Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Never forget: This very moment, we can change our lives. There never was a moment, and never will be, when we are without the power to alter our destiny."

- Steven Pressfield

“Education is the ability to listen to almost anything without losing your temper or your self-confidence.”

- Robert Frost

"You can't tell how good a man or a watermelon is 'till they get thumped."

- Judge Roy Bean

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 5 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (05.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Putin Must Go: Now Is the Time For Regime Change in Russia by John Bolton

4. U.S. Believes Ukraine Was Behind an Assassination in Russia

5. How the US might respond to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine

6. 'Watched the whole time': China's surveillance state grows under Xi

7. U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot

8. Ukrainian Colonel captures and drives off with Russian T-90 tank

9. How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era

10. Ex-cop kills 22 children, 12 others in Thai mass shooting

11. Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine

12. The Russian Military Seems to Be in Full Retreat in Ukraine

13. Frozen compass, frigid wind — How Green Berets would airdrop into the Arctic in a future war

14. How China got a spy inside the US Army

15. The Pentagon set 18 diversity goals in 2011. It’s fulfilled 6 of them.

16. US special forces conduct midnight raid in Syria killing 'ISIS leader'

17. Army Piloting Pentagon’s Counter-UAS Efforts

18. The problem with tyrants like Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin

19. How Biden Can Stand With the Iranian People

20. The World Cup Won't Clean Up Qatar's Image

21. Opinion | Ukraine needs advanced U.S. drones that can instantly transform a battle

22. Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 5 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5

Key Takeaways

The Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in Kharkiv Oblast has not yet culminated and is actively pushing into Luhansk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin took measures to assert full Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
Russian forces conducted the first strike on Kyiv Oblast since June with a Shahed-136 drone.
The Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that Putin awarded him the rank of Colonel-General.
Increasing domestic critiques of Russia’s “partial mobilization” are likely driving Putin to scapegoat the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and specifically Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
Ukrainian troops likely consolidated positions and regrouped in northern Kherson Oblast after making major gains over in the last 48 hours.
Russian sources reported Ukrainian offensive preparations northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 5.
Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the implementation of the Russian “partial mobilization” on October 5.
Russian citizens who are economically disadvantaged and ethnic minority Russian communities continue to bear a disproportionate burden in mobilization rates and casualty rates according to investigative reports, suggesting that Russian authorities may be deliberately placing poor and minority Russian citizens in more dangerous positions than well-off or ethnic Russians.
Russian President Vladimir Putin completed the final formality in the process for illegally annexing Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories on October 5.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 5

Oct 5, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Karolina Hird, Katherine Lawlor, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

October 5, 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukraine’s northern Kharkiv counteroffensive has not yet culminated after one month of successful operations and is now advancing into western Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in western Luhansk Oblast (approximately 20 km southwest of Svatove) on October 5.[1] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces have begun liberating unspecified villages in Luhansk Oblast on October 5.[2] Ukrainian forces began the maneuver phase of their counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast— which has now reached Luhansk Oblast—on September 6.[3] Russian forces have failed to hold the banks of the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers and leverage them as natural boundaries to prevent Ukrainian forces from projecting into vulnerable sections of Russian-occupied northeast Ukraine. The terrain in western Luhansk is suitable for the kind of rapid maneuver warfare that Ukrainian forces used effectively in eastern Kharkiv Oblast in early September, and there are no indications from open sources that the Russian military has substantially reinforced western Luhansk Oblast. Ukraine’s ongoing northern and southern counteroffensives are likely forcing the Kremlin to prioritize the defense of one area of operations at the expense of another, potentially increasing the likelihood of Ukrainian success in both.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 drone strike against Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast, on October 5, the first Russian strike in Kyiv Oblast since June.[4] Footage from the aftermath of the strike shows apparent damage to residential structures.[5] Russian milbloggers lauded the destructive capability of the Shahed-136 drones but questioned why Russian forces are using such technology to target areas deep in the Ukrainian rear and far removed from active combat zones. That decision fits into the larger pattern of Russian forces expending high-precision technology on areas of Ukraine that hold limited operational significance.[6]

Russian President Vladimir Putin took measures to assert full Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Putin issued a decree transferring control of the ZNPP to Russian state company Rosenergoatom on October 5.[7] The ZNPP’s current Ukrainian operator Energoatom announced that its president assumed the position of General Director of the ZNPP on October 5.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian officials are coercing ZNPP workers into obtaining Russian passports and signing employment contracts with Rosenergoatom.[9] International Atomic Energy Agency General Director Rafael Grossi plans to meet with both Ukrainian and Russian officials this week in Kyiv and Moscow to discuss the creation of a “protective zone” around the ZNPP.[10] Russian officials will likely attempt to coerce the IAEA in upcoming discussions and negotiations into recognizing Rosenergoatom’s official control of the ZNPP, and by implication Russia’s illegal annexation of Zaporizhia Oblast.

The head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that Putin awarded him the rank of colonel general on October 5.[11] This promotion is particularly noteworthy in the context of the recent controversy surrounding Kadyrov and his direct criticism of Central Military District (CMD) Colonel General Aleksander Lapin, which ISW has previously analyzed.[12] Although ISW has not found official confirmation of Kadyrov’s promotion, Putin may have made the decision to elevate Kadyrov’s rank in order to maintain the support of Kadyrov and Chechen forces while simultaneously pushing back on the Russian Ministry of Defense and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, from whom Putin seems to be rhetorically distancing himself. Kadyrov’s new rank may be a sign that Putin is willing to appease the more radical and vocal calls of the siloviki base at the expense of the conventional military establishment.

Increasing domestic critiques of Russia’s “partial mobilization” are likely driving Putin to scapegoat the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and specifically Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Putin deferred mobilization for all students, including part-time and masters students, via a decree on October 5.[13] Putin told Russian outlets that because “the Ministry of Defense did not make timely changes to the legal framework on the list of those who are not subject to mobilization, adjustments have to be made.”[14] That direct critique of the MoD is also an implicit critique of Shoigu, whom Putin appears to be setting up to take the fall for the failures of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, Colonel General (Ret.) Andrey Kartapolov, also criticized the MoD on Russian state television on October 5. Kartapolov said that all Russians know the MoD is lying and must stop, but that message is not reaching “individual leaders,” another jab at Shoigu.[15] One Russian milblogger claimed that Kartapolov’s comments demonstrate that Shoigu will soon be “demolished” and “recognized as the main culprit” of Russia’s military failures. The milblogger reminded his readers that it was the Russian MoD and its head that made an “invaluable and huge contribution to the fact that we are now on the verge of a military-political catastrophe.”[16] Another milblogger defended Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov for criticizing the MoD, applauding them for driving necessary change.[17] Kadyrov’s announcement that Putin awarded him the rank of Colonel-General is similarly indicative that Putin is willing to appease the siloviki base that has taken continued rhetorical swings at the MoD establishment.

Putin will likely hold off on firing Shoigu for as long as he feels he can in order to continue to blame Shoigu for ongoing military failures and to build up support among other factions. Shoigu’s replacement will need to take responsibility for failures that occur after his tenure begins. Putin is already working to improve his support among the nationalist milbloggers and the siloviki such as Prigozhin and Kadyrov. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov old reporters on October 5 that Prigozhin “makes a great contribution within his capabilities” to efforts in Russia and Ukraine and declined to answer questions surrounding Prigozhin’s critiques of government officials.[18] A milblogger emphasized on October 5 that Putin “regularly hosts military correspondents, carefully reads their reports, asks the right questions, and receives objective answers,” implicitly contrasting that relationship with the dishonest way in which milbloggers believe the MoD interacts with Putin.[19]

Russian authorities detained the manager of several milblogger telegram channels on October 5, indicating that the Kremlin is likely setting limits on what criticism is allowed in the domestic Russian information space. Alexander Khunshtein, the deputy secretary of the General Council of Putin’s political party, United Russia, published footage on October 5 showing Russian authorities detaining Alexei Slobodenyuk.[20] Slobodenyuk is an employee of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot media group and the manager of several milblogger telegrams, the most prominent of which are “Release Z Kraken” and “Skaner.” The telegram channel “Skaner” has featured criticism of major state officials and military personnel, the most prominent of whom are Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Russian authorities detained Slobodenyuk on accusations of fraud. His detention suggests that the Kremlin is attempting to set boundaries for which criticism is allowed in the information space and on which high-ranking officials milbloggers and journalists can criticize—Defense Minister Shoigu, Putin‘s likely scapegoat-in-waiting, now appears to be fair game, whereas officials close to Putin such as Lavrov and Putin’s spokesperson are off-limits.

Key Takeaways

The Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in Kharkiv Oblast has not yet culminated and is actively pushing into Luhansk Oblast.
Russian President Vladimir Putin took measures to assert full Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
Russian forces conducted the first strike on Kyiv Oblast since June with a Shahed-136 drone.
The Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that Putin awarded him the rank of Colonel-General.
Increasing domestic critiques of Russia’s “partial mobilization” are likely driving Putin to scapegoat the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and specifically Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
Ukrainian troops likely consolidated positions and regrouped in northern Kherson Oblast after making major gains over in the last 48 hours.
Russian sources reported Ukrainian offensive preparations northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City.
Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 5.
Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the implementation of the Russian “partial mobilization” on October 5.
Russian citizens who are economically disadvantaged and ethnic minority Russian communities continue to bear a disproportionate burden in mobilization rates and casualty rates according to investigative reports, suggesting that Russian authorities may be deliberately placing poor and minority Russian citizens in more dangerous positions than well-off or ethnic Russians.
Russian President Vladimir Putin completed the final formality in the process for illegally annexing Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories on October 5.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)

Ukrainian forces made gains in northwestern Luhansk Oblast near Svatove on October 5. Social media imagery shows Ukrainian troops in Hrekivka and Makiivka, two settlements in Luhansk Oblast 20km southwest of Svatove.[21] Russian sources continued to discuss Ukrainian attacks along the R66 (Svatove Kreminna) highway with concern and stated that Russian troops, reportedly including elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, are preparing defenses in Svatove, Kreminna, and along the R66.[22] Russian forces are likely focusing on the defense of the Svatove-Kreminna frontline because they are increasingly concerned that Ukrainian penetration of this line will allow Ukrainian troops to threaten Starobilsk, a key Russian logistics hub about 50km east of Svatove, through which run many ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that are essential to Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast. Access to the R66 will likely also allow Ukrainian troops to push south from Svatove to Kreminna, Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk, which would likely have substantial informational effects considering the protracted and costly Russian campaign to capture Severodonetsk in June.

Ukrainian troops also likely continued advances in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast near the Kupyansk area on October 5. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in the direction of Orlianka (8km east of Petropavlivka) through a “grey zone” between Petropavlivka and Vilshana.[23] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian troops are reinforcing the Kupyansk area to prepare for further eastward advances.[24]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Ukrainian forces likely consolidated positions in northern Kherson Oblast and regrouped on October 5 as Russian troops attempted to recover from recent Ukrainian advances. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command confirmed on October 4 that Ukrainian troops liberated Lyubimivka, Khreshchenivka, Zolta Balka, Bilyaivka, Ukrainka, Velyka Oleksandrivka, Mala Oleksandrivka and Davydiv Brid as ISW assessed on October 4.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that recent Ukrainian success are forcing Russian troops to evacuate the wounded to crossings on the Dnipro River and that Russian forces moved over 150 wounded servicemen to Vesele, located across the Dnipro from Nova Kakhkovka.[26] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also claimed that Russian forces are destroying their own ammunition reserves during withdrawal, likely to prevent Ukrainian forces from capturing ammunition and equipment as they advance.[27] Russian milbloggers previously criticized poorly conducted Russian withdrawals and routs in Kharkiv Oblast in early September that saw much Russian equipment and supplies abandoned and lost to Ukrainian forces.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops are preparing for offensive operations northwest of Kherson City on October 5. Several milbloggers reported that Ukrainian troops are building up their grouping around Posad Pokrovske (25km northwest of Kherson City), Oleksandrivka (35km west of Kherson City) and Ternovi Pody (25km northwest of Kherson City).[28] Several sources also reported fighting near Snihurivka (45km northeast of Kherson City).[29] Social media users amplified claims that Russian troops have entirely withdrawn from Snihurivka, which were refuted by Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim, who noted that Russian army officers left the city but that Russian troops remain.[30] Based on these conflicting reports, it is highly likely that Russian command may be withdrawing from Snihurivka in anticipation of Ukrainian attacks but that the core Russian contingent remains within the city. Russian sources are evidently focused on Ukrainian activity northwest of Kherson City due to concerns that Ukrainian forces are setting conditions for advances directly towards Kherson City. Russian forces’ loss of Snihurivka would be a significant development given the city’s position on the western side of the Inhulets River. Russian forces’ loss of control over the Inhulets River would further isolate Kherson City from the east and increase the city’s vulnerability to a Ukrainian encirclement.

Ukrainian troops continued the interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast on October 5 to support ongoing ground offensives. Ukrainian sources reiterated that Ukrainian strikes targeted Russian logistics, transportation, and command assets and concentration areas throughout Kherson Oblast.[31] Geolocated footage shows the aftermath of a Ukrainian strike on a hotel in Kherson City that reportedly housed Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers.[32] Social media users additionally reported Ukrainian strikes near the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant in Nova Kakhkovka, about 60km east of Kherson City.[33]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults southeast of Siversk near Vyimka (8km southeast of Siversk) and Spirne (13km southeast of Siversk); on and south of Bakhmut near Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut), and Kurdiumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut); and north of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske (10km northeast of Bakhmut).[34] The Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic Denis Pushilin made continued claims that Ukrainian forces are retreating from positions in Bakhmut, although ISW cannot independently verify Russian claims of Ukrainian withdrawals.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults south of Avdiivka near Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces pushed through Ukrainian defensive positions near Donetsk City and are attempting to advance on Pervomaiske and Vodiane.[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian ground attacks near Vuhledar.[38] The Ukrainian General staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on October 5.[39]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued to conduct artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 5.[40] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City with Iskander missiles.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian military hangar at the Voznesensk Airfield in Mykolaiv Oblast.[42] Ukrainian Mykolaiv Regional State Administration Head Vitaly Kim reported that Russian forces continued to target unspecified areas in Mykolaiv Oblast with Shahed-136 kamikaze drones.[43] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continued to target port infrastructure in Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[44] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted artillery and MLRS strikes against settlements on the northern bank of the Dnipro River in Nikopol, Marhanets, and Chervonohryhorivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian S-300 system in Tokmak, Zaporizhia Oblast.[46] The Russian MoD and occupation authorities claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant, and occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that the shelling damaged a tower at the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant.[47]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the implementation of the Russian “partial mobilization” on October 5. One milblogger criticized the MoD’s “blatant negligence” regarding mobilized personnel across the country, including in Omsk, Novosibirsk, and Voronezh oblasts and in Khabarovsk Krai.[48] The milblogger reported that three mobilized personnel in the Yelanksy, Sverdlovsk Oblast garrison have already died, implying that poor living conditions and general lawlessness among mobilized personnel killed them.[49] Social media users circulated videos of Russian personnel in an unspecified location claiming that they are living on the streets in the cold without a commander, tents, or food.[50] One milblogger reported that mobilized personnel in Omsk Oblast are trained in terrible conditions at overcrowded training grounds and are quartered in hangars without electricity or heat despite below-freezing temperatures.[51] Another milblogger shared a statement from a mobilized Moscow man who said that more than half of his unit has the coronavirus or another respiratory disease and that they went to southern Russia, spent several days there, and then were shipped back north.[52] The Russian MoD attempted to defend itself from these accusations and stated on October 5 that mobilized personnel from Amur Oblast began their training with “experienced instructors...who have experience in participating in modern armed conflicts.”[53]

Russian forces reportedly continued to rush newly-mobilized men to the frontlines on October 4 and 5. Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications reported on October 4 that a mobilized Russian man from Orsk joined the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to fight near Olhivka, possibly the village near Beryslav in Kherson, within five days of receiving his mobilization notice. The soldier reportedly surrendered to Ukrainian forces using Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” hotline.[54] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia posted footage of mobilized Russian personnel training in an unspecified part of Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast on October 5 but did not clarify whether the mobilized personnel are originally from Kherson Oblast, other Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories like the DNR, or Russia itself.[55

Russian citizens who are economically disadvantaged and ethnic minority Russian communities continue to bear a disproportionate burden in mobilization rates and casualty rates according to investigative reports, suggesting that Russian authorities may be deliberately placing poor and minority Russian citizens in more dangerous positions than well-off or ethnic Russians. The Georgia-based Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) and the Russian language outlet Important Stories released a study of mobilization numbers and mortality rate increases by Russian region on October 5, citing local officials and public media.[56] They calculated that Russian authorities have mobilized at least 213,000 men across 53 regions but were unable to find data for an additional 32 regions, suggesting that many more men have already been mobilized in the two weeks since September 21, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his “partial mobilization.” Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed on October 4 that 200,000 men have already been mobilized.[57] CIT noted that the regions that are reporting disproportionate shares of mobilization are consistently the poorest and most majority-minority parts of Russia. Moscow and St Petersburg showed the lowest mortality rate increases since the war began, with a 0% and 3% increase respectively, whereas the Republic of Dagestan had the highest reported increase in the male mortality rate: 105%. CIT analysts suggested that the Kremlin is targeting regions that are less likely to protest disproportionate mobilization rates to generate additional manpower without increasing domestic instability.

Russian civilians and non-governmental organizations are continuing to fundraise to provide basic supplies for mobilized Russian servicemembers. The governor of Kaluga Oblast reportedly canceled the oblast’s New Year’s celebration (a major holiday in Russia) after a public petition called on him to divert New Year’s funds to mobilized residents instead.[58] A Russian outlet reported that other petitions are circulating across the country, but other celebrations have not yet been canceled. A Russian milblogger shared a video on October 5 purporting to show equipment purchased through a crowdfunding initiative of the Interregional Public Organization.[59] The milblogger added that the organization intends to buy winter clothes, generators, blankets, drones, communications equipment, and camouflage nets for Russian forces and the Russian proxy Luhansk People’s Militia.

Russian officials are attempting to publicize support to the families of forcibly-mobilized men, likely to improve the narrative surrounding mobilization and to reduce resistance from mobilized men with families. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin signed a decree on October 5 ordering the Moscow City government to provide support to the families of mobilized men.[60] That support includes vocational training and assistance, free meals, free daycare, and additional social services for elderly and disabled family members.

Russian defense officials are continuing to recruit Russian prisoners to replenish depleted Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukraine’s General Staff reported on October 5 that over 650 prisoners from the strict-regime correctional colonies of the Stavropol region agreed to take part in combat operations in Ukraine.[61]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian President Vladimir Putin completed the final formality in the process of illegally annexing Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories on October 5. Putin signed four federal laws ratifying the treaties on the entry of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), Zaporizhia Oblast, and Kherson Oblast into the Russian Federation.[62] The laws created new legal entities for the Russian-occupied territories and granted the current occupation administration heads the status of acting head or governor for their respective territories.[63]

Russian and occupation administration officials formalized administrative measures to clarify the border procedures between Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories and Russia on October 5. Russian sources reported that Russian officials now recognize the borders between the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories and the Russian Federation as internal administrative borders, as opposed to international borders.[64] Russian sources also reported that Russian and occupation administration officials eliminated customs controls between the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied territories.[65] However, Russian sources reported that Russian authorities will continue to operate checkpoints along these borders for security purposes.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[7] https://t.me/readovkanews/43319 ; https://ria dot ru/20221005/zaes-1821775209.html ; http://publication.pravo.gov dot ru/Document/View/0001202210050022

[18] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/866377

[30] https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1577535131589509121?s=20&t=NljDKVpxI8... net/ukraine/4522947-ye-dani-pro-vtechu-ofitseriv-zi-snihurivky-kim

[31] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/videos/765803514519459; https://sprot... ua/2022/10/04/ukrayinske-pidpillya-prodovzhuye-povidomlyaty-pro-peremishhennya-voroga-na-tot/

[60] https://www.sobyanin dot ru/o-podderzhke-semei-mobilizovannyh-grazhdan?utm_source=tg&utm_medium=post&utm_campaign=051022

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (05.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (05.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

Prosecutor General's Office has already identified more than 600 suspects in the crime of aggression, Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin said. At the moment, there are about 37,000 registered cases of war crimes; the number of killed among Ukraine's civilian population is 7,500, including 418 children, Kostin said.

