Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Psychological operations, which may precede, accompany, replace, or follow applications of force, constitute the planned use of propaganda and physical actions such as terror to influence the behavior of friendly, enemy, or neutral audiences in support of political military aims. PSYOP is neither well used nor widely understood in the West, partly because it seldom is possible to prove what worked. Skills required are super specialized and rare. Technology is less useful than intellect.

Propagandists wield words as nonviolent offensive and defensive weapon systems that publicize, conceal, or misrepresent the real source to set stages properly, exploit successes, minimize failures, and make the most of mixed results. Cohesive programs, which put collective good (variously defined) above self-interest, solicit compliance and collaboration, whether the objective is stability or subversion. Divisive programs, conversely, seek to separate individuals from groups and groups from each other or society at large. Apathy, panic, disobedience, desertion, and surrender are typical objectives.”

- John M. Collins, 1987

“Listen carefully to first criticisms made of your work. Note just what it is about your work that critics don’t like - then cultivate it. THat’s the only part of your work that’s individual and worth keeping.”

- Jean Cocteau

"The struggle which we are witnessing goes by the name of political warfare, psychological warfare, or propaganda warfare... It is time we learned something of political warfare, for we have paid heavily for our ignorance."

- Wallace Carroll, 1948

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 2 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (02.11.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Russians try to subdue Ukrainian towns by seizing mayors

4. US Likely To Base Long-Range Bombers In Northern Australia

5. Save the AUKUS partnership — share the B-21 bomber

6. China's rare earth metals monopoly could be coming to an end

7. Hardened Ukrainian brigade sees Russian vulnerability in Kherson City

8. Military Leaders Praise Musk as Treasury Officials Eye Twitter Deal

9. How to Keep War With China From Being a Pick-Up Game

10. ‘Someone has to do it’: American vets in Ukraine train front-line medics as war rages with Russia

11. Why American Power Endures

12. US-China report recommends backchannel diplomacy with Chinese military

13. A Secretive US Special-Operations Base in Syria Is Taking Fire from a Shadowy Middle East War

14. The US has funneled more than $1 billion into Afghanistan since the fall of Kabul with zero accountability

15. These Air Force commandos saved troops under fire for years. Now they are fighting to save their buddies

16. The New Japan-Australia Security Agreement – Analysis

17. Why Putin prefers ‘War-War’ to ‘Jaw-Jaw’

18. Defending Taiwan vs. Defending Ukraine: What's the Difference?

19. Congress must act to boost combat-credible airpower in Indo-Pacific

20. China has no time frame for Taiwan reunification, even if US says so: envoy

21. New photos show China’s artificial islands are highly developed military bases

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 2 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2

Key Takeaways

Russian force generation efforts combined with Western sanctions are having long-term damaging effects on the Russian economy, as ISW has previously forecasted.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls for a competitive Russian military industry are divorced from the reality of Russian supply chain and defense industrial base issues.
Russian officials announced that occupation authorities began integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into Russian jurisdiction.
Russian and Belarusian officials continue to perpetuate the long-standing information operation that Belarus will enter the war in Ukraine on behalf of Russia, but Belarus’ entry into the war remains highly unlikely, as ISW has previously assessed.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the directions of Svatove and Kreminna, and Russian forces conducted offensive operations to constrain Ukrainian forces.
Russian forces continued defensive operations along the Dnipro River while Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults near Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
Russian forces continued mobilization efforts and advertising for volunteer battalions while struggling with low morale.
Russian occupation authorities continued to forcibly relocate Kherson Oblast residents, nationalize Ukrainian enterprises in occupied territory, and forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 2

Nov 2, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 2, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian force generation efforts combined with Western sanctions are having long-term damaging effects on the Russian economy, as ISW has previously forecasted. Financial experts told Reuters that the Kremlin will face a budget deficit that will “drain Moscow’s reserves to their lowest level in years” due to projected decreases in energy revenue, sanctions, and the cost of Russian mobilization.[1] One expert predicted that payouts to mobilized men including social benefits may cost the Kremlin between 900 billion rubles and three trillion rubles (around $14.6-$32.4 billion) in the next six months. The number does not account for payouts to other categories of servicemen within the Russian forces such as BARS (Combat Army Reserve), volunteer battalions, and the long-term commitment to veterans' payments to contract servicemen, volunteers, non-military specialists who moved to occupied territories, and proxy fighters.[2] ISW previously estimated that one volunteer battalion of 400 servicemen costs Russia at least $1.2 million per month excluding enlistment bonuses and special payments for military achievements.[3]

The Kremlin is continuing to rely heavily on financially incentivizing Russians to fight in Ukraine, which will likely continue to strain the Russian economy for decades. Russian officials have been promising salaries to volunteers and mobilized men that are more than twice the average Russian civilian salary before and during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[4] The Kremlin has been attempting to deflect part of the cost of the force generation effort onto Russian federal subjects but will likely need to tap into the federal budget more heavily soon. United Russia Party Secretary Andrey Turchak, for example, stated that Russian servicemen from all regions must receive uniform benefits and noted that the federal government must cover the difference if the federal subject is unable to fully compensate all participants of the “special military operation.”[5] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin even acknowledged that there are insufficient measures in place to support mobilized personnel and their families in occupied Donetsk Oblast during a United Russia meeting.[6]

The Kremlin is already facing challenges in delivering promised compensation, challenges that are increasing social tensions within Russian society. Russian Telegram channels released footage of mobilized men in Ulyanovsk protesting payment issues.[7] Other footage from the Chuvashia Republic shows a presumably Russian local official yelling at protesting mobilized men that she had not promised them a payment of 300,000 rubles (about $4,860).[8] Families of mobilized men publicly complained to Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Guseyev that they have not received promised compensation of 120,000 rubles (about $1,945).[9] The Kremlin will need to continue to pay what it has promised to maintain societal control and some resemblance of morale among Russia’s ad hoc collection of forces. ISW has also reported that the Kremlin is igniting conflict within Russian military formations amalgamated from different sources by offering different payments, benefits, and treatment.[10] Social media footage from October 31, for example, showed a physical fight between contract servicemen and mobilized men reportedly over personal belongings and military equipment.[11]

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls for a competitive Russian military industry are divorced from the reality of Russian supply chain and defense industrial base issues. Putin stressed on November 2 during a meeting of the Coordinating Council for the Russian Armed Forces that it is important that the Russian government ensures active competition between Russian military arms manufacturers.[12] Putin’s calls contrast with recent reporting that Russia has purchased weapons systems from Iran and North Korea to support its war effort in Ukraine.[13] US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby announced on November 2 that the American intelligence community believes that North Korea is covertly supplying Russia with artillery shells.[14] ISW previously reported that Iranian shipments of drones and possible ballistic missiles to Russia will likely further increase Russian reliance on Iranian-made weapons systems.[15] Russia has likely negotiated the weapon shipments with Iran and North Korea because it has significantly depleted its stock of munitions in air, missile, and artillery strikes over the course of the war in Ukraine and cannot readily restock them. Russia’s reliance on isolated and heavily sanctioned states for critical weapons systems does not support Putin’s demand that the Russian military industry becomes highly competitive and meets the needs of the Russian Armed Forces in any short period of time.

Russian officials announced that occupation authorities began integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into the jurisdiction of Russian nuclear power plant operator Rosenergoatom on November 2.[16] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko claimed that ZNPP personnel who are “critical for the work of the ZNPP” signed contracts with Rosenergoatom and that Russian authorities are exploring the creation of a security zone around the ZNPP.[17] Ukraine’s Energoatom stated on October 28 that only 100 of the 6,700 Ukrainian personnel remaining at the ZNPP plant have signed new contracts with the Russian energy agency Rosatom (out of 11,000 personnel before February 24).[18] The Ukrainian State Inspectorate of Nuclear Regulation stated that Russian forces built an unknown structure at one of seven spent nuclear fuel storage sites at the ZNPP in violation of nuclear safety standards.[19] As of this publication, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not issued a statement condemning the formally announced illegal Russian takeover of the operation of the ZNPP or addressed the likelihood that Russia will demand formal IAEA recognition of Russian control over the ZNPP and thereby de facto recognition of the Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory.

Russian and Belarusian officials continue to highlight bilateral defense cooperation between Russia and Belarus as a means of perpetuating the long-standing information operation that Belarus will enter the war in Ukraine on behalf of Russia. Belarus’ entry into the war remains highly unlikely, as ISW has previously assessed. Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced on November 2 that Russia and Belarus held the annual meeting of the Joint Board of the Ministries of Defense with the purpose of strengthening the “joint military potential” of the Russia-Belarus Union State to counter “challenges and threats of a military nature” posed by NATO.[20] Khrenin’s statement is likely meant to signal continued Belarusian loyalty to Russia and present an image of Belarusian-Russian military unity to the West. As ISW has previously assessed, the likelihood of a Belarusian invasion of the war remains highly unlikely due to the array of domestic ramifications such an action would have on President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, as well as limited Belarusian military capabilities.[21] The meeting of the Joint Board of the Ministries of Defense is therefore a continuation of a concerted effort on the part of both Belarus and Russia to perpetuate an information operation that presents the threat of the Union State as imminent in order to pin Ukrainian troops against the northern border and pollute the information space.

Key Takeaways

Russian force generation efforts combined with Western sanctions are having long-term damaging effects on the Russian economy, as ISW has previously forecasted.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calls for a competitive Russian military industry are divorced from the reality of Russian supply chain and defense industrial base issues.
Russian officials announced that occupation authorities began integrating the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) into Russian jurisdiction.
Russian and Belarusian officials continue to perpetuate the long-standing information operation that Belarus will enter the war in Ukraine on behalf of Russia, but Belarus’ entry into the war remains highly unlikely, as ISW has previously assessed.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the directions of Svatove and Kreminna, and Russian forces conducted offensive operations to constrain Ukrainian forces.
Russian forces continued defensive operations along the Dnipro River while Ukrainian forces continued their interdiction campaign.
Russian forces continued to conduct ground assaults near Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
Russian forces continued mobilization efforts and advertising for volunteer battalions while struggling with low morale.
Russian occupation authorities continued to forcibly relocate Kherson Oblast residents, nationalize Ukrainian enterprises in occupied territory, and forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts);
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensive operations in the direction of Svatove and Kreminna on November 2. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults northwest of Svatove near Yahidne (27km northwest of Svatove), Mykolaivka (31km northwest of Svatove), and Orlyanka (30km northwest of Svatove) in Kharkiv Oblast and near Kuzemivka, Luhansk Oblast (13km northwest of Svatove).[22] The Russian MoD also reported that Russian forces repelled an attempted Ukrainian attack northwest of Kreminna in the directions of Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna), Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna), and Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attempting to reach Chervonopopivka to cut the highway between Kreminna and Svatove.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults in the direction of Kreminna near Makiivka, Nevske (18km west of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[25] Russian forces are likely conducting assaults west and south of Kreminna to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions towards Kreminna and Svatove. The Ukrainian General Saff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine.[26]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

Russian forces continued to prepare for defensive operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast on November 2. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reiterated that Russian troops are trying to hold occupied positions and are conducting defensive actions.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff and other Ukrainian sources also noted that Russian forces are overseeing the evacuation of civilian populations from certain settlements on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[28] Social media users reported that Russian troops are placing prefabricated concrete “pillboxes“ (a concrete defensive structure with firing holes for small arms and artillery systems) in Hola Prystan (10km south of Kherson City on the east bank of the Dnipro River).[29] Advisor to the Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Head, Serhiy Khlan, also reported that Russian troops in Kakhovka are setting up DZOTs (long-term camouflaged firing points) and other fortifications within urban areas of Kakhovka.[30] A Russian milblogger reported on the state of Russian defense on the Kinburn Spit, about 80km west of Kherson City, and claimed that this isolated area is the southern flank of Russian defenses on the east bank of the Dnipro River.[31]

Ukrainian and Russian sources both reported ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on November 2. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated that Russian reconnaissance groups clashed with Ukrainian troops near Dudchany (40km northeast of Beryslav).[32] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops again launched an unsuccessful attempt to break through Russian defensive lines in Kherson Oblast, with one milblogger baselessly claiming that Ukrainian counteroffensives have ceased entirely due to a shortage of 155mm artillery guns.[33] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Ishchenka, Bruskynske, Sukhanove, and Pyatykhatky, all along the current frontline in northern Kherson Oblast.[34] ISW has not observed any independent confirmation of these Russian claims.

Ukrainian troops continued their interdiction campaign against Russian concentration areas, logistics nodes, and transportation assets in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian troops destroyed a Russian Pantsir-1 anti-aircraft missile system and other military equipment in Muzykivka (3km north of Kherson City) on October 29 and that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Snihurivka on October 30 (45km northeast of Kherson City).[35] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian strikes destroyed Russian equipment and personnel in the Beryslav Raion and as far south as the Henichesk Raion, which borders Russian-occupied Crimea.[36] Kherson City residents posted footage and imagery of the reported aftermath of a Ukrainian strike near the Antonivsky Bridge, which Russian milbloggers claimed was conducted with HIMARS.[37]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Bakhmut itself and near Verkhnokamianske (28km northeast of Bakhmut), Spirne (25km northeast of Bakhmut), and Mayorsk (20km south of Bakhmut).[38] Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Malyar stated that the epicenter of fighting in Ukraine is currently around Bakhmut, Soledar, and Donetsk City, where Ukrainian forces repel dozens of attacks per day.[39] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Deputy Internal Minister Vitaly Kiselyov reported that Wagner forces are rapidly trying to break through Ukrainian defenses in Soledar and Bakhmut and stated that fierce fighting is ongoing on the outskirts of both cities.[40] Russian forces continued routine artillery fire along the line of contact in the Bakhmut area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area on November 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Pervomaiske (20km northwest of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[41]A Russian milblogger posted video footage purporting to show artillery units of the Donetsk People’s Republic‘s (DNR) 100th Brigade shooting at Ukrainian positions near Nevelske (about 25km northwest of Donetsk City).[42] Geolocated footage posted on November 1 shows a Russian tank from the Southern Military District firing at Ukrainian forces in Mariinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. [43] Additional video footage posted on November 2 showed Russian Su-25s striking Ukrainian targets on the western outskirts of Mariinka.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Donetsk City on November 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted ground attacks near Pavlivka (45km southwest of Donetsk City), Vodyane (35km southwest of Donetsk City), and Prechystivka (55km southwest of Donetsk).[45] The Ukrainian General Staff also notably reported that Russian troops attacked Ukrainian infrastructure facilities with missiles and Iranian Shahed-136s in Vuhledar (56km southwest of Donetsk City) and Vodyane at night on November 2.[46] This is the first confirmation of Iranian Shahed-136 use in the Vuhledar area. Various Russian sources reported that Russian troops took losses near Vuhledar.[47] These Russian sources also reported that fighting around Pavlivka has slowed, but not stopped, as Russian troops unsuccessfully attempt to eliminate the Ukrainian presence in Pavlivka and Novomykhailivka (25km southwest of Donetsk City).[48] A Russian source additionally reported that Russian troops are digging into their positions near Novomykhailivka with the intention of attacking Vuhledar from the east and cutting off the road in Novomykhailivka.[49] Russian and Ukranian sources reported that Russian forces continued to conduct routine shelling along the contact line in southwest Donetsk Oblast.[50]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces continued routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on November 2.[51] Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Russian forces struck areas in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and an infrastructure facility in Cherkassy Oblast with kamikaze drones.[52] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down three Kh-59 missiles over Odesa Oblast.[53] Russian forces shelled Nikopol, Marhanets, and Chervonohryhorivka, and areas in Mykolaiv Oblast.[54] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian offensive actions in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to indirect fire and forced Russian forces to transfer over 100 seriously wounded personnel to hospitals in Tokmak and Melitopol in the previous days.[55]

Ukrainian and Russian officials announced on November 2 that ZNPP personnel transferred reactors 5 and 6 of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to a hot shutdown state to generate steam to restore heat and hot water to Enerhodar.[56] Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom noted that these measures are not enough to completely restore heat to the city; Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov stated that at least one ZNPP reactor would have to operate at full capacity to ensure full operation of Enerhodar’s heating systems.[57]

Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) prevented a Ukrainian “terrorist” attack on a Crimean energy facility on November 2.[58] Russian outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda claimed that the Ukrainian individual was affiliated with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).[59]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian authorities are continuing to conduct covert mobilization throughout Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian enlistment officials are continuing to send mobilization summonses to men of military age despite the official end of the partial mobilization drive.[60] Member of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Viktor Sobolev also stated Russia may resort to full mobilization if the political-military situation worsens in the future.[61]

Russian forces are continuing to face challenges with low morale among mobilized men and from the consequences of mobilizing men unfit for military service. Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta reported that a confirmed total of 23 men died during training due to physical altercations, alcohol, drugs, suicide, and accidents since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of partial mobilization on September 21.[62] Novaya Gazeta confirmed the names of 89 deceased mobilized men in total since the start of partial mobilization, but the number is likely higher given that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has only notified families of 24 of the deceased servicemen. Pro-war Russian milbloggers also reported receiving complaints from relatives of the mobilized men, stating that the Russian MoD has not addressed its communication issues with families.[63] Another Russian opposition outlet, Mediazona, reported that Russian forces are reopening camps with poor living conditions in Perevalsk, Luhansk Oblast to detain contract servicemen and newly mobilized men who refuse to fight.[64] Mediazona noted that Russian forces previously had camps in Perevalsk until closing them in August following an outcry from servicemen’s families. The report notes that Russian forces are forcing mobilized men to serve on the frontlines or join Wagner Group units.

Russian and proxy officials are resuming advertisements for volunteer contract service within Russian joint forces. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov published an advertisement video announcing the continuation of recruitment of volunteers from Chechnya to fight in Ukraine.[65] Kadyrov stated that volunteers will undergo training in Grozny before having the opportunity to sign a contract with the Russian MoD.[66] Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics’ (LNR and DNR) official sources also advertised contract service with the 2nd Army Corps and the “Nevsky” volunteer detachment, respectively.[67] A Rostov Oblast outlet reported that a Russian man who had received a mobilization notice a day prior to Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s announcement of the completion of the mobilization order on October 28 had been involuntarily enlisted as a volunteer.[68]

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continued measures to forcibly evacuate residents of Kherson Oblast on November 2. Russian sources reported that Russian occupation officials plan to begin the forced movement of residents from Kakhovka Raion in Kherson Oblast on November 6.[69] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian occupation officials are forcibly evacuating residents from the settlement of Velyka Lepetykha on the east bank of the Dnipro by bus and are prohibiting departures by private transport.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that occupation authorities gave residents in Nova Zburyivka (17km southwest of Kherson City) a three-day notice for mandatory evacuations.[71] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 2 that Russian occupation officials have begun to forcibly relocate residents in Beryslav Raion.[72] A Russian source claimed that the Kherson Oblast occupation administration stated that they have completed evacuation measures on the west bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson oblast, although ISW cannot independently verify that evacuations from the west bank have stopped.[73] Russian occupation officials will likely continue to intensify evacuation measures as the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast progresses.

Russian forces exploited recent evacuation and “nationalization” measures to engage in widespread looting in Russian-occupied territories on November 2. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 2 that Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are looting Ukrainian firms on an industrial scale.[74] The Resistance Center reported that Russian occupation officials in Melitopol embezzled money from firms in the city and looted equipment from local banks under the guise of nationalization measures.[75] The Resistance Center also reported that Russian forces are looting equipment and appliances from recreation centers in Kyryllivka, Zaporizhia Oblast under the guise of nationalizing Ukrainian-owned businesses.[76] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Head Yaroslav Yanushevych reported that Russian occupation officials looted equipment from a garment company in Kherson Oblast.[77] Ukrainian sources reported on November 2 that Russian forces are engaging in widespread looting of property left by forcibly evacuated residents from Kherson Oblast.[78] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian forces are also using the homes of forcibly evacuated residents in Kherson Oblast to house military personnel.[79] Russian forces will likely increasingly engage in looting and other violations of property rights as evacuation and nationalization measures continue in Russian-occupied territories.

Russian and occupation officials continue to illegally deport Ukrainian children with the intent to commit crimes that may constitute an act of genocide as of November 2. The Ukrainian government portal Children of War reported that as of November 2 Russian officials have deported almost 10,000 Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation.[80] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that the forced deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children is a concerted Russian effort to destroy a whole stratum of the Ukrainian population and thus the Ukrainian people as an ethnic unit. This reporting from the Ukrainian Resistance Center matches previous ISW assessments that the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation likely amounts to a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign as well as apparent violations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[8] ttps://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/13829 ; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/13842 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/14240; http...

[11] https://notes.citeam.org/mobilization-oct-31-nov-1; https://t.me/astrap... http s://vk.com/wall-131822434_46478; https://t.me/TeamSobol/11549

[12] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/transcripts/69743

[16] https://t.me/readovkanews/45993; https://ukraina dot ru/20221102/1040402860.html; https://ria dot ru/20221102/zaes-1828586570.html

[19] https://snriu.gov dot ua/news/ekspluatatsiiu-maidanchyka-ssviap-na-zaes-obmezheno-cherez-samovilne-budivnytstvo-rozpochate-okupantamy-derzhatomrehuliuvannia

[31] https://t.me/OstashkoNews/36094; https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27465/4671194/

[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2022/11/02/narazi-epiczentr-bojovyh-dij-na-doneczkomu-napryamku-ganna-malyar/

[57] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/10478 ; https://t.me/orlovdmytroEn/1208; https://suspilne dot media/307778-energeticnij-ramstajn-rosijski-kindzali-v-bilorusi-u-kievi-svitla-moze-ne-buti-tiznami-252-den-vijni-onlajn/

[62] https://novayagazeta dot eu/articles/2022/11/01/at-least-100-russian-conscripts-drafted-to-fight-in-ukraine-confirmed-dead-so-far-en-news

[64] https://zona dot media/article/2022/11/01/perevalsk

[72] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-svoyu-evakuacziyu-na-hersonshhyni/

[74] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/zagarbnyky-maroderyat-tymchasovi-okupovani-rajony-zaporizkoyi-oblasti/

[75] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/zagarbnyky-maroderyat-tymchasovi-okupovani-rajony-zaporizkoyi-oblasti/

[76] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/zagarbnyky-maroderyat-tymchasovi-okupovani-rajony-zaporizkoyi-oblasti/

[78] https://www.facebook.com/sergey.khlan/posts/pfbid0chEGe1TSTcpCCi9iSjnSKU... https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/na-hersonshhyni-okupantiv-rozselyayut-v-budynkah-misczevyh-zhyteliv/

[79] https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/na-hersonshhyni-okupantiv-rozselyayut-v-budynkah-misczevyh-zhyteliv/; https://sprotyv.mod dot gov.ua/2022/11/02/rosiyany-prodovzhuyut-svoyu-evakuacziyu-na-hersonshhyni/

[80] https://childrenofwar dot gov.ua/

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (02.11.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (02.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

More than 1,255 children were affected in Ukraine as a result of the full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation. As of the morning of November 2, 2022, the official number of child victims has not changed - 430. The number of injured has increased to more than 825.

From 6 in the morning on November 2, hourly electricity blackout schedules have been put into effect in Ukraine, NEC "Ukrenergo" reported. Schedules of hourly outages mean that certain groups of consumers will be restricted every day, but according to a certain schedule drawn up by distribution network operators for each Oblast.

In Kyiv Oblast, 16,000 homes remain without electricity, the head of the Oblast military administration (OMA), Oleksiy Kuleba, said.

One of the 13 "Shahed-136" kamikaze drones launched by the Russian forces on the night of November 2 hit an infrastructure facility in Cherkasy Oblast. The Air Force shot down the remaining 12 Shaheds. Six were shot down on the approach to Kyiv, and six over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Over the past day, the Russian military shelled populated areas of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy and Mykolaiv Oblast, heads of respective Oblast military administrations reported at 9:00 a.m:

• In Sumy Oblast, the Russian forces shelled five border settlements at night, and 22 air strikes were recorded. No victims or damages reported.

• In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast at night and in the morning, the Russian forces again shelled Nikopol and Chervonohryhorivka community. According to premilitary information, people were not injured.

• In the village of Petropavlivka, Kupiansk district, Kharkiv Oblast, a 25-year-old mother and two children – a 4-year-old boy and a 6-year-old girl – were injured as a result of Russian shelling. The mother's condition is assessed as average; the children are in serious condition. Two men were hospitalized with injuries in the Kupyansk district, one man was injured and hospitalized in the Chuhuyiv district, Kharkiv Oblast.

• Over the past day there were 4 dead and 10 injured in Donetsk Oblast. Work to restore electricity supplies in the occupied territories continues.

The sounds of explosions were heard in Zaporizhzhia at 9:11 p.m. An air alert was announced in the city and Oblast at 20:42. The head of Zaporizhzhia OMA, Oleksandr Starukh, confirmed the attack on the suburbs of Zaporizhzhia.

The US Department of State has awarded $47.6 million to Tetra Tech, Inc. to provide urgent humanitarian demining assistance to Ukraine in the face of Russia's brutal war of aggression. This project forms part of $91.5 million in demining assistance announced in August, DoS spokesperson said on Twitter.

Humanitarian demining of liberated territories in Kharkiv Oblast continues. During the day, the pyrotechnic units of the State Emergency Service defused 1,216 explosive objects. On Tuesday, near the village of Lypka, A 73-year-old man was injured when a mine blew up.

