of which are in Europe.” He predicted, “Unless the U.S. decides to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons that it has not yet dismantled, the possibility of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons being deployed in South Korea is very low.”
He continued, “The United States may redeploy a few tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, but there are currently no nuclear weapons storage facilities in South Korea.”
The explanation is that although there were nuclear weapons storage facilities until the 1990s, they were not modernized after the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea, so even if tactical nuclear weapons were reintroduced, there would be no suitable place to store them.
[Recording: Senior Researcher Bennett] “Maybe the US could send a few. But the other problem in doing that is there’s currently no storage in Korea for nuclear weapons.”
“Redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons requires reinforcement of US forces , unlikely”
Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation
Bruce Klingner, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation and former deputy director for Korea affairs at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said in a phone interview with VOA that day that it is premature to predict the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, including the Korean Peninsula, as “the Trump administration has not even held a review session for its Indo-Pacific strategy, which will take months.”
He added, “President Trump supported South Korea and Japan’s pursuit of nuclear armament during the 2016 presidential campaign, but has not said much more recently.”
“President Trump seems more interested in reducing the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea than in providing new weapons systems or defense commitments to Korea,” said Senior Researcher Klinger. “Increasing the number of U.S. troops is needed to operate and defend tactical nuclear weapons, but President Trump will not try to increase the number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea.”
[Recording: Senior Researcher Klingner] “So I think it'd be less likely that Trump would be willing to increase our presence there because that would require an increase in US forces, presumably in order to operate and defend those nuclear weapons.”
He also said, “If the South Korean government is replaced by a Democratic Party government, the Democratic Party is more likely to not want to arm itself with nuclear weapons or redeploy tactical nuclear weapons because it opposes civilian nuclear power plants.”
This is Ahn Jun-ho from VOA News.
13. Trump's 2nd term foreign affairs and defense chiefs confirmed… somewhat low interest in Korean Peninsula
I think Secretary Rubio remains interested in Korean affairs.
But it may not be a bad thing not to publicly focus on Korea at the moment, especially if the Administration plans on implementing a radical new strategy which a number of us have recommended. A lot of work needs to be done in the background.
This is a Google trasnaltion of a VOA report.
Trump's 2nd term foreign affairs and defense chiefs confirmed… somewhat low interest in Korean Peninsula
2025.1.28
https://www.voakorea.com/a/7952370.html
Just a week after US President Donald Trump took office, the top diplomacy and defense officials have been confirmed by the Senate and are getting down to business. While they have declared that they will prioritize China issues, they are showing relatively little interest in the Korean Peninsula. Reporter Lee Jo-eun reports.
The U.S. Senate confirmed Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense on the 24th.
The nomination was narrowly approved with 50 votes in favor and 50 against, with Vice President J.D. Vance, who also serves as Senate President, casting the yes vote.
Earlier, on the 20th, the day of President Trump's inauguration, the Senate unanimously approved the confirmation of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, and on the 23rd, it approved the confirmation of John Ratcliffe as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency by a vote of 74 to 25.
As Trump's second term foreign policy, defense, and intelligence chiefs begin their work in earnest, attention is also focused on how the Korean Peninsula policy will unfold.
But they have shown relatively little interest in Korean Peninsula issues during recent confirmation hearings.
John Ratcliffe, nominee for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, speaks during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 15, 2024.
At his confirmation hearing on the 15th, Director Ratcliffe did not make any comments on issues related to the Korean Peninsula, including North Korea. Instead, he briefly pointed out in written responses that North Korea's military capabilities and cyber threats are increasing.
Secretary Hegseth also did not make any specific comments on the Korean Peninsula issue during his confirmation hearing, instead pointing out North Korea's nuclear and missile threats and its growing cyber capabilities in his written response.
This is in contrast to former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, who during the Biden administration's confirmation hearing specifically stated his intention to cooperate with regional allies, including South Korea, and expressed a clear position on defense cost issues with South Korea.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio is congratulated after being sworn in by Vice President J.D. Vance at the Eisenhower Government Complex in Washington, U.S., January 21, 2025.
The only person who has shown interest in the Korean Peninsula issue is Secretary Rubio.