With the beginning of the war, 5 million out of 7.7 million internally displaced persons lost their jobs. Almost 3 million working-age citizens left Ukraine, Deputy Minister of Economy Tetyana Berezhna reported. According to the population monitoring system based on the data of mobile operators, 42% of those outside Ukraine are working, 17% are unemployed, 8% are students, 23% are pensioners, and for 10% their status could not be determined.

The Education Ombudsman Service prepared advice for teachers, school principals, parents, and children on what to do in case of a nuclear strike while children are at school. Instructions for parents and children were published on the portal of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security dovidka.info.

The Russian troops attacked the town of Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast, located about 80 km to the south of Kyiv, with 6 kamikaze drones on the night of October 5. As a result, several infrastructure objects were set on fire. One person was injured, both head of the Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Oleksiy Kuleba and the mayor of Bila Tserkva Hennadiy Dykiy reported.

On the night of October 5, the Russian forces shelled Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with "Grad" MLRS and heavy artillery, the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration (OMA) Valentyn Reznichenko said. Chervonohryhorivka, Nikopol and Marganets communities came under fire. Russian shells damaged two lyceums, a church, a shop, a gas pipeline, power lines, and other civilian targets. Another shelling was recorded on the evening of October 5. No victims were reported.

In the morning of October 5, Russia launched "Iskander" missile attacks on infrastructure facilities on the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia and the city center, one of the missiles was shot down by air defense, Oleksandr Starukh, head of Zaporizhzhia OMA, said.

In the liberated Sviatohirsk, Donetsk Oblast, the bodies of four civilians were discovered during the exhumation, the head of Donetsk OMA, Pavlo Kirylenko, said. He also reported that on October 4, Russian forces killed one civilian at Mayorsk station in Zaitseve, and 6 people were injured.

At night and in the morning of October 5, the occupiers fired rockets at Chasiv Yar in Donetsk Oblast, damaging a private house. Fighting continues in the area of the villages of Pisky, Vodyane, and Pervomaiske of the Ocheretyn community. The Russian forces also shelled the Karliv

Reservoir with "Grad" MLRS; at around 02:30, they hit the reservoir's dam. They also fired intensively at the Toretsk community, where an apartment building got damaged. Over the past day, 5 civilians were killed and 6 wounded in Donetsk Oblast, the OMA administration reported in the morning roundup.

More than 50 graves of civilians were found in the recently liberated Lyman in Donetsk Oblast. However, not all buried are identified; some tombstones have just numbers, Hromadkse TV reported.

Residents of Lyman received their first pensions, and one-time payments, Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Kyrylo Tymoshenko said.

Occupied territories

President Putin signed the laws adopted by the Russian State Duma, formally annexing the temporarily occupied territories of four Ukrainian Oblasts. At the same time, his spokesman Dmitriy Peskov failed to answer the question on what were the borders of the annexed territories. The move, in effect, demonstrates that Russian claims about separatism in the Donbas that served as the pretext for the Russian interference and the Minsk deal were false pretenses. Annexing the territory of another country is hardly a solution to its "separatism problem".

After Putin signed the illegal decree appropriating the Ukrainian Zaporizhzhia NPP to the Russian Federation, Rosenergoatom reported that Oleg Romanenko, the former chief engineer of the Balakovo NPP, was appointed to manage the Russian company in charge of the ZNPP operation.

The Russian Investigative Committee began to create investigative agencies in the territories annexed to Russia. In addition, the Russian Federal Tax Service opened its branches in the occupied Ukrainian regions annexed by Russia.

According to the head of Luhansk OMA, Serhiy Haidai, training centers located in Luhansk Oblast provide training to [Russian] private military companies personnel recruited in places of liberty deprivation [detention colonies and prisons]. Yet, Oblast residents are sent to the frontline without proper training.

Operational situation

It is the 224th day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy is trying to maintain control over the captured territories and disrupt the intensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions. The enemy continues offensive actions in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions and regroups its troops in specific directions.

The Russian military fired at the positions of Ukrainian troops along the contact line, conducted distant mining of some parts of the territory, and conducted aerial reconnaissance. It inflicts strikes on civilian infrastructure, violating the norms of international humanitarian law, and the laws and customs of war. The threat of Russian air and missile strikes persists throughout the

entire territory of Ukraine. Over the past day, the Russian military launched 9 missile strikes and 6 air strikes and carried out more than 56 MLRS attacks. The Russian strikes affected the object and civilian population of more than 27 Ukrainian towns and villages. In particular, Kharkiv, Shypuvate, Kramatorsk, Bakhmut, Mayorsk, Hulyaipole, Zaliznychne, Andriivka, Bilohirka, Voznesensk, Prydniprovske. Near the state border, Pysarivka and Holyshivske in Sumy Oblast were shelled.

The Russian occupation authorities tried to compensate for the loss of personnel by drafting the local population of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories. Thus, men from Luhansk immediately after mobilization are sent to replenish the units that suffered the most significant losses, skipping medical examination and training.

During the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 17 strikes. Hits on 4 enemy strongholds, 11 weapons and military equipment concentration areas, and 2 Russian anti- aircraft missile systems are confirmed. In addition, Ukrainian air defense units destroyed one helicopter and two Russian UAVs in different directions.

Over the past day, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery hit 2 enemy command posts, 4 areas of manpower, weapons and military equipment concentration, one anti-aircraft missile complex, a stationary bridge and a Russian pontoon bridge crossing.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired tanks, mortars and barrel artillery at the positions of the Ukrainian troops in the areas of Hraniv, Ohirtseve, Hatyshche, Vovchansk and Bily Kolodyaz.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base,

15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian forces fired mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas around Bilohorivka, Serebryanka and Spirne.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas around Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Odradivka, Zaitseve, Opytne, Yakovlivka, Yuryivka, Avdiivka, Vodyane, Maryinka, Novopil, Olhivske, Pervomaiske.

Over the past 24 hours, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas around Strileche, Zelene, Mayorsk, Spirne, Zaytseve, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Kurdyumivka, Novomykhailivka, and Vuhledar.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The destruction of the enemy S-300 anti-aircraft missile system in the area of Tokmak is confirmed, as well as the destruction of the Russian positions in the areas around Hulyaipole and Orihiv.

Kherson direction

● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.

While leaving villages and towns in Kherson Oblast, the Russian military mines infrastructure facilities and private residences, it imposed a ban on any movement of the local residents.

In the temporarily occupied Republic of Crimea, the medical facilities of Yevpatoria lack medical equipment to treat wounded Russian servicemen.

On the evening of October 3, the Defense Forces attacked the Russian pontoon and ferry crossings across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

● Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –

11.8 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th, and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.

The areas around Vyshchetarasivka, Dobra Nadiya, Illinka, Marhanets, Chervonohryhorivka, Nikopol, Pokrovske, Velyke Artakove, Andriivka, Stepova Dolyna, Bezymenne, Myrne, Luch, Shyroke, Bilohirka and Lozove were shelled by tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery.

The offensive of the Ukrainian 128th separate mountain assault brigade was supported by the offensive of the 35th separate marines brigade from the Inhulets bridgehead in the northern (on

Davydiv Brid) and eastern (on Brusynske) directions. The 35th Airborne Division was hit by Russian artillery and lost several combat vehicles but managed to liberate Davydiv Brid.

On October 2, the Ukrainian Defense Forces attacked and defeated units of the Russian 205th separate motorized rifle brigade in Myrolyubivka and Lyubymivka, forcing the survivors to flee to Beryslav. This exposed the strongholds in Khreshchenivka and Zolota Balka. At the same time, an attack was made on the command post of the 83rd separate airborne assault brigade; the deputy commander of this brigade was killed, and the Russian forces had to withdraw quickly in the direction of Dubchany.

On October 3, units of the Russian Armed Forces regrouped in the Mykhailivka area, called in air support, but lost a Su-25 attack aircraft in the Novovoskresensk area. The "regrouping" turned into a complete defeat, the Russian units left Ukrainka and Bilyaivka, and the Russian airborne units retreated from Arkhangelske and Myrolyubivka. Before leaving Dubchany, Russian sappers blew up a bridge.

The offensive of the Ukrainian Defense Forces takes place with the strong support of the combat support units, in particular, EW. During the offensive, the command of the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade of the RF Armed Forces and the 83rd separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces were literally paralyzed.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

On October 5, 9 enemy warships and boats were on a mission in the Black Sea, conducting reconnaissance and controlling navigation in the Azov-Black Sea waters. Up to 32 Kalibr missiles are ready for a volley on five carriers: three surface and two underwater (one frigate 1135.6, two "Buyan-M" missile corvettes and two submarines of project 636.3). In general, the current activity of the maritime groups of the Russian Federation is characterized by low intensity. The rocket threat to [the territory of] Ukraine remains high.

In the Sea of Azov, the Russian military continues to control sea communications, keeping up to 6 ships and boats on combat duty.

The Russian military continues shelling Ukrainian ports and coastal areas. Today, October 5, the Russian forces attacked Odesa with "Shahid 136" kamikaze drones. All six drones were shot down by air defense on the approach to the city.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 10 Su-27, Su-30, and Su-24 aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

The movement of military equipment by road and rail transport at the territory of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the direction of Kherson Oblast remains consistently intensive. Railway freight trains arrive to Kherson Oblast from the Crimean side, unloading military equipment and ammunition at the "Kalanchak", "Brylivka", and "Novooleksiiivka" stations.

Although the occupying authorities claim that the "implementation of the conscription plan by the occupied Crimea" has been completed, the criminal mobilization continues. Moreover, on October 10, the Russian Federation may announce the second wave of the alleged "partial" mobilization.

"Grain Initiative": On October 5, 6 ships with 115.5 thousand tons of agricultural products, which will be sent to the countries of Africa, Asia and Europe, left the ports of "Odesa", "Pivdenny" and "Chornomorsk". Among them is the bulk carrier ZHE HAI 505, which will deliver 28,500 tons of wheat to Algeria. A total of 59,000 Ukrainian wheat has been sent to Algeria since the beginning of October. Since the first ship left Ukrainian ports, 274 ships with 6.2 million tons of Ukrainian agricultural products have left for Asian, European and African countries.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 05.10

Personnel - almost 61,000 people (+200);

Tanks 2,445 (+11);

Armored combat vehicles – 5,038 (+20);

Artillery systems – 1,414 (+7);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 341 (+1); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 177 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,841 (+18); Aircraft - 266 (0);

Helicopters – 232 (+4);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,032 (+4); Intercepted cruise missiles - 246 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

91% of Ukrainians believe that Russia should compensate for all the damage caused to Ukraine by its invasion. Still, only 31% of respondents believe this will happen, according to the results of the "Rating" group poll conducted on September 15-19.

The Chairman of the Supreme Court, Vsevolod Knyazev, dismissed Judge Bohdan Lviv from the Supreme Court. The decision was made based on information from the Security Service of Ukraine, which confirmed that the judge has Russian citizenship, the press service of the Supreme Court reported. The Ukrainian Constitution mandates such a decision, and this is the first time a decision like this has been made.

International diplomatic aspect

"We have always [treated] and, despite the current tragedy, still have great respect for the Ukrainian people, for Ukrainian culture and the Ukrainian language, literature, and so on. And we have never allowed anything that is allowed in Ukraine in relation to the Russian culture and the Russian language," said Putin right after signing decrees on the illegal annexation of 18% of Ukrainian territories, not to mention [earlier annexed] Crimea. "In all honesty, the results of the referendum not only pleased me but also surprised me," he said.

In response to President Putin's decision to annex four Ukrainian Oblasts, the head of the Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, said on his Telegram channel, "The worthless decisions of the terrorist country are not worth the paper they are signed on. The collective madhouse can continue to live in a fictional world." He said that the Armed Forces, high-precision weapons, and the offensive would help return to reality. He concluded that Ukraine would return everything it owns.

While the head of the IAEA was on his way to Kyiv to discuss the situation at Russia's illegally occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant, Putin ordered his government to take "control" of ZNPP. "The Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant is now on the territory of the Russian Federation and, accordingly, should be operated under the supervision of our relevant agencies," said Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin. Moscow has already appointed a new "director" of the station, just days after Russian troops hijacked and held the current, legitimate director of the ZNPP hostage. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry called on its international partners to impose sanctions on Rosatom. The MFA statement called Putin's decree on the illegal takeover of the nuclear plant null and void and condemned it as a crime that "further increases the risks and threats in the field of nuclear security caused by the Russian occupation of the ZNPP."

EU ambassadors agreed on new Russia sanctions, including the oil price cap theme. The deal has some concessions for Greece, Cyprus, and Malta, whose tanker fleet delivers most of the Russian oil to the markets. A mechanism [to deal with] sanctions' circumvention is envisaged. The 8th package also includes several technology limitations and restrictions related to Russia's steel industry.

OPEC+, which includes Russia, agreed to slash their production by two million barrels per day. The news pushed oil prices 1 percent up and meant more revenues for Russia and their companions and higher prices for consumers. POTUS said he is "disappointed" by a move from oil exporting nations to slash production, and his National Security Advisor characterized it as a "short-sighted decision" that would hit countries "already reeling" from spiralling inflation. It remains to be seen how the EU and OPEC+ decisions would affect Russia. Had the G7 and the EU imposed a price cap earlier, there would have been a result. However, slow decision-making gave Russia enough time to prepare and take counteractions.

Centre for Defence Strategies (CDS) is a Ukrainian security think tank. We operate since 2020 and are involved in security studies, defence policy research and advocacy. Currently all our activity is focused on stopping the ongoing war.

We publish this brief daily. If you would like to subscribe, please send us an email to cds.dailybrief@gmail.com

Please note, that we subscribe only verified persons and can decline or cancel the subscription at our own discretion

We are independent, non-government, non-partisan and non-profit organisation. More at www.defence.org.ua

Our Twitter (in English) - https://twitter.com/defence_centre

Our Facebook (in Ukrainian) - https://www.facebook.com/cds.UA

Our brief is for information only and we verify our information to the best possible extent

3. Putin Must Go: Now Is the Time For Regime Change in Russia by John Bolton

Excerpts:

Washington’s obvious strategic objective is having Russia aligned with the West, a fit candidate for NATO, as we hoped after the Soviet Union’s breakup. Others may be unhappy about such a new Russia. China can hardly welcome the collapse of a regime that is turning into Beijing’s junior partner, if not an outright satellite. Chinese efforts to support Putin, even militarily, cannot be ruled out.

While Russian regime change may be daunting, America’s goal of a peaceful and secure Europe, episodically pursued goal for over a century, remains central to our national interests. This is no time to be shy.

Putin Must Go: Now Is the Time For Regime Change in Russia

19fortyfive.com · by John Bolton · October 4, 2022

“For God’s sake, this man cannot remain in power,” President Biden said of Vladimir Putin in March, a month after Russia’s second unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, in remarks the Washington Post called “the most defiant and aggressive speech about Russia by an American president since Ronald Reagan.” Biden’s staff, however, immediately backpedaled, saying, “the president’s point was that Putin cannot be allowed to exercise power over his neighbors or the region. He was not discussing Putin’s power in Russia or regime change.” Later, Biden himself dutifully resiled from regime change.

Why the angst? There is no long-term prospect for peace and security in Europe without regime change in Russia. Russians are already discussing it, quietly, for obvious reasons. For the United States and others pretending that the issue is not before will do far more harm than good.

Notwithstanding recent Kyiv’s military advances, the West still lacks a shared definition of “victory” in Ukraine. Last week, Putin “annexed” four Ukrainian oblasts, joining Crimea, “annexed” in 2014. The war grinds on, producing high Russian casualties and economic pain. Opposition to Putin is rising, and young men are fleeing the country. Of course, Kyiv’s civilian and military casualties are also high, and its physical destruction is enormous. Hoping to intimidate NATO, Moscow is again rhetorically brandishing nuclear weapons, and has sabotaged the Nord Stream pipelines. Europe worries about the coming winter, and everyone worries about the durability of Europe’s resolve. No one predicts a near-term cease-fire or substantive war-ending negotiations, or how to conduct “normal” relations with Putin’s regime thereafter.

To avoid the war simply grinding along indefinitely, we must alter today’s calculus. Carefully assisting Russian dissidents to pursue regime change might just be the answer. Russia is, obviously, a nuclear power, but that is no more an argument against seeking regime change than against assisting Ukrainian self-defense. White House virtue signaling already empowers the Kremlin, accusing us of “satanism,” to claim America is trying to overthrow Russia’s government even though Biden is doing no such thing. Just to remind, the Kremlin has been doing this to us for many decades. Since we are already accused of subverting the Kremlin, why not return the favor?

Obstacles and uncertainties blocking Russian regime change are substantial, but not insuperable. Defining the “change” is critical, because it must involve far more than simply replacing Putin. Among his inner circle, several potential successors would be worse. The problem is not one man, but the collective leadership constructed over the last two decades. No civilian governmental structure exists to effect change, not even a Politburo like the one that retired Nikita Khrushchev after the Cuban missile crisis. The whole regime must go.

Actually effecting regime change is doubtless the hardest problem, but it does not require foreign military forces. The key is for Russians themselves to exacerbate divisions among those with real authority, the siloviki, the “men of power.” Disagreements and animosities already exist, as in all authoritarian regimes, exploitable as dissidents set their minds to it. Boris Yeltsin standing on a tank outside the Russian White House in 1991 evidenced the fracturing of the Soviet ruling class. Once regime coherence and solidarity shatter, change is possible.

Inside Russia’s military, intelligence, and internal security ministries, there is almost certainly shock, anger, embarrassment, and despair about Moscow’s performance before and during the current invasion of Ukraine. As in many coups in third-world countries, the likely leadership for regime change will not come from the top flag officers and officials, who are too personally invested in the Putin regime, nor from the ranks of enlisted personnel or lower-level bureaucrats. It is from the colonels and one-star generals, and their civilian-agency equivalents, where the most-likely co-conspirators to take matters into their own hands. These are the decision-makers whom the dissidents must identify, persuade and support to facilitate regime change. Obviously, the desired interim outcome is not an outright military government, but a transitional authority that can hold the ring while a new constitution is formed. This stage alone is very risky business, but unavoidable given Russia’s current domestic political structures.

Outsiders can assist in many ways, including augmenting dissidents’ communications internally and with their diaspora, and significantly enhanced programs to transmit information into Russia (complicated by the long decline in US information-statecraft capabilities). Financial support, especially given Russian economic conditions, and not necessarily in large amounts, can also be critical. What Washington says publicly about regime-change should be concerted with the dissidents and other foreign allies. Keeping our actions covert may be impossible, but there is likely no need to ballyhoo them.

