Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

(Apologies: still traveling. Leaving Korea in a few hours for the last leg of my around the world trip this past week and a half. I may not get to tomorrow's news analysis with travel and time difference and jet lag.)

Quotes of the Day:

“In international as in private life, what counts most is not what happens to someone, but how he bears what happens to him. For this reason, almost everything depends from here on out on the manner in which we Americans bear what is unquestionably a major failure and disaster to our national fortunes. If we accept it with candor, with dignity with the resolve to absorb its lessons and make it good by redoubled and determined effort, starting all over again, if necessary, along the pattern of Pearl Harbor, we need lose neither our self confidence nor our allies, nor our powers for bargaining. But if we try to conceal from our own people, or from our allies, the full measure of our misfortune, or permit ourselves to seek relief in any reactions of bluster or petulance or hysteria, we can easily find this crisis resolving itself into an irreparable deterioration of our world position, and of our confidence in ourselves.”

- George Kennan, December 1950, letter to SECSTATE Dean Acheson

"Love of power, operating through greed and through personal ambition, was the cause of all these evils."

- Thucydides

"It’s limited war for Americans, and total war for those fighting Americans. The United States has more power; its foes have more willpower."

- Dominic Tierney

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 3

2. US intel chief thinking 'optimistically' for Ukraine forces

3. U.S. Not Seeking Decoupling From China, Commerce Chief Says

4. Iran to disband morality police amid ongoing protests, says attorney general

5. Iran locked into ‘vicious cycle’ over protests and arming Russia, says US

6. Iran Disbands Morality Police, Considers Changing Hijab Laws, Official Says

7. Why China Is In Crisis (And Might Never Be a Superpower Afterall)

8. Iran Should Be Scared: Israel and The U.S. Hold Joint Military Drills

9. Calls for more US economic engagement in Indo-Pacific region at US security forum

10. South China Sea: as US eyes a Subic Bay return, was Chinese ‘coercion’ of Philippines the reason?

11. Is AUKUS floundering?

12. Strong Deterrence Enables U.S. to Ensure Global Rules, Rights

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 3

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City.
French President Emmanuel Macron amplified Russian information operations about the need for NATO to consider “security guarantees” to be given to Russia during putative negotiations in a televised interview on December 3.
Conditions in eastern Ukraine are likely becoming more conducive to a higher pace of operations as winter sets in.
The Russian and Belarusian Ministers of Defense met in Minsk likely to further strengthen bilateral security ties between Russia and Belarus.
Ukrainian forces likely continue to advance northwest of Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian authorities reportedly evacuated Russian collaborators from Oleshky.
The Russian National Guard’s (Rosgvardia) Organizational and Staff Department confirmed that mobilization continues despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31.
Russian authorities are continuing to use judicial measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, DECEMBER 3

Dec 3, 2022 - Press ISW

Download the PDF

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 3

Riley Bailey, George Barros, Karolina Hird, Nicholas Carl, and Frederick W. Kagan

December 3, 6 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City. The Ukrainian “Carlson” volunteer special air intelligence unit posted footage on December 3 of Ukrainian servicemen traversing the Dnipro River in boats, reaching a wooden marina-like structure on the east bank, and raising a Ukrainian flag on a tower toward near the shore.[1] Special Unit “Carlson” reported that this is the first instance of a Ukrainian flag flying over the east bank of the Dnipro River and emphasized this operation will provide a springboard for subsequent Ukrainian operations on the east bank.[2] If confirmed, this limited Ukrainian incursion onto the east bank could open avenues for Ukrainian forces to begin to operate on the east bank. As ISW has previously reported, observed Russian fortifications on the left bank indicate Russian forces are anticipating Ukrainian offensive actions on the east bank and have been constructing defensive lines south of the Dnipro River.[3] The establishment of positions along the eastern riverbank will likely set conditions for future Ukrainian offensive operations into occupied Kherson Oblast, if Ukrainian troops choose to pursue this line of advance in the south.

French President Emmanuel Macron amplified Russian information operations about the West’s need to discuss Russian “security guarantees” in a televised interview on December 3.[4] Macron stated that the West should consider how to address Russian security guarantees if President Vladimir Putin agrees to negotiations about ending the war in Ukraine: “That topic will be part of the topics for peace, so we need to prepare what we are ready to do, how we protect our allies and member states, and how to give guarantees to Russia the day it returns to the negotiating table.”[5] ISW has extensively documented how the Kremlin demanded “security guarantees” and declared “lines” as part of the ultimatum it presented the US and NATO before launching the February 2022 invasion.[6] Russia’s demanded security guarantees entail partially dismantling NATO by returning NATO to its 1997 borders, and grants Russia a veto on future NATO expansion by demanding NATO suspend its “Open Door” policy.[7] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to these precise demands on December 1, as ISW previously reported.[8] The Russian demand for supposed “security guarantees” is part of a larger Russian information operation that portrays NATO as having provoked the 2022 Russian invasion by threatening Russia. The security guarantees that Ukraine, NATO, and the rest of Europe would accept from Russia following the Kremlin’s unprovoked and brutal war of conquest against Ukraine might be a more appropriate topic of conversation for Western leaders considering negotiations with Moscow.

Independent Russian polling data indicates that Russian citizens still support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine despite growing war weariness over the past six months. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center found that 74 percent of Russians support Russian forces’ actions in the war in Ukraine in a November poll published on December 2.[9] The poll found that 42 percent of respondents “strongly support” and 32 percent “somewhat support” Russian forces’ actions in Ukraine.[10] The poll also found that only 41 percent of respondents favored Russia continuing military operation in Ukraine, however, whereas 53 percent said that Russia should begin peace negotiations.[11] Levada Center polling between July and November 2022 shows small but consistent erosion in support for the war among Russians.[12] Levada Center findings are similar to a reported internal Kremlin-commissioned poll from November that found that 55 percent of Russians favor peace talks with Ukraine and only 25 percent favor continuing the war.[13]

Both polls indicate that a shrinking but still significant portion of Russian citizens support—and are even enthusiastic about—continuing the war in Ukraine despite Russian military failures. Russian morale and political support for the war will likely further degrade with time if current trends hold. The longer the war continues to produce Russian casualties while Ukrainian forces gain ground the more the socio-political dynamics will likely continue to turn against the Kremlin. An operational pause under the guise of peace negotiations could alleviate growing political pressure on the Kremlin and allow Russia to reconstitute its forces for subsequent renewed offensive operations.

Conditions in eastern Ukraine are reportedly becoming more conducive for a higher pace of operations as winter sets in. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 3 that the ground has frozen along the Kreminna-Svatove line and that he expects that Ukrainian forces will likely increase the pace of their counteroffensive operations in the area as a result.[14] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai also stated on December 2 that weather is finally changing on the Kreminna-Svatove line and that he expects that Ukrainian forces will soon be able to improve their counter-offensive maneuver operations as mud in the area fully freezes.[15] ISW has previously assessed that the overall pace of operations is likely to increase in the coming weeks as consistent cold weather allows the ground to freeze throughout the theater, especially in eastern Ukraine where operations on both sides have been bogged down by heavy mud.[16] Neither Russians nor Ukrainians will likely suspend offensive operations in one of the most optimal times of year for mechanized maneuver warfare in this region.