At his confirmation hearing on the 15th, Secretary Rubio emphasized that regarding North Korea policy, “We have to consider everything,” and “We have to look at what we can do to reduce the risk of accidental war between South Korea and North Korea, and perhaps now Japan, and ultimately the United States.”
[Recording: Nominee Rubio] “Looking at the policy and seeing what can we now do that stabilizes the situation, that lowers the risk of an inadvertent war, be it between South Korea and North Korea, maybe including Japan at this point and ultimately the United States,
The low level of interest in the Korean Peninsula issue revealed during the confirmation hearing also reflects the atmosphere in Congress, where Republicans control both houses of Congress.
During the recent series of confirmation hearings, the only lawmaker to ask the nominee a question about the Korean Peninsula was Democratic Senator Brian Schatz, who asked, “What do you think of the U.S. policy toward North Korea, which has failed to stop the North’s development of nuclear and missile capabilities?”
Robert King, former State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights issues
Robert King, a former State Department special envoy for North Korean human rights issues who served in Congress for 25 years, said it is true that the Trump administration has not made much mention of South Korea, adding that “what Trump is most concerned about is China, and I think he will be very tough on China.”
[Recording: Former Special Envoy King] “The Trump administration hasn’t said very much about Korea… I think China is the one that is the most concerning to Trump. I think he'll be tough on China..he'll be very anxious to try to accommodate Putin...The Ukraine problem is going to continue... I think there are going to be some problems there.”
He added that the issues with Russia and Ukraine will continue to be of great concern to the Trump administration, and that they are not easy to resolve.
[Recording: Former Special Envoy King] “I think part of the problem is that Trump made a real effort to try to do something with Kim Jong Un and he failed. So highlighting Korea right now is only going to bring back a very serious failure of his first administration. And so, unless there’s some new exciting development of some kind... I think he probably doesn’t have much interest in highlighting Korea at this point.”
Meanwhile, the Trump administration and Republicans said they “don’t seem to have much interest in highlighting Korea at this time unless there are some new and interesting developments” regarding the Korean Peninsula issue.
In fact, State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce said in a press release on the 24th that Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that the Trump administration will pursue a U.S.-China relationship that advances U.S. interests and puts the American people first.
Secretary Hegseth also sent a message to all U.S. troops on the 25th, saying that President Trump gave a clear mission to achieve “peace through strength,” and especially emphasized cooperation with Indo-Pacific allies to check China.
This is Lee Jo-eun from VOA News.
14. US Department of Defense: “ROK-US joint training to be conducted as scheduled”
It is important that the Administration not heed the advice of the uninformed pundits on cancelling exercises who have no understanding of the nature, objectivesa, and strategy of the Kim family regime let alone of US and ROK military operations.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
US Department of Defense: “ROK-US joint training to be conducted as scheduled”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/us-defense-plans-to-conduct-south-korea-us-joint-drills-01272025135901.html
WASHINGTON-Lee Sang-min lees@rfa.org
2025.01.27
In March 2015, a joint ROK-US military exercise was conducted in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province.
/ AP
A U.S. Department of Defense official familiar with the ROK-U.S. joint military exercise plan said on the 27th that this year's ROK-U.S. joint military exercise will be conducted as scheduled .
The official told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the same day, adding that it could change depending on the situation of the re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump and the impeachment of South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol .
Currently, there are plans to conduct the scheduled ROK-US military exercises, but it is noteworthy that this leaves open the possibility that the joint exercises may be suspended in the future depending on President Trump's judgment .
This is interpreted as a position that there may be changes to the schedule for the planned ROK-US military exercises depending on the political situation in Korea, where the impeachment trial of President Yoon Seok-yeol is currently underway .
Since President Trump's re-election, some have voiced their opinion that he may suspend large-scale joint ROK-US military exercises during his second term, just as he did during his first term to facilitate negotiations with North Korea .
Fred Fleitz, vice president of the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and former chief of staff to the White House National Security Council (NSC) during the first term of Trump , told RFA on the 24th that “ if there is a possibility of good-faith negotiations with North Korea, there would be no harm in pausing the exercises for a while . ”
Meanwhile, President Trump expressed his position that he would try to contact North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un again in an interview with Fox News broadcast on the 23rd .