More than 93% of educational institutions across Ukraine are already ready for the heating season, Minister of Education and Science Serhii Shkarlet said. However, the situation differs depending on the Oblast. For example, Kyiv and 13 Oblasts are 100% ready; in the rest of the [Ukraine's] territory, the indicators are 90% and higher. The temperature in shelters is also an important factor. In case it does not meet the requirements, classes will be held remotely.

Occupied territories:

On November 2, the Ukrainian staff of the Zaporizhzhya NPP restored heat supply in Enerhodar, Zaporizhzhya Oblast, and hot water also appeared in residential buildings, Enerhoatom reported. Currently, the water temperature is 51 degrees Celsius. "Energoatom" noted that this is not enough to fully provide Enerhodar with heat and hot water, but even this temperature allows for protecting the city's utility networks from damage in the event of cold weather. Since May, Zaporizhia NPP, not Zaporizhia TPP provided heat and water supply to Enerhodar. The latter had to be stopped due to the Russian shelling.

According to the Center of national resistance (CNR) of the Ukrainian MOD, The Russian occupying forces are increasing the rate of looting in the temporarily occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. In Melitopol, the occupiers continue to rob Ukrainian state-owned enterprises. In particular, the enemy ransacked the equipment of PrivatBank branches, taking away even the furniture. Russians call all this "nationalization". Russian marauders also robbed resort centers in Kyrylivka - dismantling boilers, air conditioners, and other household appliances. CNR stressed that the robbery takes place under the supervision of the Russian military. Before that, the local collaborators created a list of facilities that "belong to no one". It includes objects whose owners refused to cooperate with the occupiers.

The Russian occupying forces ransacked the Albin Gavdzinsky art gallery in the temporarily occupied Nova Kakhovka after announcing the "evacuation of the population" due to a possible counteroffensive by the Armed Forces in the Kherson region, the Nova Kakhovka City Council said. The invaders took away many paintings, graphics and sculptures from the gallery.

Restoration of the destroyed part of the Kerch Strait bridge [to Crimea] will be completed in December; the transport security of the peninsula will be completely resolved, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin said.

Operational situation

It is the 252nd day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to defend Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories,

concentrates its efforts on disrupting the counteroffensive actions of the Ukrainian troops, and does not give up attempts to conduct the offensive in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions.

Over the past day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks in the areas around Makiivka, Nevske and Bilohorivka of Luhansk Oblast and Verkhnokamyanske, Spirne, Bakhmut, Mayorsk, Pervomaiske, Novomykhailivka, Vodyane, Pavlivka and Prechystivka of Donetsk Oblast.

The Russian military continues to shell the Ukrainian troops along the contact line, fortify frontiers in certain directions, and conduct aerial reconnaissance. In violation of the norms of international humanitarian law, the laws and customs of war, it continues to strike critical infrastructure. Over the past day, the Russian forces have launched 7 missile strikes and 47 air strikes and fired over 90 MLRS rounds. Areas around more than 25 Ukrainian towns and villages were hit by the Russian fire, including Kramatorsk, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Mykilske in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Pavlivka in Donetsk Oblast. Near the state border, Hai and Senkivka in Chernihiv Oblast, Mefedivka, Vovkivka, Zarutske, Myropillia, Hirky, Yunakivka, Zapsillia and Oleksandrivka in Sumy Oblast, Hlyboke, Kamianka, Vilkhuvatka, Neskuchne, Vovchansk, Kozacha Lopan, Mylove, Starytsya, Strilecha, Veterynary, Udy and Chuhunivka of Kharkiv Oblast.

Over the past day, the aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces made 33 strikes against the enemy. 26 on areas of enemy weapons and military equipment concentration, and 7 of its anti- aircraft missile systems positions were hit. Over the past day, the Ukrainian air defense units shot down one Russian helicopter, 2 "Orlan-10" UAVs, 6 "Shakhed-136" assault UAVs and 2 "Kub" UAVs.

Missile and artillery forces hit 4 areas of weapons and military equipment concentration, 3 ammunition depots, and 6 other important Russian military targets.

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian MOD reported that Iranian officials intend to send a shipment of more than 200 Shahed-136, Mohajer-6 and Arash-2 UAVs to the Russian Federation. The UAVs will be sent disassembled, and Russian personnel will assemble them with Russian markings. Iran also plans to send a thousand weapons to Russia by the end of the year, including short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles and combat drones.

Russian military institutions expand training capacity. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation reported on November 1 that Russia is developing "tactical simulator" complexes using various unspecified training tools to reduce the cost of using expensive weapons systems.

The threat of missile strikes and the use of attack UAVs persists, specifically from the territory of the Republic of Belarus. The Republic of Belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.

The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus reported that Belarus and Russia plan to set up joint training centers for the joint training of Russian and Belarusian military personnel. Their

ostensive goal is to expand the training and development capabilities of the Russian military, potentially in response to widespread and systemic problems with the training of mobilized reservists under partial mobilization.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The Russian military fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Kucherivka, Kyslivka, Dvorichne, Grekivka, Zarichne, Ivanivka, Kotlyarivka, Makiivka, Nadiya, Yampolivka and Terny.

On November 1, Ukrainian troops continued to conduct a counteroffensive in the direction of Svatove. Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest of Svatove in the direction of Mykolaivka and Kuzemivka in Luhansk Oblast and near Orlyanske in the Kharkiv Oblast.

The Ukrainian defense forces have crossed the Zherebets River near Stelmakhivka and are preparing to resume the offensive against the Russian positions in the area. The 13th and 16th BARS detachments hold the defense in the Svatove direction.

The Ukrainian defense forces continued to conduct a counteroffensive in the direction of Kreminna. They are preparing for an offensive in the direction of Chervonopopivka to enter Kreminna from the north. Near Ploshchanka, they intend to launch an offensive that will cut the road between Kreminna and Svatove. Russian troops periodically counterattack to the west of Kreminna near Terny and Torske to deter the movement of the Ukrainian forces in the direction of the highway.

The Ukrainian Defense forces unsuccessfully tried to storm Kreminna from the direction of Nevske, which is under Ukrainian control.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

The Russian military fired tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Nevske and Berestove.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled the areas around Spirne, Bilohorivka, Rozdolivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Ivanhrad, Opytne, Zelenopillia, Mayorsk, Avdiivka, Maryinka, Vodyane, Paraskoviivka, Kamianka, Krasnohorivka, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Netaylove and Novomykhailivka with tanks and artillery.

The Russian forces continued their offensive around Bakhmut. Fierce fighting continues in the area of Opytne in the Kurdyumivka direction and near Zaitseve in the vicinity of Soledar and Bakhmut, where units of the "Wagner" PMC are trying to break through the Ukrainian defenses. Ukrainian troops evacuate civilians from the village of Klyshchiivka.

On November 1, Russian troops continued their offensive on the northern, northwestern, and southwestern outskirts of the city of Donetsk. They attacked in the Avdiivka direction, stormed Ukrainian positions in Nevelske, and captured a group of Ukrainian soldiers. At the end of the day on October 31, battles continued in Pervomaiske and Vodiane. Russian troops managed to advance within Maryinka.

The Russian military deployed an additional hospital in the area of Zavitne Bazhannya in Donetsk Oblast, which is currently full of wounded servicemen of the occupying forces.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The Russian military shelled positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Bohoyavlenka, Pavlivka, Velyka Novosilka, Prechystivka, Vuhledar, Novomayorske, Vremivka, Neskuchne, Paraskoviivka, Hulyaipole, Hulyaipilske, Mali Shcherbaky, Novoandriivka, Orihiv, Pavlivka, Zaliznychne, Dorozhnyanka, Stepove, Olhivske, Malynivka, Novodanilivka and Chervone.

On November 1, Russian troops continued their offensive to the southwest of Donetsk in the Novopavlivka direction. Battles intensified in the Vuhledar direction; Russian troops are trying to capture Pavlivka (the 155th separate marines brigade controls up to half of the city) and Novomykhailivka. The Ukrainian Joint Forces are trying to hold the left bank of the Kashlygach River and regroup in the Vuhledar area, from the Slavne-Solodke frontier. The advanced positions of the Armed Forces Ukraine attacked to the south of Novomykhaylovka. The Russian offensive is probably aimed at encircling the Ukrainian grouping in Vuhledar.

The Russian military employs approximately five BTGs (one BTG from the 36th separate motorized rifle brigade), a combined BTG from the 18th machinegun-artillery division and 39th separate motorized rifle brigade and several units of the "company-battalion" level from the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR people's militia (3rd and 5th separate motorized rifle brigade, of the 11th motorized rifle regiment, two rifle battalion of the mobilization reserve, part of forces of "Kalmius" artillery brigade and special unit the so-called "DNR Interior Ministry"), divided into two tactical groups, namely Vuhledar and Novomykhailivka.

The Russian military aims to eliminate the Vuhledar-Maryika salient of the Ukrainian Joint Forces, which is objectively a convenient springboard for an offensive on Volnovakha or Dokuchaevsk, by means of two strikes in directions converging approximately east of Vodyane.

On November 1, artillery fire from the Ukrainian Joint Forces destroyed the Akhtamar hotel on the Mariupol-Donetsk road near Volnovakha, where Chechen units were stationed.

Tavriysk direction

- Vasylivka – Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

- Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd Army Corps of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd Army Corps of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

The Russian fire hit areas of more than 18 towns and villages along the contact line. The city of Nikopol and the village of Illinka in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were hit by shelling from Russian MLRS.

Russian troops continued to prepare defensive lines and positions, conducted aerial reconnaissance and formed defensive lines on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. Russian troops are digging trenches and entrenching themselves for the defense of the eastern bank, including along the Nova Kakhovka - Dniprany - Korsunka line, Hola Prystan and as far south as Mykhailivka.

The Russian military repelled Ukrainian attacks in the direction of Beryslav. The Ukrainian Defense Forces unsuccessfully tried to advance in the direction of Mylove, Sukhanove, in the area of Bruskinske - Kostromka and Zeleny Hai.

The Ukrainian defense forces continued to block Russian concentration areas and logistics hubs. They struck Russian ammunition depots in the Beryslav district and the area of Kozatske near Nova Kakhovka.

The forced so-called "evacuation" of civilians from towns and villages in the temporarily occupied territories of Kherson Oblast continues. In particular, the occupying forces take people away by bus from the village of Velyka Lepetykha. Travel by private transport is prohibited. The Russian occupiers were seen moving archival documents from the administrative buildings in Kherson. Russian losses were confirmed in the area of Muzikyvka, Kherson Oblast, on October 29. Thus, as a result of fire damage, the anti-aircraft missile-gun complex "Pantsir-S1" was destroyed, and up to ten units of other Russian military equipment were damaged. 12 invaders were destroyed in the area of Snihurivka, Mykolaiv Oblast.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

The Russian fleet has 10 ships and boats at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Among them is 1 Kalibr cruise missile carrier: a Project 21631 small missile ship carrying a total of 8 missiles.

In the Sea of Azov waters, 6 patrol ships and boats are located on the approaches to the Mariupol and Berdyansk seaports to block the Azov coast.

Russian aviation continues to fly from the Crimean airfields of Belbek and Hvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 12 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saki airfields were involved.

On the morning of November 2, the Russian military carried out a missile attack with three Kh- 59 cruise missiles on Odesa Oblast. The attack was carried out from the direction of the Black Sea, from Su-30 aircraft. Ukrainian air defense forces shot down all missiles over the sea.

"The Grain initiative": On Wednesday, November 2, the delegations of the UN, Turkey and Ukraine agreed not to plan the movement of ships through the grain corridor in the Black Sea. This was reported by the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) press service. Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said that ships under the Turkish flag would continue to enter Ukrainian ports and take grain for export. Those vessels that are already in the grain corridor will continue to move. Akar said: "Ships that have left Ukrainian ports and are going to sea will continue their journey. There are no problems with the departure of ships under the Turkish flag.

Meanwhile, on November 2, Russia decided to return to the "grain agreement", so the corridors for the export of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea should resume from noon on Wednesday, November 2. This was announced by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said that the head of the Russian Defense Ministry had called the Turkish Minister of Defense and announced Russia's return to the "grain agreement". According to him, the corridor for the export of Ukrainian grain will be operational starting at noon on Wednesday, November 2.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 02.11

Personnel - almost 72,700 people (+800);

Tanks 2,714 (+16)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,525 (+24);

Artillery systems – 1,733 (+3);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 387 (+4); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 198 (+1); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,153 (+10); Aircraft - 277 (+1);

Helicopters – 258 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,438 (+23); Intercepted cruise missiles - 397 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

American historian and writer Yale University professor Timothy Snyder became the ambassador of the fundraising platform UNITED24, the Office of the President of Ukraine reported. He

became the second ambassador for United24 after actor Mark Hamill, who will focus his efforts on raising funds for the "Defense and demining" direction.

International diplomatic aspect

Russia's Foreign Ministry published a statement "on preventing nuclear war." Like in the Cold War times, any message from Moscow should be read as the opposite. Usually, a threat begins by mentioning that Russia bears "a special responsibility" for "strengthening international security and strategic stability." In such a way, the Russian diplomats remind the US and the rest that Moscow possesses the largest nuclear arsenal and may do whatever it wants, for nobody can stop a nuclear superpower. Recalling "solely defensive goals" of the nuclear arms and that they might be used for nuclear deterrence Russia and "exclusively in response to an aggression involving the use of weapons of mass destruction," Russians add "a bit" of ambiguity. "An aggression with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy" is such a vague reason that allows anyone in the Kremlin to justify deployment. Who can check Vladimir Putin, that enjoys more power than the formally non-democratic secretaries- general of the Communist Party of the USSR? To make the threatening message clear, Russians condemn "irresponsible and impudent actions aimed at undermining our national security," which means American "proxy war" against Russia, and pretend to be a constructive power that wishes "to avoid any military clash of nuclear powers."

Russia calls on the "nuclear five," which means merely the United States, "to give up the dangerous attempts to infringe on vital interests of each other while balancing on the brink of a direct armed conflict and encouraging provocations with weapons of mass destruction, which can lead to catastrophic consequences." So, according to Kremlin, it's the West led by the US is "threatening" peace and security in Europe, not Russia that started the largest military conflict in Europe since the global conflict ignited by the Nazis and Bolsheviks allies in 1939.

The stated goal is to set up a "more robust architecture of international security based on ensuring predictability and global strategic stability, as well as on the principles of equal rights, indivisible security and mutual account of core interests of the parties." It translates as the US must accept the Kremlin's spheres of influence by accepting limited sovereignty of those beyond "nuclear five," ("equal rights"), the US must not interfere in Russia's violations of human rights and authoritarian rule at home ("core interests" of the parties), the US must disband NATO or at least make it irrelevant by providing Russia with veto power over security of the others ("indivisible security").

While Moscow threatens Washington, DC, Pyongyang threatens Seoul and Washington, DC. North Korea fired about 17 missiles into the sea, including one that landed less than 60 km off South Korea's coast. "If [the US] does not want any serious developments not suited to its security interests, it should stop the useless and ineffective war exercises at once. If not, it will have to totally take the blame for all the consequences," stated North Korea's foreign ministry. In the meantime, the White House said that North Korea is covertly shipping a "significant number" of artillery shells to Russia in support of its invasion of Ukraine.

Saudi Arabia has shared intelligence with the US that suggests Iran could be preparing for an imminent attack on the Kingdom. As a copycat of the Russian statement "on preventing nuclear war," the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the country "adheres to the policy of good neighborliness, acts on the basis of mutual respect and within the framework of international law, seeks to strengthen stability and security in the region and will continue constructive interaction with neighboring countries," rejecting a hostile intention. Meanwhile, according to Ukrainian military intelligence, Iran plans to send sophisticated Arash-2 drones to Russia. It will be a part of a large package that includes "a batch of more than 200 combat drones Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6." Iran still denies supplying Russia with kamikaze drones despite hard evidence that says the opposite.

Russian mercenaries committed yet another massacre, killing at least 13 civilians in the region of Mopti, Malian. The so-called Wagner PMC is active in Ukraine, Syria, and a dozen African countries. The PMC is run by the closest aid of Vladimir Putin, who seems to be gaining more power in Russia and might be in a contest to be chosen as Putin's heir. The Human Rights Watch report alleged that Russian mercenaries have been committing murders and tortures of civilians in the Central African Republic since 2019. Besides Moscow's support of the most brutal regimes, war crimes and genocide are Russia's modus operandi everywhere. Bringing Russia to justice in Ukraine is the only way to put an end to a culture of genocide and a clear threat to global peace and security.

"I have given instructions to the Ministry of Defense to resume our full participation in this work," Putin said, announcing that Russia is in the "grain deal" again. Russia suspended its participation in the deal over the weekend, accusing Ukraine that its military used the "grain corridor" (some 200 km away from Sevastopol!) to conduct a drone attack on Russian warships engaged in a missile attack against Ukraine. Three bulkers loaded with grain departed Ukraine on Tuesday despite Russia suspending its participation. Meanwhile, Ukraine, Turkey, and the UN have carried out vessel inspections without Russia, allowing some shipments to continue. "Even if Russia behaves hesitantly because it didn't receive the same benefits, we will continue decisively our efforts to serve humanity," Turkey's President said in a speech. Vladimir Putin had a choice of targeting civilian cargo vessels or Turkey's navies, which could have led to the Article 5 response or a return to the deal. So, his hunger blackmail failed.

Russia, relevant news

In October, Russia became the largest oil supplier to India, overtaking the traditionally dominant suppliers - Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Economic Times writes with reference to data from the energy cargo tracker Vortexa. In October, the Russian Federation supplied India with 946,000 barrels of oil per day - this was 22% of the total oil imports to India. It is followed by Iraq (20.5%) and Saudi Arabia (16%). Compared to September, total crude oil imports rose 5% in October, with imports from Russia up 8%. At the same time, India imported more oil from Russia by sea than the EU for the first time: the volume of supplies to India was 34% greater than to the EU.

The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade allowed the parallel import of alcohol brands Jagermeister, Jameson, Jim Beam, Johnnie Walker, Absolut, Aperol, White Horse, William

Lawsons's, Hennessy, Moet, Bacardi, Baileys, Capitan Morgan. This means that the products will be imported into the country without the producer's consent. The Ministry also said that the updated list for parallel imports might include Marvel, Disney Pixar and DC Comics products.

According to the Ministry of Economic Development, the decline in Russia's GDP in September accelerated to 5% in annual terms and annual inflation as of October 31 was 12.69%.

Russian airlines reduced traffic in September by 20%, Russian Federal Statistics agency Rosstat reported.

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3. Russians try to subdue Ukrainian towns by seizing mayors

These are pacification operations. Soon we may hear "we have to burn a village to save it." Or "we may have to burn a village to destroy the resistance."

Russians try to subdue Ukrainian towns by seizing mayors

AP · by YURAS KARMANAU · November 3, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — Not long after Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine, soldiers broke down the office door of Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov. They put a bag over his head, bundled him into a car and drove him around the southern city for hours, threatening to kill him.

Fedorov, 34, is one of over 50 local leaders who have been held in Russian captivity since the war began on Feb. 24 in an attempt to subdue cities and towns coming under Moscow’s control. Like many others, he said he was pressured to collaborate with the invaders.

“The bullying and threats did not stop for a minute. They tried to force me to continue leading the city under the Russian flag, but I refused,” Fedorov told The Associated Press by phone last month in Kyiv. “They didn’t beat me, but day and night, wild screams from the next cell would tell me what was waiting for me.”

As Russians seized parts of eastern and southern Ukraine, civilian administrators and others, including nuclear power plant workers, say they have been abducted, threatened or beaten to force their cooperation — something that legal and human rights experts say may constitute a war crime.

Ukrainian and Western historians say the tactic is used when invading forces are unable to subjugate the population.

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This year, as Russian forces sought to tighten their hold on Melitopol, hundreds of residents took to the streets to demand Fedorov’s release. After six days in detention and an intervention from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, he was exchanged for nine Russian prisoners of war and expelled from the occupied city. A pro-Kremlin figure was installed.

“The Russians cannot govern the captured cities. They have neither the personnel nor the experience,” Fedorov said. They want to force public officials to work for them because they realize that someone has to “clean the streets and fix up the destroyed houses.”

The Association of Ukrainian Cities (AUC), a group of local leaders from across Ukraine, said that of the more than 50 abducted officials, including 34 mayors, at least 10 remain captive.

Russian officials haven’t commented on the allegations. Moscow-backed authorities in eastern Ukraine even launched a criminal investigation into Fedorov on charges of involvement in terrorist activities.

“Kidnapping the heads of villages, towns and cities, especially in wartime, endangers all residents of a community, because all critical management, provision of basic amenities and important decisions on which the fate of thousands of residents depends are entrusted to the community’s head,” said Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko, head of the AUC.

In the southern city of Kherson, one of the first seized by Russia and a key target of an unfolding counteroffensive, Mayor Ihor Kolykhaiev tried to stand his ground. He said in April that he would refuse to cooperate with its new, Kremlin-backed overseer.

Kirill Stremousov, deputy head of the Russian-installed regional administration, repeatedly denounced Kolykhaiev as a “Nazi,” echoing the false Kremlin narrative that its attack on Ukraine was an attempt to “de-Nazify” the country.

Kolykhaiev continued to supervise Kherson’s public utilities until his arrest on June 28. His whereabouts remain unknown.

According to the U.N. Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 407 forced disappearances and arbitrary arrests of civilians were recorded in areas seized by Russia in the first six months of the war. Most were civil servants, local councilors, civil society activists and journalists.

Yulia Gorbunova, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, said the abuse “violates international law and may constitute a war crime,” adding that Russian forces’ actions appeared to be aimed at “obtaining information and instilling fear.”

The U.N. human rights office has warned repeatedly that arbitrary detentions and forced disappearances are among possible war crimes committed in Ukraine.

Several mayors have been killed, shocking Ukrainian society. Following the discovery of mass burials in areas recaptured by Kyiv, Ukrainian and foreign investigators continue to uncover details of extrajudicial killings of mayors.

The body of Olga Sukhenko, who headed the village of Motyzhyn, near Kyiv, was found in a mass grave next to those of her husband and son after Russian forces retreated. The village, with a prewar population of about 1,000, is a short drive from Bucha, which saw hundreds of civilians killed under Russian occupation.

Residents said Sukhenko had refused to cooperate with the Russians. When her body was unearthed on the outskirts of Motyzhyn, her hands were found tied behind her back.

Mayor Yurii Prylypko of nearby Hostomel was gunned down in March while handing out food and medicine. The prosecutor general’s office later said his body was found rigged with explosives.

Ukraine’s government has tried to swap captive officials for Russian POWs, but officials complain that Moscow sometimes demands Kyiv release hundreds for each Ukrainian in a position of authority, prolonging negotiations.

“It’s such a difficult job that any superfluous word can get in the way of our exchange,” said Dmytro Lubinets, Ukraine’s human rights commissioner. “We know the places where prisoners are kept, as well as the appalling conditions in which they are kept.”

There has been no news about the fate of Ivan Samoydyuk, the deputy mayor of Enerhodar, site of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. Samoydyuk, abducted in March, has repeatedly been considered for a prisoner swap, but his name was struck off the list each time, Mayor Dmytro Orlov told the AP.

The 58-year-old deputy mayor was seriously ill when seized, Orlov said, and “we don’t even know if he’s alive.” At best, Samoydyuk is sitting in a basement somewhere “and his life depends on the whim of people with guns,” he added.

More than 1,000 Enerhodar residents, including dozens of workers at Zaporizhzhia, Europe’s largest nuclear plant, were detained by the Russians at one time or another.

“The vast majority of those who came out of the Russian cellars speak of brutal beatings and electric shocks,” he said.

Gorbunova, the HRW senior researcher, said torture “is prohibited under all circumstances under international law, and, when connected to an armed conflict, constitutes a war crime and may also constitute a crime against humanity.”

Each week brings reports of abductions of officials, engineers, doctors and teachers who won’t cooperate with the Russians.

Viktor Marunyak, head of the village of Stara Zburivka in the southern Kherson region, is famous for appearing in Roman Bondarchuk’s 2015 documentary “Ukrainian Sheriffs,” an Academy Award contender. The film explores the separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine that began in 2014. While the film didn’t win an Oscar, it cemented Marunyak’s salt-of-the-earth reputation.

After Russian troops seized Stara Zburivka in spring, Marunyak held pro-Ukrainian rallies and hid some activists in his home. He was eventually taken prisoner.

“At first, they put (electrical) wires on my thumbs. Then it seemed not enough for them, and they put them on my big toes. And they poured water on my head so it would flow down my back,” he told the AP. “Honestly, I was so beaten up that I didn’t have any impressions from the electric current.”

After 23 days, Marunyak was “released to die,” he said. Hospitalized for 10 days with pneumonia and nine broken ribs, he finally left for territory controlled by Kyiv.

History professor Hubertus Jahn of Cambridge University said that from the time of Peter the Great onward, the tactic by imperialist Russia of co-opting locals targeted elites and nobility, with resistance often bringing Siberian exile.

During World War II, he said, “German SS units operated in a similar way,” by targeting local administrators in order to pressure residents into submission. Jahn called it an obvious strategy “if you don’t have the strength to subordinate a region outright.”

Historian Ivan Patryliuk of Kyiv’s Taras Shevchenko National University said municipal authorities in Soviet Ukraine often fled before Nazi occupation forces arrived, which “helped avoid mass executions of officials.”