The Russian and Belarusian Ministers of Defense met in Minsk likely to further strengthen bilateral security ties between Russia and Belarus. Russian Minister of Defense Army General Sergei Shoigu met with Belarusian Minister of Defense Major General Viktor Khrenin and signed amendments to the Agreement on the Joint Provision of Regional Security in the Military Sphere.[17] Shoigu also met with Belarusian President Aleander Lukashenko during which Lukashenko stated that Belarusian and Russian forces continue to train together on Belarusian territory so that the “Union State [can] repel any aggression.[18] Shoigu likely met with Khrenin and Lukashenko in an attempt to place pressure on Belarus to further support Russia’s offensive campaign in Ukraine. ISW has previously assessed that Belarus is highly unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine due to domestic factors that constrain Lukashenko’s willingness to do so.[19]

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri reportedly met with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin in Tehran on December 3.[20] The two discussed unspecified military cooperation, according to official readouts from Iranian state media. They may have discussed the sale of Iranian drones and missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. Bagheri is Iran’s chief of defense and responsible for military policy and strategic guidance. The meeting has not been reported in Russian media as of this writing.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces reportedly reached the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River across from Kherson City.
French President Emmanuel Macron amplified Russian information operations about the need for NATO to consider “security guarantees” to be given to Russia during putative negotiations in a televised interview on December 3.
Conditions in eastern Ukraine are likely becoming more conducive to a higher pace of operations as winter sets in.
The Russian and Belarusian Ministers of Defense met in Minsk likely to further strengthen bilateral security ties between Russia and Belarus.
Ukrainian forces likely continue to advance northwest of Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.
Russian authorities reportedly evacuated Russian collaborators from Oleshky.
The Russian National Guard’s (Rosgvardia) Organizational and Staff Department confirmed that mobilization continues despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31.
Russian authorities are continuing to use judicial measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and one supporting effort)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian forces continued to defend their positions against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the directions of Kreminna and Svatove on December 3. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces are conducting defensive operations amidst fierce battles near Kreminna and Svatove.[21] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are also building a second line of defense near Starobilsk (55km southeast of Svatove).[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian attacks within 14km northwest of Svatove near Kuzemivka and Kolomyichykha and within 2km north of Kreminna near Zhytlivka.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have reached Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) and that Russian forces no longer control part of the P-66 highway north of Kreminna.[24] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing the pace of their counteroffensive operations in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Chervonopopivka, further indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely made advances in the area.[26] A prominent Russian milblogger’s map posted on December 3 similarly shows Chervonopopivka outside of the Russian area of control.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine.[28]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian force concentration areas and logistics nodes in Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian force concentration on December 2 in the vicinity of Starobilsk, killing 14 Russian personnel and wounding 30.[29] Russian sources claimed on December 3 that Ukrainian forces struck Khoroshe, Starobilsk, Svatove, and Novochervone in Luhansk Oblast with HIMARS rockets.[30]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations around Bakhmut on December 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 13km northeast of Bakhmut near Soledar and within 4km south of Bakhmut near Opytne.[31] Russian milbloggers claimed that reports of Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the suburbs of Bakhmut are false and that serious fighting in Opytne is ongoing.[32] A separate Russian milblogger claimed on December 3 that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian positions near Spirne (within 30km northeast of Bakhmut) and suffered heavy losses on December 2.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions south of Bakhmut near Andriivka and Kurdiumivka.[34]

Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiiivka-Donetsk City area on December 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 27km southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian positions in the vicinity of Nevelske are heavily fortified and that Russian forces are finding it difficult to progress due to current conditions in the area.[36] Geolocated footage posted on December 3 shows Russian forces operating closer to Heorhiivka (within 30km southwest of Avdiivka).[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain lost positions near Avdiivka, and Marinka.[38]

Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are maintaining defensive lines in this section of the front.[39] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks within 111km southwest of Donetsk City near Solodke and Novomayorsk in western Donetsk Oblast and Shevchenka in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[41]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Note: ISW will report on activities in Kherson Oblast as part of the Southern Axis in this and subsequent updates. Ukraine’s counteroffensive in right-bank Kherson Oblast has accomplished its stated objectives, so ISW will not present a Southern Ukraine counteroffensive section until Ukrainian forces resume counteroffensives in southern Ukraine.

Russian forces continued defensive operations on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on December 3. Ukrainian military sources noted that Russian troops on the east bank are focused on defending previously captured lines and shelling recently liberated settlements on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro, particularly Kherson City.[42] Ukrainian sources additionally reported that Russian officials withdrew all Russian collaborators from Oleshky, a settlement on the east bank within 10km southeast of Kherson City.[43]

Ukrainian forces continued interdiction efforts against Russian concentration areas in the rear of Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian strikes on Melitopol and Vasylivka on December 2 wounded up to 270 Russian personnel.[44] Ukrainian Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, stated that residents of Mykhailivka (north of Melitopol) reported loud explosions near the village, likely near a Russian concentration area.[45] Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops are massing near the Zaporizhia frontline for an attack into the Russian rear.[46] Russian forces continued routine fire along the line of contact in western Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts and notably conducted missile and rocket strikes on Zaporizhzhia City and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[47]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian documents indicate that Russian authorities continue mobilizing Russian citizens despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of the formal end of partial mobilization on October 31. A Russian Telegram channel dedicated to providing Russians legal support to avoid compulsory military service published a document dated November 29 from the Russian National Guard’s (Rosgvardia) Organizational and Staff Department.[48] The Rosgvardia document states that Putin’s announcement on the end of the mobilization selection (“набор”) does not mark the end of partial mobilization.[49] The document states that Putin’s initial mobilization decree continues to be in force and that “there are no legal grounds for dismissal from military service upon the expiation of service contract.”[50] This report is consistent with previous ISW findings that Russian entities are preparing for more mobilization efforts.[51] The Odintsovo garrison military court in Moscow Oblast inadvertently confirmed in mid-November that mobilization is continuing despite its formal end, for example.[52]

Russian occupation forces continue to mobilize Ukrainian citizens into Russian forces. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on December 3 that Russian authorities in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast, are preying on Ukrainian citizens who stand in lines to get bottled water to hand them mobilization summonses and ensure they are registered with the local military commissariat.[53]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian authorities are continuing to use judicial measures to consolidate administrative control of occupied territories. The Russian State Duma proposed a draft law on November 30 that introduces a provision according to which a criminal act committed on the territory of a new subject of the Russian Federation before September 30 (the date of the illegal annexation of Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts into the Russian Federation) will not be recognized as criminal or punishable under the Criminal Procedure Code or Criminal Code of the Russian Federation if it is deemed to be aimed at protecting the interests of Russia or the aforementioned subjects.[54] This draft law would essentially give Russian-controlled courts in occupied areas broad latitude to dismiss criminal cases on the grounds that the crimes were committed in pursuit of Russian interests. It is unclear what kinds of illegal acts the Russian Duma seeks to permit through this draft law. The Ukrainian Resistance Center notably reported that Russian-controlled courts in Crimea are using charges of “extremism” and “discrediting the Russian army” to intensify repressions against residents of Crimea.[55] These efforts intensify Russian control of the justice systems of occupied areas into the Russian criminal justice system in a way that will give Russian law broader discretion in determining and adjudicating what constitutes as legality in occupied areas.

Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian partisan activities are continuing to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head, Serhiy Haidai, stated that Ukrainian partisans set fire to automated railway control equipment near the Luhansk Power Station in Schastia, about 15km north of Luhansk City.[56] Haidai noted that this attack will likely significantly complicate Russian efforts to transport equipment to the frontline by rail.[57] Such partisan actions in the rear of Luhansk Oblast may pose continued logistical challenges to Russian forces as they try to fortify the current frontline in western Luhansk Oblast as Ukrainian troops continue limited counteroffensive operations.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[9] https://www.levada. dot ru/2022/12/02/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-noyabr-2022-goda/

[10] https://www.levada dot ru/2022/12/02/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-noyabr-2022-goda/

[11] https://www.levada dot ru/2022/12/02/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-noyabr-2022-goda/

[12] https://www.levada dot ru/2022/12/02/konflikt-s-ukrainoj-noyabr-2022-goda/

[18] https://eng.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-to-shoigu-neither-russia-nor-belarus-wants-any-war-155147-2022/

[43] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/03/rosiyany-vyvezly-vsih-kolaborantiv-z-oleshok/; https://t.me/hueviyherson/30292

[53] https://sprotyv.mod.gov dot ua/2022/12/03/v-makiyivczi-okupanty-rozdavaly-povistky-pry-vydachi-vody/

[54] duma.gov dot ru/news/55882/; sozd.duma dot gov.ru/bill/246425-8

understandingwar.org

2. US intel chief thinking 'optimistically' for Ukraine forces

US intel chief thinking 'optimistically' for Ukraine forces

AP · by JAMEY KEATEN and NOMAAN MERCHANT · December 4, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — The head of U.S. intelligence says fighting in Russia’s war in Ukraine is running at a “reduced tempo” and suggests Ukrainian forces could have brighter prospects in coming months.