Some will object that foreign involvement would compromise the dissidents, affording Putin propaganda openings. The short answer is that he is already making this point, and will continue, whatever we say or do. Our metric should be whether the dissidents themselves value outside help. Most likely, their cost-benefit analysis will welcome the assistance more than they fear Putin’s anti-American rhetoric. Russians have heard it all before.

What follows the Putin regime is ultimately the most critical question. Russians are already considering their options, as they should, since it is primarily their task to form a successor government. Enough mistakes were made after the Soviet Union dissolved that humility in future planning this round is fully warranted, and highlights why immediate research and planning is necessary.

President Putin watches the Zapad 2021 joint strategic exercises of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

Washington’s obvious strategic objective is having Russia aligned with the West, a fit candidate for NATO, as we hoped after the Soviet Union’s breakup. Others may be unhappy about such a new Russia. China can hardly welcome the collapse of a regime that is turning into Beijing’s junior partner, if not an outright satellite. Chinese efforts to support Putin, even militarily, cannot be ruled out.

While Russian regime change may be daunting, America’s goal of a peaceful and secure Europe, episodically pursued goal for over a century, remains central to our national interests. This is no time to be shy.

Ambassador John R. Bolton served as national security adviser under President Donald J. Trump. He is the author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” You can follow him on Twitter: @AmbJohnBolton.

19fortyfive.com · by John Bolton · October 4, 2022

4. U.S. Believes Ukraine Was Behind an Assassination in Russia

Who is speaking to reporters out of school? Do we think transmitting a message that we were not involved while throwing Ukraine under the bus will somehow prevent escalation? Does Putin think we perhaps "doth protest too much?" (admit nothing, deny everything , make counter accusations?)

Will any good come of this "messaging?"

U.S. Believes Ukraine Was Behind an Assassination in Russia

By Julian E. Barnes, Adam Goldman, Adam Entous and Michael Schwirtz

Oct. 5, 2022

nytimes.com · by Michael Schwirtz · October 5, 2022

American officials said they were not aware of the plan ahead of time for the attack that killed Daria Dugina and that they had admonished Ukraine over it.

Daria Dugina’s memorial service in Moscow in August. U.S. intelligence agencies believe that parts of the Ukrainian government authorized the attack that killed her.Credit...Kirill Kudryavtsev/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

WASHINGTON — United States intelligence agencies believe parts of the Ukrainian government authorized the car bomb attack near Moscow in August that killed Daria Dugina, the daughter of a prominent Russian nationalist, an element of a covert campaign that U.S. officials fear could widen the conflict.

The United States took no part in the attack, either by providing intelligence or other assistance, officials said. American officials also said they were not aware of the operation ahead of time and would have opposed the killing had they been consulted. Afterward, American officials admonished Ukrainian officials over the assassination, they said.

The closely held assessment of Ukrainian complicity, which has not been previously reported, was shared within the U.S. government last week. Ukraine denied involvement in the killing immediately after the attack, and senior officials repeated those denials when asked about the American intelligence assessment.

While Russia has not retaliated in a specific way for the assassination, the United States is concerned that such attacks — while high in symbolic value — have little direct impact on the battlefield and could provoke Moscow to carry out its own strikes against senior Ukrainian officials. American officials have been frustrated with Ukraine’s lack of transparency about its military and covert plans, especially on Russian soil.

Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s security services have demonstrated their ability to reach into Russia to conduct sabotage operations. The killing of Ms. Dugina, however, would be one of the boldest operations to date — showing Ukraine can get very close to prominent Russians.

Some American officials suspect Ms. Dugina’s father, Aleksandr Dugin, a Russian ultranationalist, was the actual target of the operation, and that the operatives who carried it out believed he would be in the vehicle with his daughter.

Mr. Dugin, one of Russia’s most prominent voices urging Moscow to intensify its war on Ukraine, has been a leading proponent of an aggressive, imperialist Russia.

The American officials who spoke about the intelligence did not disclose which elements of the Ukrainian government were believed to have authorized the mission, who carried out the attack, or whether President Volodymyr Zelensky had signed off on the mission. United States officials briefed on the Ukrainian action and the American response spoke on the condition of anonymity, in order to discuss secret information and matters of sensitive diplomacy.

U.S. officials would not say who in the American government delivered the admonishments or whom in the Ukrainian government they were delivered to. It was not known what Ukraine’s response was.

While the Pentagon and spy agencies have shared sensitive battlefield intelligence with the Ukrainians, helping them zero in on Russian command posts, supply lines and other key targets, the Ukrainians have not always told American officials what they plan to do.

The United States has pressed Ukraine to share more about its war plans, with mixed success. Earlier in the war, U.S. officials acknowledged that they often knew more about Russian war plans — thanks to their intense collection efforts — than they did about Kyiv’s intentions.

Cooperation has since increased. During the summer, Ukraine shared its plans for its September military counteroffensive with the United States and Britain.

U.S. officials also lack a complete picture of the competing power centers within the Ukrainian government, including the military, the security services and Mr. Zelensky’s office, a fact that may explain why some parts of the Ukrainian government may not have been aware of the plot.

When asked about the U.S. intelligence assessment, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, reiterated the Ukrainian government’s denials of involvement in Ms. Dugina’s killing.

“Again, I’ll underline that any murder during wartime in some country or another must carry with it some kind of practical significance,” Mr. Podolyak told The New York Times in an interview on Tuesday. “It should fulfill some specific purpose, tactical or strategic. Someone like Dugina is not a tactical or a strategic target for Ukraine.

“We have other targets on the territory of Ukraine,” he said, “I mean collaborationists and representatives of the Russian command, who might have value for members of our special services working in this program, but certainly not Dugina.”

Though details surrounding acts of sabotage in Russian-controlled territory have been shrouded in mystery, the Ukrainian government has quietly acknowledged killing Russian officials in Ukraine and sabotaging Russian arms factories and weapons depots.

A senior Ukrainian military official who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the topic, said that Ukrainian forces, with the help of local fighters, had carried out assassinations and attacks on accused Ukrainian collaborators and Russian officials in occupied Ukrainian territories. These include the Kremlin-installed mayor of the Kherson region, who was poisoned in August and had to be evacuated to Moscow for emergency treatment.

Countries traditionally do not discuss other nations’ covert actions, for fear of having their own operations revealed, but some American officials believe it is crucial to curb what they see as dangerous adventurism, particularly political assassinations.

Still, American officials in recent days have taken pains to insist that relations between the two governments remain strong. U.S. concerns about Ukraine’s aggressive covert operations inside Russia have not prompted any known changes in the provision of intelligence, military and diplomatic support to Mr. Zelensky’s government or to Ukraine’s security services.

In a phone call on Saturday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken told his Ukrainian counterpart, Dmytro Kuleba, that the Biden administration “will continue to support Ukraine’s efforts to regain control of its territory by strengthening its hand militarily and diplomatically,” according to Ned Price, the State Department’s spokesman.

Officials from the State Department, National Security Council, Pentagon and C.I.A. declined to comment on the intelligence assessment.

The war in Ukraine is at an especially dangerous moment. The United States has tried carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation with Moscow throughout the conflict — in part by telling Kyiv not to use American equipment or intelligence to conduct attacks inside of Russia. But now, the recent battlefield successes by Ukraine have prompted Russia to respond with a series of escalatory steps, like conducting a partial mobilization and moving to annex swathes of eastern Ukraine.

Concern is growing in Washington that Russia may be considering further steps to intensify the war, including by renewing efforts to assassinate prominent Ukrainian leaders. Mr. Zelensky would be the top target of Russian assassination teams, as he was during the Russian assault on Kyiv earlier in the war.

But now, American officials said Russia could target a wide variety of Ukrainian leaders, many of whom have less protection than Mr. Zelensky.

The United States and Europe had imposed sanctions on Ms. Dugina. She shared her father’s worldview and was accused by the West of spreading Russian propaganda about Ukraine.

Russia opened a murder investigation after Ms. Dugina’s assassination, calling the explosion that killed her a terrorist act. Ms. Dugina was killed instantly in the explosion, which occurred in the Odintsovo district, an affluent area in Moscow’s suburbs.

After the bombing, speculation centered on whether Ukraine was responsible or if it was a false flag operation meant to pin blame on Ukrainians. The bombing took place after a series of Ukrainian strikes in Crimea, part of Ukraine that Russia seized in 2014. Those strikes had led ultranationalists in Mr. Dugin’s circle to urge Mr. Putin to intensify the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the F.S.B., blamed Ms. Dugina’s murder on Ukraine’s intelligence services. In an announcement made a day after the attack, the F.S.B. said that Ukrainian operatives had contracted a Ukrainian woman, who entered Russia in July and rented an apartment where Ms. Dugina lived. The woman then fled Russia after the bombing, according to the F.S.B.

Ilya Ponomarev, a former member of the Russian Duma who voted against the annexation of Crimea, has claimed that a group made up of pro-Ukrainian and anti-Putin fighters operating in Russia known as the National Republican Army was responsible for the killing.

In an interview with The New York Times, Mr. Ponomarev claimed to be in contact with the National Republican Army and was aware of the operation against Ms. Dugina several hours before it occurred. Many officials in Washington have been skeptical of Mr. Ponomarev’s claims on behalf of the group.

Julian Barnes, Adam Goldman and Adam Entous reported from Washington, and Michael Schwirtz from Kyiv, Ukraine.

nytimes.com · by Michael Schwirtz · October 5, 2022

5. How the US might respond to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Much speculation has also been given as to the exact kind of weapon Putin might potentially use, with fears he could resort to using tactical nuclear weapons — meant to be used in a battle or on a specific population center to try to bring an end to the conflict.

“We always have to try to take the threat of nuclear use seriously and so we do, and that’s why we are watching very closely, and that’s why we do consult closely with allies,” Cooper said.

“But at the same time, at this point, [Russia’s] rhetoric is only rhetoric, and it’s irresponsible saber-rattling that we see at this point,” Cooper said.

For now, the U.S. will respond to Russian aggression by continuing to pour weapons and other aid into Ukraine, including four more of the advanced rocket systems Kyiv has credited with greatly helping its offensive begun at the start of this month.

How the US might respond to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine

The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · October 5, 2022

As concerns grow over Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling amid continued losses in Ukraine, what a U.S. response would look like has become an increasingly urgent question.

U.S. officials since the start of Russia’s attack on Ukraine have stressed there are plans being developed to counter a range of moves by Moscow but have kept specifics under wraps.

While the administration says there are no signs that the Kremlin has made moves toward a nuclear strike — and that Washington has not changed its own nuclear position — experts say the potential U.S. options could turn into a very real scenario given Russia’s floundering military campaign and an increasingly frustrated Putin.

Mark Cancian, a former Pentagon official-turned-defense expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said a U.S. response to a major Russian attack would be twofold — one military and one diplomatic.

“If the Ukrainians kept fighting, we would continue our flow of aid and we’d probably take the gloves off” in terms of weapons provided to Kyiv, he told The Hill.

At the top of Ukraine’s wish list is the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), a surface-to-surface missile that can travel four times farther than anything Kyiv has now in its fight against Russia. The embattled country has pressed the U.S. for the system for months, but Washington has been hesitant to provide it over fears it could escalate the conflict.

However, should Moscow use a tactical nuclear weapon on Ukrainian troops or civilians, or even detonate such a device away from populated areas, Cancian predicted the administration would finally allow Kyiv to have ATACMS or “anything else they wanted” to go after Russian targets.

On the diplomatic side of things, meanwhile, Russian use of nuclear weapons could very well prompt countries such as India, China and Turkey — the latter a NATO ally — to put pressure on Putin economically, according to Cancian.

“A nuclear strike would really, I think, put them under a lot of pressure to go along with the sanctions and take a tougher line towards Russia, so Russia would lose these lifelines that they’ve been clinging to and nurturing,” he said.

National security adviser Jake Sullivan last week said there would be “catastrophic consequences” should Moscow deploy nuclear weapons and said a more specific ultimatum had been delivered to Moscow privately.

President Biden has said since the start of the war that U.S. troops will not be sent to Ukraine, and experts warn that a nuclear response to a nuclear attack could quickly escalate into a nuclear world war.

Retired Gen. David Petraeus offered a prediction of how the U.S. would respond to a Russian nuclear attack on Sunday, though he noted that he had deliberately avoided speaking with Sullivan about it.

“I mean, just to give you a hypothetical, we would respond by leading a NATO, a collective effort, that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black Sea,” he said.

Laura Cooper, the deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, said Tuesday that U.S. officials “have continually consulted with allies about the Russia threat, and the nuclear threat that Russia poses is just one aspect of that, and certainly the NATO forum is our premier forum for consultation on these issues.”

One Austrian official told The Hill that it’s offered the country as a neutral ground for difficult negotiations and is ready to host de-escalation talks and maintain channels with Russia.

Though Putin’s national televised speech last month was not his first time raising the specter of nuclear war, current and former U.S. officials have raised new alarms over the Kremlin’s increasingly bellicose nuclear rhetoric as it moves to annex four regions of Ukraine.

Putin threatened on Aug. 21 that Moscow would deploy its massive nuclear arsenal to protect Russian territory or its people — which could now include the four Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions. However, both Kyiv and Washington have said they will not be deterred from continued fighting to take back those regions.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, in an interview with CNN aired Sunday, said that while he hasn’t seen intelligence to suggest the Russian leader has chosen to use nuclear weapons, “there are no checks on Mr. Putin.”

“To be clear, the guy who makes that decision, I mean, it’s one man,” Austin said.

John Kirby, the National Security Council’s coordinator for strategic communications, said Monday that the U.S. is “closely” watching Russian activity at the Zaporizhzhia power plant — another location Putin could choose to attack to escalate the war.

And former national security adviser H.R. McMaster on Sunday said Putin is “under extreme pressure” due to battlefield failures and domestic outcry over a mobilization order that could send hundreds of thousands of reservists into the war.

“I think the message to [Putin] is If you use a nuclear weapon, it’s a suicide weapon. And the response from NATO and the United States doesn’t have to be nuclear,” McMaster told “Face the Nation” host Margaret Brennan on CBS.

Fears were further stoked this week when an online video emerged of a train in Russia appearing to carry equipment from a Kremlin military unit that handles nuclear weapons. The video, which Pentagon officials could not confirm, shows military vehicles allegedly from the secretive 12th Main Directorate of the Russian ministry of defense being transported on the train, according to Konrad Muzyka, an aerospace and defense analyst focused on Russia and Belarus.

The Kremlin unit is responsible for nuclear munitions, their storage, maintenance, transport and issuance, Muzyka tweeted Sunday.

“I have seen these reports. I have nothing to corroborate,” Cooper told reporters Tuesday when asked about the video.

Pressed on whether the Pentagon has seen anything to indicate that Russia is contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, she said officials “have certainly heard the saber rattling from Putin” but “see no signs that would cause us to alter our posture.”

Cooper also declined to answer questions on whether the U.S. has seen any movement of Russia’s nuclear forces, citing the protection of U.S. intelligence.

Some, including Rep. Mike Turner (R-Ohio), ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, have urged the administration to increase its nuclear readiness in Europe and move additional missile defense assets into the region.

“This administration needs to step up its game on missile defense,” Turner said on Fox News over the weekend. “We have assets in Europe, and we need to engage them so that we can provide protection to our allies.”

Much speculation has also been given as to the exact kind of weapon Putin might potentially use, with fears he could resort to using tactical nuclear weapons — meant to be used in a battle or on a specific population center to try to bring an end to the conflict.

“We always have to try to take the threat of nuclear use seriously and so we do, and that’s why we are watching very closely, and that’s why we do consult closely with allies,” Cooper said.

“But at the same time, at this point, [Russia’s] rhetoric is only rhetoric, and it’s irresponsible saber-rattling that we see at this point,” Cooper said.

For now, the U.S. will respond to Russian aggression by continuing to pour weapons and other aid into Ukraine, including four more of the advanced rocket systems Kyiv has credited with greatly helping its offensive begun at the start of this month.

The soon-to-be delivered High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems — used by the Ukrainians to target bridges, roads and munition storage areas Russia uses to supply its forces — are part of a new $625 million lethal aid package announced Tuesday.

Young women are trending liberal. Young men are not Health Care — Boosters prevent thousands of deaths: research

Asked later on Tuesday whether the United States will provide anything to help the Ukrainians protect themselves against a possible nuclear strike, Cooper said Washington has already provided “a considerable amount of protective equipment against chemical, biological and radiological threats.”

She pointed to a military aid package from earlier this year that included “a number of personal protective equipment items” as well as “significant quantities” of such equipment given as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

Laura Kelly contributed reporting.

The Hill · by Ellen Mitchell · October 5, 2022

6. 'Watched the whole time': China's surveillance state grows under Xi

'Watched the whole time': China's surveillance state grows under Xi

By Jing Xuan TENG

Beijing (AFP) Oct 6, 2022

spacewar.com

When Chen picked up his phone to vent his anger at getting a parking ticket, his message on WeChat was a drop in the ocean of daily posts on China's biggest social network.

But soon after his tirade against "simple-minded" traffic cops in June, he found himself in the tentacles of the communist country's omniscient surveillance apparatus.

Chen quickly deleted the post, but officers tracked him down and detained him within hours, accusing him of "insulting the police".

He was locked up for five days for "inappropriate speech".

His case -- one of the thousands logged by a dissident and reported by local media -- laid bare the pervasive monitoring that characterises life in China today.

Its leaders have long taken an authoritarian approach to social control.

But since President Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he has reined in the relatively freewheeling social currents of the turn of the century, using a combination of technology, law and ideology to squeeze dissent and preempt threats to his rule.

Ostensibly targeting criminals and aimed at protecting order, social controls have been turned against dissidents, activists and religious minorities, as well as ordinary people -- such as Chen -- judged to have crossed the line.

- Eyes in the sky -

The average Chinese citizen today spends nearly every waking moment under the watchful eye of the state.

Research firm Comparitech estimates the average Chinese city has more than 370 security cameras per 1,000 people -- making them the most surveilled places in the world -- compared with London's 13 or Singapore's 18 per 1,000.

The nationwide "Skynet" urban surveillance project has ballooned, with cameras capable of recognising faces, clothing and age.

"We are being watched the whole time," an environmental activist who declined to be named told AFP.

The Communist Party's grip is most stark in the far-western region of Xinjiang, where facial recognition and DNA collection have been deployed on mainly Muslim minorities in the name of counter-terrorism.

The Covid-19 pandemic has turbo-charged China's monitoring framework, with citizens now tracked on their smartphones via an app that determines where they can go based on green, yellow or red codes.

Regulations rolled out since 2012 closed loopholes that allowed people to purchase SIM cards without giving their names, and mandated government identification for tickets on virtually all forms of transport.

- Online offences -

There is no respite online, where even shopping apps require registration with a phone number tied to an identification document.

Wang, a Chinese dissident speaking to AFP under a pseudonym due to safety concerns, recalled a time before Xi when censors were not all-knowing and "telling jokes about (former Chinese president) Jiang Zemin on the internet was actually very popular".

But the Chinese internet -- behind the "Great Firewall" since the early 2000s -- has become an increasingly policed space.

Wang runs a Twitter account tracking thousands of cases of people detained, fined or punished for speech acts since 2013.

Thanks to the real-name verification system as well as cooperation between police and social media platforms, people have been punished for a vast array of online offences.

Platforms such as Weibo employ thousands of content moderators and automatically block politically sensitive keywords, such as tennis star Peng Shuai's name after she accused a senior politician of sexual assault last year.

