Quotes of the Day:

"Truth is not what you want it to be. it is what it is, and you must bend to its power or live a lie."

- Miyamoto Musashi

"I hate it that Americans are taught to fear some books and some ideas as though they were diseases."

- Kurt Vonnegut

"There are some ideas so absurd that only an intellectual could believe them."

- George Orwell

1. [Washington Talk] VOA "North Korea's 'radioactive tsunami' is exaggerated... Optimized for North Korean nuclear attacks against South Korea, not the United States”

2. Underwater Strategic Weapon System Tested in DPRK

3. North Korea’s New “Unmanned Underwater Nuclear Attack Craft”: Red October or White Elephant?

4. Ukraine, North Korea and Iran included in leaked documents

5. China's Xi tells N. Korea's Kim to bolster 'strategic guidance' over bilateral ties

6. U.S. Seeks Ways to Help Burkina Faso’s Military Junta Fight Jihadists

7. U.S. S. Korea forging closer cooperation on N. Korea, regional issues: CRS report

8. [Translation] South Korean government published the first human rights report regarding North Korea: “North Korea executed Juveniles and pregnant women publicly.”

9.  N. Korea conducted another test of underwater nuclear-capable attack drone this week

10. A Fresh Look at North Korea at Night

11. N. Korea unresponsive to regular contact via military hotline for 2nd day

12. Book Review: “A Pyongyang Woman From London”

13. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has TV hunk erased from repeats of hit 1998 show

14. Korean refugee raised among US troops comes full circle as professor on military base through global campus

15. Canada Deploys Military Aircraft to Japan to Implement North Korea Sanctions

16. The daughter who fled North Korea to find her mother

1. [Washington Talk] VOA "North Korea's 'radioactive tsunami' is exaggerated... Optimized for North Korean nuclear attacks against South Korea, not the United States”

I commend this video and the excellent analysis by Vann Van Diepen on north Korea's arsenal of evil. This is very timely because north Korea today again is reporting on its "nuclear torpedo." Mr. Van Diepen provides an excellent tutorial for us lay people on north Korea's weapons.

Note this is for broadcast in Pyongyang with the target audience of the regime elite. It is also broadcast into South Korea and around the world as well. It is in English with Korean subtitles.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_N6JyD9_RBU

[Washington Talk] "North Korea's 'radioactive tsunami' is exaggerated... Optimized for North Korean nuclear attacks against South Korea, not the United States”

A former senior U.S. official has pointed out that North Korea has exaggerated the capabilities of its underwater nuclear drone 'Tsunami'. It is a diagnosis that it cannot cause a radioactive tsunami and the underwater explosive power is weak. However, it was evaluated that the nuclear warhead miniaturization technology, such as the 'Hwasan-31' recently unveiled by North Korea, has already been accumulated for a long time. He also stressed that North Korea's nuclear capabilities are optimized to attack South Korea, not the United States, and that South Koreans should clearly recognize North Korea as an enemy. Moderator: Cho Eun-jung / Conversation: Vann Van Diepen (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation), David Maxwell (Vice President, Asia​ ​Pacific Strategy Center ) Torpedo #UnderwaterDrone #Nuclear Armament #ExpansionDeterrence #Tactical Nuclear #Biden #Seok -Yeol Yoon #Jeong-Eun Kim #NPT #Denuclearization #North Korea #Korea #USA #FreedomShield #United StatesUnitedTraining #ICBM #VannVanDiepen #DavidMaxwell #WashingtonTalk

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2. Underwater Strategic Weapon System Tested in DPRK

KCNA  KCNA.kp (En)

Underwater Strategic Weapon System Tested in DPRK

Date: 08/04/2023 | Source: KCNA.kp (En) | Read original version at source

https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1680903254-280354447/underwater-strategic-weapon-system-tested-in-dprk

Pyongyang, April 8 (KCNA) -- A national defence science research institute in the DPRK carried out a test of underwater strategic weapon system from April 4 to 7.

The underwater nuclear attack drone "Haeil-2" entered into the test in Kajin Port, Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province in the afternoon on April 4. It cruised 1 000 km of simulated underwater distance in elliptical and "8" patterns set in the East Sea of Korea for 71 hours and 6 minutes. In the afternoon on April 7 it arrived in the waters off Ryongdae Port, Tanchon City, South Hamgyong Province, the place of simulated target, where the test warhead accurately detonated underwater.

The test perfectly proved the reliability of the underwater strategic weapon system and its fatal attack ability.

The system will serve as an advantageous and prospective military potential of the armed forces of the DPRK essential for containing all evolving military actions of enemies, removing threats and defending the country. -0-

www.kcna.kp (Juche112.4.8.)

3. North Korea’s New “Unmanned Underwater Nuclear Attack Craft”: Red October or White Elephant?

A detailed explanation to complement Vann's excellent discussion on VOA's Washington Talk this week. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_N6JyD9_RBU)

North Korea’s New “Unmanned Underwater Nuclear Attack Craft”: Red October or White Elephant?

• BY: VANN H. VAN DIEPEN
• APRIL 6, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/04/north-koreas-new-unmanned-underwater-nuclear-attack-craft-red-october-or-white-elephant/

(Source: Rodong Sinmun)

On March 24, North Korea unveiled the “Haeil,” its first-ever nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). The data released by the North are insufficient to substantiate the Haeil’s existence, its claimed development timeline and test activities, or its claimed performance. But development of a nuclear-armed UUV is within North Korea’s technical capabilities.

Based on what has been gleaned so far about the Haeil, it would still be substantially inferior to North Korea’s nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles in terms of time-to-target, accuracy and lethality. Its range limits it to coastal targets in South Korea and southeast Japan. Although this means it would not be subject to allied air and missile defenses, it would still be vulnerable to engagement by anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets. North Korea claimed this weapon could attack “naval striker groups,” but it is too slow to pose a viable threat to ships that are underway and thus probably limited to attacking ports and known anchorages. Its slow speed, forcing it to face many hours of potential ASW detection risk before reaching target, makes it an unlikely first-strike weapon, although it would be suitable as a retaliatory weapon. Even then, most of the damage from a North Korean retaliatory strike would already have been done by missiles long before any Haeils arrived. Pyongyang might also see the Haeil as a “dead hand” option to ensure some sort of nuclear retaliation after an allied disarming strike or a lost war, but success would be far from assured, given allied ASW capabilities.

As is often the case with North Korea, the UUV would appear to have much more political than military utility. Unveiling the Haeil is consistent with the past several years of North Korean force development and related public diplomacy, messaging that:

• North Korea has large and diverse nuclear delivery capabilities;
• Allied attempts at preemption, decapitation and missile defense will, therefore, be unsuccessful, and North Korean nuclear retaliation cannot be avoided, especially against South Korea; and
• North Korea is highly technologically capable and can build the same kinds of weapons the major powers can.

All in all, the Haeil UUV brings little to the table in terms of military capabilities. Even its political value may have already been exhausted in its unveiling. Given these realities, it remains to be seen how much Pyongyang will really invest in deploying this weapons system.

Information to Date

On March 24, North Korea announced the existence of a new “underwater nuclear strategic attack weapon system,” the “Unmanned Underwater Nuclear Attack Craft ‘Haeil’.” Its mission reportedly is to “stealthily infiltrate into operational waters and make a super-scale radioactive tsunami through underwater explosion to destroy naval striker groups and major operational ports of the enemy,” and it “can be deployed at any coast and port or towed by a surface ship for operation.” According to North Korean state media reporting, the Haeil (Korean for volcano) has been under development since 2012; has “undergone more than 50 shakedowns for the past two years,” including 29 “weapon tests” that were “personally guided” by Kim Jong Un; and “its operational deployment was decided at the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee” of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in January 2023.

Coverage of the launch also reported a drill in which the Haeil was “deployed” on March 21 and “reached the target point…set as a mock enemy port with its test warhead detonating underwater” on March 23, “after cruising along an oval and pattern-8 course at an underwater depth of 80 to 150 meters in the East Sea of Korea for 59 hours and 12 minutes.” That drill reportedly “verified its reliability and safety and fully confirmed its lethal strike capability.” Associated photographs showed Kim Jong Un sitting near the nose of a torpedo-like object, a surface photo of a cylinder-like object vaguely visible underwater and apparently in motion, and the plume from an underwater explosion.