Avril Haines alluded to past allegations by some that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s advisers could be shielding him from bad news — for Russia — about war developments, and said he “is becoming more informed of the challenges that the military faces in Russia.”

“But it’s still not clear to us that he has a full picture of at this stage of just how challenged they are,” the U.S. director of national intelligence said Saturday at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California.

Looking ahead, Haines said, “honestly we’re seeing a kind of a reduced tempo already of the conflict” and her team expects that both sides will look to refit, resupply, and reconstitute for a possible Ukrainian counter-offensive in the spring.

“But we actually have a fair amount of skepticism as to whether or not the Russians will be in fact prepared to do that,” she said. “And I think more optimistically for the Ukrainians in that timeframe.”

On Sunday, the British Ministry of Defense, in its latest intelligence estimate, pointed to new signs from an independent Russian media outlet that public support in Russia for the military campaign was “falling significantly.”

Russia-Ukraine war

Meduza said it obtained a recent confidential opinion survey conducted by the Federal Protection Service, which is in charge of guarding the Kremlin and providing security to top government officials.

The survey, commissioned by the Kremlin, found that 55% of respondents backed peace talks with Ukraine while 25% wanted the war to go on. The report didn’t mention the margin of error.

Levada Center, Russia’s top independent pollster, found in a similar poll carried out in November poll that 53% of respondents supported peace talks, 41% spoke in favor of continuing the fight, and 6% were undecided. That poll of 1,600 people had a margin of error of no more than 3.4 percent.

The British Defense Ministry noted that “despite the Russian authorities’ efforts to enforce pervasive control of the information environment, the conflict has become increasingly tangible for many Russians since the September 2022 ‘partial mobilization.’”

“With Russia unlikely to achieve major battlefield successes in the next several months, maintaining even tacit approval of the war amongst the population is likely to be increasingly difficult for the Kremlin,” it said.

In recent weeks, Russia’s military focus has been on striking Ukrainian infrastructure and pressing an offensive in the east, near the town of Bakhmut, while shelling sites in the city of Kherson, which Ukrainian forces liberated last month after an 8-month Russian occupation.

In his nightly address on Saturday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy lashed out at Western efforts to crimp Russia’s crucial oil industry, a key source of funds for Putin’s war machine, saying their $60-per-barrel price cap on imports of Russian oil was insufficient.

“It is not a serious decision to set such a limit for Russian prices, which is quite comfortable for the budget of the terrorist state,” Zelenskyy said, referring to Russia. He said the $60-per-barrel level would still allow Russia to bring in $100 billion in revenues per year.

“This money will go not only to the war and not only to further sponsorship by Russia of other terrorist regimes and organisations. This money will be used for further destabilisation of those countries that are now trying to avoid serious decisions,” Zelenskyy said.

Australia, Britain, Canada, Japan, the United States and the 27-nation European Union agreed Friday to cap what they would pay for Russian oil at $60 per barrel. The limit is set to take effect Monday, along with an EU embargo on Russian oil shipped by sea.

Russian authorities have rejected the price cap and threatened Saturday to stop supplying the nations that endorsed it.

In yet another show of Western support for Ukraine’s efforts to battle back Russian forces and cope with fallout from the war, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland on Saturday visited the operations of a Ukrainian aid group that provides support for internally displaced people in Ukraine, among her other visits with top Ukrainian officials.

Nuland assembled dolls out of yarn in the blue-and-yellow colors of Ukraine’s flag with youngsters from regions including northeastern Kharkiv, southern Kherson, and eastern Donetsk.

“This is psychological support for them at an absolutely crucial time,” Nuland said.

“As President Putin knows best, this war could stop today, if he chose to stop it and withdrew his forces — and then negotiations can begin,” she added.

___

Merchant reported from Washington, D.C.

AP · by JAMEY KEATEN and NOMAAN MERCHANT · December 4, 2022

3. U.S. Not Seeking Decoupling From China, Commerce Chief Says

U.S. Not Seeking Decoupling From China, Commerce Chief Says

Gina Raimondo says the aim is to promote trade with China without jeopardizing U.S. technology

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-not-seeking-decoupling-from-china-commerce-chief-says-11669773016?mod=hp_user_preferences_pos3#cxrecs_s

By Yuka Hayashi

Updated Nov. 30, 2022 1:38 pm ET

WASHINGTON—The U.S. isn’t seeking to decouple from China, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Wednesday, even as she emphasized steps the U.S. is taking to safeguard its technology to ensure its economic competitiveness.

Ms. Raimondo spoke Wednesday on U.S. competition with China at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. At a briefing with reporters in advance, Ms. Raimondo highlighted the importance of promoting trade and investment in areas outside of core economic and national security interests.

As an example, she pointed to a new Commerce Department initiative to promote American personal care products in China, which she said would generate significant revenue for U.S. businesses and help project America’s soft power through its well-known brands.

“It’s important that we get the bilateral economic relationship right, not just by protecting but also by actively promoting our economic interests in trade,” she told reporters. “We are not seeking the decoupling from China.”

Biden, Xi Meet Ahead of Bali G-20 Summit in Push to Restart Dialogue

Iran to disband morality police amid ongoing protests, says attorney general

By Siavash Ardalan BBC2 min

December 4, 2022

View Original

BBC Persian

Iran's morality police, which is tasked with enforcing the country's Islamic dress code, is being disbanded, the country's attorney general says.

Mohammad Jafar Montazeri's comments, yet to be confirmed by other agencies, were made at an event on Sunday.

Iran has seen months of protests over the death of a young woman in custody.

Mahsa Amini had been detained by the morality police for allegedly breaking strict rules on head coverings.

Mr Montazeri was at a religious conference when he was asked if the morality police was being disbanded.

"The morality police had nothing to do with the judiciary and have been shut down from where they were set up," he said.

Control of the force lies with the interior ministry and not with the judiciary.

On Saturday, Mr Montazeri also told the Iranian parliament the law that requires women to wear hijabs would be looked at.

Even if the morality police is shut down this does not mean the decades-old law will be changed.

Women-led protests, labelled "riots" by the authorities, have swept Iran since 22-year-old Amini died in custody on 16 September, three days after her arrest by the morality police in Tehran.

Her death was the catalyst for the unrest but it also follows discontent over poverty, unemployment, inequality, injustice and corruption.

If confirmed, the scrapping of the morality police would be a concession but there are no guarantees it would be enough to halt the protests, which have seen demonstrators burn their head coverings.

Iran has had various forms of "morality police" since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, but the latest version - known formally as the Gasht-e Ershad - is currently the main agency tasked enforcing Iran's Islamic code of conduct.

They began their patrols in 2006 to enforce the dress code which also requires women to wear long clothes and forbids shorts, ripped jeans and other clothes deemed immodest.

More on this story

Image caption, A protester holds a picture of Mahsa Amini during protests in Turkey last month

5. Iran locked into ‘vicious cycle’ over protests and arming Russia, says US

Iran locked into ‘vicious cycle’ over protests and arming Russia, says US

Washington focusing on protests and Tehran’s support of Russia in Ukraine rather than nuclear talks, envoy says

The Guardian · by Patrick Wintour · December 4, 2022

Iran’s leadership has locked itself into a “vicious cycle” that has cut it off from its own people and the international community, the US special envoy has said, adding that Washington was more focused on Tehran’s decision to arm Russia in Ukraine and the repression of its internal protests than on talks to revive the nuclear deal.

“The more Iran represses, the more there will be sanctions; the more there are sanctions, the more Iran feels isolated,” Rob Malley, the US special envoy on Iran, told a conference in Rome.

“The more isolated they feel, the more they turn to Russia; the more they turn to Russia, the more sanctions there will be, the more the climate deteriorates, the less likely there will be nuclear diplomacy. So it is true right now the vicious cycles are all self-reinforcing.

“The repression of the protests and Iran’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine is where our focus is because that is where things are happening, and where we want to make a difference,” Malley added.

The US director of national intelligence, Avril Haynes, said at the weekend there was worrying evidence that Russia was seeking to deepen military cooperation with Iran. Ali Bagheri, Iran’s deputy foreign minister, was in Moscow at the weekend.

One senior European diplomat said Iran was paying a huge cost for its decision to become the only country to arm Russia in the war against Ukraine. “It’s an unholy alliance and a massive miscalculation by Iran,” the diplomat said.