Cyberspace authorities are proposing new rules that would force platforms to monitor comments sections on posts -- one of the last avenues for people to voice their grievances online.

- Ideological policing -

Many of the surveillance technologies in use have been embraced in other countries.

"The real difference in China is the lack of independent media and civil society able to provide meaningful criticism of innovations or to point out their many flaws," Jeremy Daum, from the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School, told AFP.

Xi has reshaped Chinese society, with the Communist Party stipulating what citizens "ought to know, to feel, to think, and say, and do", Vivienne Shue, professor emeritus of contemporary China studies at Oxford University, told AFP.

Youngsters are kept away from foreign influences, with authorities banning international books and forbidding tutoring companies from hiring overseas teachers.

Ideological policing has even extended to fashion, with television stations censoring tattoos and earrings on men.

"What disturbs me more is not the censorship itself, but how it shaped the ideology of people," said Wang, the Twitter account owner.

"With dissenting information being eliminated, every website becomes a cult, where the government and leaders have to be worshipped."

7. U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot

New meaning to the arsenal of democracy?

We must not forget the human element of the "porcupine defense" - civil resistance. ( recommendation HERE.)

U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot

Officials say Taiwan needs to become a “porcupine” with enough weapons to hold out if the Chinese military blockades and invades it, even if Washington decides to send troops.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/05/us/politics/taiwan-biden-weapons-china.html?utm

Give this article
461

Taiwanese military exercises in July. The United States has approved several weapons packages for the island.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

By Edward Wong and John Ismay

Oct. 5, 2022

Sign up for the Russia-Ukraine War Briefing. Every evening, we'll send you a summary of the day's biggest news. Get it sent to your inbox.

WASHINGTON — American officials are intensifying efforts to build a giant stockpile of weapons in Taiwan after studying recent naval and air force exercises by the Chinese military around the island, according to current and former officials.

The exercises showed that China would probably blockade the island as a prelude to any attempted invasion, and Taiwan would have to hold out on its own until the United States or other nations intervened, if they decided to do that, the current and former officials say.

But the effort to transform Taiwan into a weapons depot faces challenges. The United States and its allies have prioritized sending weapons to Ukraine, which is reducing those countries’ stockpiles, and arms makers are reluctant to open new production lines without a steady stream of long-term orders.

And it is unclear how China might respond if the United States accelerates shipments of weapons to Taiwan, a democratic, self-governing island that Beijing claims is Chinese territory.

U.S. officials are determining the quantity and types of weapons sold to Taiwan by quietly telling Taiwanese officials and American arms makers that they will reject orders for some large systems in favor of a greater number of smaller, more mobile weapons. The Biden administration announced on Sept. 2 that it had approved its sixth weapons package for Taiwan — a $1.1 billion sale that includes 60 Harpoon coastal antiship missiles. U.S. officials are also discussing how to streamline the sale-and-delivery process.

President Biden said last month that the United States is “not encouraging” Taiwan’s independence, adding, “That’s their decision.” Since 1979, Washington has had a policy of reassuring Beijing that it does not support independence. But China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said in a speech at the Asia Society last month that the United States was undermining that position “by repeated official exchanges and arms sales, including many offensive weapons.”

The People’s Liberation Army of China carried out exercises in August with naval ships and fighter jets in zones close to Taiwan. It also fired ballistic missiles into the waters off Taiwan’s coast, four of which went over the island, according to Japan.

The Chinese military acted after Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the House, visited Taiwan. But even before that, U.S. and Taiwanese officials had been more closely examining the potential for an invasion because Russia’s assault on Ukraine had made the possibility seem more real, though Chinese leaders have not explicitly stated a timeline for establishing rule over Taiwan.

Editors’ Picks

New York City

Before She Died, My Wife Kept a Diary. Why Won’t Her Cousin Let Me See It?

Fossils Reveal Pterosaur Relatives Before They Evolved Wings

The United States would not be able to resupply Taiwan as easily as Ukraine because of the lack of ground routes from neighboring countries. The goal now, officials say, is to ensure that Taiwan has enough arms to defend itself until help arrives. Mr. Biden said last month that U.S. troops would defend Taiwan if China were to carry out an “unprecedented attack” on the island — the fourth time he has stated that commitment and a shift from a preference for “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan among U.S. presidents.

Image

Exercises in Pingtung, Taiwan, in July. Two former defense officials wrote that Taiwan needs “a large number of small things” for distributed defense.Credit...Lam Yik Fei for The New York Times

“Stockpiling in Taiwan is a very active point of discussion,” said Jacob Stokes, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security who advised Mr. Biden on Asia policy when he was vice president. “And if you have it, how do you harden it and how do you disperse it so Chinese missiles can’t destroy it?”

More on the Relations Between Asia and the U.S.

North Korea: Pyongyang fired an intermediate range ballistic missile over Japan for the first time since 2017, when Kim Jong-un seemed intent on escalating conflict with Washington. But the international landscape has changed considerably since then.
A Broad Partnership: The United States and 14 Pacific Island nations signed an agreement at a summit in Washington, putting climate change, economic growth and stronger security ties at the center of an American push to counter Chinese influence.
Harris’s Asia Trip: What on the surface appeared to be a routine, symbolic visit for Vice President Kamala Harris became a tricky dance of diplomacy in an increasingly unnerved region.
South Korea: President Yoon Suk Yeol has aligned his country more closely with the United States, but there are limits to how far he can go without angering China or provoking North Korea.

“The view is we need to lengthen the amount of time Taiwan can hold out on its own,” he added. “That’s how you avoid China picking the low-hanging fruit of its ‘fait accompli’ strategy — that they’ve won the day before we’ve gotten there, that is assuming we intervene.”

U.S. officials increasingly emphasize Taiwan’s need for smaller, mobile weapons that can be lethal against Chinese warships and jets while being able to evade attacks, which is central to so-called asymmetric warfare.

“Shoot-and-scoot” types of armaments are popular with the Ukrainian military, which has used shoulder-fired Javelin and NLAW antitank guided missiles and Stinger antiaircraft missiles effectively against Russian forces. Recently, the Ukrainians have pummeled Russian troops with mobile American-made rocket launchers known as HIMARS.

To transform Taiwan into a “porcupine,” an entity bristling with armaments that would be costly to attack, American officials have been trying to steer Taiwanese counterparts toward ordering more of those weapons and fewer systems for a conventional ground war like M1 Abrams tanks.

Pentagon and State Department officials have also been speaking regularly about these issues since March with American arms companies, including at an industry conference on Taiwan this week in Richmond, Va. Jedidiah Royal, a Defense Department official, said in a speech there that the Pentagon was helping Taiwan build out systems for “an island defense against an aggressor with conventional overmatch.”

In a recent article, James Timbie, a former State Department official, and James O. Ellis Jr., a retired U.S. Navy admiral, said Taiwan needs “a large number of small things” for distributed defense, and that some of Taiwan’s recent purchases from the United States, including Harpoon and Stinger missiles, fit that bill. Taiwan also produces its own deterrent weapons, including minelayer ships, air defense missile systems and antiship cruise missiles.

They said Taiwan needs to shift resources away from “expensive, high-profile conventional systems” that China can easily destroy in an initial attack, though some of those systems, notably F-16 jets, are useful for countering ongoing Chinese fighter jet and ship activities in “gray zone” airspace and waters. The authors also wrote that “the effective defense of Taiwan” will require stockpiling ammunition, fuel and other supplies, as well as strategic reserves of energy and food.

Officials in the administration of Tsai Ing-wen, the president of Taiwan, say they recognize the need to stockpile smaller weapons but point out that there are significant lags between orders and shipments.

Image

A Taiwanese AH-64 Apache helicopter during exercises last month. American officials have been trying to steer their Taiwanese counterparts away from systems meant for a conventional ground war.Credit...Ritchie B Tongo/EPA, via Shutterstock

“I think we’re moving in a high degree of consensus in terms of our priorities on the asymmetric strategy, but the speed does have to be accelerated,” Bi-khim Hsiao, the de facto Taiwanese ambassador in Washington, said in an interview.

Some American lawmakers have called for faster and more robust deliveries. Several senior senators are trying to push through the proposed Taiwan Policy Act, which would provide $6.5 billion in security assistance to Taiwan over the next four years and mandate treating the island as if it were a “major non-NATO ally.”

But Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, said in an interview that weapons makers want to see predictability in orders before committing to building up production. Arms directors from the United States and more than 40 other nations met last week in Brussels to discuss long-term supply and production issues.

If China decides to establish a naval blockade around Taiwan, American officials would probably study which avenue of resupplying Taiwan — by sea or by air — would offer the least likelihood of bringing Chinese and American ships, aircraft and submarines into direct conflict.

One proposition would involve sending U.S. cargo planes with supplies from bases in Japan and Guam to Taiwan’s east coast. That way, any Chinese fighters trying to shoot them down would have to fly over Taiwan and risk being downed by Taiwanese warplanes.

“The sheer amount of materiel that would likely be needed in case of war is formidable, and getting them through would be difficult, though may be doable,” said Eric Wertheim, a defense consultant and author of “The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World.” “The question is: How much risk is China and the White House willing to take in terms of enforcing or breaking through a blockade, respectively, and can it be sustained?”

China has probably studied the strategic failure of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, he said, and the United States should continue to send the kinds of arms to Taiwan that will make either an amphibious invasion or an attack with long-range weapons much more difficult for China.

“The Chinese naval officers I’ve spoken to in years past have said they fear the humiliation that would result from any kind of failure, and this of course has the effect of them being less likely to take action if there is an increased risk of failure,” Mr. Wertheim said. “In essence, the success the Ukrainians are having is a message to the Chinese.”

Officials in the Biden administration are trying to gauge what moves would deter China without actually provoking greater military action.

Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of government at Cornell University who worked on China policy this past year in the State Department, wrote on Twitter that Mr. Biden’s recent remarks committing U.S. troops to defending Taiwan were “dangerous.” She said in an interview that pursuing the porcupine strategy enhances deterrence but that taking what she deems symbolic steps on Taiwan’s diplomatic status does not.

“The U.S. has to make clear that the U.S. doesn’t have a strategic interest in having Taiwan being permanently separated from mainland China,” she said.

But other former U.S. officials praise Mr. Biden’s forceful statements, saying greater “strategic clarity” bolsters deterrence.

“President Biden has said now four times that we would defend Taiwan, but each time he says it someone walks it back,” said Harry B. Harris Jr., a retired admiral who served as commander of U.S. Pacific Command and ambassador to South Korea. “And I think that makes us as a nation look weak because who’s running this show? I mean, is it the president or is it his advisers?

“So maybe we should take him at his word,” Admiral Harris added. “Maybe he is serious about defending Taiwan.”

8. Ukrainian Colonel captures and drives off with Russian T-90 tank

He gives colonels a good name!

See the video:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=Uxrx4L9nWEQ

Ukrainian Colonel captures and drives off with Russian T-90 tank

1,073,250 views Oct 4, 2022 Ukrainian Colonel and Ukranain hero Pavlo Fedosenko commander of the 92nd Mechanised Brigade drives off with and elite captured Russia tank in new footage.

In the footage the Colonel can be seen attempting to start the captured tank. The colonel can be seen saying, "Damn how it starts, on two batteries" before he drives away with the elite Russian tank.

The footage was posted by Defense of Ukraine with the caption: 'Colonel Pavlo Fedosenko, Hero of Ukraine, Defender of Kharkiv, commander of the 92nd Mechanized Brigade is driving modern russian T-90A tank captured by the #UAarmy, russian lend-lease continues."

The footage has not been independently verified by The Sun

The Sun newspaper brings you the latest breaking news videos and explainers from the UK and around the world

Become a Sun Subscriber and hit the bell to be the first to know

Read The Sun: http://www.thesun.co.uk

Like The Sun on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/thesun/

Follow The Sun on Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheSun

Subscribe to The Sun on Snapchat: https://www.snapchat.com/discover/The...

#Ukraine #Russia #Ukrainenews

9. How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era

Please go to the link to view the interactive webpage and graphics. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/09/28/how-global-public-opinion-of-china-has-shifted-in-the-xi-era/

How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era

BY LAURA SILVER, CHRISTINE HUANG AND LAURA CLANCY

SEPTEMBER 28, 2022

The Chinese Communist Party is preparing for its 20th National Congress, an event likely to result in an unprecedented third term for President Xi Jinping. Since Xi took office in 2013, opinion of China in the U.S. and other advanced economies has turned precipitously more negative. How did it get to be this way?

In the U.S., views of China experienced minor fluctuations in the years preceding Xi’s presidency. Throughout this period, around four-in-ten or more had positive views of China and only a minority had negative views of the country. Still, views ebbed and flowed somewhat alongside domestic and international events.

Negative views of China were slightly more elevated when Xi took office and during President Barack Obama’s second term. Alongside frictions in the bilateral relationship, such as China’s efforts at land reclamation in the South China Sea and America’s negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, American views of China turned somewhat more negative, with around half or more saying they had an unfavorable view of the superpower.

As President Donald Trump took office, views of China improved somewhat. Early in Trump’s tenure, he heaped praise on Xi, inviting him to his residence at Mar-a-Lago and discussing their personal chemistry. Republican views of China, in particular, turned significantly less negative during these two years and in 2018, there were no partisan differences in views of China for the first time since 2008 – a year that was characterized by a new administration.

Views of China soured as the trade war took hold – particularly among Republicans. The trade war – which began in July 2018 and resulted in numerous tit-for-tat tariffs between the U.S. and China – was accompanied by increasingly unfavorable views of China. Between 2018 and 2019, negative views among Republicans increased nearly 20 percentage points.

Unfavorable views of China continued to increase as COVID-19 spread globally.

BY MARCH 2020, AROUND THREE-QUARTERS OF AMERICANS HAD UNFAVORABLE OPINIONS OF CHINA – A VIEW WHICH WAS PARTICULARLY HIGH AMONG THOSE WHO THOUGHT CHINA WAS DOING A BAD JOB HANDLING COVID-19.

A large majority of Americans see China unfavorably amid concerns about China’s policies on human rights, its partnership with Russia and other factors.

Views of China continue to be broadly negative as Americans view

multiple issues

in the bilateral relationship as very serious problems for the U.S. (In 2020, Pew Research Center

switched the mode

BY WHICH IT ASKS VIEWS OF CHINA.)

10. Ex-cop kills 22 children, 12 others in Thai mass shooting

Another tragic event that did not take place in the US.

Ex-cop kills 22 children, 12 others in Thai mass shooting

Reuters · by Reuters

Summary
Attacker identified as ex-policeman dismissed last year
Had been in court earlier in the day on drugs charge
Attack began at lunchtime, distraught parents await news
Police official: Witnesses saw attacker also wielding knife

BANGKOK, Oct 6 (Reuters) - A former policeman killed 34 people including 22 children in a gun rampage at a daycare centre in Thailand on Thursday, later shooting dead his wife and child at their home before turning his weapon on himself, police officials said.

Police identified the attacker as a former member of the force who was dismissed from his post last year over drug allegations.

The man had been facing trial on a drugs charge and had been in court in the hours before the shooting, a police spokesperson told broadcaster ThaiPBS.

He had come to collect his child from the daycare centre but opened fire when he did not find the child there, the spokesperson said.

District police official Chakkraphat Wichitvaidya cited witnesses as saying the gunman was also seen wielding a knife in the attack in Uthai Sawan, a town 500 km (310 miles) northeast of Bangkok in the province of Nong Bua Lamphu.

Paisal Luesomboon, a police spokesperson, also told ThaiPBS that witnesses reported seeing the attacker use a knife and a gun. "He started shooting, slashing, killing children at the Utai Sawan daycare centre," Paisal said.

About 30 children were at the facility when the attacker arrived, fewer than usual, as heavy rain had kept many people away, district official Jidapa Boonsom, who was working in a nearby office at the time, told Reuters.

"The shooter came in around lunch time and shot four or five officials at the childcare centre first," said Jidapa.

At first people thought the shots were fireworks, she said.

"It's really shocking. We were very scared and running to hide once we knew it was shooting. So many children got killed, I've never seen anything like it."

The attacker forced his way into a locked room where children were sleeping, Jidapa said. She said she thought he killed children there with a knife, adding that a teacher who was eight months pregnant was also killed with a knife.

1/2

People gather outside of a daycare center's scene of a mass shooting in the town of Uthai Sawan, 500 km (310 miles) northeast of Bangkok in the province of Nong Bua Lamphu, Thailand October 6, 2022. Sakdipat Boonsom/Handout via REUTERS

Videos posted on social media showed sheets covering what appeared to be the bodies of children lying in pools of blood.

Reuters could not immediately authenticate the footage.

DRUGS CHARGE

Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha, in a statement on Facebook, called the shooting a "shocking incident".

"I have ordered the police chief to travel to the scene immediately to take necessary actions and all involved parties to provide immediate relief to all affected people," he said in the statement.

Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan will travel to Uthai Sawan to visit the scene on Thursday, his office said.

By afternoon, officials stood guarding the front entrance to the daycare centre, a pink, one-storey building surrounded by a lawn and small palm trees.

In a gazebo nearby, anxious-looking people gathered, waiting mostly in silence for news. One woman could be heard weeping.

"He (attacker) was already stressed and when he couldn't find his child he was more stressed and started shooting," police spokesperson Paisal told broadcaster ThaiPBS, adding that he had then driven home and killed his wife and child there before taking his own life.

Gun laws are strict in Thailand, where possession of an illegal firearm carries a prison sentence of up to 10 years. But ownership is high compared with some other countries in Southeast Asia. Illegal weapons, many brought in from strife-torn neighbouring countries, are common.

However, mass shootings are rare. In 2020, a soldier angry over a property deal gone sour killed at least 29 people and wounded 57 in a rampage that spanned four locations.

Reporting by Panarat Thepgumpanat; Writing by Martin Petty, Robert Birsel and Raissa Kasolowsky; Editing by Kim Coghill, Clarence Fernandez and Mark Heinrich

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

11. Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine

Conclusion:

So what happens when things don’t go to plan once again? What happens when Russian forces fail to defeat the Ukrainians, the West increases its military aid and demonstratively ignores Putin’s blackmail, and people in the new territories continue to resist their Russian occupiers, targeting senior officials and administrative buildings in terrorist attacks? Then the pivotal moment will arrive when the only option Putin sees available to him is the nuclear one. It will also be a decisive moment for the Russian elites who still do not dare to countenance this worst-case scenario, something that many today avoid thinking about. Domestic political conditions may be reaching the point where senior officials would dare to disobey, speak out louder, and fight with each other more resolutely. Ukraine may become a poison pill for Putin: in seeking to swallow it, he is dooming himself to defeat.

Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine

Annexation and Mobilization Make Nuclear War More Likely

By Tatiana Stanovaya

October 6, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Tatiana Stanovaya · October 6, 2022

On September 30, following a series of sham referendums held in occupied territory in Ukraine, the Russian government declared that four Ukrainian regions are now officially part of Russia. The annexation came amid a “partial” Russian mobilization that is in fact rapidly becoming a large-scale one that has left many Russians aghast and anxious. With these moves, the war in Ukraine has entered a new stage in which the stakes have risen drastically.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is explicitly demonstrating that he is going to do whatever it takes to win, even at the risk of undermining his own regime. Blindly believing in his own rectitude, Putin may resort to nuclear weapons if events in Ukraine continue to confound his ambitions. The key question is whether Russia’s elites and broader society are prepared to accompany their president on this journey to hell, or if Putin, in doubling down on his disastrous gamble in Ukraine, has only paved the way for his own end.