Trump's closest aide: "Considering suspending South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises" Will Trump suspend large-scale South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises again ?
Meanwhile , in a statement released on the 26th , North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioned the joint South Korea-U.S. air force training exercise that took place from the 21st to the 24th, and insisted that since the U.S. rejects North Korea's sovereignty and security interests, it must respond with an extremely hard-line stance against the U.S.
In response, it is being analyzed that North Korea sent a message to President Trump that if he wants to talk, he should cancel the joint training .
Editor Park Jeong-woo , Web Editor Lee Gyeong-ha
15. [Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Trump, Dispatch of Special Envoy to North Korea Possible Soon"
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
I do not think the President is ready to dispatch a special envoy to north Korea nor do I think Kim would receive one. I think we need to remember that President Trump does not communicate normal diplomatic language so we should not assess his words from the conventional diplomatic perspective. I wish we could channel his business negotiation skills to focus on political warfare against our adversaries. His skils could come in handy in support of a political warfare strategy because hedoes not use conventional diplomatic language.
Excerpts:
[ Reporter ] President Trump directly said, “ I will contact Kim Jong-un . ” This also suggests a US-North Korea dialogue or a US-North Korea summit . There is also interest in how General Secretary Kim will react to this . What is your outlook, sir ?
[ Lee Jung-ho ] In order to predict Kim Jong-un’s reaction, we need to consider his psychological state and the internal environment of the North Korean regime. Kim Jong-un is an isolated dictator , but he is strengthening his propaganda of greatness both domestically and internationally in order to solidify his authority and the legitimacy of his regime . In that sense, President Trump’s direct mention of “ I will contact you ” is likely to be seen as an attractive offer to Kim Jong-un . For Kim Jong-un, the summit with President Trump will be a symbolic tool for propaganda of his regime. The mere fact that he will meet the president of the United States, the world’s most powerful country, on equal footing will be very effective in shedding his image as an isolated leader and in greatly promoting his authority and leadership .
In addition, there is already a personal relationship and symbolism between President Trump and Kim Jong-un formed through past summits. The two sides have been exchanging indirect messages of respect for each other through 'personal letter diplomacy', which increases the possibility that Kim Jong-un will seriously consider Trump's proposal. In particular, Kim Jong-un will likely recognize that contact with President Trump will not only strengthen his international standing, but also provide a new opportunity for easing economic sanctions, improving foreign relations, and recognition as a nuclear state .
Another interesting clue is that President Trump showed interest in North Korea's Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone. His indirect mention of North Korea's economic development project ( business ) suggests that there may have been unofficial signals exchanged between the two leaders. This could also strengthen Kim Jong-un's motivation to come to the negotiating table. For this reason, Kim Jong-un is likely to 'play it safe' with President Trump's remarks , but in reality, he will likely respond positively, as this suits his strategic calculations. However, regarding the content of the talks or actual progress, it is expected that Kim Jong-un will still be thoroughly prepared to maximize his own interests.
[Room 39, Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes] "Trump, Dispatch of Special Envoy to North Korea Possible Soon"
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/north-korea-trump-presidential-summit-envoy-pyongyang-01272025150650.html
WASHINGTON-Noh Jeong-min nohj@rfa.org
2025.01.27
U.S. President Donald Trump answers reporters' questions as he signs executive orders in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., on January 20.
/AFP
00:00 /12:56
“Hello . I am Ri Jeong-ho, a former high-ranking official from the Daeheung General Bureau of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers’ Party.”
[ Based on the experience of a former high-ranking North Korean official, we dig into the secrets of the Kim Jong-un regime and its core power circles , examine the truth and lies of North Korea's policies today, and analyze politics , economy , and society through 'Room 39 , Lee Jeong-ho's Eyes' , with Lee Jeong-ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center (KPDC) .]
“ At this point, President Trump seems very willing to talk to Kim Jong-un , and Kim Jong-un seems to be secretly welcoming it . In this context , it is quite possible that President Trump’s special envoy will visit Pyongyang in February .”
As US President Donald Trump said in an interview with Fox News on the 23rd that he would “ contact Kim Jong-un, ” the possibility of resuming US-North Korea talks and a summit is growing . There is speculation that North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un may also be secretly welcoming this .