The Iranian regime says the protests have reduced over the past week as its crackdown has intensified, but a call has been made for protesters to take to the streets on 14 December.

Iran’s attorney general, Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, said on Saturday that the government was reviewing the law on the compulsory hijab, one of the issues that sparked the protests that have lasted more than 10 weeks. Montazeri also said the “morality police”, who are responsible for enforcing the dress code, had been “closed”, but he gave no details.

The next show of US solidarity with the protesters is likely to come when it tables a motion to throw Iran off the UN committee on the status of women in a vote due on 14 December, Malley said.

The move follows a UN human rights council vote on a motion tabled by Germany and Iceland to establish a fact-finding committee of inquiry into the protests, which Iran has said it will boycott. The Iranian human rights activist Narges Mohammadi, in a letter to the UN, urged the organisation to examine the sexual harassment of women being held in jail.

Iran’s interior minister, Ahmad Vahidi, has set up an internal fact-finding commission, but he said on Sunday that political parties and student representatives would not sit on it.

Some senior European diplomats believe an irreversible turning point has been reached from which Iran’s leadership will not recover. The diplomat said: “The situation is really quite simple. The Islamic Republic – the regime – after 43 years has finally lost contact with their people and that is what this is really about. This is different from anything that’s gone before in the previous 43 years.

“They are having a dialogue with themselves but the main population finds the offers of reform as largely an irrelevance.”

The diplomat also detected tensions within the regime over how to respond to the protests, saying: “There is a lot of internal disharmony around different bits of the particular security apparatus in terms of passing responsibility for handling the protests.”

The diplomats believe the regime’s self-evident loss of domestic support is sharpening the internal Iranian debate about whether to reduce its isolation through a growing alliance with Russia, or instead try to revive the nuclear deal.

Malley’s remarks suggest the US believes Iran has taken a series of fateful decisions that make a full revival of the nuclear deal, in which the west lifted some economic sanctions in return for controls on Iran’s nuclear programme, a political impossibility for now, although he said the door to diplomacy was not shut if Iran’s leadership changed course.

The revival of the deal was about to be sealed in August when in America’s view Iran added fresh demands separate to the deal calling for the dropping of a UN nuclear inspectorate inquiry into Iran’s past nuclear activities at three sites. The UN inspectorate has said Iran’s explanations for the presence of the nuclear particles are not credible. Iran said the inquiry into its past activities was inspired by Israel.

With the UN inspectors given only the most limited access to Iran’s nuclear programme and its growing use of more advanced centrifuges, the west’s nuclear negotiators accept that Iran may be weeks away from being able to produce enough enriched uranium to create a nuclear bomb. But Haynes said the US did not have intelligence that Iran was trying to weaponise the uranium stockpiles.

The Guardian · by Patrick Wintour · December 4, 2022

6. Iran Disbands Morality Police, Considers Changing Hijab Laws, Official Says

Never underestimate the power of civil society when it takes collective action. It has happened before (and also it has been quelled by brutal crackdowns). What does the future hold for the Iranian people? I hope the regime's hammer is not about to drop on them in other ways. The dissidents will need to be very careful about calls for negotiations and airing of grievances and demands for change. The regime could be conducting a ruse to expose the dissident leadership and then arrest them.

Iran Disbands Morality Police, Considers Changing Hijab Laws, Official Says

Move is aimed at trying to quiet protests that have taken place across the country, analysts say

https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-abolishes-morality-police-considers-changing-hijab-laws-official-says-11670165171?mod=hp_lead_pos3

By David S. Cloud

Updated Dec. 4, 2022 2:59 pm ET

Iran’s attorney general said the country had disbanded its so-called morality police and is considering altering the requirement that women cover their heads in public, a move that analysts said was aimed at peeling away support for antigovernment protests.

Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri outlined the steps Saturday, saying the law requiring veils, known as hijabs, was under review by Iran’s Parliament and judiciary, and that the morality police had been abolished, according to government-run news agencies.

President Ebrahim Raisi echoed his remarks in a televised speech Saturday, saying Iran’s Islamic system was enshrined in its constitution but adding, “There are methods of implementing the constitution that can be flexible.”

Protests continued in Mahabad and Bukan, cities in Iran’s Kurdish region, with fires and road blockades, according to Hengaw, a Kurdish human-rights group based in Norway.

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It is unclear if Mr. Montazeri’s comments reflect a high-level decision by Iran’s rulers to make significant changes in the system of enforcing the hijab law or if they are temporary overtures aimed at helping to suppress the protests, analysts said.

Atena Daemi, a civil-rights activist in Tehran, said the morality police have been less visible in enforcing the hijab law since the protests began. She added that if the protests died down the government was likely to resume using the police or create another mechanism to pressure women to publicly cover their heads.

“They will continue to deal with those who do not wear the Islamic hijab,” she said, adding that she didn’t believe the claims that the morality police have been disbanded.

A decision to formally disband the morality police would likely involve Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has strongly defended mandatory hijab in recent years, and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, a government panel appointed by Mr. Khamenei that created the police force.

“The people’s problem with the Islamic Republic is not only the hijab,” said Azam Jangravi, who was jailed in Iran for protesting against the veil, and now lives in Canada. “Even if they remove the hijab, the people want regime change.”

Mr. Montazeri said that recommendations for changes in the hijab law would be made later this month. “We are working on the issue of hijab quickly and trying to employ a wise solution,” he said.

He said the disbanding of the morality police, a force established in 2005, had been made by a committee of government officials but provided no other details. He said the country’s Islamic courts would continue to monitor public behavior, according to media accounts of his remarks.

The laws around women’s head coverings sparked the nationwide protest movement that began after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who died in custody after being arrested by the morality police for improperly wearing her hijab. Her death touched a nerve among many Iranian families whose female members have been targeted by officers tasked with enforcing the country’s strict Islamic codes for clothing and behavior. Among those protesting have been conservative women and men, joining throngs of young secular people who say the enforcement of rules has often been capricious.

Some women have burned their hijabs and shunned wearing them in public since the protests started. Many young protesters say they are seeking not only elimination of the hijab but to bring down Iran’s theocratic government.

The regime appears to be testing if such concessions might peel away broader support for the demonstrations among other Iranians, analysts say.

Iran has been rocked by protests for months.

PHOTO: WANA NEWS AGENCY/VIA REUTERS

“They are probably tired and think some small superficial concessions like this will quell the uprising against them,” said Mahsa Alimardani, a senior researcher at London-based Article 19, a human-rights group. “This move certainly won’t stop protesters or appease those chanting for complete regime change.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Tehran’s move could be a positive response to the protests. “But we have to see how it actually plays out in practice and what the Iranian people think,” he said Sunday on CBS‘s “Face the Nation.” Asked if he thought this act would stop the monthslong protests that government forces have sought to quell, Mr. Blinken said, “This is about them, and it’s up to them.”

The Biden administration in September and October heaped more sanctions on the country as the numbers of deaths, including those of children, rose from the crackdown. Among those targeted by the sanctions included the morality police, its senior leadership and a host of other top Iranian officials in charge of the country’s prisons, security and military forces the U.S. said are responsible for the alleged human rights abuses against protesters.

The morality police have eased their enforcement of the hijab law and other statutes regulating women’s public dress and behavior since the protests began, Iranians and analysts say. But there has been no official announcement that the police force has been disbanded, other than Mr. Montazeri’s comments.

The widespread support for the protests may force the government to abandon enforcement of the hijab law in most public places other than in government buildings, official events and other high-profile circumstances, analysts said.

Support for the hijab statute remains strong among male conservatives and clerics, complicating any move to eliminate it by Iran’s hard-line leadership. Only weeks before the protests began, Mr. Raisi himself called publicly for stricter enforcement of the law, according to accounts by state-run news agencies.

Aliasghar Anabestani, a conservative member of Parliament, called last week for the denial of government benefits to any women detained for failing to wear a headscarf, according to Iranian media outlets.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president, tightened the hijab laws and enforcement during his tenure from 2005 to 2013, creating the modern version of the morality police and empowering them.

Their white vans became a familiar and feared sight throughout the country. In Tehran, the group often conducts checks in crowded areas and outside subway stations and takes women back to the Vozara detention center, a drab two-story building that faces a pine-tree-lined park frequented by local families and tourists.