A NOT-SO-GRAND ULTIMATUM

Ukraine’s counterattack, launched at the end of August, has completely changed Putin’s calculations regarding how Russia should fight. His previous plan, based on the idea that Kyiv would not dare to carry out a full-fledged offensive on Russian positions, presumed that the Kremlin had plenty of time to establish itself in the territory it had occupied, while the Ukrainian government, exhausted by the war and with the economy in ruins, would sooner or later have to capitulate.

The strategic part of Putin’s plan remains the same. It envisages that Kyiv will fall, since his paramount purpose in this war is still to put an end to what he sees as the “anti-Russia” geopolitical project managed by the West and secure a long-term Russian presence on Ukrainian territory. The tactics Putin will use to achieve this goal, however, have been fundamentally revised. The military threats to Russian positions in Ukraine, based on the Kremlin’s miscalculations, have reached the point where the Kremlin has effectively issued an ultimatum to the world: either Russia wins Ukraine or it will resort to nuclear escalation.

This ultimatum has three major parts. The first is declaring stretches of Ukraine to be Russian territory. The annexation of four regions—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia—means that Russia has artificially transformed its war to destroy Ukraine as an independent state into a war of self-defense against foreign military forces. The annexation is a form of protest against Western involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. It frames the West’s military aid to Ukraine as tantamount to aggression against Russia. By annexing these territories, Putin is sending a blunt message: continuing to help Kyiv will inevitably lead the West into a direct conflict with Russia, something he believes Western capitals would like to avoid. This move also reflects another important shift in the Kremlin’s understanding of the current situation. Before Kyiv’s counteroffensive, Moscow did not believe that Western aid could drastically change the balance of forces and create conditions in which Ukraine would threaten Russia militarily. Now, it does.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

Another plank of Putin’s ultimatum is the nuclear option, which is now squarely back on the table. After cooling his rhetoric over the summer, Putin has returned to invoking this ultimate threat as a way to influence Western policy on Ukraine. In April, when Russian forces retreated from failed offensives against Kyiv and Chernihiv, the Kremlin turned to nuclear blackmail, with Putin suggesting that his government was willing to allow the use of nuclear weapons “if necessary” and effectively blaming the West for Russian failures. By May, however, that language had died down; Putin had concluded that even with Western assistance, Ukraine was doomed to lose eventually.

With the Russian military struggling, commentators and officials are once again advocating the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. They have filled TV screens and social media with nuclear saber rattling. The pro-Kremlin segment of Telegram, a Russian information-sharing app, is buzzing with hundreds of posts justifying Moscow’s legitimate right to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or trying to convince the world that Putin is seriously ready to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of further escalation. The profusion of posts insisting that “Yes, he can,” “he must,” and “he will” is not only part of a deliberate campaign to intimidate the West, but also a demonstration of the growing determination among the most committed, ambitious pro-war elements of Russia’s elite and society that the war must be won no matter what.

Whether or not Putin is bluffing, the threat of using nuclear weapons creates higher expectations among the elites about how far Putin is prepared to go, and it dramatically reduces room for maneuvering in a hypothetical future political bargain over Ukraine. To take the nuclear card off the table, Putin would need to see the successful military advance of Russian forces combined with signals from Washington that the West will shrink its role in the conflict. If these demands are not met—and it is safe to say they will not be—Russia will resort to the nuclear option: such is the new reality that Putin seeks to shape, in effect taking the world hostage.

TOTAL WAR

Raising the stakes through his annexation of Ukrainian regions and his invocations of nuclear war, Putin has also upped the ante further by making ordinary Russians part of the war. His mobilization order in September caught Russians off-guard. Over the summer and in the first half of September, polls recorded an uptick in the positive mood among Russian society, growing fatigue with military rhetoric, and declining interest in the war in Ukraine. Although the pro-war part of the establishment, together with the military, demanded that Putin announce a mobilization as soon as possible, those in the presidential administration who oversee domestic policy had tried to minimize the war in the minds of the public. They sought to calm the angry jingoists who were advocating for Moscow to take Kyiv. Now, mobilization has irretrievably changed the lives of millions. In the latest Levada Center poll of Russians, 47 percent of respondents said that the partial mobilization made them feel “anxiety, fear, and horror,” 23 percent felt “shock,” and 13 percent felt “anger and indignation.” Only 23 percent said they felt “pride in Russia.” Even if the mobilization has not prompted mass protests, it has undermined the public’s trust in the state and state media.

Beyond the question of how the mobilization will affect domestic affairs, this drastic political decision reveals much about Putin’s priorities. The president has dared to announce what looks to be the most unpopular political decision in his 22 years of rule, regardless of how mass conscription will stoke anger, resentment, and social tensions and threaten domestic political stability. This decision puts in doubt any further social consolidation between the authorities and ordinary Russians over the war.

Until recently, the majority of Russians accepted the deal offered by the Kremlin: Putin would fight for “historical justice” against Ukrainian “Nazis,” relying on “professionals” and volunteers to avert the strategic threats posed to Russia by the West’s involvement in Ukraine. This goal found significant social support, but on one important condition: that Russia fought without the direct involvement of ordinary Russians, who have been living their lives more or less as usual since the invasion began. Mobilization has ripped up this contract. Having chosen mobilization despite the predictable public anger, Putin has shown that if it comes to a choice between achieving his goals in Ukraine and placating Russian society, Putin will opt for the former, sacrificing popular support at home for geopolitical victory in Ukraine. It is an explicit rebuttal to those who have suggested that Putin’s fear of a collapse in his political support among Russians would stop him from taking risky decisions. In truth, he is single-mindedly driven to turn his gamble in Ukraine into a victory, whatever the cost.

THE POISON PILL

Putin’s nuclear ultimatum and mobilization order put significant pressure on both Russian society and the increasingly nervous Russian elites, who must decide which losing scenario is less tragic: to accompany the furious leader until the end of the world, to escape both Putin and the retribution of the West, or to wait for Russia to lose. It puts Putin in an unprecedentedly vulnerable position. His obsession with Ukraine has never been shared to the same extent by most of the Russian elite, and his readiness to sacrifice thousands of Russian lives is not shared by much of his own electorate. He appears to be pushing a scenario in which he is the only one who has the capacity to pay whatever price it takes, to fight under the banner of “all or nothing.” The president’s manic course of action carries a distinct and bitter taste of suicidal exasperation.

It would be wrong, however, to think that it cannot get any worse. At this stage, however cornered Putin may seem, he still believes he can win. In his eyes, the mobilization should help the Russian army drive out Ukrainian forces from the newly annexed territories and convince the West to step back from Ukraine, leaving Kyiv doomed to surrender and opening the opportunity for the Russian government to establish some facsimile of normal life in the new regions.

So what happens when things don’t go to plan once again? What happens when Russian forces fail to defeat the Ukrainians, the West increases its military aid and demonstratively ignores Putin’s blackmail, and people in the new territories continue to resist their Russian occupiers, targeting senior officials and administrative buildings in terrorist attacks? Then the pivotal moment will arrive when the only option Putin sees available to him is the nuclear one. It will also be a decisive moment for the Russian elites who still do not dare to countenance this worst-case scenario, something that many today avoid thinking about. Domestic political conditions may be reaching the point where senior officials would dare to disobey, speak out louder, and fight with each other more resolutely. Ukraine may become a poison pill for Putin: in seeking to swallow it, he is dooming himself to defeat.

TATIANA STANOVAYA is a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Founder and CEO of the political analysis firm R.Politik.

Foreign Affairs · by Tatiana Stanovaya · October 6, 2022

12. The Russian Military Seems to Be in Full Retreat in Ukraine

The Russian Military Seems to Be in Full Retreat in Ukraine

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 5, 2022

Ukraine presses on while Putin retreats: On the 224 of the war, the Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the east and the south while the Russian military seems to be in full retreat.

The Ukrainian Way of War

After weeks of successful Ukrainian counteroffensives, a pattern is emerging. The Ukrainian military has been launching a two-prong attack from the north and south, aiming at an enemy-occupied city. Once it is threatening to envelop or has enveloped the city, the Russian forces retreat, often under heavy artillery fire, and the Ukrainian military captures the city and then repeats the process.

Using this town-hopping approach, the Ukrainians have managed to liberate large swaths of territory in the east. The Ukrainian forces have already done this four times, most notably in Kupyansk, Izium, and Lyman, and are setting the conditions for repeating it two more.

The Ukrainian military now has the proper manpower and weapon systems, especially long-range precision capabilities in the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), to fix the Russian forces on a particular position but also generate preponderant power at weak spots on the Russian defenses and achieve tactical depth penetration.

As a result, the Ukrainian forces have consolidated a large area east of the Oskil River close to Kharkiv in the east. The Russian military would have hoped to create a new defensive line on the Oskil after its harried retreat from Kharkiv, but the Ukrainian forces didn’t allow that. Now, the Ukrainians are approaching Svatove, which is a major logistical base.

“Politically, Russian leaders will highly likely be concerned that leading Ukrainian units are now approaching the borders of Luhansk Oblast, which Russia claimed to have formally annexed last Friday,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in its latest estimate of the war.

Making things worse for the Russian military is the fact that with every mile that the Ukrainians advance, they are able to bring their deadly long-range weapon systems, most notably the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and its heavier cousin, the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), closer to the frontlines and thus threaten additional Russian units and lines of communication and supply that were out of range previously.

The Russian Casualties in Ukraine

Overall, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense claimed that as of Wednesday, Ukrainian forces have killed approximately 61,000 Russian troops (and wounded approximately thrice that number), destroyed 266 fighter, attack, and transport jets, 232 attack and transport helicopters, 2,435 tanks, 1,414 artillery pieces, 5,038 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, 341 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), 15 boats and cutters, 3,841 vehicles and fuel tanks, 177 anti-aircraft batteries, 1,032 tactical unmanned aerial systems, 132 special equipment platforms, such as bridging vehicles, and four mobile Iskander ballistic missile systems, and 246 cruise missiles shot down by the Ukrainian air defenses.

Expert Biography: A 19FortyFive Defense and National Security Columnist, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

19fortyfive.com · by Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 5, 2022

13. Frozen compass, frigid wind — How Green Berets would airdrop into the Arctic in a future war

Hard men living in hard conditions.

Frozen compass, frigid wind — How Green Berets would airdrop into the Arctic in a future war

The minus-100-degree Fahrenheit wind left each operator “to contemplate the finer points of frostbite and temperature at which eyeballs freeze.”

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED OCT 5, 2022 2:49 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · October 5, 2022

Everybody knows the Arctic is cold, but a new essay by two military officers reveals just how much the frigid weather there can complicate military operations like jumping out of an airplane.

“Twenty minutes from the drop zone at Deadhorse, Alaska, the ramp on the U.S. Air Force C-17 slowly opens, letting in a blast of Arctic air,” wrote Army Brig. Gen. Shawn Satterfield and Air Force Lt. Col. Sky Jensen in an essay published Monday in the Air Force’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs.

It was April 2021, at the end of a six-hour flight from Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Green Berets were en route to practice military freefall and parachuting as part of the exercise Vigilant Shield, one of several training events the U.S. military holds with its allies to prepare for fighting in the frigid regions of the Arctic.

Satterfield and Jensen explained that the temperature in the C-17’s cargo compartment had been deliberately lowered to 32 degrees Fahrenheit so that the eight soldiers from 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) could get used to the freezing weather they were about to jump into.

Vigilant Shield 2021

Bring a jacket, because training is about to get cold! 10th Special Forces Group – Airborne conducted a successful Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise to the Arctic Circle. Sgt. Justin Smith#BestoftheBest | #Readiness

Posted by U.S. Army on Sunday, May 23, 2021

As it turns out, the outside air was a little colder than the Green Berets might have liked. When the green light came on and the soldiers leapt out over the white expanse of the Alaska North Slope, the minus 100-degree Fahrenheit wind ripped away the modified snowmobile face shields each had been wearing to protect against the cold, “leaving each operator to contemplate the finer points of frostbite and temperature at which eyeballs freeze,” the officers wrote.

After 40 seconds of freefall, the soldiers pulled their ripcords, where they discovered that it takes an additional two to three seconds for the canopy to fully deploy in the freezing cold. Even with the canopy open, the team’s troubles were not over: the temperature was around minus 45 degrees Fahrenheit, so cold that the batteries in their GPS and communication gear failed, and their oil-boat compasses designed to work in extreme temperatures were frozen. On top of that, the team also had trouble steering their canopies: the risers had frosted and their heated gloves were clumsy.

The soldiers managed to land safely, but the challenges illustrate just how much U.S. service members have to learn about operating on the northern borders of their home soil.

A Green Beret assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) performs special reconnaissance from an improvised mission support site during Exercise ARCTIC EDGE 2022 near Wainwright, Alaska, March 11, 2022. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant/U.S. Army)

U.S. special operations forces’ ability to fight in the Arctic has atrophied over the last two decades, Satterfield and Jensen wrote, and troops need a refresher as adversarial nations like Russia and China seek to exploit new shipping routes, oil and natural gas deposits, and valuable metals made accessible by receding ice.

“Just surviving in the Arctic requires extensive training and appropriate equipment prior to being deployed to the region,” the two wrote. “However, to thrive in the Arctic, defined as the ability to conduct SOF’s core activities, requires consistent immersion and operational experience in this environment.”

U.S. Army Special Forces are not the only ones training at the top of the world. In 2021, a group of Air Force survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) specialists spent a week at the so-called “Cool School,” located well inside the Arctic Circle at the northernmost point of Alaska. Students contended with 50-mile-per-hour winds, negative 60-degree temperatures, and constant near-darkness as they learned how to build snow caves and igloos, signal for rescue, and learned from local Indigenous people how to find food and stay healthy.

“It doesn’t matter if you’ve got the best equipment or aircraft in the world,” said Maj. Tyler Williams, the commander of the instructors at the school, at the time. “If you don’t have the right training, the Arctic environment will kill you.”

Air Force Staff Sgt. Samuel Ley, a 66th Training Squadron, Detachment 1 survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) specialist, demonstrates how to use an MK-124 smoke and illumination signal on the Chukchi Sea Jan. 13, 2021. The MK-124 is a smoke and illumination flare used to signal search and rescue personnel in the event of an emergency or extraction situation. (Air Force photo / Maj. Tyler Williams)

With their small footprint and extensive training for long missions in tough or sensitive areas, special operations teams are an ideal force for the Arctic, Satterfield and Jensen wrote. The isolated indigenous communities living in the Arctic also make it an ideal place for modern Army Special Forces, which were established during the Cold War precisely for helping “indigenous guerrilla” forces fight America’s enemies.

Subscribe to Task & Purpose Today. Get the latest military news, entertainment, and gear in your inbox daily.

As of 2018, there are 122,977 Alaskans living in subsistence areas, an area where use of fish and wildlife resources is a principal characteristic of the economy, culture and way of life, according to the Alaska state government. Between 2012 and 2016, about 55.3% of people living in those areas identified as Alaska Native. Members of those communities could provide essential lessons to U.S. service members who may have to fight in the Arctic, three Special Forces officers wrote in a separate essay published on Monday.

“Things as simple as how to conduct route planning, types of equipment to bring, movement over terrain, and medical care in the Arctic are things that indigenous communities have developed and mastered over centuries; yet, outside of individual efforts, that experience has not been translated into military … standard operating procedures,” wrote Army Majors W. Barrett Martin, Michael Tovo and Devin Kirkwood, all members of the 10th Special Forces Group. “Nor has it been widely integrated into the Alaskan National Guard, whose footprint has been reduced to a presence mostly concentrated around Anchorage and Juneau.”

Survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE) specialists going through upgrade training learn how to construct an igloo on Utqiaġvik (Barrow), Alaska, Jan. 14, 2021. Igloos were originally used by the Inuit tribe of northern Alaska and are still in use today. They provide warmth and shelter from extreme winds and sub-zero temperatures. (Air Force photo / Master Sgt. Ryan M. Dewey)

The airmen who trained at the “Cool School” are also well aware of the importance of working with the locals.

“Before all of this modern equipment, it was the cultural values and practices that allowed them to thrive in this region,” said Williams. The school is located near Utqiaġvik, a city of about 4,400 people, 61 percent of whom are Iñupiat Eskimo, according to the city website.

“There’s a lot of people who live across the Arctic,” said Master Sgt. Garrett Wright, superintendent of the Arctic Survival School. “Students have to understand that they might not be picked up by American forces and they may not even be military.”

Not only could indigenous populations help teach U.S. troops how to operate in the Arctic, but they could also provide vital intelligence or logistics support in a fight in that region, the Green Berets wrote. The U.S. took advantage of this in World War II, when 6,300 Alaska Natives volunteered to serve in the Alaska Territorial Guard, where they conducted surveillance and support activities along the state’s remote coastlines, wrote the majors.

“Assembled to defend against potential Japanese invasion, the ‘Eskimo Scouts’ were the U.S. military’s eyes and ears along the territory’s 6,640-mile coastline,” wrote the National Museum of the American Indian on its website.

U.S. Army Green Berets assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), use a snowmobile to exit the tarmac after loading equipment on a U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules with the 731st Airlift Squadron for movement north of the Arctic Circle in support of Exercise ARCTIC EDGE 2022 at Fairbanks International Airport, Fairbanks, Alaska, March 2, 2022 (Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant/U.S. Army)

Though that outfit closed down after the war, Canada has a similar group called the Canadian Rangers, a reserve force of 5,000 people made up of “Inuit, First Nations, and Métis and non-Aboriginals, depending on each community’s local demographics” according to a Rangers website. In February, the Canadian Rangers traveled 150 miles through the Yukon with seven members of the U.S. 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne). This was a separate group of Green Berets from the ones in the 10th Special Forces Group who jumped out of the C-17 in April. But they too realized they had never experienced anything quite like the Arctic.

“During the operation, the team experienced temperatures as low as minus 58 degrees Fahrenheit, whiteout conditions with less than 10 feet visibility, and the new experience of ‘polar bear watch’ each evening,” Satterfield and Jensen wrote. “[T]hese valuable skills will atrophy unless they continue to train and exercise in this region/environment.”

Those skills have a particularly short shelf life because there are not many opportunities for U.S. troops to receive genuine Arctic survival training, which is not quite the same as cold weather training in upstate New York or alpine training in the Rocky Mountains, the three Special Forces majors wrote.

Even the most qualified mountain team in a Special Forces regiment would not be considered Arctic-capable, the majors said. What makes the Arctic unique is the “near-constant darkness and cold in the winter juxtaposed with near-constant light and impassable terrain in the summer months,” due to the swampy conditions caused by summer thaws, they wrote. Other unique characteristics of the Arctic include its lack of trees, the permanent snow and ice in some areas and the grasses, sedges, mosses and low shrubs in others, according to the University of California-Berkeley.

A Green Beret with 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) stokes a fire within a snow shelter during pre-deployment training for ARCTIC EDGE 22 at Yukon Training Area, Alaska, Feb. 20, 2022. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Bryant/U.S. Army)

Sending Army Special Forces to the Arctic could solve two problems at once, the majors wrote. First, it could provide Green Berets with a valuable and consistent way to train for the unique Arctic environment. Second, by deepening their relationship with indigenous communities, the soldiers could help put more eyes on an isolated and possibly contested part of the world. However, the U.S. government needs to help indigenous communities if it hopes to be helped by them, the majors wrote.

