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Quotes of the Day:
“A million zeros joined together do not, unfortunately, add up to one. Ultimately everything depends on the quality of the individual, but the fatally shortsighted habit of our age is to think only in terms of large numbers and mass organizations, though one would think that the world had seen more than enough of what a well-disciplined mob can do in the hands of a single madman.”
- Carl Jung
“Teaching is more difficult than learning because what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, let's nothing else be learned than learning. His conduct, therefore, often produces the impression that we properly learn nothing from him, if by “learning” we now suddenly understand merely the procurement of useful information.”
- Martin Heidegger
"Wisdom is knowing what to do next. Virtue is doing it."
- David Starr Jordan
1. North Korea's Provocations: Time for an Asymmetric Approach
2. Chinese warship activity in S. Korea's jurisdictional waters rises: lawmaker
3. Russians fleeing Putin's call-up sail to S.Korea, most denied entry
4. South Korea’s status as rising defense player on display at AUSA
5. Korea Turns Back Russian Yachts After Putin's Conscription Order
6. Yoon solicits opinions on deployment of strategic nuclear weapons
7. Experts “Reallocation of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea has little military benefit and only adds to the burden on the U.S.-ROK alliance”
8. Washington shrugs off Kim Jong-un's threats again
9. North nukes shift from strategic to tactical
10. Four geopolitical risks for Korea
11. South Korea faces growing calls to acquire nuclear weapons
1. North Korea's Provocations: Time for an Asymmetric Approach
My latest thoughts on the current situation.
North Korea's Provocations: Time for an Asymmetric Approach
19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell · October 11, 2022
Do not fear North Korea’s provocations. They are a standard expression of leader Kim Jong Un’s three-pronged strategy, which is built on political warfare, blackmail diplomacy, and advanced warfighting preparation.
The regime conducted seven missiles launches of various types over a two-week period ending on Oct. 11. Pyongyang is likely to continue such provocations, and it may even conduct its seventh nuclear test in the coming months. Rather than fear these provocations, North Korea’s adversaries should view them as another opportunity to show Kim his strategy will not work.
North Korea’s Strategy
There are several possible reasons for this flurry of tests. One assessment is that North Korea is using the recent firings, which have emanated from multiple locations, to try to create a targeting dilemma for the U.S. and South Korea. They may be trying to undermine the ROK’s Kill Chain concept, showing that they can conduct a strike at a time and place of their choosing, and the alliance will not be able to know when or from where it will come.
However, the indications and warnings for a missile test will be much different than the indications and warnings for a launch if Kim decides to go to war. A missile strike into the South (or targeting Japanese or U.S. bases in the Pacific) would be the first salvo in a war, and the regime would have to prepare for a decisive kinetic response from U.S. allies if they carried one out. Fortunately, there have been no indications that such preparations are occurring, according to open source reporting. This means the regime is probably testing in hopes of advancing its capabilities; testing to send an external message (in other words, using blackmail diplomacy); and testing for domestic messaging purposes, aiming to keep tensions high so the regime can justify the enormous sacrifices and suffering his people must make.
Considering everything that has happened over the past few weeks, some important assessments can be made.
Kim is continuing to execute his three pronged political warfare strategy. He aims to subvert South Korea and the ROK/U.S. alliance, and to use blackmail diplomacy to wring concessions from the ROK, the U.S., and the international community. And his advanced warfighting strategy focuses on developing the capabilities needed to dominate the peninsula under regime rule some day in the future. These are not separate and distinct strategies — they are mutually supporting and reinforcing.
In addition, Kim is likely under enormous internal stress. He is facing a failed economy, a poor COVID response, natural disasters, and a poor upcoming harvest. As noted, he needs an external threat to justify the suffering of the Korean people.
Understanding Kim’s Motivations
Kim may feel the need to carry out the missile tests because the U.S. is distracted with Ukraine, Taiwan, and Iran. Kim needs the U.S. to keep some focus on North Korea and make statements that the regime can exploit to support its domestic propaganda. Every time the U.S. addresses North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, Pyongyang’s Propaganda and Agitation Department can use Washington’s words to show that the U.S. fears these programs.
Kim may also believe he is free to grow his military capabilities because the U.S. is distracted and wants to avoid any significant response on the Korean peninsula. Kim also might believe that the U.S. would make concessions in order to keep the peninsula stable.
Kim might also seek to support Russia and China by causing problems for the U.S. as it seeks to deal with the situations in Ukraine and Taiwan. The North has been supportive of Putin in recognizing the annexed territories and providing “diplomatic” support to Russia. It will be interesting to see if the regime provides workers or soldiers to Russia as has reportedly been discussed.
While the ROK/U.S. alliance cannot stop North Korea’s provocations and tests, it has successfully deterred a resumption of hostilities for the past 69 years, and that must always be the priority.
Given North Korea’s actions, the alliance needs to recognize Kim’s strategy, understand it, expose it, and attack it with information and a superior political warfare strategy. The alliance must not overreact to Pyongyang’s actions, and it must not show fear. Every time the alliance discusses the regime’s nuclear and missile programs, it boosts Kim’s domestic legitimacy. The alliance therefore needs to keep its focus on human rights, even when political leaders discuss nukes and missiles. They must state the fact that Kim is responsible for the suffering of North Koreans – he prioritizes nuclear weapons and missiles over their welfare. Nuclear weapons and human rights must be linked in all statements. Human rights are not only a moral imperative, but also a national security issue, as Kim must curtail rights in order to remain in power.
Responding to Kim
Traditionally the alliance has tried to pressure the regime through military shows of force ranging from military exercises to the deployment of strategic assets, and combined with UN and U.S. sanctions regimes. Sanctions enforcement, and therefore pressure on Kim, has been weak. China and Russia continue to block any additional UN sanctions pressure using their Security Council vetoes. Indeed, the alliance needs to do much better on sanctions. However, to really pressure Kim, the alliance must focus on human rights and influence activities and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea. It needs to do things it has never done before.