Women observed not wearing a headscarf, even while riding in a vehicle, could sometimes be summoned for questioning by the morality police, who would text their phones after tracking the car’s license plate.

Yet their presence on the street had been on the decline until Mr. Raisi took office in 2021 and stepped up their aggressiveness at enforcing the dress code, according to Sanam Vakil, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a London-based think tank. For that reason, getting rid of the force might be an option even conservatives could accept.

“It’s probably the lowest-lying fruit and the easiest change the Islamic Republic could make,” she said. “I read this as symbolic and certainly not enough to build back bridges or placate the protesters.”

—Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.

7. Why China Is In Crisis (And Might Never Be a Superpower Afterall)

Conclusion:

The famous but likely faux Chinese curse is: “May you live in interesting times.” In the space of a month, the PRC has become quite interesting. Absent an unexpected and extraordinary crisis, Xi will weather current political squalls. However, he and the CCP face serious long-term challenges. Contrary to what he claims, the party fails to live up to the expectations of many Chinese. The more he attempts to reinforce his power, the more his people may end up challenging him.

Why China Is In Crisis (And Might Never Be a Superpower Afterall)

19fortyfive.com · by Doug Bandow · December 3, 2022

A month ago China’s Xi Jinping reigned triumphantly. He choreographed the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to cement his position as his nation’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. And his rule looked to be forever, or at least as long as he lives.

Rather like Winston Churchill, Xi offered the Chinese people nothing but “blood, toil, tears and sweat,” only on behalf of the ruling party rather than the country. He insisted “that the party will never change in quality, change its color, or change its flavor.”

Yet it is now evident that many Chinese don’t like the CCP’s quality, color, or flavor. The rapid, spontaneous spread of demonstrations against the regime reflected deeply popular dissatisfaction. For a moment people were no longer afraid to speak out. Demonstrators took over the streets in a dozen cities and four score universities and focused their anger on what had become a totalitarian zero-COVID policy. Even more astonishing, people attacked the system – Xi, the CCP, and dictatorship – and called for freedom, democracy, and human rights. As videos of protests flooded forth Beijing’s vast censorship system was overwhelmed.

The regime’s embarrassment was acute because Xi purports to represent the people. And for a time, he may have done so. The Council on Foreign Relations’ Ian Johnson observed: “throughout Xi’s first decade in office, when he shuttered independent film festivals, closed history journals, and generally made life difficult for free-thinking people, observers usually had to concede that he could count on the backing of ordinary Chinese. Of course, such mainstream support was impossible to prove, given the lack of independent polling in China. Yet many indications made clear that he was popular among the lower- and middle-income population. Many of these people were fed up with the widespread corruption and growing inequality that had taken hold during the administrations of Xi’s immediate predecessors.”

However, Xi’s ruthless approach to the pandemic evidently stoked anger across the country. Working people, no less than the middle class and students, want normalcy. So they joined together to resist one of the world’s most complete systems of social surveillance and control. What happened?

One trigger was a fire in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, where China’s beleaguered and oppressed Uyghur population is concentrated. Firefighters were delayed in reaching the burning apartment building by COVID enforcement obstacles, resulting in the death of ten residents. Tragically, this was merely the latest episode of callous treatment of people locked in their apartments, or worse, in overcrowded in decrepit quarantine camps. It wasn’t even the deadliest example.

Watching the World Cup, where masses of fans gathered without masks and lockdowns, also may have spurred protests. Chinese viewers apparently wondered why the People’s Republic of China was different from elsewhere. A WeChat user asked if the PRC and Qatar were on the same planet. As protests spread, official match coverage changed: “China’s state broadcaster [cut] close-up shots of maskless fans at the Qatar World Cup, after early coverage sparked anger at home where street protests have erupted over harsh Covid-19 restrictions.”

Whatever their immediate cause, the protests badly embarrassed the regime. People rose despite everything done by Xi and his minions to create a docile, inert population. Censorship has grown ever tighter, creating a parallel red universe with limited relation to reality. “Patriotic” indoctrination, er, education is inflicted by schools at all levels. The regime spends more to defend the CCP from internal threats than the nation from external threats.

Due to increased repression – and colder weather – the protests have mostly fizzled out. The government also promised reform of its brutal zero-COVID policy, with a number of localities beginning to relax restrictions.

However, China’s peaceful streets might be only temporary. For instance, one government tactic was to send students home early, defusing protests at universities. Eventually collegians will return to campus, where they might organize again, following in the long tradition of revolutionary student movements, including as recently as the 1980s.

The death of Jiang Zemin also might reenergize resistance. Under normal circumstances, the nation’s former leader would not be a symbol of liberal rule. After all, Jiang rose to the top job after the bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown and subsequent political purge, replacing ousted CCP general secretary Zhao Ziyang. However, everything is relative. Noted Politico’s Jamil Anderlin: “as China has become more repressive and authoritarian over the last decade under Xi, Jiang’s image has been rehabilitated.”

Identified as a toad because of his physiognomy (rather like how now banned Winnie the Pooh became a symbol of Xi), in death Jiang, a much more personable and relatable figure than Xi, could become the latter’s toughest adversary. Toad imagery already has been used both in China and Hong Kong to represent opposition to Xi’s authoritarian course and his role as the new Mao. Explained Anderlin, “Now, as then, it is impossible for the party to ban mourning or memorial activities for a former paramount leader. But acts of remembrance in the coming days and weeks will provide untold opportunities to express dissent and dissatisfaction over the current state of Chinese politics.”

The 1976 death of the more moderate Zhou Enlai, then China’s premier, led to public mourning seen as indirect criticism of Mao Zedong’s bloody reign. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were triggered by the death of Hu Yaobang, who had been removed by the dominant Deng Xiaoping for being too liberal. Mourning Jiang’s death could become a patriotic means to criticize Xi and the latter’s policies.

Posing an even more serious problem for the regime, the CCP is continuing to lose China’s young, many of whom turned out to protest. Reported Bloomberg’s Adam Minter: “members of China’s Generation Z stopped lying flat and joined the protests targeting Covid lockdowns. It’s an abrupt shift for a cohort that, only a few months ago, was widely viewed as giving up and doing the bare minimum to get by as China’s economy strained under the pandemic.”

The current social compact, that the party ensures economic growth and progress while the people exhibit political passivity and impotence, has broken down. The unemployment rate for those between 16 and 24 runs about 20 percent. It is very difficult, at least without parental support, for young workers to find an affordable urban apartment. Without a job and home, men, who disproportionately outnumber women because of the now reversed “one-child policy,” have trouble marrying.

Even a college education is no ticket for a comfortable life. The working class faces much greater obstacles. According to Johnson: “China is facing an acute education crisis that has left huge swaths of the population inadequately prepared for the future. Over half of China’s population comes from rural areas where they are served by second-rate schools and largely precluded from pursuing a university education. And many of the unskilled jobs that these people could once count on have been replaced by automation or outsourced to other countries.”

Although export-oriented policies have delivered economic growth, a disproportionately low share of the economy is devoted to domestic consumption. Of that, services are less important than the global average. As a result, observed Fudan University’s Xi Xican, “the share actually consumed by its own residents is much lower than in other countries.”

Increasing economic hardship and declining confidence in the future have generated increasing pessimism among the young: “Now many believe that they’re the most unlucky generation since the 1980s as Beijing’s persistent pursuit of the zero Covid policy is wreaking havoc. Jobs are hard to find. Frequent Covid testing dictates their lives. The government is imposing more and more restrictions on their individual liberty while pushing them to get married and have more children.”

The result is a multi-faceted drop-out culture for an increasing number of young adults. Even while promoting nationalist memes, they express doubts about the future: “Young Chinese in particular are taking to online platforms like Bilibili or Weibo to voice despair over skyrocketing house prices, widening inequality, and the increasing price of everyday goods.”