Many Alaskan communities do not have the infrastructure to support food security, health care, education or commerce, Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) said in February. Examples include a lack of broadband internet, poor housing, and stressed supply chains that cannot deliver food, sanitation or medical equipment, she said. The Special Forces majors argued that if the U.S. government does not help those isolated communities, other countries like Russia or China might try to fill the void to gain influence there.

“Investing in Indigenous Alaskan communities is a chance to deny competitor influence, rebuild trust with Native Alaskan communities while establishing multi-use infrastructure with multi-domain effects, and increase our military’s Arctic readiness,” the majors said.

Both Satterfield and Jensen and the trio of majors seem to agree on one thing: the Arctic may be cold, but by using special operations to build relationships with the people living there, they might be able to get a warmer welcome.

The latest on Task & Purpose

These are the worst pieces of military gear ever issued, according to veterans
The Marine Corps’ new littoral combat team is changing the Marine rifle squad
How Air Force maintainers achieved a rare perfect inspection on a 49-year-old aircraft
Why hundreds of Camp Pendleton Marines have been stuck in sweltering hot barracks for years
The Air Force has finally rescued a stranded Osprey aircraft from a remote Norwegian island

Want to write for Task & Purpose? Click here. Or check out the latest stories on our homepage.

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · October 5, 2022

14. How China got a spy inside the US Army

How China got a spy inside the US Army

https://www.theruck.news/p/how-china-got-a-spy-inside-the-us?utm

“They just told me to get to meet people, some American friends."

Paul Szoldra

4 min ago

CHINA STEALS SECRETS through a “network of defense attachés, academics, and spies operating in and out of China,” according to federal court documents, and one of them was until 2018 serving as a soldier in the U.S. Army.

Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese national, was convicted of espionage last month in Chicago, Illinois. A Justice Department news release touting the verdict revealed that the 31-year-old had worked for years on behalf of China before joining the U.S. Army Reserve in 2016. He faces up to 15 years in prison at sentencing in January 2023.

It certainly won’t end Chinese spying in the United States. But this and a related case have revealed fascinating details on the practice—including the personal diaries, texts, and a never-before-seen document from the Chinese spymaster Ji dealt with. And when reading through evidence revealed in court filings, we can get a sense of Beijing’s recruiting process.

The Ruck is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

Subscribed

“There was not much advertising,” Ji later told an undercover FBI agent of when he first met with Chinese intelligence at a job fair in college. “They were asking if anyone was interested in joining the organization. They said it was a confidential unit but they did not elaborate.”

Ji was curious enough and met with several intelligence officers in Beijing and Nanjing. One officer dined with him often and regaled him with the story of three heroic spies who infiltrated a political rival in the 1930s and helped save the Chinese Communist Party. It made an impression, and he considered working for Beijing’s spy service, but said “it was myself who switched and came” to the U.S. “for an education.”

“They just told me to get to meet people, some American friends,” Ji told an undercover agent of his handlers. “However, they did not name the person, or the kind of person, that they want me to meet. What I did was that I wanted to have my status adjusted by joining the military and then get quick access to those places in the U.S. that tend to have limited access to the Chinese people.”

So by the time Ji first left Beijing in August 2013 to go to the United States, ideology and several thousand dollars in cash payments motivated him. And he acted like a “fish at the bottom of the ocean” once in the United States, according to an expert on Chinese intelligence, keeping a low profile as a master’s student at the Illinois Institute of Technology and meeting several times with handlers in China.

“Hi Big Brother, I'm JI Chaoqun. I'm taking the G203 [train] and will arrive at Nanjing South Station at 22:37,” he texted a Chinese intelligence officer before meeting in December 2013. Their second meeting in January 2014 “likely occurred in a hotel room,” an FBI investigator wrote, based on communications and tradecraft suggesting that “meetings in hotel rooms provide a discreet, private place for the intelligence officer to recruit or debrief his/her intelligence asset.”

Ji’s handler paid for his trip back to Beijing the following day. But he asked that the used train ticket be mailed to a precise location: The Ministry of State Security in Jiangsu Province.

“Based upon my training and experience, Chinese intelligence agencies often require intelligence officers to produce itemized receipts for expenditures related to intelligence assets,” the investigator wrote.

A third meeting in China took place in June 2014. And Ji’s recruitment showed promise. But the real test didn’t come until the Fall of 2015 when he was instructed to purchase background reports on several naturalized U.S. citizens of Chinese and Taiwanese descent working in the American science and technology industry. He passed with flying colors.

“[E]ight sets of the midterm test questions for the last three years,” Ji later wrote in code to an email address hosted in China on August 30, 2015, attaching eight encrypted PDF documents with the requested background reports. At least seven targets worked for U.S. defense contractors.

By December 2015, Ji had obtained a master’s degree in electrical engineering, but his temporary visa required him to leave the country or find a job. He found a fraudulent website providing bogus employment paperwork to Chinese nationals. And then in May 2016, he was able to join the Army Reserve under a special recruiting program, lying repeatedly about his past contacts with Chinese government officials.

Ji eventually landed on the FBI’s radar and lost access to sensitive information. But when speaking to an undercover agent, he showed his willingness to potentially steal secrets from GE, the FBI, and NASA. He said he could share a list of soldiers of Chinese descent and noted that getting U.S. citizenship would help earn a cherished top-secret clearance.

“[O]nce I have the clearance, if I can be a normal American, I can apply for all kinds of jobs,” said Ji, adding that he was interested in cybersecurity at NASA. “One who does it can see them all,” he said of the field. “Since we are responsible for database security, we will be able to see them all.”

15. The Pentagon set 18 diversity goals in 2011. It’s fulfilled 6 of them.

Did anyone assess whether we have the right goals?

Excerpts:

The IG recommends that the service diversity offices, along with the DoD-level personnel and readiness office, come up with an oversight plan for implementing the remaining dozen goals.

DoD, the Navy and the Air Force all partially agreed with those recommendations, though they pushed back on the idea that they were coming up short. The IG report noted that they did not provide full evidence to contradict that, however.

“The DoD is currently focused on goals, priorities, and objectives that are relevant to where the Department is today and where it aims to be in the future,” according to the report. “Additionally, the DoD pledged to take procedural steps to ensure the proper tracking of the current and future strategic plans, including establishing milestones and obtaining supporting documentation, where applicable.”

The National Guard fully disagreed, saying that their service members are served by Army and Air Force policies. The Army and Marine Corps did not respond to the IG at all, according to the report.

The Pentagon announced in late September that it had selected leadership for a newly formed diversity, equity and inclusion advisory committee, which would be carrying the torch for previous efforts.

The Pentagon set 18 diversity goals in 2011. It’s fulfilled 6 of them.

militarytimes.com · by Meghann Myers · October 5, 2022

Back in 2011, the Defense Department’s issued a report with 18 recommendations for how the military could improve diversity, equity and inclusion across the services, with a five-year Department of Defense Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. More than a decade later, just six of those recommendations have been implemented, according to an inspector general report released Tuesday.

The issue is mainly that while the report laid out a wish list, it didn’t include concrete road maps or an oversight plan, so the Pentagon simply didn’t do anything it didn’t feel like doing. It’s unfortunately not uncommon for the military to set policy but not create a mechanism to enforce it.

“As a result of not fully addressing the Strategic Plan’s three goals, the DoD may not be meeting the intent of the Strategic Plan, which is to encourage commitment and incorporate diversity and inclusion initiatives unique to each Service,” according to the report.

The breakdown is pretty straightforward: the Pentagon’s personnel and readiness office, along with the individual service diversity offices, didn’t oversee implementation of the plan because they didn’t have to.

“As a result of a lack of defined policy, roles and responsibilities, and data collection, the DoD cannot determine what progress has been made and what still needs to be accomplished,” the report found.

Services may be improperly denying vaccine religious waivers, IG says

A DoD IG review of religious waivers to COVID vaccines shows the services may be failing to provide individualized assessments, required by federal law.

The goals that the Pentagon did achieve include creating a definition of diversity, a personal commitment “to making diversity an institutional priority” from military leadership, optimizing service members’ ability to make informed career choices, eliminating the combat exclusion for women, expanding the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services’ focus to the gender retention gap and the establishment of a chief diversity officer as a DoD position.

DoD’s personnel and readiness office said they were informally tracking this progress, but the IG couldn’t find any written evidence to back that up.

“As a result of the inconsistent implementation of the MLDC recommendations, the DoD has an increased risk of not recruiting, retaining, or promoting the most qualified Service members,” the report found.

Among the dozen unimplemented recommendations, there are efforts to diversify the pool of potential recruits that the services focus on, accountability reviews and mechanisms, training on leading diverse groups and “making respect for diversity a core value.”

The IG recommends that the service diversity offices, along with the DoD-level personnel and readiness office, come up with an oversight plan for implementing the remaining dozen goals.

DoD, the Navy and the Air Force all partially agreed with those recommendations, though they pushed back on the idea that they were coming up short. The IG report noted that they did not provide full evidence to contradict that, however.

“The DoD is currently focused on goals, priorities, and objectives that are relevant to where the Department is today and where it aims to be in the future,” according to the report. “Additionally, the DoD pledged to take procedural steps to ensure the proper tracking of the current and future strategic plans, including establishing milestones and obtaining supporting documentation, where applicable.”

The National Guard fully disagreed, saying that their service members are served by Army and Air Force policies. The Army and Marine Corps did not respond to the IG at all, according to the report.

The Pentagon announced in late September that it had selected leadership for a newly formed diversity, equity and inclusion advisory committee, which would be carrying the torch for previous efforts.

About Meghann Myers

Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members.

16. US special forces conduct midnight raid in Syria killing 'ISIS leader'

The boys are getting it done. We have developed an unparalleled ability to capture/kill high value targets at the time and place of our choosing.

US special forces conduct midnight raid in Syria killing 'ISIS leader'

US special forces conduct midnight raid deep in government-held area of Syria killing 'ISIS leader' and taking several others captive

US special forces carry out raid deep in govt-controlled territory, it's reported
The operation killed one person, thought to be an ISIS leader, in Syria's northeast
Several other people were captured by US forces in the raid, reports state
A resident named the victim as Abu Hayel, from nearby Hassakeh province

By WALTER FINCH FOR MAILONLINE

PUBLISHED: 06:14 EDT, 6 October 2022 | UPDATED: 08:05 EDT, 6 October 2022

Daily Mail · by Walter Finch For Mailonline · October 6, 2022

US special forces carried out a midnight raid deep into the heart of government-controlled territory in Syria that killed an 'ISIS leader' and took others captive, two security sources confirmed to Reuters.

Local sources said that US troops landed in the village Muluk Saray in the countryside of the Qamishli region in north east Syria, where territory is controlled between US-backed Kurdish fighters and the Russia-backed government.

Sources told news channel Al Mayadeen that the victim was named Rakan Abu Hayel from the village of Tuwaimin in the eastern countryside.

The family of the slain man and members of another family were arrested and taken into US custody, they claim.

'US occupation forces carried out a landing operation using several helicopters in the village of Muluk Saray in the southern countryside of Qamishli and killed one person,' Syria's state broadcaster said, without elaborating.

A local village resident named the victim as Abu Hayel, a little-known displaced person from Hassakeh.

The resident said that three US helicopters carrying troops had landed in the overnight operation.

'They used loudspeakers to call on residents to stay indoors' during the operation, the resident said.

A US special forces raid in three helicopters reportedly ventured deep into government-controlled territory in Syria to conduct a raid against an alleged ISIS commander, resulting in his death and the detention of his family (pictured: Stock image of a Black Hawk helicopter)

The raid was carried out deep in government-controlled territory in the village of Muluk Saray in southern countryside of Qamishli

During the operation US forces engaged in a firefight with auxiliary forces of the Syrian army, according to the Russian news agency Sputnik. There are no reports of casualties.

Around 50 US special forces soldiers were reported to be involved in the daring raid in multiple helicopters.

The person killed in the operation 'had been a resident of the area for years and is likely an Islamic State' group leader, the Britain-based Observatory for Human Rights said.

It is the first such operation in government-held territory, the war monitoring group added, which relies on a wide network of sources in Syria.

The US armed forces' Central Command (CENTCOM) said it currently has 'no information to provide'.

The village targeted lies 17 kilometres (10 miles) south of the city of Qamishli and is controlled by Syrian government forces, according to the Observatory and AFP correspondents.

'It is the first time,' that US forces conduct such an operation in regime-held areas, the Observatory said.

ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi died in a US Special Forces raid on February 2

Washington is part of a US-led coalition battling the IS group in Syria, however they are at odds with the Syrian government under the control of the dictatorial President Bashar al-Assad.

In July, the Pentagon said it killed Syria's top IS jihadist in a drone strike in the northern part of the country.

CENTCOM said he had been 'one of the top five' leaders of Islamic State overall.

The July strike came five months after a nighttime US raid in the town of Atmeh, which led to the death of the overall Islamic State leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi.

The one-legged ISIS chief had rigged his house with explosives and blew himself and his family to pieces when US Special Forces arrived, because his disability stopped him using a suicide vest.

The one-legged ISIS chief had rigged his house (pictured) with explosives and blew himself and his family to pieces when US Special Forces arrived, officials said

The building, in Atmeh, Syria, near the Turkish border, was destroyed when al-Qurayshi detonated explosives, killing him and his family

American helicopters carrying 24 commandos arrived just after 1am on February 2 this year. When they left two hours later ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi was dead

Officials believe al-Qurayshi, who was tracked down after a drone spotted him bathing on the building's roof last year, himself detonated the explosives that killed him and his family at his home in the sleepy village of Atmeh near the Turkish border on February 2.

They also revealed officials had thought they had a good chance of taking al-Qurayshi alive because of his issues with a suicide belt and had made plans to turn him over to another government.

The troops safely brought four children from the second floor out of the house. But a toddler was found dead there. Officials said the child was likely killed by the concussive effects of the third-floor explosion and not shot in the gunfight.

An ISIS member, described as a lieutenant of al-Qurayshi's, and his wife were on the second floor, with as many as five children. All are believed to have been killed in the blast.

After losing their last territory following a military onslaught backed by the US-led coalition in March 2019, the remnants of IS in Syria mostly retreated into desert hideouts.

They have since used such hideouts to ambush Kurdish-led forces and Syrian government troops while continuing to mount attacks in Iraq.

Daily Mail · by Walter Finch For Mailonline · October 6, 2022

17. Army Piloting Pentagon’s Counter-UAS Efforts

Ukraine is a laboratory.

Excerpts:

Examples of how drones are being used in real-world conflicts today, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have reinforced the Pentagon’s decision to establish a joint strategy for counter-UAS, said the office’s director, Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey.

“I think it’s bringing more to light of what we already know — that when you scale this capability from a small quadcopter all the way up to a larger group 3 and are able to leverage [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] to put other effects of other systems to bear, it really shows the importance of having counter-UAS at scale,” he said.

To create a more cohesive counter-drone effort in the department, the joint office first conducted an operational assessment of all the capabilities already fielded by each of the services.

Army Piloting Pentagon’s Counter-UAS Efforts

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

10/6/2022

The Marine Corps’ Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System

Marine Corps photo

Once considered an everyday, low-risk hobby, small unmanned aircraft systems have become a key capability for militaries on modern battlefields. While the availability and technology of these systems advance at a rapid pace, the Pentagon wants to take an enterprise approach to defeat the growing threat.

The Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, or the JCO, is leading a department-wide effort to address how the U.S. military will combat adversaries’ use of small drones both now and in the future.

Established in 2020, the office is collaborating with the services to develop and deploy multi-domain solutions through capability demonstrations, joint training plans and global partnerships.

Congress directed the Pentagon in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act to create a plan to develop and field a counter-small UAS system. The budget request for fiscal year 2023 shows the department plans to spend at least $668 million for counter-drone research and development and $78 million for procurement.

Examples of how drones are being used in real-world conflicts today, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have reinforced the Pentagon’s decision to establish a joint strategy for counter-UAS, said the office’s director, Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey.

“I think it’s bringing more to light of what we already know — that when you scale this capability from a small quadcopter all the way up to a larger group 3 and are able to leverage [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] to put other effects of other systems to bear, it really shows the importance of having counter-UAS at scale,” he said.

To create a more cohesive counter-drone effort in the department, the joint office first conducted an operational assessment of all the capabilities already fielded by each of the services.

“The services were already working on this problem set. Every service had a different capability fielded out there, mainly focused on joint, operational, urgent needs for [combatant commands],” he said during an Association of the United States Army event in August.

While it was important to quickly field capabilities to warfighters at the time in order to combat adversary drones in places like Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan, the varying systems were customized for each service rather than the entire joint force, he said.

The office’s assessment found that when counter-UAS systems were employed as standalone capabilities, they weren’t as impactful against adversaries as they could be.

“What we’ve quickly realized is that you need a system-of-systems approach,” Gainey said. “Not one effector would be the be-all-end-all within the counter-UAS portfolio, but you had to have a common command-and-control system — same as we do in air defense — and then you needed to integrate the systems into that common command-and-control system.”

After the assessment, the counter-drone office created a joint requirements document to serve as its foundation for evolving counter-drone technologies for the future. The office is working closely with combatant commands, the Army Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office, also known as RCCTO, and each of the services to bring capabilities currently in use to full maturation, he said.

The office has since evaluated more than 40 fielded counter-UAS systems that were rapidly procured for conflicts in the Middle East, according to a May report from the Congressional Research Service, “Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems.” Ten of those systems have been selected for further development — including mounted, fixed and handheld technologies as well as both kinetic and electronic warfare options, the report said.

To demonstrate capabilities and inform future joint requirements, the JCO and RCCTO have been conducting exercises twice a year with the services and industry. Three multi-week exercises have been held so far and focused on a range of technology areas, including low-collateral interceptors that can neutralize small UAS, inexpensive ground-launched and hand-held capabilities and high-powered microwave technology.

“Once we narrowed down our systems, we funded the services and said ‘Hey, take this as far as you can to get after this expanded joint requirements document and see — from a technology standpoint — how far you can push the envelope with this current system,’” Gainey said.

A fourth demonstration at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in September looked at both systems evaluated in past exercises and other fielded counter-UAS capabilities to reevaluate how the updated technology has improved, he said.

Once capability gaps have been identified, the office will work with industry technology available while also leveraging the services to build prototypes, he said. This will “eventually open up a vehicle for the services to procure those systems and make it part of their system-of-systems approach,” he added.

One of the technologies the military has decided to invest in and develop further is the Army’s Coyote drone which is part of the Howler counter-UAS system, he noted. Made by Raytheon Missiles and Defense, the system combines Raytheon’s Coyote small-UAS with the company’s Ku-band radio frequency multi-mission radar.

Coyote is a tube-launched drone that is deployable from the ground, air or on ships, according to Raytheon. It features a seeker and a warhead, making it able to identify and eliminate adversary drones in the Defense Department’s group 3 classification — which includes large systems designed as one-way explosive attack vehicles or others used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions, Gainey said.

He noted the initial interceptor wasn’t as successful as the office expected for a first evaluation, but it is a promising technology. With investment from the office and continued tests, the Coyote is now in its third iteration and is “performing quite well in the air,” he said.

Another mounted system the joint office selected is the Marine Corps’ Marine Air Defense Integrated System, which uses both kinetic and electronic warfare “jamming” methods to block radio frequencies and neutralize enemy drones, according to the CRS report. The system can be attached to platforms like the MRZR all-terrain vehicle and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

The office is also interested in advancing emerging technologies coming from industry for counter-UAS efforts, Gainey noted. When drones first became a threat to warfighters, the department initially turned to electronic warfare-based solutions because it kept the cost of the system low, he added.