On March 28, the North reported that another test of what it called the “Haeil-1” had occurred between March 25 and 27. “After cruising along a jagged and oval course simulating the distance of the 600 kilometers in the East Sea of Korea for 41 hours and 27 minutes,” the Haeil “correctly set off the test warhead underwater.” Two more photos were released with a surface image with a portion of a partially submerged torpedo-like object in motion and the plume from an underwater explosion.

Finally, on the same day, Pyongyang reported a March 27 meeting in which Kim Jong Un “guided the work for mounting nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.” The report referred to “new tactical nuclear weapons” and their “interchangeability with different weapons systems.” Most importantly, the associated photos depicted what apparently were at least 10 units of an integrated “tactical” nuclear weapon. They also showed a graphic hanging on a wall of the inspection area with cutaway drawings of the front sections of eight different delivery systems, including the Haeil, each apparently showing the same type of warhead mounted inside.

Is It Real?

These reports and photographs are the first open-source indication of a nuclear UUV but are insufficient to substantiate the Haeil’s existence, its claimed development timeline and test activities, or its claimed performance. Kim Jong Un’s January 2021 report to the Eighth Party Congress noted a task to possess “an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon which will be of great importance in raising the long-range nuclear striking capability,” but the report did not specifically reference a UUV and that task was mentioned in the context of “solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater and ground ballistic rockets” and a “nuclear-powered submarine.” The March 24, 2023 announcement noted that the Haeil was “informally reported” to the Central Committee Political Bureau at the “Defence Development Exhibition Self-Defence-2021” held in October 2021, but such a UUV was not seen in the extensive images released by North Korea at the time.

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) released a statement on March 27 saying that “there have been signs that North Korea has been developing unmanned submarines, but we assess that they are still at an elementary level.”[1] And as one analyst noted, it is indeed correct that we “can’t rule out the possibility that this is an attempt at deception.” But development of a nuclear-armed UUV is within North Korea’s technical capabilities. For example, the US and USSR developed nuclear-armed torpedoes in the 1950s. And acquiring another type of nuclear delivery system (“based on a new operational concept,” in the words of the North’s March 24 announcement) would be consistent with North Korea’s emphasis over the past few years on a diverse nuclear force resistant to preemption and decapitation, and on demonstrating its technological prowess.

Potential Capabilities

The Haeil’s configuration is uncertain. Open-source analysts thus far have assessed a diameter of some 500-800 mm (a standard 21-inch torpedo is 533 mm in diameter), and the full length of the UUV has not been displayed. The March 24 announcement’s reference to the Haeil being “deployed at any coast and port or towed by a surface ship” may suggest that it is too long and/or too large in diameter for a standard torpedo tube. (North Korea’s CHT-02D 533-mm torpedo is 7.35 meters long.)

Range and speed. Pyongyang has not described the Haeil’s propulsion type, but it almost certainly relies on batteries. The North claimed a 600-km range and 41.5-hour endurance (thus, a 7.8-knot average cruising speed) for the March 25-27 Haeil test. The 59-hour endurance claimed for the March 21-23 test may reflect a lower average cruising speed, given the likely tradeoff between speed and endurance in a battery-powered UUV, but may suggest the vehicle is capable of a somewhat longer range. These performance claims appear credible given the 500-km range (without payload), 110-hour endurance, and 2.5-knot cruising speed of the US battery-powered REMUS 620 UUV, which can sprint for brief periods at eight knots. The US system, at 324 mm in diameter and 4.8 m long, is probably much smaller than the Haeil but presumably is more technologically advanced.

A 600-km range would permit strikes against South Korea’s coastlines from a wide variety of North Korean coastal locations. The UUV would need to be launched from the southern part of North Korea’s east coast to strike targets in Japan (the southeast part of the Home Islands). Additional targeting flexibility could be gained from launching the Haeil at sea, but any towing or launch platform would be severely vulnerable even just a few hundred kilometers off North Korea’s coasts. Thus, the UUV is almost certainly a theater weapon constrained to coastal targets.

Accuracy. We do not know how the Haeil is guided or how accurate it is. To minimize its vulnerability to detection and jamming while submerged, it probably uses an inertial guidance system. The accuracy of naval inertial systems degrades over time, as much as some 1.85 km per 24 hours.[2] Ideally, the inertial system would be updated by exposing an antenna periodically (or at least once, a few hours before reaching target) to receive shore-based or satellite navigational signals, but this may increase the UUV’s vulnerability to detection while doing so, and such signals are subject to jamming and the destruction of their land-based facilities.

Lethality. The North Korean schematic showing the newly-unveiled “tactical” nuclear warhead incorporated inside the Haeil is consistent with the size of the warhead shown in the March 28 photos and the assessed diameter of the UUV. The Institute for Science and International Security has assessed that warhead as “feasible for North Korea’s experience and number of underground tests” and its yield “is likely in the range of 10 kilotons” (kt). Contrary to Pyongyang’s claims, a warhead of this yield detonated underwater (or even a very much larger one) would not produce a “tsunami.” Instead, a 10-kt warhead would throw up and irradiate a column of as much as one million tons of water that would fall out over an area of several miles—severely contaminating ships and land areas within that zone.[3] But a 10-kt airburst from a missile would be more destructive (akin to the 15-kt “Little Boy” bomb used on Hiroshima) because so much of the energy of a UUV-based nuclear explosion is contained under water.

Deployment and basing. Assuming Pyongyang actually deploys the Haeil, we do not know how many might be fielded or how it might be based. The UUV would quite likely be deployed in hardened shore installations akin to coastal defense torpedo-launching sites that would be heavily camouflaged and/or disguised as civilian or other benign installations. Because the Haeil could be hidden in such facilities before launch, it could be fairly secure from pre-launch attack, barring a fortuitous allied intelligence coup.

It also is possible that Haeils could be towed out to sea by North Korean ships, as noted in the March 24 statement, during a prewar crisis or prior to an attack decision. The ship (perhaps a commandeered civilian vessel) could either drop the UUV off at sea or stay tethered to the UUV for subsequent launch. This approach would increase allied opportunities to detect the UUV in transit or at its sea holding area, however, compared to land basing. It also would be harder to ensure launch commands were received, especially in wartime, unless the UUV was still tethered to a ship and the ship had not previously been attacked.

Limited Threat Potential

The Haeil would be inferior to North Korea’s nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles in terms of speed (and thus time-to-target), accuracy, and lethality; furthermore, it is limited to in-theater coastal targets. Although it would not be subject to allied air and missile defenses, it would be at risk of detection and engagement by ASW assets. A slow, battery-powered UUV would probably be quieter, and thus less vulnerable to acoustic detection, than North Korea’s conventional submarines, but we do not know how quiet the Haeil is relative to allied detection thresholds.

Not much anti-ship capability. The March 24 statement referred to attacking “naval striker groups.” The Haeil appears to be too slow to pose a viable threat to ships that are underway. It would also need to have an on-board capability to detect such groups itself and/or a way to receive and act upon external targeting information—data that would be challenging for North Korea to obtain, especially in wartime. And both capabilities could increase the UUV’s vulnerability if used. Therefore, Haeil’s threat to shipping probably is limited to ports and known anchorages.

Unlikely first-strike weapon. The UUV’s extremely slow speed, forcing it to face many hours of potential ASW detection risk before reaching target, makes it unlikely that North Korea would consider using the Haeil alone to conduct a surprise nuclear attack or as an attack precursor, or timing the Haeil’s arrival to coincide with that of an initial nuclear missile strike. Moreover, it is not clear whether North Korea can communicate (or communicate reliably) with the UUV once underway to cancel an impending attack if circumstances change during its many hours of transit. Once even conventional hostilities begin, North Korea’s land-based means to communicate with a submerged UUV are likely to be taken out.

Suitable for delayed retaliation. More likely, the Haeil would be launched at the same time as a nuclear missile strike—particularly if the North was a) initiating nuclear use; b) preempting what it strongly believed was an imminent allied nuclear attack or an attempt at a disarming strike against its missile force; or c) retaliating against such attacks, either while the attacks were ongoing or after the fact. The damage caused to allied ASW and command-and-control by the earlier arrival of North Korean missiles probably would increase the Haeil’s ability to avoid interception if successfully launched. But most of the damage from a North Korean retaliatory strike would already have been done by missiles long before any Haeils arrived.