Responses are diverse but largely negative. At a time when the government is desperately encouraging child-bearing, some women are deciding against getting married or having kids. Some couples are deciding not to have a family. To relieve stress and protest COVID policies, students have begun engaging “in a gentler form of demonstration which has been dubbed ‘collective crawling’.” More broadly, the “lying flat” and “let it rot” movements advocate abandoning the pressure-filled and leisure-deprived lives typical of ambitious workers, especially in the technology industry. The latter is characterized by 996, that is, working 9-9 six days a week. A number of younger Chinese are turning to government employment, with fewer hours and a lighter workload. More extreme is “the mindset of leaning into self-indulgence and open decay and away from life expectations that seem neither meaningful nor attainable.”

Some Chinese are seeking to leave the PRC. Totalitarian COVID controls quickly spurred an exodus of foreigners. Now young Chinese speak of a “run philosophy,” as in running away from their homeland. A video-producer complained to the Economist: “No matter how much money, education or international access you have, you cannot escape the authorities.” Older Chinese, at least those with money, also are increasingly considering emigration.

In China, these hostile reactions to Xi’s world are not just personal. They are political, representing “Gen Z’s rejection of China’s—and Xi Jinping’s—ambitious national development program.” Censors have removed blog posts on dropping out. The nationalistic, semi-official Global Times was emphatic: “Young people are the hope of this country. Neither they themselves nor the country will allow them to collectively lie flat.” Even Xi felt forced to respond, calling for an economy “in which everyone participates, avoiding involution and lying flat.” However, many Chinese see him and the CCP as part of the problem, so no modern Red Guards have streamed forth, dedicated to reviving the PRC.

Unfortunately for Xi, economic problems are likely to intensify rather than mitigate. State enterprises are heavily indebted; state banks are weighed down with bad debt; the population is rapidly aging and has begun to shrink; only government support has prevented the real estate bubble from bursting disastrously. Perhaps most seriously, Xi has been extending party control throughout the economy and even into private businesses. A badly politicized, heavily indebted economy with ever fewer and more poorly educated workers is no prescription for prosperity.

What is needed is a return to liberal economic reform. Explained Zeng Xiangquan of the China Institute for Employment Research: “The structural adjustment faced by China’s economy right now actually needs more people to become entrepreneurs and strive.” However, Xi continues to move the PRC in the opposite direction, emphasizing enhanced party and personal control. Free markets are at variance with the Leninist state that he is determined to create. Noted Johnson, Xi:

“is much more comfortable as a status quo policymaker who keeps the population under control through ever-growing surveillance measures and ideology, especially nationalism and appeals to traditional Chinese values. As long as China was able to maintain high growth rates and the country appeared to be heading in the right direction, most people didn’t care about Xi’s lack of reforms … . But the mounting costs of zero-COVID lockdowns seemed to have awakened a growing part of the population to the larger challenges the country faces and to their own diminishing expectations. In other words, the tight pandemic controls have become an easy way for people to explain why standards of living are stagnating.”

The famous but likely faux Chinese curse is: “May you live in interesting times.” In the space of a month, the PRC has become quite interesting. Absent an unexpected and extraordinary crisis, Xi will weather current political squalls. However, he and the CCP face serious long-term challenges. Contrary to what he claims, the party fails to live up to the expectations of many Chinese. The more he attempts to reinforce his power, the more his people may end up challenging him.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire. Bandow is a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

19fortyfive.com · by Doug Bandow · December 3, 2022

8. Iran Should Be Scared: Israel and The U.S. Hold Joint Military Drills

Iran Should Be Scared: Israel and The U.S. Hold Joint Military Drills

19fortyfive.com · by Maya Carlin · December 2, 2022

The Israel Defense Forces released footage of the joint military exercises it held with the U.S. military this week. Iran is likely watching the drills very closely for obvious reasons.

Four of Israel’s F-35I Adir fighter jets flew alongside four American F-15 airframes, and several of Israel’s F-15I jets were refueled midair by a U.S. KC-135 aircraft.

A formation of U.S. and Israeli aircraft is depicted in photographs published by the IDF on Twitter. Aimed to progress joint plans for offensive missions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the military exercise was confirmed during IDF Chief Aviv Kohavi’s Washington visit last week.

These joint U.S.-Israeli aerial drills come amidst soaring tensions over Tehran’s proximity to achieving nuclear capabilities and general regional instability. The exercise in part is likely intended to deter the Iranian regime from escalating its hostile activities further.

Details on the drill

The two-day long joint aerial exercise was carried out over sections of Israel and the Mediterranean Sea. Israeli and American aircraft flew long-range flights during the drills to simulate the distance it would take to reach Iranian territory, located roughly 1,200 miles from the Jewish state. I

srael acquired the American-made F-35 Lightning II back in 2010, and became the first nation to fly this top-of-the-line airframe in combat operations a few years later.

The Israeli Air Force’s fleet of F-15I Ra’am (Thunder) fighters are perhaps the service’s second most significant aerial asset. Israel procured its modified variant of the U.S.-made F-15 in the late 1990’s, and its unique capabilities and sleeker airframe make it a formidable fighter. Boeing’s KC-135 Stratotanker is an American military refueling tanker that initially entered service with the Air Force in the late 1950’s. Although the aging airframe will be partially replaced by the KC-46 Pegasus, the KC-135 continued to play a significant role in the U.S. Air Force’s arsenal.

The powerhouse of airframes that flew in this week’s joint military exercise indicates the U.S. and Israel want to send Iran a message. A statement released by the IDF said that “The Intelligence Directorate conducted an extensive simulation that replicated a campaign against distant countries,” adding that “This exercise tested the IDF’s abilities at gathering intelligence, researching and outlining targets, and making intelligence available to the operational forces.” The country referenced in these remarks is clearly Iran, which Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened to target if necessary.

Defense Minister Benny Gantz announced that “Israel has the ability to act in Iran,” making joint aerial drills even more significant.

Israel and the U.S. have conducted more drills in recent months

The Israeli government has been strongly opposed to the Biden administration’s efforts to revive a nuclear agreement with the Iranian regime, often citing the rogue country’s blatant noncompliance, buildup of illicit materials and weapons development programs. Since the joint talks in Vienna have commenced, the IDF has ramped up its efforts to better prepare for a potential confrontation with Iran- specifically against its nuclear facilities. For this reason, the IDF has been conducting more simulations and joint military exercises.

In August, Israeli and U.S. naval forces carried out a four-day maritime exercise in the Red Sea. According to a U.S. Navy statement, the bilateral training event between U.S. 5th Fleet and Israeli naval forces focused on “mission planning, maritime interdiction and other drills at sea,” including drills to target weapons-smuggling operations in the Red Sea.

Iran supplies its Yemen-based affiliates the Houthi rebels with weapons and other assistance via these waters, making the Red Sea task force vital to Israel’s security needs. In the drills, the USS Nitze and USS Lewis B. Puller sailed alongside Israel’s corvettes.

A few months prior to the Red Sea drills, the IDF launched its two-week long “Chariots of fire” military exercise to prepare a credible military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This simulation marked the first time in over half a decade that the IDF conducted such a wide-scale drill of its kind. Thousands of active-duty soldiers and reservists participated in the exercise, making it the largest military drill to ever take place in Israel.

Notably, U.S. airframes, including refueling planes took part in Chariots of Fire, further cementing the two country’s shared defense goals.

Since the Vienna negotiations have stalled and Iran has shown no effort to stymie its nuclear or ballistic missile expansion efforts, additional Israeli-U.S. military drills should be expected.

Maya Carlin is a Middle East Defense Editor with 19FortyFive. She is also an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

19fortyfive.com · by Maya Carlin · December 2, 2022

9. Calls for more US economic engagement in Indo-Pacific region at US security forum

Calls for more US economic engagement in Indo-Pacific region at US security forum

By Charissa Yong

US Correspondent

The Straits Times2 min

December 3, 2022

View Original

Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen is in California until Sunday to attend the forum, and will also meet key current and former US defence officials. PHOTO: NG ENG HEN/FACEBOOK

WASHINGTON – Defence leaders at a security forum on Saturday lamented the United States’ lagging economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, noting that it failed to keep up with China and even risked undermining America’s security presence in Asia.

The US should do more to engage Indo-Pacific countries economically and cannot focus on only its military presence in the region, said Singapore’s Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen at the Reagan National Defence Forum in California.

The legitimacy of America’s presence in Asia is predicated not only on the security it provides, but also the global system it builds that all countries benefit from, Dr Ng added at a panel on US cooperation with allies and partners.