Most importantly, the alliance must never make concessions, especially in the form of sanctions relief. Any concession will convince Kim his political warfare and blackmail diplomacy strategies are successful, which will cause him to double down.
Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: North Korea State Media.
Image of Hwasong-12 IRBM. Image Credit: KCNA.
That said, the number one priority is for the alliance to demonstrate strength and resolve in the face of provocations, and it has done this well by taking some sound military actions. The ROK and U.S. must never again cancel exercises, as that shows weakness and emboldens Kim. The alliance must view provocations as opportunities to demonstrate to Kim that his strategies are failing and will fail. Seoul and Washington must do that through a comprehensive political warfare campaign that makes effective use of information and influence while building on the rock-solid foundation of a strong ROK/U.S. military alliance.
There is growing recognition of the importance of information and influence, and proposals are being put forth that would take advantage, for example, of the massive influx of K-pop and South Korean entertainment. However, an influence and information activities campaign must be developed in even greater depth. K-pop alone will not pressure the regime. The alliance needs to focus on human rights and on separating the second-tier military leaders from the elite. It must give those leaders options when faced with decisions from the regime. An information campaign must develop cracks in the regime by exploiting differences and weakness within the party political structure. The alliance must begin the long educational process of preparing the population for unification.
Naysayers will laugh off K-pop and all the derogatory anti-Kim propaganda that is sent into the North, and indeed the alliance needs to develop a sophisticated and comprehensive information and influence activities campaign. K-pop is useful to open the door, but it does not constitute a real influence campaign.
Ultimately such a campaign must pursue three broad possible effects. The first intent is to pressure Kim directly to change his behavior, although this is the least likely outcome. The second is to pressure the elite and the military to change Kim’s behavior. The third is to encourage North Koreans to change the regime.
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un. Image Credit: KCNA.
The alliance must devise and execute a superior political warfare strategy that is based on an influence campaign and an approach that prioritizes human rights, with the long term objective of achieving a free and unified Korea. It must rest on the strongest possible foundation of deterrence and defense. Finally, the alliance must recognize and accept there will be no end to the nuclear threat and the human rights abuses in the North until there is a United Republic of Korea. Therefore, it must pursue this objective.
David Maxwell, a 1945 Contributing Editor, is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 20 years in Asia and specializes in North Korea and East Asia Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
19fortyfive.com · by David Maxwell · October 11, 2022
2. Chinese warship activity in S. Korea's jurisdictional waters rises: lawmaker
PRC and nK synchronizing activities to create dilemmas for the ROK/US alliance?
Chinese warship activity in S. Korea's jurisdictional waters rises: lawmaker | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · October 12, 2022
SEOUL, Oct. 12 (Yonhap) -- The number of Chinese warships spotted operating in waters under South Korea's jurisdiction rose to some 260 last year, up from around 220 in the previous year, a ruling party lawmaker said Wednesday.
Rep. Lim Byung-heon of the People Power Party (PPP) cited data from the Defense Intelligence Agency under the defense ministry, highlighting the need to bolster South Korea's maritime security amid lingering regional territorial tensions.
The number of Chinese military vessels found in the South's "jurisdictional sea area" grew last year, though the figure came to some 220 in 2020, down from around 280 in 2019.
In the first eight months of this year, over 170 Chinese warships were seen operating in the waters, with roughly 110 of them in waters south of the Korean Peninsula.
The jurisdictional sea area encompasses the country's territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and other segments under its jurisdiction. Parts of the waters overlap with areas where China asserts its maritime jurisdiction.
Citing data from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rep. Shin Won-sik, another PPP lawmaker, disclosed Chinese aircraft carrier activities in the South's jurisdictional waters.
In the first half of this year, a Chinese carrier, whose name was not identified, was found to have operated three times in waters just 130-200 kilometers away from South Korea's territorial waters.
Last year, it was spotted appearing just once in waters around 100 km away from the South's waters.
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · October 12, 2022
3. Russians fleeing Putin's call-up sail to S.Korea, most denied entry
Russians fleeing Putin's call-up sail to S.Korea, most denied entry
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin
SEOUL, Oct 12 (Reuters) - Desperate to avoid military call-up to fight in Ukraine, more than 20 Russians have sailed in yachts down the North Pacific coast to South Korea, but most were refused entry, a South Korean lawmaker said on Wednesday.
There has been an exodus of conscription-age men from Russia since President Vladimir Putin ordered a partial mobilisation on Sept. 21, but most fled by road, rail and air to Europe and neighbouring former Soviet Union countries, like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
Arriving aboard four yachts, 23 Russians have reached South Korea since late September, but authorities have granted entry to only two, lawmaker An Ho-young said, citing coast guard data.
The others "were rejected because their purposes were unclear and they did not have sufficient documents," the lawmaker said in a statement.
Two yachts left from the South Korean island of Ulleung and southeastern port of Pohang on Tuesday with 15 Russians aboard, An said.
Two other yachts remained in Pohang, and one of them - left with just two Russians aboard after two gained entry - intended making the long voyage to Thailand, the lawmaker added.
A justice ministry official said he did not have details about the yacht cases, but Russians are in general allowed to enter the country without a visa as long as they obtain prior approval via South Korea's electronic travel authorisation system.
Reporting by Hyonhee Shin; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Hyonhee Shin
4. South Korea’s status as rising defense player on display at AUSA
South Korea is now a contributing member of the "arsenal of democracy."
South Korea’s status as rising defense player on display at AUSA
Defense News · by Joe Gould · October 11, 2022
WASHINGTON ― South Korea’s defense export sales have already hit $15 billion this year, surpassing a record $7.25 billion last year, and could reach $20 billion by year’s end if potential deals with Australia, Malaysia, Norway and Saudi Arabia break in Seoul’s direction.
The dramatically growing figure, reported by the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, isn’t by accident but rather part of a deliberate strategy, observers say. South Korean firms are leveraging a combination of high-level deal-making across multiple administrations in Seoul, commercial technology, favorable government policies and industry appearances at arms fairs like the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual meeting in D.C. this week.