A limited “dead hand.” Pyongyang might also see the Haeil as a “dead hand” option, ensuring some sort of nuclear retaliation in the event that a) an allied disarming strike against its missile force was somehow successful, or b) North Korea had lost, or was doomed to lose, a conventional war or had suffered nuclear devastation. A successful last UUV strike would be far from assured, however, given allied ASW capabilities. And the limited, albeit terrible, impact of 10-kt coastal strikes against a country with so much of its population and industry inland may not offer North Korea what it regards as sufficient comfort or satisfaction.

More Political Than Military Value

Based on what we can divine from open sources on the Haeil’s capabilities and military potential, the South Korean JCS’s March 27 assessment that “it is highly likely that these claims are exaggerated and manipulated” appears to be correct. As is often the case with North Korea, the UUV seems to have much more political than military utility. Future, more capable follow-ons to the Haeil cannot be ruled out—and perhaps the North was hinting at this by adopting the “Haeil-1” nomenclature on March 28—but battery-powered UUVs are unlikely to offer any military advantage in nuclear delivery over North Korea’s ballistic and cruise missile forces.

Politically, however, the unveiling of the Haeil is consistent with the past several years of Pyongyang’s force development and related public diplomacy, which it has used to message that:

• North Korea has large and diverse nuclear delivery capabilities (referred to on March 24 as “the more developed, multi-faceted and offensive nuclear attack capability,” and on March 28 in “the strategic plan…on combining and operating nuclear weapons by different means in the diversified operation spaces”);
• Allied attempts at preemption, decapitation and missile defense will, therefore, be unsuccessful, and North Korean nuclear retaliation cannot be avoided, especially against South Korea; and
• North Korea is highly technologically capable and can build the same kinds of weapons the major powers can.

All of these themes come together in North Korea’s clear effort to introduce the Haeil in a way that evokes Russia’s Poseidon UUV—down to the claim of being able to generate “a super-scale radioactive tsunami.” Unlike the Haeil, however, the Poseidon is very large (at least 1,500-mm diameter), nuclear-powered, has very deep diving, high speed (over 50 knots), intercontinental range nuclear warhead, and is armed with at least two megatons (with claims of 100 megatons, although even that could not generate a “tsunami”).

The Bottom Line: A Political Statement Posing a Limited Threat

As other analysts have concluded, North Korea is unlikely to deploy very many Haeil UUVs and will continue to rely on ballistic missiles for the bulk of its nuclear strike capability. As a nuclear delivery system, this UUV brings little to the table due to its slow speed, potential in-transit vulnerability to ASW, and limited attack capability. The Haeil is much more valuable to North Korea as a political messaging tool, although even a good part of that value may already have been gained simply through unveiling it. It remains to be seen how much more Pyongyang invests in this venture.

1. [1]
2. See Colin Zwirko, “North Korea shows off smaller nuke warhead it says fits on missiles aimed at ROK,” NK News, March 28, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/03/kim-jong-un-inspects-warheads-as-part-of-push-to-produce-more-nuclear-material; and Jeongmin Kim, “North Korea ‘exaggerated’ about new undersea nuclear drone, Seoul says,” NK News, March 27, 2023, https://www.nknews.org/2023/03/north-korea-exaggerated-about-new-undersea-nuclear-drone-seoul-says.
3. [2]
4. David Titterton and John L. Weston, “Ship’s Inertial Navigation Systems (SINS),” in Strapdown Inertial Navigation Technology, 2nd Edition (Stevenage, United Kingdom: The Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2004).
5. [3]
6. See David Albright, “Underwater Nuclear Drone: North Korea’s Nuclear Madmen,” Institute for Science and International Security, March 27, 2023, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/underwater-nuclear-drone-north-koreas-nuclear-madmen; and Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), 52 and 54, https://www.atomicarchive.com/resources/documents/effects/glasstone-dolan.html.

4. Ukraine, North Korea and Iran included in leaked documents

Who is behind this?

Ukraine, North Korea and Iran included in leaked documents

The Department of Justice is investigating the leak.

ByLuis Martinez and Chris Looft

April 7, 2023, 9:10 PM

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

The leak of U.S. secret documents about Ukraine continued on social media on Friday as an ABC News review found that dozens of documents were first posted on the internet in early March shortly after they were drafted and also included secret documents about Iran's nuclear program, North Korea's missile program, and other regions of the world.

The new developments highlight the broadening security concerns about what was already a major security leak of classified information about the U.S. effort to assist Ukraine's military.

Pentagon Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh said that "The Department of Defense is actively reviewing the matter, and has made a formal referral to the Department of Justice for investigation."

The Department confirmed that they were now investigating the leak.

"We have been in communication with the Department of Defense related to this matter and have begun an investigation. We decline further comment," a spokesperson for the Department of Justice said in a statement.

The handful of documents posted on social media platforms on Thursday included precise details about the Ukrainian battlefield, U.S. weapons use by Ukraine, and the training of Ukrainian troops as of March 1. The documents posted do not appear to include any military planning for the long-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive that is expected for later this spring.

Those postings of what appeared to be U.S. military documents triggered a Pentagon review into how the documents ended up on the internet.

In this Sept. 1, 2021, file photo, the Pentagon seal is shown in the Pentagon Briefing Room in Arlington, Va.

Bloomberg via Getty Images, FILE

MORE: Russia-Ukraine live updates: US announces $2.6B in new security aid for Ukraine

"We are aware of the reports of social media posts, and the Department is reviewing the matter," Singh said in a statement provided to ABC News on Thursday.

A U.S. official told ABC News that the U.S. government is working to have the documents brought down by social media platforms.

But as of Friday, photographs of those documents were still being posted on various social media platforms, as well as a new image of a March 1 map of the battlefield situation around Bakhmut, the city that has been the focus of heavy fighting in recent months.

The Bakhmut map was one of dozens that an ABC News internet review determined were posted on the internet in early March, shortly after they were drafted.

Those documents also included what appear to be U.S. intelligence documents about Iran's nuclear program, North Korea's missile program, China, and other regions of the world.

Asked about the new developments a Pentagon spokesman referred back to its earlier statement.

A U.S. official discounted the intelligence value of the documents posted on the web telling ABC News that "the assessment is that the documents are of limited intelligence value and appear to have been altered from the original documents."

The official described them as "a snapshot in time from five weeks ago and the disposition of forces is no longer relevant to the battlefield."

However, the new information that the documents may have been posted shortly after they were drafted by the U.S. military and U.S. intelligence raises new concerns about their potential impact at the time.

Each of the documents posted on social media platforms appears to be photographs of folded printouts of individual PowerPoint slides produced by the U.S. military that contain details of the battlefield situation in Ukraine on March 1.

Some of them also contain information about the readiness rates of Ukrainian units, particularly of nine Ukrainian military brigades being supplied by the United States and NATO allies.

And in at least one instance, the documents appear to have been altered to reflect Russian fatality estimates that are significantly lower than the 200,000 killed and wounded that have been publicly stated by U.S. officials.

That alteration has led to speculation among national security analysts that Russia may be behind the dissemination of the leak.

A Ukrainian serviceman fires a rocket-propelleged grenade (RPG) during a training exercise in Donetsk region on April 6, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

AFP via Getty Images

"As many of these were pictures of documents, it appears that it was a deliberate leak done by someone that wished to damage the Ukraine, U.S., and NATO efforts," said Mick Mulroy, an ABC News contributor and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

"Russia's obvious manipulation of some facts has made it more difficult to determine what is real and what is not," said Mulroy. "Something that may help somewhat limit the damage overall ironically."

Mulroy speculates that a leak investigation has already started that "it will be very thorough in finding out how this happened and who was responsible. That individual (or individuals) needs to be held accountable."

Mykhailo Podolyak, a senior Ukrainian official, said in a statement that the leak contained a "very large amount of fictitious information" that appeared to be "standard elements of operational games by Russian intelligence and nothing more.

"Russia has no doubt that the United States or NATO are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict," Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said about the leaked documents on Friday.

The Pentagon says it is reviewing the apparent leak, but if a formal investigation is launched, it would presumably include a look at officials who would have access to the documents.

Investigators in previous leak investigations have been known to use polygraph tests to help determine the truthfulness of people being interviewed for the investigation.

ABCNews.com · by ABC News

5. China's Xi tells N. Korea's Kim to bolster 'strategic guidance' over bilateral ties

Closer than lips and teeth.

