Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Today is the youngest you will ever be for the rest of your life.”

– James Carville

"War: first, one hopes to win; then one is satisfied that the enemy too is suffering; in the end, one is surprised that everyone has lost."

– Karl Kraus

"A man is not old until regrets take the place of dreams."

– John Barrymore

1. N. Korea orders officials to conceal information about anti-socialist behavior cases

2. Russia's provision of precision weapons to N.K. would leave no line for Seoul's aid to Ukraine: official

3. Putin warns South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine would be ‘big mistake’

4. U.S. expert calls for S. Korea's inclusion into G7, touts its 'trustworthiness'

5. N. Korea orders munitions factories to beef up security

6. Bridging The Divide: A Neutral Approach To Peace On The Korean Peninsula

7. S. Korean commandos sharpen special operations capabilities amid NK threats

8. Russia-North Korea defense pact moves military cooperation out of shadows

9. Kinzinger: Russia-North Korea pact a ‘bad look for Vladimir Putin’

10. Learning to Live With a Nuclear North Korea

11. Defector group sends more plastics bottles containing rice to N. Korea, raising concerns about Pyongyang's trash balloons

12. S. Korea running out of red lines on Russia-N. Korea cooperation

13. 'Unfeasible' idea of nuclear-armed South Korea resurfaces

14. US and South Korea race to finish troop cost talks with Trump looming

15. N. Korea to hold key party meeting this week after signing new partnership treaty with Russia

16. Tony Shaffer to Newsmax: Biden Erased All US Gains With NKorea

1. N. Korea orders officials to conceal information about anti-socialist behavior cases

I know there are few that want to read what follows but I will continue to beat the drum on this. The regime cannot allow the cancer of resistance to grow.

This report highlights the reason why we are seeing all the external activity with north Korea from its increased tensions and threats to its participation in the axis of aggressors/dictators. Unfortunately most people focus on the threats and Kim's nuclear weapons and people are speculating that war could be imminent. Few are willing to cinder and assess the real threats that are internal and how that is the real path to conflict.

Kim and his regime are under severe stress and the existential threat to his rule is from within (from among the elite, the 2d tier leadership, and the people). Kim must maintain the most oppressive conditions to prevent internal resistance. Yet the paradox is that the oppression will reach a breaking point for someone within the elite, the 2d tier leadership. and the population - though it will take someone with access and placement ["Mr. X"] to take the ultimate action against Kim. But he cannot prevent the threat forever and it will come. So Kim must create the perception of the external threat to justify the sacrifices and suffering of the Korean people (all of them). But at the point in time when the party/regime can no longer govern all the territory in the north from Pyongyang combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military and security services we are going to see the collapse of the Kim family regime. It is at this point that Kim could be most dangerous and decide that the only way to survive is to execute his campaign plan to unify the peninsula by force as the only way to possibly survive. Of course he continues to pursue this goal by trying to create the conditions necessary for successful execution, namely driving a wedge in the ROK/US alliance and removing US troops from the peninsula. But in extremis - when Kim is threatened in what he believes is an existential way from within he may execute even if he has not created the necessary conditions.

Therefore we need to observe for the indications and wording of regime collapse to gain earlier warning of possible attack rather than only focusing on attack indicators.

Then we have the other scenario - Kim misses the opportunity to attack or a successful information campaign interrupts his chain of control and 2d tier leaders choose not to accept his orders. If that happens we will see internal conflict with civil war likely and the potential for loss of control of all the regime's WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological). Are we prepared for that? When are we going to develop the plans and be prepared to employ the full range of combined capabilities (because neither the ROK nor the US can deal with this challenge unilaterally) to secure WMD on a massive scale in a very hostile and denied environment possibly while internal civil war is taking place?

north Korea is a wicked problem. Is anyone taking it seriously?

N. Korea orders officials to conceal information about anti-socialist behavior cases - Daily NK English

"For young people in particular, simply mentioning the titles of newly banned songs, dances, movies, books, magazines, or pictures can arouse their interest," a source told Daily NK

By Jeong Seo-yeong - June 21, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · June 21, 2024

In this screen capture from the video, young people caught watching or distributing foreign content appear to be awaiting punishment. (Daily NK)

Police and security officials have been instructed by North Korea’s Unified Command on Non-Socialist and Anti-Socialist Behavior to conceal information about incidents involving anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior from the public.

“The orders, signed by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, were sent to all parts of the country on June 8,” a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity. “The orders instruct officials to comprehensively analyze and then classify new forms of anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior.”

The orders emphasize the need to compile incidents involving media from “unapproved” foreign countries, particularly South Korea and the U.S. The directive mandates careful monitoring and documentation of the consumption and distribution of foreign media. New types of incidents are to be reviewed and classified at the political level before being archived.

The source said that officials believe classifying these incidents is necessary because releasing information about them to the public can have the unintended effect of weakening people’s ideological commitment to the regime.

“When new cases are presented in public trials and struggle sessions, participants can draw conclusions from trivial details that can undermine their ideology. For young people in particular, simply mentioning the titles of newly banned songs, dances, films, books, magazines, or pictures can arouse their interest,” the source said.

“The orders noted that when provincial branches of the United Command and police departments and state security bureaus release information about new cases, they are essentially shooting themselves in the foot. These law enforcement agencies were severely criticized for failing to do their jobs.”

Regime aims to further prevent people from being exposed to foreign media

As a result, the provincial branches of the unified command, as well as the police and state security apparatus, have been ordered to conceal information about new types of crimes to internal files that will be archived after being submitted to the central authorities. The details of these cases should not be included in public information or educational materials, which should instead emphasize the dangers of consuming foreign media.

Law enforcement agencies should establish the following guidelines for video recordings: They should focus on educational value, omit all details of the offense, and relate the offenders’ corrupt behavior to universally relatable situations.

“The unified command hopes this will prevent North Koreans from being exposed to foreign media and educate them more effectively. It also said that preventing people from being ideologically tainted and corrupted by outside influences will preserve the socialist system and ensure that young people in particular remain staunch supporters of the ‘our state-first’ ideology,” the source said.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Seo-yeong · June 21, 2024

2. Russia's provision of precision weapons to N.K. would leave no line for Seoul's aid to Ukraine: official

The ROK will need to make its own decision based on an assessment of its strategic interests. I believe it will be in its interest to provide lethal aid to Ukraine. It must not be swayed by Russian threats. The ROK must stand on the side of like minded democracies and stand up for the rules based international order.

Russia's provision of precision weapons to N.K. would leave no line for Seoul's aid to Ukraine: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · June 23, 2024

SEOUL, June 23 (Yonhap) -- National security adviser Chang Ho-jin said Sunday that South Korea will not be bound by anything with regard to its assistance to Ukraine if Russia provides North Korea with precision weapons.

Director of National Security Chang made the remark during a TV appearance, underscoring the point that Seoul's decision on whether to provide weapons to Ukraine depends on how Russia's military cooperation with North Korea goes.

"I would like to emphasize that it all depends on what Russia will do," Chang said on KBS TV. "Will there be any line remaining for us if Russia gives precision weapons to North Korea?"

Chang's remark means South Korea could provide lethal weapons to Ukraine if Russia crosses the line.

South Korea has said it will reconsider its position of not supplying weapons to Ukraine after Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty that commits each other to mutual defense and military technology cooperation.

Putin has since warned Seoul's weapons provision to Ukraine would be "very big mistake."

Chang said not only South Korea, but also Russia should make efforts to improve bilateral relations.