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol recently announced his aspiration to make his country one of the world’s top four arms exporters. Already, Seoul is riding a wave of deals this year that includes a $5.8 billion pact with Poland for Korea Aerospace Industries’ FA-50 fighter jets, Hyundai Rotem’s K2 Black Panther tanks, and Hanwha Defense’s K9 Thunder howitzers and K10 resupply vehicles. The K9 also beat out French, Russian and Chinese offerings to win a $1.7 billion contract with Egypt in February.
On Tuesday, Hanwha Defense announced the Pentagon had accepted its unmanned ground vehicle, the Arion-SMET, for a coveted spot in upcoming foreign comparative tests. Days earlier, the company announced its K9 howitzer and K10 had proved their interoperability with a variety of U.S. munitions at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona.
South Korea has set its sights on the U.S. market, and executives on the sidelines of the show said the Yuma tests and upcoming experiments for the Arion-SMET are paving the way.
“We’ve really shown the U.S. community about the capability of this product here,” Hanwha Defense USA’s chief executive, John Kelly, told Defense News.
“There’s a lot of interest in K9 and K10 globally, as you can imagine, driven by current events in Ukraine, and we have a lot of existing customers who are looking at upgrading and buying additional capacity,” he added. South Korea, Turkey, Poland, India, Finland, Norway, Estonia, Australia and Egypt all own K9 howitzers.
One potent symbol of South Korea’s competitiveness and cooperation with American firms is the AS-21 Redback. U.S. company Oshkosh Defense’s bid to replace the Army’s M2 Bradley is based on the Redback; and in Australia’s competition for a new tracked infantry fighting vehicle, the Redback and German firm Rheinmetall’s Lynx are still in contention, while British company BAE Systems and American business General Dynamics were eliminated in 2019.
By Kelly’s reckoning, that settled the question of whether South Korea’s defense exports can compete against their U.S. counterparts.
“Who were the two companies selected? They weren’t U.S. companies,” Kelly said. “The reason we have just done the demonstrations here in Yuma is because the capabilities we have on both of those vehicles exceed what the U.S. already has in place.”
“It’s no longer a question of: ‘Can we compete?’ I believe we can compete. I believe we are very competitive on price as well,” he added.
U.S. company Oshkosh Defense’s bid to replace the Army’s M2 Bradley is based on the Redback, which is the South Korean system seen here. (Hanwha Defense)
‘A strong edge’
Beyond North America, South Korea’s defense industry is marketing itself as the ideal partner for Eastern European countries in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Whereas the West has been enmeshed in the war on terror since 2001, South Korea and its defense-industrial base have focused on conventional warfare since 1953, when an armistice agreement was signed amid the Korean War.
“We have a strong edge in terms of land-focused weapons systems, like the K9 howitzer and main battle tanks like the K2,” Col. Kim Yong Sun, who oversees operations of South Korea’s state arms procurement agency in the U.S., told Defense News earlier this month.
“Poland, the Baltic countries and other nations confronting Russia — they need weapons systems and raw materials right now, not in two, three or four years,” Kim said. “On the Korean Peninsula and in the current geopolitical situation, main battle tanks, howitzers and that level of weapons systems are essential. We have the infrastructure to produce massive amounts of weapons systems.”
Another way South Korea pursues buyers is through tailored sales pitches. Nikkei Asia recently reported that Seoul conducts thorough analysis of the buyers’ security challenges, finances and industrial makeup, and from there it might suggest jointly producing the arms with a local player or offer to sell cheaper, secondhand equipment.
South Korea also markets itself as more flexible when it comes to technology transfer agreements.
“[Washington has been] very reluctant to share its technology with countries that buy U.S. weapons systems. But Korea, we are different,” said Kim, who is both the defense cooperation and defense logistics attache in Washington.
“Selling only a weapons system is just a very small scope of cooperation, but sharing the values, like technology, is very essential for other countries,” Kim added. “We’d like to give them knowledge, how to produce the weapons and maintain them.”
Arion-SMET, a six-wheel drive unmanned ground vehicle, leverages commercial electric vehicle technology. (Hanwha Defense)
‘Not just K-pop’
South Korea’s aggregate defense exports for the last five years rose 177% over the previous five years, making it the world’s eighth-largest defense exporter for that period, according to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. That means South Korea is the globe’s fastest-climbing country over those periods, beyond China and the United Kingdom.
“They will go up in the rankings probably by next year,” said Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Swedish think tank. “They’re the quickest moving in the last decade or two.”
That growth is based on its expansion beyond historic customers in Southeast Asia like the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand to India, Australia and as far afield as the United Arab Emirates. Wezeman said Seoul made a splash 10 years ago when the U.K. passed over its own shipyards to buy South Korean naval tankers, and it has since become a powerhouse.
“They’re at the level where they can offer countries a slightly simpler combat aircraft, a slightly simpler corvette, a slightly simpler submarine at reasonable prices, with a track record where everything works,” Wezeman added. “That’s interesting for a lot of markets.”
Some observers don’t find South Korea’s thriving defense industry hard to believe when the country has a long tradition of manufactured exports that now includes everything from cars, phones and semiconductors to container ships.
“It’s not just K-pop that they’re exporting,” said Byron Callan, managing director of Capital Alpha Partners. “Why is it a surprise that a country with some pretty acute security needs on their northern border, and that’s demonstrating they’re a globally competitive technology producer, would also be an emerging power in defense markets?”
RELATED
Australia buys K9 howitzers from South Korea’s Hanwha Defense
The deal is worth about $730 million, representing the highest-valued export of Hanwha’s K9 self-propelled howitzer, nicknamed Thunder and known in Australia as the AS9.
Hanwha Defense’s Arion-SMET, a six-wheel drive unmanned ground vehicle, is one program that leverages commercial technology ― in this case, electric vehicle technology.