“The kind of torture and humiliation (of) city leaders that the Russians are now perpetrating ... is one of the darkest and most shameful pages of the current war,” Patryliuk said.

___

Hanna Arhirova in Kyiv, Joanna Kozlowska in London, and Jamey Keaten in Geneva, contributed to this report.

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by YURAS KARMANAU · November 3, 2022

4. US Likely To Base Long-Range Bombers In Northern Australia

US Likely To Base Long-Range Bombers In Northern Australia

eurasiareview.com · by BenarNews · November 3, 2022

By Stephen Wright

Plans to station nuclear capable B-52 bombers in the far north of Australia show that the U.S. military is seeking more deterrence options against China as its military strength increases, defense experts said.

In August, the U.S. Department of Defense sought preliminary information from contractors about building a parking apron to accommodate six B-52 bombers at the Australian air force’s Tindal base southeast of Darwin, according to the U.S. government’s contracting site. Australian broadcaster ABC reported on Monday that it had seen detailed plans for the air base expansion.

For more than a decade, Australia and the United States have extended their defense alliance with what they call force posture initiatives that have involved deployments of U.S. marines in Darwin as well as joint air force exercises and military infrastructure investment in Australia.

“This deployment has been a long time coming,” said Brian Harding, a former Pentagon official who helped negotiate the initial Australia-U.S. force posture arrangements under President Barack Obama.

“The development of new infrastructure in northern Australia to support U.S. Air Force operations has long been seen as potentially far more strategically important than the rotations of U.S. Marines, but has flown below the radar,” he told BenarNews.

China’s Foreign Ministry criticized the U.S.-Australian plans and said the two countries have an outdated Cold War zero-sum mentality.

“Such a move by the U.S. and Australia escalates regional tensions, gravely undermines regional peace and stability, and may trigger an arms race in the region,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a ministry press conference.

China’s military buildup, its expansive claims tothe South China Sea, a busy global shipping route, and its forays into Taiwan’s airspace have contributed to heightened tensions in East Asia for several years.

China’s annual military spending will reach U.S. $230 billion this year compared with $60 billion in 2008, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which cites official Chinese government figures. U.S. military spending was nearly $770 billion in 2021, according to CSIS.

On Tuesday, the Pentagon said that infrastructure works at the Tindal air base would support the “rotational presence” of a range of U.S. military aircraft in Australia following commitments for enhanced cooperation made at ministerial talks in 2021.

U.S. military aircraft, including B-52s and other bombers, have visited Australia for years to participate in joint exercises, which would continue, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Defense said in an email. Australia hosted four U.S. stealth bombers at its Amberley air force base in July.

The B-52 strategic bombers can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons. Since 1970, Australia has been a signatory to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which commits it not to acquire nuclear weapons and to support efforts at disarmament.

Paul Dibb, a former director of Australia’s Defence Intelligence Organization, said in a television interview that Australia’s prohibition of nuclear weapons would be unlikely to change unless there was a conflict or imminent threat of one.

“What this [B-52] presence does … is to show to China it can’t just keep pushing south and south through the straits and waterways of the South China Sea,” he said.

It would also be reassuring for U.S. allies South Korea and Japan, Dibb said.

Meanwhile, Taiwanese Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng said Taiwan, which China regards as a breakaway province, had not asked for a B-52 deployment in Australia.

“We’ve been making efforts to defend ourselves. To improve our capabilities is our permanent goal. Of course we pay close attention to other countries’ activities and developments but we don’t take part in them,” he said.

Ashley Townshend, a security expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said China’s military buildup had contributed to regional instability and eroded American primacy in the Pacific by threatening U.S. ports and airstrips in places such as Guam.

“China’s missile threat is so severe that [the] U.S. needs more, safer places to operate. Australia is one such place. Dispersal here is part of efforts to bolster deterrence by making bombers more survivable, effective,” he said on Twitter.

Australia sees a robust U.S. military presence as crucial to its own security and a boost to U.S.-Australian navy cooperation is likely to be next, Townshend said.

eurasiareview.com · by BenarNews · November 3, 2022

5. Save the AUKUS partnership — share the B-21 bomber

Excerpts:

The AUKUS partnership would have to expand the existing capacity to assemble B-21s. As with its submarines, the Pentagon delayed the overhaul of its rapidly aging bomber force for far too long. As a result, the Air Force’s bomber force is dangerously old and small. The new B-21 will be America’s main aircraft for deterring China. The Air Force must be first in line as the jet comes off the assembly line.

That assembly line, in Palmdale, Calif., is a dangerous single point of failure and lacks the production capacity to build during this decade the new bombers the Air Force needs plus those that Australia should have.

Congress should appropriate the relatively modest sum needed to build a second B-21 production line somewhere in the center of the United States, along with enhancements to the B-21 production supply chain. A second plant would be a wise insurance policy for Palmdale, and it would speed the arrival of new jets to the Air Force. The second plant would also provide the capacity to build a squadron of export-modified B-21s for Australia before the end of this decade. The United States possesses half of the world’s nearly trillion-dollar aerospace industrial enterprise and has the capacity for this diversification.

AUKUS is a powerful idea for strengthening the three-nation strategic relationship. But its plan centered on nuclear-powered submarines won’t deliver relevant military capability in time to face the threat from China. Sharing the B-21 Raider and expanding its production capacity will make AUKUS work. The Indo-Pacific is in a dangerous decade. A new AUKUS, centered on the B-21, is an opportunity to reinforce deterrence and maintain peace in the region.

Save the AUKUS partnership — share the B-21 bomber

BY ROBERT HADDICK, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 11/02/22 10:30 AM ET

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3710034-save-the-aukus-partnership-share-the-b-21-bomber/

AUKUS, the defense technology partnership that Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States formed in September 2021, is already in trouble. The central focus of AUKUS is to provide Australia’s navy with state-of-the-art nuclear-powered attack submarines, to replace Australia’s aging and nearly obsolete Collins class boats. Achieving this upgrade would give Australia a long-range military asset that could patrol the Taiwan Strait and western Pacific, countering China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) alongside U.S. and Japanese forces.

But this vision for AUKUS is dead in the water. Australia has no experience with nuclear-powered warships and indeed has no civil nuclear power industry. Nor do the United States or Great Britain have any spare capacity to build nuclear-powered submarines for Australia; both countries are urgently modernizing their own attack and ballistic missile submarine fleets, projects they deferred for too long. The earliest possible date for getting Australia its first new submarine is the mid-2030s. That’s too late for the 2020s, which the Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy describes as the “decisive decade” for the competition against China.

Fortunately, there is another way to make AUKUS work: share the U.S. Air Force’s new B-21 Raider bomber, starting with the Australian air force. The B-21 will be the Air Force’s next-generation long-range stealthy bomber, able to penetrate advanced air defenses and deliver large weapon payloads against any adversary target. There are six B-21 jets already in production. Armed with the B-21, Australia would quickly become a major player in the coalition countering the PLA in the Indo-Pacific region. Such a move would greatly enhance conventional military deterrence in the region.

The B-21 would provide Australia with powerful military capabilities, sooner and cheaper than AUKUS’s submarine plan. A B-21 can carry more weapons and attack more land and ship targets on a single flight than a submarine can on a patrol lasting weeks or months. A B-21 flying from Australia could patrol across the Indian Ocean one day, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait the next, and the south Pacific the day after that. A submarine can’t do that.

In a crisis, the Australian air force could disperse its bombers to bases across Australia, to friendly bases in the region, or even to the United States. Submarines by contrast will have to operate from one or two known and vulnerable bases.

If Australia expects to buy a nuclear-powered submarine similar to the U.S. Navy’s Virginia class subs, today’s cost is $3.5 billion per submarine. For that, Australia could buy five B-21s, giving its air force the capacity to strike scores of targets per day across the Indo-Pacific region.

The AUKUS partnership would have to expand the existing capacity to assemble B-21s. As with its submarines, the Pentagon delayed the overhaul of its rapidly aging bomber force for far too long. As a result, the Air Force’s bomber force is dangerously old and small. The new B-21 will be America’s main aircraft for deterring China. The Air Force must be first in line as the jet comes off the assembly line.

That assembly line, in Palmdale, Calif., is a dangerous single point of failure and lacks the production capacity to build during this decade the new bombers the Air Force needs plus those that Australia should have.

Cyber incident reporting isn’t the problem — ignorance is

Biden’s National Security Strategy reinforces tech decoupling and increased regulatory focus

Congress should appropriate the relatively modest sum needed to build a second B-21 production line somewhere in the center of the United States, along with enhancements to the B-21 production supply chain. A second plant would be a wise insurance policy for Palmdale, and it would speed the arrival of new jets to the Air Force. The second plant would also provide the capacity to build a squadron of export-modified B-21s for Australia before the end of this decade. The United States possesses half of the world’s nearly trillion-dollar aerospace industrial enterprise and has the capacity for this diversification.

AUKUS is a powerful idea for strengthening the three-nation strategic relationship. But its plan centered on nuclear-powered submarines won’t deliver relevant military capability in time to face the threat from China. Sharing the B-21 Raider and expanding its production capacity will make AUKUS work. The Indo-Pacific is in a dangerous decade. A new AUKUS, centered on the B-21, is an opportunity to reinforce deterrence and maintain peace in the region.

Robert Haddick is a visiting senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Air & Space Forces Association and the director of research at Champion Hill Ventures in Chapel Hill, N.C. He is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer with experience in East Asia and Africa. His new book is “Fire on the Water, Second Edition: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific.”

6. China's rare earth metals monopoly could be coming to an end

Excerpts:

The Biden administration's recently published national security strategy has already identified rare earth supply chains as a major issue. A 2021 Defense Department review concluded that overreliance on China "creates risk of disruption and of politicized trade practices" that would hit commercial sectors particularly hard.

But it wasn't always this way. American military scientists created the rare earths industry in World War II, but a combination of market forces and environmental concerns pushed production abroad. Now the U.S. operates only one rare earth mine and has no processing capability, although this is slowly changing.

Officials in Beijing, meanwhile, have spent three decades capitalizing on the opening presented to them. Deng Xiaoping, China's economic reformist leader of the 1980s, knew critical minerals would one day be just as important as petroleum is to the Middle East.

...

"China is acting outside of the market to maintain its level of control, so any solution for rare earths is too big for any single nation to address," Coyne said. "The solution must be through a form of minilateralism," he said, meaning a small grouping of nations that share common strategic interests.

Since assuming office, Biden's multilateral agenda to strengthen alliances and partnerships has also involved notable minilateral components, such as the elevation of the Quad (U.S., Australia, India, Japan) and the creation of AUKUS (Australia, U.K., U.S.).

To ensure American and allied primacy in high-end semiconductor research and production, the U.S. also roped in three Asian allies for a collaboration known as the "Chip 4" (U.S., South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), which convened its first working group talks in October.

As allies that share a similar stake in rare earth elements, Australia, the U.S. and Japan could do more together to build a clean and secure supply chain, said Coyne, who echoed Yellen's calls for America to practice more "friend-shoring."

For Western companies looking to safeguard their supply chains from geopolitics, it could take the U.S. and Australia eight to 10 years to turn a mine into something that contributes to the value chain. "That's a long time to wait. In the meantime, you're vulnerable to Chinese economic coercion and punishment," he said.

China's rare earth metals monopoly could be coming to an end

Newsweek · by John Feng · November 2, 2022

After decades of geopolitical tensions over access to oil, the transition to clean energy is setting up a global competition over another natural resource: rare earth elements.

The 17 metals, which aren't scarce but are hard to find in economically viable concentrations, are significant to greening economies of the future and the defense industrial base of the United States and others.

America's heavy reliance rare earth imports—indispensable in the production of wind turbines and electric vehicles, but also advanced fighter aircraft and precision-guided munitions—has been identified as a serious strategic vulnerability, especially at a time when the global supply chain is comprehensively dominated by its foremost rival, China.

The U.S. lists dozens of critical minerals including rare earths as vital to its economic security: lithium, cobalt, nickel and manganese for EV batteries; copper and aluminium for power grids; dysprosium and terbium for missiles and jet engines; as well as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium for magnets and semiconductors.

Observers say the contest over the composition of tomorrow's supply chain—from extradition to refinement—could be as intense as energy crises of the past, such as the 1970s Arab oil embargo that sent prices surging in the U.S., or Europe's current Russian gas crunch.

The Biden administration's recently published national security strategy has already identified rare earth supply chains as a major issue. A 2021 Defense Department review concluded that overreliance on China "creates risk of disruption and of politicized trade practices" that would hit commercial sectors particularly hard.

But it wasn't always this way. American military scientists created the rare earths industry in World War II, but a combination of market forces and environmental concerns pushed production abroad. Now the U.S. operates only one rare earth mine and has no processing capability, although this is slowly changing.

Officials in Beijing, meanwhile, have spent three decades capitalizing on the opening presented to them. Deng Xiaoping, China's economic reformist leader of the 1980s, knew critical minerals would one day be just as important as petroleum is to the Middle East.

"They have immense strategic significance and we must certainly deal with rare earths issues with care, unleashing the advantages they bring," he was recorded as saying in 1992.

The United States and its allies could end China's monopoly on the global rare earth elements market. Getty Images/Newsweek

A Risky Dependence on China

China's monopoly on rare earths has been on Capitol Hill committee agendas for well over a decade; its role in the global supply chain is huge. That role begins with an abundance of domestic facilities that process local- or foreign-sourced raw material and ends with the country's status as the world's top exporter—and the U.S. as its top client.

Analysis by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) suggests China accounts for 60 percent of global rare earth extraction and 87 percent of processing. It's nothing short of a national priority for Beijing. In contrast, U.S. rare earth mining is roughly 15 percent of global production.

"The risk of supply chain disruptions and volatile prices is exacerbated by the fact that clean energy technology supply chains are highly concentrated," the IEA said in its latest World Energy Outlook.

The risk is even more acute for the U.S. economy, whose high-tech sectors imported 78 percent of their rare earth metals from China between 2017 and 2020, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.

John Coyne, head of the Northern Australia Strategic Policy Center at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think tank, said Beijing's control of the market "didn't happen by accident."

"That dominance leaves the market and the U.S. open to being impacted by domestic Chinese policy, and the reliance can't be regulated by free market forces," Coyne told Newsweek.

A 2018 Pentagon report observed that China had "strategically flooded the global market with rare earths at subsidized prices, driven out competitors and deterred new market entrants."

"When China needs to flex its soft power muscles by embargoing rare earths, it does not hesitate," it concluded, pointing to Beijing's unofficial mineral embargo against Tokyo in 2010 following a flare-up around the Japan-controlled Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Japan, a key U.S. treaty ally in Asia, has a sizeable heavy industry of its own. Beijing later lifted its export controls after Washington, Brussels and Tokyo brought the case to the World Trade Organization, which ruled against China in 2014.

In the meantime, Japan was forced to look elsewhere and has recently made plans to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earth imports to less than 50 percent by 2025.

A combination image of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Joe Biden and construction vehicles being used by workers at a jade mine in Hpakant, in Myanmar's Kachin State.

Tensions over mineral acquisition are unlikely to lead to direct conflict at present, and supply cut-offs are likely to hit China's exporters just as hard. However, analysts do expect Beijing to use its rare earths monopoly to improve its strategic posture.

A Bloomberg report in 2019 indicated that China had drawn up plans to restrict rare earth exports to the U.S., to be executed when necessary, as part of the intensifying trade war.

Global disruptions amid the COVID-19 pandemic have also brought supply chain resilience to the forefront of policymaking. In July, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said it was imperative the U.S. not let China use its market position "to disrupt our economy or exercise unwanted geopolitical leverage."

It's a hole Washington needs to plug, but it could take a decade or more.

Kick-Starting Rare Earth Resilience

Different administrations may focus more or less on national defense or the climate crisis, but there's bipartisan support in the U.S. for securing the supply of rare earth elements, said Jane Nakano, a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic International Studies, a U.S. think tank.

The government has its own stockpile for defense production, while recent demand has been driven by the transition to renewal energy, she told Newsweek.

Solar, wind, hydro and geothermal energy infrastructure is expected to spike in the coming decades, leading to a quadrupling of demand for critical minerals by 2040, according to the IEA.

In February, the Biden administration unveiled plans to build a wholly domestic supply chain for rare earth magnets.

Las Vegas-headquartered MP Materials was awarded a $35 million Pentagon contract to construct a heavy rare earth elements processing facility at Mountain Pass, California, where the company currently operates the country's only rare earth mine. In 2020, MP Materials was awarded a separate $9.6 million contract to restore light rare earth elements processing at the same site.

Feedstock sourced from Mountain Pass will help manufacture alloy and magnets for General Motors EV fleets at a new plant in Fort Worth, Texas, from late 2023, according to a deal announced last year.

Australia's Lynas Rare Earths, the world's largest producer outside China, has also been brought in to help shore up America's supply of critical minerals. In June, the mining company was awarded a $120 million contract to build the first commercial heavy rare earth elements separation facility in the U.S. Last year, as part of a separate $30.4 million agreement, Lynas was contracted to construct a light rare earth elements processing facility.

Both projects, which are expected to come online in 2025, would be co-located in an industrial area on the Texas Gulf Coast, said Lynas, which could produce up to one-quarter of the world's rare earth elements.

With raw material being extracted from a Lynas mine in Mount Weld, Australia, and shipped to the U.S. for refinement, the supply chain would bypass China.

Wind turbines from the Roth Rock wind farm spin on the spine of Backbone Mountain next to the Mettiki Coal processing plant on August 23, 2022, in Oakland, Maryland. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

"China is acting outside of the market to maintain its level of control, so any solution for rare earths is too big for any single nation to address," Coyne said. "The solution must be through a form of minilateralism," he said, meaning a small grouping of nations that share common strategic interests.

Since assuming office, Biden's multilateral agenda to strengthen alliances and partnerships has also involved notable minilateral components, such as the elevation of the Quad (U.S., Australia, India, Japan) and the creation of AUKUS (Australia, U.K., U.S.).

To ensure American and allied primacy in high-end semiconductor research and production, the U.S. also roped in three Asian allies for a collaboration known as the "Chip 4" (U.S., South Korea, Japan, Taiwan), which convened its first working group talks in October.

As allies that share a similar stake in rare earth elements, Australia, the U.S. and Japan could do more together to build a clean and secure supply chain, said Coyne, who echoed Yellen's calls for America to practice more "friend-shoring."

For Western companies looking to safeguard their supply chains from geopolitics, it could take the U.S. and Australia eight to 10 years to turn a mine into something that contributes to the value chain. "That's a long time to wait. In the meantime, you're vulnerable to Chinese economic coercion and punishment," he said.

"Some markets are not going to jump ship to new suppliers overnight, so I think a smaller group of like-minded countries could invest heavily with equity, knowing that it would take eight years to get the technology right," Coyne argued. But even then, it would be difficult to compete with Chinese rare earth prices.

"There's a premium cost to be paid for this," Coyne said. "The U.S. is looking at the market and saying market forces won't provide us with economic resilience and a secure supply chain. But we believe it's important, so we're ready to test it, and certainly we've seen that with the U.S. and Lynas."

A combination image of a coal miner working in a mine in Huaibei, Anhui, China, and employees of SunEdison installing photovoltaic solar panels on the roof of a Kohl's department store on July 15, 2008, in Hillsborough, New Jersey.

At a macro level, continued U.S. reliance on Chinese exports directly concerns America's ability to take an economic hit in times of crisis, as demonstrated by the West's urgent decoupling from Russian energy supplies this year.

Transatlantic allies in the European Union have their own untapped resources of rare earth elements, but their current reliance on Chinese extraction and processing is even higher than that of the U.S.

Nakano said supply chain construction is "a decadal process" that could take a generation to see results. But the consequences of the current status quo could leave many countries beholden to single producers, much like the reliance on petrostates for fossil fuels.

"I believe the effect could be even more pronounced if things stay the way they are," she argued.

China's Market To Lose

The U.S. wants to reduce its reliance on a single source for critical and rare earth minerals, but it's "unrealistic to expect complete supply chain independence," Nakano said.

"I can't imagine a rear earth supply chain that doesn't have China in it," she said. As the U.S. tries to wrestle back some of the global market share, China is likely to adjust its own policies, too.

Chinese state-owned mining companies have room to expand domestic production. They also continue to explore mineral reserves in the neighborhood, including in Southeast and Central Asia.

Last December, Beijing approved the merger of three state firms into the China Rare Earth Group, an industrial giant responsible for nearly 70 percent of the country's rare earth production. Experts in the field saw it as a significant step to further consolidate China's dominance over the industry.

At the same time, the government has turned to investing heavily in Chinese research and development, a move that could see rare earth exports slashed in favor of manufacturing more profitable, value-added clean energy products such as EVs, batteries and solar panels.

Beijing won't sit on its hands as the West erodes its market share; nor will it make the process any easier.

In June, the Pentagon acknowledged the work of cybersecurity firm Mandiant, a Google subsidiary, which identified a pro-China disinformation campaign that sought to undermine the U.S.-based projects of Lynas and others by mobilizing protests over alleged environmental concerns.

This year, Russia's control of strategic gas supplies to Europe has changed the complexion of the transition to clean energy, according to the IEA. The agency now believes global emissions will reach a "high point" in 2025 as the volatility of fossil fuel prices pushes governments to invest more in renewal sources, further boosting demand for critical minerals.

"The global energy crisis triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine is causing profound and long-lasting changes that have the potential to hasten the transition to a more sustainable and secure energy system," its World Energy Outlook said.

It's difficult to assess what the U.S. and its allies might consider a safe share of the rare earths market—it could be mineral-specific, Coyne said.

"Supply chains don't have to be completely bifurcated, but it's pointless doing everything and then having one part of the process that's 100 percent done in China because it negates the impact of having a resilient supply chain," he said.

"There must be a viable, competitive, alternative market that offers products and lets the market choose whether or not it wants to order from a supply chain that's not prone to domestic policy disruptions and economic coercion," Coyne said.

Newsweek · by John Feng · November 2, 2022

7. Hardened Ukrainian brigade sees Russian vulnerability in Kherson City

Excerpts:

Finally, it is not just Russian equipment that has been depleted. Much of Moscow’s professional infantry corps, many of whom were transferred from eastern Ukraine to Kherson over the summer in anticipation of an impending Ukrainian assault, has been put out of action. With competent manpower consistently lacking and contract servicemen, many of whom have been fighting without a break since Feb. 24, increasingly dwindling, Russia has thrown in a new stopgap to bolster the lines: conscripts.

The men of the 59th are unimpressed by what they have seen.

”We’ve already gone up against their mobilized men here,” says Mikhail, another senior lieutenant at a post closer to the front. “They are nearly useless. Many of them can hardly hold a gun, let alone a position. We have killed their professional soldiers, and now [Russia] is hoping to slow us down with bodies,” he says.

As the situation shifts in Ukraine’s favor, the soldiers want for only one thing: extra artillery and tanks to crack Russia’s defenses and exploit breakthroughs in the inevitable assault on Kherson.

“We have almost everything we need,” Vadym says. “We just need a bit more artillery, to fight against their guns, and especially tanks — maybe the most important element in an attack. There will be positive developments here [in Kherson] very soon.”

Hardened Ukrainian brigade sees Russian vulnerability in Kherson City

militarytimes.com · by Neil Hauer · November 2, 2022

MYKOLAIV/KHERSON FRONTLINE — It’s now been over eight months of full-scale warfare since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But while the war continues, the features of the battlefield have changed significantly — both in the systems employed, and the tactics used to counter them.

Ukraine’s military, which began the war with largely Soviet-era equipment, has transitioned into an ever-more Western-armed and -trained force. By contrast, much of Russia’s best equipment — and its most professional troops — have been destroyed or killed in months of relentless combat, leading Moscow to draw on older stocks as the Russian force regresses.

Few people, or units, know this better than Ukraine’s 59th Motorized Brigade. Stationed in Kherson oblast at the start of the war, the 59th was subjected to the full force of one of Russia’s best-prepared strike groups, an armored thrust northwards from occupied Crimea. But while they were forced to cede Kherson City in early March, the 59th held back Russia’s spearheads from seizing Mykolaiv, the next city along the coast towards Odesa. Now, after seven months of largely static warfare, the changing balance of power sees the 59th poised to play a major role in the upcoming battle to liberate Kherson.

The soldiers of the 59th are bullish on their prospects of beating the Russians back at Kherson City. They talk dismissively of the battlefield effectiveness of the Iranian drones that have made headlines in recent weeks — weapons well-suited to harassing civilian infrastructure but less effective against prepared military units. Consistent degradation of Russian logistics and supply lines has hampered the enemy’s ability to effectively contest the battlefield. Russian leaders’ desperate moves to staff their front line with unwilling conscripts, their focus on looting Kherson of anything moveable, and even their use of air defense systems to attack ground targets, all buoy the 59th’s morale. They smell blood in the water.

On a sunny day in late October, one platoon from the brigade was catching some sleep during a break in the action at a disused gas station a few kilometers back from the frontline. The soldiers and officers present shared with Military Times their impressions of how the war has changed — for them, often for the better — over the past few months.