"If they want to restore and move Korea-Russia relations forward, I would like to reiterate that the Russian side should think carefully," he said.

National security adviser Chang Ho-jin gives a briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on June 20, 2024, regarding the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang the previous day. Chang expressed grave concerns over the treaty. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · June 23, 2024

3. Putin warns South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine would be ‘big mistake’

Do not fear Russian threats.

Putin warns South Korea sending weapons to Ukraine would be ‘big mistake’

https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/putin-skorea-warning-06212024010940.html

Seoul said it would consider arming Ukraine in response to Russia and North Korea signing a mutual defense pact.

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.06.21

Tapei, Taiwan

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh (not pictured) at the Government Office in Hanoi, Vietnam, June 20 2024.

Luong Thai Linh/Pool via Reuters

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned South Korea that sending weapons to Ukraine would be a “very big mistake” after South Korea said it would consider doing so in response to a pact between Russia and North Korea to come to each other’s aid if attacked.

U.S. ally South Korea announced on Thursday it would reconsider its stance on arms to Ukraine in response to North Korea and Russia signing a treaty the previous day that includes a mutual pledge to provide immediate military assistance if either is attacked.

“As for the supply of lethal weapons to the combat zone in Ukraine, it would be a very big mistake. I hope it will not happen. If it does, then we too will then make the respective decisions, which South Korea’s current leadership is unlikely to be pleased with,” Putin told a press conference on Thursday during a visit to Vietnam, Russia’s Sputnik news agency reported.

South Korea’s assistance to Ukraine has included first-aid kits, medicine, portable mine detectors and protective gear but it has not supplied weapons in line with a policy of not providing lethal aid to countries engaged in conflict.

During Putin’s first visit to North Korea in 24 years, he and leader Kim Jong Un, agreed to offer military assistance “without delay” if either is attacked under a new partnership treaty signed after their summit on Wednesday.

South Korea’s National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin condemned both countries on Thursday, saying that Seoul would have to think again about supplying arms.

“We plan to reconsider the issue of arms support to Ukraine,” Chang said in a press briefing at the presidential office.

He added that any cooperation that directly or indirectly aided North Korea’s military enhancement was a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and would be subject to international scrutiny and sanctions.

“The government expresses grave concern and condemns the signing of the comprehensive strategic partnership agreement between North Korea and Russia, which aims to strengthen mutual military and economic cooperation,” Chang said.

John Kirby, the spokesperson for U.S. President Joe Biden's National Security Council, said the announcement by Russia and North Korea of their pact to come to each other’s help if attacked was “no surprise” but it boded poorly for the people of Ukraine and the Korean peninsula.

“Our view is that this agreement is also a sign of Russia's desperation,” Kirby added.

“I mean, they’re reaching out to North Korea for missiles, and they’re getting drones from Iran. They don’t have a lot of friends in the world.”

North Korea has supplied Russia with large amounts of weapons for its war in Ukraine, in particular artillery rounds and ballistic missiles, the United States has said, though both Russia and North Korea deny that.

Edited by RFA Staff.

4. U.S. expert calls for S. Korea's inclusion into G7, touts its 'trustworthiness'

U.S. expert calls for S. Korea's inclusion into G7, touts its 'trustworthiness' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 23, 2024

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, June 22 (Yonhap) -- A prominent U.S. expert has made an emphatic call for the Group of Seven (G7) to consider its membership expansion to include South Korea, touting the Asian democracy's "trustworthiness," performance and potential role to add diversity to the club of the world's leading industrialized nations.

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made the case, stressing the need for G7 leaders to pursue "serious" reforms to enhance the group's capabilities, effectiveness and legitimacy.

His call came as the government of President Yoon Suk Yeol has sought South Korea's role as a "global pivotal state" to contribute more to address a growing list of global issues in tune with the country's enhanced global stature.

This photo, taken on May 21, 2023, shows South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol (R), U.S. President Joe Biden (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida talking ahead of their trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Hiroshima, Japan. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

"The G7 must transform from an old boys club of financiers chatting about monetary policy to a coalition of action-oriented, like-minded partners inspired to sustain the rules-based international order by addressing issues ranging from Ukraine to digital security," Cha said in an opinion piece that he contributed to Yonhap News Agency on Saturday.

"To do this, G7 leaders must consider serious reforms that enhance the group's capabilities, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Expanded membership to include Korea would be an important step in the right direction," he added.

His op-ed came after the leaders of the G7 -- Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Britain and the United States -- held a summit in Italy earlier this month.

Yoon was not invited there as the host country, which has sole authority on the guest list, focused on migration among other main issues. He attended the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, last year.

"But it is self-evident that South Korea should not only be invited to the G7, but also that it should become a permanent member," he said.

This photo, taken on Oct. 8, 2023, shows Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, speaking during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at CSIS headquarters in Washington. (Yonhap)

Cha corroborated his case for South Korea's entry into the G7 forum, cataloguing a series of examples that highlight South Korea's growing capacity and role on the global stage.

In particular, he cited a recent CSIS report that shows Seoul can contribute to the G7's expanded agenda of global issues, including economic security, digital competitiveness, climate change, food security, nonproliferation and Ukraine.

"South Korea is ranked above Italy and just below Japan in total performance," he said, citing the report. "On digital competitiveness, Korea is ranked higher than all G7 members except the U.S. and U.K. And on Ukraine, South Korea last year was one of the largest suppliers of humanitarian assistance."

Cha also said that South Korea offers the combination of "trustworthiness" and "effectiveness," which G7 leaders value as the hallmark of their group.

He then pointed out that South Korea's status meets the G7 "bar."

"South Korea's is an advanced industrialized democracy, an OECD member, and is the first former aid recipient to become a member of the OECD's donor club," he said, referring to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Cha also said that South Korea would add "diversity" to the G7 forum in "numerous ways."

"The inclusion of more views from Asia is critical to the future of the G7 if it is to be a leader in global affairs," he said. "The entirety of the vast region of Asia is currently represented by only one country, Japan."

He noted that Japan is the "outspoken" opponent against South Korea joining the G7.

"The reasons for this opposition are unclear," he said. "It stems not just from the desire to hold the sole seat from Asia, but also a sense of entitlement as historically, the region's sole great power."

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · June 23, 2024

5. N. Korea orders munitions factories to beef up security

Without any information campaign taking place, the regime likely fears the US or the alliance may take action against its military industrial complex because of its support for Putin's war in Ukraine. Has north Korea been penetrated by external intelligence services capable of supporting subversion and sabotage through the Korean people in the north? Certainly the regime thinks so.

Of course the stealing of raw materials and selling them on the black market can be viewed through the lens of the people being practical in trying to survive or it could be the adapted application of the subversion techniques outlined in the OSS Simple Sabotage Manual. Either way the factories are under threat.

N. Korea orders munitions factories to beef up security - Daily NK English

There have been many cases of people stealing raw materials at the factories and selling them in markets for ill-gotten gains, a source told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - June 21, 2024

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · June 21, 2024

The Chongjin Munitions Factory (Google Earth)

North Korean authorities recently ordered major munitions factories to beef up security amid a surge in production and theft of raw materials, Daily NK has learned.

In early June, major ammunition factories in North Pyongan and Chagang provinces were ordered to more than double the number of guards patrolling their premises, a source in North Pyongan Province told Daily NK on Tuesday on condition of anonymity.

The guards at the weapons factories are managed by affiliated security departments. Most of the employees of these departments (70-80%) are Ministry of Social Security personnel, while the remainder (20-30%) are civilian guidance officers.