“We are taking all the lessons from the commercial sector and applying it to the military sector,” said Youngwoo Seo, an executive in charge of the company’s defense robotics division. “There’s a lot of crossover; we’re not isolated in a chamber working all the technology alone. We learn and collaborate with universities and the vendors.”
Promotional efforts by President Yoon have included a trip to the NATO summit in Spain this summer, where he met with European leaders. But the goal transcends who’s in the Blue House, said Peter Lee, a research fellow in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre, a think tank in Australia.
Defense exports in particular have for years been a way for South Korea to bolster alliances and sustain its military as it faces down North Korea’s formidable combat power ― a view that prevailed even under the recently ended administration of President Moon Jae-in, regarded as a peacemaker.
“The underside of the Korean peace-loving stereotype is that they’re actually defense hawks and usually increase defense spending to get out from under the American shadow and build self-reliance,” Lee said.
During a recent visit to Australia, South Korean officials offered to build attack submarines within seven years to bridge the gap between the Collins-class diesel-electric sub Australia wants to replace and the nuclear-powered subs promised by Australia’s alliance with the U.S. and the U.K. According to Lee, that assurance highlights the peril of South Korea’s ambition.
“It was a very bold pitch, it got front page headlines and it got the interest in that the South Koreans might actually be players on the undersea warfare side of the equation,” Lee said. “Those are good pitches, they’re very audacious and it creates a lot of expectations that might not be met.”
Still, Lee argued, South Korea’s rise is good news for the U.S. as the Biden administration works, with an eye on Russia and China, to shore up allied and partner defense-industrial bases. In other words, there’s enough demand right now to go around.
“It’s something the U.S. should welcome unless in some miraculous, near-term future the U.S. defense-industrial base can ramp up to basically accommodate all these needs,” Lee said. “With the prospect of a two-front war [in Europe and the Pacific] now feasible, the demand in Europe, the demand in Asia is just going to keep growing.”
About Joe Gould
Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.
5. Korea Turns Back Russian Yachts After Putin's Conscription Order
Korea Turns Back Russian Yachts After Putin's Conscription Order
english.chosun.com
October 12, 2022 11:19
Twenty-three Russians tried to enter Korea on their yachts since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced partial conscription, but all but two were turned back.
According to data from the Korea Coast Guard, three yachts carrying 10, five and four Russians were discovered on the East Sea on Oct. 1, while one yacht with four Russians was found there on Oct. 2 and another carrying three Russians on Oct. 5.
Four of the boats docked in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province and all 23 Russians aboard applied for entry as tourists. But only two of them, who had previous records of entering Korea, were allowed in. Twenty-two of the 23 were men of conscription age in their 20s and 30s.
But it was unclear whether they were fleeing conscription.
Earlier, the U.K.'s Guardian reported that eight Russians from Vladivostok also tried to enter Korea on a yacht since conscription was announced, but it is not known whether their boat was among the ones that were reported by the coast guard.
Russia Designates Korea as 'Unfriendly' Nation
Korea Sanctions Russian Banks
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
6. Yoon solicits opinions on deployment of strategic nuclear weapons
I respect the thinking on this and President Yoon's willingness to listen to opinions. This Is a hugely emotional/psychological issue for Koreans.
But the question I have to ask is how much do we think ROK tactical nuclear weapons (or deployment of US nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula) will contribute to deterrence? Will they have any significant influence on Kim Jong Un?
And the next question I have is what is the concept of employment for such weapons? To effectively deter Kim he must know that they will be used to decisive effect.
And that brings me to my last question, can they have a decisive effect if hostilities resume?
Yoon solicits opinions on deployment of strategic nuclear weapons
donga.com
Posted October. 12, 2022 07:44,
Updated October. 12, 2022 07:44
Yoon solicits opinions on deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. October. 12, 2022 07:44. by Su-Young Hong gaea@donga.com.
Regarding the growing demand for the re-deployment of strategic nuclear weapons in response to the advancement of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, President Yoon said he is currently “listening to the opinions from both South Korea and the U.S. and examining them.”
“Now is not the time to publicly announce my opinion as the president,” said President Yoon in his doorstepping sessions on Tuesday. “The ironclad alliance between Korea and the U.S. and security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan will be utilized to build a strong response mechanism that will help us better prepared (for threats from North Korea).”
“Currently, North Korea is consistently developing and advancing its nuclear weapons and imposing threats to not only the Republic of Korea but also the entire world,” said the president. “There is nothing North Korea can acquire through nuclear weapons.”
President Yoon’s remark has been slightly tilted from the previous stance that drew the line regarding the re-deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. At the interview sessions marking his 100th day in office, President Yoon said that the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a fundamental and essential premise for permanent global peace. “It is our priority to pursue effective and reinforced implementation of extended deterrence under any circumstances,” he said.
The attention is on whether President Yoon’s remark, which came amid the legislative pursuit for preemptive nuclear strikes and growing threats from North Korea and its continued ballistic missile provocations and strategic nuclear weapons attacks, will lead to a review of whether to allow nuclear arms use for South Korea. “It is too soon to make a public announcement, and no change has been made on this matter,” said an official from the Presidential Office.
한국어
donga.com
7. Experts “Reallocation of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea has little military benefit and only adds to the burden on the U.S.-ROK alliance”
Given that President Yoon is soliciting views on tactical nuclear weapons for Korea, here is a Voice of America article about the issue. A number of us weigh in.
This is a google translate version of the Korean broadcast. (I wish VOA would provide English translations of Eunjung Cho's (Jo Eun-jung) reporting as she provides tremendous strategic insights in every report).
Note that this report is broadcast to north and South Korea (and around the world). I make my comments considering that they might be heard in Pyongyang. (We need that the regime provides transcripts of VOA reporting to the elite so I make my comments with that in mind - though I fear they might redact some of my comments that they do not want read by the elite :-)).