China's Xi tells N. Korea's Kim to bolster 'strategic guidance' over bilateral ties | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · April 8, 2023

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping told North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that the two nations should bolster "strategic guidance" over bilateral ties, Pyongyang's state media reported Saturday.

The remarks came as Kim received a message from Xi as the Chinese leader thanked the North Korean leader for congratulating him on his reelection as president of China, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

In the message, Xi "attaches great importance to the relations between the two parties and two countries, expressing his willingness to accelerate the development of the socialist cause of the two countries and promote regional peace, stability, development and prosperity by strengthening the strategic guidance" over the China-DPRK relations," the KCNA reported in an English-language dispatch.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

China's new ambassador to North Korea, Wang Yajun, who began his official activities earlier this week, delivered the message to Kim Song-nam, international department director of the Central Committee of the North's ruling party, according to the KCNA.

Wang's arrival came amid speculation that the North will soon resume trade with China following years of its border closure over the COVID-19 pandemic.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 8, 2023, shows China's new ambassador to North Korea, Wang Yajun delivering a message from Chinese President Xi Jinping for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Kim Song-nam (2nd from R), international department director of the North's ruling party the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 김수연 · April 8, 2023

6. U.S. Seeks Ways to Help Burkina Faso’s Military Junta Fight Jihadists

A complex situation that could be more complex than this article alone illustrates.

No mention of north Korea and Burkina Faso re-establishing diplomatic relations. We should expect north Korea to begin providing weapons and possibly training. Is SOCAFRICOM ready to compete with north Korea?

See this article:

Burkina Faso to resume diplomatic relations with North Korea

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/burkina-faso-to-resume-diplomatic-relations-with-north-korea/2859013

Listen to my discussion with John Batchelor here:

https://audioboom.com/posts/8276386-burkinafaso-northkorea-proliferation-in-sub-saharan-africa-david-maxwell-fdd

To SOCAFRICOM I commend these two books to provide background on what north Korea is doing in Africa as well as the long history of north Korea supporting third world countries.

North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa: Enabling Violence and Instability by Dr, Bruce Bechtol

https://www.amazon.com/Korean-Military-Proliferation-Middle-Africa/dp/0813175887/ref=sr_1_1?refinements=p_27%3ABruce+E.+Bechtol+Jr.&s=books&sr=1-1

Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World by Dr. Benjamin Young

https://www.amazon.com/Guns-Guerillas-Great-Leader-International/dp/1503627632/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=Benjamin+Young+north+Korea+guerillas&s=books&sr=1-1

• WSJ NEWS EXCLUSIVE

U.S. Seeks Ways to Help Burkina Faso’s Military Junta Fight Jihadists

Officials want to counter Islamists, but U.S. law bans most security aid to military regimes

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-seeks-ways-to-help-burkina-fasos-military-junta-fight-jihadists-f942cf68?st=7d80zh9p18jpxwf

By Michael M. PhillipsFollow

April 8, 2023 5:30 am ET

ACCRA, Ghana—The Biden administration is quietly helping Burkina Faso’s ruling junta battle al Qaeda and Islamic State in a hotly contested corner of West Africa, without running afoul of U.S. laws banning most security aid to military regimes.

The U.S. has included Burkinabe commandos in American-led exercises, but excluded the West African country’s top officer from an international gathering of defense chiefs after a military takeover last year. The Pentagon has a team of U.S. Green Berets stationed in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso’s capital, but won’t allow them to train their beleaguered local counterparts.

The State Department pays civilian contractors to prepare Burkinabe police and gendarmes to fight militant groups, as permitted by U.S. law, but the Defense Department can’t do the same for military combat forces.

The administration hopes such low-level American security assistance will be enough to help contain the flash-flood spread of jihadist groups across a swath of Africa, while convincing Burkina Faso’s military rulers not to follow neighbor Mali and hire Kremlin-linked Wagner Group mercenaries.

“Our interest in Burkina is to help them push back and regain more security control over more of their territory and to support them in their stated commitment to have democratic elections in 2024,” U.S. Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland told The Wall Street Journal.

The U.S. has included commandos from Burkina Faso in American-led exercises.

PHOTO: LUC GNAGO/REUTERS

U.S. officials estimate that militants control or operate in 60% of the territory of Burkina Faso, a country of 22 million people in Africa’s Sahel region, a semidesert band just south of the Sahara.

Between the beginning of 2017 and the end of last year, al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates killed 21,138 people across the Sahel, most of them in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, according to figures from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, a nonprofit violence-monitoring organization, as analyzed by the Pentagon’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Last year, insurgents conducted 1,470 attacks in Burkina Faso, leaving 3,600 people dead.

Militant groups now threaten Ghana, which U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris visited last week, along with Ivory Coast, Benin and Togo on the Gulf of Guinea coast.

Frustrated by battlefield setbacks, Burkinabe officers overthrew the country’s elected government in January last year. A second coup d’état followed in September.

The military takeovers triggered Section 7008 of U.S. appropriations law, which bans military aid to regimes that come to power through coups. State Department lawyers—not Pentagon generals—became the ultimate arbiters of what bilateral activities are acceptable.

The provision first became law in the 1980s, when members of Congress were concerned about aid to a military government in El Salvador. The U.S. currently applies Section 7008 sanctions to Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Myanmar and Burkina Faso.

Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit watchdog, has accused armed Islamist groups in Burkina Faso of carrying out summary executions, rapes and widespread pillaging. Likewise, the group has alleged that Burkinabe security forces have killed hundreds of civilians, but praised the government’s approval in February of a law to improve discipline in the armed forces and protect detainees.

Burning barricades in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, following protests in January.

PHOTO: OLYMPIA DE MAISMONT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Captain Ibrahim Traoré took power in Burkina Faso in a September coup.

PHOTO: IDRISSA OUEDRAOGO/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Neither Burkina Faso’s chargé d’affaires in Washington nor a spokesman for its Ministry of Defense responded to requests for comment.

“Considering our security situation, we still need the U.S.,” said one high-ranking Burkinabe officer involved in international military cooperation. “We have a great relationship with them.”

Before the coups, the U.S. was deeply involved with Burkina Faso’s military. In 2019, Burkina Faso hosted U.S.-led exercises for 2,000 commandos from 32 African and Western militaries, training intended to improve the battlefield performance of local troops against al Qaeda and Islamic State.

Burkinabe army Lt. Col. Paul-Henri Damiba, who later led the first military coup, attended an American-sponsored intelligence course in Senegal and a State Department peacekeeping program. In 2020, he attended U.S.-led commando training in Mauritania.

That same year, the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou said the U.S. trained and equipped some 3,000 Burkinabe troops annually, including a $2 million program to help the locals defend against roadside booby-traps set by militants.

A U.S. Green Berets team arrived in Ouagadougou in January 2022 to work with local commandos. Within days, however, Burkinabe soldiers, angry with what they saw as lackluster government support for the campaign against militant groups, surrounded the presidential palace and arrested the elected president, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré.

The Green Berets fell back on the U.S. Embassy to bolster security during the uprising.

The Biden administration has left the Green Berets team in Ouagadougou, even though the soldiers can’t train local counterparts, according to American officials.

U.S. officials say the Green Berets monitor the local security situation and are brokering negotiations about sending Burkinabe commandos for training in neighboring Niger, at a base in the Sahara. Those talks are still under way, according to a senior Nigerien official.

A funeral in Ouagadougou for soldiers killed by al Qaeda in an ambush last year.

PHOTO: OLYMPIA DE MAISMONT/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Overshadowing the U.S. decision-making is fierce strategic competition with Russia for influence in Africa. Governments in the Central African Republic, Sudan and Mali have hired Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, who the European Union and U.S. have accused of committing human-rights abuses and pillaging gold and other natural resources. Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin has denied that Wagner fighters were involved in massacres and other abuses in Africa.

Mali’s deal with Wagner led to a rift with France, which had been leading the West’s counter-militant operations in its former West African colonies.

The U.S. continues to provide humanitarian aid to Mali, but has all but given up on its army. “The choices that the Malian junta has made make it impossible for us to support their military—because they’re in bed with Wagner,” Ms. Nuland said.

Burkina Faso, which also ejected French combat troops, has flirted with Wagner. Ghana’s president, Nana Akufo-Addo, last year publicly accused the Burkinabe regime of using Wagner mercenaries to fight militant groups.