“ What President Trump can achieve from the US-North Korea summit and the criteria for success will depend on his strategic approach and negotiating skills . But I think there are some key outcomes that can realistically be discussed .”
If another North Korea-US summit were to take place, what would President Trump and General Secretary Kim demand from each other and what would they receive ? It seems like a war of words has begun again between the two leaders .
“ Kim Jong-un will respond to US-North Korea talks by ‘ pretending not to win ’ ”
[ Reporter ] Hello, Mr. Lee Jeong-ho. From the day of his inauguration, US President Donald Trump has mentioned North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un . He even said in an interview with Fox News on the 23rd that he would “ contact Kim Jong-un . ” Although this was somewhat expected , why do you think President Trump is taking such an active stance ?
[ Lee Jung-ho ] President Trump has shown his will to solve international issues through a unique diplomatic method that emphasizes personal relationships between leaders. He also positively evaluated his relationship with Kim Jong-un during his presidential campaign , and immediately after his inauguration, he expressed his expectations that Kim Jong-un would welcome his return . These actions are related to President Trump’s strong will to complete the unfinished task of “ solving the North Korean issue , ” which he attempted during his first term . In particular , it seems related to the fact that Kim Jong-un has continuously sent letters expressing his friendliness to President Trump and has been making his presence felt .
Also, President Trump’s remarks on Kim Jong-un may be deeply connected to the Russia-Ukraine war. Given that North Korea is providing weapons to Russia and the North Korean military is participating in the war, his message seems to have a strong strategic intention to crack Russia’s will to wage war through Kim Jong-un. At the same time, it can also be interpreted as reflecting a political calculation to re-emphasize his presence on the international diplomatic stage. I think this approach by President Trump shows that he emphasizes international leadership while continuously pursuing a strategy that is different from the existing diplomatic method.
[ Reporter ] President Trump directly said, “ I will contact Kim Jong-un . ” This also suggests a US-North Korea dialogue or a US-North Korea summit . There is also interest in how General Secretary Kim will react to this . What is your outlook, sir ?
[ Lee Jung-ho ] In order to predict Kim Jong-un’s reaction, we need to consider his psychological state and the internal environment of the North Korean regime. Kim Jong-un is an isolated dictator , but he is strengthening his propaganda of greatness both domestically and internationally in order to solidify his authority and the legitimacy of his regime . In that sense, President Trump’s direct mention of “ I will contact you ” is likely to be seen as an attractive offer to Kim Jong-un . For Kim Jong-un, the summit with President Trump will be a symbolic tool for propaganda of his regime. The mere fact that he will meet the president of the United States, the world’s most powerful country, on equal footing will be very effective in shedding his image as an isolated leader and in greatly promoting his authority and leadership .
In addition, there is already a personal relationship and symbolism between President Trump and Kim Jong-un formed through past summits. The two sides have been exchanging indirect messages of respect for each other through 'personal letter diplomacy', which increases the possibility that Kim Jong-un will seriously consider Trump's proposal. In particular, Kim Jong-un will likely recognize that contact with President Trump will not only strengthen his international standing, but also provide a new opportunity for easing economic sanctions, improving foreign relations, and recognition as a nuclear state .
Another interesting clue is that President Trump showed interest in North Korea's Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone. His indirect mention of North Korea's economic development project ( business ) suggests that there may have been unofficial signals exchanged between the two leaders. This could also strengthen Kim Jong-un's motivation to come to the negotiating table. For this reason, Kim Jong-un is likely to 'play it safe' with President Trump's remarks , but in reality, he will likely respond positively, as this suits his strategic calculations. However, regarding the content of the talks or actual progress, it is expected that Kim Jong-un will still be thoroughly prepared to maximize his own interests.
North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un toured several completed hotels and auxiliary facilities in the Galma Coastal Tourist Zone (Wonsan City) that were completed on the 29th of last month, the Korean Central News Agency reported on the 31st. The inspection was accompanied by Pak Tae-song, who was appointed as the new North Korean Prime Minister, and his daughter Ju-ae. / Yonhap News
[ Reporter ] Some experts predict that General Secretary Kim will not readily respond to US-North Korea talks . First of all, he has a strong backer in Russia , and his nuclear capabilities have also grown since the first term of the Trump administration . How do you evaluate this observation from North Korea’s perspective ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] There is some truth to the observation that Kim Jong-un will not readily respond to US-North Korea talks and the prediction that talks are possible in the second half of this year . If Kim Jong-un meets with President Trump , there will certainly be some burdensome aspects . However, from North Korea’s perspective , the current situation cannot be explained simply by relying on strengthening nuclear capabilities or relations with Russia to gain confidence .