Experts “Reallocation of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea has little military benefit and only adds to the burden on the U.S.-ROK alliance”
https://www.voakorea.com/a/6785739.html
2022.10.12
Several U.S. experts have taken a negative stance on the allegations of tactical nuclear redeployment in some parts of South Korea as North Korea raises the level of its nuclear threat to South Korea. It is pointed out that the military benefit is small, it can lead to misjudgment by North Korea, and it can become a burden on the US-ROK alliance due to the growing controversy within South Korea. Instead of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons, experts suggested strengthening military cooperation between the US and South Korea. Reporter Jo Eun-jung reports.
US diplomats and security experts, including former officials, oppose the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, pointing out that, above all, they have low military utility.
Former acting US ambassador to Korea, Robert Rapson, told VOA on the 11th, "I believe that US nuclear weapons should not be redeployed to South Korea for two important reasons."
[녹취: 랩슨 전 대사대리] “I do not think US nuclear weapons should be redeployed to South Korea for two primary reasons. It would be seen as an escalatory measure that could significantly ratchet up tensions on the peninsula, and thus heighten risks of miscalculation and counter-response by Pyongyang and for little gain. Redeployment would not add anything to our strategic deterrence posture as the US’s nuclear deterrent against the north is more than fully covered by an array of assets based off the peninsula.”
Former acting ambassador Rapson said the tactical nuclear redeployment "will be seen as a measure that can greatly escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula, thus increasing the risk of North Korea's misjudgment and response, but of little benefit."
"As the US nuclear deterrence against North Korea is sufficiently maintained with a set of (military) assets based off the coast of the Korean Peninsula, the redeployment will not add to our strategic deterrence posture," he said.
Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, also said, "There is no military advantage to relocating US nuclear weapons to South Korea."
[클링너 연구원] “The redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons to South Korean soil lacks military merit. The ground-based weapons removed in the 1990s no longer exist in the U.S. military inventory. Today’s tactical nukes are mounted on mobile air- and sea-based platforms, making them difficult for North Korea to find and target. To place them in a static underground bunker would degrade deterrence and heighten the risk of a North Korean preemptive attack on such high-value targets. Some have suggested that, if tensions on the peninsula should rise, the missiles could always be moved back to their mobile launch platforms. But doing so during a crisis might be deemed “too escalatory” and, therefore, prevented, thus increasing risk to the South Korean population.”
"The US military no longer has the ground-launched weapons it withdrew from South Korea in the 1990s," said Klingner. said.
"Deploying tactical nuclear weapons in fixed underground bunkers will reduce deterrence and increase the risk of North Korea's preemptive strike against high-value targets," he said.
“Some have suggested that the (fixed) missile could be turned into a mobile launch platform at any time in case of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but doing so in a crisis situation could be viewed as further escalating tensions,” Klingner said. may increase the risk for
David Maxwell, a senior researcher at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy, also said, "Nuclear weapons do not prevent nuclear attacks," adding that conventional weapons can sufficiently defend South Korea.
[녹취: 맥스웰 연구원] “We have conventional capabilities that can destroy the North Korean People’s army anywhere in North Korea. If it attacks into South Korea, we certainly don’t want to use tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but we have the conventional capability to destroy the North Korean People’s Army and therefore tactical nuclear weapons are not necessary to win the war against North Korea.”
"The United States and South Korea have the conventional capability to destroy the North Korean People's Army anywhere in North Korea," said Maxwell, a former ROK-U.S. CFC operations chief. not,” he said.
“But we don’t need tactical nuclear weapons to win the war with North Korea because we can destroy the North Korean People’s Army with conventional capabilities,” he said.
On the 10th, on a TV installed at Seoul Station, South Korea, a report about the training of a tactical nuclear operation unit released by North Korea is coming out.
“I am concerned about political controversies in Korea”
Experts also point out that the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons could cause great controversy in South Korea and burden the US-ROK alliance.
Former White House weapons of mass destruction coordinator Gary Seymour said in a phone call with VOA on the 11th that "the US government does not currently see 'tactical nuclear redeployment' as the best way to provide extended deterrence to South Korea."
[녹취: 세이모어 전 조정관] “I think there are people in Washington that are worried that the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea could become a big controversial domestic political issue in South Korea, which would make the U.S.-ROK alliance controversial. So I think the U.S. is worried about doing something that would cause political problems for the alliance.”
Former Coordinator Seymour said, "In Washington Joya, there are people who are concerned that the relocation of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea will become a highly controversial domestic political issue, and that this will also throw the US-ROK alliance into controversy."
"The United States is concerned about doing something that could create political problems for our alliance," he said.
Former Coordinator Seymour explained that there are other disarmament supporters in the United States that 'even treaty alliances should not proliferate US nuclear weapons.'
Bruce Bennett, a researcher at the Rand Institute, also pointed out that the tactical nuclear redeployment is “premature”.
There are several obstacles to deploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, and one of them is the political controversy in South Korea.
[녹취: 베넷 연구원] “In fact politically it would be extraordinarily divisive. It would create strong anti-government and kind of crisis-like condition in Korea.”
Researcher Bennett said the tactical nuclear redeployment would "create significant political divisions, and could lead to a crisis situation due to strong anti-government sentiment in South Korea."
"It's not that we shouldn't redeploy tactical nuclear weapons, it's that we should move forward while removing obstacles in a creative way," he said.
Researcher Bennett pointed out that one of such creative methods is to repeatedly warn North Korea of the possibility of relocating tactical nuclear weapons, creating logic that can lead to actual deployment in the future.
Sumi Terry, director of the Wilson Center for Asia, said the US and South Korea should consider a variety of possibilities, including tactical nuclear redeployment.
[녹취: 테리 국장] “I think we should examine all options on the table, including NATO-style sharing, or potentially redeploying tactical nuclear weapons. We need to weigh the pros and cons. At this moment, I can’t confidently say this is what we should do, but I am for the idea of doing studies or research and examine the various options.”
"We need to consider all options, whether it's NATO-style nuclear sharing or potential tactical nuclear relocation," Terry said.