U.S. officials, however, say Burkina Faso hasn’t yet signed a deal and is still looking at its options. In private talks with American officials and public statements, Burkinabe leaders say they want to fight their own battles.

The country “is not lost to Russia or Wagner,” said a senior U.S. military official. “Maybe we can keep Burkina from stepping off the brink.”

The U.S. military wanted to invite Burkina Faso army Col.-Maj. David Kabré, then the country’s top military official, to a February gathering of African chiefs of defense in Rome. The White House National Security Council, according to two U.S. officials, argued against the invitation, which would have included Col.-Maj. Kabré in a sit-down with Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other West African military commanders.

“We looked at them in terms of the optics and in terms of the prestige being conferred on them by being invited,” said a senior U.S. diplomat.

As a compromise, the administration instead invited 46 Burkinabe troops to American-led commando exercises in Ghana and Ivory Coast last month. However, instead of working directly with U.S. commandos, the Burkinabe soldiers rehearsed antiterrorism raids and battlefield first aid under the guidance of Dutch special forces.

African participants at the exercises received lectures on respect for the rule of law, according to U.S. Special Operations Command Africa.

The Biden administration is now trying to decide whether U.S. law permits the Pentagon to invite Burkina Faso to the 30th anniversary of a federal program pairing foreign militaries with state National Guard units. Burkina Faso is partnered with the District of Columbia National Guard.

U.S. law doesn’t restrict civilian aid. The State Department spends $26 million a year to provide training, border-screening gear and body armor to Burkinabe gendarmes and police, as well as some $130 million annually in economic-development and humanitarian assistance.

Benoit Faucon contributed to this article.

Write to Michael M. Phillips at Michael.Phillips@wsj.com

7. U.S. S. Korea forging closer cooperation on N. Korea, regional issues: CRS report

The two page report can be accessed here: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10165. As always, CRS provides a very succinct description of alliance relations and issues.

U.S. S. Korea forging closer cooperation on N. Korea, regional issues: CRS report | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2023

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, April 7 (Yonhap) -- The United States and South Korea are enhancing their cooperation to tackle various issues including North Korea, a U.S. congressional report said Friday.

President Joe Biden and his South Korean counterpart, Yoon Suk Yeol, are also seeking to expand their countries' multilateral cooperation with Japan to rein in North Korea's escalating provocations, the report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) suggested.

"President Joseph Biden and Yoon have capitalized on greater U.S.-ROK strategic alignment by forging closer cooperation on North Korea policy through military exercises and expanding trilateral cooperation with Japan," it said.

The report is the latest update of the CRS' longstanding paper on U.S.-South Korea relations, which comes before Yoon's scheduled State Visit to Washington later this month.

This file photo, taken Nov. 13, 2022, shows South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden posing for a photo during their summit at a hotel in Phnom Penh. (Yonhap)

The South Korean president is set to arrive here on April 24, becoming the first South Korean leader to make a State Visit to the U.S. since 2011. He is also scheduled to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress on April 27, becoming the first South Korean head of state to do so since 2013.

The report notes that the U.S. and South Korea have become increasingly more aligned in many policy perspectives under the new South Korean leader.

"South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, in office since May 2022, is seeking to transform South Korea into a "global pivotal state" by raising its profile beyond the Korean Peninsula and becoming a more active partner in the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy," it said, also noting that South Korea issued its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy last year.

"Despite the growing alignment, South Korea's approach to China is less confrontational than the United States', and U.S.-ROK economic friction had increased due to South Korean complaints about the electronic vehicle (EV) provisions in P.L. 117-169, known as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022," it added.

ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea.

The U.S. and South Korea are, however, more aligned when it comes to dealing with North Korea, according to the report.

"Whereas the previous ROK government emphasized diplomacy with North Korea, Yoon and Biden have emphasized deterrence," it said, noting the countries have reactivated "high-level consultations on extended deterrence" while the U.S. has increased deployments of strategic assets such as stealth fighters jets to the region.

"Alongside these steps, the two allies have offered Pyongyang unconditional humanitarian assistance, and Yoon has pledged to provide large-scale economic assistance if North Korea "embarks on a genuine and substantive process for denuclearization"," added the report.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · April 8, 2023

8. [Translation] South Korean government published the first human rights report regarding North Korea: “North Korea executed Juveniles and pregnant women publicly.”

Again, it is good to see South Korea adopting a human rights upfront approach.

[Translation] South Korean government published the first human rights report regarding North Korea: “North Korea executed Juveniles and pregnant women publicly.”

https://www.wikileaks-kr.org/news/articleView.html?idxno=136810

North Korea’s human rights report, which the government prepared for a long time based on years of data, pieces of evidence, and testimonies, will be released. North Korea’s human rights situation was expected to be serious, but it is shocking that most of them go beyond common sense, such as “Young people who watched South Korean videos were executed”, and “Pregnant women pointed the Kim Il-sung’s statue with her finger were executed.”

Ministry of Unification said that the ‘2023 North Korean Human Rights report’ based on 500 escapees(estimated)’ testimonies will be released tomorrow. It is the first time to reveal this report to the public even though it has been published annually since after the North Korean Human Rights Act has been enacted. 

Considering the privacy of North Korean defectors and the backlash of North Korea, it was confidential. But the government changed its policy to let the public know about North Korea’s poor human rights situation. According to the Ministry of Unification, the 450-page report consists of four major chapters: △Civil and Political Rights, △Economic Social, and Cultural Rights, △Vulnerable groups, △political prisoners of war, abductees, and separated families. 

According to the report, it says “In North Korea, arbitrary deprivation of life by authorities has been found.” and added that testimonies regarding the ‘immediate execution’ has been collected continuously. Also, they mentioned that “Not only for violent crime, but also for the acts that cannot be imposed under the terms of freedom, such as drug transactions, watching and distributing Korean videos, and religious and superstitious acts.” It explained.

The report mentioned that the women were exposed to violence in the whole society such as at home, school, military, and detention facilities, and a huge number of youths had been executed since they watched the South Korean videos. In 2015, 6 juveniles who watched some South Korean videos and used opium got a life sentence and were executed immediately.

In 2017, a video of a woman dancing at home was circulated in public, and the woman, who was six months pregnant at the time, was publicly executed due to a problem that she pointed to a portrait of Kim Il-sung using her finger. In addition, as the food distribution system did not work properly, most residents secured food through personal economic activities. Additionally, public medical service was not properly operated, so people should give the medical doctor cash as an allowance in kind.

The report added that serious human rights violations have occurred, such as executions and forced labor of prisoners of war, abductees, and separated families suffering from surveillance and discrimination. Most of these contents are contained in some other reports released by the United Nations or domestic and foreign private organizations, but this report is meaningful as it has been issued officially by the government.

This report was based on more than 1,600 human rights violation testimonies from 508 North Korean defectors who escaped from North Korea between 2017 and 2022. An official from the Ministry of Unification explained, “Among the total of 3,412 people surveyed, 2,075 North Korean defectors filled out the questionnaires.” And added that 508 testimonies that met the conditions of defecting after 2017 were selected and reflected in the report. 

The proportion of women(53%) and men(47%) testifiers was similar, and 20s(31.1%) were the most common. By their residence, Yanggang-do(59.1%), Hamgyeongbuk-do(17.3%), and Pyongyang(10.8%). The Ministry of Unification explained that many cases in the border area were cited and that there are very few cases after 2022 as the number of North Korean defectors plunged due to North Korea’s border blockade because of COVID-19.

The official said, “This report is significant in that it is the government’s first public report published under the North Korean Human Rights Act enacted in 2016 through bipartisan cooperation.” And added, “No other government agency has ever investigated and published the report about North Korean human rights.”

The Ministry of  Unifications plans to distribute 2,500 copies online and offline and push for the publication of the English version so that the report can be used as reliable basic data in the field of human rights in North Korea. The official added that it will be published annually in the form of an annual report, but it depends on the situation, such as a decrease in North Korean defectors. 

Unification Minister Yong-se Kwon said, “The publication of this report is the result of the South Korean government’s willingness to make more efforts to substantially improve human rights in North Korea.” And added, “We hope to play a meaningful role in bringing meaningful changes in attitudes and responsible actions by the North Korean authorities,” he said. Finally, he emphasized that the government will continue to work together with the international society to improve human rights until the day North Koreans have their own rights for granted. 

