Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“I want our nation to be the most beautiful in the world. By this I do not mean the most powerful nation. Because I have felt the pain of being invaded by another nation, I do not want my nation to invade others. It is sufficient that our wealth makes our lives abundant; it is sufficient that our strength is able to prevent foreign invasions. The only thing that I desire in infinite quantity is the power of a noble culture. This is because the power of culture both makes ourselves happy and gives happiness to others.”

- Kim Ku, Korean freedom fighter

"Life is long to the miserable, but short to the happy."

– Publilius Syrus

"Human beings are perhaps never more frightening than when they are convinced beyond doubt that they are right."

– Laurens Van der Post

1. The Dangers of Overreacting to North Korea’s Provocations

2. N. Korea conducts another cruise missile launch: JCS

3. Russia supplied some 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum to N. Korea last year

4. N. Korea forms committee to carry out regional economic policy

5. N. Korea pulls out of Hong Kong, Libya in series of embassy closures: official

6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ “Prepare for war…” Government intensifies civil defense training amid efforts to stoke crisis…tells those not attending drills that their rations, wages will be cut

7. N. Korea fires 3 missiles in a week, signals performance upgrades

8. ‘12.12: The Day’ and lessons from S. Korea-US relations

9. Is S. Korea ready for trade war planned by Trump?

10. North Korean orphans ‘volunteer’ for grueling mine and farm work

11. Analysts: China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors Supports Pyongyang's Authoritarian Rule

12. N Korea launches rural growth committee as economy struggles

13. S. Korea’s echo chambers grow, study finds

14. N. Korean farmers express frustration at “Juche Farming Method” lectures

15 N. Korean university students complain about the state taking away their vacations.

16. Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected

17. An ‘Orange Revolution’ in South Korean Politics?

18. 'A lot of punishment, no food, hard work': North Korean defector's fears for sister who will 'die in jail'

19. Secret calls and code names: The risky business of sending money to N Korea

20. The Korean War: The First Year

1. The Dangers of Overreacting to North Korea’s Provocations

My recommendations for responding to north Korean provocations.

North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Test: A 6 Step Strategy To Respond

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/01/north-koreas-ballistic-missile-test-a-6-step-strategy-to-respond/

First, do not overreact.

Second, never ever back down in the face of North Korean increased tension, threats, and provocations.

Third, coordinate an alliance response.

Fourth, exploit weakness in North Korea – create internal pressure on Kim and the regime from his elite and military.

Fifth, demonstrate strength and resolve.

Sixth, depending on the nature of the provocation, be prepared to initiate a decisive response using the most appropriate tools, e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, information and influence activities, cyber, etc., or a combination.

Key point from Dr. Terry in the conclusion below.

Excerpts:

The Biden administration has repeatedly tried and failed to entice North Korea to engage in renewed dialogue. The administration has made more than 20 attempts to restart talks, without success. Washington must keep trying; it is vital to establish channels of communication with Pyongyang to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. But Kim has little incentive to begin talks with Biden, preferring to wait for Trump’s potential return. In the meantime, the United States should continue to strengthen its military capabilities and alliances to deter North Korea.

Biden’s success in fostering greater cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan will be vital to this effort. Washington must deepen and expand this growing tripartite alliance, extending it to include intelligence sharing and missile defense. The Biden administration should press for a greater number of trilateral and bilateral military exercises to deter North Korea and prepare for any contingency. Washington should also continue sending nuclear capable submarines, bombers, and other U.S. military assets to the region in order to show Pyongyang that the United States stands ready and able to defend South Korea.

War is not inevitable. Washington and its allies can still prevent conflict by deterring Pyongyang. Of course, doing so will become harder due to the North’s expanding WMD capabilities and its increasing closeness with Moscow. But now is not the time to panic. It is time, instead, to send North Korea a signal of resoluteness and strength. U.S. power has kept the peace for more than 70 years on the Korean Peninsula. There is no reason that it cannot continue to do so.

The Dangers of Overreacting to North Korea’s Provocations

What Kim Jong Un’s Latest Moves Really Mean

By Sue Mi Terry

January 30, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Sue Mi Terry · January 30, 2024

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is once again raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Every week seems to bring fresh news of missile tests, as Pyongyang’s range of weapons of mass destruction expands in quality and quantity. At the same time, Kim is issuing new threats of war with South Korea. Denying the kinship between the two countries, he now denounces his neighbor as an enemy state.

There is no doubt that Pyongyang is ramping up its rhetoric and its military provocations. The question, however, is whether Kim is doing this to safeguard his regime and coerce Seoul or if he is planning an impending offensive against South Korea and the United States. In January, Robert Carlin, a former chief of the Northeast Asia Division at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, warned that Kim “has made a strategic decision to go to war.” “The danger is already far beyond the routine warnings in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about Pyongyang’s ‘provocations,’” they wrote in an article for 38North, a website devoted to North Korean issues. “We do not see the war preparation themes in North Korean media appearing since the beginning of last year as typical bluster.”

Although Carlin and Hecker raise legitimate and serious concerns, they do not present any hard evidence that Kim wants a war. The likelihood is that he does not. Kim knows that a major war with South Korea would surely draw in the United States and would spell the end of his regime. The risk, then, is not that North Korea will intentionally begin a war but that Pyongyang’s saber rattling and regular acts of low-level aggression—including launching missiles into South Korean waters, sending drones toward its islands, and violating borders in the Yellow Sea—could nevertheless start a war by provoking retaliation. To ensure that this does not happen, and that peace holds on the peninsula, Washington and Seoul must send an unmistakable signal of military strength and purpose even as they seek to reestablish communication with Pyongyang.

BEHIND THE BLUSTER

There is nothing new about North Korean leaders issuing threats to Seoul and its Western allies. Kim, who took power in 2011 following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il, has regularly done so. But he went further than usual in a speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly on January 15. South Korea, he announced, was “the most hostile” country in the world, and war with it was inevitable. Kim vowed to rewrite the North Korean constitution to label the government in Seoul as his country’s primary foe, and he called for the destruction of various symbols of Korean cooperation, including an unused cross-border rail line and the massive, nine-story monument to the goal of Korean unification that his father constructed in Pyongyang.

Kim’s speech followed his announcement at the end of 2023 that reunification with the South was “impossible” and that the two Koreas no longer have any “kinship” or “homogeneity.” They are instead, he said, two separate “belligerent states in the midst of war.” This declaration should be interpreted not as the latest instance of North Korean bluster but as a significant, even momentous event. With this statement, Kim implicitly criticized and reversed his father’s and revered grandfather’s policies on reunification.

Until Kim’s recent declaration on reunification, three generations of North Korean leaders had consistently extolled, with a quasi-religious fervor, the ideal of a unified, socialist Korea. To that end, for decades, the Kims have maintained that people in the South were compatriots in need of liberation from a puppet-capitalist regime beholden to Washington. Pyongyang, accordingly, used emotive language to shape its citizens’ perceptions of their southern brethren. There was, they were told repeatedly, a “great ethnic unity” that would be restored through “peaceful reunification” and “reconciliation” with their “fellow countrymen.” Now these phrases have been jettisoned—dismissed, in Kim’s words, as nothing but “remnants of the past.”

The risk is that Pyongyang’s saber rattling and regular acts of low-level aggression could start a war.

Pyongyang has for decades advocated for aggression against the South to accomplish reunification. But Kim’s abandonment of this objective will not lead to peace on the peninsula. Rather, this policy shift was accompanied by Kim’s instruction to the military to prepare for a “showdown with the enemy” and “for a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea.” This should, he said, be done through nuclear war, if necessary. The goal, it seems, is no longer reunification but conquest—or at least coercion.

Other dangerous moves have resulted. Since 2018, Pyongyang has de facto accepted the maritime border between North and South Korea, which was drawn up by the United Nations at the end of the Korean War. Kim has now declared this border illegal and asserted North Korean territorial claims in the area, raising the risk of clashes with the South. He has warned that if Seoul’s forces invade the North’s “ground territory, territorial air space, or territorial waters by even 0.001 mm, it will be considered a provocation of war.” The practical effect of this warning is still unclear. Seoul rejected it as low-level psychological warfare, but ignoring it could be a justification for further North Korean provocation.

There are three likely explanations for the changes in Kim’s tone and policy. The first and most concerning is that these policy changes are motivated by his desire to justify the use of nuclear weapons in a future conflict. By designating South Korea as an enemy, rather than a wayward member of the Korean family, Kim has established a logical, moral, and ideological basis for aggression. The second, more sanguine, explanation holds that this change of attitude is a way of normalizing relations by treating South Korea as just another foreign country. Kim’s decision to sever all links with the South, however, renders this explanation unlikely. The most credible explanation is that this change has been made to justify greater aggression against the South, which will probably stop short of a major war. Nevertheless, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo must take Kim’s words seriously, as his motivations remain unclear and it is imperative to be prepared for whatever he may do.

FRIENDS AND FIREPOWER

Kim has begun what he calls an “exponential” expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and increased the production of mobile missile launchers. He has also pledged to put three new spy satellites into orbit, in order to monitor alleged threats from South Korea and the United States. Meanwhile, Pyongyang has put plans in place to improve the reliability, accuracy, and sophistication of its short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles. This missile program has benefitted from Russian battlefield testing in Ukraine, which has also advertised North Korean weaponry to potential buyers.

In expanding its WMD arsenal, North Korea is taking advantage of a propitious geopolitical situation. U.S.-Chinese competition and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have led to greater cooperation among Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. As a result, Russia and China now refuse to work with the United States to impose or enforce sanctions on North Korea. This means that Pyongyang’s provocative actions now have fewer consequences, leaving the regime free to increase the quantity and quality of its missiles. In 2023, Pyongyang launched a record number, including what it claimed in December was a solid-propellent, road-mobile, nuclear-capable ICBM that can reach any location in the United States. North Korea is also developing hypersonic missiles that can penetrate U.S. air defenses and, in January, it successfully test-fired an intermediate-range solid-fuel ballistic missile capable of reaching U.S. military bases in the western Pacific.

The relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang, which ended after the Cold War, has been revived. North Korea now supplies Russia with ballistic missiles, drones, and artillery shells. In return, Moscow is helping Pyongyang with advanced military technologies. After two failed attempts to launch a military satellite into orbit in May and August 2023, North Korea finally succeeded in November. There is widespread speculation that Russian experts helped Pyongyang pull off that feat. Putin seemed to confirm as much when he was asked during a meeting with Kim at a spaceport in Russia in September 2023 whether Moscow would help North Korea build and launch satellites.“That’s why we came here,” he replied.

Pyongyang is likely to join in China and Russia’s efforts to interfere in elections in rival states, particularly in the United States and South Korea. A study published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that North Korea stages more than four times as many provocations in U.S. election years than in other years. This year, Kim may have a particular incentive to make trouble for U.S. President Joe Biden in the hope of securing former President Donald Trump’s return—an outcome that Kim would see as positive, given Trump’s open admiration for Kim and Trump’s repeated threats to pull U.S. troops out of South Korea.

TO THE BRINK

War could result from North Korean provocations ranging from more missile or nuclear tests to limited conventional clashes with South Korea. It is still doubtful that Kim would launch a nuclear attack on the South—which would likely result in North Korea’s destruction by the United States—or even a raid similar to the one undertaken by Hamas against Israel on October 7, which is a possibility that concerns South Koreans. But Kim may very well commit a provocation or set a trap to bait South Korea into a clash that could lead to a limited conventional conflict between the two countries. He might be tempted to ramp up tensions to keep the pressure on South Korea in this election year, to set the stage for negotiations if Trump wins the presidency, or to rally the populace behind his regime. Kim has learned that there are few consequences for misconduct and many potential rewards.

Such clashes have periodically occurred in the past, prompted by North Korean provocations. In 2010, Northern forces attacked a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, and killed 46 sailors. The Obama administration, fearful of a larger war breaking out, restrained South Korean President Lee Myung-bak from launching a retaliatory airstrike. Then, later that same year, Yeonpyeong Island was shelled by North Korean artillery, killing four. Kim probably ordered the artillery strikes in part due to the perceived weakness of the Lee government, which had failed to take decisive action after the Cheonan sinking. In response, Lee ordered an artillery barrage on North Korean territory.

The situation remains tense. On January 6, the North fired more than 200 artillery shells into South Korean waters close to Yeonpyeong Island, causing Seoul to evacuate nearby civilians. If one of the North’s artillery shells had killed civilians or military personnel on Yeonpyeong Island, then South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol might have ordered an escalatory, retaliatory artillery strike or airstrike. Yoon, a conservative hard-liner, has already condemned Kim’s description of South Korea as an enemy state, and vowed to punish North Korea in the event of any military provocation. The possibility of a limited confrontation spiraling out of control is all the more concerning in light of North Korea’s lowered threshold for first use of nuclear weapons.

ACCIDENTS CAN HAPPEN

Although there are many reasons to be concerned, Kim remains a rational actor who realizes that no country can win a nuclear war, particularly against the United States. Even if Trump returns to the White House, Pyongyang would be running an existential risk if it launched a major attack on South Korea. Trump declared himself willing in 2017 to unleash “fire and fury” if North Korean tests continued, although he later pivoted to praise Kim. That is why there is no indication that Kim is preparing for war. If he is he would need to build up military assets near the border with South Korea and create huge weapons and munitions stockpiles. Neither has been done. There have been no increases of the forces stationed on the border and military supplies continue to flow to Russian troops in Ukraine. Kim probably does not want a war, but it is possible that he could miscalculate and accidentally start one. Given the parlous state of Pyongyang’s relations with Washington and Seoul since the failure of the Hanoi summit in 2019, there are few guardrails in place to prevent complex situations from spiraling out of control.

The Biden administration has repeatedly tried and failed to entice North Korea to engage in renewed dialogue. The administration has made more than 20 attempts to restart talks, without success. Washington must keep trying; it is vital to establish channels of communication with Pyongyang to reduce the risk of accidental conflict. But Kim has little incentive to begin talks with Biden, preferring to wait for Trump’s potential return. In the meantime, the United States should continue to strengthen its military capabilities and alliances to deter North Korea.

Biden’s success in fostering greater cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan will be vital to this effort. Washington must deepen and expand this growing tripartite alliance, extending it to include intelligence sharing and missile defense. The Biden administration should press for a greater number of trilateral and bilateral military exercises to deter North Korea and prepare for any contingency. Washington should also continue sending nuclear capable submarines, bombers, and other U.S. military assets to the region in order to show Pyongyang that the United States stands ready and able to defend South Korea.

War is not inevitable. Washington and its allies can still prevent conflict by deterring Pyongyang. Of course, doing so will become harder due to the North’s expanding WMD capabilities and its increasing closeness with Moscow. But now is not the time to panic. It is time, instead, to send North Korea a signal of resoluteness and strength. U.S. power has kept the peace for more than 70 years on the Korean Peninsula. There is no reason that it cannot continue to do so.

SUE MI TERRY is the founder of Peninsula Strategies Inc. and a producer of an award-winning documentary film on North Korean defectors, Beyond Utopia.

Foreign Affairs · by Sue Mi Terry · January 30, 2024

2. N. Korea conducts another cruise missile launch: JCS

(LEAD) N. Korea conducts another cruise missile launch: JCS | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 30, 2024

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest details in from paras 6-12)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea fired several cruise missiles off the west coast Tuesday, the South Korean military said, just two days after it test-fired submarine-launched cruise missiles from the east coast.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the North's launch at around 7 a.m. from its west coast. It did not specify the number of missiles.

"While strengthening our monitoring and vigilance, our military has been closely coordinating with the United States to monitor additional signs of North Korea's provocations," the JCS said in a text message sent to reporters.

It marks the third cruise missile launch in a week.

On Sunday, North Korea test-fired a newly developed submarine-launched strategic cruise missile, named the "Pulhwasal-3-31," near Sinpo, a major shipyard for submarines, just days after the strategic cruise missile was tested for the first time on Wednesday last week.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 29, 2024, shows the North's firing of a submarine-launched cruise missile the previous day. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un oversaw the test-fire of the new Pulhwasal-3-31 strategic cruise missile and reviewed a project to build a nuclear-powered submarine, state media reported. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Military officials believe the unusually rapid pace of cruise missile tests was aimed at enhancing the performance of the new weapons system.

North Korea claimed the submarine-launched Pulhwasal-3-31 flew for approximately two hours Sunday and hit preset targets, but the South Korean military speculated the North may have exaggerated the flight time.

"The flight time of the cruise missiles launched today flew longer than the ones launched on Jan. 28, which are believed to be flying at a normal range," a Joint Chiefs of Staff official said on the background.

The North first test-fired the Hwasal-1 cruise missile in September 2021, and launched several Hwasal-1 and -2 cruise missiles presumed to be capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons last year.

The normal flight range of Hwasal-1 is estimated to be around 1,500 km, while Hwasal-2 is presumed to have a range of about 2,000 km. Hwasal means "arrow" in Korean, and Pulhwasal means "fire arrow."

The cruise missiles add threats to the South Korean air defense system in addition to sophisticated ballistic missiles with varying ranges, warheads and launch platforms.

Experts say the submarine-launched cruise missiles could pose a serious threat to South Korea's air defense system if perfected as they are harder to detect and shoot down due to their low-flying altitude and precision strike capabilities.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · January 30, 2024

3. Russia supplied some 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum to N. Korea last year

Every little bit (barrel) helps nK.

Russia supplied some 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum to N. Korea last year | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 30, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- Russia reported to the United Nations that it had supplied around 100,000 barrels of refined petroleum to North Korea last year, data showed Tuesday.

According to data from the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) sanctions committee on North Korea, Russia reported to the committee that it had provided refined petroleum totaling 50,523 barrels to the North between March and December last year.

Under the UNSC Resolution 2397 adopted in 2017, member countries' shipments of refined petroleum to North Korea were capped at 500,000 barrels per year. Member states providing such items to the North should report their monthly supply to the U.N.

This computerized image depicts the suspended supply of refined petroleum to North Korea under U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs. (Yonhap)

On the website of the committee, Russia's related data for January and February 2023 were missing. But Moscow earlier reported it had exported refined petroleum of 44,655 barrels and 10,666 barrels, respectively.

When combining those figures, Russia is believed to have supplied 105,845 barrels of refined petroleum to Pyongyang for the whole of 2023.

In December 2022, Russia resumed the provision of refined petroleum to North Korea for the first time in more than two years.

Despite deepening military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, Moscow's 2023 supply of refined petroleum still stayed far below pre-pandemic levels.

Russia reported to the U.N. that it had exported 241,114 barrels and 277,365 barrels of such a product in 2018 and 2019, respectively.

North Korea is believed to have obtained petroleum through illegal ship-to-ship transfers when it shut down its border over the COVID-19 pandemic.

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Soo-yeon · January 30, 2024

4. N. Korea forms committee to carry out regional economic policy

Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic?

(LEAD) N. Korea forms committee to carry out regional economic policy | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 30, 2024

(ATTN: ADDS unification ministry's assessment, details in paras 2, 7-9)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has formed a committee led by a key aide of leader Kim Jong-un to oversee the construction of modernized factories in backward provinces to spur regional development, state media said Tuesday.

The move came as Kim has been stressing the importance of developing the economy in areas outside of Pyongyang by building modernized factories in 20 counties over the next decade to raise the "basic material and cultural living standards of the people."

The committee, led by Jo Yong-won, secretary for organizational affairs in the ruling Workers' Party, will oversee the design and construction of the envisioned industrial factories based on the party's regional development policy, the Korean Central News Agency said.