One of the 59th Motorized Brigade's D-20 howitzers is pictured here under cover in October 2022. (Neil Hauer/Courtesy photo)

One of the hot topics in recent weeks has been Russia’s heavy deployment of Iranian-made Shahed 136 loitering munitions. Carrying a warhead of up to 50 kilograms and with a range of 1,500 kilometers, these ‘kamikaze drones’ have been employed across Ukraine, in particular to strike heating and power infrastructure in Kyiv and other cities. While they have been used on the battlefield as well, soldiers say they have not been particularly effective militarily.

“Iranian drones are attacking Mykolaiv constantly,” says Vadym, a senior lieutenant in the 59th. “They’re active over the entire region, but most of them are shot down. They are only really useful against civilian targets, when they can slip past air defense,” he says.

One of the difficulties drones present to many air defense systems is a small radio and heat signature, which can make it difficult to achieve lock-on. With advance warning of an approaching drone, however, this can be mitigated — and there are other tools that work even better.

“It’s difficult to hit [a Shahed] with any system that works by heat lock, such as a Stinger [MANPAD], unless you have extra time to track it,” Vadym says. “But our foreign partners have provided us with some very effective systems. The German Gepards [self-propelled anti-aircraft guns] are very good against them. They see the [drone] and can easily shoot it down. Even machine guns can down [Shaheds] quite easily if they are not flying too high — they are quite large and slow,” he explains.

Other troops agree with Vadym’s estimation.

“These drones [Shaheds] are not a problem at all,” says Zhenya, a sergeant major. “If you have warning and anti-aircraft weapons, you can down them quite easily. That’s why [Russia] uses them against cities — they are not useful on the battlefield,” he says.

Mikhail, a senior Ukrainian military lieutenant at a post near the front, is pictured in the trenches here in October 2022. (Neil Hauer/Courtesy photo)

The use of these systems speaks to the difficulties Moscow is facing in maintaining a steady level of long-range strikes eight months into the war. As its stocks of precision-guided munitions deplete, Russia has turned to other methods, some not designed for the task: soldiers say that S-300 missiles, originally designed for air defense, are now one of the primary weapons used to strike Mykolaiv. Despite their poor accuracy when used against ground targets, the missiles are still fired at the city regularly at night.

Ukraine’s efforts to degrade Russian logistics and supply routes in Kherson are also paying dividends.

“American HIMARs [precision rocket artillery] have been incredibly useful for us. Once we started hitting the bridges, the intensity of the [Russian] shelling decreased a lot,” says Vadym, describing the Ukrainian shelling of the Antonovsky and Nova Kakhovka bridges, the only two connections between Kherson and the rest of Russian-held southern Ukraine. “We destroyed a lot of their artillery and ammunition warehouses as well. Before, [the Russians] used to shell everything, just firing as much as they wanted at any targets. Now, they are forced to economize,” Vadym says.

American-provided long-range artillery systems have been crucial to shifting the tide here as well. Vadym specifically names the M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzer and the M777, whose guided Excalibur shells can hit targets up to 40 kilometers away with high accuracy.

“Before we had the M777, we couldn’t reach their [artillery] systems, but now we can,” he says.

Finally, it is not just Russian equipment that has been depleted. Much of Moscow’s professional infantry corps, many of whom were transferred from eastern Ukraine to Kherson over the summer in anticipation of an impending Ukrainian assault, has been put out of action. With competent manpower consistently lacking and contract servicemen, many of whom have been fighting without a break since Feb. 24, increasingly dwindling, Russia has thrown in a new stopgap to bolster the lines: conscripts.

The men of the 59th are unimpressed by what they have seen.

”We’ve already gone up against their mobilized men here,” says Mikhail, another senior lieutenant at a post closer to the front. “They are nearly useless. Many of them can hardly hold a gun, let alone a position. We have killed their professional soldiers, and now [Russia] is hoping to slow us down with bodies,” he says.

As the situation shifts in Ukraine’s favor, the soldiers want for only one thing: extra artillery and tanks to crack Russia’s defenses and exploit breakthroughs in the inevitable assault on Kherson.

“We have almost everything we need,” Vadym says. “We just need a bit more artillery, to fight against their guns, and especially tanks — maybe the most important element in an attack. There will be positive developments here [in Kherson] very soon.”

About Neil Hauer

Neil Hauer is a freelance reporter covering the war in Ukraine and the Caucasus at large. You can follow him on Twitter at @NeilPHauer.

8. Military Leaders Praise Musk as Treasury Officials Eye Twitter Deal

Excerpt:

“What he symbolizes, in reality, is the combination of the civil and military cooperation and teamwork that makes the United States the most powerful country in space. So, Elon, thank you for making yourself present here today,” Gen. Mark Milley said during the Wednesday ceremony at Joint Base Andrews outside Washington, D.C.

Military Leaders Praise Musk as Treasury Officials Eye Twitter Deal

Outgoing Chief of Space Operations Gen. Jay Raymond thanked the SpaceX CEO “for being here.”

defenseone.com · by Jennifer Hlad

In this April 2022 photo, SpaceX CEO Elon Musk takes selfies with future U.S. Space Force officers at the U.S. Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colo. U.S. Air Force / Trevor Cokley

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Policy

Outgoing Chief of Space Operations Gen. Jay Raymond thanked the SpaceX CEO “for being here.”

November 2, 2022 05:19 PM ET

By Jennifer Hlad

News Editor, Defense One

November 2, 2022 05:19 PM ET

Elon Musk is not the only defense-industry exec who showed up for the Space Force’s first change-of-command ceremony. But the SpaceX founder and controversial new owner of Twitter was the only one who got a by-name call out from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“What he symbolizes, in reality, is the combination of the civil and military cooperation and teamwork that makes the United States the most powerful country in space. So, Elon, thank you for making yourself present here today,” Gen. Mark Milley said during the Wednesday ceremony at Joint Base Andrews outside Washington, D.C.

Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, the first chief of space operations and the service’s first member, also thanked Musk before rattling off the names of seven other senior executives in attendance. Raymond is retiring after 38 years of service in the Air Force and Space Force, after passing the Space Force flag to Gen. Chance Salzman.

Though Musk has long been a darling of the space-focused parts of the U.S. military, Wednesday’s warm reception came as the U.S. Treasury Department is looking into whether it can investigate Musk’s foreign-financed purchase of Twitter, where he is poised to “make it easier for purveyors of false information to go viral,” as strategist Peter Singer wrote this week for Defense One.

Musk’s SpaceX had to fight for a place at the national-security space table—it sued the Pentagon in 2014, saying U.S. military space launches should be bid competitively, instead of simply awarded to the Lockheed Martin-Boeing joint venture United Launch Alliance. The move was championed at the time by the late Sen. John McCain, who had harshly criticized ULA’s reliance on Russian-made rocket engines.

In the process, Musk revealed “tens of billions in potentially unnecessary military spending,” Politico reported in 2016. The company was awarded its first national security space contract in 2016, and on Tuesday launched a Falcon Heavy rocket with that rocket’s first national security space payload: two classified U.S. Space Force satellites.

9. How to Keep War With China From Being a Pick-Up Game

Instead of a new Joint Force HQ, how about a Northeast Asia Combatant Command? Perhaps INDOPACOM is too big?

As I shared yesterday in response to Senator Rubio's letter on concerns over INDOPACOM force structure:

Perhaps we need to resurrect the proposal for a Far East Combatant Command or a Northeast Asia Combatant Command in Korea. But we should also consider a "super" or regional ambassador in Japan and a Far East Asia Economic Cooperation center in Taiwan.

From a paper I contributed to Patrick Cronin's report (Pathways to Peace: Achieving the Stable Transformation of the Korean Peninsula) pre-COVID.

One of the ways for the United States to look at its future in Northeast Asia is to revise its military, diplomatic, and economic structures in the region. In recent years, Washington has undertaken a pivot or rebalance to Asia, and under the current administration transformed the US Pacific Command into the US Indo-Pacific Command. The latter highlights the importance of the entire region, which has been codified in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the Asia-Pacific theater is large and complex. Perhaps it is time to reexamine the Unified Command Plan and consider reorganizing the structure and responsibilities in the theater. The United States should examine the feasibility of establishing a Northeast Asia Command as a new and separate combatant command. This is not a new idea, but it has never been sufficiently examined. Given the importance of the entire region and Northeast Asia within it, a separate combatant command with responsibility for Korea, Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, China, and the Russian Far East would enhance US strategic capabilities. However, one argument against this idea will always come to the fore. Whenever a new set of boundaries is established, it will always create gaps and seams. This is especially true when competition with China is considered. But such a recommendation should not be discounted solely for that reason. The analysis may reveal other opportunities and, even if the proposal is not accepted, may reveal other ways to better support US strategic objectives.

While new ideas tend to focus on how to organize the military, the other instruments of power should also be considered. Perhaps it is time to think about creating a diplomatic organization in the region to coordinate all diplomatic activities and all information and influence activities to support US strategic objectives. A US Northeast Asia ambassador with the requisite supporting staff organization would provide the diplomatic and information effort necessary to synchronize the elements of national power. A third organization to support the economic instrument of power could be a Northeast Asia Economic Engagement Center. These three organizations would not only bring the strength of the US instruments of power to the region in a new and dynamic way; they would also send a powerful message of commitment, especially if they were located in the right places. The Northeast Asia Command could be located in Korea, the Northeast Asia ambassador in Japan, and the Northeast Asia Economic Engagement Center in Taiwan. Of course, this would create political challenges. However, such a proposal could also enhance the strength and power of the US alliance structure in the region and provide allies with effective tools to compete with the revisionist powers and defend against the rogue powers as outlined in the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. These are merely proposals and may not be at all feasible. However, it is time to creatively reexamine employment of the instruments of power to see if the United States can be more effective in achieving its strategic objectives and maintaining and strengthening its alliances in Northeast Asia.

https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Cronin_Pathways%20to%20Peace%20-%20Achieving%20the%20Stable%20Transformation%20of%20the%20Korean%20Peninsula.pdf#page=61

How to Keep War With China From Being a Pick-Up Game

INDOPACOM needs a joint force headquarters now, not when crisis arrives.

defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

A parade of senior defense leaders argued over the last few months that China is on the precipice of invading Taiwan. They may be right. Fresh off his elevation to permanent leader during the recent Communist Party Congress, Xi Jinping may see the next few years as his best window to absorb Taiwan and cement his legacy. But the Pentagon is not acting like an assault on Taiwan is imminent, especially when it comes to command and control.

If conflict arises across the Taiwan Strait in the next year or two, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command would have to scramble to assemble forces and defend allies in the region—the military equivalent of assembling a pick-up squad to face a well-prepared team. Although the U.S. military has extensive plans for responding to Chinese aggression, they assume adequate warning and availability of the right units at the right time. Both assumptions could be wrong given China’s ability to rapidly escalate and the overall erosion of U.S. military readiness.

One way the Defense Department avoids going to war with pick-up teams is by establishing Joint Task Forces. These fill a gap left by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which created the joint force but did not provide a way to integrate and manage units from different services in the field. One such task force was the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s JTF-519, which for a decade developed and assessed responses for a potential conflict against China and considered ways of better dissuading Chinese aggression.

JTF-519 was disestablished in 2013 but the need for it remains. The new National Defense Strategy and Joint Warfighting Concept suggest the U.S. military can deter or defeat Chinese aggression by making and enacting decisions faster and more effectively than opponents. Given the Pentagon’s time and fiscal constraints, this concept of expanded maneuver may also be the only way for U.S. forces to succeed against a numerically superior PLA if war comes during the next few years.

But the processes and systems needed for decision-making advantage cannot be built on the fly. New command-and-control centers require time and practice to become effective. And establishing a headquarters as tensions rise could accidentally escalate a confrontation by implying U.S. and allied militaries are preparing to act preemptively.

JTF-519 was led by the Navy’s Pacific Fleet commander since a war with China was seen as primarily a maritime conflict. A decade later, the challenges and opportunities of joint warfighting are much greater. Recent wargames show U.S. forces can counter the Chinese threat, but only by seamlessly combining actions across domains and services because the range and speed of action exceed what a single service component like U.S. Pacific Fleet can execute.

Building command-and-control structures and kill chains spanning multiple domains will therefore demand sustained effort by operators in the only completely joint setting DoD has: the combatant commanders’ theaters. The difficulties experienced by DoD’s Joint All-Domain Command and Control initiative make this clear, having only modestly grown the force’s variety of kill chains after three years of experimentation.

Section 1046 of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s National Defense Authorization Act would help the Pentagon regain its multi-domain momentum. The provision would establish a joint force headquarters at Indo-Pacific Command to assess command and control architectures and kill chains needed for a future war with China through ongoing experiments, exercises, and demonstrations.

The location and reporting chain for the new headquarters are critical. DoD’s military services and support agencies are incentivized to further institutional equities in their experimentation. A generic joint force headquarters in Washington would not keep up with the increasing sophistication and specialization of threats worldwide or reflect China’s nature as DoD’s pacing challenge. Only Indo-Pacific Command is seized with the need to deter and potentially fight China in the near-term.

The new joint force headquarters would also provide a transition partner for some of the DoD’s highest-priority projects, which today lack a customer equipped to assess the product. For example, JADC2 is languishing because its top-down requirements and service-driven implementation will take decades to yield a highly interoperable force. A joint force headquarters focused on addressing the threat from China around Taiwan could focus JADC2 on the most advantageous kill chains for confrontations that could happen in the next year.

While its most important task would be preparing for combat, a standing joint force headquarters could also help the DoD dissuade aggression. The new defense strategy identifies as one of its three main lines of effort campaigning, which seeks over time to frustrate enemy efforts and produce allied advantages. Exercising command and control and demonstrating novel kill chains are part of campaigning, but the expertise and focus of a joint force headquarters would also be essential to developing and managing campaigns that orchestrate U.S. operations, posture, and engagement to undermine Chinese plans and support U.S. and allied capabilities.

Pentagon bureaucrats are sure to resist the idea of a distant joint force headquarters leading campaigns and driving priority efforts such as JADC2. They were right during the last 30 years of post-Cold War stability, when moving the nexus of capability development to the field would produce custom solutions ill-suited for other theaters. But the urgency of today’s China’s challenge—as described by the DoD’s own leaders—demands a different approach. Unless the U.S. military organizes for campaigning and conflict in the Indo-Pacific today, it risks playing a pick-up game against a larger and better-prepared home team.

Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and Director of the Hudson Center for Defense Concepts and Technology

defenseone.com · by Bryan Clark

10. ‘Someone has to do it’: American vets in Ukraine train front-line medics as war rages with Russia

‘Someone has to do it’: American vets in Ukraine train front-line medics as war rages with Russia

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · November 2, 2022

KYIV, Ukraine — Bathed in red light and surrounded by the booming sound of explosions, Ukrainian soldiers and civilians raced against the clock to stanch wounds before their comrades bleed out.

White strobe lights flashed in the darkness, and a woman screamed as they strapped tourniquets on limbs, checked for labored breathing and ran through smoke to evacuate casualties to safety.

The simulated scene repeats on a regular basis in the basement of a run-down military training school near the outskirts of Ukraine’s capital city, where instructors with the Ukrainian outfit KoLeSo and the American nonprofit Task Force Yankee Ukraine teach soldiers and civilians the basics of combat medical care.

“It’s one thing to know how to put a tourniquet on and how to stuff a wound but to save a life in chaos is a whole different thing, and that’s what you’ve got to learn,” said Mike Postupak, 56, who served as a U.S. Marine corporal and now leads Kyiv operations for the American group.

Founded by four U.S. veterans in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, Task Force Yankee Ukraine has crisscrossed the country to prepare more than 12,000 Ukrainians to treat the unique injuries of war.

Oleksii Bozhko hefts a Ukrainian soldier as he demonstrates the firefighter’s carry, a method of lifting an injured casualty out of a dangerous area, during training outside Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 27, 2022. Before the Russian invasion, Bozhko enjoyed spending his days kitesurfing on lakes and rivers. (J.P. Lawrence/Stars and Stripes)

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They offer an unmatched American military export: training in Tactical Combat Casualty Care, or TCCC, which is considered the gold standard for trauma life support on the battlefield. The set of guidelines developed by the Pentagon aims to identify and stop massive bleeding, respiratory impairment and other ailments caused by serious injury until a casualty can be transported to a hospital.

KoLeSo adapted the methodology for its own training system in 2014, after Russia’s first incursion into Ukraine, and regularly works with Americans to supplement its teaching staff. Members of the all-volunteer Task Force Yankee Ukraine step in several times a week to teach classes and hold their own trainings to meet high demand. The makeup of the group changes frequently. Most are veterans, others are either paramedics or first responders. Some are not Americans.

“We keep this going every day,” American veteran Angel Luna said as he watched a class practice wrapping casualties in foil to retain heat and lessen blood loss. “Most of the people we get have never held a weapon in their hand so this is doing a great deal; and the people we train, they use their knowledge and they train other soldiers. It's a ripple effect.”

Angel Luna, an American veteran who traveled to Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2022, shows off his tattoo. It reads “Protect freedom, not just for your country but for all” while at a training site outside of Kyiv on Oct. 27, 2022. (J.P. Lawrence/Stars and Stripes)

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Luna, who was a specialist with the North Carolina National Guard, quit his job in a Walmart warehouse in Nebraska to join Task Force Yankee Ukraine in May.

He said he was inspired by the words tattooed on his upper arm: “Protect freedom, not just for your country, but for all.” He had been following Ukraine’s plight since 2016 and flew the country’s blue-and-yellow flag in his yard alongside America’s.

“I truly believe in these people’s freedoms,” said Luna, 30. “I feel I have a purpose.”

That zeal prompted him to drive to Washington, D.C., at the end of February to stand at attention in front of the Ukrainian Embassy where he was arrested for having firearms in his car.

Luna pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, and he said he served 40 hours of community service.

“What I wanted to do was show the world that America was at the ready to help,” he said.

Recent missile and drone strikes in Kyiv, where the organization’s operations are based and where there is a hostel where all volunteers stay, have not deterred Luna from his mission. The group’s members also travel widely throughout Ukraine to wherever unit commanders need them, including the Kharkiv, Luhansk, Odesa, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia and Lviv regions.

“I understand the risks, and I accept them,” Luna said. “Any one of us here can die any second, but it doesn’t scare me, I’m going to go out there and help.”

The attacks on the capital in mid-October after months of relative calm rattled the civilian population so much that Task Force Yankee Ukraine is now largely training government employees and other nonmilitary city residents, Postupak said.

“It seems to me that they’re kind of feeling the reality of it,” he said. “I stress the point, especially to a lot of the government workers, that you are probably a target on someone’s map and what happened Monday can happen to you here today and maybe your dear friend who you loved is bleeding out in front of you so please learn this.”

Postupak arrived in Kyiv from Oregon in September after itching to come to Ukraine’s aid for months. He is the son of a Ukrainian immigrant father and has family in the country he helped advise as they fled their homes for a cottage in the woods at the start of the war.

U.S. Marine veteran Mike Postupak watches as Ukrainian soldiers and civilians practice first aid at a training site outside Kyiv on Oct. 27, 2022. Postupak said he quit his private security job and put his life on hold to volunteer in Ukraine. (J.P. Lawrence/Stars and Stripes)

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“My heart just goes out to the Ukrainian people,” he said.

As Postupak watched Russia’s invasion unfold, he took stock of the skills that he gained through six years of service with the 11th Marine Regiment in the 1980s and decided to put them to use. He was given leave from his private security job, left his wife and two children in the U.S. and tapped into his savings to work as an instructor for no pay until his authorized 90-day stay in Ukraine expires in December.

“It’s fulfilling to see some of the appreciation on people when they’re done,” Postupak said. “Soldiers, for instance, they think they know what to do, but we’ll run a scenario and let them do it and when you point out all the things they missed they realize, ‘Oh crap everybody would’ve been dead with what I knew at this time.’ When they see the difference, they’re so appreciative of that.”

Oleksandr, a 54-year-old freshly minted soldier from the occupied port city of Berdiansk, watched intently as his comrades acted out a casualty simulation on the broken pavement of a parking lot on a recent evening. He had dutifully recited the steps of trauma care hours earlier, straining to recall their correct order as a Ukrainian KoLeSo instructor prodded him.

Nearly everything was new to him.

“I knew almost nothing that I learned today — how to use a tourniquet, how to stop heavy bleeding, how to administer first aid,” Oleksandr said, declining to provide his last name for security reasons. “I didn’t know any of this until today.”

Prior to the war, he tended to a 20-acre farm with 10 cows and other livestock. He was in Russia when the fighting began and spent months getting home to the southern Zaporizhzhia region as sanctions sealed off borders, ultimately traveling back through Crimea.

Oleksandr returned to a city under stifling Russian occupation.

“You can’t breathe there, you can’t live there,” he said.

Ukrainian special forces soldiers jump from their seats and dive onto the floor as they rush to put on tourniquets during first aid training at a site outside Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 27, 2022. (J.P. Lawrence/Stars and Stripes)

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Oleksandr continued moving toward Ukrainian-held territory, paying people to help him evade certain Russian checkpoints as he crossed through the front line. As soon as he could, he headed to a military recruitment office to volunteer for the army.

“My only wish is to run the occupants from our lands, that’s what we all constantly think about and train for,” Oleksandr said.

In addition to training, Task Force Yankee Ukraine has produced first-aid kits for soldiers deploying to the front, transported about 25 tons of medical supplies and humanitarian aid, evacuated wounded civilians and housed some 300 refugees who flooded into Poland in March, said Joe Meacham, 41, the group’s director of operations and security.

Meacham, a 15-year Army veteran based in Alaska, said the organization is modeled on the structure of an Army or Marine Corps battalion, with staff sections and a command-and-control cell but without “rank or yelling.”

“We have to be delicate because everybody’s a volunteer,” he said.

Most members served in the military, and the group particularly seeks out those with medical training or command experience. Jason Rhind, a 36-year-old from Bermuda, was among the first wave of volunteers with Task Force Yankee Ukraine and had previously served as a teacher and medic in the Royal Bermuda Regiment.

“TCCC is probably one of the most valuable skills you can learn in the military,” he said.

Lidiya Todoraschko, a 42-year-old homemaker, has no intentions of fighting in battle, but she signed up for a first-aid class at the urging of a friend who fought in the country’s eastern Donbas region in 2014 and 2015.

“This is the kind of information that every Kyivan needs to know now,” she said, recovering in the cold air after participating in the red-soaked mass casualty simulation in the basement.

She brought her 18-year-old son, Bohdan, along for the eight-hour day. He is eager to enlist in the Ukrainian army, and she wants him to be prepared in case her efforts to dissuade him fail.

“I’m not sure I’ll be able to keep him at home and in case of an emergency, I want to be confident that he can put on a tourniquet and take care of himself,” Todoraschko said.

Postupak said Task Force Yankee Ukraine tailors training to fit its wide range of students. Service members learn how to establish perimeters for evacuations, for example, while civilians might be taught how to check whether areas are safe to enter and, if need be, how to drag a casualty to a safe place, he said.

Masha had little faith that she would be able to do any of the latter. The 28-year-old survived and escaped the siege of Mariupol and, though hardened by the experience, believes she will be just as distraught if faced with a similar situation.

For three weeks, she hunkered down with her family in their fifth-floor apartment as windows were blown out, and the city burned. She avoided sleeping in her bed for two weeks. When she decided finally to spend the night in her bedroom, she woke up to debris narrowly missing her head.

“The state of shock as shards of glass and debris are flying is something I’ve never been in,” Masha said, declining to provide her last name. “You become overwhelmed and lost and don’t know what to do.”

She came to KoLeSo hoping to gain more practice in high-stress situations. Her parents remain in Russian-occupied Mariupol, lucky to be among the few city residents whose home was not significantly damaged or destroyed.

“At least one person in the family should know how to do this,” Masha said.

Ukrainian troops and civilians practice first aid Oct. 27, 2022, under the watchful gaze of instructors at a training site on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine. (J.P. Lawrence/Stars and Stripes)

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Postupak has big dreams for the future of Task Force Yankee Ukraine as more Ukrainians see the value of preparing for the bloody realities of war even far from the front lines. He wants to add training modules on demining or maybe what to do in the event of a nuclear catastrophe. He would like to expand operations to Zaporizhzhia, but that requires more people.

“We’re a hand-to-mouth organization, the more money we get, the more impact we have,” said Meacham, who was a noncommissioned officer in the service.

The group’s personnel, donations and support have dwindled from peaks in the spring and summer as “Ukraine fatigue” sets in, Postupak said. Volunteers constantly come and go, rotating in and out in 90-day cycles to adhere to the country’s visa laws.

“It’s harder to get people to come over here,” Postupak said. “It’s hard to keep things going.”

Task Force Yankee Ukraine is now working with a skeleton crew of six to eight men and will probably scale down further over the bitter Ukrainian winter, he said. Postupak said he anticipates revving back up again in the spring, though he is not certain whether finances will permit him to come back himself.

Postupak said his mission in Ukraine will not feel complete until he has fine-tuned the training and poured all his knowledge into making it the best it could be. Only then will he be comfortable stepping away.

“This program is good, it’s toward the top notch right now, but you can always do better,” he said. “I’d really like to come back and finish the job. Someone has to do it.”