Kim Jong-un is currently facing the realistic challenge of North Korea’s severe economic crisis and international isolation. Securing supporters like Russia and showing off nuclear capabilities may be effective strategies for maintaining the regime, but easing sanctions on North Korea and external economic support are essential to solve fundamental economic problems. To this end, Kim Jong-un has no choice but to have a dialogue with President Trump, who is friendly to him. At this point, President Trump seems very willing to have a dialogue with Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-un seems to be secretly welcoming it. In this context, it is quite possible that President Trump’s special envoy will visit Pyongyang in February. However, even if actual US-North Korea dialogue takes place, the content and results are separate issues, and the two sides’ interests may be sharply divided.
US Experts: “ US-North Korea , Underwater Contacts, Exploratory Warfare Already Begin ” “ Trump’s ‘ North Korea Possesses Nuclear Weapons ’ Statement is a Calculated Inducement ”
Trump : “ I will contact Kim Jong-un again ”… South Korea: “ I urge North Korea to resume dialogue ”
Kim Jong - un's sincerity tested by returning the USS Pueblo and operating rights to the Wonsan Kalma area
[ Reporter ] If the US-North Korea summit is held , what can President Trump receive from North Korea ? And to what extent can the summit be considered a success ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] What President Trump can achieve from the US-North Korea summit and the criteria for success will depend on his strategic approach and negotiating skills. However, I believe that several key agenda items can be realistically discussed .
First, the return of the USS Pueblo . The Pueblo, which was captured by North Korea in 1968 , is a symbolic asset that holds American pride, and its return could be a major political victory for President Trump. Given that North Korea has long used it for anti-American propaganda, the return of the US warship could be interpreted as a signal that Kim Jong-un is seriously considering improving relations with the United States.
Second, it is a demand to irreversibly dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear facility. This is a proposal that Kim Jong-un made at the 2019 Hanoi summit, so it seems like a negotiable card. Even if the Yongbyon nuclear facility is old, completely dismantling it could be recorded as the biggest denuclearization achievement for the United States since the 1994 Geneva Agreement. It could also be considered a fatal defeat for North Korea internally, revealing the weakness of the regime.
Third, regarding the Wonsan Galma Coastal Tourist Zone, it is an unprecedented proposal to hand over the 50- year operating rights to the United States . This will be a symbolic measure to Kim Jong-un to show the openness of the North Korean economy. Based on this, President Trump can induce actual opening by promising economic cooperation and support with North Korea.
And finally, fourth, a concrete roadmap ( implementation plan ) for North Korea's denuclearization and a promise to normalize US-North Korea relations will be the final and most important goals of the talks. However, the possibility that Kim Jong-un will accept such an agreement is close to zero. Nevertheless, it is very meaningful for the US president to make such a proposal .
U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un leave the signing ceremony for a joint statement at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa Island in Singapore on June 12, 2018. / Yonhap News
[ Reporter ] You made a very unconventional proposal . Then , what would General Secretary Kim have to get from his meeting with President Trump to be considered a success ? And how much could he get from the United States ?
[ Lee Jeong-ho ] The first and second goals that Kim Jong-un wants to achieve from his meeting with President Trump are to ensure the stability and survival of the regime . At the same time , the focus will likely be on securing tangible results that can overcome economic difficulties .
First, Kim Jong-un is likely to demand sanctions relief linked to denuclearization. In particular, he is likely to propose sanctions relief for major foreign currency earners such as coal , minerals , textiles , and labor exports . He will also attempt to reach an international agreement to be recognized as a nuclear state by the United States and to secure the security of the regime through nuclear disarmament negotiations . This could include banning military threats against North Korea, reducing or suspending joint military exercises between South Korea and the United States, and withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea.