During a meeting of the political bureau of the Workers' Party last week, Kim said the overall regional economy is in a "terrible situation" and defined the insufficient provision of basic living necessities in provincial areas as a "serious political issue."

A child and a woman smile in this propaganda image aimed at promoting North Korea's regional development policy carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Jan. 28, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

South Korea's unification ministry in charge of inter-Korean affairs has assessed the North's recent emphasis on regional development as efforts to tackle a widening economic gap between Pyongyang and backward provinces amid prolonged economic difficulties.

The North has been under tightened U.N. sanctions, which call for, among other things, a ban on the country's exports of coal and other mineral resources to cut off North Korea's access to hard currency.

The ministry expressed skepticism over the development plan Tuesday, questioning whether the resource-scarce country would have sufficient equipment and funding to implement the plan in addition to ongoing policy efforts to build more houses and raise crop output.

"North Korea has been emphasizing agriculture and the construction of residential flats, and if it prioritizes manpower and resources for the regional development plan, it would likely affect other plans," a ministry official told reporters condition of anonymity.

"Even if it succeeds in completing the exterior of the factories, operating them efficiently is another issue," the official said.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · January 30, 2024

5. N. Korea pulls out of Hong Kong, Libya in series of embassy closures: official

Is there no more illicit activity the regime can profit from?

Excerpts:

The total number of North Korean diplomatic missions stood at 44 as of Tuesday, according to the South Korean foreign ministry website.

In November last year, North Korea said it was closing and opening new diplomatic missions "in accordance with the changed global environment and national diplomatic policy," without elaborating.

South Korea's unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, earlier assessed the recent shutdowns as an apparent sign of North Korea's faltering economy worsened by global sanctions.

Rather than receiving funds from Pyongyang, the North's diplomatic missions are known to secure funds for operations through illicit trade and commercial activities, and to send remittances to their home country, according to former North Korean diplomats who have defected to South Korea.

N. Korea pulls out of Hong Kong, Libya in series of embassy closures: official | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 30, 2024

SEOUL, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has shut down its diplomatic missions in Hong Kong and Libya, a foreign ministry official said Tuesday, as the recalcitrant regime struggles with economic challenges amid prolonged sanctions.

They are the latest in the list of overseas missions Pyongyang has shut down in the past months, including Angola, Nepal, Bangladesh, Spain and Uganda. North Korea has said the closures are part of efforts to enhance its diplomatic efficiency.

The total number of North Korean diplomatic missions stood at 44 as of Tuesday, according to the South Korean foreign ministry website.

In November last year, North Korea said it was closing and opening new diplomatic missions "in accordance with the changed global environment and national diplomatic policy," without elaborating.

South Korea's unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, earlier assessed the recent shutdowns as an apparent sign of North Korea's faltering economy worsened by global sanctions.

Rather than receiving funds from Pyongyang, the North's diplomatic missions are known to secure funds for operations through illicit trade and commercial activities, and to send remittances to their home country, according to former North Korean diplomats who have defected to South Korea.

This image, provided by Yonhap News TV, shows North Korean workers dispatched abroad. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

julesyi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · January 30, 2024

6. ＜Inside N. Korea＞ “Prepare for war…” Government intensifies civil defense training amid efforts to stoke crisis…tells those not attending drills that their rations, wages will be cut

Another indication of internal stress. The regime is creating external threats to justify these actions that are all designed to continue to oppress the Korean people to prevent any possible resistance as they suffer what might become some of the worst conditions since the Arduous March of the great famine of 1994-1996.

＜Inside N. Korea＞ “Prepare for war…” Government intensifies civil defense training amid efforts to stoke crisis…tells those not attending drills that their rations, wages will be cut

asiapress.org

In North Korea, the military's regular winter drills began on December 1, 2023. Meanwhile, military drills for civilians began in early 2024 and they are more intense than in previous years, which has led to growing discontent. With tensions between North and South Korea also on the rise, North Korean authorities are throwing gasoline onto the fire with calls to "prepare for war" and urging all North Koreans to provide support for the military. This report comes from several sources in North Hamgyung province. (KANG Ji-won and ISHIMARU Jiro)

(FILE PHOTO) Armed civilians guarding the border with China. They appear to be reserve soldiers, the "Worker-Peasant Red Guards.” Photo taken by Park Young-min from the Chinese side of the border across from North Pyongan Province in late September 2017 (ASIAPRESS)

◆ Those failing to take part in drills face reduced rations and wages

Musan County, North Hamgyong Province, is home to North Korea's largest iron mine. Since mid-January, mine workers have been required to undergo reserve army (kyododae) training in addition to their regular duties. A source in Musan County told ASIAPRESS that this year's training is as grueling as that of the regular army.

"It's very hard. In the iron mines, only basic jobs such as those in the quarry and the ore concentration center are active, while the rest of the workers are mobilized in shifts for paramilitary training. The training, which begins at 8 or 9 a.m., is similar to that of the regular military, and the drills are as tough as those faced by soldiers. Exercises include repairing fortifications, assaulting enemy fortifications, and maneuvering. Soldiers are required to wear uniforms, hats, and armbands. Those who [don't] want to participate in the training have no choice but to do so, because the authorities have threatened them with a cut in their food rations and wages if they don't.”

※ Kyododae: A reserve force composed mainly of veterans and single women between the ages of 17 and 50. Each unit is similar to an army infantry division in terms of weaponry and size.

"It is cold this year, food rations are low, and many workers are suffering from the constant drills. A party cadre came to the workplace and gave a lecture, saying: 'The situation around us is serious and tense, so it wouldn't be surprising if a war broke out right now. Everyone must be vigilant and ready to mobilize. We must use our nuclear arsenal and our unity to settle [the fight against our enemies] once and for all, so we must train well.”

Civil defense reservists marching in a military parade. Korean Central Television, September 9, 2023.

◆ Everyone must take part in drills

In neighboring North Hamgyung province, Hoeryong began its civilian-military drills in January as well. A reporting partner who lives in Hoeryong explained details regarding the civil defense training:

"Under the excellent leadership of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, our nuclear and missile forces have become the best in the world. In early January, the Central Committee of the Workers' Party issued a directive to be ready to strike back at any enemy provocation. So this year, 100% of citizens will participate in civil defense drills, and those who claim they cannot participate due to personal circumstances or illness will be strictly inspected [to find out whether they are telling the truth]. Some people are paying to get medical certificates from hospitals, but if any doctors are found to have issued fake certificates, the authorities are threatening to confiscate their licenses.”

In factories and enterprises, "combat emergency backpacks" have undergone inspections. They were checked to ensure they all have a week's worth of food, lighters, matches, medicines, blankets, solid fuel, and salt. This year, civil defense training will include drills in maneuvering, attacking enemy fortifications, and live fire training."

* Civil defense organizations refer to the kyododae as well as other civilian-military reserve organizations.

◆ Gloves, belts, and pork..The government demands people to donate goods to the military

In addition to strengthening the training of civilian-military reserve organizations, the government is also pushing people to provide various kinds of support for the army.

"At a meeting of our neighborhood watch unit on January 6, officials announced that a mass support project would be conducted to ensure results in the winter drills. In addition to the tasks assigned to each household, people were asked to voluntarily donate supplies such as gloves, belts, and pork, and those who were willing to do so were asked to inform the neighborhood watch units and district offices of the quantity and items to be donated.

“The order also said that the people should make voluntary contributions to improve the defense of the country. Neighborhood watch units, as well as social organizations such as the Socialist Women’s League and the Youth League, were instructed to extend their support for the army.

“Exemplary families, businesses, social organizations, and individuals who donated supplies were to be praised and given tickets to hot springs and ski resorts as a courtesy of the Workers’ Party.”

Neighborhood watch units are North Korea’s lowest-level administrative units, with about 20 to 30 households per unit.

Meanwhile, the flu has been raging in Musan and Hoeryong since mid-January.

"Thirty percent of the people around me are sick. [As a result] the military training of the civilian armed forces is not being carried out properly," said a reporting partner in Hoeryong.

※ ASIAPRESS smuggles Chinese cell phones into North Korea to maintain communication with its reporting partners.

A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org

7. N. Korea fires 3 missiles in a week, signals performance upgrades

I defer to the missile experts for an assessment.

N. Korea fires 3 missiles in a week, signals performance upgrades

https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2024/01/30/JE7YYH7Q3FDW3JNLPXGEOJ2NMU/

By Yang Ji-ho,

Park Su-hyeon

Published 2024.01.30. 16:07

Updated 2024.01.30. 16:10

Citizens in Seoul Station watching news about North Korea's cruise missile launch on Jan. 30, 2024./News1

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported on Jan. 30 that an undisclosed number of cruise missiles were detected, launched by North Korea into the West Sea around 7 a.m. This comes just two days after North Korea fired two cruise missiles into the sea near Sinpo on 28th, and adds to the missile launches, including one in the western sea on 24th, making it three launches within a week.

A military official stated on the 30th that the estimated range of the cruise missiles was approximately 1500-2000 kilometers, similar to North Korea’s claims for the cruise missiles ‘Hwasan-1′ and ‘Hwasan-2.’ This contrasts with previous analyses that suggested the range fell short of specifications during the cruise missile launch on the 24th, indicating an improved performance this time.

Speculation arises regarding North Korea’s concentrated missile launches alternating between the West Sea and the East Sea, seen as efforts to test and enhance cruise missile performance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that launching cruise missiles three times within a week is unusual.

On the 24th, North Korea claimed to have launched several units of a new strategic cruise missile, named ‘Bulhwasal-3-31,’ toward the West Sea near Pyongyang. On the 28th, the country asserted firing two Bulhwasal-3-31 missiles in the waters near Sinpo-si, South Hamgyong Province.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned that they are currently analyzing the location of the missile launch, determining whether it was from land or sea. However, reports indicate that the military is giving weight to the possibility of a land-based launch.