“To situate American presence in Asia solely on Taiwan is a slightly more difficult proposition,” he said.

“The US increasing their military presence in Asia as a stabilising force is virtuous, it’s good, and we will support that. We think the US should do more to engage, as it did previously, to build an economic framework, which as a tide it can lift all boats. And be careful on Taiwan,” he added.

Tensions between the US and China over Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province to be reunited with the Chinese mainland, by force if necessary, have prompted unease in many capitals in Asia.

The critique that America needed to catch up to China on trade and economics in the Indo-Pacific intensified after Washington withdrew in 2017 from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which later became the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Washington is negotiating the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which covers 13 other countries and a total of 40 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP). But it is not a traditional trade agreement and lacks market access, which is at the top of Asian countries’ wish list.

Dr Ng said there is currently a perception that “the US is against multilateralism” when it comes to economics because of its TPP withdrawal.

At the same time, China joined the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which covers a market of 2.2 billion people and a third of global GDP.

China is also the top trading partner of most Asian countries, noted Dr Ng.

He added that America is doing quite a lot on the military front, from its Aukus security partnership with Australia and Britain to the Quad security dialogue among the US, Australia, India and Japan.

But he asked: “Is American presence in the Indo-Pacific primarily premised on security grounds adequate? Will it give you that kind of moral legitimacy that you had in the 1960s to the year 2000?”

He added: “America needs to… up its game in the economic sphere, whether it’s in Asia or globally.”

10. South China Sea: as US eyes a Subic Bay return, was Chinese ‘coercion’ of Philippines the reason?

Chinese wolf diplomacy and debt trap diplomacy? Has China miscalculated?

I only spent the last fews days at Clark and did not get to see Subic but in my discussions with Filipinos there does seem to be at least a wariness and suspicion about China.

Based on my people to people contact the alliance seems to be on a good footing but that is only anecdotal.

Interestingly it is the Koreans who are dominating investment in Clark Global City/Clark Freeport Zone and tourism. At both Clark International Airport and Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila all the signs include Korean language as well as Chinese and English. i cannot recall seeing that much Korean language when I was last here in 2007.

South China Sea: as US eyes a Subic Bay return, was Chinese ‘coercion’ of Philippines the reason?

The Philippines could soon welcome back US troops to a South China Sea-facing port that Washington relinquished control of over 30 years ago
Observers say Beijing is sure to find such a move ‘disconcerting’, but Manila’s heightened ‘threat perceptions’ of China may force its hand

Maria Siow

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Published: 8:30am, 4 Dec, 2022

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3201826/south-china-sea-us-eyes-subic-bay-return-was-chinese-coercion-philippines-reason?utm_source=rss_feed

The proposed return of US forces to a vast former military base in the Philippines after a three-decade-long absence looks set to heighten superpower rivalry in the South China Sea, as it weighs on Manila-Beijing relations.

Subic Bay was once home to the United States’ largest naval base in Asia – almost the same size as the whole of Singapore – but disagreements over leasing costs in the post-Cold War era led to the withdrawal of American troops from the facility in 1992.

That could all be about to change, however, after reports emerged late last month that the site is likely being considered as a new location under the US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows the US to build and operate facilities on Philippine military bases and rotate in troops for prolonged stays.

First signed in 2014, the EDCA was laid aside after former President Rodrigo Duterte took office in 2016 as he looked to forge closer ties with China.

Tap to enlarge

But the pact has now been revived under his successor Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, whose defence department put out a statement last month saying the Philippines was working with the US to speed up EDCA projects at existing sites, and “exploring new locations that will build a more credible mutual defence posture”.

Existing EDCA locations include Cesar Basa Air Base, about 55km (34 miles) inland from Subic Bay; Fort Ramon Magsaysay in central Luzon – the Philippines’ largest military base; and Lumbia Airport Base Station on the southern island of Mindanao.

Subic Bay is rumoured to be among the five additional EDCA sites that Philippine military chief Lieutenant General Bartolome Vicente Bacarro told local media last month the US had expressed an interest in, shortly before US Vice-President Kamala Harris’ visit to the country.

These additional sites could be confirmed as early as December or January, according to Collin Koh, a research fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, who said “Manila is likely to expedite” the approval process amid heightened “threat perceptions in the South China Sea” – such as a recent flare-up over rocket debris that the Philippine military said was “forcefully” seized by the Chinese coastguard.

China denies using force to retrieve rocket debris from Philippines navy boat

21 Nov 2022

Koh said Marcos may hold off on confirming the new EDCA locations until after his planned state visit to Beijing next month, however, to avoid leaving “a bad taste” in Chinese officials’ mouths – adding that the expanded agreement was sure to be discussed during the president’s visit.

The return of US troops to Subic Bay “would come across as rather disconcerting to Beijing”, Koh said, as it would “allow the Americans to strengthen surveillance over key waterways close by, especially the highly strategic Bashi Channel” – part of the Luzon Strait that separates the Philippines’ northernmost islands from Taiwan.

He said it would also enable the US to expand its military presence in the region and take part in more joint drills such as the annual Balikatan exercises, which have involved troops from Australia as well as other regional observer forces in the past.

Locking Manila into ‘the US system of alliances’

Both Australia and the US already have a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, which allows their soldiers to conduct operations on Philippine soil.

Fellow US ally Japan is now also reportedly eyeing such a pact, according to Aries Arugay, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, who said “this will be huge and a big deal as it will really lock the Philippines into the US system of alliances.”

Japan and the Philippines already have close defence ties, with Tokyo vowing in 2013 to help Manila defend its “remote islands” in the South China Sea, and sending a small contingent of unarmed troops and armoured vehicles to play a “humanitarian support role” in joint US-Philippines drills in 2018.

China’s continued coercion has driven the Philippines to seek closer military cooperation with the US

Gregory Poling, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Meanwhile, Arugay said other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would largely welcome an increased US presence in the Philippines as he said “their beef against the US” under former President Donald Trump had been that it was “more absent than present in the region”.

“Asean members have been longing for more US involvement in the region and this is why a lot of them have pivoted to China because they thought the US was unreliable and undependable,” he said.

Given Subic Bay’s size and favourable geography, a US return to the former naval base “makes sense”, Arugay said.

US military set to return to Philippines’ Subic Bay to counter China’s presence

28 Nov 2022

Gregory Poling, senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, agreed – though he also noted that any possible EDCA site at Subic Bay would not resemble the old US base “in scale or function”.

“It would be under complete Philippine control,” he said, adding that Manila would have to approve in advance any joint exercises and the rotation of US forces.

That being said, the expansion of the EDCA “highlights just how much China’s continued coercion has driven the Philippines to seek closer military cooperation with the US,” Poling said.

CONVERSATIONS (78)

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11. Is AUKUS floundering?

Excerpts:

But now, AUKUS appears to be in trouble. The United States cannot seem to figure out its mind on how to bring the sub deal to life. Bureaucratic politics, and a lack of any sense of strategic or political urgency, may explain the problem. To get the submarines to Australia as fast as possible, they will need to be built in the United States, where nuclear-powered submarine technology is well understood. Yet America’s shipyards do not have the capacity to build subs for Australia while also trying to expand this nation’s own attack submarine fleet from its current level of around 55 SSNs to 60 or more, as the Navy would like.

One idea is to ask Australia to help fund an expansion of the U.S. shipbuilding base. That may make sense, if the price is reasonable — and if Australia then can be guaranteed delivery of its vessels by a certain date. But on both of these matters, it appears the U.S. Navy is balking and no one is overruling them.

The result is that AUKUS could wither on the vine. That would not be good politics for the Biden team at a time when its overall handling of the Russian and Chinese threats has been reasonably impressive through 2022, after a wobbly overall start to foreign policy in 2021. More importantly, it would not be good for American grand strategy at a time when Beijing already wonders if the United States has lost its sense of geopolitical purpose and resolve — as well as its ability to stick to any new strategy for more than a year or two at a time.

Is AUKUS floundering?