He added, “I do not strongly recommend that [the relocation of tactical nuclear weapons] be pursued at this point, but I support the study and review of various options.”
Director Terry pointed out that North Korea is focusing on its tactical nuclear capabilities against South Korea through recent missile tests, and has significantly lowered the 'threshold' of a preemptive nuclear attack by enacting nuclear force legislation.
“Considering the current situation, it is perfectly reasonable for South Korea to consider all options as a normal country,” he said.
On the 30th of last month, the U.S., South Korean navy, and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces conducted a combined anti-submarine exercise on the east coast of South Korea.
“An alternative to strengthening military cooperation between the United States and South Korea and Japan”
Experts consider strengthening military cooperation between the United States and South Korea and Japan as an alternative to tactical nuclear redeployment in the face of North Korea's missile provocations.
[녹취: 세이모어 전 조정관] “The important immediate step is for the U.S. and ROK to improve their joint planning and consultation to discuss contingencies in the event that there was a conflict on the Korean peninsula and North Korean use of nuclear weapons, all of which I think is very unlikely.”
"The important step that the United States and South Korea will take immediately is to deepen joint planning and consultations in response to the conflict situation on the Korean Peninsula and North Korea's use of nuclear weapons," Seymour said.
He also cited the cooperation between the United States and Japan on missile defense in the region.
Researcher Maxwell also emphasized the necessity of integrating the missile defense network between the United States and Japan, and also mentioned strengthening intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
[녹취: 맥스웰 연구원] “You need the most aggressive and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to be able to find the entire nuclear and missile systems throughout North Korea, storage, transfer, refueling, assembly areas and launch sites. All of those need to be discovered and targeted.”
Researcher Maxwell said, “We need to find nuclear and missile systems across North Korea through aggressive and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute, also mentioned strengthening the US-ROK alliance as an alternative to tactical nuclear redeployment.
[크로닌 석좌] “The US is heavily deployed to South Korea and our combined alliance structure is the strongest deterrent to aggression. Nuclear weapons are better threats than actual instruments of war. So we need to strengthen our arsenal, integrate systems where we can, harden targets and make resilient our communications, and then keep innovating our defenses while expanding our economic and technological lead over North Korea’s current leadership.”
Cronin said, "A lot of US troops are deployed in South Korea, and the US-ROK alliance structure is the strongest deterrent against aggression."
“Nuclear weapons are a threat rather than a real tool of warfare,” he said. It has to be solidified,” he said.
This is Jo Eun-jung from VOA News.
8. Washington shrugs off Kim Jong-un's threats again
I think there is a difference between "shrugging off" and not overreacting.
Wednesday
October 12, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Washington shrugs off Kim Jong-un's threats again
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/12/national/northKorea/Korea-John-Kirby-National-Security-Council/20221012174206236.html
John Kirby
The United States remains open to dialogue with North Korea but is also committed to the regime's denuclearization and the maintenance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea, U.S. officials said Tuesday.
Speaking at an online press briefing, National Security Council (NSC) coordinator for strategic communications John Kirby stated Washington’s goal is “the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” and said the U.S. government “believes that there’s still a diplomatic path forward” to that goal.
Kirby’s remarks came after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un dismissed the necessity of dialogue with either South Korea or the United States in comments reported Monday by Pyongyang’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Referring to denuclearization and Pyongyang’s refusal to negotiate with Washington, Kirby said, “We have said we would be willing to sit down with Kim Jong-un without preconditions to negotiate that kind of outcome, but he has not responded to that offer, except to say that he has only continued his provocations, continued his missile launches, continued to try to pursue his nuclear ambitions, and all that’s doing is causing greater insecurity and instability.”
North Korea and the United States have not held denuclearization talks since the 2019 summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump collapsed with no agreement.
North Korea staged seven ballistic missile launch events between Sept. 25 and Oct. 9, including an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that flew over Japan and a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) launched underwater from a reservoir.
Photos of the recent missile launches show that Kim was in attendance at several.
Pyongyang is also said to have completed all preparations to conduct what would be its seventh nuclear test, according to Seoul’s spy agency.
The National Intelligence Service told South Korean lawmakers in a recent parliamentary briefing that the North may conduct its seventh nuclear test after the Chinese Communist Party concludes its annual National Congress.
Kirby also said the United States is focused on bolstering its bilateral and trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan.
When asked if the United States would redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea if North Korea conducts a fresh nuclear test, the NSC spokesman declined to answer.
State Department spokesman Ned Price said U.S. President Joe Biden remains committed to maintaining the extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to South Korea when asked a similar question at a Tuesday press briefing.
“[President Biden] affirmed that commitment to the ROK, using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities,” Price said, referring to South Korea by the acronym for its official name, Republic of Korea.
Meanwhile, North Korean ambassador to the United Nations Kim Song blamed tensions on the Korean Peninsula on the U.S. deployment of strategic assets to the region at a speech in New York on Tuesday and suggested Washington should abandon its own nuclear weapons before pressing Pyongyang to do the same.
“The main objective of our self-defense capabilities is to prevent war by forcing the enemy to give up their aggression,” Kim said.
“In order to realize the complete abandonment of nuclear weapons, the United States must take the lead in dismantling nuclear weapons and refrain from extending nuclear umbrellas.”
While the recent flurry of missiles fired by the North mostly consisted of short-range missiles, the North is believed to be working to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking the mainland United States to deter Washington from intervening in a hypothetical second conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
9. North nukes shift from strategic to tactical
Support to advanced warfighting capabilities. He is telegraphing his war plans.
Tuesday
October 11, 2022
dictionary + A - A
North nukes shift from strategic to tactical
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/11/national/northKorea/Korea-North-Korea-missile/20221011185807930.html
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and his wife Ri Sol-ju cover their ears while watching a recent missile launch in this photo released by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Monday. [YONHAP]
North Korea appears to be making good on leader Kim Jong-un's vow to equip frontline units with tactical nuclear weapons and realize its objective of being able to carry out preemptive nuclear attacks should the regime's survival come under threat.