Stars and Stripes · by Svetlana Shkolnikova · November 2, 2022

11. Why American Power Endures

Excerpts:

The United States enters today’s struggle to shape the twenty-first century with profound advantages. It still possesses the vast bulk of the material capabilities it had in earlier decades. It remains uniquely positioned geographically to play a great-power role in both East Asia and Europe. Its ability to work with other liberal democracies to shape global rules and institutions is already manifest in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and will stand it in good stead in any future collective response to Chinese aggression in East Asia. Although China and Russia seek to move the world in the direction of regional blocs and spheres of influence, the United States has offered a vision of world order based on a set of principles rather than competition over territory. Liberal international order is a way of organizing an interdependent world. It is, as the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad called it, an “empire by invitation.” Its success depends on its legitimacy and appeal and not on the capacity of its patrons to force obedience. If the United States remains at the center of world politics in the decades to come, it will be because this type of order generates more supporters and fellow travelers around the world than that offered by China and Russia.

The U.S. confrontation with China and Russia in 2022 is an echo of the great-power upheavals of 1919, 1945, and 1989. As at these earlier moments, the United States finds itself working with other democracies in resisting the aggressive moves of illiberal great powers. The Russian war in Ukraine is about more than the future of Ukraine; it is also about the basic rules and norms of international relations. Putin’s gambit has placed the United States and democracies in Europe and elsewhere on the defensive. But it has also given the United States an opportunity to rethink and reargue its case for an open, multilateral system of world order. If the past is any guide, the United States should not try to simply consolidate the old order but to reimagine it. U.S. leaders should seek to broaden the democratic coalition, reaffirm basic values and interests, and offer a vision of a reformed international order that draws states and peoples together in new forms of cooperation, such as to solve problems of climate change, global public health, and sustainable development. No other great power is better placed to build the necessary partnerships and lead the way in tackling the major problems of the twenty-first century. Other powers may be rising, but the world cannot afford the end of the American era.

Why American Power Endures

The U.S.-Led Order Isn’t in Decline

By G. John Ikenberry

November/December 2022

Foreign Affairs · November 1, 2022

For over a century, people around the world have lived through an American era: a period dominated by U.S. power, wealth, institutions, ideas, alliances, and partnerships. But many now believe this long epoch is drawing to a close. The U.S.-led world, they insist, is giving way to something new—a post-American, post-Western, postliberal order marked by great-power competition and the economic and geopolitical ascendance of China.

Some greet this prospect with joy, others with sorrow. But the storyline is the same. The United States is slowly losing its commanding position in the global distribution of power. The East now rivals the West in economic might and geopolitical heft, and countries in the global South are growing quickly and taking a larger role on the international stage. As others shine, the United States has lost its luster. Divided and beleaguered, melancholy Americans suspect that the country’s best days are behind it. Liberal societies everywhere are struggling. Nationalism and populism undercut the internationalism that once backed the United States’ global leadership. Sensing blood in the water, China and Russia have rushed forward to aggressively challenge U.S. hegemony, liberalism, and democracy. In February 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a joint declaration of principles for a “new era” when the United States does not lead the world: a shot across the bow of a sinking American ship.

But in truth, the United States is not foundering. The stark narrative of decline ignores deeper world-historical influences and circumstances that will continue to make the United States the dominant presence and organizer of world politics in the twenty-first century. To be sure, no one knows the future, and no one owns it. The coming world order will be shaped by complex, shifting, and difficult-to-grasp political forces and by choices made by people living in all parts of the world. Nonetheless, the deep sources of American power and influence in the world persist. Indeed, with the rise of the brazen illiberalism of China and Russia, these distinctive traits and capacities have come more clearly into view.

The mistake made by prophets of American decline is to see the United States and its liberal order as just another empire on the wane. The wheel of history turns, empires come and go—and now, they suggest, it is time for the United States to fade into senescence. Yes, the United States has at times resembled an old-style empire. But its role in the world rests on much more than its past imperial behavior; U.S. power draws not only on brute strength but also on ideas, institutions, and values that are complexly woven into the fabric of modernity. The global order the United States has built since the end of World War II is best seen not as an empire but as a world system, a sprawling multifaceted political formation, rich in vicissitudes, that creates opportunity for people across the planet.

This world system whirred into action most recently in the global reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The struggle between the United States and its rivals China and Russia is a contest between two alternative logics of world order. The United States defends an international order it has led for three-quarters of a century—one that is open, multilateral, and anchored in security pacts and partnerships with other liberal democracies. China and Russia seek an international order that dethrones Western liberal values—one that is more hospitable to regional blocs, spheres of influence, and autocracy. The United States upholds an international order that protects and advances the interests of liberal democracy. China and Russia, each in its own way, hope to build an international order that protects authoritarian rule from the threatening forces of liberal modernity. The United States offers the world a vision of a postimperial global system. The current leaders of Russia and China increasingly craft foreign policies rooted in imperial nostalgia.

This struggle between liberal and illiberal world orders is an echo of the great contests of the twentieth century. In key earlier moments—after the conclusions of World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—the United States advanced a progressive agenda for world order. Its success rested somewhat on the blunt fact of American power, the country’s unrivaled economic, technological, and military capacities. The United States will remain at the center of the world system in part because of these material capabilities and its role as a pivot in the global balance of power. But the United States continues to matter for another reason: the appeal of its ideas, institutions, and capacities for building partnerships and alliances makes it an indispensable force in the years ahead. This has always been, and can remain, the secret of its power and influence.

The United States, despite repeated announcements of its demise as a world leader, has not truly declined. It has built a distinctive type of order in which it plays an integral role. And in the face of threatening illiberal rivals, that order remains widely in demand. The reason the United States does not decline is because large constituencies within the existing order have a stake in the United States remaining active and involved in maintaining that order. Even if U.S. material power diminishes relative to, say, China’s growing capabilities, the order the United States has built continues to reinforce its power and leadership. Power can create order, but the order over which Washington presides can also buttress American power.

Like an onion, the United States’ liberal internationalist order has several layers. At the outer layer are its liberal internationalist ideas and projects, through which the United States has provided the world a “third way” between the anarchy of states furiously competing with each other and the overweening hierarchy of imperial systems—an arrangement that has delivered more gains for more people than any prior alternative. Beneath the surface, the United States has benefited from its geography and its unique trajectory of political development. It stands oceans apart from the other great powers, its landmass faces both Asia and Europe, and it accrues influence by playing a unique role as a global power balancer. Adding to this, the United States has had critical opportunities following major conflicts in the twentieth century to build coalitions of like-minded states that shape and entrench global rules and institutions. As the current crisis in Ukraine shows, this ability to mobilize coalitions of democracies remains one of the United States’ essential assets. Beneath the realm of government and diplomacy, the United States’ domestic civil society—enriched by its multiracial and multicultural immigrant base—connects the country to the world in networks of influence unavailable to China, Russia, and other powers. Finally, at the core, one of the United States’ greatest strengths is its capacity to fail; as a liberal society, it can acknowledge its vulnerabilities and errors and seek to improve, a distinct advantage over its illiberal rivals in confronting crises and setbacks.

No other state has enjoyed such a comprehensive set of advantages in dealing with other countries. This is the reason that the United States has had such staying power for so long, despite periodic failures and disappointments. In today’s contest over world order, the United States should draw upon these advantages and its long history of building liberal order to again offer the world a global vision of an open and rules-based system in which people can work freely together to advance the human condition.

AMERICA’S THIRD WAY

For over a century, the United States has been the champion of a kind of order distinct from previous international orders. Washington’s liberal internationalism represents a “third way” between anarchy (orders premised on the balance of power between competing states) and hierarchy (orders that rest on the dominance of imperial powers). After World War II and again after the end of the Cold War, liberal internationalism came to dominate and define the modern logic of international relations through the construction of institutions such as the United Nations and alliances such as NATO. People across the world have connected to and built on these intergovernmental platforms to advance their interests. If China and Russia seek to usher in a new world order, they will need to offer something better—an onerous task indeed.

The first generation of liberal internationalists in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century were heirs to an Enlightenment vision, a belief that through reason, science, and measured self-interest, societies could build political orders that improved the human condition. They imagined that institutions and political orders could be devised to protect and advance liberal democracy. International order can be a forum not just for waging war and seeking security but also for collective problem solving. Liberal internationalists believed in peaceful change because they assumed that international society is, as Woodrow Wilson argued, “corrigible.” States could tame factious, belligerent power politics and build stable relations around the pursuit of mutual gains.

The essential goal of liberal order building has not changed: the creation of a cooperative ecosystem in which states, starting with liberal democracies, manage their mutual economic and security relations, balance their often conflicting values, and protect the rights and liberties of their citizens. The idea of building international order around rules and institutions is not unique to the United States, Western liberals, or the modern era. But U.S. order building is unique in putting these ideas at the center of the country’s efforts. What the United States has had to offer is a set of solutions to the most basic problems of international relations—namely, the problems of anarchy, hierarchy, and interdependence.

The prophets of American decline are wrong.

Realist thinkers claim that states exist in a fundamental condition of anarchy that sets limits on the possibilities for cooperation. No political authority exists above the state to enforce order or govern relations, and so states must fend for themselves. Liberal internationalists do not deny that states pursue their own interests, often through competitive means, but they believe that the anarchy of that competition can be limited. States, starting with liberal democracies, can use institutions as building blocks for cooperation and for the pursuit of joint gains. The twentieth century offers dramatic evidence of these sorts of liberal ordering arrangements. After World War II, in the shadow of the Cold War, the United States and its allies and partners established a complex and sprawling system of institutions that persist today, exemplified by the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions, and multilateral regimes in diverse areas of trade, development, public health, the environment, and human rights. Grand shifts in the global distribution of power have occurred in the decades since 1945, but cooperation remains a core feature of the global system.

The problems of hierarchy are the mirror opposite of the problems of anarchy. Hierarchy is political order maintained by the dominance of a leading state, and at the extreme, it is manifest as empire. The leading state worries about how it can stay on top, gain the cooperation of others, and exercise legitimate authority in shaping world politics. Weaker states and societies worry about being dominated, and they want to mitigate their disadvantages and the vulnerabilities of being powerless. In such circumstances, liberal internationalists argue that rules and institutions can simultaneously be protections for the weak and tools for the powerful. In a liberal order, the leading state consents to acting within an agreed-upon set of multilateral rules and institutions and not use its power to coerce other states. Rules and institutions allow it to signal restraint and commitment to weaker states that may fear its power. Weaker states also gain from this institutional bargain because it reduces the worst abuses of power that the hegemonic state might inflict on them, and it gives them some voice in how the order operates.

Unique in world history, the U.S.-led order that emerged after 1945 followed this logic. It is a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics. The United States has used its commanding position as the world’s leading economic and military power to provide the public goods of security protection, market openness, and sponsorship of rules and institutions. It has tied itself to allies and partners through alliances and multilateral organizations. In return, it invites participation and compliance by other states, starting with the subsystem of liberal democracies mostly in East Asia, Europe, and Oceania. The United States has frequently violated this bargain; the Iraq War is a particularly bitter and disastrous example of the United States undermining the very order it has built. The United States has used its privileged perch to bend multilateral rules in its favor and to act unilaterally for parochial economic and political gains. But despite such behavior, the overall logic of the order gives many countries around the world, particularly liberal democracies, incentives to join with rather than balance against the United States.

The problems of interdependence arise from the dangers and vulnerabilities that countries face as they become more entangled with each other. Starting in the nineteenth century, liberal democracies have responded to the opportunities and dangers of economic, security, and environmental interdependence by building an international infrastructure of rules and institutions to facilitate flows and transactions across borders. As global interdependence grows, so, too, does the need for the multilateral coordination of policies. Coordinating policies does entail some restrictions on national autonomy, but the gains from coordination increasingly outweigh these costs as interdependence intensifies. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt made this case in his appeal to the delegates grappling with postwar financial and monetary issues at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944. Great gains could be obtained from trade and investment across borders, but domestic economies had to be protected from destabilizing economic actions taken by irresponsible governments. Such logic is in wide application today within the U.S.-led liberal order.

In each of these areas, the United States sits at the center of a liberal system of order that offers institutional solutions to the most basic problems of world politics. The United States has been an imperfect champion of these efforts to shape the operating environment of international relations. Indeed, a great deal of the criticism directed at the United States as a global leader stems from the perception that it has not done enough to move the world in this “third way” direction and that the order it presides over is too hierarchical. But that is precisely the point—if the world is to organize itself to address the problems of the twenty-first century, it will need to build on, not reject, this U.S.-led system. And if the world is to avoid the extremes of anarchy and hierarchy, it will need more, not less, liberal internationalism. China and Russia have themselves benefited from this system, and their reactionary vision of a post-American order looks more like a step backward than a step forward.

THE ANTI-IMPERIAL EMPIRE

The United States is a world power like no other before it, a peculiarity that owes much to the idiosyncratic nature of its rise. It alone among the great powers was born in the New World. Unlike the United States, the other great powers, including China and Russia, find themselves in crowded geopolitical neighborhoods, struggling for hegemonic space. From the very beginning of its career as a great power, the United States has existed far from its main rivals, and it has repeatedly found itself confronting dangerous and often violent efforts by the other great powers to expand their empires and regional spheres of influence. These circumstances have shaped the United States’ institutions, its way of thinking about international order, and its capacities for projecting power and influence.

Distance from other powers has long given the United States space to build a modern republican-style regime. The Founding Fathers were quite conscious of this uniqueness. With the European powers an ocean away, the American experiment in republican government could be safeguarded from foreign encroachments. In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton argued that the United Kingdom owed its relatively liberal institutions to its location. “If Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled . . . to make her military establishments at home co-extensive with the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability be at this day a victim to the absolute power of a single man.” The United States was similarly lucky. Its European counterparts had to develop the robust state capacities to swiftly mobilize and command soldiers and materiel to wage the continent’s endless wars; the United States did not. Instead, it began as a fragile attempt to build a state that was institutionally weak and divided—by design—to prevent the rise of autocracy at home. The United States’ isolation gave it the opportunity to succeed.

More prosaically, the vast natural resources of the continent gave the United States the capacity to grow. By the turn of the twentieth century, the United States had joined the world of the great powers, a peer of its European counterparts. But it had become powerful at great remove, unimpeded by the acts of counterbalancing so frequently evident in the relations between rival powers in Europe and East Asia.

The United States’ sheltered experiment in republican rule invariably shaped its thinking about international order. One of the oldest worries in the liberal-republican tradition, noted by theorists across the ancient and modern eras, is the pernicious impact that war, power politics, and imperialism have on liberal institutions. Historically, republics have been vulnerable to the illiberal imperatives and impulses generated by war and geopolitical competition. Warfare and imperial expansion can lead to the militarization and regimentation of a society, opening the door to the “garrison state” and turning a would-be Athens into a Sparta. The cause of protecting national independence curtails liberties. Indeed, the American founders argued for union among the colonies by insisting that if left unbound, the postcolonial states would fear each other and militarize their societies.

Anti-government protesters in Hong Kong, September 2019

Jorge Silva / Reuters

This concern, of course, did not stop the United States from joining the world of great powers or from ultimately becoming the world’s largest military power. Nonetheless, this republican worry kept alive the liberal internationalist notion, dating back to Immanuel Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers, that societies can protect their way of life best by working together and creating zones of peace that push tyrannical and despotic states to the periphery.

Such an orientation helped shape the United States’ response to the geopolitical circumstances it faced as a rising great power in the early twentieth century in a world dominated by empires. The United States, for a time, was itself engaged in empire building in the Caribbean and the Pacific, in part to compete with its peers. Indeed, every one of the United States’ great-power peers during this era was pursuing empire in one way or another. This global system of empire reached its zenith in the late 1930s when Nazi Germany and imperial Japan embarked on wars of territorial aggression. Add to that the Soviet Union and the far-flung British Empire, and the future appeared as one in which the world would be permanently divided into blocs, spheres, and imperial zones.

In this bleak mid-twentieth-century setting, the United States was forced to contemplate what kind of order it wanted to bring into existence. The question that U.S. strategists grappled with, particularly during World War II, was whether the United States could operate as a great power in a world carved up by empires. If vast stretches of Eurasia were dominated by imperial blocs, could the United States be a great power while operating only within the Western Hemisphere? No, policymakers and analysts agreed, it could not. To be a global power, the United States would need to have access to markets and resources in all corners of the world. Economic and security imperatives, as much as lofty principles, drove this judgment. U.S. interests and ambitions pointed not to a world where the United States would simply join the other great powers in running an empire but to one where empires would be swept away and all regions would be opened up to multilateral access.

In this way, the United States was unique among its peers in using its power and position to undermine the imperial world system. It made alliances and bargains with imperial states at various moments and launched a short-lived career of empire at the turn of the twentieth century in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. But the dominant impulse of U.S. strategy across these decades was to seek a postimperial system of great power relations, to build an international order that would be open, friendly, and stable: open in the sense that trade and exchange were possible across regions; friendly in the sense that none of these regions would be dominated by a rival illiberal great power that sought to close off its sphere of influence to the outside world; and stable in the sense that this postimperial order would be anchored in a set of multilateral rules and institutions that would give it some broad legitimacy, the capacity to adapt to change, and the staying power to persist well into the future.

The United States’ geographic position and rise to power in a world of empires provided the setting for a distinctive strategy of order building. Its comparative advantage was its offshore location and its capacity for forging alliances and partnerships to undercut bids for dominance by autocratic, fascist, and authoritarian great powers in East Asia and Europe. Many countries in those regions now worry more about being abandoned by the United States than being dominated by it. As a result, alliances with fixed assets, such as military bases and forward troop deployments, provide partners with not just security but also greater certainty about U.S. commitment. This confluence of geographic circumstances and liberal political traits gives the United States a unique ability to work with other states. The United States has over 60 security partnerships in all regions of the world, while China has only a scattering of security relationships with Djibouti, North Korea, and a few other countries.

Collective power

The merits of the U.S.-led order don’t just lie in what Washington made but in how it brought this order into being. The United States did not become a great power through conquest. Rather, it stepped opportunistically into geopolitical vacuums created at the ends of major wars to shape the peace. These moments occurred after the two world wars and the Cold War, when upheavals in great power relations left the global system and the old world of empires in tatters. At these junctures, the United States demonstrated the ability to build coalitions of states to hammer out the new terms of world order. During the twentieth century, this settlement-oriented, coalitional approach to order building overwhelmed the aggressive efforts of rival illiberal great powers to shape the future. The United States worked with other democracies to produce favorable geopolitical outcomes. This method of leadership continues to give the United States an edge in shaping the terms of world order today.

At three pivotal moments during the last century—after the end of World War I, again in the wake of World War II, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union—the United States found itself on the winning side of major conflicts. The old order was in ruins, and something new had to be built. In each case, Washington aimed to do more than merely restore the balance of power. The United States saw itself in a struggle with illiberal great-power aggressors, contesting world order principles and defending the liberal democratic way of life. In each case, the mobilization for war and great-power competition was framed as a contest of ideas and visions. U.S. leaders sent a message to their citizens: if you pay the price and bear the burdens of this struggle, we will endeavor to build a better United States—and a more hospitable world order. The United States sought to better organize the world when the world itself was turned upside down.

The world cannot afford the end of the American era.

The United States chose to exercise its power in these crucial moments by working with other democracies. In 1919, 1945, and 1989, the United States was the leading member of a coalition of states (the Allies, the United Nations, the “free world,” respectively) that won the war and negotiated the terms of the subsequent peace. The United States provided leadership and material power that turned the tide in each war. U.S. officials emphasized the importance of building and strengthening the coalition of liberal democracies. A slew of U.S. presidents, including Wilson, Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and George H. W. Bush, argued that the country’s survival and well-being had to be premised on building and maintaining a critical mass of similarly disposed partners and allies.

In a world of despotic, hostile, and powerful rivals, the United States and other liberal democracies have repeatedly concluded that they are safer working as a group than alone. As Roosevelt put it in January 1944, “We have joined with like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely threatened by gangster rule.” Of course, liberal states have always been willing to ally with nondemocracies within larger coalitions. During the Cold War and again today, the United States has allied itself and partnered with authoritarian client states around the world. Nonetheless, in these eras, the core impulse has been to build U.S. grand strategy around a dynamic core of liberal states in East Asia, Europe, North America, and Oceania.

Democratic solidarity also creates a setting for generating progressive ideas and attracting global support. Collective security (defined by Wilson in his Fourteen Points speech as “mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”), the Four Freedoms (Roosevelt’s goals for postwar order: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear), and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, are all grand ideas forged out of great-power contests. The world order contest underway between the United States and its autocratic rivals China and Russia offers a new opportunity to advance liberal democratic principles around the world.

AT HOME IN THE WORLD

The United States is not just a unique great power, it is also a unique kind of society. Unlike its great-power rivals, the United States is a country of immigrants, multicultural and multiracial, or what the historian Frank Ninkovich has called a “global republic.” The world has come to the United States, and as a result, the United States is profoundly connected to all regions of the world through family, ethnic, and cultural ties. These complex and far-reaching ties, operating outside the realm of government and diplomacy, make the United States relevant and engaged across the world. The United States is more knowledgeable about the outside world, and the outside world has a greater stake in what happens in the United States.

The immigrant tradition in the United States has also paid dividends in building the country’s human capital base. Without this immigrant culture, the United States would be less affluent and distinguished in the leading fields of knowledge, including medicine, science, technology, commerce, and the arts. Of the 104 Americans who have been awarded Nobel Prizes in chemistry, medicine, and physics since 2000, 40 have been immigrants. Chinese students want to come to the United States for their university education; foreign students do not flock to Chinese universities at similar rates.

Just as the diversity of its population links it to the world, so, too, does the United States’ welter of civil society groups build an influential globe-spanning network. In the past century, U.S. civil society has increasingly become part of an expansive global civil society. This sprawling transnational civil society is an often overlooked source of American influence, fostering cooperation and solidarity across the liberal democratic world. China and Russia have their own political networks and diaspora communities, but global civil society tends to reinforce liberal principles, amplifying the United States’ centrality in global confrontations over world order.

Civil society comes in many guises, including nongovernmental organizations, universities, think tanks, professional associations, media organizations, philanthropies, and social and religious groups. In recent decades, civil society groups have proliferated and spread across the world. The most salient of these groups engage in transnational advocacy, focused on causes such as the environment, human rights, humanitarian assistance, the protection of minorities, citizenship education, and so forth. In fact, these activist groups are at least partially creatures of the postwar liberal international order. Operating in and around the United Nations and other global institutions, civil society groups have seized on the idealistic principles and norms espoused by liberal states—and endeavor to hold those states to account.

Global civic activism often targets Western governments, but with its focus on human rights and civic freedoms, autocratic and authoritarian governments find themselves most under pressure. By definition, civil society groups seek to function outside the reach of the state. Not surprisingly, both China and Russia have cracked down on the activities of international civil society groups within their borders. Under Putin, Russia has sought to extend state control over civil society, discrediting foreign-funded groups and using government tools to weaken civic actors and promote pro-government organizations. China has also acted aggressively to restrict the activities of civic groups and to crack down on democracy activists in Hong Kong. At the UN, China has used its membership on the Human Rights Council to block and weaken the role of NGO advocacy groups. Global civil society tends to stimulate reform within liberal democracies while threatening autocratic and authoritarian regimes.

A multicultural immigrant society is more complex and potentially unstable than more homogeneous societies such as China. But China is home to a number of ethnic and religious minorities, and despite the country’s putative communist commitment to egalitarianism and equality, such minorities suffer intense discrimination and repression. Even though the United States must work harder than China to be a stable and integrated society, the upside of its diversity is enormous in terms of creativity, collaboration, knowledge creation, and the attraction of the world’s talent. It is hard to imagine China, with a shrunken civil society that is closed to the world, as a future center of global order.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Given the country’s recent domestic convulsions, these exhortations for the centrality of the United States in the coming century might seem odd. Today, the United States looks more beset with problems than at any time since the 1930s. Amid the polarization and dysfunction that plague American society, it is easy to offer a narrative of U.S. decline. But what keeps the United States afloat, despite its travails, is its progressive impulses. It is the idea of the United States more than the country itself that has stirred the world over the last century. The country’s liberal ideals have inspired leaders of liberation movements elsewhere, from Mahatma Gandhi in India to Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. Young people in Hong Kong protesting against the Chinese government have routinely waved U.S. flags. No other state aspiring to world power, including China, has advanced a more appealing vision of a society in which free individuals consent to their political institutions than has the United States.

The story that the United States presents to the world is one of an ongoing enterprise to confront and overcome painful impediments to a “more perfect union,” starting with its original sin of slavery. The United States is a constant work in progress. People around the world held their breath when Americans voted in the 2020 presidential election and again during the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol by supporters of President Donald Trump. The global stakes of these moments were profound.

The United States is uniquely a global republic.

By contrast, in 2018, when Xi overturned the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing rules and laid the groundwork to make him, in effect, dictator for life, the world simply shrugged. People across many parts of the world seem to expect more of the United States than they do of China, invariably measuring U.S. actions against the standard of avowed American principles and ideals. As the political scientist Samuel Huntington once observed: “America is not a lie, it is a disappointment. But it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope.”

What will keep the United States at the center of world politics is its capacity to do better. The country has never fully lived up to its liberal ideals, and when it commends these ideals to others, it looks painfully hypocritical. But hypocrisy is a feature, not a bug, of liberal order, and need not be an impediment to making the liberal order better. The order over which the United States has presided since World War II has moved the world forward, and if people around the globe want a better world order that supports greater cooperation and social and economic advancement, they will want to improve on this U.S.-led system, not dispense with it.