Reporter Hye-won Kang of Wikileaks Korea

Translated by Yubin Jun, HRNK Intern

9.  N. Korea conducted another test of underwater nuclear-capable attack drone this week

I guess the regime is doubling down on its radioactive tsunami torpedo. It must really be trying to scare us.

(3rd LD) N. Korea conducted another test of underwater nuclear-capable attack drone this week | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with weapon analysis, more details in paras 9, 11-15)

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Saturday it carried out another test of an underwater nuclear-capable attack drone this week, proving the weapon system's reliability and "fatal" striking capability.

The North tested the Haeil-2 underwater strategic weapon system from April 4-7, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

"The system will serve as an advantageous and prospective military potential of the armed forces of the DPRK essential for containing all evolving military actions of enemies, removing threats and defending the country," the KCNA said in an English-language dispatch.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

This photo, captured from the Korean Central TV on April 8, 2023, shows a broadcast of the "Haeil-2" underwater strategic weapons system's test conducted from April 4-7. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The North's provocation came as the secretive regime has vowed to take "overwhelming" actions against joint military drills between South Korea and the United States.

The test drone was deployed from a port in South Hamgyong Province on Tuesday, and "correctly set off" a test warhead underwater Friday after cruising along an "oval and eight-shaped" course simulating a distance of 1,000 kilometers for 71 hours and six minutes, it added.

The provocation came about two weeks after the North first made public a test of its underwater attack drone Haeil on March 24. It claimed the "secret weapon" is capable of generating a "radioactive tsunami" and stealthily attacking enemies.

On March 28, the regime unveiled its Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead for the first time and claimed that it had staged an underwater detonation test of its Haeil-1 drone a day earlier.

The North said at the time the Haeil-1 traveled a course simulating a distance of 600 kilometers for 41 hours and 27 minutes before setting off its test warhead.

Considering the change in the weapon's name in the latest test, the North could have tested an improved version of the Haeil this week, observers said.

Some experts, however, have noted Pyongyang's unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) system offers little to bolster its military capabilities, compared with other weapons.

Vann H. Van Diepen, former U.S. principal deputy assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said the Haeil would be "substantially inferior" to the North's nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles in terms of accuracy and lethality.

"Its range limits it to coastal targets in South Korea and southeast Japan. Although this means it would not be subject to allied air and missile defenses, it would still be vulnerable to engagement by anti-submarine warfare assets," Van Diepen wrote Thursday in a report on 38 North, a U.S. website monitoring North Korea.

"North Korea claimed this weapon could attack 'naval striker groups,' but it is too slow to pose a viable threat to ships that are underway and thus probably limited to attacking ports and known anchorages," he said. "The UUV would appear to have much more political than military utility."

The North has recently intensified its provocative acts, such as the unveiling of the Hwasan-31 and the launch of cruise missiles from a submarine, in response to springtime military drills between South Korea and the United States.

Observers said the North is likely to bolster its weapons tests on key anniversaries this month, namely the 111th birthday of late North Korean founder Kim Il-sung on April 15.

A set of photos, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on April 8, 2023, show the North testing an underwater nuclear-capable attack drone Haeil from April 4-7. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

sooyeon@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2023

10. A Fresh Look at North Korea at Night

Images at the link: https://www.38north.org/2023/04/a-fresh-look-at-north-korea-at-night/

I think image number 3 was the late Secretary Rumsfeld's favorite one of north Korea.

This analysis concludes with a comparison of Myanmar with north Korea (and it does not look good for north Korea)

A Fresh Look at North Korea at Night

• BY: MARTYN WILLIAMS
• APRIL 2, 2023

In January 2014, astronauts on board the International Space Station (ISS) took a photo that dramatically illustrated the economic divide between North Korea and its neighbors. It showed both South Korea and China bathed in nighttime light while North Korea was largely dark.

Figure 1. The Korean Peninsula at night, taken in 2014 by a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) astronaut from the International Space Station.

Nine years on, has anything changed?

Examination of nighttime images from the past seven years shows that North Korea is getting brighter at night, although it is still outpaced by its richer, more industrialized neighbors. The patterns of newly lit-up areas do tend to align with Kim Jong Un’s priority development projects, such as large industrial complexes and housing projects, and even active construction sites. In the Samjiyon region, for instance, entire towns that were not visible a few years ago are now faint dots in nighttime imagery.

It is a far cry from South Korea’s enormous glow, but indicates that there are areas in North Korea with more access to electricity than before.

However, despite persistent and ongoing efforts to increase energy production inside North Korea, such as the recent completion of the Orangchon Power Plant after 40 years of construction, the country continues to suffer from a chronic shortage of electricity. Even compared to other developing countries, like Myanmar, the North’s night light profile still lags far behind. Solar and renewable energies are helping fill in some gaps, but as the imagery shows, massive energy boosts are still sorely needed.

Figure 2. Nighttime lights of North Korea in August 2022. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Background

The ISS image was captured as it flew about 400 kilometers (km) above the Korean Peninsula on January 30, 2014, at 10:16 p.m. Korean Standard Time. In the image, Pyongyang shines about as bright as a mid-size South Korean city, and a few other cities, such as Wonsan, Hamhung and some areas around Pyongyang, can be located as smaller specks of light. Security lights along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) clearly mark the border between the two Koreas.

While the ISS image captured attention at the time, it was not the first capture of North Korea at night. The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP), operated by the US Department of Defense, has been capturing nighttime images of North Korea since the 1970s.

Figure 3. The Nighttime lights of the Korean Peninsula from 1992 to 2012. Photo: DMSP/DOD/Earth Observation Group.

However, in 2012, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument onboard the NASA/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (NPP) satellite began providing superior nighttime satellite imagery. The service has been supplemented with the launch of VIIRS on the NOAA-20 and NOAA-21 weather satellites, and it will be included on several additional upcoming satellites.

The two sets of images are not directly comparable because of the different satellites and sensors used, but they both tell a story of a country that remains decades behind its neighbors in industrial development.

Figure 4. The Nighttime lights of the Korean Peninsula from 2013 to 2021. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group.

The lights at sea on either side of the Korean Peninsula are mostly fishing boats.

About the Images

This article is based on VIIRS images gathered daily by the Suomi NPP and the NOAA-20 satellites. For this analysis, we used monthly and annual VIIRS Day/Night Band images from the Earth Observation Group (EOG) at the Colorado School of Mines. The images show the average radiance levels over the period and are processed to keep stray light and other data errors to a minimum and be cloud-free.

Each pixel on the Day/Night Band image is approximately 375 meters square. This means the data can be used to determine radiance to a moderate resolution but cannot differentiate between individual buildings.

Pyongyang

North Korea’s capital city has gotten visibly brighter throughout Kim Jong Un’s rule. Under Kim, a number of new construction and development projects have taken place that include a generous use of external architectural lighting. Buildings throughout the capital are externally lit at night, in addition to statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

One of the biggest changes to the city has been Kim’s project to build 50,000 apartments in Pyongyang between 2021 and 2026.

The massive construction sites for these projects are illuminated brightly during the night, and after completion, lights from the tower blocks create a new, permanent source of nighttime light. In this image from August 2022, bright light is visible from construction at the Hwasong area project and also from the Sadong area project that opened earlier in 2022.

Figure 5a. The Sadong and Hwasong areas of Pyongyang are visible in this image from March 2023. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. Figure 5b. The Sadong and Hwasong areas of Pyongyang are visible in this image from August 2022. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Several areas close to Pyongyang are also evident, including the Chollima Steel Mill (Complex), Sangwon Cement Complex and Taean Heavy Machinery Complex.

Figure 6a. Industrial establishments in the greater Pyongyang area. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Figure 6b. Industrial establishments in the greater Pyongyang area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Hamhung

North Korea operates a dual electricity grid that often results in factories and the military getting power while households do not. At night, this can mean that major factories shine more brightly thanks to the greater supply of electricity than their neighboring towns. A good example of this can be seen in Hamhung.

The industrial area of the city around Haean-guyok is consistently brighter at night than the downtown area.

Figure 7a. Industrial establishments and the central Hamhung area. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Figure 7b. Industrial establishments and the central Hamhung area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

The brightest area is the February 8 Vinalon Complex, which occupies around 2.5 square km and is one of the largest industrial establishments in the area. Also visible as sources of light are the Ryongsong Machine Complex and Hamhung Fertilizer Complex.

Figure 8. Industrial establishments and the central Hamhung area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group.