8. ‘12.12: The Day’ and lessons from S. Korea-US relations

Excerpts:

Nevertheless, the United States has not always viewed its relationship with South Korea solely through the lens of national interest. The intervention in the Korean War during the 1950s, which saw the sacrifice of 140,000 Americans, was not motivated by strategic advantages but rather by a determination to counter unilateral communist aggression – a fusion of moralistic and realistic diplomatic principles. The South Korea-U.S. alliance, instrumental in deterring North Korean hostility and fostering economic growth, exemplifies the necessity for moralistic and realistic approaches in foreign policy to coexist. Perhaps the most significant takeaway from December 12 is the essential need for a flexible response tailored to each scenario.

‘12.12: The Day’ and lessons from S. Korea-US relations

donga.com

Posted January. 30, 2024 07:46,

Updated January. 30, 2024 07:46

‘12.12: The Day’ and lessons from S. Korea-US relations. January. 30, 2024 07:46. .

After watching "12.12: The Day" with my son, a high school student, he couldn't hide his perplexity, questioning, "How come the December 12th coup wasn't prevented?" It's a query likely echoed by many others. There's also curiosity about the United States' role, given its command over South Korea’s military forces at the time: Did the U.S. attempt to thwart the coup or, if not, why?

Coup origins are often internal. Reassessing the U.S. response on December 12 isn’t a rehashed anti-American sentiment but rather a reminder of the inherent nature of diplomacy, even in a close South Korea-U.S. relationship as a blood brother– a constant balancing act between ideals and practical benefits.

In his 1999 memoir, John Wickham Jr., former Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, recounts the night of December 12, 1979. Then-Defense Minister Ro Jae-hyun was with Wickham in the U.S. 8th Army bunker. This placed the highest echelons of both South Korean and US military in one location. The forces - Capital Mechanized Infantry Division and the 26th Infantry Division - requested by Seoul Defense Commander Jang Tae-wan to Lee Gun-yeong, the commander of the third division, to quell the insurgents, were under Wickham’s operational command. Yet, Wickham advised Roh against moving troops, citing the high risk of misidentifying friend and foe in the dark. This decision, especially as Roh Tae-woo pushed the 9th Division into Seoul, suggests the US had no initial intent to suppress the new military faction.

One might wonder why the U.S. discouraged action against the rebels at such a critical juncture. William H. Gleysteen, who was the US Ambassador to Korea at the time, reflects in his memoirs that “on the night of Dec. 12 and next morning, the emphasis was on preventing a clash within the South Korean military, which could provoke North Korea, and on averting the collapse of Korea's political freedom. The primary focus was clearly on the former.” The United States' primary goal was to forestall a potential civil war within the South Korean military. This conflict might have incited a North Korean invasion, as well as prevented the demise of democracy due to the coup. Above all, the paramount concern was unmistakably the prioritization of security. It appears that the U.S., in this instance, chose to prioritize 'security interests' over the 'democratic values' it normally advocates.

The irony lies in that the Carter administration, more than ever before, championed diplomacy rooted in moral principles. In his 1977 inaugural speech, President Carter declared the U.S. couldn't support authoritarian allies suppressing human rights. Ahead of Carter’s 1979 visit to South Korea, the U.S. leveraged a promise from the Korean government to release 180 prisoners of conscience over six months in exchange for not withdrawing U.S. forces.

Such mood in Washington shifted dramatically after the 1979 November Iranian hostage crisis, especially post-October 26. With losing a key ally in the Middle East, the U.S. was keen not to destabilize the crucial South Korea-U.S. alliance against the communist bloc in East Asia. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27 of the same year further underscored the need for a robust, stable approach to security on the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the United States has not always viewed its relationship with South Korea solely through the lens of national interest. The intervention in the Korean War during the 1950s, which saw the sacrifice of 140,000 Americans, was not motivated by strategic advantages but rather by a determination to counter unilateral communist aggression – a fusion of moralistic and realistic diplomatic principles. The South Korea-U.S. alliance, instrumental in deterring North Korean hostility and fostering economic growth, exemplifies the necessity for moralistic and realistic approaches in foreign policy to coexist. Perhaps the most significant takeaway from December 12 is the essential need for a flexible response tailored to each scenario.

한국어

donga.com

9. Is S. Korea ready for trade war planned by Trump?

Is S. Korea ready for trade war planned by Trump?

donga.com

Posted January. 30, 2024 07:46,

Updated January. 30, 2024 07:46

Is S. Korea ready for trade war planned by Trump?. January. 30, 2024 07:46. .

The U.S. media reported that the country’s former President Donald Trump is considering a plan to impose a tariff of 60 percent on Chinese-made products by classifying China as a hostile country if he wins the presidential election in November and takes back the presidential office. It is a much more aggressive tariff policy compared to the existing one that imposes an additional tariff of 10 percentage points on foreign products imported into the U.S. If this policy is put in place after the former president’s win in the election, China will take retaliatory measures, which will cause an all-out trade war between the two countries.

According to The Washington Post, the former president is preparing a high tariff on thousands of Chinese products, which were subject to a tariff of 25 percent during the former president’s term in 2018 and 2019. The new tariff rate is expected to be more than double the existing one. Even revoking China’s status as a “most favored nation” for trade is being considered to avoid the World Trade Organization’s rule of ensuring equal treatment among its member countries. The share of Chinese products in the U.S.’s imports from January to November last year was 13.9 percent, the lowest since 2004, due to the trade tensions between the two countries that began during the Trump administration.

What’s problematic is that the trade war caused by Trump can critically impact South Korea. China is one of South Korea’s major trade partners, accounting for 20 percent of South Korea’s exports, even though the share of South Korean products in China’s imports decreased to 6.3 percent last year, the lowest during the last 30 years. If fewer Chinese products are exported to the U.S., South Korean semiconductors, machinery, petrochemical products, etc. used to produce Chinese products will be impacted. This means South Korean companies need to quickly find alternative sources of sales in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America.

Furthermore, the biggest reason for Trump’s restrictions on Chinese-made imports is the large trade surplus earned by China from its trade with the U.S. South Korea recorded 44.5 billion dollars of trade surplus last year from its trade with the U.S. An issue faced by the former Moon Jae-in administration, which had to make significant concessions as the Trump administration demanded a renegotiation of the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement claiming that it was unfavorable to the U.S, can be repeated. South Korean companies building plants in the U.S. following the Inflation Reduction Act might face some challenges as the Joe Biden administration is proclaiming to abolish the act.

The possibility of Trump’s second term in office is the most significant risk to this year’s global economy. Japan and other advanced countries began efforts to influence the direction of U.S. policies that might have unfavorable effects on them by mobilizing figures close to the Trump camp. It will create irreversible damage if the South Korean administration and political circles miss out on the large flow of reorganizing international trade orders while only focusing on the general elections and other domestic issues.

한국어

donga.com

10. North Korean orphans ‘volunteer’ for grueling mine and farm work

It is all about oppression and control by the regime to prevent resistance.

Excerpts:

“If you are an orphan, you cannot serve in the military or study at a university. Regardless of whether you graduated from a secondary school or even if you were adopted by an ordinary family and graduated from a high school,” the second resident said.

In years past, the orphans were all assigned to work together in a single group, he said, but this year they are receiving individual assignments.

“If orphans are gathered as a group in one place, there is a risk that they could betray the country as a group, so they are individually separated.”

North Korean orphans ‘volunteer’ for grueling mine and farm work

After they age out of the system, the teens have nowhere else to go.

By Moon Sung Hui for RFA Korean

2024.01.29

rfa.org

North Korean state media reported that hundreds of young people across the nation have “volunteered” for arduous work in coal mines and on farms out of a sense of patriotic duty, but sources told Radio Free Asia that most of them are orphans aging out of the system, and it’s usually because they have nowhere else to go.

On Jan. 17, the state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported on a ceremony in the eastern province of South Hamgyong that congratulated the young volunteers, who appear to be in their late teens, with several local dignitaries offering speeches thanking them for their service.

“More than 80 young people in South Hamgyong Province of the DPRK volunteered to work at revolutionary battle sites and major worksites for socialist construction,” it said. “Officials and young people in the province presented bouquets to the volunteers leaving for new revolutionary posts and warmly saw them off.”

But in reality, the youths who will spend the next few years doing backbreaking work as miners, lumberjacks, salt workers or livestock hands are actually filling a quota which the central government assigned to the province, a teacher from the northern province of Ryanggang told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“The number of youth who were to enter the volunteer work project was designated in advance: 100 people in provinces with a large youth population, and 80 people in provinces with a small youth population,” he said.

“The Ryanggang Youth League also moved up the graduation ceremony for its orphans secondary schools from March to mid-January to meet the quota [by making more orphans eligible].”

According to the resident, 70 out of the 80 Ryanggang volunteers were orphans.

“Among those who volunteered, 47 were from the orphans’ schools, 23 were orphans who were adopted by ordinary families,” he said.

Seven of the remaining 10 volunteers were actual volunteers, while the other three are officers from the youth league, the resident said.

Keeping them occupied

The number of volunteers reported in the media gives the people a good indication of how many orphans there are in the country, another Ryanggang resident told RFA Korean on condition of anonymity to speak freely.

“If we figure out the number of youths who have entered difficult sectors as volunteers every year, we know how many orphans there are in our country each year, because more than 90% of the volunteers are orphans,” he said.

After graduating from high school, most orphans don’t have great job prospects. And while it wasn’t clear that they were forced to take these difficult jobs, they may simply not have anywhere else to go.

So the goal of the government is to make sure they don’t cause any problems, he said.

“The government advertises that it warmly cares for and raises orphans, but orphans cannot serve in the military or go to college,” the second resident said.

“The authorities assume that they may harbor resentment towards the government system because they grew up without parents,” he said. “Also, their family background is unclear.”