However, the ratio of security officers to civilian guidance officers varies from factory to factory, the source said.

Munitions factories are operating at full capacity

The order to improve security comes as the munitions factories increase production, according to the source.

Earlier this year, North Korean authorities ordered major munitions factories that produce missiles and other weapons to increase production more than fivefold from last year.

At the time, North Korean leaders cited tensions in the region, including U.S.-South Korean military exercises, as the reason for the expansion. However, Daily NK’s source said that the directive was in response to increased arms exports.

“Major military factories producing shells and missiles have been operating at full capacity recently,” the source said, adding that “raw materials and finished products have been piling up as weapons production has increased.

“There is a growing number of raw materials that need to be monitored, and this requires an increase in security personnel,” he added.

As the number of raw materials managed by ammunition factories has increased, there have also been many cases of people stealing the materials and selling them in markets for ill-gotten gains.

Factories look to existing workforce for security personnel

Meanwhile, the directive has prompted major munitions factories to begin the process of selecting new civilian guidance officers.

Some munitions factories are trying to transfer veterans of the special forces among their factory workers to security guards or to recruit new security guards, mainly young men with good physical fitness from the surrounding areas.

If Russia and North Korea conducted further discussions on the arms trade during their recent summit, North Korean munitions factories will likely increase production and expand their workforces accordingly.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seulkee Jang · June 21, 2024

6. Bridging The Divide: A Neutral Approach To Peace On The Korean Peninsula

ASEAN as a bridge builder? I am surprised Mongolia was not mentioned since there are Mongolian leaders who have offered this role for their country. They have relations with both north and South.

Conclusion:

So, to conclude, they are all failed major powers and there is a need for a different road. The bridge builder, with its neutrality, and diplomatic agility, representing the third side of the triangle for peace seems to be a solution. Addressing structural issues and cultivating sustainable peace the bridge builder can enable dialogue, promote trust-building measures in a way that is mutually reinforcing and learn from potential successes. In doing so, it will furnish the international support needed and demonstrate a real commitment to this diplomatic path while also providing a foundation upon which to build a cooperative future for the Korean Peninsula. That future carries colossal global consequences for stability and security.

Bridging The Divide: A Neutral Approach To Peace On The Korean Peninsula – OpEd

June 23, 2024 0 Comments

By Simon Hutagalung

eurasiareview.com · June 22, 2024

Tensions have also continued in the Korean Peninsula despite previous diplomatic initiatives. In this elaborate game that the region has been playing, Russia and North Korea are complicating things even further with their recent special agreement, which should leave you in no doubt as to how complex a situation we’re dealing with and why creative solutions must be pursued if stability is to return to this region. The rest of this essay will suggest the bridge builder as a hopeful way to stabilize the Korean Peninsula.

The Current Role of the Four Major Powers and the Challenges ahead

For instance, Russia, China, the USA and Japan have ulterior motives in the Korean Peninsula therefore USSR is not entitled to attack North Korea just because they possess nuclear weapons. The thing is that China also sees North Korea as a strategic buffer against an encroaching US military and wants stability over denuclearization. The latter side is composed of Russia, which partners with North Korea for strategic placement and economic purposes. The US pursues deterrence and denuclearization, yet frequently fans the flames of contention. Tokyo is mainly concerned with North Korea’s missile program and abductions of Japanese citizens, but it also backs sanctions and military readiness. Nevertheless, the peninsula remains unstable and a new way of addressing this problem is needed.

Latest Advancements and Agreements

The new Russian-North Korean special agreement only complicates matters further by underlining the inability of current diplomatic frameworks to deal with such a scenario. Peace, however, remains fragile amidst challenges including those related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the use of economic sanctions and border tussles.

Imagining Bridging Conceptualised

Bridge Builder ~ Definition & Traits

In the Korean Peninsula, a bridge builder is an entity or nation that is neutral, impartial, diplomatic and a model of peace and stability. This would include roles that ranged from facilitating dialogue and compliance monitoring to providing humanitarian and economic assistance. Given their diplomatic credibility and traditions of mediation, neutral states such as Switzerland, Sweden and Indonesia and major international organizations like the United Nations and ASEAN are particularly well suited to play these roles.

Candidates for the Bridge Builder

Switzerland and Sweden given their long history of being neutral states and skilful mediation in international conflicts have the potential to serve as bridge builders. As noted above, Indonesia too can be a bridge builder using its considerable influence within Southeast Asia and the Non-Aligned Movement. There is also scope for multilateral engagement through regional outfits such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Bridge Builder Role: A Strategic Framework for Operationalization Multilateral Venue Selection based on Typology – Challenges and Overcoming Them-Resistance from Systemic Powers

Bridge-building on the Korean Peninsula is a tough task by itself given the opposition created by key bridge builders. Taking some kind of action in a preventative way can make it-or-break-it outrageousness.

There could be a challenge in terms of scepticism of big powers to join a multilateral platform. The bridge builder can mitigate and explain this by emphasizing how their presence would further stability and economic prospects. Better communication or simultaneity can reduce resistance, such as an equal vision of peace and cooperation.

Power dynamics between major powers could also pose an additional threat to such progress. To do that, it is imperative for everyone involved to be the same sit back and relax think equally responsibly and be decision-makers. Bolster open debate and party unity to better withstand power struggles.

There will also be resistance from individual countries, who may too quickly see their unique interests as threatened by the initiatives of the bridge builder. Diplomatic engagements are needed to talk about the mutual gains and allay fears in such a case. It is not for nothing that transparency and win-win solutions can pose as panaceas from this evil of resistance.

Bridge builders should forge a multilateral platform engaging all key stakeholders, encourage confidence-building measures, draw lessons from successful models and focus on anticipated challenges and resistance A focus on win-win, nonaligned engagement and commitment to long-term peaceful coexistence can help fully cement peace and cooperation in the Mideast.

The major powers may prove too afraid of losing their grip to serve as bridge-builders. What is necessary to reassure them is to show them the long-term benefits that come with stability, namely economic growth for the region as a whole and less military spending. Talking to them, and providing this level of assurance will guarantee their involvement.

The relationships between North and South Korea are a lot more complicated and involve dealing with decades of grievances and mistrust. The bridge builder can breed confidence by arranging common historical commissions and cultural exchanges so that victims on both sides see each other not just as opponents but also as people like ourselves. Closer people-to-people contacts and joint development projects also go a long way in transforming hostility. Sustainable peace needs monitoring – and adjustments to evolving geopolitical dynamics Regular Review of all stakeholders – The bridge builder should set up mechanisms for regular audit and feedback Being flexible and keeping long-term objectives are stabilizing.

Conclusion

So, to conclude, they are all failed major powers and there is a need for a different road. The bridge builder, with its neutrality, and diplomatic agility, representing the third side of the triangle for peace seems to be a solution. Addressing structural issues and cultivating sustainable peace the bridge builder can enable dialogue, promote trust-building measures in a way that is mutually reinforcing and learn from potential successes. In doing so, it will furnish the international support needed and demonstrate a real commitment to this diplomatic path while also providing a foundation upon which to build a cooperative future for the Korean Peninsula. That future carries colossal global consequences for stability and security.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Bibliography

Armstrong, C. K. (2013). The Koreas. Routledge.
Cha, V. D. (2018). The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. Ecco.
Kim, S. (2006). The Two Koreas and the Great Powers. Cambridge University Press.
Lankov, A. (2013). The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia. Oxford University Press.
United Nations. (2021). UN Role in Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/mediation
Wada, H. (2012). The Korean War: An International History. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

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eurasiareview.com · June 22, 2024

7. S. Korean commandos sharpen special operations capabilities amid NK threats

The ROK Army Special Warfare Command motto: "Make the Impossible possible" and "nothing is impossible."