The crises over Taiwan and Ukraine underline this fact. In both cases, China and Russia are seeking to draw unwilling open societies into their orbit. The people of Taiwan look at the plight of Hong Kong and, not surprisingly, are horrified at the prospect of being incorporated into a country ruled by a Chinese dictatorship. The people of an embattled democratic Ukraine see a brighter future in greater integration into the European Union and the West. That China is ramping up pressure on Taiwan and that Russia sought to yoke Ukraine to its sphere of influence does not suggest American decline or the collapse of liberal order. On the contrary, the crises exist because Taiwanese and Ukrainian societies want to be part of a global liberal system. Putin famously groused that the liberal idea is becoming obsolete. In reality, the liberal idea still has a long life ahead of it.

EMPIRE BY INVITATION

The United States enters today’s struggle to shape the twenty-first century with profound advantages. It still possesses the vast bulk of the material capabilities it had in earlier decades. It remains uniquely positioned geographically to play a great-power role in both East Asia and Europe. Its ability to work with other liberal democracies to shape global rules and institutions is already manifest in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and will stand it in good stead in any future collective response to Chinese aggression in East Asia. Although China and Russia seek to move the world in the direction of regional blocs and spheres of influence, the United States has offered a vision of world order based on a set of principles rather than competition over territory. Liberal international order is a way of organizing an interdependent world. It is, as the Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad called it, an “empire by invitation.” Its success depends on its legitimacy and appeal and not on the capacity of its patrons to force obedience. If the United States remains at the center of world politics in the decades to come, it will be because this type of order generates more supporters and fellow travelers around the world than that offered by China and Russia.

The U.S. confrontation with China and Russia in 2022 is an echo of the great-power upheavals of 1919, 1945, and 1989. As at these earlier moments, the United States finds itself working with other democracies in resisting the aggressive moves of illiberal great powers. The Russian war in Ukraine is about more than the future of Ukraine; it is also about the basic rules and norms of international relations. Putin’s gambit has placed the United States and democracies in Europe and elsewhere on the defensive. But it has also given the United States an opportunity to rethink and reargue its case for an open, multilateral system of world order. If the past is any guide, the United States should not try to simply consolidate the old order but to reimagine it. U.S. leaders should seek to broaden the democratic coalition, reaffirm basic values and interests, and offer a vision of a reformed international order that draws states and peoples together in new forms of cooperation, such as to solve problems of climate change, global public health, and sustainable development. No other great power is better placed to build the necessary partnerships and lead the way in tackling the major problems of the twenty-first century. Other powers may be rising, but the world cannot afford the end of the American era.

G. JOHN IKENBERRY is Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University. He is the author of A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order.

Foreign Affairs · November 1, 2022

12. US-China report recommends backchannel diplomacy with Chinese military

US-China report recommends backchannel diplomacy with Chinese military

Defense News · by Bryant Harris · November 2, 2022

Correction: A previous version of this article misrepresented background information on the report. The report was commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, but it does not reflect the commission’s official recommendations to Congress. The commission’s recommendations will be released later in November 2022 in its annual report.

WASHINGTON — A report commissioned by the congressionally mandated U.S.-China commission suggests Congress fund backchannel military diplomacy with Beijing, citing growing gaps in Washington’s knowledge of personnel matters and reform efforts in relation to the People’s Liberation Army.

A report on PLA personnel from BluePath Labs, requested by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, advocates for nongovernmental and quasi-governmental dialogues with the Chinese military. The U.S.-China commission is due to issue its full set of recommendations to Congress on Nov. 15 in its annual report.

“While the current state of U.S.-China bilateral relations is not conducive to exchanges in this area, Congress should work with the Department of Defense to reestablish Track 1.5 and 2.0 military dialogues with China if conditions support,” the report states. “Given the increasingly closed nature of China’s information sphere, properly planned and managed interactions could be enormously helpful in better understanding the inner workings of the PLA.”

Track 2 diplomatic dialogues between two countries are usually comprised of nongovernment representatives from academia and think tanks. In a Track 1.5 dialogue, each delegation consists of a mix of government representatives acting in an unofficial capacity alongside outside participants.

“China and the United States previously had multiple forums for exchanging military-related information,” the report reads. “However, almost all of these have disappeared in recent years, likely in part due to worsening bilateral relations and the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, the United States has lost access to valuable information concerning the PLA, including educational and promotion pathways, how unit leaders are chosen and the success of reform initiatives.”

The PLA began slow-walking senior military leaders’ exchanges between the two countries prior to the pandemic. China also suspended multiple military dialogues with the United States following the visit of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., to Taiwan in August.

During the pandemic, China also began to crack down on backchannel exchanges. Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University visited Scott Kennedy, a China analyst at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, in February — the first apparent Track 2 event between the two countries in more than two years.

The report also suggests Congress fund an organization that can facilitate the purchase of PLA open-source publications, which China provided for free until 2018.

“One of the keys to understanding the PLA and its personnel is having access to PLA primary sources, including newspapers, journals, books, and websites,” the report states. “Although some organizations have limited access to at least some, but not all, of those publications, the cost has increased appreciably and each organization must pay for them individually.”

Despite the decreased visibility into the PLA in recent years, the 63-page report details the Chinese military’s efforts at personnel modernization, including recruitment and training reform for noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel as well as its anti-corruption campaign.

“While progress has been uneven, the sum of these initiatives is likely to produce a PLA that is more educated, professionalized and technically proficient in the coming years,” the report says.

The Chinese military in 2021 switched from one to two conscription cycles per year to boost combat readiness.

Nonetheless, the report also mentions that “many commanders are still judged as incapable of properly assessing situations, making operational decisions, deploying forces or leading forces in a modern, joint, informationized war.”

The PLA “has made significant changes to its non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps, gradually empowering it to take on greater responsibilities,” according to the report. It has also “begun new partnerships with civilian academic institutions to provide education to NCOs, as well as directly recruiting civilians with in-demand technical skills as NCOs.”

The report notes that “efforts to recruit a more educated enlisted force overall appear to be succeeding, even if they have not always met the PLA’s high recruitment targets.”

While the PLA has recruited students to study “aerospace, radar, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missile technology, and maritime science,” it does not efficiently use them after their recruitment, the report adds.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party has declared victory on President Xi Jinping’s war against corruption in the ranks. But the report states that it’s “unclear if this has actually changed the culture of pervasive corruption in the PLA,” which has historically included bribery for promotions and graft in the defense procurement process.

The report also recommends Congress fund a follow-up report specifically devoted to the “annual training cycle for each service, force, and branch” of the Chinese military as well as a conference on PLA force structure and reorganization.

The report’s release coincides with a bipartisan push to create a China Grand Strategy Commission via an amendment to the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which the Senate is expected to vote on later this month.

About Bryant Harris

Bryant Harris is the Congress reporter for Defense News. He has covered U.S. foreign policy, national security, international affairs and politics in Washington since 2014. He has also written for Foreign Policy, Al-Monitor, Al Jazeera English and IPS News.

13. A Secretive US Special-Operations Base in Syria Is Taking Fire from a Shadowy Middle East War

Not so secret anymore.

A Secretive US Special-Operations Base in Syria Is Taking Fire from a Shadowy Middle East War

military.com · by 2 Nov 2022 Business Insider | By Rachel Nostrant · November 2, 2022

Read the original article on Business Insider.

A remote US special-operations base in the Syrian desert is caught in a shadow war between military powers in the Middle East.

Al-Tanf garrison, a US base typically housing between 100 and 200 US troops alongside coalition forces, has for years been a hub for operations against ISIS as well as Iran and its proxies. In August and September, the outpost was involved in a series of attacks, including a rocket attack by Iranian-backed militias that wounded three US troops.

The base was established in 2016, when US forces were in the thick of combat operations against ISIS in Syria. US and coalition troops needed a stronghold from which they could isolate ISIS fighters and monitor activities across the region.

Al-Tanf -- in southeastern Syria along the M2 Baghdad-Damascus highway and near the borders with Iraq and Jordan -- was the ideal location.

The area around the base was liberated from ISIS that year. Shortly thereafter, the US and Russia, which were both operating in the area, agreed to set up a 34-mile deconfliction zone around the outpost.

The garrison has been a launchpad for counterterrorism and anti-smuggling operations as well as for provision of humanitarian aid and coalition-led training efforts. Sustaining a foothold at al-Tanf also helps ensure that the US is a part of discussions regarding Syria's future.

In recent months, however, al-Tanf has become a focal point in a shadowy conflict between the region's key players: Israel, the US, Russia, and Iran.

Israel regularly strikes Iranian-backed forces in Syria, and flying over al-Tanf allows Israeli aircraft to limit their exposure to Syrian air defenses, most of which are in western Syria.

Routes near al-Tanf are especially appealing for Israeli strikes against Iranian proxy forces near the al-Qaim border crossing with Iraq.

Current and former US defense officials told The Wall Street Journal in mid-June that the US had for years been reviewing Israeli plans for strikes against Iranian proxies and allies in the area to avoid interference with US-led operations against ISIS, especially those at al-Tanf.

"They like to use our air corridors because [Syria's] air defenses can't tell the difference until it's too late," a former defense official told Al Monitor later that month.

But allowing Israel and occasionally Jordan to operate around al-Tanf has exposed the US to retaliatory attacks from Iran and its proxies.

The base was hit by what was believed to be an Iranian-launched drone strike on August 15, one day after Israel struck military targets in the Syrian provinces of Damascus and Tartus -- strikes aimed at a Syrian air-defense base that often houses Iranian-backed fighters, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group.

The August 15 strike, which caused minimal damage and no casualties, prompted the US to retaliate with an airstrike on August 25, which in turn set off a series of attacks by US and Iranian-backed forces.

Changing Dynamics

Russia's war in Ukraine may create new problems for US troops at al-Tanf.

Grant Rumley, a US Defense Department advisor for Middle East policy during the Trump and Biden administrations, told Insider that there are additional threats around al-Tanf that now need to be considered.

One involves continuing the fight against ISIS by maintaining a physical presence and weeding the group's fighters out of local villages.

The base's role in the Syrian conflict and in the region's wider tensions may also become even more convoluted. US and Russian forces conduct patrols in northeastern Syria, where they have had both contentious and friendly interactions, but Russia's attitude may change because of events in Ukraine.

"There is the risk that Russia, on the ground in Syria, will be worried about the perception that it's focused solely on Ukraine," Rumley said. "In that regard, you could see more erratic Russian behavior, and they could not observe the 55 km [deconfliction] zone or there could be more friction at checkpoints."

Iran is also increasing its weapons shipments to Russia, sending hundreds of drones and missiles that Moscow is using in Ukraine, which may affect Tehran's actions in the Middle East.

In exchange for those weapons, Iran may ask Russia to put pressure on Israel to decrease or halt its strikes or to facilitate an increased Iranian presence on the ground in Syria, said Rumley, now a fellow at The Washington Institute focusing on great-power competition in the Middle East.

Russia has withdrawn combat forces from Syria in recent weeks, which may signal a shift in Moscow's role there, but it's unclear what that or other changes could mean for the US mission in Syria and for al-Tanf, Rumley said.

"The dynamics in Syria will change as Russia continues to get overburdened with Ukraine," Rumley told Insider. "So what might not have been possible in the past, like some sort of negotiated outcome, could become possible in the future," he added, "or it might not."

Rachel Nostrant is a US-based journalist with work published in New York magazine, VTDigger, Military Times, and Defense News. She has covered topics including environmental contamination outside of military bases, the murder of US Army soldier Vanessa Guillen, rising tensions between China and Taiwan, and the war in Ukraine.

military.com · by 2 Nov 2022 Business Insider | By Rachel Nostrant · November 2, 2022

14. The US has funneled more than $1 billion into Afghanistan since the fall of Kabul with zero accountability

???

The US has funneled more than $1 billion into Afghanistan since the fall of Kabul with zero accountability

Multiple U.S. agencies refused to cooperate with the government's top Afghanistan reconstruction watchdog.

BY JARED KELLER | PUBLISHED NOV 2, 2022 1:45 PM

taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · November 2, 2022

The U.S. government has funneled more than $1.1 billion in taxpayer dollars into Afghanistan since the Taliban took control of the country in August 2021 with minimal oversight or accountability according to the watchdog responsible for overseeing U.S.-led reconstruction efforts there.

A new report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) notes that the watchdog, for the first time since it was established in 2008, is unable “to provide Congress and the American people with a full accounting of this U.S. government spending due to the non-cooperation of several U.S. government agencies.”

Those agencies include the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Treasury Department, which “refused to cooperate with SIGAR in any capacity” during the watchdog’s regular audit of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The State Department, which only shared “high-level funding data but not details of agency-supported programs,” still administers funds there.

“A State official has informed SIGAR that department staff have received internal direction to not engage with or speak to SIGAR without prior clearance from State legal counsel,’ the report states.

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Despite having freely provided relevant information for over a decade, SIGAR reports that the State Department and USAID have now “refused” to give the watchdog important “information and assistance” for several congressionally-mandated reviews and audits.

Those included reviews and audits regarding the collapse of the U.S.-backed government in Afghanistan and the associated risks to the Afghan people and State and USAID compliance with laws “prohibiting the transfer of funds to the Taliban,” among others.

The refusal among U.S. government agencies to provide relevant data on Afghanistan reconstruction efforts to SIGAR constitutes a “direct violation” of the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act that established SIGAR in the first place and the Inspector General Act of 1978, which established that federal agency leaders shall not prevent department IGs “from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation.”

“SIGAR has notified Congress of this matter,” the report states.

According to SIGAR’s latest report, the U.S. government has spent approximately $146.55 billion in funds explicitly for reconstruction “and related activities” in Afghanistan from shortly after the U.S-led invasion through September 20, 2022, although USAID “refused to report its account balances” from June 30, 2022, onward.

The U.S. government spent an estimated $2 trillion executing the 20-year military campaign in Afghanistan, with the Defense Department responsible for roughly $849.7 billion in costs related to “warfighting and reconstruction,” according to a September 2021 DoD ‘Cost of War’ report cited by SIGAR.

By the end of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, the American public generally viewed the U.S. troop presence there unfavorably: a Pew Research Center poll conducted in late August 2021 found that 54% of Americans favored the withdrawal, while 69% said the U.S. “mostly failed in achieving its goals” during the occupation.

Despite this, the U.S. continues to pour money into Afghanistan — and, if SIGAR is correct, the American public will have no idea how many of their tax dollars are being spent on the aftermath of a failed nation-building effort overseas.

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taskandpurpose.com · by Jared Keller · November 2, 2022

15. These Air Force commandos saved troops under fire for years. Now they are fighting to save their buddies

These Air Force commandos saved troops under fire for years. Now they are fighting to save their buddies

‘I woke up one morning, started typing a mission statement, and First There was born. Really it was out of necessity because I didn’t want my friend to kill himself.’

BY DAVID ROZA | PUBLISHED NOV 2, 2022 10:40 AM

taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · November 2, 2022

You never know who you might end up sitting next to in class one day. For example, biology students at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill between 2017 and 2019 may not have known that the quiet older guy in their classroom was a decorated Air Force commando who saved his entire team of U.S. and Afghan special operators from being overrun on a 2008 mission in Afghanistan, a mission where he repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire and directed danger-close air strikes against the local militant group despite being shot through the leg.

As incredible as it sounds, that kind of story is fairly common in the world of Air Force combat control. Though many civilians and service members may not know about them, CCTs are some of the most elite special operators on the planet. Trained to the same physical capabilities as their better-known comrades in the Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs, CCTs are also technical experts who can call in deadly close air support within 10 meters of their position with a sucking chest wound while surrounded by enemy fighters.

“Nobody knows about us, even though we kill more people on the battlefield than anyone in the history of human warfare,” retired Air Force CCT veteran Dan Schilling told Task & Purpose last year. “What CCTs do is they stitch everything together, and they determine whether everyone on the battlefield lives or dies.”

Army Special Forces soldiers from ODA 3336, 3rd Special Forces Group, recon the remote Shok Valley, Afghanistan February 19, 2008. Air Force combat controller Zac Rhyner is standing on the far left. (Sgt. David N. Gunn/U.S. Army)

Retired combat controller Zac Rhyner certainly determined whether he and his buddies lived on that battlefield in Afghanistan in 2008. But while he had survived what one special operations commander described as “one of the most difficult situations” in combat, civilian life on a college campus presented a new kind of challenge.

“It was strange because I was in for 11 years and then all of the sudden I was a college student,” Rhyner, who medically retired from the military in 2015, told Task & Purpose. “Being a decade older than the other students – and it didn’t help that I wasn’t the friendliest guy on campus – I was pretty reserved.”

Rhyner had a tough last few years in the Air Force. On his last deployment in 2013, a gunshot shattered his right femur and severed a nerve. The commando spent more than a year in a wheelchair, often on a heavy dose of pain medication, as he wondered whether he would ever be able to rejoin his buddies in special operations.

To go from the fast-paced life of a combat controller to the slower pace of convalescence was “pretty rough,” Rhyner said, but his physical therapist taught him how to walk again and gave him a sense of newfound purpose.

“Through my two years of rehab and recovery, I found this love for physical therapy,” said the former controller, who also credited the therapist with ”just trying to boost my morale through those hard times and pushing me when I needed it.”

An airman comforts an infant during an evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan, Aug. 20, 2021. U.S. service members and coalition partners are assisting the Department of State with a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Afghanistan. (Sgt. Isaiah Campbell/U.S. Marine Corps)

Rhyner pushed on through recovery, through his undergraduate studies and into the Duke University Doctor of Physical Therapy Program to pursue his new dream. But recovering from war has highs and lows, and Rhyner hit a low along with many other veterans while watching the U.S. military evacuation from Afghanistan last year.

“I think I really went downhill after that,” said Rhyner, who described feeling angry, irritable and upset that the civilians around him seemed oblivious to what was happening to the country he had fought and bled in so many times. That, plus his long hours of clinical rotations as a budding physical therapist, were chipping away at his well-being. Luckily, he had a few buddies looking out for him.

“I was fortunate that within the small combat control network some guys recognized that I wasn’t doing great,” Rhyner said.

The retired airman was about to become one of the first combat controllers to benefit from the First There Foundation, a new nonprofit devoted to helping CCTs and their families with mental health, career advancement, financial advice and other areas that can be difficult to navigate after the high-tempo world of special operations.

‘How come we don’t do this for combat controllers?’

There is a galaxy of nonprofits dedicated to helping veterans, but First There founder Eric Hohman noticed during his own struggle after leaving the Air Force that the tight-knit, little-known community of combat controllers was not receiving the same support as other special operations veterans. The reality hit home when he attended an event put on by the Special Forces Charitable Trust, a nonprofit “that provides meaningful and sustainable support to the Green Berets and their families,” according to the trust’s website.

“I was just like, ‘how come we don’t do this for combat controllers?’” Hohman asked.

Air Force Combat Controller and founder of the First There Foundation Eric Hohman pictured while on a deployment to Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy Eric Hohman)

There is one organization that exists already: the Combat Control Foundation, which has a similar set of goals as First There. In the first eight months of 2022 alone, the Foundation spent $203,608 on resiliency, education, health and heritage efforts within the CCT community, according to the foundation’s website. Still, Hohman described it as more of a “heritage foundation,” whereas his goal with First There is to connect with younger generations of CCTs.

“We want to include older guys too, but we’re also largely made up of Global War on Terror veterans,” Hohman said.

Mike Lamonica, president of the Combat Control Foundation and its sister group, the Combat Control Association said Hohman’s characterization of CCF and CCA was accurate.

“We have programs built to assist with resiliency, health, education and heritage,” for CCTs and their families and teammates, he said. “As with any organization there are generational gaps, whether real or perceived.”

The leaders of both the CCA and CCF “want nothing more than to see Eric and team be successful,” Lamonica added. “We are a small community filled with operators, family members, and teammates who sacrifice on a daily basis in service to this great nation. Those people deserve to be supported and recognized.”

Hohman also noticed that the only times his community rallied together was in mourning for a fallen brother.

“It was a very reactive thing,” he said. “We should be celebrating our dudes now instead of waiting until someone dies before we all come together and mourn this guy.”

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The experience of special operations is often so intense, so high-tempo and so niche that leaving those communities can present a unique set of challenges compared to other veterans. On top of that, the combat controller community sometimes suffers from its own success at being ‘quiet professionals.’ Hohman recalled applying for the same job as a former Navy SEAL, and though Hohman was more experienced and held a bachelor’s degree and the SEAL did not, the latter got the job.

“‘Nobody knows what a controller is,’” Hohman recalled one of the people who reviewed his application telling him. “’They know what a SEAL is.’”

Air Force Combat Controller and founder of the First There Foundation Eric Hohman pictured while on a deployment to Afghanistan. (Photo courtesy Eric Hohman)

Not getting that job was one of several rough moments Hohman went through after getting out of the military in 2013 with a beat-up body and survivor’s guilt.

“I couldn’t find a job, I couldn’t find a purpose,” Hohman said. “I was like ‘I used to be this rock star, I used to brief generals. And now I’m 35 and I’m living with my parents … What is wrong with me? I was an operator.’’”

Within a year, Hohman started thinking about running his car off a bridge or putting a gun to his head. Luckily, a Veterans Affairs psychologist managed to get the controller to open up about how he was feeling, which helped Hohman start to turn things around. After that, the Special Forces Charitable Trust helped him realize what the combat control community was missing, but the last straw did not break until the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, when Chris “AZ” Rush, a mentor to Hohman and a well-known figure in the CCT world, died by suicide. It was an unexpected blow for many controllers.

“That broke my heart, and we couldn’t say goodbye to him because of COVID,” Hohman said. Then another buddy who was struggling called Hohman and he figured “it’s up to me. So I woke up one morning and started typing a mission statement, and First There was born. Really it was out of necessity because I didn’t want my friend to kill himself.”

An extension of the team room

Hohman began approaching donors with a pitch in hand: an extension of the team room. A team room is like a common room for special operations teammates to debrief, get ready for missions, or just hang out and chat. The First There Foundation would create a lasting extension of that space into civilian life for controllers and their families.

“We’re a trusted source, like ‘I know this is run by team guys, and I can trust them,’” Hohman explained. “All I do is facilitate with our network and say ‘this guy needs a job, or this guy needs help writing a resume, or this guy is having a hard time getting his VA rating.’ All we are doing is connecting guys and getting them help when they need it.”

Former Air Force Combat Controller Eric Hohman speaks at the first annual Scarlet Beret Gala put on by The First There Foundation, San Antonio, Texas, Sept. 10, 2022. (Parish Photography/Courtesy Eric Hohman)

Hohman hopes that First There can help develop a professional network for combat controllers where the valuable skills they developed in the military are appreciated by employers. On the First There Foundation website is a list of CCT-owned businesses in industries like real estate, retail, construction, marketing and even skateboarding apparel.

“The SEALs and Green Berets have done so well at getting their people in high positions of business,” said Jonathan Howard, a former CCT who owns several real estate businesses and is a donor to First There. “We don’t really have that in CCT, just because the notoriety is not there.

“I’ve hired a few controllers to come work for me, but it’s not going to be that Fortune 500 company,” he added. “That’s a gap we’re trying to fill, to help them on that transition out.”

Former Air Force Combat Controller and First There Foundation donor Jonathan Howard speaks at the first annual Scarlet Beret Gala put on by The First There Foundation, San Antonio, Texas, Sept. 10, 2022. (Parish Photography/Courtesy Eric Hohman)

Beyond a network and a resource, Hohman hopes that First There will also be a kind of connective tissue for controllers after they leave the military, reminding them that no matter where life takes them, they can always count on their brothers in scarlet berets.

“Part of it is really just to look out for each other, and be proactive,” Hohman said. “When guys have babies we send them a baby blanket. When guys retire, we send them out to camp. It’s little things to let them know that we’re there.”

‘I really saw the change it did for them’

Having a trusted network can be particularly important for navigating the mental health turmoil CCTs sometimes encounter when leaving the military. Howard explained that it takes a while for many controllers to admit that they are struggling, and then it can take even longer to find a mental health provider they connect with.

“I saw a lot of mental health professionals, but the one I really connected with was former enlisted Marine infantry,” Howard said. “Someone like that I can connect with. He gets it, he knows the lifestyle, and I don’t have to explain a lot of things.”

U.S. Air Force Special Tactics operators spread out on a berm to provide security at the landing zone and observe their target during operability training with 14th Weapons Squadron air assets at Eglin Range, Florida, April 22, 2020. (Staff Sgt. Rose Gudex/U.S. Air Force)

There are plenty of well-intentioned, well-executed mental health programs out there, but not all of them are effective for the unique circumstances of a CCT. Several CCTs who spoke with Task & Purpose for this story mentioned how the traditional medication prescribed to them by VA doctors often made them feel dead inside. Howard hopes to help expose CCTs to alternative treatments, such as mushrooms, which he found to be more effective than pills.

“It really changed my life for the better,” he said. “It’s dental floss for your brain.”

Howard first got into mushrooms through a trusted source: his buddies from combat control and from Air Force pararescue, another elite field of special operations.

“I really saw the change it did for them, they just seemed happier and not as stressed,” he said.

Other treatments besides psychedelics have also worked for some controllers. Hohman felt a breakthrough after trying out reiki, “an energy healing technique that promotes relaxation, reduces stress and anxiety through gentle touch,” according to the Cleveland Clinic.

“I thought it was a crock of shit, but I think my mom was so worried about me that she was like ‘look I don’t care what you think about it, you’re going to do this,’” he said. “And it was the first time that I felt at peace. It was something to do with my soul.”