In North Korea, family background is of the utmost importance, and those who are allowed to attain the highest positions in the country have descended from ancestors who demonstrated their loyalty to the North Korean leadership for several generations. Those with bad family backgrounds can never get ahead.

In other words, people are unfairly judged based on the actions of their grandparents or great-grandparents.

While some are lucky enough to benefit from a good family background, orphans have no background, so they are automatically classified with those who have bad backgrounds.

“If you are an orphan, you cannot serve in the military or study at a university. Regardless of whether you graduated from a secondary school or even if you were adopted by an ordinary family and graduated from a high school,” the second resident said.

In years past, the orphans were all assigned to work together in a single group, he said, but this year they are receiving individual assignments.

“If orphans are gathered as a group in one place, there is a risk that they could betray the country as a group, so they are individually separated.”

Translated by Claire S. Lee. Edited by Eugene Whong and Malcolm Foster.

rfa.org

11. Analysts: China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors Supports Pyongyang's Authoritarian Rule

Analysts: China's Repatriation of North Korean Defectors Supports Pyongyang's Authoritarian Rule

January 26, 2024 6:33 PM

By Christy Lee

voanews.com · January 26, 2024

washington —

Human rights experts are dismissing Beijing's latest claim, made again this week, that North Koreans fleeing into China are not political refugees but only illegal migrants seeking economic opportunities.

Several experts said they see the claim as simply a way of supporting Pyongyang's authoritarian system, which is similar to China’s own.

"There [are] no so-called DPRK defectors in China. People who illegally entered into China for economic reasons are not refugees," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin said Wednesday at a press briefing.

His remarks came after South Korea called on Beijing to protect North Korean defectors in China during a Tuesday U.N. meeting examining China's rights records.

The meeting in Geneva was the fourth review by the U.N. Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group since February 2009. The council held previous reviews in October 2013 and November 2018.

South Korea's ambassador to the U.N. office in Geneva, Yun Seong-deok, said Beijing should stop repatriating North Koreans. He also said Beijing should consider making its refugee law comply with the 1951 Refugee Convention.

This was the first time South Korea addressed China at the UPR for its treatment of North Korean defectors. They face harsh treatment, including torture and death sentences, when they are forcibly repatriated, according to Human Rights Watch and the advocacy group Liberty in North Korea.

China is a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol. This means Beijing is obligated to comply with the principle of nonrefoulement. This "asserts that a refugee should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom," according to the convention.

China's constitution says it "may grant asylum to foreigners who request it on political grounds."

N Korea launches rural growth committee as economy struggles

The move came a week after leader Kim Jong Un admitted his country’s dire economic status.

By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA

2024.01.29

Seoul, South Korea

rfa.org

North Korea has formally launched a party committee dedicated to the development of its economically challenged rural regions. This initiative comes as local areas are dealing with economic difficulties stemming from sanctions and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The inauguration of the committee followed just about a week after the country’s leader Kim Jong Un made a rare public acknowledgement of the dire state of his country’s economy, urging ruling party officials to take immediate action.

“In the midst of actively promoting organizational work to thoroughly and perfectly implement transformative strategies for local industrial development, the non-permanent 20×10 Local Development Central Implementation Committee has embarked on its official projects,” North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency said Tuesday.

The 20×10 Local Development Policy refers to a measure announced by Kim earlier this month, aimed at improving the North’s struggling local economies. The measure involves constructing industrial factories throughout 20 counties across the nation each year, and ultimately improve the living standards of the North Korean people within the next 10 years.

Led by a Presidium of the Politburo member of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea, Jo Yong Won, the committee will “oversee and guide the construction progress, including the design and construction of new local industrial factories, as well as the development projects for raw material bases,” KCNA said.

The importance of the newly established committee is reflected in the fact that Jo also holds a position as a secretary of the Secretariat of the WPK, a close associate and advisory body of the North Korean leader. Vice Premier Pak Jong Gun, whose main responsibility is overseeing the nation’s economy, was also included in the committee.

Kim last week labeled the country’s ongoing economic problem as a “serious political issue,” saying that his government was unable “to provide even basic necessities such as basic foodstuffs, groceries, and consumer goods to the local people.”

“The overall local economy is currently in a very pitiful state, lacking even basic conditions,” Kim said at a politburo plenary meeting last week, according to KCNA.

North Korea’s economy contracted for the third consecutive year in 2022, according to South Korea’s Statistics Korea report in December. The latest available data showed a 0.2% year-on-year drop in North Korea’s GDP in 2022, following a 0.1% decrease in 2021, and a 4.5% contraction in 2020.

On a closer look, the country’s manufacturing industry shrank for six consecutive years since 2017, with it contracting 4.6% in 2022, according to the latest available data from the South’s central bank, Bank of Korea. The economic impact of this to the nation may have been severe as the sector accounts more than 20% of the North’s entire economy.

A major mission of the committee is to revive the manufacturing sector.

“Establishing practical measures to solidify local raw material bases and ensure the normalization of production in local industrial factories is also one of the important tasks of the Central Implementation Committee,” according to KCNA.

Kim has been facing issues related to the economy and food shortages since he assumed power in 2012. These problems have been intensified recently amid the aftermath of COVID-19 and international sanctions.

North Korea shut down its borders for the COVID quarantine at the expense of its trade with China, while it has continued its nuclear and missile development, putting its economy under the United Nations’ sanctions regime.

Amid economic challenges, North Korea has recently been ramping up its military threats in the Korean peninsula. According to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Tuesday, the North fired multiple “unidentified cruise missiles” off its western coast at around 7 a.m.

North Korea also test-fired submarine-launched cruise missiles Sunday, with Kim ordering officials to expedite his country’s nuclear submarine development.

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mike Firn.

rfa.org

13. S. Korea’s echo chambers grow, study finds

Like many populations around the world in the modern media and communications environment.

S. Korea’s echo chambers grow, study finds

koreaherald.com · by Yoon Min-sik · January 30, 2024

By Yoon Min-sik

Published : Jan. 30, 2024 - 13:15

South Korea's National Assembly building in Yeouido, Seoul. (Getty Images)

South Koreans' tendency to search only the information matching their own political inclination has been rising while their general interest toward politics has been on a downward trajectory, a recent survey by a local research company indicated.

Last year the online research company Embraine conducted a survey of 1,000 adults aged 19 to 59 to find how much they are affected by the filter bubble, which refers to when an internet user encounters information that conforms to and/or reinforces their own beliefs.

The study showed that 17.8 percent of respondents actively look up news or information with conflicting political views from their own. This marked a decrease from 25.8 percent in 2023, indicating that a growing percentage of the public is becoming uninterested in information that opposes their own politics.

When facing those with contrasting political opinions, the percentage of those who have discussions decreased from 2021 to 2023, both online -- 25.8 percent to 20.2 percent -- and offline -- 27.2 percent to 21.7 percent. In contrast, an increasing percentage of people said they avoid such debates altogether in that same period -- 11.4 percent to 14.7 percent online, and 9.7 percent to 13.8 percent offline.

This indicates a growing tendency for people only communicate with those who hold similar political views and shut out those who have differing views.

Researchers found that older people were more indifferent toward what other people thought. When asked if one would be okay "even if nobody related to my thoughts," 61.6 percent of those in their 50s said they would be fine, compared to 50 percent of 40-somethings, 44.8 percent of 30-somethings, and 38 percent of those in their 20s.

In contrast, 50.8 percent of those in their 20s said "getting people to relate to my thoughts is very important," compared to 46.4 percent, 42 percent, and 40 percent of the 30s, 40s, and 50s age groups, respectively.

It was found that the older generation in general is more likely to watch YouTube channels that match their own political beliefs: 43.1 percent for those in their 50s, 37.7 percent for 40s, 28 percent for 30s, and 28.6 percent for 20s.

"This indicates that (the older generation) is more likely to only receive biased information when it comes to political issues, putting them at an increased risk of the filter bubble. Since the aforementioned results indicate that many people from this generation have no trouble when no one relates to their thoughts, it can be expected that they are more likely to be subject to extreme political bias," the study said.

Around half the people on both Meta -- formerly Facebook -- and YouTube said they are not aware of their friends' political inclinations, 48.1 percent for Meta and 51.8 percent for YouTube.

In addition to growing political bias, the study showed a general trend of declining interest in politics with 18.3 percent of respondents saying that they have no interest in politics in 2023, nearly double the 8.9 percent of respondents in 2020.

Around 50.4 percent said they do not support any political party while 13.1 percent said they do not know much about the parties, both figures increasing from the 2021 results of 47.1 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively.

koreaherald.com · by Yoon Min-sik · January 30, 2024

14. N. Korean farmers express frustration at “Juche Farming Method” lectures

The Korean people in the north recognize the failure of the regime's economic and agricultural policies.

And of course they know that you cannot eat propaganda and ideology but that is the regime's answer to every problem. More ideological training.

N. Korean farmers express frustration at “Juche Farming Method” lectures

Rather than propaganda, the lectures should focus on providing information on how agricultural policies can increase farmers' income and improve their living conditions

By Jo Hyon, PhD, Kyungnam University - 2024.01.30 4:00pm

dailynk.com

N. Korean farmers express frustration at “Juche Farming Method” lectures - Daily NK English

Recently, North Korean farmers have expressed dissatisfaction with the format and content of study sessions focused on the “Juche Farming Method.” A source in North Korea recently told Daily NK that “the sessions focus on inspiring loyalty to the Workers’ Party and the Supreme Leader, instead of providing farmers with practical agricultural skills and experience.”

The instructors, sent by provincial rural accounting committees and county-level agricultural cooperative management committees, claim that agriculture is managed scientifically based on the analysis of the previous year’s crop production. However, they have given priority to emphasizing patriotism and loyalty in the study sessions. There is little information on methods of mitigating climate change or measures to increase the yield of crops per . Farmers have responded by saying: “If this is what they are going to say to us, it’d be better to just hold criticism sessions rather than study meetings.”