The traditional greeting among Special Forces soldiers is "Tong Il" which means unification.

S. Korean commandos sharpen special operations capabilities amid NK threats

The Korea Times · June 23, 2024

South Korean special operations troops take part in a counterterrorism exercise at a training range in Gwangju, in this photo provided by the Army, June 20. Yonhap

Donning pitch-black gear, a team of South Korean commandos calmly swarmed into an indoor training ground after blasting through the front door with a detonating cord.

The troops swiftly formed into smaller groups to clear multiple rooms and fire upon nine mock targets, neutralizing the simulated terror threat in less than two minutes.

The counterterrorism exercise took place as part of a series of special operations demonstrations for a group of reporters Thursday at the Army Special Warfare Command's training range in Gwangju, 32 kilometers southeast of Seoul.

While the session largely centered on the unit's counterterrorism capabilities, they included other special operations exercises, highlighting the command's primary focus on deterring North Korean threats.

In another demonstration, six commandos jumped out of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter at around 5,000 feet (1,524 meters) above the training ground, softly parachuting onto a target area to demonstrate their airborne infiltration capabilities.

Troops can jump from an altitude of up to 25,000 feet, with the drops reaching speeds as fast as 60 kph, one of the command's soldiers said, noting their gear, including the parachute, weighs about 50 kilograms.

The drills came amid renewed attention on Seoul's deterrence capabilities in the face of growing security uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula over deepening military ties between Pyongyang and Moscow.

On Wednesday, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty calling for mutual assistance if either is attacked as they held a summit in Pyongyang.

The pact also calls for expanding cooperation in various fields, such as space, the peaceful use of nuclear power, and science and technology, raising concerns such efforts might assist Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

Thursday's training underscored the role some special forces play in one of the pillars of Seoul's "three-axis" deterrence system against the North's evolving nuclear and WMD threats — Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation.

South Korean special operations troops take part in an airborne infiltration exercise over a training range in Gwangju, in this photo provided by the Army, June 20. Yonhap

The operational plan is designed to incapacitate the North's leadership in the event of its use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by utilizing the military's strategic strike capabilities.

According to Seoul's Defense White Paper, the military is seeking to expand the "all-weather" infiltration and strike capabilities of special warfare units as part of efforts to ensure KMPR capabilities.

The specific role of special forces in the KMPR has been shrouded in secrecy, with Pyongyang often reacting angrily to combined special operations exercises between South Korea and the United States.

In April, North Korea staged a simulated nuclear counterattack drill in protest against a series of joint drills between the allies, including an airborne infiltration exercise that the South described as being designed to eliminate an unspecified target.

When asked about the so-called decapitation mission, Lt. Gen. Kwak Jong-keun, the unit's commander, declined to comment but noted that his troops are not training with "specific targets" in mind.

"We need to acquire a readiness posture to complete our given mission," he said. "That is why we train and why we should acquire necessary equipment and supplies."

Kwak emphasized the need for state-of-the-art equipment, stressing its importance to improve training and boost readiness.

Established in 1958, the Special Warfare Command has strengthened its capabilities over the decades with the introduction of new equipment and facilities to train troops in realistic scenarios.

At the Gwangju training range, the unit held aircraft hostage rescue drills, utilizing a real-size mock passenger plane, during which troops entered the aircraft to overpower a group of terrorists.

The unit operates an indoor skydiving wind tunnel to simulate high-altitude jumps at its headquarters in Icheon, 58 kilometers southeast of the capital.

As part of efforts to further bolster airborne infiltration capabilities, South Korea approved a 3.7 trillion-won ($2.66 billion) plan last year to buy special operations helicopters from overseas by 2031.

"Compared to training an infantry soldier, it is really difficult to produce one special operations personnel," Kwak said. "My goal is to train them in the hardest way possible to make them win in combat." (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · June 23, 2024

8. Russia-North Korea defense pact moves military cooperation out of shadows

The headline is important. There has been ongoing cooperation even before it has made the news. And the cooperation will continue even after it fades from the news.

Russia-North Korea defense pact moves military cooperation out of shadows

June 21, 2024 10:06 PM

By Christy Lee

voanews.com · June 21, 2024

washington —

A new defense pact signed between Russia and North Korea this week publicly laid out Moscow's willingness to engage in full-fledged military cooperation with Pyongyang, in contrast to their denials prior to the summit, analysts said.

Before Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang for a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on Wednesday, it was already widely believed that Moscow was transferring military technology to Pyongyang for weapons upgrades.

In 2023, North Korea launched the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 missile for the first time. After analyzing the shape and color of the smoke at the tail of the missile, experts said these technologies appeared to have come from Russia.

At the same time, U.S. and other officials have accused North Korea of providing Russia with large quantities of conventional munitions for its war in Ukraine.

In September, Kim showed an interest in various military assets during his tour of Russia's satellite launch site, fighter jet factory, and Pacific Fleet equipped with nuclear-capable bombers and hypersonic missiles.

Both Russia and North Korea denied any arms dealings between them prior to Putin's visit to Pyongyang.

Learning to Live With a Nuclear North Korea

Insisting on denuclearization is a dead end in negotiations.

By Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

Foreign Policy · by Doug Bandow

North Korea

June 21, 2024, 11:12 AM

Most discussions on U.S. policy toward North Korea follow a predictable pattern, expressing alarm about current developments and acknowledging Washington’s policy failure, but insisting that nothing can be done other than repeat the process.

More than seven decades after an armistice ended the Korean War, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—North Korea’s formal name—remains as hostile as ever. A plethora of U.S.-led sanctions have impaired an already decrepit collectivist economy but failed to prevent Pyongyang from pursuing an aggressive agenda of military preparation, including the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Indeed, Nikkei reported in January that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had recently set “the launch of three new spy satellites as well as the building of drones and strengthening of the country’s nuclear weaponry as goals for this year.”

Most U.S. policymakers continue to insist on denuclearization, even though Kim called his country’s nuclear status “irreversible” and insisted that “there can be no bargaining over our nuclear weapons.”

In fact, only one nation—South Africa—has ever abandoned functioning nuclear weapons, of which the country had only six. (Ukraine gave up Soviet nuclear weapons that were stationed on its territory, but those weapons were never under its control.) Virtually no one studying Korea believes (or at least publicly expresses the belief) that the North will voluntarily disarm—certainly not while the Kim regime remains in power.

Yet policymakers who expect talks to fail nevertheless commonly advocate maintaining and increasing pressure on North Korea. Some analysts, such as the Rand Corporation’s Soo Kim and the Brookings Institution’s Evans Revere, explicitly reject any switch to arms control, which would accept North Korea as a nuclear power and negotiate to limit its weapons and activities.

Rather, they insist on reiterating the demand that Pyongyang denuclearize. Washington also lectures Chinese President Xi Jinping that it is in his nation’s interest to destabilize North Korea, China’s one formal military ally. No one should expect anything good to come from such an approach.