In particular, the North appears to be shifting the focus of its nuclear weapons program towards tactical nuclear weapons and away from strategic nuclear weapons, which could lead to a reassessment of the defenses for South Korea’s military facilities, ports and air bases.
Strategic nuclear weapons are aimed at destroying wide areas, such as entire cities, while tactical nuclear weapons have a comparatively smaller explosive yield and are designed to attack military targets and destroy a limited area.
The shift was first enunciated in state media reports in April, around the time the North tested two short-range projectiles, which was supervised by Kim personally.
In an English-language report, the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the new weapons system as being “of great significance in radically increasing the fire striking power of the long-range artillery units on the front and strengthening the effectiveness of tactical nuclear operation of the DPRK and diversification of the firepower task,” using the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
In a military parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army on April 25, Kim said his regime would “continue to take measures to strengthen and develop nuclear weapons at top speed” — a statement that was followed up in June by a “new operation plan” in the East Sea outlined by the ruling Workers’ Party Central Military Commission and a “nuclear force policy” in September stipulating the conditions for using nuclear weapons, which included a threat to the country’s leadership.
The North then conducted seven missile launch events between Sept. 25 and Oct. 9, firing a variety of short-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as a multiple rocket launcher.
“Recent developments since Kim Jong-un’s April statement clearly show that North Korea is shifting its objectives [in nuclear weapons development] from strategic nuclear weapons to tactical nuclear weapons,” said Jung Dae-jin, a professor at Halla University in Wonju, Gangwon in an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo.
“The North is applying as much pressure as possible to the United States Forces Korea (USFK) and the South Korean military at a time it is relatively difficult for Washington to pay attention to Pyongyang … to force the United States to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, just as it implicitly tolerates Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons.”
In KCNA’s Monday report summarizing the recent missile launch events, North Korea claimed all of the missiles for “tactical nuclear operations” were equipped with “virtual nuclear warheads” and published photos of the launches being observed by Kim.
One launch photo showed what experts believe to be a modified version of the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) being launched underwater from a reservoir.
The KN-23 and KN-24 SRBMs possessed by the North perform “pull-up” maneuvers as they approach their targets, enhancing their ability to evade the existing South Korean and U.S. missile defense systems, which target parabolic missile trajectories.
The North’s heavy focus in recent missile tests on SRBMs that can penetrate air defenses suggests that Pyongyang is seeking to level the playing field with Seoul, which is believed to possess far superior and better-trained conventional forces.
BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
10. Four geopolitical risks for Korea
Wednesday
October 12, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Four geopolitical risks for Korea
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/12/opinion/columns/South-Korea-North-Korea-Kim-Jongun/20221012195727801.html
1
Kim Byung-yeon
The author is a professor of economics and head of the Institute for Future Strategy at Seoul National University.
South Korea faces four grave geopolitical risks. First is Russian President Vladmir Putin, who threatened to use “all available means of destruction,” suggesting the use of nuclear weapons to end the drawn-out war with Ukraine. Putin would wish to avoid turning to a nuclear arsenal that could be destructive to himself and Russia. But if his nuclear blackmail does not scare the West as he had hopes — and if his weapons do not work to tame Europe — Putin could be tempted to push the nuclear button. Even a low-yield nuclear strike can cause a radioactive tsunami. If the United States and Europe decide to punish Russia, the world could see another mass-scale war.
Second is Chinese President Xi Jinping. The question is how the policy on Taiwan will change after he starts his third term. Will he turn more docile on foreign policy since he has achieved so much on the personal level? Or will Xi go after Taiwan as he did with Hong Kong to achieve the ultimate goal toward a unified China? Given his principles and character, Xi could turn more aggressive towards Taiwan. China could blockade Taiwan out or even attempt an attack. Chinese sentiment has changed. A study on Chinese school curriculum from 2004 to 2010 showed that students have come to trust the government and Chinese systems more. Japanese experts singled out China’s invasion of Taiwan as the biggest geopolitical risk for Korea. The U.S. and Japan could go to war with China over Taiwan.
Third is North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The North’s seventh nuclear test would be less alarming than the previous cases. But Pyongyang could attempt to magnify its provocation. Another nuclear test could draw greater attention if the North follows Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. In tandem with China’s attack plan for Taiwan, North Korea could threaten Seoul, Washington and Tokyo with its nuclear weapons. Pyongyang could think that if it sides with Russia or China, it could draw economic, diplomatic and military support from them. Russia and China also would like to use North Korea to shake the U.S.-led front.
Another risk comes from instability in the Pyongyang regime. North Korea sought international aid in 1995 when its GDP shriveled. Its GDP is projected to fall to 70 to 80 percent of the 2015 level, but Kim still resists outside help by claiming the country can survive on its own. During the Arduous March from the famine after a length drought, North Korea desperately needed food aid. However, since today’s crisis involves foreign exchange reserves and industries, the country can endure. When the Covid-19 threat ends, the country could resume bilateral trade with China. It could send North Korean laborers to the Far East of Russia — and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk known as the Donbas in eastern Ukraine that Moscow unilaterally claims — to bring home hard currency. But its plans may not work. How long can its residents and elite tolerate economic hardship? Does Kim know the reality of his country?
Lastly, U.S. politics also pose a risk. What if the top person in the White House stays aloof to the geopolitical challenges as long as they do not damage America? In that case, Russia would already have won over Ukraine and China also could have become more aggressive toward Taiwan. Even U.S. troops could be pulled out of South Korea. Such a U.S. president would have been unimaginable in the past. However, with income inequalities in the U.S. at the levels of the Great Depression, things may be different. The U.S. has impressive resilience based on the world’s best education and research capabilities. However, could the U.S. economy based on finances and services succeed in high-tech manufacturing of chips and batteries? Could the U.S. education system prioritizing freedom and creativity breed highly-skilled workers? Could America solve deepening polarization that has reached a dangerous level?