Former Air Force Combat Controller Eric Hohman flicks up his suit collar during the first annual Scarlet Beret Gala put on by The First There Foundation. San Antonio, Texas, Sept. 10, 2022. (Parish Photography/Courtesy Eric Hohman)

Psychedelics, reiki or other therapies classified as alternative medicine may not work for everybody, but Howard hopes that First There can provide a word-of-mouth network for CCTs to hear about those therapies and, if they are interested, try them out in safe, supportive environments among people they trust.

“That’s a big thing I wanted to put out there with the First There Foundation,” he said. “The VA won’t send you on a nature retreat with a medical professional for ayahuasca. But if we can pay that bill to send a guy there for four nights and get his life reset, I’m all about that.”

‘We’d say their name and just bury it down.’

In the combat controller world, Jesse Schrader has been around the block. He’s been on the teams since 2002, gone on 13 deployments, and knows every single controller who’s been killed in combat since 9/11. Losing so many friends made it difficult for Schrader to keep in touch with their family members after their deaths.

“We’d a toast, we’d say their name and just bury it down,” he explained. “Part of my burying it away and not ever having to deal with it is I would kind of push aside all the families. I’ve known every combat controller who has been killed since 9/11 and I knew their families as well, and I just completely stopped talking to their families because talking with them brought up survivor’s guilt or whatever you want to call it.”

Now, as Schrader prepares to retire later this year, he imagines that other controllers may be in a similar situation, and he wants to make sure Gold Star families are not forgotten or neglected.

“We’ve been going the extra mile to get contact information for all the Gold Star family members: where they are, what their needs are, do they need help paying a mortgage, is there anything they need help with,” Schrader explained.

The way Hohman sees it, the First There Foundation may be able to help those families the way their sons, husbands or fathers might have. Even if it’s just something simple, like paying to fix a garbage disposal.

“I want First There to be an extension of the team room, but I also want it to be there for Gold Star families to step in where their sons or husbands would have,” he said.

Veterans and family members are not the only ones who Schrader thinks First There can help. Active-duty controllers may also stand to benefit. Schrader said combat control units across the service have made a big push to create “human performance optimization teams,” to look out for CCTs’ physical and mental well-being while still in uniform. Those teams can include weight-lifting coaches, physical therapists and mental health providers.

“The problem is, the people at the units won’t use them,” the CCT explained. “They’re like ‘as soon as I walk over to the psych doc and tell them I’m having these issues, they’re going to take all my weapons away. They are going to tell me that I am grounded from flying, jumping, I can’t train, they are going to take me off the team. Everybody in the entire squadron is going to know and find out that I self-diagnosed and raised my hand because I have an issue. Even though they are going to applaud me because I am trying to get help, they are going to have that stigma on me, and then will I ever be able to recover from it?’”

The First There Foundation laid out a Soldier’s Cross, complete with the scarlet beret of Air Force Combat Controllers, at the foundation’s first annual Scarlet Beret Gala. San Antonio, Texas, Sept. 10, 2022. (Parish Photography/Courtesy Eric Hohman)

Some CCTs may feel comfortable reaching out for that help, Schrader said, but the worst-case scenario weighs on many minds in the career field. Schrader hopes the First There Foundation may be able to help with that, especially since he still knows many active-duty controllers. For example, if a team sergeant at one squadron has an airman who just returned from a deployment and needs help, but does not want to risk that worst-case scenario of being seen getting help, then the sergeant could call Schrader, who hopefully could help send the airman on a retreat or some other form of help sponsored by First There.

“He takes leave, comes out to see us and we try to do the best we can to right the wrong,” Schrader said.

Recovering from war has ups and downs, and even CCTs who have been out for a decade or more may need help through the downs.

“People who we know who have gone through that trauma might be burying themselves away with alcohol in a trailer somewhere that no one knows about until someone finds out and then hopefully they get them to us,” Schrader said.

‘It’s up to us’

When Zac Rhyner took the stage at San Antonio, Texas on September 10, he was feeling much better than he had in the months following the Afghanistan withdrawal. He had finished his doctor of physical therapy program and, with the help of First There, gone on a mental health retreat for special operations veterans which other CCTs recommended.

“Being around that environment of people you relate to and being able to focus on mental health for a couple days, that was incredible,” he said. “It was the catalyst that I needed to get back on the right track.”

Former Air Force Combat Controller Zac Rhyner speaks at the first annual Scarlet Beret Gala put on by The First There Foundation, San Antonio, Texas, Sept. 10, 2022. (Parish Photography/Courtesy Eric Hohman)

That day, Rhyner shared his story with a room full of 134 CCTs, family members, donors and other guests at the First There Foundation’s first-ever Scarlet Beret Gala, a kind of coming-out for the budding non-profit. Adult beverages were consumed, fallen comrades remembered, and songs from the 80s danced to in what Hohman hopes will become the first of an annual tradition. But Hohman hoped the event also served as a call to action.

“It’s up to us,” Hohman reminded guests at the gala. “It’s up to us and only us to spread the word about what we can do here.”

Maybe First There can be a sort of homecoming, not just for all the combat controllers and families who have served and are serving now, but for all CCTs to come. Maybe soon Zac Rhyner will be just one of many controllers who First There helped get to a better place.

“It’s taking care of us. It’s having a place where, when guys get out and life gets difficult, they can say “hey, I can call this guy or that guy at First There and say ‘hey man I’m really struggling, how can you help?’” Hohman told Task & Purpose. “That’s all it is.”

Update: 11/02/2022; This article has been updated with comments from the Combat Control Foundation.

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taskandpurpose.com · by David Roza · November 2, 2022

16. The New Japan-Australia Security Agreement – Analysis

Excerpts:

Moving forward, observers should expect more deepening of regional security ties, both between Japan and Australia and between both countries and other strategically aligned states. This seems especially true for India, the third leg of the Quad. That said, Japan and Australia seem unlikely to move towards forging a formal treaty alliance, if only because there is no apparent urgent need to do so. Nevertheless, Japan and Australia should be considered de-facto allies, as Canberra and Tokyo are both signaling that they are prepared to use their defense forces to assist each other’s shared strategic goals. The United States should encourage its allies and partners in the region to forge similar relationships based on mutual benefit, and take the lead of its allies in recognizing the importance of topics like energy security in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia and Japan, two countries that placed their national security in the hands of the United States since the end of the Second World War, are beginning to forge their own shared strategy for the region. This, in turn, should be viewed as a success and a very welcome byproduct of the US-backed alliance system in Washington.

The New Japan-Australia Security Agreement – Analysis

eurasiareview.com · by Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute · November 3, 2022

By Ryan Ashley*

More than Koalas

(FPRI) — The Oct. 22 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Perth mostly made the news thanks to the peculiarly Australian greeting awaiting the Japanese prime minister, a hug with a koala and photoshoot with matching green vests. Behind the cuddly animals and pageantry, though, lies a new agreement that is deepening one of the Indo-Pacific region’s most important strategic partnerships.

Kishida visited Western Australia to sign an updated security cooperation agreement that makes Australia one of Japan’s closest defense partners, arguably second only to the United States. Australia, in turn, is signaling that it is fully committed to making Japan its closest security partner outside of its traditional anglophone relations with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. The rapidly deepening Australia-Japan strategic relationship highlights the importance of several important trends for Indo-Pacific security, namely the increased popularity of “minilaterals,” a rise in security arrangements between American allies, and the importance of energy security.

Beyond Hubs and Spokes

Although both Australia and Japan are firmly ensconced in their respective military alliances with the United States, Tokyo and Canberra did not form any meaningful bilateral security relationship until 2007. That year, Australian Prime Minister John Howard and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo agreed to a “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” promising to cooperate on regional security issues, committing to future joint exercises and training, and initiating annual “2+2” dialogues with each country’s defense and foreign ministers.

The Japan-Australia relationship deepened with the 2009 initiation of bilateral military exercises and regular defense exchanges. More recently, Australia and Japan have acted as the cornerstones of the “Quad,” an informal grouping of the two countries with the United States and India that meets on a regular basis to coordinate on regional security. Earlier this year, Japan and Australia signed a “Reciprocal Access Agreement,” allowing for more seamless dispatches of defense forces from one country to the other and enabling future combined exercises.

To be sure, the relationship has not always been smooth sailing. Canberra frustrated some in Tokyo after it chose a French manufacturer over Japanese bids for a $40 billion submarine purchase in April 2016. Controversially, Australia would subsequently cancel that order with France entirely in favor of American and British-designed nuclear powered submarines under a new trilateral security agreement called “AUKUS.” The multi-part saga strained Australia’s defense relations with both Paris and Tokyo.

The ambition and depth of this year’s new security agreement, however, makes the submarine affair appear a mere speed bump. The new pact, also called the “Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation,” commits both sides to increased cooperation on a laundry list of topics including military interoperability, intelligence, cybersecurity, space cooperation, logistics, law enforcement, and energy security. While the text does not explicitly mention China, the agreement seems squarely and unambiguously pointed at countering the regional giant’s influence. Indeed, Beijing reacted harshly to the agreement, stating that it could lead to a “new cold war” in the region.

Of note, part six of the agreement states that both sides “will consult each other on contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.” As noted by experts, David Walton and Daisuke Akimoto, that wording resembles Article III in the ANZUS Treaty which signals a very close defense relationship but stops short of codifying a full mutual defense commitment, like the US-Australia defense commitment enshrined in Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty. It also mentions the importance of “resisting economic coercion and disinformation” in a clear reference to China’s recent actions against Australia and Japan.

The Age of Minilaterals

This new agreement highlights the importance of three ongoing trends in Indo-Pacific security. First, it is another example of the continued move towards so-called “minilaterals” in the region’s defense architecture. This term refers to the recent flowering of security links through a web of complementary but separate point-to-point security arrangements, in contrast with the more unified networked security arrangements in Europe. As described by Jada Fraser writing for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, minilaterals often necessarily come with more narrow agendas than larger security arrangements. Yet, in the Indo-Pacific they are proving to be flexible and durable arrangements that facilitate stronger consensus-building in a rapidly changing region.

For example, the Joint Declaration can be understood as a new minilateral on intelligence sharing between Canberra and Tokyo. While Japan’s readiness for full membership in the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing pact (which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and United States) is frequently debated, this new agreement promotes bilateral intelligence sharing on “strategic assessments.” For Japan, participation in lower-level intelligence sharing with a Five Eyes member may not be groundbreaking on its own, but serves as another step in tightening an array of intelligence-sharing relationships between strategically aligned countries in the Indo-Pacific.

Another minilateral, the Quad, also stands to benefit from this new agreement. The Quad is a decidedly informal arrangement without specific security obligations, leading some to minimize its potential impact on regional security. Nevertheless, its convening power and influence are clearly leading to increased security ties between its individual members. Several barriers, mostly the restrictions of India’s complex geopolitical position, stand between the Quad’s current structure and its potential future as a more formal security pact. Nevertheless, the strengthening of ties between two individual Quad members through the Joint Declaration will likely result in a stronger Quad organization overall, boosting the bloc’s future influence.

American Disengagement?

Second, this new agreement demonstrates that Canberra and Tokyo are determined to counteract any future American disengagement in the Indo-Pacific by deepening their own ties. Although prospects for such disengagement look low today, both Canberra and Tokyo fear a potential shift towards isolationism in Washington. The Joint Declaration allows both countries to hedge against such a worst-case scenario by bolstering relations with like-minded regional partners. Simultaneously, it seeks to serve as a mechanism to keep such a worst-case scenario from occurring in the first place by encouraging deeper US security involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

Canberra and Tokyo may see this year’s Joint Declaration as an equivalent failsafe in the unlikely but not-implausible scenario of American disengagement from the Indo-Pacific. Neither US ally wants Washington to disengage from the region, and neither is betting on that occurring, but both appear to be planning for any development.

To be sure, the Joint Declaration should be understood as a highly beneficial and complementary addition to the US alliances with Japan and Australia. Kishida and Albanese said as much during the signing of the agreement, clearly communicating that their defense vision is intended to strengthen each country’s respective security relationship with Washington. Nevertheless, this development is evidence that American allies in the Indo-Pacific are no longer satisfied organizing their security arrangements through Washington alone, and are forming tighter links within the region on their own terms.

Follow the Energy

Third, the recent prominence given to energy security by both Canberra and Tokyo highlights the importance of this issue for both countries, and the region as a whole. While most headlines on energy security focus on Europe’s need for reliable power and gas following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, East Asia and Oceania, too, are facing a crisis of energy supplies. As a result, Japan and Australia would like to pin themselves as decisive energy-producing and consuming states in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries consider reliable energy flows to be part of their national security, and are likely to continue deepening their security partnership into the energy sphere.

Australia is an ideal energy source for Japan, whose imports have been impacted by the war in Ukraine, and whose leaders are wary of depending on flows through the disputed South China Sea. Australia, on the other hand, is constantly looking to diversify its exports of coal and gas away from China, with Japan recently proving a lucrative alternative. Today, Australia provides Japan with roughly two-thirds of its coal, and one-third of its natural gas. It is thus no surprise that Kishida and Albanese’s meeting took place in the capital of Western Australia, a territory that exports large quantities of liquified natural gas and coal to Japan.

Japan and Australia are far from the only countries in the Indo-Pacific concerned with their energy security. South Koreaand Taiwan are essentially equally as dependent on imported energy as Japan. Gas exporting states in Southeast Asia, like Brunei and Malaysia, are constantly seeking to diversify their customer base, wary of becoming dependent on a single market. By boosting cooperation on energy security through the Joint Declaration, Canberra and Tokyo are signaling to the Indo-Pacific that they are willing to play leading roles in addressing an emerging regional priority.

A Step in the Right Direction

Canberra and Tokyo’s updated security pact should come as little surprise to observers, as Japan and Australia see only upsides in tightening their bilateral relationship. Indeed, leaders in both countries often see their own strategic concerns reflected in their counterpart’s geopolitical position: Japan and Australia are island countries, wary of their dependence on trade and economic ties with China, treaty allies of the United States, and deeply concerned with access to trade routes, global commons, and energy flows. Canberra and Tokyo are also looking to hedge against the potential of future US disengagement in the Indo-Pacific, and seek counterbalances to China’s increasing influence.

Moving forward, observers should expect more deepening of regional security ties, both between Japan and Australia and between both countries and other strategically aligned states. This seems especially true for India, the third leg of the Quad. That said, Japan and Australia seem unlikely to move towards forging a formal treaty alliance, if only because there is no apparent urgent need to do so. Nevertheless, Japan and Australia should be considered de-facto allies, as Canberra and Tokyo are both signaling that they are prepared to use their defense forces to assist each other’s shared strategic goals. The United States should encourage its allies and partners in the region to forge similar relationships based on mutual benefit, and take the lead of its allies in recognizing the importance of topics like energy security in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia and Japan, two countries that placed their national security in the hands of the United States since the end of the Second World War, are beginning to forge their own shared strategy for the region. This, in turn, should be viewed as a success and a very welcome byproduct of the US-backed alliance system in Washington.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. In addition, the views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.

*About the author: Ryan Ashley is an Air Force Intelligence Officer pursuing a Ph.D. in Public Policy at the LBJ School of Public Affairs. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Public Policy and History from George Washington University, a Master’s in Security Studies from Angelo State University, and a Master’s of Arts in Asian Studies from Georgetown University.

Source: This article was published by FPRI

eurasiareview.com · by Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute · November 3, 2022

17. Why Putin prefers ‘War-War’ to ‘Jaw-Jaw’

Excerpts:

One might hope that the accumulation of bad news from the front might weaken Putin’s resolve and lead him to discuss peace deals in more realistic terms. An additional basis for hope might be found in the saga of the on-off grain deal. After an audacious Ukrainian attack on the Russian Navy near its port of Sevastopol a furious Putin announced that he was suspending Russia’s participation in the export of Ukrainian grain by sea to countries that could experience food shortages without it. Turkey, which had brokered the deal in the first place, insisted that the shipments would continue, at which point Putin relented. The suspension was over. There are obvious positives from this episode: the trade continues; Putin has shown that he knows how to back down, especially when the alternative is to start sinking food ships; Turkey’s President Erdoğan has demonstrated that he is always available as a mediator (he has also been active in prisoner exchanges). But there was also a severe backlash in Russia (as there had been with past prisoner exchanges) over the appearance of weakness and concessions.

This illustrates Putin’s problem. If, as I suspect, he fears having to order his troops to withdraw from all of Ukraine because on the anger and recriminations that would follow, then he will struggle to take the initiative even if his forces continue to be pushed back towards Russia’s true borders. If the military retreat at least he can still blame the generals and he has a ready-made excuses for Ukraine’s current strength - the range of support given by the US and its allies to Ukraine. The Russian people can appreciate that if they are really fighting all of NATO it might be tricky to prevail.

Letting events on the batllefield take their course carries its own dangers for Putin. The spectre of defeat will hang over the Kremlin. The decision-making process will malfunction and frustrations will grow among the elite. Potential successors will start jockeying for position. The military will get caught between their need to conserve forces while not abandoning strategic positions, between a system demanding success yet incapable of providing the necessary resources.

Faced with stark chocies Moscow might suddenly discover a serious interest in negotiations. Until then, however, there is little choice but for Kyiv, with Western support, to persevere with its efforts to liberate territory until a point is reached where a Russian defeat can no longer be denied – or, to use another Churchillian phrase, to ‘keep buggering on.’

Why Putin prefers ‘War-War’ to ‘Jaw-Jaw’

samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

‘Jaw, jaw is better than war, war.’

Winston Churchill 1954,

As is often the case with familiar quotes this is not quite what Churchill actually said. Official biographer Sir Martin Gilbert reports that the original was ‘Meeting jaw to jaw is better than war’ which is not quite as punchy. The sentiment remains the same, however - talking is to be preferred to fighting. But the context is also important because Churchill was explaining why summit diplomacy was vital to prevent another great power war. He was not arguing that diplomacy was always preferable to continuing with the fight once a war had begun. After all one of his first acts as Prime Minister in 1940 was to reject suggestions that it was time to explore a negotiated peace just because, at that time, Nazi Germany appeared to have the upper hand in the war.

Another biographer of Churchill, Boris Johnson, used the phrase last January in conversation with Vladimir Putin about the need for talks as an alternative to fighting. But while jawing might be preferable to warring, jawing and warring at the same time is much more problematic. A deal to stop a war will define who has won and lost. Neither side will want to agree so long as there is a possibility that its position may be improved through further fighting. When it comes to the current war there is a further problem. Since the spring observers have thought it would make sense for Putin to offer a cease-fire that would leave him with something to show for invading Ukraine, even though for the same reason Zelensky would be bound to reject such proposals. Yet without there being any proposals on the table from Putin, Zelensky is still regularly urged to take the prospect of negotiations seriously in order to gain relief from this bloody war, and to remove the risk of escalation. Far less attention is paid to the Russian side of this equation. Why is Putin not demanding talks? Is it because he still dreams of victory? Perhaps, but a more disturbing reason is that he dare not conclude the war in a way that requires him to acknowledge failure.

Why no Negotiations?

In one fundamental sense little has changed in this war since the end of February. Ukraine is determined to resist the Russian invasion and is both confident in its ability to do so and fearful of the dire consequences should it fail. For the war to end Russia must accept that it cannot subjugate Ukraine and must give up on its attempt to do so. Once it became clear after the first couple of weeks that Russia’s initial strategy was failing there was much discussions in the West about the need to find Vladimir Putin an ‘off-ramp’ or some ‘face-saving’ device to make it easier for him to accept this failure. Some areas where Ukrainian concessions might be possible were identified, often around whether it should find some formula that kept it out of NATO while remaining secure. There were even some negotiations, including at foreign minister level, but no compromise was found. By April Kyiv was less interested in helping Russia find a way out. Its behaviour in the occupied territories and persistent efforts to make life as miserable as possible for ordinary Ukrainians by attacking their homes and energy supplies, made it impossible to contemplate rewarding it by conceding any conquered territory.

Zelensky’s attitude is best summed up in a recent interview:

‘You don't have time for this diplomacy because they lie. It's not diplomacy. They lie, you know, they want to find “diplomatic directions” to stop the war. It's lying. Yesterday they said, “we are ready, Ukraine is not ready.” And today they attacked us by fifty-four rockets. What? They are crazy.’

‘So they are ill – I can't understand – on their head. So what are they speaking about? How can we speak if they attacked us with fifty-four rockets? This day – half of the day. What about are they speaking now? I think they live on another planet. It's not about compromise or no compromise, of course, only victory.’

Few dispute Ukraine’s right to take this position but there have been regular questions about its wisdom. For some the problem is that its war aims are unrealistic. Ukraine lacks the strength to take back all its territory and so it should cut a deal to avoid yet more death and destruction. For others the problem is that it is too realistic. Suppose Ukraine continues to liberate territory and even begins to move to free Crimea from Russian rule. Might that lead Putin to use nuclear weapons to prevent total humiliation? Better to negotiate now so that Putin has no need to resort to such a terrible threat. For those who take this view Ukrainian objections are not overriding. If Zelensky’s government persists in trying to push Russian forces out of all of its territory, despite the difficulties and risks, then they should be invited to a ‘conversation’ with Washington to discuss how they must take account of the wider international interest in preventing escalation and be reminded how much they depend on Western support to keep their forces supplied and their economy afloat.

In an earlier post I explored the difficulties associated with trying to bring peace through negotiations. The only deal that would meet the standards of international law, is routinely rejected by Moscow because it does not accept that it is the aggressor and is obliged to withdraw from occupied territory. A more cynical ‘grand bargain’, reflecting the existing balance of power and gives something to both parties even if neither are left totally satisfied, is unlikely to be found while both have reason to hope that they can improve their positions. Even if the outlines of a deal could be designed and there was sufficient goodwill, currently in extremely short supply, to pursue it, turning it into treaty language would be a tortuous process. The issues to be decided are complex and could not be sorted in a hurry. Zelensky has promised to take any agreement to a referendum. Moscow will want sanctions eased but this will be conditional on Russia honouring its part of any bargain that has been struck. That is why in my post I argued that a more promising approach would be to go for a ceasefire/disengagement agreement, negotiated on a military-to-military basis, which would require Russia to withdraw to internationally recognised borders. But this is only promising compared to other even less credible options and would still depend on Ukraine making more military progress.

What is striking in all these debates about how to get to a deal is how little Russia contributes. Moscow never says it has no interest in negotiations, but then patiently explains why the problem holding them back is Kyiv’s refusal to accede to its demands. Putin has shown no urgency when it comes to bringing the war to a quick conclusion. Even if a serious offer was put on the table we cannot assume that he would give it careful consideration. We need to consider another possibility: that Putin has no interest in ending the war soon if this would require him acknowledging that he has failed to achieve his key objectives.

An article by Emma Ashford for Foreign Affairs illustrates the problem. She explains why there is a case for negotiations whether Ukraine is doing too well or not well enough, and explores the issues that would need to be addressed. She assumes, probably correctly, that the United States would need to play a leading role in any talks, not least because of the sanctions issue. She is emphatic that the West should not ‘push Ukraine to concede’ and acknowledges that little is likely to happen in the diplomatic sphere until the situation in the military sphere becomes clearer. Her argument is more that at some point a negotiation will occur and the Biden administration needs to prepare for that eventuality. Nonetheless that clearly involves some strong guidance:

‘Washington should encourage Kyiv to take a more moderate stance on issues, such as Crimea, that are likely to figure in a future settlement; to tone down triumphalist talk; and to emphasize the economic rewards that Ukraine stands to receive through international reconstruction aid and European economic integration under a settlement.’

Out of this emerges Ashford’s preferred solution, which is one that was widely canvassed early in the war when it might have had some traction, involving Ukraine agreeing that it will not take back Crimea and perhaps leave alone the enclaves in the Donbas.

Can Putin Compromise?

The real difficulty with her analysis comes when she gets to Russia. We learn a lot about the arguments that Washington might put to Kyiv about the need for compromise but not much about how the case might be made to Moscow:

‘policymakers need to focus on Putin and the small group of elites around him and consider what settlement they might be willing to accept. Given Putin’s mobilization of several hundred thousand additional frontline troops, it seems increasingly clear that he will seek to avoid a complete, devastating loss at any cost. But like many other authoritarians before him, he can sell a poor result as a win. This means that it may be possible to find some face-saving deal in which de facto realities, such as Russian legal control of Crimea, could be recognized, and which the Kremlin could portray to the Russian public as genuine concessions by the West.’

Yet Putin has described the sort of settlement he would be willing to accept and it is not one that Kyiv, or its Western backers, could agree to. The issue of Crimea is, as far as he is concerned, not even part of the discussion. Putin has had no doubt about ‘legal control’ of Crimea since 2014. Now he has added to the problem by refusing to accept that there can be any doubt about the legal status of the four provinces he has annexed, even though none are under Russia’s complete control. His condition for talks is that Zelensky accepts that these are forever part of Russia. If he had been trying to manage expectations to prepare the Russian people for an eventual compromise, announcing the annexations was the worst possible move.

For this reason he could not claim that something that fell far short of this was a ‘win’. He may be a master of manipulating Russian public opinion but even for him there are limits. As the bad news began to come in during September, with first the successful Ukrainian offensives and then the botched mobilisation, even among Putin’s cheerleaders on Russian state media there was no attempt to pretend that all was well. Giving up what has been proclaimed to be a chunk of Russia could not be finessed.