A diplomatic shift is necessary, but it will not be easy. North Korean-U.S. dialogue has been sporadic over the years. It peaked and then crashed during the administration of former U.S. President Donald Trump, when the failed Hanoi summit effectively ended Kim’s outreach to Washington. North Korea has ignored Biden administration’s efforts to engage in the most basic diplomacy while pouring obloquy over both the United States and South Korea. At last December’s party plenum, Kim stated:

“[T]he U.S. and its vassal forces have still perpetrated vicious anti-DPRK confrontational moves, and the desperate efforts of the enemies have reached the extremes unprecedented in history in their reckless, provocative, and dangerous nature. The U.S., which has caused instability and continued to aggravate the situation in the Korean Peninsula, is exposing various forms of military threat to our state even at this moment when the year is falling. The U.S. has more persistently instigated the South Korean puppets and Japanese, who are playing the role as the most faithful stooge and ‘running dog’ in carrying out its hostile policy toward our republic.”

As if that wasn’t enough to discourage even the most seasoned diplomat, Kim has directed particular abuse at South Korea and its president, Yoon Suk-yeol. Indeed, Kim recently proposed changing his country’s constitution to define South Korea as the North’s “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” Although disclaiming any desire to start an inter-Korean war, Kim promised to finish one on his terms by occupying the South.

To Washington’s frustration, Beijing refuses to act against its allies in the North, relaxing sanctions enforcement and refusing to back any new restrictions. To be fair, Chinese opposition still might have discouraged North Korea from undertaking a long-predicted nuclear test, and Kim has moved much closer to Russia. The latter has ostentatiously busted sanctions that it previously approved and is now importing artillery shells and missiles from Pyongyang.

Western analysts fear that in return, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin might be aiding the North’s development of ICBMs and even nuclear weapons. Indeed, given the United States’ support for Ukraine—which has resulted in thousands and perhaps even more Russian battle casualties—Moscow might view such cooperation as appropriate payback.

By any measure, then, U.S. policy toward the North has failed. In 1992, the Heritage Foundation warned that North Korea possessed “enough plutonium to build one to three weapons.” As a result, the organization predicted that “[i]f diplomacy fails, the options open to the United States and South Korea are grim. … Prolonged diplomacy may give North Korea the time it needs to build nuclear weapons. … But if Pyongyang refuses to comply [with demands for denuclearization], both Washington and Seoul must prepare a program of political and economic sanctions, as well as military measures, to deter possible North Korean aggression.”

Three decades later, North Korea is estimated to have several scores of nuclear weapons. Its ultimate objective is uncertain, but pessimists posit that it could amass an arsenal of as many as 242 weapons in just a few years. The logical—indeed, seemingly inexorable—end point is North Korea’s possession of tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use, with many more nukes atop MIRV-tipped ICBMs targeting U.S. cities.

A change is vital. However, Washington’s mindset remains locked in the past. The National Security Council’s Mira Rapp-Hooper created a brief flurry by suggesting a willingness on the U.S. side “to consider interim steps on that pathway to denuclearization.” However, the State Department had repudiated prior talk of “arms control” discussions with the North, and there was no follow-up. Little more is expected from Washington in the near future, with the U.S. presidential election only a few months off.

This resistance to change reflects several unpersuasive arguments. One is that it is simply unacceptable for North Korea to have nuclear weapons, as successive U.S. administrations, including the current one, have declared. But it does have them, whether the United States accepts it or not. Another is that North Korea cannot be trusted to fulfill any agreement that it signs. If so, then it will also be impossible to negotiate denuclearization.

Other policymakers fear accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state would undermine nonproliferation policy. Seoul has emphasized this point. However, the basic problem is that the North has already developed nukes, not that Washington might accept that reality. Anyway, the international system has survived U.S. recognition of India and Pakistan—and at least the private acceptance of Israel—as nuclear weapons states. Acknowledging Pyongyang would be no worse.

Analysts also worry about the reaction of allies, most notably Japan and South Korea. However, continuing demands for denuclearization won’t ease concerns about North Korea’s growing arsenal. Better to limit the threat than ostentatiously huff and puff. Finally, U.S. policymakers fret that South Korea and Japan might develop their own nuclear weapons. That would not be good, but continuing to hold U.S. cities and people hostage to North Korea’s capabilities would be much worse.

Unfortunately, the reflexive panacea is to strengthen extended deterrence, as the United States has done through the Washington Declaration published in April 2023. This is but a thin reed upon which to lean. First, Americans lose if North Korea becomes a significant nuclear power with a substantial war-making capacity. Second, South Koreans can count. The larger the number of Pyongyang’s weapons, the lower U.S. credibility falls. South Korea realizes that it is foolish to expect Americans to engage in self-immolation in the event of a nuclear war with Pyongyang. Nor should they. The strongest proponents of extended deterrence fail to explain how doing so would be in Americans’ interest.

Rather than whine about what Washington cannot change—Pyongyang’s nuclear capability—the United States should abandon denuclearization as an essential demand. It might be possible to square the circle. John Carl Baker of the U.S. Institute of Peace has suggested pursuing a course that acknowledges rather than accepts the North’s status “in order to secure pragmatic constraints that, in the long run, will put the peninsula and the world back on the path to disarmament.” Something like this might be what Rapp-Hooper intended to convey. Limiting North Korea’s program is the first and most essential requirement.

In demanding full denuclearization, successive administrations have encouraged North Korea to become a serious nuclear power. Only by conceding past failure and pursuing a new course is there much chance of actually thwarting the North’s ambitions.

Foreign Policy · by Doug Bandow

11. Defector group sends more plastics bottles containing rice to N. Korea, raising concerns about Pyongyang's trash balloons

The South is sending information into the north from the moral high ground.

Defector group sends more plastics bottles containing rice to N. Korea, raising concerns about Pyongyang's trash balloons | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 23, 2024

By Kim Han-joo

SEOUL, June 23 (Yonhap) -- A group of North Korean defectors said Sunday that it has sent 200 plastic bottles containing rice across the border, heightening concerns that Pyongyang may resume sending balloons filled with trash in retaliation.

Keunsaem, the organization behind the effort, said the bottles also contained U.S. dollar bills and USBs. The bottles were sent from the western border island of Ganghwa on Saturday morning.

The organization has regularly sent these bottles every month. On June 7, around 500 plastic bottles were released.

On Thursday night, another defectors' group sent 20 balloons carrying approximately 300,000 leaflets, U.S. dollars and USB sticks containing a popular K-drama and songs across the border from the border city of Paju.

On Friday, Kim Yo-jong, the influential sister of North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un, hinted at launching more trash-carrying balloons into South Korea. She condemned "human scum" for sending what she described as "dirty wastepaper and things."

This image, provided by Keunsaem on June 23, 2024, shows plastic bottles containing rice that were sent across the border. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Han-joo · June 23, 2024

12. S. Korea running out of red lines on Russia-N. Korea cooperation

No more red lines unless there is the absolute will to decisively respond if they are crossed.

S. Korea running out of red lines on Russia-N. Korea cooperation

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 23, 2024

S. Korean spy agency-affiliated institute suggests Yoon government work to render Russia-N. Korea treaty 'invalid'

By Ji Da-gyum

Published : June 23, 2024 - 15:35

National security adviser Chang Ho-jin gives a briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on Thursday, regarding the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang the previous day. (Yonhap)

South Korean national security adviser Chang Ho-jin issued another stark warning Sunday, clarifying that South Korea will have no red lines left to uphold if Russia supplies "high-precision weapons" to North Korea, at a time when Seoul and Moscow are walking a tightrope in their relations.

"Russia's recent actions have been gradually approaching a red line, which is why we've issued the warning," Chang said Sunday during an interview with state broadcaster KBS, without specifying what constitutes the line.