Now, the JCO is looking to incorporate directed energy lasers — which the office is seeing success with now — and high-powered microwave systems that disable drones by burning the electronics inside them, Gainey said.

The demonstrations are also helping the services understand how drone technology is evolving and how to match it as their speed, size and autonomy increase.

In particular, enemy drones have used autonomy to avoid many of the counter-UAS systems that employ electronic warfare attacks. These platforms are able to autonomously disrupt the connection between drone and operator or the satellite systems they are using, he said.

But with the office’s system-of-systems approach to counter-drone efforts, an operator will have a range of tools — such as kinetic effectors and radars — to compensate for variations in drone types.

“I’m always going to look to integrate that EW capability into our system-of-systems approach, but I want to have the ability to have a kinetic solution in case … as they move to autonomy and find creative ways to mask themselves against our EW capability, our soldiers have a capability in the kit bag they can leverage,” Gainey said.

In addition, the office has selected Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control system — or FAAD C2 — as its battlefield management system for the Pentagon’s joint counter-drone effort. The platform, designed by Northrop Grumman, was the Army’s system for short-range air defense and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar missions, according to the service.

Gainey noted that prior to the JCO’s efforts, other services were also in the process of integrating their own short-range capabilities with their counter-UAS systems under a common command and control system.

Rather than adopting FAAD C2, some of those services are instead working to integrate their respective command-and-control systems with the Army’s chosen platform, he said. For example, the Air Force is working to make its Multi-Domain Control Station for Unmanned Systems interoperable with FAAD C2 for joint counter-drone operations.

“If you can leverage any C2 system to get that operational sight picture and be able to leverage the different systems, that’s how we want to move forward in the future where we’re not designating systems but designating how we want capability to integrate moving forward,” he explained.

Warfighters also must be trained on the systems. When seeking feedback from the services on current counter-UAS solutions, training was a resounding problem as warfighters were receiving on-the-job instructions, Gainey said.

“As you can imagine, a soldier at a location having 15 or 16 different systems and trying to be trained and proficient on all of these systems — it’s quite challenging,” he said.

In response, the office is standing up a Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft System academy at the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, by fiscal year 2024 to create more holistic training across the services. The plan is to create common training guidelines and qualification standards that are direct responses to emerging drone threats and evolving counter capabilities for the entire joint force, according to the Pentagon’s counter-small unmanned aircraft system strategy document.

Eventually, each service will use its own expertise to increase individualized training for specific units.

Until the academy is up and running, the JCO is hosting classes to train warfighters on counter-drone systems at Yuma Proving Ground, Gainey said. Units that are about to deploy can also train using mobile training teams organized by the office, he added.

Moving forward, the office will continue hosting demonstrations and working closely with industry and agencies across the department to synchronize counter-UAS solutions, Gainey said.

“At the end of the day, the technology that best delivers the best effect is what we’re going to put out there,” he said.

nationaldefensemagazine.org · by Mikayla Easley

18. The problem with tyrants like Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin

Excerpts:

I understand the desire, on both the left and the right, for “a diplomatic solution.” I understand why many people believe that Mr. Putin must want an “offramp” — because that’s what they’d want if they were in his place.

But nothing he has said or done to date indicates that’s true.

And if he finds that his threats are causing the West to retreat, would he be satisfied — or emboldened?

If he sees that Western leaders are giving appeasement a chance, why would he not continue to advance, probing with his spear so long as he feels mush, not steel? Why would he end a war he believes he is winning?

And what lessons will the despotic rulers of North Korea, Iran and China take away based on our actions or inactions, the risks we take and the risks we avoid? Because let me remind you, they are not like us.

The problem with tyrants like Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin

They're not like us

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

OPINION:

We’re inclined to believe that those who rule nations, however despotic they may be, are not so different from us. Surely they weigh costs and benefits, are open to compromise, and prefer peace to war. Does the evidence support this belief? I don’t think so.

Recall President Donald Trump’s approach to Kim Jong-un. He told the North Korean dictator that, if he’d only adopt more moderate policies, he could have “prosperity like he has never seen” and become “the hero of his people.” Mr. Trump communicated, too, that if Mr. Kim declined this offer, he might find American missiles raining down on his head.

Wouldn’t you have been tempted by that carrot and frightened by that stick? Sure. But Mr. Kim is not like you.

Similarly, President Barack Obama offered Iran’s theocrats respect, power and lucre. He asked only that they pledge to delay — not end — their nuclear weapons program.

He didn’t understand that, for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, “Death to Israel!” and “Death to America!” are not just slogans. They are the goals of the revolution to which he has dedicated his life. He will do whatever is necessary to achieve these goals — including, at this moment, murdering, torturing and imprisoning Iranian women who have had quite enough of his soul-crushing interpretation of Islamic law.

President Biden and his advisers have denounced Mr. Khamenei’s brutality. But they continue to offer him billions of dollars to agree to a watered-down version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that won’t seriously impede the regime’s nuclear ambitions. It will, however, finance terrorism abroad and atrocities at home. So, why doesn’t Mr. Khamenei take the deal?

He may think he can still get more. Or he may not want even to appear to be on the same page with satanic Americans. He’s not like us and he wouldn’t want anyone to think he is.

Turn next to Vladimir Putin. As I’ve long argued, he fancies himself a latter-day czar. His goal is to restore the Russian empire, which, in the bellicose Kremlin speech he gave last week, he called “great historical Russia.”

He had been making progress toward this goal. In 2008, he cut two provinces from Georgia. In 2014, he seized Crimea from Ukraine and began an insurgency in Donbas. Belarus and Armenia have become Russian satellites.

Back in February, many analysts doubted he’d invade Ukraine because saber rattling alone would almost certainly have resulted in restrictions on Ukraine’s sovereignty — a clear win for him.

When he did send tanks over the border, many analysts expected only a “limited incursion” that the U.S. and its allies could earnestly deplore and then rapidly forget.

But it turned out that Mr. Putin was no longer content with salami-slicing. He believed — as did most Western military analysts — that his troops would easily overrun the Ukrainian army and subdue the Ukrainian people who, he insists, are nothing more than disobedient little brothers who deserve to be punished for refusing to return to the Fatherland.

Instead, of course, Ukrainians have fought, with astonishing courage and skill, to defend their land and independence. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, a comedian turned politician, emerged as their inspiring leader.

In his most recent Kremlin speech, Mr. Putin announced that he is annexing Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — Ukrainian territories where he staged fraudulent plebiscites and where his forces are, at this moment, losing ground.

He also gave vent to grievances he has been nursing for years while gazing at the Black Sea from his Italianate palace.

He denounced “the ruling circles of the so-called West” as “the enemy.” He accused “the Anglo-Saxons” of sabotaging “the Nord Stream international gas pipelines.” (My guess: He blew them up himself so he can allege that he’s been directly attacked by the U.S. and/or NATO. He may also be contemplating additional sabotage of undersea infrastructure.)

He recited standard leftist dogma about slavery, genocide, “Western racists,” the American “neocolonial system,” “totalitarianism, despotism, and apartheid.” For good measure, he threw in “the plunder of India, of Africa, the wars of England and France against China.” He said the U.S. “occupies” Germany, Japan and South Korea.

Then, reaching out to Western conservatives, he added: “Do we really want … it drilled into children in our schools … that there are supposedly genders besides women and men, and [children to be] offered the chance to undergo sex change operations?” If you’re so credulous as to believe Vladimir Putin is the man to lead the counterrevolution against Wokeism, there’s a bridge over the Dnieper River whose purchase I can facilitate for you.

Most ominously, Mr. Putin declared that the territories he is annexing are now Russian lands, implying he might use nuclear weapons to defend them. He claimed that America’s use of such weapons in 1945 had “created a precedent.”

I understand the desire, on both the left and the right, for “a diplomatic solution.” I understand why many people believe that Mr. Putin must want an “offramp” — because that’s what they’d want if they were in his place.

But nothing he has said or done to date indicates that’s true.

And if he finds that his threats are causing the West to retreat, would he be satisfied — or emboldened?

If he sees that Western leaders are giving appeasement a chance, why would he not continue to advance, probing with his spear so long as he feels mush, not steel? Why would he end a war he believes he is winning?

And what lessons will the despotic rulers of North Korea, Iran and China take away based on our actions or inactions, the risks we take and the risks we avoid? Because let me remind you, they are not like us.

• Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for The Washington Times.

Correction: In a previous version of the column, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un‘s name was misspelled.

Click to Read More and View Comments

Click to Hide

washingtontimes.com · by Clifford D. May

19. How Biden Can Stand With the Iranian People

Excerpts;

Despite domestic unrest, Tehran has not taken its eye off of the Middle East’s proxy wars. Neither should Washington. In addition to the need to counter Iran’s weapons proliferation and terror funding, a greater kinetic pushback on Iran and its proxies could lead to concurrent and even reinforcing foreign and domestic vectors of pressure on the regime. Over time, this could help elicit or widen fissures among the security establishment, as they may be forced to debate priorities and have to consider reallocating funding, time, political attention, and other resources to each contest. Ultimately, sustained domestic and foreign cost-imposition to the Islamic Republic can shatter the image of invincibility that it has carefully cultivated among adversaries and allies

At the end of the day, the Iranian people are and will remain the stewards of their own destiny. But three weeks in, one thing is clear: the Iranian people deserve more support. This strategy offers Washington a way to get off the sidelines and show, in ways consistent with American national security interests, that it stands with the Iranian people in practice, not just principle.

How Biden Can Stand With the Iranian People

With the prospect of reform non-existent, the Iranian protests offer Washington a chance to do well by doing good.

by Behnam Ben Taleblu Saeed Ghasseminejad

The National Interest · by Behnam Ben Taleblu · October 5, 2022

“These men have not slept for nights.” That’s what Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, the chief of the Islamic Republic’s judiciary, said about Iran’s security forces in a recently leaked video. Despite seeking a quick end to protests rocking the country, the Islamic Republic’s repressive apparatus is yet to win the war of wills against its own people. In another clip, Brig. Gen. Hossein Ashtari, the commander of Iran’s Law-Enforcement Forces (LEF), is seen attempting to boost the morale of his officers by saying that they should “not have a shred of doubt” about the task that lies ahead of them. Already, 133 Iranians have been reportedly killed and over 3,000 have been arrested in demonstrations that have mushroomed across the entire country. But protests continue.

Triggered by the morality police’s brutal killing of twenty-two-year-old Mahsa Amini for allegedly violating mandatory veiling laws, the latest iteration of Iran’s street protests both borrows from, and breaks with, the recent past. Unlike the 2009 Green Movement protests, which followed an election being stolen from a reformist candidate, the past half-decade of increasing Iranian protest activity is not tied to any faction or element of the regime. This is made clear in the slogans chanted at the protests, such as “reformists, principlists, the jig is up!”

Instead, these protests build on the critical evolution of demonstrations and labor strikes since 2009 away from reform and toward revolution. Starting in late 2017, Iranians began to take every available opportunity to move from “passive resistance” to active resistance. This was and continues to be done by using economic, environmental, social, and even security issues as a way to contest the Islamic Republic and, in doing so, make a larger political point about Iranians’ desire for a representative government in line with their values and interests.

In November 2019, Iranians poured onto the streets in response to high gas prices, but their slogans and aims were not about macroeconomics. While some in the West failed to comprehend this, Iran’s rulers faced no such analysis paralysis. Hiding behind an internet blackout, security forces reportedly killed 1,500 protesters in a matter of days. Yet Iranians turned out to protest less than two months later when the Islamic Republic downed a civilian airliner, killing 176 passengers. Fast forward to 2022, and the anti-regime protests that began this September actually picked up where protests sparked by high food prices this May had left off.

Yet, the increasing frequency, scale, and scope of Iranian political protests, the violence employed against protesters by authorities, and the population’s willingness to push back and continue transgressing redlines are missed in Washington’s nuclear-deal-centric framing of Iran policy.

Success for Iran’s protest movement or even the erosion of the Islamic Republic’s power could have profound consequences for stability in the Middle East and redound to America’s strategic advantage if supported correctly and carefully. After all, the Islamic Republic has never been shy about hiding its enmity for America—“the Great Satan”—and its desire to frustrate U.S. policy. This is especially true in the counterterrorism context, given Iran’s material support to terror proxies—styled by Tehran as “the Axis of Resistance”—in places like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza, as well as through the increasingly relevant paradigm of great power competition, where Tehran is busy tightening economic and military ties with China and Russia.

With the prospect of reform non-existent, the Iranian protests offer Washington a chance to do well by doing good. Here’s a ten-point plan to do exactly that.

First, the Biden administration should push away from nuclear negotiations, however indirect, with Tehran centered on resurrecting the 2015 Iran nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). So long as the JCPOA remains on the table, Tehran will know that international pressure will ultimately fade. A nuclear deal that fails to fully and permanently block Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon is, on its best day, a Faustian bargain for American national security. But having that same deal provide a regime like the Islamic Republic with a financial windfall of an estimated one trillion U.S. dollars by 2030 is sheer folly. Enabling the flow of such funding in exchange for limited and reversible concessions on select elements of Iran’s atomic infrastructure will oil the repressive apparatus that killed Mahsa Amini and her protesting compatriots. It will also permit Tehran to better back its foreign legion, thereby underwriting more, not less, bloodshed in Iran and across the Middle East.

Second, Washington should move to politically isolate the Islamic Republic by pushing for its removal from, or censure in, international organizations while also pressuring allies to sever or downgrade their bilateral diplomatic relations. Lest we forget, there have been a handful of times over the past four decades when European nations recalled their ambassadors from Tehran. The recent string of demarches, statements, and more by American allies is therefore welcome, but more can be done. There is no reason why, in the aftermath of the brutal killing of Mahsa Amini (as well as many other brave young women in protests), Iran should be permitted to retain its seat cost-free on the Commission on the Status of Women at the UN. Elected to the commission this spring, a regime that treats women as the Islamic Republic does not deserve to be anywhere near such a body.

Moreover, Washington could work with partners to support the establishment, as recommended by Amnesty International’s Secretary General, of an investigative body “by the UN Human Rights Council for the most serious crimes under international law committed by the Iranian authorities.” National governments with evidence of rights violations should be encouraged to submit information to such a body with the aim of developing a baseline international consensus as to what accountability for Iranian rights violators must look like.

Third, following its recent designation of Iran’s morality police and select military commanders for enabling the Islamic Republic’s crackdown, the Biden administration should initiate a mass designations campaign. Aimed at naming, shaming, and penalizing the Iranian people’s oppressors, these penalties can target vigilante, LEF, Basij paramilitary, or even Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders at the regional and local levels. Elsewhere, penalties can be scaled-up to explore the applicability of sanctions against politicians and officials supportive of the crackdown at the regional and national levels. Most of this culpability can be determined through open sources.

Specifically, sanctions can be ratcheted-up to target Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and President Ebrahim Raisi, both of whom are currently on the Treasury Department’s blacklist, but not for human rights-related offenses. Sanctions can also be extended to other pillars of the regime where there may be a financial or institutional nexus of support to Iran’s apparatus of repression. For example, Iran’s current Minister of Information and Communications Technology is not sanctioned despite his ministry’s involvement in internet restrictions and blackouts during protests. Yet in 2019, his predecessor was sanctioned for exactly that. The administration should also investigate the applicability of sanctions against select telecommunications and information technology firms and their leadership structures, be they government subsidiaries or government-supported “start-ups.” Doing so can help protect against nefarious actors using cut-outs to take advantage of new licenses and loosening communications restrictions by Washington.

As a corollary, Washington should share targeting information about these entities with its international partners who possess or are developing autonomous sanctions authorities. The mass designation and accountability campaign can then be “multilateralized” against the IRGC, LEF, regime officials, sanctions busters, censors, and others aiding the Islamic Republic’s repression machine. Canada’s recent sanctions against Iran’s morality police are a good example of this, but they must be expanded to include America’s trans-Atlantic partners. Conversely, when there are instances of entities subject to EU penalties that are yet to be targeted using State Department and Treasury Department authorities, Washington should rapidly move to bridge the trans-Atlantic gap.

Fourth, building on the mass designations campaign, the administration should use existing State Department authorities under a 2021 appropriations act to prevent the entry into the United States of Iranian human rights violators and their families. Far from any blanket visa ban that existed under the previous administration, this penalty can first be applied to individuals on the Treasury Department’s blacklist where an evidentiary basis for human rights penalties may already exist. It can then be broadened against new targets. After that, Washington can commence a dialogue with international partners where it has had success in sharing sanctions targeting information to get them to also consider a visa ban against the same persons and their families. The net result would be a widening web or “no-go zone” for Iranian human rights violators and their families. Lastly, should the political appetite and commensurate legal interpretations exist, the administration or Congress could inquire about, within the full extent of the law, revoking visas for family members of the regime elite already in the United States.

Fifth, with international politics and domestic news cycles not slowing down anytime soon, the Biden administration should work to increase its rhetorical support for Iranian protesters and keep the spotlight on the Islamic Republic’s crackdown. Drawing on the playbook employed by his predecessor during protests in 2018 and 2019, Biden and other high-ranking officials can vigorously embrace traditional and social media to amplify their support for the Iranian people and remind demonstrators that Washington stands with them. The more U.S. officials mention the names of the victims of the regime’s repression, the more the Iranian people will know their plight has not been overlooked and forgotten.

Concurrently, members of Congress can and should continue the string of letters, resolutions, tweets, and statements made in support of the Iranian people while also seeking to clarify or improve U.S. policy. Hearings about the administration’s human rights policy toward Iran, amongst others, can also be of assistance.

Sixth, the administration should support efforts to provide the Iranian people access to uncensored internet via satellite. As Iranians increasingly rely on the internet, social media applications, and mobile communications to organize and share the regime’s atrocities with the outside world, the Islamic Republic has improved its domestic cyber capabilities to censor and throttle or blackout the internet. With a reported 80 percent of Iranians already using virtual private networks (VPNs) and anti-filtering technologies prior to the start of the protests, measures to ensure connectivity are now a critical lynchpin.

Reports that Elon Musk is seeking to provide Iranians with Starlink is welcome news. To ramp up the production of Starlink terminals, an Iran Free Internet Fund (or similarly named entity) should be created under public-private auspices to offer Starlink financial support for an Iran-specific acquisition program. Washington can then create an interagency task force to oversee an operation to ensure that Iranians get access to the necessary hardware to make sure Starlink becomes operational, and sustain the costs of funneling this hardware into Iran over time. In the meantime, the U.S. government task force can help identify and contest regime or pro-regime hacker-led disinformation and hacking efforts to mislead Iranians about the current operational status of Starlink.

Seventh, the latest round of Treasury Department designations against Tehran’s petrochemical and oil smuggling networks raises hopes that at a very minimum, Washington may move towards greater enforcement of the sanctions penalties it has inherited and, until recently, decided to let atrophy. Since May, the Treasury Department has issued these penalties against networks supporting illicit Iranian oil and petrochemical producers, financiers, and shippers to the tune of one sanctions package a month. While these measures have been insufficient to elicit Iranian nuclear concessions or foster a change in behavior, a greater focus on Iran’s petrochemical exports is critical given their importance to the regime.

The administration should make sure relevant agencies are tracking these shipments so that Washington can move to confiscate, wherever possible and within the full extent of the law, illicit Iranian shipments. The funds generated from these sales can not only fund the aforementioned Iran Free Internet Fund, but also underwrite a strike and protest fund akin to what was done for Poland’s Solidarity Movement during the Cold War.