Kim Jong-un may try to link the resumption of Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone or Mt. Kumgang tourism with the United States. Through this, he will try to create a window for earning foreign currency and improve his external image . In addition, I think Kim Jong-un will likely try to establish a US liaison office in Pyongyang or draw a concrete agreement to start diplomatic exchanges between Pyongyang and Washington. This will play an important role in helping North Korea overcome its image of isolation in the international community and stabilize its regime. He may also demand a peace declaration between the US and North Korea or a formal end to the Korean War.
Ultimately, for Kim Jong-un, the success criteria for the North Korea-US summit will be to achieve tangible results that can stabilize the regime, provide an economic breakthrough, and enhance the international status. All of these demands should be viewed as strategic approaches to achieve the fundamental goal of regime survival.
[ Reporter ] Yes . So far, we have been analyzing President Trump’s statement that he will “ contact Kim Jong-un ” and the possibility of resuming US-North Korea dialogue with Lee Jung -ho, head of the Korea Prosperity Development Center and former high-ranking official of Room 39 of the North Korean Workers ’ Party . Thank you for your words today , Lee Jung-ho .
This is Jeongmin Noh of RFA Radio Free Asia .
Editor Park Bong-hyeon, Web Editor Kim Sang-il
16. North Koreans ask: Why are our soldiers fighting Ukraine when ‘main enemy’ is US?
Kim family regime "101": externalize your problems with the perception of external threats. This is necessary for "blame" and to justify the suffering and sacrifice of not only soldiers but of the entire population of north Korea.
This is a Google translation of an RFA report.
North Koreans ask: Why are our soldiers fighting Ukraine when ‘main enemy’ is US?
State media and education system distort history and geopolitical situation to blame Washington for current woes.
https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/01/28/north-korea-russia-soldier-deployment-reason/
By Ahn Chang Gyu for RFA Korean
2025.01.27
Soldiers, presumed to be North Korean, are lined up to receive supplies from the Russian military, Oct. 2024. (SPRAVDI)
Read a version of this story in Korean
North Koreans are questioning why the country’s soldiers are being sent to Russia to fight against Ukraine when they have been told all their lives that their main enemy is the United States, residents told Radio Free Asia.
The Pentagon and South Korean intelligence estimate that Pyongyang has deployed around 12,000 troops to Russia, but Pyongyang and Moscow have not openly acknowledged this, and there is no news of it in state media.
But by now, most people have learned about the deployment by word of mouth as news has trickled into the country from North Koreans working in China or other countries.
The news has puzzled North Koreans, who are discreetly discussing it among themselves, source say.
One resident of the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA Korean that he recently talked about it with two friends.
“We reasoned that if they had been dispatched to Russia then they must be fighting Ukraine, but why should we be fighting Ukraine? That was the main point of our discussion,” he said.
Enemy #1
From an early age, North Koreans are taught that the United States is its main enemy -- and South Korea is close behind because it is a “puppet” of Washington.
North Korean propaganda blames the United States for dividing Korea after World War II and starting the 1950-53 Korean War -- both of which are inaccurate in the view of most historians.
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Although prior to the end of World War II, Washington did propose the 38th parallel as the divider between U.S. and Soviet zones to accept the eventual surrender of former colonizer Japan, it was never intended to be a permanent national border.
And while there were frequent skirmishes between North and South Korean forces in the years prior to the Korean War, most historians agree that it was the North who invaded the South in 1950.
Today, North Korea’s many economic woes are also blamed on U.S. sanctions, which have been imposed over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs. The United Nations also has put sanctions on the country.
“The authorities are always trying to make us hate America, saying that they are our bitter enemies with whom we cannot share the same sky,” the resident said.
“But now that our soldiers have gone to war against Ukraine, people are wondering why we are fighting Ukraine instead of America,” he said.
‘Why do we have a new enemy?’
Similar secret discussions are going on all over the country, including in the northern province of Ryanggang, a resident there told RFA on condition of anonymity to speak freely.
“If you look at recent newspapers and broadcasts, they say that Ukraine is a puppet government,” he said. “I am curious why the authorities are suddenly calling Ukraine a puppet and when did Ukraine become our enemy?”
He said authorities still emphasize that the United States is enemy #1.
“According to their logic, our soldiers should only be sent into battle to fight the Americans, but in reality they are covering up that we’re fighting against Ukraine,” he said. “I don’t understand.”