Seoul and Moscow have been publicly exchanging warnings, each cautioning the other not to cross a red line, following the high-stakes summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday during Putin's first trip to Pyongyang in 24 years.

The meeting revived mutual defense commitments similar to the level of their former Cold War-era 1961 treaty, including immediate military intervention. This has elevated military cooperation between the two nuclear-armed countries, both of which are under UN sanctions, despite Seoul's public warnings against such actions.

"If (Russia) provides high-precision weapons to North Korea, then what lines will we have left to maintain?" Chang posed Sunday, directly addressing remarks made by Putin.

Putin on Thursday said that he would not rule out the possibility of providing North Korea with high-precision weapons as a countermeasure to US and EU military aid for Ukraine.

"I would like to point out that public opinion will likely reflect this sentiment, and Russia needs to take this aspect into consideration," Chang added.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (left) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un attend a state reception in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024. (Pool via Reuters)

During his interview with KBS, Chang also underscored, "The composition of our weapons support for Ukraine could change depending on how Russia responds in the future."

However, Chang declined to specify the types of weapons South Korea might provide to Ukraine, explaining that revealing such details "would weaken our leverage against North Korea and Russia."

"Managing South Korea-Russia relations is not something we can do alone. Russia also needs to make corresponding efforts," Chang emphasized.

"If Russia wants to restore and develop South Korea-Russia relations after the war (in Ukraine), I would like to stress once again that it needs to carefully consider its actions."

Chang's warning came just days after he announced Thursday that South Korea "plans to reconsider its stance on weapons support for Ukraine" in response to the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership by Kim and Putin. His remark hinted at a potential shift from Seoul's long-held policy of refraining from providing lethal aid to Kyiv -- a move that Russia has indicated would be a red line.

In return, Putin on the same day warned that South Korea's possible deliveries of lethal weapons to Ukraine "would be a grave mistake," stating that Russia "will also make the necessary decisions that the leadership of South Korea will hardly welcome" if that happens.

The South Korean government also issued a statement to express "grave concern and condemn" the signing of the treaty that "aims to strengthen mutual military and economic cooperation" hours after North Korea unilaterally released the full statement of its treaty with Russia on Thursday morning.

The Institute for National Security Strategy, affiliated with Seoul's spy agency, underscored in a report released Friday that the South Korean government "should work to render the Russia-North Korea alliance treaty invalid in the medium to long term."

"If the Russia-Ukraine war ends and North Korea's strategic value decreases, or if South Korea-Russia relations gain importance, the treaty could be nullified," the institute said. "Thus, it is crucial to ensure that the provisions of the Russia-North Korea alliance treaty are not implemented in practice for the time being."

Russia's President Vladimir Putin (left) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong-un attend a press conference following their talks in Pyongyang, North Korea June 19, 2024. (Sputnik via Reuters)

The controversy mainly revolves around clause 4 of the treaty, despite Chang's warning on June 16 that Russia should not "go beyond a certain point" just days before the summit.

The clause stipulates that North Korea and Russia "shall immediately provide military and other assistance using all means at their disposal ... if either party is subjected to military aggression from an individual country or multiple countries and enters a state of war."

Jeh Sung-hoon, a professor of Russian studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, commented, "The treaty appears to be at a level that can be considered an alliance treaty."

"According to the document, North Korean support troops could potentially appear on the Ukrainian front. Additionally, in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, Russia could provide weapons to North Korea in a manner similar to North Korea's support to it against Ukraine," Jeh told The Korea Herald.

Patricia Kim, a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, also highlighted the security implications of the treaty, noting that the treaty's deliberately ambiguous language is intended to instill caution in the US and its allies.

"A grave concern is that with a Russian 'security guarantee' or at least the facade of one in hand, North Korea may be emboldened to intensify its provocations based on the calculation that the United States and its allies will respond with greater caution now that they have to take a potential Russian reaction into account," Kim said in a commentary issued Friday.

"Putin could very well welcome a North Korean provocation on the Korean Peninsula that forces the United States to turn its attention away from Europe, where Russia is continuing its relentless war against Ukraine," Kim added.

koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · June 23, 2024

13. 'Unfeasible' idea of nuclear-armed South Korea resurfaces

Unfortunately the stars may be aligning for South Korea to really want to pursue them between the north's threat, alignment with Russia, and the possible outcome of the US election in November.

'Unfeasible' idea of nuclear-armed South Korea resurfaces

The Korea Times · by 2024-06-23 14:15 | North Korea · June 23, 2024

The USS Theodore Roosevelt, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, is seen at a naval base in the southeastern port city of Busan, Saturday. Courtesy of Navy

Experts call for rational response to Kim-Putin military pact

By Lee Hyo-jin

The idea of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons is resurfacing among some U.S. pundits in light of the strengthened military partnership between North Korea and Russia.

However, while local analysts describe this as highly unlikely, they are skeptical about whether the growing camaraderie between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin is significant enough to push South Korea to withdraw from its decades-long commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a move that would likely draw major international sanctions.

Allison Hooker, former senior director for Asia at the National Security Council under former U.S. President Donald Trump, suggested, Friday, that the deepening military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang might prompt Seoul to consider pursuing its own nuclear weapons.

"I think we cannot rule out the possibility that South Korea might move more rapidly toward its own nuclear program. We need to determine how we feel about that within the U.S. and the alliance context as well," Hooker said during a webinar hosted by the Asia Society Policy Institute.

Her remarks came a day after Republican Senator Roger Wicker called for redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, reiterating a proposal he floated in late May.

"With our allies South Korea, Japan and Australia, we should discuss nuclear burden-sharing agreements. It’s time for them to step forward and join us in nuclear burden-sharing," Wicker said Thursday on the Senate floor, as he spoke about the latest Kim-Putin summit.

Wicker added, "We should also explore redeploying American nuclear weapons back to the region to keep North Korea and China in check."

An F-18 fighter jet is seen in the hangar of the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, anchored at a naval base in Busan, Saturday. Joint Press Corps

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, dismissed these proposals as unrealistic.

"Do the Americans really mean it? Does the U.S. truly want Seoul to obtain its own nuclear weapons, which would decrease U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula? I don't think so," Yang told The Korea Times, Sunday, adding that such statements from U.S. pundits seem to be bluffs aimed at Russia and China.

S. Korea needs to consider nuclear armament as way to diversify options against NK nukes: think tank

Cho Han-bum, a senior researcher at the Korean Institute for National Unification, described discussions about South Korea going nuclear as an "overreaction" to the military pact signed by Putin and Kim.

During a summit in Pyongyang on Wednesday, the two leaders signed a new comprehensive partnership agreement, which includes a clause for mutual assistance in the event of aggression against one of the parties.

South Korean officials have strongly protested the North Korea-Russia military pact, stating that the deal poses a threat to its security. They also warned that Seoul might consider sending arms to Kyiv in response to Russia's military support to North Korea.

"It is true that security threats have worsened after Russia and North Korea — both nuclear-armed countries — signed the military agreement, which adds to the U.S.' security burden," Cho said.

"But the idea of South Korea obtaining nuclear weapons is merely rhetoric lacking feasibility."

The researcher explained that even if the United States brings South Korea’s nuclear armament to the U.N. table, the other four U.N. Security Council members —Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom — are unlikely to consent. Also, a nuclear-armed South Korea would likely trigger a nuclear domino effect in East Asia, prompting similar discussions in Taiwan and Japan, a scenario that the international community would not support.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un attends a farewell ceremony for Russian President Vladimir Putin at an international airport outside Pyongyang, Wednesday. AP-Yonhap

"Neighboring countries, including South Korea, should respond rationally to what could eventually become Kim Jong-un's one-sided love for Russia depending on the course of the war in Ukraine," Cho said, stressing that Kim's offerings to Putin are limited to ammunition and some other weapons.