Nampho

In the port city of Nampho, the brightest lights in 2021 were those at the container port. Despite Covid restrictions that shuttered most foreign trade, the Nampho container port appeared busy throughout 2021 in daytime imagery, which is also mirrored in the nighttime coverage.

The area around the coal port was also bright in the latest image. The nearby Ryongnam shipyard is also lit, although noticeably dimmer.

Figure 9a. Nighlights in the Nampho area. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Figure 9b. Nighlights in the Nampho area.Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Samjiyon

The results of one of Kim Jong Un’s key projects, the multi-year redevelopment of Samjiyon, have presented one of the most dramatic changes in recent years. The lights of Samjiyon were barely visible until 2017, but its light signature began to grow as the redevelopment started. By 2019, the year reconstruction was completed, the city appeared much brighter at night.

Figure 10a. Nightlights in the Samjiyon County area. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Figure 10b. Nightlights in the Samjiyon County area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

That brightness has remained, and the subsequent redevelopment of Samjiyon’s satellite towns has also resulted in them becoming visible in nighttime imagery. Rimyongsu-dong, Phothae-dong, Junghung-ri, Poso-ri, Thongsin-ri, Paeksam-ri and Ohomuldong-dong are all visible in 2021 annual imagery where before, there was just darkness.

Figure 11. Development of the Samjiyon County area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group.

Wonsan

In Wonsan, the reconstruction of the airport and development of a prominent tourist area on the beach are both evident in nighttime imagery.

Until 2014, the peninsula on which the airport and beach resort sit was dark at night. Construction on the airport began in 2014 and was completed in 2015. That year, the site became visible on nighttime imagery.

The peninsula fell dark after that until work on the beach resort began to pick up speed and intensity. Kim Jong Un visited the site in 2018 and called on workers to have it completed by April 2019. While that deadline was missed and pushed back a few times, the construction site can be seen bathed in light throughout 2019.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and other priorities resulted in construction stalling, and the resort area has been largely dark since 2020.

Previous

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Figure 12d. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2021 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12a. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area overview. Photo: Sentinel 2. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12b. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2019 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12c. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2020 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12d. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2021 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12a. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area overview. Photo: Sentinel 2. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12b. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2019 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12c. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2020 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Figure 12d. Wonsan-Kalma tourist area at night, 2021 composite. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

Next

Sunchon

Sunchon is a key base of North Korea’s chemical industry, and several of the largest factories are visible in 2021 annual imagery.

In May 2020, Kim Jong Un presided over the inauguration of the Sunchon Phosphatic Fertilizer Factory. Despite a slow start to fertilizer production, the factory is visible on nighttime imagery as one of the brightest spots in Sunchon from 2021.

A major new chemical factory under construction in Sunchon, referred to in state media as “the project for establishing C1 chemical industry,” is also visible from 2021, and the nearby Sunchon Cement Complex and Sunchon Thermal Power Plant also register.

Figure 13a. Industrial nightlights in the Sunchon area. Image © 2023 Planet Labs, PBC cc-by-nc-sa 4.0. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Figure 13b. Industrial nightlights in the Sunchon area. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

North Korea vs. Myanmar

While North Korea has made some progress since the ISS image, it still lags far behind not only its neighbors, but other developing countries as well. Compared to Myanmar, for example, North Korea has much lower light emission at night.

Figure 14. Nighttime lights of Myanmar in August 2022. Photo: VIIRS/NASA/NOAA/Earth Observation Group. Annotation by 38 North.

In Myanmar, several cities are easily visible at night, as is the main highway from Naypyidaw to Mandalay. The series of towns along the Irrawaddy River, which arcs west from Mandalay and then turns south to Pyay, can also be made out.

A look at North Korea, captured in the same month by the same satellite, reveals the obvious city lights of Pyongyang but little else. Few of the country’s main cities stand out, and the road network is not visible at all, probably due to the much lower volume of cars, movement restrictions on citizens and the lack of streetlights.

11. N. Korea unresponsive to regular contact via military hotline for 2nd day

Still playing hard to get to the alliance's unrequited love. What if we just ignored the regime and did not make a test call until the north initiated a phone call to see why we had not called?

Perhaps we need a couple of young teenage boys and girls to advise us on how to handle the regime playing hard to get.

(note sarcasm)

(LEAD) N. Korea unresponsive to regular contact via military hotline for 2nd day | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2023

(ATTN: MODIFIES headline; UPDATES with details on afternoon call, background info throughout)

SEOUL, April 8 (Yonhap) -- North Korea remained unresponsive to regular contact via the inter-Korean military hotline for the second day Saturday, military officials said.

The North did not respond to the regular morning and afternoon calls between the two sides, the officials said, after daily calls through the military line and another cross-border liaison channel went unanswered the previous day.

The two Koreas typically hold phone calls twice a day using the joint liaison office channel and their military channel. While the liaison office channel operates only on weekdays, the military channel also conducts calls on weekends.

"Regular calls aren't being made due to an unspecified reason from the North's side," a military official said. "We will monitor the situation, leaving all possibilities open, including a (technical) problem in the North's line."

The suspension comes amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the wake of North Korea's recent weapons tests in protest of joint military drills between South Korea and the United States.

Earlier in the day, the North's state media reported that the country staged an underwater detonation test of its Haeil-2 nuclear-capable attack drone earlier this week.

Daily phone calls via inter-Korean communication channels have previously gone unanswered due to technical reasons. Last June, Pyongyang did not respond to a regular hotline call apparently due to technical glitches caused by heavy rains.

In July 2021, the North restored the inter-Korean hotline, about a year after it severed the contact channel in protest against Seoul activists' leaflet campaigns critical of Pyongyang. The liaison line was again cut off in August that year and restored later.

This file photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows a South Korean liaison officer talking to his North Korean counterpart at the Seoul bureau of their joint liaison office on Oct. 4, 2021. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · April 8, 2023

12. Book Review: “A Pyongyang Woman From London”

I look forward to the English translation of this book.

https://www.38north.org/2023/04/book-review-a-pyongyang-woman-from-london/

Book Review: “A Pyongyang Woman From London”

• BY: ROBERT LAULER
• APRIL 5, 2023

A Pyongyang Woman from London

By Oh Hye Son. Deomirakeul Publishing (더미라클 출판사), 2023. 319 pp.

Korean cover of “A Pyongyang Woman From London (런던에서 온 평양 여자),” by Oh Hye Son.

When North Korean defector Thae Yong-ho released his memoir in 2018, it became one of South Korea’s most-read books, ranking 15 out of the 30 top-selling books that year. Thae’s book promised pizzazz and delivered exactly that to a certain extent by sharing his experiences as an interpreter for Kim Jong Il, shepherding one of Kim Jong Il’s sons in London and working shoulder-to-shoulder with some of North Korea’s most famous diplomats. In the book, Thae delved a bit into his family life and his relationship with his two sons, but most of those stories took a backseat to stories and anecdotes focused on his professional career as a diplomat in North Korea and at embassies abroad.

As if to bring Thae’s family life into clearer focus, Oh Hye Son, Thae’s wife, released her own book this year entitled A Pyongyang Woman From London.[1] Given their shared experience living abroad in North Korean embassies, Oh’s book traces the outlines of some of the events already covered in her husband’s book, but through the perspective of that of a diplomat’s wife and a working mother of two sons. She also shares details about her own life, which are almost absent from Thae’s work, revealing more information about what life as a female member of North Korea’s elite is like, and her own views on North Korea’s society and economy. As such, the book is an interesting addition to what is a growing body of literature being written by North Korean defectors.

Life as an Elite in North Korea

Oh’s book starts with her early life before shifting to her relationship with Thae and the course their lives took up until their defection to South Korea in 2016. We learn that she is from an elite family and a relative of Oh Paek Ryong, a famous North Korean general who fought with Kim Il Sung against the Japanese. In fact, Oh has stated in media interviews that one of the reasons she wrote the book was to dispel myths about life in North Korea. The anecdotes she shares about her life in the 1980s and 1990s reveal some of the characteristics of North Korean society that can still be read about today. In particular, Oh talks about being mobilized to work on farms as a young woman, helping to move rice seedlings to the fields for planting. Mass mobilizations were also present during her university life, where Oh makes clear that studying took a backseat to her political organizational activities and her required work on various projects outside of the classroom.