The fact that these soldiers are fighting an enemy other than the United States or South Korea is making people question if Washington really is the main foe, the Ryanggang resident said.
“Who is our enemy? Why do we have a new enemy?” he asked. “This confrontational view toward the Americans -- which the authorities have attempted to instill in the people -- is wavering.”
Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.
17. Ukraine Destroyed a Bizarre New DPRK Missile System
Ukraine Destroyed a Bizarre New DPRK Missile System
The system is considered to be a game changer for Russian anti tank capabilities.
The National Interest · by Adam Lammon · January 27, 2025
Topic: Security
Blog Brand: The Buzz
Region: Europe
January 27, 2025
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The system is considered to be a game changer for Russian anti tank capabilities.
Moscow’s growing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK; also known as North Korea) have become a challenge for Europe as North Korean troops have joined the war in Ukraine. Accordingly, the Russian Federation and the DPRK have established a sort of symbiosis in terms of supplying one another with weapons; for example, Russia is furnishing at least some of North Korea’s in-country soldiers with fifth-generation AK-12 rifles; in return, North Korea is providing Russia with sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) such as the Bulsae-4.
The Basics Behind the Bulsae-4
The story about this missile system comes to us courtesy of a report in The Daily Digest—republished on MSM on January 25, 2025—titled “A strange new North Korean weapon was destroyed by Ukraine.” To wit:
“On November 30 [2024], combat footage released by the Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade via the unit’s Telegram channel showed the destruction of a very unconventional North Korean weapon being used by Russian forces in Ukraine … The weapon in question was a Bulsae-4 Anti-Tank Guided Missile system. It was taken out by an attack drone in the Kharkiv region according to a report by Defense Post. But what was a North Korean Bulsae-4 doing fighting on the frontlines of Ukraine? … North Korea has been providing material and military assistance to Russia since 2023. However, the first reports that the advanced North Korean Bulsae-4 system had made its way into Russian hands came in July 2024.”
According to a December 3, 2024, article in The Defense Post by Joe Saballa, the Ukrainians used a so-called “Windbreaker suicide drone” to kill the Bulsae-4. However, when I searched for “Windbreaker drone” and “Windbreaker UAV” online, no such unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) by that name came up; the closest moniker I found was the Windracers Uncrewed Low-cost Transport (ULTRA), a British-made drone that, according to Janes Defence Weekly, “has been conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and supporting resupply for the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 2023.” (So, perhaps Saballa committed a Freudian slip?)
Bulsae-4 (“Phoenix-4”) Initial Specifications
The Bulsae-4 made its public debut (on DPRK state television) in 2016. The original iteration of the Bulsae (which for whatever reason was given the official numeric designation of Bulsae-2 instead of Bulsae-1) came out in 1988; it was a copy of the Soviet 9K111 “Fagot” (“bassoon,” not to be confused with the NATO English reporting name of “Fagot” that describes the Soviet-designed MiG-15 fighter jet that fought in the Korean War).
The weapons system is mounted on an M-2010 6×6 wheeled armored vehicle, and reportedly the munitions have an effective range of 25 kilometers (15.5 miles). Additional technical specs of the “Phoenix-4” come to us courtesy of Army Recognition:
- Armament: eight x Launch Containers (Tubes)
- Crew: two or three
- Vehicle speed: 90 km/h road speed
- Length: 6.5 meters
- Width: 2.9 meters
- Height: 7 meters
- Weight: 14,200 kg
- Vehicle range: 500 km
Long-Term Implications?
The Military Watch Magazine editorial staff assesses these implications thusly in a January 7, 2025 report:
“The system is considered to be rivalled only by the Chinese HJ-10 in its performance, thus representing a game changer for Russian anti tank capabilities, although as a relatively new addition to the North Korean inventory it remains uncertain in what numbers they may be available. The sheer scale of North Korean arms transfers to Russia is expected to provide a major boon to the East Asian state’s economy, and potentially provide funding for further modernisation of its defence sector and the accelerated development of new generations of weapons systems.” [emphasis added]
Time will tell, so stay tuned, dear readers.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr
Christian D. Orr was previously a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.
Image: Shutterstock.
The National Interest · by Adam Lammon · January 27, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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