"Even if North Korean troops are deployed to the war in Ukraine to support Russia, they are likely to be assigned to rebuilding infrastructure in Russian-occupied regions rather than participating in frontline battles."

South Korea's intelligence agency said Saturday that it is closely monitoring the possibility of North Korean troops being deployed to the Ukraine war.

Seoul is planning to flex its military muscles with its allies in the wake of the Pyongyang-Moscow military partnership.

The USS Theodore Roosevelt arrived at a naval port in Busan on Saturday in a major show of force against North Korea's evolving threats and deepening military cooperation with Russia. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is expected to participate in a South Korea-U.S.-Japan trilateral military exercise, dubbed Freedom Edge, which will take place later this month.

The Korea Times · by 2024-06-23 14:15 | North Korea · June 23, 2024

14. US and South Korea race to finish troop cost talks with Trump looming

US and South Korea race to finish troop cost talks with Trump looming

By PHELIM KINE

06/21/2024 06:32 PM EDT

Politico

Seoul fears another Donald Trump presidency could complicate talks on renewing a defense-related deal.

Seoul is pushing Washington to do an early renewal of a bilateral cost-sharing deal that helps pay for the 28,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea to deter potential North Korean aggression. | Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images

06/21/2024 06:32 PM EDT

South Korea and the Biden administration are racing to renew a high-stakes defense-related deal to avoid a potentially more difficult bargaining process if Donald Trump returns to the Oval Office in 2025.

Seoul is pushing Washington to do an early renewal of a bilateral cost-sharing deal — called the Special Measures Agreement — that helps pay for the 28,000 U.S. troops based in South Korea to deter potential North Korean aggression.

The current SMA expires at the end of 2025, but the prospect of a second Trump administration has spurred Seoul to try to refresh the deal sooner. The State Department has acknowledged that talks are underway — the third round wrapped up last Wednesday — but won’t say whether they are aiming for a year-end deadline.

But former U.S. officials warn that Seoul’s strategy risks reprisals if Trump wins in November. That could include punitive financial burdens for South Korea that would strain ties between Seoul and Washington amid rising regional tensions with both China and North Korea. North Korean soldiers have crossed into South Korean territory three times in the last month, as Pyongyang seeks to fortify the ironically named Demilitarized Zone.

It also comes as Russia and North Korea deepen their military ties. Earlier this week, Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un pledged to immediately provide each other with military assistance if their countries were to be invaded.

South Korea has reason to worry. Trump has complained that Seoul pays “almost nothing” for those troops and that he expects it to pay more. “I want South Korea to treat us properly … we’ve essentially paid for much of their military, free of charge. And they agreed to pay billions of dollars. And now, probably now that I’m gone, they’re paying very little,” Trump told Time Magazine in April.

Seoul’s goal now is to avoid a replay of the bruising SMA renewal negotiations with the Trump administration in 2020, in which the U.S. demanded a massive increase in South Korea’s share of those costs.

South Korea is “hedging against a possible Trump two administration — they’ve seen this movie and it was very painful,” said Harry Harris, a former naval aviator who served as U.S. ambassador to South Korea during the Trump administration. Trump made an “inappropriate” demand that Seoul raise its annual cost-sharing contribution to $5 billion from the around $900 million that it was previously paying, Harris added.

Seoul responded with diplomatic foot-dragging in hopes of a better deal if Biden won the 2020 election. “They were facing this $5 billion bogey … so they bet on a change in administration and delayed [renewal] until 2021,” said Harris.

Other former officials said that an early renewal of the SMA isn’t worth the risk.

“It’s a bad idea — If Trump wins, he will negate [the SMA] immediately [because] SMA allows either party to back out with advance notice,” said Victor Cha, former National Security Council director for Japan and Korea. That could sour bilateral ties at the outset of the new administration. “Trump will also be angry with South Korea” if they do an early SMA renewal, Cha said.

Seoul’s effort to head off a potentially more costly SMA renewal could backfire by opening the door to other punitive financial demands if Trump wins in November.

“There are countless ways that President Trump, should he be elected, could try to make South Korea pay more,” said former senior U.S. foreign service officer Mark Tokola, who’s currently vice president of the Korea Economic Institute of America. “Asking them to pay for U.S. participation in joint [military] exercises is one that comes to mind.”

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Politico

15. N. Korea to hold key party meeting this week after signing new partnership treaty with Russia

I cannot wait to read the Propaganda and Agitation Department's report on this.

N. Korea to hold key party meeting this week after signing new partnership treaty with Russia | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 23, 2024

SEOUL, June 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is expected to hold a plenary meeting of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) this week to review policy performances in the first half, amid attention over whether it would discuss follow-up measures to implement a new partnership treaty signed with Russia.

In May, the WPK's politburo decided to hold a plenary meeting of the party's Central Committee in late June to review progress in its economic and other projects in the first half, without disclosing other details, such as the date of the meeting.

North Korea usually holds a party plenary meeting for a few days in June. But the upcoming gathering draws more attention due to the possibility that it could discuss detailed measures to expand cooperation with Russia following its signing with Moscow of the treaty of comprehensive strategic partnership.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a summit in Pyongyang on Wednesday and clinched the sweeping treaty that calls for providing military assistance without delay if either comes under attack.

Article 4 of the 23-point treaty could be seen as warranting automatic military intervention in the event of aggression on either country. That would amount to the restoration of a Cold War-era alliance for the first time in 28 years since a mutual defense treaty was scrapped in 1996.

The treaty also indicates North Korea and Russia could join hands in resisting international sanctions against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs. Article 16 of the treaty calls for both sides to oppose "unilateral coercive measures of an extraterritorial nature."

The new pact specifies science and technology, space, the peaceful use of nuclear power and artificial intelligence as among the areas for cooperation. This raises concerns that North Korea and Russia's cooperation in such fields could assist the North's development of weapons of mass destruction banned under U.N. sanctions.

Whether North Korea would ratify the treaty at the WPK meeting will also garner attention. Under the North's constitution, an "important treaty" can be ratified or scrapped solely by its leader Kim, though the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), the North's parliament, approves ordinary treaties.

After this week's party plenary meeting, North Korea is widely expected to hold a key session of the SPA in a bid to revise the constitution. The North's leader earlier called for revising the constitution to define South Korea as the North's "primary foe" and clarify its territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

Experts said at this week's WPK meeting, Kim may issue a message critical of the United States and South Korea over the allies' joint military drills scheduled for August.

Seoul and Washington plan to stage the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) in August, which the North has long denounced as a rehearsal for northern invasion.

Separately, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, a U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, arrived in the southeastern port city of Busan on Saturday in a show of force against North Korea's military threats. The U.S., South Korea and Japan will hold their first-ever trilateral multidomain exercise later this month.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on June 20, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un (R) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) posing for their summit talks at the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · June 23, 2024

16. Tony Shaffer to Newsmax: Biden Erased All US Gains With NKorea

Give me a break. What gains? All our administrations have failed on north Korea.

I wanted to determine the Lt Col's Korea expertise. All I could recall was his connection to Able Danger. So I found his "bio" that I have pasted below. It is from Rep Walter Jones honoring him in Congress in 2011. He has quite a storied career though I think anyone who has served on active duty for any period of time can read between these lines on some of these assignments.