BY MICHAEL O’HANLON, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 12/01/22 10:00 AM ET

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3753627-is-aukus-floundering/?utm_source=pocket_saves

Is the so-called AUKUS arrangement between close allies Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States losing its mojo? Were that the case, one of the Biden administration’s top two or three signature initiatives for pushing back with allies and partners against the threatening aspects of China’s rise could be lost. Yet the administration seems unaware of this risk. From the E ring of the Pentagon to the White House, it is time that people lose their complacency on the matter.

The initial AUKUS idea was counterintuitive in various ways. It was not clear why three countries that were already allies needed a new mechanism to collaborate. With Australia’s modest military budget of around $35 billion (about 1/20th America’s own) it was not obvious that that nation could really afford the submarines at the heart of the deal or that there were other, larger benefits for the United States to gain by collaborating with such a mid-sized partner on other areas of military technology development. Also, with some in the U.S. government predicting that China might attack Taiwan later this decade, it was not clear how a program that would only deliver submarines to Australia in the 2030s (at the earliest) would make any useful difference.

Worse, AUKUS’s unseemly 2021 rollout made a bit of a mockery of Biden’s argument that adults were back in charge in the White House, and that American allies would be respected again by the U.S. government. Negotiated secretly between Washington, Canberra and London, its centerpiece concept was a proposal to sell Australia eight American-designed nuclear-powered attack submarines for the Australian armed forces. Those submarines would complement America’s own fleet of more than 50 attack submarines in patrolling Indo-Pacific waters, even as China’s military buildup and assertive behaviors in the region continued. They would also symbolize the collective resolve of the allies to work together to secure the region.

But to make the deal affordable for Australia, Canberra had to cancel a pre-existing contract with French shipyards to build conventionally-powered submarines. Paris hit the roof — not unreasonably — and the Biden team, only recently humbled by the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, looked bad on national security matters as well as on basic diplomatic skills. Reportedly, national security adviser Jake Sullivan offered his resignation in response, though Biden declined to accept it.

Leaving aside the merits of the original case, and the unbecoming behind-the-scenes maneuvering that produced the deal in the first place, the AUKUS arrangement has become a widely respected and distinctive element of U.S. grand strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. In addition to the gradual strengthening of the “Quad” — an informal security partnership involving Japan, the United States, Australia and India — as well as the gradual efforts to improve frosty relations between South Korea and Japan, it has been a centerpiece of U.S. efforts to work with others to push back proactively against China’s militarization of the South China Sea, autocratic behavior toward Hong Kong and Xinjiang province, and threats against Taiwan.

By tightening relations between Washington and two of its allies who share America’s views about the potential China threat — yet who often do so with a calm and tempering attitude that can defuse our American tendency toward overreaction in such matters — AUKUS makes for a good element of grand strategy. That is true above and beyond any single technology or arms sale that its members seek to showcase.

But now, AUKUS appears to be in trouble. The United States cannot seem to figure out its mind on how to bring the sub deal to life. Bureaucratic politics, and a lack of any sense of strategic or political urgency, may explain the problem. To get the submarines to Australia as fast as possible, they will need to be built in the United States, where nuclear-powered submarine technology is well understood. Yet America’s shipyards do not have the capacity to build subs for Australia while also trying to expand this nation’s own attack submarine fleet from its current level of around 55 SSNs to 60 or more, as the Navy would like.

One idea is to ask Australia to help fund an expansion of the U.S. shipbuilding base. That may make sense, if the price is reasonable — and if Australia then can be guaranteed delivery of its vessels by a certain date. But on both of these matters, it appears the U.S. Navy is balking and no one is overruling them.

The result is that AUKUS could wither on the vine. That would not be good politics for the Biden team at a time when its overall handling of the Russian and Chinese threats has been reasonably impressive through 2022, after a wobbly overall start to foreign policy in 2021. More importantly, it would not be good for American grand strategy at a time when Beijing already wonders if the United States has lost its sense of geopolitical purpose and resolve — as well as its ability to stick to any new strategy for more than a year or two at a time.

Michael O’Hanlon is the Philip H. Knight Chair in Defense and Strategy at the Brookings Institution and the author of several books, including the forthcoming “Military History for the Modern Strategist.” Follow him on Twitter @MichaelEOHanlon.

12. Strong Deterrence Enables U.S. to Ensure Global Rules, Rights

This theory will be tested.

Strong Deterrence Enables U.S. to Ensure Global Rules, Rights

Dec. 3, 2022 | By C. Todd Lopez , DOD News |

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

With many hotspots around the globe creating uncertainty, the United States will need more than the assistance of Congress and American industry to build, maintain and strengthen the deterrent capability needed to defend democracy and maintain a free and open global world order.

"These next few years will set the terms of our competition with the People's Republic of China, and they will shape the future of security in Europe, and they will determine whether our children and grandchildren inherit an open world of rules and rights, or whether they face emboldened autocrats who seek to dominate by force and fear," said Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III during a keynote presentation Saturday at the Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California.

Forum Remarks

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III delivers remarks at the 2022 Reagan National Defense Forum at the President Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Calif., Dec. 3, 2022.

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Deterrence is at the heart of the National Defense Strategy, which the Defense Department released just last month, Austin said.

"We've got the right strategy and the right operational concepts," Austin said. "And they're driving us to make the right investments for our warfighters. So we're upgrading and honing and strengthening our armed forces for a changing world."

In an imperfect world, Austin said, "deterrence does come through strength. We will continue to make clear to any potential foe the folly of aggression against the United States at any time, or any place, in any theater, or any domain."

F-15EX Flight

An F-15EX aircraft flies towards its new home at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., March 11, 2021. The F-15EX is a capability the Defense Department has invested in within the FY 2023 budget request in order to strengthen American deterrence.

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Austin laid out some of the efforts the U.S. military is undertaking to strengthen that deterrence, including that on land, air and at sea.

In the fiscal year 2023 budget, he said, the Defense Department requested more than $56 billion for airpower. That is focused on the F-35 Lightning II, the F-15EX fighter, the B-21 Raider and other systems.

B-21 Bomber

The B-21 Raider was unveiled during a ceremony in Palmdale, Calif., Dec. 2, 2022. Designed to operate in tomorrow's high-end threat environment, the B-21 will play a critical role in ensuring America's enduring airpower capability.

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"American airpower helps deter conflict every day, from joint exercises with our Indo-Pacific partners, to aerial drills with our allies to protect NATO's eastern flank," Austin said.

Deterrence also happens on the ocean, he said. There, the Defense Department is investing in construction of nine battle-force ships, and continuing to invest in the Ford-class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and the Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines. Just last month, he said, an American Ford-class nuclear powered carrier made its first transit to Europe.

Ford Return

The USS Gerald R. Ford returns to Naval Station Norfolk after completing its inaugural deployment to the Atlantic Ocean, Nov. 26, 2022. Ford-class carriers such as the USS Gerald R. Ford are one of the capabilities the Defense Department has invested in within the FY 2023 budget request in order to strengthen American deterrence.

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VIRIN: 221126-N-QI061-2036R

Also included in deterrence are long-range fires — the kind finding success now in Ukraine.

"Long range fires will be vital for contingencies in the Indo-Pacific as well," he said. "We're investing in land-based hypersonic missile batteries and in an air-launched hypersonic cruise missile. And the USS Zumwalt will become the first Navy platform to field hypersonics."

USS Zumwalt

The USS Zumwalt approaches the Gov. William Preston Lane Memorial Bridge, also known as the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, as the ship travels to its new home port of San Diego, Calif. The U.S. military depends on the technology built in to systems such as the Zumwalt. The Defense Department recently stood up the Office of Strategic Capital to ensure that technologies under development right now, which may be critical to future U.S. military requirements, are able to get the funding they need to make it to market.

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Perhaps the strongest deterrent, Austin said, is America's nuclear capability. And there's plenty of investment there as well, he told the audience.

"Deterrence means a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal as the ultimate backstop to deter strategic attacks on our country and our allies, including NATO, Japan and the Republic of Korea," he said, adding that the fiscal year 2023 budget includes $34 billion to modernize the nuclear triad and to bolster nuclear command, control and communications.

Austin called on Congress to pass an on-time appropriation to ensure the department gets the capabilities needed to further strengthen its deterrent capability.

Spotlight: Science & Tech Spotlight: Science & Tech: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/science-and-technology/

defense.gov · by C. Todd Lopez

13.

14.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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