Study meetings on the Juche Farming Method are held annually at the beginning of each year. The management committees of the urban agricultural cooperatives first draw up curricula for each sub-sector: agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation, pomiculture, vegetation, and handicrafts. The committees then bring together primary-level leaders such as farm managers, work team leaders, and sub-work team leaders to train them. In turn, the primary level managers teach the farmers they supervise what they have learned. The sessions were created after the Workers’ Party criticized experience-based farming as “clumsy.” Although they have continued for more than fifty years, the sessions do not seem to have produced positive results.

The reason is that the central government sets the curricula for the sessions, which are neither specific nor diverse because they do not reflect regional characteristics. Farmers dislike the sessions because they have become another political tool for the Workers’ Party to impose ideological education.

North Korea acknowledges the fact that agricultural production has declined and a food crisis persists. But is this the result of farmers’ lack of loyalty?

North Korea’s food self-sufficiency rate is 78.2%, but productivity has been steadily declining. This is due to irrational resource allocation, inflexible agricultural management and distribution policies, and the dilapidated state of the country’s agricultural infrastructure. The state’s response to the decline in agricultural productivity has been based on the principle of self-reliance, including an emphasis on planting and producing at the right time and place, improving irrigation, expanding electrification, increasing the use of machinery, and making the use of chemical fertilizers universal.

However, the fundamental reason for the steady decline in agricultural production is that the Workers’ Party is focused on maintaining its power over the country. That is why the peasants do not trust the meetings on the Juche Farming Method.

So what should be the purpose of the meetings? They should focus on providing information on how investment and agricultural policies can increase farmers’ income and improve their living conditions. The Workers’ Party should understand that the farmers would not be dissatisfied in the first place if the education were aimed at truly helping them.

Translator requested anonymity. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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15. N. Korean university students complain about the state taking away their vacations

N. Korean university students complain about the state taking away their vacations

Students from outside Pyongyang can earn more for their loyalty in the capital city than in little-noticed provincial areas, a source told Daily NK

By Jong So Yong - 2024.01.30 11:00am

dailynk.com

N. Korean university students complain about the state taking away their vacations - Daily NK English

“Young university students are actively engaged in sociopolitical activities during their winter break,” Rodong Sinmun reported on Jan. 8. The photo shows students from Han Deok-soo University of Light Industry in front of the Pyongyang Thermal Power Plant. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

North Korean university students are complaining that instead of resting they have to spend the holidays in social-political activities such as various propaganda and support activities in factories, enterprises, and farms, Daily NK has learned.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in Pyongyang told Daily NK on Wednesday that university students across the country “are engaged in various socio-political activities in cities and rural areas under orders to take part in economic agitation for reinvigorating the people’s economy.” In particular, students from provincial areas enrolled in universities in Pyongyang “have given up taking meaningful vacations in their hometowns and are busy running around Pyongyang instead.”

Students from the provinces have been engaged in socio-political activities since they returned to Pyongyang immediately after the New Year holiday. Although the students could carry out activities near their hometowns, they return to Pyongyang to do so because doing so in the capital can earn them more recognition for their loyalty than in the little-noticed provincial areas.

University students have to submit to their schools certificates issued by the places where they did their socio-political activities, stating exactly what they did. However, students from wealthy, influential families find it tedious and annoying to obtain these certificates by doing socio-political activities in factories, enterprises, and farms, so they obtain the certificates in exchange for bribes in cash or cigarettes.

On the other hand, students from less well-connected families work hard to earn as much recognition as possible for their activities, running around production centers every day looking for things to do.

“The state requires university students to use their winter holidays to engage in economy-related propaganda and agitation activities, but this doesn’t mean that the tasks assigned to them for the holidays disappear,” the source said. “So some students say this is the first time they’ve heard the authorities ask them to ‘donate their vacations to the state,’ and complain that the sacrifice won’t improve the state of affairs.”

Students from provincial areas who had originally planned to go home during the holidays to meet with friends, eat home-cooked meals, complete their holiday assignments and prepare for the next semester are sulking about having to rush back to Pyongyang after the Lunar New Year to participate in forced socio-political activities, the source said.

“Students who have neither money nor power suffer from socio-political activities during the day and their holiday assignments at night,” he said. “The holiday assignments include a lot of different things that require going to a library or using a computer, so students have to face a lot of difficulties as they have to look for places with electricity.”

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

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Jong So Yong

Jong So Yong is one of Daily NK’s freelance reporters. Questions about her articles can be directed to dailynk@uni-media.net.

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16. Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected

(LEAD) Bolton warns Trump could seek 'reckless' deal on N.K. nuclear program if reelected | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS lead; ADDS more info in paras 7-8)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Jan. 30 (Yonhap) --Former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton warned in a new edition of his memoir Tuesday that former President Donald Trump, if reelected, could attempt to reach a "reckless" deal on North Korea's nuclear program that would alienate South Korea.

Bolton, who served as national security advisor under Trump from 2018-2019, made the prediction in the new foreword of his book, "The Room Where It Happened," as Trump is expected to face President Joe Biden in the Nov. 5 presidential election.

"Imagine Trump's euphoria at resuming contact with North Korea's Kim Jong-un, about whom he famously boasted, 'We fell in love,'" he wrote in the 18-page foreword that entails his forecast for what would happen under a potential second-term Trump administration.

"Trump previously almost gave away the store to Pyongyang, and he could try again early in a second term. A reckless deal on the North's nuclear weapons program would further alienate Japan and South Korea, and extend China's influence," he added.

This file photo, taken on April 25, 2023, shows former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton speaking during a forum in Seoul. (Yonhap)

Bolton also forecast that burgeoning military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow would not keep Trump from reuniting with the North Korean leader.

"Pyongyang's emerging role in the Beijing-Moscow axis, including providing ammunition and weapons for Russia to use against Ukraine, will not deter Trump from getting back together with Kim," he claimed.

With Trump having a commanding lead in the Republican nomination race, attention has been gravitating to what policy changes Trump would bring about should he return to the White House.

Trump is known for his leader-to-leader diplomacy with the North, which led to three face-to-face meetings with Kim, though serious negotiations between the two sides stalled following the no-deal summit in Hanoi in 2019.

In the foreword, Bolton also predicted that Taiwan and others along China's Indo-Pacific periphery could face "real peril" in a second Trump term.

"He still shows no recognition of Taiwan's importance, as he earlier ignored Beijing's crushing of Hong Kong's autonomy. The near-term risks of China's manufacturing a crisis over Taiwan will rise dramatically," he said.

He went on to say that it is unlikely Beijing will "physically" invade Taiwan since crossing the Taiwan Strait's open ocean is a "formidable" task. "More likely, China's Navy will blockade the island, and perhaps seize Taiwanese islands near the mainland, just to show that it can," he said.

Bolton also expressed concerns that Trump may believe the "one-China" policy means the U.S. can accept Beijing's absorbing of Taiwan.

"But our Indo-Pacific allies would be justifiably appalled," he said. "The loss of Taiwan's independence, which would soon follow a U.S. failure to resist Beijing's blockade, could persuade most countries near China to follow a 'Finlandization' policy at best."

Finlandization refers to a process by which a powerful nation makes a smaller neighbor refrain from opposing the former's external policy while allowing the latter to keep its independence and political system.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · January 31, 2024

17. An ‘Orange Revolution’ in South Korean Politics?

Conclusion:

It remains to see whether Lee’s “Orange Revolution” (following his new party’s chosen color) will indeed become a reality and turn South Korea’s decades-old power politics into something that is more productive and can actually pave the way for the country’s future. Regardless, Lee’s innovative initiatives have already marked a new development in South Korean politics and will leave a mark on the upcoming general election.

An ‘Orange Revolution’ in South Korean Politics?

thediplomat.com

Ousted PPP chair Lee Jun-seok has started his own political party. Will his New Reform Party become a force to be reckoned with?

By Yong-Shik Lee

January 31, 2024

PPP presidential candidate (and future South Korean president) Yoon Suk-yeol (left) and then-PPP chair Lee Jun-seok (holding Yoon’s hand) campaign together in Seoul on July 25, 2021, before their falling out and Lee’s ouster from his party leadership position.

Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ 고려

On January 20, Lee Jun-Seok, a former head of South Korea’s ruling party, and his supporters launched a new political party named the New Reform Party. This new party has attracted strong public and media attention throughout the country, evidenced by hundreds of media reports and the presence of leading politicians, including South Korea’s former prime minister, at the launch event.

Lee, a Harvard graduate, has generated more news than any other political figure in South Korea since the summer of 2021, when he was unexpectedly elected as the head of then the largest opposition party, People Power Party (PPP). At just 36 years old, Lee became the youngest politician to ever head a major political party in South Korea

After his election as the party leader in June 2021, Lee successfully led the PPP’s presidential campaign, making its candidate Yoon Suk-yeol South Korea’s new president in 2022. Yoon had been a political outsider but gained popular support for his stance against South Korea’s former regime on a politically sensitive case in his capacity as the head of the prosecution service.

Lee’s innovative political campaign not only led to Yoon’s victory in South Korea’s presidential election held in March 2022, but also racked up huge gains in South Korea’s local elections in June 2022. Despite these victories, the newly elected Yoon was known to harbor resentment against him. Generational culture gaps – Yoon is 63 years old – and internal power struggles caused acute disagreements between them during the presidential election campaign.

Yoon’s resentment of Lee had serious consequences for South Korean politics. It influenced and empowered Lee’s opponents to act against him, which resulted in Lee’s expulsion from his party leadership position in July 2022, shortly after the PPP’s victories in the local elections. The party’s ethics committee convened sessions to address charges made against Lee for a supposed attempt to conceal evidence concerning sexual misconduct that allegedly happened ten years before.