Tony Shaffer to Newsmax: Biden Erased All US Gains With NKorea

https://www.newsmax.com/newsmax-tv/tony-shaffer-blaine-holt-russia/2024/06/21/id/1169715/

Holt and Shaffer on Salcedo

By James Morley III | Friday, 21 June 2024 06:10 PM EDT

Retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer told Newsmax on Friday that the Biden administration's weakness regarding North Korea has erased "all gains" that former President Donald Trump made with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim signed an agreement Wednesday that pledges mutual aid if either country faces "aggression." Shaffer said Putin will also teach North Korea "how to shrug off sanctions."

"These things are being lost," he said during an appearance on "The Chris Salcedo Show.”

Retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Blaine Holt joined the conversation and said that the current U.S. administration's strategy with Russia of "poking the bear" is not working.

"It's time for serious people to come into the room and to say, You know what? We do have to sit down. We do have to talk. These are nuclear weapons. We are on the brink," he said.

Information from The Associated Press was used in this report.

James Morley III

James Morley III is a writer with more than two decades of experience in entertainment, travel, technology, and science and nature.

[Congressional Record: September 14, 2011 (Extensions)]

[Page E1629]

HONORING LT. COL. ANTHONY SHAFFER, SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, UNITED

STATES ARMY RESERVE (RETIRED)

https://irp.fas.org/congress/2011_cr/shaffer.html

______

HON. WALTER B. JONES

of north carolina

in the house of representatives

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Mr. JONES. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to rise today to honor Lt. Col.

Tony Shaffer, Military Intelligence Corps, for his twenty-five years of

service as a field intelligence operative aid more than three decades

of service to the nation in both the Army National Guard and Army

Reserve.

Col. Shaffer's extensive career started in January 1981, while still

in high school, when he enlisted in the Ohio Army National Guard.

He went on to graduate from Wright State University in 1986. And this

year, 2011, Col. Shaffer was chosen as their College of Liberal Arts

Alumnus of the Year.

Col. Shaffer's storied career has been distinguished by his

willingness and ability to work at the cutting edge of our nation's

intelligence community. He has successfully endeavored to adapt new

technology and use these capabilities to ensure the protection of the

American people. It is likely that most of Lt. Col. Shaffer's work will

never be fully recognized--but I can assure you it is appreciated by me

and the American people.

During his initial years of service, he deployed to Germany during

REFORGER 85 to conduct anti-terrorism operations against the Red Army

Faction, RAF, and other German based terrorism groups. He was also

assigned to the Army's New York City Resident Office during a critical

period when foreign terrorists were targeting the United States.

In 1988 he attended training at ``The Farm'' where he graduated first

in his class of the Military Operations Training Course, MOTC, at Camp

Perry, VA.

He was promoted to Captain in 1990 and was brought to active duty by

the Army for the first Gulf War in 1991 where he worked to develop a

key classified program named STARWATCHER B. After the conclusion of the

first Gulf War, he was appointed to serve as the chief of the Army's

global clandestine HUMINT collection program, and ran specific the

Special Access Program, SAP, operation, unclassified nickname: CAROLINA

MORNING, which netted highly significant information that was critical

to the national leadership during the 1990s.

He was the senior HUMINT advisor to the J2/Senior Intelligence

Officer of Joint Interagency Task Force East, JIATF-E. JIATF-E

conducted counter-drug operations in the Transit Zone between Columbia

and the United States southern border. During this tour he was

successful in integrating highly specialized hybrid technology/human

intelligence operations to obtain high value intelligence information

to support the operational forces.

In 1995, Tony transitioned to Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, as

part of the consolidation of all Service, Army, Navy, Air Force, and

USMC, controlled HUMINT into the Department of Defense.

He created and directed Task Force STRATUS IVY--a one-of-a-kind

special mission task force that harnessed the skills of officers from

the National Security Agency, NSA, Army Intelligence and Defense

Intelligence Agency that conducted direct support to Department of

Defense, Special Operations Command and other non-DoD agencies.

After his promotion to Major, due to his highly sought after skills,

he was assigned to serve at both the HUMINT Support Element, HSE, at

both Special Operations Command, SOCOM, and the Joint Special

Operations Command, JSOC. He also served as a team leader of classified

element that provided direct support to the Director of Operations of

Defense HUMINT Service, DHS.

During this period of his career he participated in multiple highly

classified operations--the most notable, a project known as ABLE

DANGER--the controversial counterterrorism operation that was designed

to detect, degrade and counter Al Qaeda capabilities that was

successful in detecting Al Qaeda cells operating within the United

States before the

9/11 attacks.

He had two peacetime overseas deployments--the first to Thailand

where he was attached to the III Marine Expeditionary Force, MEF, to

attend Exercise COBRA GOLD 1991; the second to New Zealand with

attachment to the New Zealand Defense Force for Joint Warrior

Interoperability Demonstration in mid 2001.

Just after the 9/11 attacks, in December 2001, he was returned to

active duty for a 30-month period, during which he commanded a DIA

operating base and had two successful combat tours to Afghanistan.

He commanded Field Operating Base, FOB, Alpha, a joint DIA/CIA

brigade equivalent unit conducting classified collection and special

operations support regarding terrorists just after the 9/11 attacks.

During his two undercover combat tours in Afghanistan, he

participated in the search for senior Al Qaeda leadership in

Afghanistan and is credited for helping to break the back of the

Taliban's first attempt to return to power in Afghanistan.

Col. Shaffer received the Bronze Star Medal, BSM, for performance as

an Operations Officer of the HUMINT Support Detachment in Afghanistan

supporting CJTF 180 and CJFT 121.

After promotion to lieutenant colonel in 2005, he was attached to

Navy's premier counterterrorism think-tank, DEEP BLUE at the Pentagon

where he worked on key situational awareness and counterterrorism

technology and tools.

In 2005 to 2006, Tony worked with the U.S. Congress and testified on

multiple issues that relate to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and

intelligence failures.

In 2006 he was assigned to and commanded the Special Troops

Battalion, STB, of the 9th Theater Support Command, Ft. Belvoir, VA.

He was then, in 2007, selected to serve as the G6/Senior Information

Officer, Anti-Terrorism Officer and Public Affairs Officer of the 94th

Division, Force Sustainment, Ft Lee, VA--the 94th Division was re-

activated in 2008 and was one of Gen George Patton's key divisions that

participated in the Battle of the Bulge, Ardennes, in 1944-45. He

remained with the 94th Division until he reached his mandatory

retirement date, MRD, in July of 2011.

He continues to serve this great nation through his work at the

Center for Advanced Defense Studies where, as a Senior Fellow, he

continues to influence national defense strategy and policy through

research and advocacy of critical national security issues.

Over these three decades Lt. Col. Shaffer has served with distinction

and unmatched willingness to conduct high risk operations, while always

recognizing the ethical and moral responsibly of his office.

Lt. Col. Shaffer's keen operational judgment and dynamic leadership

has contributed substantially to the development of critical national

level intelligence capabilities--many of which remain in operation

today. His influence over national defense and security is indelible

and significant--his service has constantly worked to identify threats

and then develop capability to protect the American people. He

consistently worked to influence national intelligence policy and

capabilities to insure the security of the American people and has done

so in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Army.

On behalf of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, I would like

to recognize Col. Shaffer's outstanding accomplishments, courageous

attitude and past and present devotion to this nation. I wish to

congratulate him, his wife Rina, and sons Alexander and Ryan on the

completion of long and distinguished career.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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