Eighth, the United States and many of its international partners have significant cyber capabilities that can be used to help protesters. In addition to targeting Tehran’s command and control systems from abroad, Washington can help the protesters in their efforts to move from street power to strike power. At present, protesters are facing challenges in sustaining a pincer movement against the regime. Labor strikes are currently ongoing in educational institutions across Iran, but they are slowly moving towards the service sector. Laborers in strategic sectors, such as the energy sector, are now threatening to go on strike. Disrupting the operations of these key sectors could give a much-needed boost to laborers and threaten the regime. Oil strikes were a critical factor that multiplied street power in the 1978-1979 protests that took down the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran.

Ninth, as protesters combat a well-equipped machine of oppression, Washington and its partners are likely already in possession of intelligence through signals and imagery that could possibly be shared with protesters via the Iranian opposition. Specifically, should Basij, IRGC, and LEF bases and command outposts be the subject of monitoring, then information on force deployments from these positions could be useful for Iranian protesters.

Tenth, as the Islamic Republic continues its crackdown on Iranians at home, it has been looking abroad to project strength. For the third time since protests began in September, Iran attacked Kurdish positions in northern Iraq. But unlike the first two days of strikes, on the third day, IRGC ground forces escalated to launch a reported seventy-three ballistic missiles at several locations in Iraqi Kurdistan, killing a reported thirteen people. This marks Iran’s second ballistic missile operation against northern Iraq in 2022, the first being a barrage in March against the home of a Kurdish oil tycoon, which Tehran claimed was an Israeli outpost. The recent operation even took the life of an American citizen, but Tehran has thus far only received condemnation from Washington.

Despite domestic unrest, Tehran has not taken its eye off of the Middle East’s proxy wars. Neither should Washington. In addition to the need to counter Iran’s weapons proliferation and terror funding, a greater kinetic pushback on Iran and its proxies could lead to concurrent and even reinforcing foreign and domestic vectors of pressure on the regime. Over time, this could help elicit or widen fissures among the security establishment, as they may be forced to debate priorities and have to consider reallocating funding, time, political attention, and other resources to each contest. Ultimately, sustained domestic and foreign cost-imposition to the Islamic Republic can shatter the image of invincibility that it has carefully cultivated among adversaries and allies

At the end of the day, the Iranian people are and will remain the stewards of their own destiny. But three weeks in, one thing is clear: the Iranian people deserve more support. This strategy offers Washington a way to get off the sidelines and show, in ways consistent with American national security interests, that it stands with the Iranian people in practice, not just principle.

Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Saeed Ghasseminejad is a senior adviser. Both contribute to FDD’s Iran Program and Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP), among others. The views expressed are their own.

Image: Reuters.

The National Interest · by Behnam Ben Taleblu · October 5, 2022

20. The World Cup Won't Clean Up Qatar's Image

The World Cup Won't Clean Up Qatar's Image

19fortyfive.com · by David May · October 5, 2022

Doha’s $220 billion public relations stunt is crashing and burning. By halftime of its inaugural game on September 9, the 2022 World Cup’s flagship stadium ran out of water. Panicked fans got a taste of the conditions migrant workers faced while building these state-of-the-art arenas in Qatar’s 100-degree heat. On top of that, several team captains want to wear rainbow armbands to draw attention to Qatar’s poor treatment of the LGBT community. Though Qatar would like a PR bump from the games, the World Cup spotlight provides the perfect opportunity to shine a light on Qatar’s many vices.

Qatar Using the Autocrat’s Playbook

Doha has hosted soccer, swimming, motorsport, and other athletic events in the past to improve its image. But the World Cup is its biggest stage by far. In its eagerness for this opportunity, the Gulf country won the honor by bribing FIFA officials, according to U.S. court documents.

Using the glitz and glamor of sporting events to distract from human rights abuses is a standard move from the autocrat’s playbook. Like Doha, Moscow employed bribery to secure the World Cup it hosted in 2018. Russia also hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics. Earlier this year, China hosted the Winter Olympics — pejoratively termed the “#GenocideGames” because of Beijing’s imprisonment of over 1 million ethnic minority Uyghurs.

Already, Qatar has received favorable attention for its willingness to host Israeli visitors for the Cup. But this policy does not entail a reversal of Doha’s general ban on Israelis. Rather, this temporary measure is the bare minimum expected of Qatar, since sporting bodies have cracked down on nationality-based discrimination in recent years.

Players and Attendees Supporting and in the LGBT Community

Qatar’s promises to welcome LGBT fans have been even less convincing. In 2020, Qatar assured FIFA it would allow fans to display rainbow flags. However, a senior Qatari official overseeing the tournament’s security recently claimed that if his personnel seize rainbow flags, it is for the fans’ own protection. In any case, Qatar’s month-long charade will not change the fact that Qatari law prescribes a seven-year prison sentence for being gay.

Qatar’s two-faced approach to gay rights extends to Doha’s largest influence operation: Al Jazeera. To get a sense of Al Jazeera’s popularity, over a period of three months in 2020, the state-owned and -funded network’s digital platforms boasted 1.4 billion viewers. While Al Jazeera has entertained Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf Al Qaradawi’s condemnations of homosexuality in Arabic, its English AJ+ outlet courted millennials by collecting a list of “LGBTQ+ Films For Pride Month.”

Pedaling Influence with Oil Funds

Qatar has also used its oil largesse to influence think tanks and universities. From 1986 to 2018, the Gulf country channeled some $5 billion to U.S. universities. A research institute on antisemitism has warned that these funds could be fueling anti-Jewish hatred on campus. Doha’s influence operations have also included millions of dollars to prominent DC think tanks.

Qatar has used these soft power tools to mask its soft spot for terrorists. Doha has hosted top leaders of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, and other extremist groups. Its $360 million to $480 million annual contributions subsidize Hamas’ activities, which include offering Palestinians $200 to post TikTok videos of themselves attacking Israelis.

While terrorists stayed in Doha’s luxury hotels, foreign workers toiled to build new resorts for the World Cup. Foreigners, including one million construction workers, constitute around 91 percent of the country’s workforce91 percent of the country’s workforce, including one million construction workers. The games’ organizer reported the deaths of 37 construction workers. Meanwhile, a Guardian report found that over 6,500 migrant workers have died in the Gulf country since FIFA announced Qatar as the host of the 2022 games. The total death toll could be much higher since the report only covered workers from five countries.

Beyond poor working conditions, these laborers face an exploitative sponsorship system that gives employers widespread control over their workers. After paying a large fee to work in Qatar, indebted workers face the threat of deportation if they do not sign contracts with their employers. Qatar has made legal reforms in recent years, but little has changed on the ground.

A quarter-trillion dollars will buy Qatar a world stage in two months. But the extra attention will shine a light on the Gulf autocracy’s discrimination against the LGBT community, foreign laborers, and Israelis, and its continued support for terrorism. Nobody should be fooled by Doha’s attempt to win hearts and minds built on the backs of migrant workers.

David May (@DavidSamuelMay) is a research manager and senior research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

19fortyfive.com · by David May · October 5, 2022

21. Opinion | Ukraine needs advanced U.S. drones that can instantly transform a battle

It is interesting that a columnist/pundit such as George Will with no military expertise would be writing about such a specific capability (of course he is using it to illustrate larger points).

Conclusion:

Blinken’s formulation is pitch-perfect: If Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends. If Biden stays strong, with U.S. drones as a judicious increment in punishing Putin’s brutality by reversing his aggression, Biden’s presidency will be deemed by wise historians as, on balance, a success.

Opinion | Ukraine needs advanced U.S. drones that can instantly transform a battle

The Washington Post · by George F. Will · October 5, 2022

“In war, moral power is to physical as three parts out of four.” — Napoleon Bonaparte

On the afternoon of June 18, 1815, near the Belgian village of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington said: “Hard pounding, this, gentlemen: let’s see who will pound the longest.” If Ukraine is given material aid equivalent to one-fourth of that nation’s moral resources, Ukraine can prevail against the Russian invaders, which means, at a minimum, restoration of the status quo ante Feb. 24. So, the immediate imperative is to supply Ukraine with the most sophisticated and dangerous U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a.k.a. drones, which can be force-multipliers for Ukraine’s hard pounding of the Russians.

So far, the most consequential weapon transferred to Ukraine has been the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), whose munitions have the long reach and accuracy necessary to immediately imperil Russian artillery pieces. UAVs can locate Russian artillery when they unleash their often-indiscriminate attacks on urban population centers before the artillery can be moved to avoid a counterstrike.

Russia’s invasion was, by the standards of the 1945-1946 Nuremberg tribunal, a war crime. The conduct of the war is another. Russia’s military doctrine, which ratifies that nation’s traditional practices, stresses mass fire systems to crush the enemy’s military in battles, and to intimidate and demoralize the enemy’s population. By the end of August, the invaders’ artillery had fired more than 10 million rounds — about 60,000 rounds per day. The invasion’s death toll of Ukrainian noncombatants is estimated in the tens of thousands.

Follow George F. Will's opinionsFollow

Advanced U.S. drones combine intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting and strike capabilities. Such drones can be sent into, and transform, a battle immediately, saving civilian lives by making Russia’s terror tactics terrifying for those who are firing the artillery or launching low-level airstrikes.

A bipartisan group of 17 members of Congress has urged Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to immediately magnify Ukraine’s technological advantage by expediting delivery to Ukraine of Gray Eagle and/or Reaper drones, thereby making distant Russian ammunition dumps and command centers — including generals and other senior officers — vulnerable. The key is knowing the target’s location in all weather, day or night. Advanced drones can defeat Russia’s defenses by seeing them from long range.

Opinion writers on the war in Ukraine

Post Opinions provides commentary on the war in Ukraine from columnists with expertise in foreign policy, voices on the ground in Ukraine and more.

Columnist David Ignatius covers foreign affairs. His columns have broken news on new developments around the war. He also answers questions from readers. Sign up to follow him.

Iuliia Mendel, a former press secretary for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, writes guest opinions from inside Ukraine. She has written about trauma, Ukraine’s “women warriors” and what it’s like for her fiance to go off to war.

Columnist Fareed Zakaria covers foreign affairs. His columns have reviewed the West’s strategy in Ukraine. Sign up to follow him.

Nataliya Gumenyuk, a Ukrainian author and journalist specializing in foreign affairs, writes guest opinions about the mood inside Ukraine. She has written about Ukrainians stepping up, the war’s tremendous losses and rejoicing after a successful counteroffensive.

Columnist Josh Rogin covers foreign policy and national security. His columns have explored the geopolitical ramifications of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine.

Columnist Max Boot covers national security. His columns have encouraged the West to continue its support for Ukraine’s resistance. Sign up to follow him.

1/7

End of carousel

The military historian Max Hastings writes for Bloomberg, perhaps too sanguinely: “Today’s major powers have developed a better understanding of how to fight each other through proxies, without blowing up the world, since their first major experience with the phenomenon following the North Korean invasion of the South in June 1950.” The proxy nature of NATO’s fight against Russia would not be altered by the delivery of the most sophisticated drones, any more than it was by the tremendous impact of giving Ukraine HIMARS.

Henry Kissinger, a realist who reasons from facts and knows that events put facts in flux, tells the Wall Street Journal: After Russia’s criminal savagery in Ukraine, “now I consider, one way or the other, formally or not, Ukraine has to be treated in the aftermath of this as a member of NATO.” This fact, which it is, strengthens the case for giving Ukraine weapons that will help it produce battlefield results commensurate with its future status as a member of the European Union and, “formally or not,” NATO.

Furthermore, if Russian President Vladimir Putin’s thinly veiled nuclear threats are seen to deter the Biden administration from taking the next step that military logic entails — sophisticated drones for Ukraine — there will be two terrible consequences: Putin will repeatedly make such threats, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime will unravel as other nations’ ruthless and reckless leaders see the practicality of nuclear weapons and build them.

Additional drones should be a defining issue for Biden. He has floundered regarding many things but has resoundingly succeeded regarding the most important thing. He has ignited inflation, has made the swollen national debt into a potentially self-exploding crisis as the cost of servicing it rises, and has dispensed scalding rhetoric to a nation weary of such. No president has more needed talented speechwriters or had worse ones: In nine months, they have produced two of the worst (delivered in Atlanta and Philadelphia) speeches in presidential history. Regarding Ukraine, however, Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken have been superb.

Blinken’s formulation is pitch-perfect: If Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends. If Biden stays strong, with U.S. drones as a judicious increment in punishing Putin’s brutality by reversing his aggression, Biden’s presidency will be deemed by wise historians as, on balance, a success.

The Washington Post · by George F. Will · October 5, 2022

22. Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?

Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?

military.com · by 5 Oct 2022 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · October 5, 2022

Gary Anderson was the director of Marine Corps Wargaming and chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab. He lectures on Wargaming and Alternative Analysis (Red Teaming) at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

In a recent speech to the Marine Corps Association, the current commandant, Gen. David Berger, congratulated his Marines on having an open and honest debate concerning his Force Design (FD) 2030 initiative, which eliminated all the service's tanks, much of its tubed artillery, many helicopters and its heavy engineering capability, and drastically reduced Marine Corps infantry strength.

My question is: What debate? Incoming students at the Marine Corps professional education schools are told in no uncertain terms that the restructured service is a done deal and not up for discussion. The only articles in service-specific publications that have seriously questioned the premises or execution of FD 2030 have been by retired Marines or independent analysts. The new doctrine was developed behind closed doors by the commandant and a close circle of trusted advisers. No input from the rest of the active duty or the retired members of the Corps was solicited.

Historically, that approach has not ended well for the militaries that have employed it. In 1936, the French General Staff issued a gag order concerning criticism of the French standing doctrine known as "Methodical Battle" either in public or in professional journals. Officers such as Charles de Gaulle had their careers threatened when they continued to push for independent mass armored units instead of using tanks solely to support slow moving infantry. War games, such as they were, constituted rehearsals for the application of Methodical Battle doctrine. There were no competent "Red Teams;" the opposing force, if one existed, acted as tackling dummies.

The only serious criticism of French doctrine came from the Germans in a 1940 live-fire exercise that overran France in a little over a month.

The German preparation for war was far different. Not only was there lively internal debate over the massed use of tanks, but also of the close coordination of aircraft with ground forces. War games and field exercises were umpired affairs with competent "Red Teams" opposing the emerging ideas for strategy, trying to poke holes in them.

Conversely, we don't know much about how the war games that led up to FD 2030 were conducted because they were classified. Berger claims that the games validated the 2030 concept, and he asks us to take his word for it. The Marine Corps has announced that unclassified summaries will be released later this year. One thing I stress to my students at George Washington University when lecturing on war games is that when someone tells you that games have validated anything, "grab your wallet."

Good war games only identify issues, they don't prove anything. When they are manipulated by the sponsor or the Red Team is hobbled, the results can be disastrous if the concept being examined is let loose in the wild. A good example of this is the series of war games conducted by Japanese Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto in the months and weeks leading up to the Battle of Midway during World War II. Yamamoto had his umpires discount several American tactics that appeared to disrupt the Japanese plan for the Midway operation. One of those tactics was the one that won the actual battle for the U.S. Navy's dive bombers.

I am not alleging that the FD 2030 games were rigged, because I don't know. The whole process is opaque due to classification. What is true is that Berger has made significant changes to the force structure and size of the Marine Corps with no consultation with Congress and apparently no input from the U.S. combatant commanders in Europe, Africa and the Middle East who may have based their war plans on capabilities that the Marine Corps no longer possesses.

To date, Congress has abdicated its military oversight responsibility when it comes to the force redesign. Congressmen who served in the Marine Corps have backed the initiative because Marines are instinctively supportive of the Corps. Congress has often kept the Marine Corps afloat when others were trying to scuttle it. "Once a Marine, always a Marine" was drummed into all of us from our first days in boot camp and Officer Candidates School. However, it is not clear to me that even the Marine veterans in Congress understand the full implications and potential dangers inherent in FD 2030.

The Armed Services Committees of both the House and the Senate should hold hearings regarding the real value of FD 2030 both to the nation and the Marine Corps. Witnesses at such hearings should be eclectic and include stakeholders from within the Marine Corps and the joint community for which it has Title 10 responsibilities to support. Members should have appropriate clearances to view the classified reports of the games and studies.

The first group of witnesses should include those associated with the 2030 war games. Key questions should include the following: First, who made up the Red (Chinese) Team? Did they include experts in existing Chinese doctrine? Who comprised the analytical game team who wrote the reports? Were members of the team who wrote the FD 2030 concept involved in analysis? If so, it would represent a conflict of interest that could have skewed the results -- particularly if these people were senior to other members of the analytical team.

A second group of stakeholders should include the combatant commanders of the various regions that the Marine Corps supports. How does the change in Marine Corps force structure impact their war plans? This should include the commander of the Indo-Pacific theater since FD 2030 is specifically designed to support him. Does he believe that FD 2030 will significantly help in deterring China or aid in victory if conflict breaks out?

Finally, there are our Indo-Pacific allies and potential wartime partners. These would notably include Japan, Taiwan, India, Singapore and Australia. The same questions should be posed to them as to our Indo-Pacific commander. If our military leaders and allies believe that there is worth in FD 2030 that outweighs the trade-offs that Berger has made, so be it. Now, however, we just don't know.

military.com · by 5 Oct 2022 Military.com | By Gary Anderson · October 5, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 5

Oct 5, 2022 - Press ISW

CDS Daily brief (05.10.22) CDS comments on key events

Occupied territories

Operational situation

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

Kramatorsk direction

Donetsk direction

Zaporizhzhia direction

Kherson direction

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 05.10

Ukraine, general news

International diplomatic aspect

Putin Must Go: Now Is the Time For Regime Change in Russia

U.S. Believes Ukraine Was Behind an Assassination in Russia

How the US might respond to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine

'Watched the whole time': China's surveillance state grows under Xi

U.S. Aims to Turn Taiwan Into Giant Weapons Depot

Editors’ Picks

New York City

Before She Died, My Wife Kept a Diary. Why Won’t Her Cousin Let Me See It?

Fossils Reveal Pterosaur Relatives Before They Evolved Wings

More on the Relations Between Asia and the U.S.

How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era

Ex-cop kills 22 children, 12 others in Thai mass shooting

DRUGS CHARGE

Putin’s Apocalyptic End Game in Ukraine

Annexation and Mobilization Make Nuclear War More Likely

By Tatiana Stanovaya

A NOT-SO-GRAND ULTIMATUM

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

TOTAL WAR

THE POISON PILL

The Russian Military Seems to Be in Full Retreat in Ukraine

Frozen compass, frigid wind — How Green Berets would airdrop into the Arctic in a future war

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED OCT 5, 2022 2:49 PM​

​​

The latest on Task & Purpose

How China got a spy inside the US Army

“They just told me to get to meet people, some American friends."

The Pentagon set 18 diversity goals in 2011. It’s fulfilled 6 of them.

US special forces conduct midnight raid in Syria killing 'ISIS leader'

US special forces conduct midnight raid deep in government-held area of Syria killing 'ISIS leader' and taking several others captive

Army Piloting Pentagon’s Counter-UAS Efforts

The problem with tyrants like Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin​

They're not like us​

How Biden Can Stand With the Iranian People

The World Cup Won't Clean Up Qatar's Image

Opinion | Ukraine needs advanced U.S. drones that can instantly transform a battle

Can Congress Save the Marine Corps from Itself?

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED OCT 5, 2022 2:49 PM

The problem with tyrants like Kim Jong-un and Vladimir Putin

They're not like us