None of these charges, including Lee’s alleged sexual misconduct, was proven, and it was even unclear whether the party’s disciplinary committee had the authority to impose disciplinary action against the elected party head. However, the committee nevertheless decided to suspend Lee’s party membership in July 2022, and this decision led to his removal from the party leadership position later that year.

This was the first case in South Korean history in which an elected head of a major political party was removed by the actions of the party’s disciplinary committee. Lee’s expulsion made for a dramatic political saga, considering that he had won two major elections – the presidential and regional elections – for the PPP, which had lost the four preceding major elections since 2016.

Since Lee’s controversial removal from the party leadership, Yoon’s approval rate dropped below 40 percent. In addition to Lee’s expulsion, which cost him support from the younger generation, Yoon also deviated from the majority’s preference by emphasizing his conservative political stance and failing to work with the opposition party, which holds the majority of seats in South Korea’s legislature. This failure means that his administration has been unable to address South Korea’s significant economic and social issues effectively, as doing so requires new legislation and support from the opposition.

Over 18 months after Lee’s ouster, the political situation does not seem to have improved for the president and the ruling party. South Korea’s general election is scheduled to be held in April, now less than three months away, and given Yoon’s low approval rate and the ruling party’s unpopularity, it seems rather unlikely for the PPP to win majority control of the National Assembly.

Against that backdrop, in December 2023, Lee left the ruling party he had once led and recently formed a new party, calling for changes in South Korea’s politics. His new party has significant implications for South Korean politics, not only because of Lee’s objections to Yoon, whom he once supported in the last presidential campaign. The New Reform Party represents a new political focus and is bringing new dynamics to South Korea’s political scene.

First, Lee has “digitalized” the political process in South Korea. When Lee first suggested that he could leave the PPP and form a new political party, several commentators expressed doubts that he had the financial and personnel resources to do so. Surprisingly, Lee recruited over 50,000 members for his party in only a few days, and he did it through an online campaign and internet application process.

Lee’s approach represents a new innovation that significantly economizes the political process and broadens political participation across the board. Lee’s innovation did not begin with his new party. He won the election for the PPP leadership in 2021 through online and media engagements with the aid of only a few assistants and a modest budget. Lee had also used online platforms to increase the membership of the PPP by hundreds of thousands. Now, his digital strength and innovation empower his new party, which he has successfully formed at an unprecedented speed with a membership of over 50,000 from all age groups and regions in South Korea.

Beyond his digital approach, Lee’s focus on pragmatic policies – rather than the power politics so often seen in South Korea – raises hopes for many South Koreans who have waited to see more “productive politics” to address their real economic and social issues. Lee has announced a series of new policies, including one to minimize political influence on media by mandating employee approval for the government appointment of the head of state-financed media outlets, such as Korea Broadcasting Service (KBS).

Lee has shown the courage to announce policies that might be beneficial in the long run but are likely be unpopular and face challenges in the short run. For example, Lee is calling to stop a free subway ride benefit for the elderly (those over 65), which has been in place since the 1980s, and replace it with a transportation voucher and a discounted fare scheme. In a fast-aging country such as South Korea, where a third of the population is expected to be in this age category, this type of reform is necessary but has provoked resistance and criticism from many elderly South Koreans.

Lee’s political initiatives face three challenges. First, the new party’s success will be measured by its performance in the upcoming general election in April. As is the case in the United States, South Korean politics have been dominated for decades by two major parties, one more conservative (the People Power Party, currently holding the presidency) and another more liberal (the Democratic Party, currently in control of the legislature). Each party commands over 40 percent support in most elections.

Many say that PPP and DP supporters are not likely to vote for a third party, even if they may not be completely satisfied with their own parties. However, there is a growing popular sentiment that the power politics of these two parties have reached a dead end, and a third party, which will focus on pragmatic policies that will actually help the voters’ lives, is necessary. Lee will have to garner support from this segment of the population to secure a meaningful number of legislative seats in the upcoming election.

The second challenge for Lee and his party is to develop and implement policies that will gain support from the general population. The policies that he has announced so far have drawn a degree of interest but do not seem to address the most important problems that the country faces, such as South Korea’s population decline on the back of the world’s lowest birth rate, serious economic difficulties prevalent among small and medium-sized businesses and general economic stagnation, and deepening security issues arising from North Korea’s military and nuclear threats. Lee has also faced fierce criticism for his comments opposing feminism, which is seen as encouraging the misogynistic turn of a growing section of South Korean men.

Finally, Lee’s new party is a leading alternative to the two major parties, but it’s not the only one. Several other political dissidents, including a former South Korean prime minister, are also forming their own parties. Voters who wish to support a third party could be split if they remain separate from each other. Lee will have to show political leadership to create a united or coordinated front, encompassing these new players that span the political spectrum. This is a necessary step to build a lasting new political force in South Korea that can make meaningful changes.

It remains to see whether Lee’s “Orange Revolution” (following his new party’s chosen color) will indeed become a reality and turn South Korea’s decades-old power politics into something that is more productive and can actually pave the way for the country’s future. Regardless, Lee’s innovative initiatives have already marked a new development in South Korean politics and will leave a mark on the upcoming general election.

Authors

Guest Author

Yong-Shik Lee

Yong-Shik Lee is the director of the Law and Development Institute and an adjunct professor of law at Cornell University.

thediplomat.com

18. 'A lot of punishment, no food, hard work': North Korean defector's fears for sister who will 'die in jail'

We must never forget what is happening to the Korean people in the north and the brutality of the Kim family regime.

'A lot of punishment, no food, hard work': North Korean defector's fears for sister who will 'die in jail'

Humans rights groups believe up to 500 people were sent from China to North Korea in just one day last October - the largest such mass deportation in at least a decade. Sky's Helen-Ann Smith speaks to the sister of a woman who was thought to be among them and is now facing a bleak future.

Helen-Ann Smith

Asia correspondent @HelenAnnSmith0

Sky News

Kim Kyu-li welled up when she talked about the family she's lost.

It must sometimes feel that ghosts and fragments are all she has left of them - such is the way when you're a defector from North Korea.

But there was a very particular, very raw pain when she spoke about her younger sister, Kim Cheol-ok.

Cheol-ok escaped from North Korea to China in the late 1990s. But within days she was sold into marriage by traffickers and spent the next 25 years in the country - only to be arrested in 2023 by Chinese police and deported back to the country she sacrificed so much to escape.

She has, in a sense, just vanished.

And she is not alone. Human rights groups have told Sky News they believe the deportation of North Korean defectors from China is continuing "apace".

It comes after October saw the largest mass deportation event in at least a decade, with up to 500 people sent back in just one day. A further 100 were deported during August and September.

Image: Seoul-based NGO Transitional Justice Working Group says up to 500 people were deported back to North Korea across these border crossings on 9 October alone

It has caused such alarm that China was questioned for the first time on the issue at the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) last week, the fourth such review into China's human rights record since 2009.

We met Ms Kim at her home in Morden, south London. She has her own remarkable story about escaping across the North Korean border into China as a teenager and eventually making it to the UK.

But it is not her story we have come to discuss.

Image: Protesters call for an end to the deportations

Sold to a husband three times her age

At the time of her flight, Ms Kim did not take her younger sister with her.

Cheol-ok made her journey to China a few years later at the age of 14 to escape the devastating famine that was gripping North Korea.

But within a few days of her escape, Cheol-ok was sold by traffickers to a husband three times her age. Her sister then lost all trace of her for the following two decades.

It wasn't until 2020, with the aid of Chinese social media, that they reconnected against the odds.

"I felt I got all the world," Ms Kim reminisced with a smile, "every day we were talking, just crying, crying."

Please use Chrome browser for a more accessible video player

0:58

What are North Korea's plans for 2024?

A dangerous undocumented life

By this time, Cheol-ok was nearly 40 and had a grown-up daughter of her own. She had survived in China for 25 years with regular payments to local officials to avoid being reported, a cost Ms Kim said the family could barely afford.

But North Korean escapees in China have no ID, and no right to work or access basic services like healthcare. It is a dangerous, undocumented life.

"In January she caught coronavirus very hard, very hard," explained Ms Kim, "but she can't go to the hospital, nobody cares. During that time she understood [that she had to leave China]."

"When she got better she said, 'sister, I have to come. If I stay here, I will die like this'."

'It's already too late'

So they made secret plans for her to travel to Vietnam, a well-worn route for North Korean defectors. But just two hours into her journey she was arrested by Chinese police.

Within six months the nightmare scenario for her family came true - with a call from Cheol-ok's daughter saying her mother would be deported to North Korea in just two hours' time.

"It's already too late," Ms Kim said with tears in her eyes, "we can't do anything, what can we do in two hours?"

She now lives with the agony of knowing what likely awaits Cheol-ok back in their home country.

Please use Chrome browser for a more accessible video player

1:18

Kim's tears up over birth rate crisis

Punishment, no food, hard work

"There will be a lot of punishment, no food in the jail, hard work," she said.

"She doesn't speak Korean anymore, she has no family there, she will die in jail."

When she thought of China, the country she believes abandoned her sister, she choked on her tears.

"Twenty-five years she lived there, it is her home now.

"How could they do that?! Maybe they have a relationship with North Korea, but they shouldn't do that. It's not human, we are not animals. If she goes back to North Korea [she will be treated] like flies, they kill flies."

Image: North Korea enforced a strict three-year border closure in response to the COVID pandemic

Mass deportation

The Seoul-based human rights NGO Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), has worked closely with other agencies tracking deportations. It believes Cheol-ok was in a group of up to 500 others all deported on 9 October, the largest mass deportation event in over a decade.

They have identified five crossing points along the 850-mile border. They believe the majority of people sent back were women, and the identities of most of them are not known.

The most prominent of the crossing points is in the city of Dandong, on the western end of North Korea's border.

The bridge there, which crosses the Yalu River dividing the two countries, is a tourist attraction and a tribute to the Chinese soldiers who used it to join the fighting in the Korean war.