Even assuming that Zelensky would be prepared to concede Crimea and bits of the Donbas, Putin can no longer present this as a ‘win’. And if that is the case then it will appear as a loss and that contains many dangers for Putin.

There is an important distinction between not winning and clearly losing. Given the current state of the war currently his main priority is not so much to achieve a win, although that aspiration has not gone away, but to avoid a complete loss. For Putin the stakes are personal. This is his war and he has not hidden what he sought to achieve. Once it is impossible to deny failure then his judgement will be shown to be flawed and his position will become vulnerable. Put crudely for Putin to stay in power Russia needs to stay in the war.

His concern is not only that any conceivable deal will appear as a loss, but a deal that truly ends the fighting will be followed by a reckoning. So long as the war continues Putin is protected to a degree by patriotic urges to support the motherland when it is in peril, and also the opportunities war provides for censorship and tight control of all dissent. Without the war the consequences of his folly will be exposed. The legacy will not be expanded territory but instead a contracted economy, continued international isolation, a diminished reputation, and a multitude of disillusioned followers, bereaved families, and traumatised veterans with nothing to remember with pride.

Staying in the war was the point of mobilisation. Without it, shortages of manpower meant that Russian forces would struggle to keep it going. The first tranches of mobilised troops were dumped in the front line to hold positions under threat from Ukrainian advances. Putin’s aim remains to hold these lines for the next few months so when winter ends the rest of these troops can be turned into a moderately professional force capable at least of allowing the battles to grind on, just so long as more military humiliations can be averted.

If Ukraine can be denied victory he can hope, as he has hoped from the start, that it will start to buckle under the weight of the social and economic pressures caused by his strikes against critical infrastructure. Yet even if this leads Kyiv, along with its weary international backers, to go grovelling to Moscow to explore a negotiated peace, he will still only want peace on his terms. Otherwise it is not worth having. For if it is in any respect a ‘just and lasting peace’, that acknowledges Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, then the question of ‘what was all that for’ will still be impossible to ignore in Russia. Thus any suggestions for a compromise peace will not be assessed on their merits but for signs of Kyiv’s desperation. If Zelensky appears desperate enough then talks might be worthwhile but only to see if more concessions can be extracted. As the quote above illustrates, Zelensky is certainly exasperated but he is not desperate.

It is important to keep in mind an important difference between the Ukrainian and Russian situations. The war and the September mobilisation have disrupted Russian society but life can go on. There are no disruptions to energy and food supplies. Homes have not been blown apart. There is no need to rush regularly into air raid shelters. Sanctions have hurt the economy and its degradation will continue steadily, especially as energy prices fall and Russia can no longer participate in what were once key markets. All forms of manufacturing, including defence, has been badly hit and few international companies are looking to invest in Russia over the long term. The costs of this war are huge and will relegate Russia to an even lowlier position in the international economic system. Nonetheless, the economy is not approaching a cliff edge.

What Might Change?

There is no offer that might be tabled by Ukraine that would tempt Moscow as withdrawal from occupied territory would be a core condition. Any deal would require Moscow to move explicitly from its current maximalist position and signal some readiness to compromise on the territorial issues. What might lead this to happen? One obvious route would be some change at the top in Moscow. This might happen but few Kremlin watchers expect it or can explain how it would come about, or even offer confidence that any replacement would be easier to deal with. The major opposition to Putin’s conduct of the war has come from disgruntled hard liners. My own view for some time has been that one possible route, which is not to say probable, would be if Russia’s military concluded that its position is untenable, which is also why I suspect a military-to-military deal on disengagement is one of the better options.

For there to be any rethink in the Kremlin, more needs to happen on the ground. After the impressive Ukrainian offensives of September, October was a much slower month. There were a number of reasons for this: keeping up supplies of ammunition; wet weather making for boggy conditions and slow movement of vehicles; Russian defensive lines being filled up with the new draftees. Ukraine knows the costs of rushing into assaults across open ground and so, to use an American phrase, prefers to prepare the battlefield by using its advantages in accurate artillery to work on Russian supply routes, ammunition dumps, command posts, and troops concentrations where they can be found. There have been some significant advances into Luhansk. There has been talk of Russian forces preparing for a vigorous defence of Kherson City but enthusiasm for this option may be waning. There is evidence of Russians evacuating the city with as much loot as they can carry. The sole Russian offensive against Bakhmut in Donetsk has reportedly led to utter carnage (including many of the former prisoners recruited by the Wagner group along with other ‘single-use soldiers’). So the military initiative is still with Ukraine.

One might hope that the accumulation of bad news from the front might weaken Putin’s resolve and lead him to discuss peace deals in more realistic terms. An additional basis for hope might be found in the saga of the on-off grain deal. After an audacious Ukrainian attack on the Russian Navy near its port of Sevastopol a furious Putin announced that he was suspending Russia’s participation in the export of Ukrainian grain by sea to countries that could experience food shortages without it. Turkey, which had brokered the deal in the first place, insisted that the shipments would continue, at which point Putin relented. The suspension was over. There are obvious positives from this episode: the trade continues; Putin has shown that he knows how to back down, especially when the alternative is to start sinking food ships; Turkey’s President Erdoğan has demonstrated that he is always available as a mediator (he has also been active in prisoner exchanges). But there was also a severe backlash in Russia (as there had been with past prisoner exchanges) over the appearance of weakness and concessions.

This illustrates Putin’s problem. If, as I suspect, he fears having to order his troops to withdraw from all of Ukraine because on the anger and recriminations that would follow, then he will struggle to take the initiative even if his forces continue to be pushed back towards Russia’s true borders. If the military retreat at least he can still blame the generals and he has a ready-made excuses for Ukraine’s current strength - the range of support given by the US and its allies to Ukraine. The Russian people can appreciate that if they are really fighting all of NATO it might be tricky to prevail.

Letting events on the batlefield take their course carries its own dangers for Putin. The spectre of defeat will hang over the Kremlin. The decision-making process will malfunction and frustrations will grow among the elite. Potential successors will start jockeying for position. The military will get caught between their need to conserve forces while not abandoning strategic poisitions, between a system demanding success yet incapable of providing the necessary resources.

Faced with stark chocies Moscow might suddenly discover a serious interest in negotiations. Until then, however, there is little choice but for Kyiv, with Western support, to persevere with its efforts to liberate territory until a point is reached where a Russian defeat can no longer be denied – or, to use another Churchillian phrase, to ‘keep buggering on.’

Comment is Freed is a reader-supported publication. We are making Lawrence’s posts on the Russian invasion of Ukraine free to read but if you find the pieces valuable and can afford to subscribe we would welcome the support. A monthly subscription is £3.50 and an annual one is £35. It includes four subscriber only posts a month.

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Picture credit: SERGEI ILYIN/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images

samf.substack.com · by Lawrence Freedman

18. Defending Taiwan vs. Defending Ukraine: What's the Difference?

Excerpts:

Ukraine is not a U.S. treaty ally. Taiwan is not a treaty ally. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania are U.S. treaty allies that border Ukraine. Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are U.S. treaty allies who would face destructive consequences in a Chinese invasion of neighboring Taiwan.

The strategic parallels are clear, but the arguments are disjointed. Reasonable people can disagree on what constitutes a core national security interest. They could conclude, wrongly in my view, the first major land war in Europe since World War II should not concern the United States at all. If they want to make that argument, they need to explain why defending Taiwan and standing up to China are grave national security imperatives but defending Ukraine and challenging Russia is an act of avarice, corruption, and warmongering.

Defending Taiwan vs. Defending Ukraine: What's the Difference?

19fortyfive.com · by Anthony W. Holmes · November 2, 2022

Eight months into Russia’s attempted annexation of Ukraine there remains a chorus of conservative commentators who argue that our military support for NATO and materiel support for Ukraine enable China.

Pre-invasion, we were warned not to take our eye off China. Asia specialists lamented that Ukraine would distract America from China and Taiwan. After the invasion, a lone U.S. senator voted against allowing Sweden and Finland to join NATO because it was a “legacy commitment” in Europe with no role in a China fight.

In a series of illogical but common threads, cable commentators and podcast pundits lectured that preparing for war with China was a national security imperative while aiding Ukraine was warmongering. They rhetorically asked when Congress would start putting America’s needs ahead of President Zelensky’s. Satirical articles and memes have exploded of Zelensky wearing gold chains and shamelessly asking for more money to fund, for example, a diamond coated swimming pool. Support for Ukraine is broadly called a “cult.”

Yet, you never hear them ask when Congress will put America’s needs ahead of Taiwan President Tsai’s.

The same isolationist sentiments that would argue against aiding Ukraine should also apply to Taiwan and, to be honest, all of East Asia. In fact, would not war with China be unnecessary if we did not have interests to protect and we retrenched back to our shores?

This strange phenomenon is what I call “selective isolationism,” and it finds safest harbor in conservative circles that adopted former President Trump’s warning against “forever wars.” That inoffensive, anodyne warning has metastasized into a deep distrust of all of America’s institutions, foreign policy ideals, and national security goals.

In the past, America’s political left derided military operations in Iraq as a “war for oil” and “imperialism” for any attempt to defeat communism. America’s uniformed military leaders had “blood on their hands,” were “child killers,” were banned from college campuses, and were generally held responsible for the political decisions of their leaders.

Compare that with today, where many conservative commentators make pronouncements that would fit right in at the 2003 anti-war rally in D.C. I observed while interning for a senior Republican member of Congress.

They tell us the United States started the war in Ukraine by allowing the Soviet Union’s freed former puppet states to join NATO. They tell us Ukraine is so uniquely corrupt that it deserves no support whatsoever. They proclaim that merely supplying Ukraine with the means to defend itself is immoral and born from corporate greed. In fact, it is not uncommon to see them now off-handedly say that the United States started the war in Afghanistan. They have become indistinguishable from a leftwing college professor ranting about the military-industrial complex.

How then did we arrive at these same people telling us that preparing for conflict with China is a necessity? What is the difference?

The China Crisis

By their logic are we not “starting a conflict” with China by arming Taiwan to defend itself, working with Japanese allies on defense reform, and holding annual military training exercises with the Republic of Korea? Beijing holds this exact view.

The argument that we are taking our eye off China by paying attention to the Russia-Ukraine War is seriously misguided. If our adversaries knew that we were evaluating every conflict everywhere against how it impacts the primacy of strategic competition with China it would make war more likely, not less.

Our adversaries would take more strategic initiative, believing that they could seize and lock-in gains while the United States debated internally over whether a U.S. response was “worth it.” This policy would also encourage China to outsource its activities to proxies in the belief that plausible deniability would make U.S. action more politically difficult.

I almost cannot believe I have to make this point, but Russia is engaging in a land war right now on the borders of a major U.S. alliance system. If Ukraine had not bravely resisted, other states would likely be under occupation at this stage. To argue that we should not have an interest in the conflict happening right now because of what China may do in the future is strategic malpractice.

To accept the selective isolationist view, you would have to believe that China is deterred by a U.S. that spends no treasury or political will on treaty allies in Europe who are being directly threatened by a revanchist and resurgent empire on its borders.

171207-N-JH929-039 PACIFIC OCEAN (Dec. 7, 2017) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Kidd (DDG 100) prepares to perform a sea-power demo alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) during Tiger Cruise 2017, Dec. 7, in the Pacific Ocean. The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is on a regularly scheduled deployment to the Western Pacific. The U.S. Navy has patrolled the Indo-Asia-Pacific region routinely for more than 70 years promoting peace and security. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Cole Schroeder/Released).

Ukraine is not a U.S. treaty ally. Taiwan is not a treaty ally. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania are U.S. treaty allies that border Ukraine. Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are U.S. treaty allies who would face destructive consequences in a Chinese invasion of neighboring Taiwan.

The strategic parallels are clear, but the arguments are disjointed. Reasonable people can disagree on what constitutes a core national security interest. They could conclude, wrongly in my view, the first major land war in Europe since World War II should not concern the United States at all. If they want to make that argument, they need to explain why defending Taiwan and standing up to China are grave national security imperatives but defending Ukraine and challenging Russia is an act of avarice, corruption, and warmongering.

Now a 19FortyFive Contributing Editor, Anthony W. Holmes was Special Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs from 2017-2021.

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19fortyfive.com · by Anthony W. Holmes · November 2, 2022

19. Congress must act to boost combat-credible airpower in Indo-Pacific

Congress must act to boost combat-credible airpower in Indo-Pacific

airforcetimes.com · by Mackenzie Eaglen · November 2, 2022

It is hardly news that for the last decade the Pentagon has fallen short of its strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Still, it is quite conspicuous when evidence of that “say-do gap” emerges within 24 hours of the publication of the Pentagon’s most important strategic document.

Last week, the Pentagon’s new National Defense Strategy declared that China is the “pacing challenge” of this “decisive decade” while citing posture as a key element of deterring Chinese aggression. Within hours of the strategy’s publication, the Financial Times reported that the Pentagon is set to withdraw two fighter squadrons stationed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan over the next two years. The Pentagon later confirmed the withdrawal. And though it plans to begin temporary deployments of more advanced aircraft during the withdrawal, it acknowledged it has made no decision on a long-term solution to replace the loss of forward-stationed combat power.

The problem with withdrawing permanently stationed fighter aircraft from Japan is not about symbolic presence or the “message” the decision sends to Beijing. The central issue is combat-credible posture. Eliminating one-quarter of the permanently stationed fighter squadrons west of the international date line, promising temporary rotations as a substitute, and offering no long term plan for their replacement does not enhance combat-credible posture.

Defenders of the decision say the retiring F-15C and D aircraft currently stationed at Kadena are old, fourth-generation aircraft that would not contribute much in a conflict with China. Yes, the Air Force should upgrade fighter aircraft in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, we strongly support stationing F-35As at Misawa Air Base in Japan. But that is not what the Air Force has announced. It has promised temporary rotations of more advanced aircraft but has not finalized plans beyond an initial six-month rotation for F-22s from Alaska. Moreover, after operating fifth-generation aircraft for nearly two decades, the Air Force has announced no plans to permanently station any fifth-generation aircraft west of the international date line.

Send Air Force F-35s to Japan

Stationing F-35As at Misawa Air Base in Japan would boost military cooperation with U.S. allies, writes this author.

By Dustin Walker

Other observers argue withdrawing U.S. fighter aircraft from Kadena Air Base is wise given the base’s vulnerability to Chinese missile strikes in a contingency. Repositioning fighter aircraft from Okinawa to other bases in Japan or elsewhere in the Second Island Chain certainly has merit. But once again, that is not what the Air Force has announced.

The Air Force has made no decisions to base additional aircraft at any other Indo-Pacific bases. More to the point, the Air Force appears to have no intention of leaving Kadena. In a statement last week, the Air Force pledged to “maintain a steady-state presence at Kadena.” Indeed, the Air Force is still investing in the base. Its fiscal year 2023 budget request asked for $148 million in military construction at Kadena. The year before it asked for $232.1 million.

Still others argue that permanently stationing fighter aircraft at Kadena or other forward locations in the Indo-Pacific is not necessary. They contend that rotational forces would be just as effective. Failing that, aircraft can deploy rapidly from elsewhere around the world in the event of a contingency. We disagree. Analysis from the RAND Corporation suggests “it is much more costly to rotate forces than to permanently base them abroad,” and thus that “continuous rotations should be minimized to the extent possible.”

The source of rotational forces also matters. If rotational aircraft are sourced from elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific area of operations (such as Alaska or Hawaii), the withdrawal of permanently stationed aircraft from Kadena would result in a net reduction of combat power in the region. Moreover, a rotational model raises the possibility of gaps in forward presence. And while it is true that aircraft could deploy relatively quickly to the Indo-Pacific in the event of a contingency, that’s cold comfort in plausible scenarios where minutes and hours could make the difference in denying a fait accompli invasion attempt. Relying too heavily on aircraft from outside the theater reduces options in competition, crisis, and early in a conflict. Moreover, introducing forces into theater in a crisis (instead of those forces being present from the start) may add to the risk of escalation.

The decision to withdraw two permanently stationed fighter squadrons from Japan without a ready replacement plan demonstrates that the Indo-Pacific is not being treated as the posture priority so often touted.

Year after year, the Air Force has divested older aircraft in search of budget savings. Just in FY23, it’s seeking to cut 150 aircraft while purchasing just 82. Meanwhile, it’s used new aircraft to replace missions at domestic bases set to lose aircraft.

Consider the F-35. As of today, the Air Force has decided to station F-35As at no less than six active component bases, four Guard bases, and one reserve base in the United States. It has chosen just one overseas base for the F-35A in the United Kingdom. That’s twelve F-35-A bases with zero planned for the Indo-Pacific.

How many more U.S. or European bases will the Air Force select to receive F-35As before a single base in the Indo-Pacific west of the international date line? The same question should be asked about the F-15EX.

The Air Force has been considering the retirement of the F-15 for at least the last five years. But even with the benefit of time, F-15 retirements at Kadena will commence with no plan for their replacement. That’s a stark contrast to Europe. The Air Force selected RAF Lakenheath as its first F-35 base in Europe back in 2015. Until F-35As began arriving in December 2021, the Air Force used European Deterrence Initiative funds to keep F-15s at RAF Lakenheath. The aircraft finally departed in April 2022.

Congress needs to ask the Pentagon and the Air Force some pointed questions:

What is U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s risk assessment of the near-term loss of two permanently stationed fighter squadrons?
How does the Japanese government view this decision?
In the short term, will the Air Force maintain continuous rotational presence at Kadena?
Will rotational aircraft be sourced from the continental United States or from those already assigned to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Alaska and Hawaii?
In the longer term, will the 48 F-15s at Kadena be replaced tail-for-tail?
Will their replacements be permanent or rotational?
Will those replacements go to Kadena, or will other Indo-Pacific bases be considered?
How many other bases will receive F-15EX and F-35A aircraft before these two Indo-Pacific squadrons are replaced?

Until these questions are answered, Congress needs to intervene legislatively. As the defense committees finalize negotiations on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY23, lawmakers should prohibit the withdrawal of F-15s from Japan pending the submission of a classified assessment by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command of the impact of the withdrawal as well as a clear transition plan from the Air Force for its fighter aircraft posture in Japan and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific.

The new National Defense Strategy was correct that we are living through a decisive decade and that we must prioritize the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific region. How the Pentagon responds now in putting forward an urgent plan to enhance — not just backfill — combat-credible airpower in the Indo-Pacific will be the first major test of translating this new defense strategy from words into action.

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where she works on defense budget, defense strategy, and military readiness. Eric Sayers and Dustin Walker are nonresident fellows at the American Enterprise Institute. Walker was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on Europe and the Indo-Pacific from 2017 to 2020. Sayers was the lead adviser to the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Indo-Pacific from 2014 to 2016 and an adviser to the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command from 2016 to 2018.

20. China has no time frame for Taiwan reunification, even if US says so: envoy

China has no time frame for Taiwan reunification, even if US says so: envoy

Washington-based diplomat’s take follows remarks by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken saying Beijing keen to hasten plan to seize self-ruled island
‘We don’t want to use force, but … we should have the capability to deter and prevent the worst-case scenario’ of Taiwan independence, says Jing Quan

Robert Delaney

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Published: 6:30am, 3 Nov, 2022

By Robert Delaney South China Morning Post3 min

View Original

The USS Benfold sailing through the Taiwan Strait in July. The warship was forward-deployed to the US 7th Fleet’s area of operations to support Taiwan’s military defence capability. Photo: U.S. Navy

A Chinese diplomat on Wednesday said Beijing had no time frame for the unification of Taiwan with the mainland, refuting recent assessments by US government officials that the mainland’s government had sped up plans for a military seizure across the Taiwan Strait.

“I don’t think there’s any so-called timeline over the Taiwan issue,” Jing Quan, a minister at China’s embassy in Washington, said in a discussion with Susan Thornton, a former senior US State Department official, organised by the Institute for China-America Studies, a think tank.

Jing made the remarks days after US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Beijing was trying to “speed up” a plan to seize the self-ruled island, based on comments by officials in Beijing during China’s 20th Communist Party congress, which wrapped up last week.

“Some people are talking about five years, 10 years, 2035, 2049. I don’t think so,” Jing said. “We want to get united as soon as possible, but we don’t have any timeline.

“Here, the interpretation, and the media’s interpretation about the party congress is not correct – to say it’s more tough and it’s focused on the use of force,” he added.

“We don’t want to use force, but at least that we should have the capability to deter and prevent the worst-case scenario, that is Taiwan independence.”

As is the case with many Western countries, the US does not recognise the island as an independent state. But Washington is committed by law to support Taiwan’s military defence capability – a stance Beijing strongly opposes.

Washington also pursues a policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, which leaves unclear whether it would defend the island in the event of an attack by China.

Blinken, who said in an interview with Bloomberg that Beijing “wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue reunification”, is not the only US government official to warn of a near-term military takeover of Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army.

Admiral Michael Gilday, chief of US naval operations, said last week that a mainland Chinese invasion of Taiwan could take place as soon as this year, based partly on comments by officials at the twice-a-decade political meeting.

“What we’ve seen over the past 20 years is that they have delivered on every promise they’ve made earlier than they said they were going to deliver on it,” Gilday said in a discussion hosted by the Atlantic Council. “So when we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind, that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window.”

Thornton defended the US government’s strategic ambiguity policy against growing calls among some US policymakers for a switch to strategic clarity, or an explicit pledge to defend Taiwan. The policy has been in place since Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taipei in 1979.

“The Chinese calculus is already that the US is going to be involved in a Taiwan contingency, so they’re planning against that [and] so it doesn’t have much of a deterrent benefit,” said Thornton.

Strategic ambiguity, she added, also “has the benefit of a dual-deterrence strategy, which is to say that Taiwan should not declare independence and that Beijing should not use force to pursue unification”.

Robert Delaney

Robert Delaney is the Post’s North America bureau chief. He spent 11 years in China as a language student and correspondent for Dow Jones Newswires and Bloomberg, and continued covering the country as a correspondent and an academic after leaving. His debut novel, The Wounded Muse, draws on actual events that played out in Beijing while he lived there.

21. New photos show China’s artificial islands are highly developed military bases

New photos show China’s artificial islands are highly developed military bases

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · November 2, 2022

This article was originally published by Radio Free Asia and is reprinted with permission.

New images have emerged showing airfields and other structures on some of China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea that the U.S. said had been “fully militarized.”

Getty Image’s photographer Ezra Acayan obtained access to flights near a number of reefs and rocks that China has reclaimed and turned into military bases with radar stations, airstrips and artillery installations.

The photos taken on Oct. 25 show another dimension of the Chinese artificial islands, up to now mostly captured on satellite images.

U.S. Indo-Pacific commander, Adm. John C. Aquilino, said in March that China had fully militarized at least three artificial islands including Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross, all in the Spratly archipelago that Beijing claims “historical rights” over.

Life on Fiery Cross

The Getty photos provide extensive details of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) facilities on Mischief Reef, Gaven Reefs, Subi Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Hughes Reef – six of the 15 Spratly features occupied by China.

Fiery Cross Reef appears to be one of the most developed, with a fully operational airfield, hangars, other large buildings and radomes, or domes with radar equipment inside.

A new type of building spotted on Fiery Cross, as well as on Mischief and Subi Reefs, is a garage-like structure that may be sheltering missile launchers, according to analysts.

“My guess is that the sea-facing garages are for angled cruise missile launchers,” Tom Shugart, adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, wrote on Twitter.

Another analyst, Tyler Rogoway, editor of The War Zone defense news portal, said they could “be used to house, service, and rapidly deploy” launchers used to fire surface-to-air, anti-ship, or surface-to-surface missiles.

Shugart also noted some other details such as “a car driving around Fiery Cross and someone walking down a street.”

“It’s not crowds, but it’s also not nothing,” he wrote.

Three weeks ago, Chinese state media reported that there is a growing population of more than 5,000 “officers and soldiers stationed” on islands and reefs that China occupies in the South China Sea.

Radomes and gun turrets

In one of the pictures of Fiery Cross, a KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft is visible on the runway.

“The image of a KJ-500 on the runway is compelling and confirms that the PLA is still regularly flying aerial patrols off the islands,” Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) told RFA.

“That has been ongoing since 2020,” he added.

According to The War Zone’s Rogoway, the KJ-500 and other intelligence-gathering and submarine-hunting aircraft “frequently operate from the airfield there.”

Radomes, gun turrets and close-in weapon systems for detecting and destroying incoming missiles and aircraft are common features on all the artificial islands.

On Subi Reef, the main runway is being blocked by several objects, possibly vehicles, or carts.

“This is an unsafe act, hostile to anyone else flying in the area” as pilots of an aircraft in true distress may not see the blockade and crash, according to Shugart.

“This once again puts the lie to the idea these islands were built for the navigational safety of all,” the Fort Hood-based analyst said.

“They’re military bases, period.”

China and five other parties claim parts of the South China Sea including the features which, according to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, are reefs and rocks and not islands.

By law, reefs and rocks have much more limited rights to natural resources than islands.

Beijing has developed at least seven artificial islands, creating 1,295 hectares (3,200 acres) of new land since 2013, according to the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

On a trip to Washington in 2015, China’s leader Xi Jinping said “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the artificial islands in the South China Sea but critics say they greatly expand the offensive capability of the PLA and threaten other countries in the vicinity.

Flip

americanmilitarynews.com · by Radio Free Asia · November 2, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

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Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

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Phone: 202-573-8647

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Web Site: www.fdd.org

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FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

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