We are living in a dangerous period. If the U.S. does not respond well, the danger will be amplified. Such geopolitical risks can be fatal to Korea. Putin’s nuclear war can further worsen the energy crisis and China’s invasion of Taiwan can destabilize the global economy.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin toast each other at a reception at the Far Eastern Federal University on Russky Island, April 25, 2019. [TASS/YONHAP]
The 21st century has already been an epoch of complex clashes. Hegemonic contests, geopolitical risks, security, economy, politics, and technologies are intricately intertwined. The challenges cannot be combated under the current divisive government and policies. Such a time calls for experts armed with an ability to analyze.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
11. South Korea faces growing calls to acquire nuclear weapons
South Korea faces growing calls to acquire nuclear weapons
The Korea Times · by 2022-10-05 07:41 | North Korea · October 5, 2022
An F-15K fires two joint direct attack munition (JDAM) bombs against a virtual target at the Jikdo shooting field in the West Sea, Tuesday. Courtesy of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Growing threat from North Korea, Ukraine war makes some South Koreans rethink nuclear-free policy
By Kang Seung-woo
South Korea is facing growing calls to acquire nuclear weapons irrespective of ideological dogma. Such calls are being fueled by North Korea's growing nuclear menace and misgivings about the U.S.' extended deterrence if Pyongyang decides to attack its southern neighbor.
"There has been a nuclear taboo ― a normative inhibition against the first use of nuclear weapons ― but Russia is about to break it in its war against Ukraine, thereby stoking concerns among countries, (including South Korea) that do not have their own nuclear weapons," said Go Myong-hyun, a senior fellow of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
Go added that, despite Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, the United States and NATO were poised to respond to it with conventional weapons, with many South Koreans fearful of Washington's possible half-hearted response to North Korea's potential nuclear attack against the South.
Cheong Seong-chang, the director of the Center for North Korean Studies at the Sejong Institute, also said that the growing interest in the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program comes as the U.S.' steadfast nuclear retaliation, in the case of North Korea using nuclear weapons against South Korea, appears uncertain.
"Even though the allies held an Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) meeting in September, for the first time in nearly five years, they failed to reach an agreement on the U.S.' immediate and automatic retaliation in response to a North Korean nuclear attack against the South," Cheong said.
The EDSCG, a high-level consultative mechanism to achieve North Korean denuclearization through steadfast deterrence, was held in Washington, D.C., on Sept. 16, but its joint statement merely stipulated that North Korea would face an "overwhelming and decisive" response in the event of a nuclear attack.
"North Korea has made significant progress in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, so it seems that our trust in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, aimed at ensuring deterrence against nuclear threats, has been eroded," Cheong said.
According to a recent poll by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University, more than half of South Koreans, or 55.5 percent, supported the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program, with 92.5 percent of 1,200 respondents believing that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear program.
In that respect, calls for an independent nuclear arsenal have been reignited amid an accelerated buildup of North Korea's nuclear weapons.
"Ukraine was the world's third-largest nuclear power, but it disarmed its nuclear weapons following security assurances from the U.S., Britain and Russia and as a result, Ukraine is now facing Russia's nuclear attack," Daegu Mayor Hong Joon-pyo said on Facebook, Wednesday,
An Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile is fired during a joint military drill between South Korea and the United States at an undisclosed location in South Korea, Wednesday. Courtesy of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Allies fire 4 missiles into East Sea in response to N. Korea's provocation
In 2017, Hong, who was the leader of the Liberty Korea Party, the predecessor of the current ruling People Power Party, claimed that South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons if it is to negotiate with North Korea on an equal footing.
"Amid the U.S. and British struggle to effectively deal with Russia's nuclear aggression, if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against us, while declaring its attacks against the U.S. and Japan, could they retaliate against the North with nuclear arsenals?" Hong added.
He added, "It is time for a full review of our nuclear strategy against North Korea's nuclear weapons."
Former Korea Foundation President Lee Geun, a professor at Seoul National University's Graduate School of International Studies, recently presented a similar view.
"Now, we need to acknowledge the irreversibility of North Korea's nuclear weapons policy and think about our nuclear power strategy in preparation for this," he said on Facebook.
Referring to President Yoon Suk-yeol's remarks in his speech marking Armed Forces Day, Saturday, that North Korea's nuclear weapons development defies the international nonproliferation treaty, Lee also said, "Such a political statement sounds unrealistic and is just empty rhetoric."
Until now, any mention of acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered taboo within the South Korean government, given that it would result in significant costs while bringing about limited benefits for the country.
Go said developing a South Korean nuclear weapons program would result in an "invisible" high opportunity cost beyond punitive measures meted out by the international community.
"Many believe that South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons could lead to the international community placing sanctions on the nation, but as we witnessed in India's case, it would barely impose any punitive measures on us in consideration of the country's role and status in the international community," he said.
"Rather, the move would undermine South Korea's alliance with the U.S., because the alliance is based on Washington's provision of its nuclear umbrella in a way, but South Korea's development of independent nuclear weapons could break up the alliance and that is why we have yet to be enthusiastic about acquiring nuclear weapons."
Go added, "What would China prefer, between a nuclear-armed South Korea and a South Korea without its alliance with the U.S., given that Beijing is already surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons?"
In that sense, Go believes that the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula is a better option. The U.S. removed tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991.
"The return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons will ensure a stable South Korea-U.S. alliance, while strengthening their response to North Korea's nuclear threats," he said.
In a new development, South Korea and the U.S. fired four surface-to-surface missiles into the East Sea on Wednesday morning in response to North Korea's intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) launch.
The two sides each launched two Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles, which precisely hit mock targets and demonstrated the allies' deterrence capability, according to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).
Meanwhile, the South Korean military fired one Hyunmoo-2 ballistic missile, but it fell inside the base where it was launched after an abnormal flight.
The Korea Times · by 2022-10-05 07:41 | North Korea · October 5, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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