It stood largely empty during the pandemic, as North Korea enforced a strict three-year border closure.

We saw a handful of trucks making the journey across.

"Sometimes there are more, sometimes less," one woman who works under the bridge told us, "sometimes there's no trucks for the whole day, sometimes there are a few more."

It was these border closures that caused such a large backlog in deportations.

Image: A truck crosses the bridge over the Yalu River

Defectors seen as traitors

Multiple reports from inside North Korea say defectors are seen as traitors and punished brutally with imprisonment, torture and possibly execution.

Other accounts say three years of border closures have wrought poverty and starvation.

But China has argued to the UN there is no evidence of such treatment and therefore the deportations are not illegal under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

"There is no such thing as a North Korean 'defector' in China," said Wang Wenbin, spokesman for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs when asked by Sky News.

He said: "People who come to China illegally for economic reasons are not refugees. They have violated Chinese law and have disrupted the order of China's entry and exit administration.

"China has always dealt with these people in accordance with the principle of combining domestic law, international law and humanitarianism."

Breaking News

Pressure on China

But international pressure over the issue is growing. For the first time South Korea questioned China at a UN Human Rights Council review.

South Korea's ambassador to the UN office in Geneva, Yun Seong-deok, said Beijing should stop repatriating North Koreans.

However, experts say any such pressure will almost certainly come second to the bigger geopolitical picture in which China needs a stable North Korea.

In the context of the war in Ukraine and the heightening tension between West and East, China's alliance with Russia and other like-minded nations is paramount.

"In Beijing, it's much more about geopolitics, and their primary interest is maintaining good relations with North Korea," explained Ethan Hee-Seok Shin, a legal analyst at TJWG.

"The last thing they want is to destabilise the North Korean state.

"The feared scenario from Beijing is that this kind of exodus, or floodgate, of North Korean escapees would result in the collapse of North Korea, as happened with East Germany back in 1989."

'Stay strong'

These issues feel all the more pressing now in the context of North Korea's recent relationship building with Russia and heightened threats against South Korea.

Some experts believe North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un may seriously be considering conflict.

Back in London, Ms Kim said she will not stop fighting. But it must sometimes feel that no one is listening.

She said she believes she will see Cheol-ok again, and wants to tell her to "stay strong".

But she knows she is a pawn in a much bigger picture.

Sky News

19. Secret calls and code names: The risky business of sending money to N Korea

This is important to understand. While it is becoming difficult it is possible to get money into north Korea just as it is possible to get information in.

Secret calls and code names: The risky business of sending money to N Korea

BBC

By Jungmin ChoiBBC Korean

Jungmin Choi / BBC Korean

Broker Hwang Ji-sung defected to the South in 2009

Every year, hundreds of North Korean defectors, who have since settled in the South, send much-needed money back home. But this is getting riskier as both countries are increasingly cracking down on illegal transfers of money.

"It is like a spy movie and people are putting their lives on the line," says Hwang Ji-sung, who has been a broker in South Korea for more than a decade.

As a defector himself, he knows how complex and difficult the task is - requiring a covert network of brokers and couriers spread across South Korea, China and North Korea.

Secret calls using smuggled Chinese phones are made at remote locations. Code names are used.

The stakes are incredibly high - if caught, North Koreans risk being sent to the country's dreaded political prison camps, known as kwan-li-so, where hundreds of thousands are believed to have died over the years.

A 2023 survey by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights which polled about 400 North Korean defectors, found that around 63% had transferred money to their families in the North.

But since 2020, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has intensified a crackdown on brokers to stop the flow of money and "reactionary ideology and culture" from South Korea.

Jungmin Choi / BBC

The couple has been in the money transfer business for over a decade

"The number of brokers in North Korea has gone down by more than 70% compared to a few years ago," says Joo Soo-yeon, Mr Hwang's wife. She is also a broker.

South Korea bans such transfers too, but in the past authorities have mostly looked the other way. Now that is changing.

Last April, Mr Hwang and Ms Joo's home in Gyeonggi province - which is close to Seoul - was raided by four police officers, who accused her of violating the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act. Because the bank account that was used to send money to North Korea was in her name, she's the one facing charges.

At least seven other brokers are also under investigation.

On-camera interviews with brokers are rare, but Ms Joo has chosen to speak to the BBC partly because she wants to publicise her case. The police have not responded to a BBC inquiry over her case.

South Korean authorities told Mr Hwang that any money transfer to North Korea should be carried out through a "legitimate bank".

"If there is one, let me know!" he said, adding that there is no institution that can legally receive money in North Korea since the two Koreas are technically still at war.

Inter-Korean relations have been worsening since the North blew up a joint liaison office with the South in 2020. Earlier this month, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un even said it was no longer possible to achieve reunification with the South - a goal enshrined in the constitution.

Secret calls

These illicit cross-border cash transfers begin with a phone call between defectors in the South and their families in the North - made possible by an influx of smuggled Chinese phones in border provinces which can tap into Chinese telecom networks.

The calls are facilitated by brokers in North Korea who have to travel long distances and sometimes even climb mountains to arrange such calls.

After hours of waiting, the call is connected, and the defector will agree on a sum with families. But the conversation has to be brisk to avoid surveillance from the Ministry of State Security.

The defector then makes a deposit into a Chinese account through brokers in South Korea. This is also fraught with risk as China also closely monitors the flow of foreign currency.

It is up to the Chinese brokers to bring the money into North Korea.

The borders are relatively porous as China is North Korea's most important ally. Remittances from defectors are sometimes disguised as transactions between Chinese and North Korean trading companies.

Jungmin Choi / BBC Korean

Kim Jin-seok was a courier in North Korea before he fled the country in 2013

They employ several couriers in North Korea to deliver the money to the families.

"The people delivering the money don't know each other, and they shouldn't because their lives are at stake," says Kim Jin Seok, who used to work as a courier in North Korea before he fled the country in 2013. We've given him a pseudonym for his safety.

Brokers have to use aliases and develop codes to signal when it will be safe for families to receive funds.

Mr Hwang, who has about 800 clients, says he has even encountered families who rejected the money.

"They were scared that it could be a trap set up by the security police and would say things like, 'We won't accept money from traitors.'"

Once the money is delivered, brokers will take about a 50% cut.

"North Korean brokers risk their lives to make 500,000 to 600,000 won per transfer," Mr Hwang says. At today's exchange rates, that's about $375-$450 (£295-£355).

"Nowadays, if you are arrested by a security officer and convicted, you would face 15 years in jail. If convicted of espionage, you would be sent to a kwan-li-so."

Mr Hwang shows us testimony from North Koreans who have received money through his brokers.

Handout

A North Korean counts the money after receiving the delivery from the brokers

"I was starving every day and ate grass," cries an old woman in one of them, her hands swollen from scavenging for food in the woods.

In the same video, another woman says: "It's so difficult here that I want to thank you 100 times."

Ms Joo says her heart breaks every time when she sees these videos.

"Some defectors have left their parents and children behind. They simply want to ensure that their families in North Korea will survive so that they can be reunited one day."

She says a million won is enough to feed a family of three for a year in the North.

Years ago, North Koreans coined the term "Hallasan stem" for people who receive assistance from defectors in the South, says Mr Hwang.

Hallasan refers to Mount Halla, a famous volcano on South Korea's scenic Jeju Island.

"A person from a Hallasan stem family is considered the most desirable spouse, even better than Communist Party members," he says.

A severed lifeline

It is unclear why South Korea has started cracking down on brokers, but lawyer Park Won-yeon, who has been providing legal support for defectors, believes overzealousness could be a factor, as the power to investigate national security cases, such as espionage, was transferred to police from the National Intelligence Service this year.

"If the police fail to prove the espionage charges, they [will] prosecute them under the foreign exchange transaction act," he says.

Under increasing pressure from both governments, this lifeline for families of North Korean defectors could be severed.

Mr Hwang is ready to take his wife's case all the way to the Supreme Court if she is convicted. He believes the remittances from defectors are not just about the money.

"It is the only way to bring North Korea down without fighting," he says. "Along with the money, it also comes with the news that the South is prosperous and wealthy… That's what Kim Jong Un is afraid of."

Mr Kim believes that defectors like him will not stop sending money to their loved ones back home, even though authorities from both sides want to stop them. He says he will travel to China himself to deliver the money if necessary.

"I took the risk that I would never see my children again, but at least my children will have a good life," he says.

"We will send the money in any way we can, and no matter what."

He now works as a lorry driver in South Korea and sleeps in his vehicle five days a week.

He is saving as much as possible so that he can send four million won to his wife and two sons in the North every year. He has been playing an audio message from his family on repeat.

One of his sons says, "How are you, dad? How much have you suffered? Our hardship is nothing compared to yours."

BBC

20. The Korean War: The First Year

A nice 25 minute overview video of the Korean War (first year) from a number of professors at Fort Leavenworth. Of course those who believe the US started the Korean War will not like this.

The Korean War: The First Year

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oTKKzrkkxQ

Army University Press

20,070 views Jan 22, 2024

Created for the Department of Command and Leadership and the Department of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College, “The Korean War: The First Year” is a short documentary focused on the major events of the Forgotten War. Designed to address the complex strategic and operational actions from June 1950 - June 1951, the film answers seven key questions that can be found in the timestamps below. Major events such as the initial North Korean invasion, the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, the Inchon landing, and the Chinese intervention are discussed.

Timestamps:

1. Why are there Two Koreas? – 00:25

2. Why did North Korea Attack South Korea? – 02:39

3. How did the UN stop the Communist invasion? – 06:30

4. Why did MacArthur attack at Inchon? – 10:24

5. Why did the UN attack into North Korea? – 14:27

6. Why did China enter the Korean War? – 18:51

7. How did the UN stop the Communist invasion….again? – 21:44

**While this movie was designed to be a “Watch-ahead”, each question can also be viewed separately for use in the classroom.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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