Oh also talks about the impact of songbun, North Korea’s system of ascribed social status, on her life. To be sure, Oh’s family, being of revolutionary stock and living in Pyongyang, was located closer to the top in the regime’s hierarchy. However, social status was nonetheless something that impacted her life in resounding ways. She shares a story about a relationship with a man she had before being introduced to Thae. This man was a “returnee” from Japan—something viewed as unacceptable to friends and family due to the status of returnees as outsiders in North Korean society, largely because their loyalties were always in question.[2] Indeed, Oh’s mother expressed distaste at the thought of her daughter dating the man because of his undesirable social status, which Oh recalls played an important role in her relationship with him falling apart. Songbun still plays a major role in delineating social position in North Korea today, making it difficult, for example, for farmers in rural areas to move into other occupations in urban areas. Ultimately, Oh recalls that although Thae’s family was not particularly well off, he was of better revolutionary stock, which made him more acceptable to her family and friends.

Life as a Wife and Working Mother at Home and Abroad

What really shines through in the book is Oh’s insight into the microsocieties of North Korea’s embassies abroad. North Korean embassies are run on shoestring budgets, and diplomats, an elite group carefully selected after undergoing intense physical examinations and ideological tests, generally live together in the same compound, where they can be strictly monitored and controlled.

No level of monitoring and control, however, can prevent people from observing what they see outside the embassy walls, and Oh attributes much of her “awakening” about how far behind North Korean society is compared to the rest of the world to just living and observing circumstances in her host countries. One area she emphasizes in particular is medical care. Oh’s eldest son, who was born with nephrotic syndrome, was in need of medical care that went beyond what could be provided in North Korea. Oh recalls that North Korean doctors had little idea about modern medicine, and were limited in information, equipment and pharmaceuticals. However, what was considered to be a difficult disease to manage in North Korea was easily treated by doctors in her host countries in Europe.

Oh also goes into detail about the roles of wives at overseas embassies, including the fact that they are expected to conduct (unpaid) work, even if they have children to take care of. She recalls that wives engaged in a range of activities, from cooking, typing and doing finances to even taking care of accommodations for officials who, due to a lack of foreign currency, had no choice but to stay at the embassies. Oh also relates that wives were expected to prepare banquets and parties to celebrate important North Korean holidays and engage in efforts to buy second-hand goods with the intent to sell these items back in Pyongyang. This last point drives home the financially unstable position many North Korean diplomats found themselves in where they were underpaid, and with their futures back in North Korea so unclear, there was an imperative to think ahead and ensure they could make enough money upon returning home.

Furthermore, Oh shares stories about her life as a researcher at North Korea’s Ministry of Trade. She began working there after graduation from university but naturally took a hiatus from work when her family went abroad. Before Oh and her family’s final return to London, Oh reentered the trade ministry, rubbing shoulders with famous figures at that institution, including the daughter of prominent North Korean diplomat Heo Dam.[3] She provides her own views on why North Korea’s economy has stagnated, pointing a finger at bureaucracy and outdated thinking that has pervaded the top leadership. For example, Oh recalls a meeting attended by Choe Yong Rim,[4] a one-time premier of the DPRK, and his nostalgia for the “golden years” of the 70s and 80s under Kim Il Sung that clouded his thinking about finding newer ways to shape the economy (196). She also claims that North Korean economic researchers were asked to study China’s socialist economic opening in the early 1990s, but when they came forward with a plan to reform the economy by distributing land to farmers to increase production, they were criticized for lacking revolutionary and class spirit. This, Oh claims, convinced researchers not to take any unnecessary risks in their work from then on.

The Wife of a Politician

The publication of Oh’s book comes as Thae Yong Ho’s star status has risen in South Korean politics. As the first directly elected defector-politician in South Korea, Thae has become both a magnet for praise and controversy; and as a member of the People Power Party’s Supreme Council, he looks set to become an important fixture in South Korean politics for some time to come.

Given Thae’s status, it is worth reflecting for a moment on Oh’s book as being part of an effort to refine the image of Thae and his family. In general, much of the information we have about Thae—and many other high-profile defectors, such as defector-poet Jang Jin-sung—rely on what they say about themselves or the books they write. Much of the commentary about Thae in Oh’s book could fall into the category of “folksy,” with a jab or two at his later-in-life lack of hair and, perhaps, understandably, drinking a bit too much at his first meeting with Oh’s father. Generally, Thae comes off as a hard-working diplomat who takes the education of his children seriously and ultimately grows frustrated enough with the North Korean regime that he and his wife decide to defect. However, Oh does not go into any detail about their actual defection process.

Interestingly, she does note toward the end of the book that it was her husband’s idea to head to South Korea so he could conduct a unification campaign against the regime rather than take the more “quiet” route of remaining in Europe. If they had stayed in Europe, Oh recalls she had thought that they could reduce the level of retribution the regime could deliver on their families. Her conclusion about whether she and her family made the right decision to leave North Korea appears clear, however. In her words, North Korea is a: “country without a future regardless of how hard one works” (276).

All in all, Oh’s book does not have the same level of headline-grabbing anecdotes about the inner workings of North Korea’s leadership and diplomacy that characterizes her husband’s book. Nor does her book provide any particularly new insights into contemporary North Korean society that cannot be gleaned from defector testimonies and grassroots organizations reporting on the country. However, she does add interesting details that complement Thae’s story and provides stories about herself that, given her background as a woman and a former member of the North Korean elite, are interesting in their own right.

1. [1]
2. Also written as O Hye-son.
3. [2]
4. In the late 1950s and 1960s, North Korea conducted a massive campaign to bring tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans living in Japan back to the homeland. Many ethnic Koreans chose to leave Japan, where they faced ethnic discrimination, and began new lives in North Korea.
5. [3]
6. Heo Dam served as North Korea’s foreign minister from 1970 to 1983. He died in 1991.
7. [4]
8. Choe Yong Rim held various high-level posts since the 1950s, including vice-premier of the Administration Council and secretary general of the Supreme People’s Assembly Presidium. He served as premier of North Korea from June 2010 to April 2013.

13. North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has TV hunk erased from repeats of hit 1998 show

Only in north Korea.

North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has TV hunk erased from repeats of hit 1998 show and replaced digitally by different actor because of star's womanising and links to hated uncle who he executed in 2013 'for not clapping properly'

• Choe Ung Chol has been replaced as the protagonist by actor Pak Jong Taek
• Advanced video technology has now been used to remove him from the series

By CHRISTIAN OLIVER 

PUBLISHED: 01:20 BST, 7 April 2023 | UPDATED: 02:02 BST, 7 April 2023

Daily Mail · by Christian Oliver · April 7, 2023

The North Korean regime has digitally scrubbed a disgraced actor from an old television series in the latest effort to remove any trace of defectors.

The series in question, The Taehongdang Party Secretary, aired in the rogue state between 1998 and 2000, and previously starred North Korean actor Choe Ung Chol.

It is understood that Choe displeased the Pyongyang regime due to his alleged womanising and favour of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un's disgraced uncle who was executed in 2013.

Advanced video technology has now been used to remove him from the series, and leave the rest of the programme unaltered.

Instead Pak Jong Taek now stars as the protagonist for Korean Central Television reruns in the show that depicts the life of North Korean potato farmers in 1990s amid famine.

Pak Jong-taek now stars as the protagonist for Korean Central Television having replaced Choe Ung Chol in The Taehongdang Party Secretary

Pak Jong Taek (pictured) appears identically to how Choe Ung Chol did in reruns of The Taehongdang Party Secretary

The change of actor was noticed by Tatiana Gabroussenko, a professor at Korea University in Seoul, and expert in North Korean culture.

She wrote for the NK News website: 'When the regime perceives somebody as an enemy, they will relentlessly hunt down and destroy this threat, squashing out any hint that they ever existed.

'North Korea is clearly adept at highly advanced digital editing techniques, creating a sort of deep fake character for a TV series that's a quarter-century old.

'Propagandists have evidently arrived at a suitable solution to the decades-old problem of how to erase problematic figures from an otherwise pro-regime cultural artifact without entirely destroying it.'

In the reruns, Pak Jong Taek appears identically to how Choe Ung Chol did, reading the same lines verbatim, reproducing mannerisms, and interreacting in an identical fashion with the other actors.

Gabroussenko described it as a 'remarkable feat of digital editing' but says the 'casting of Pak in the role doesn't quite work'.

The expert in North Korean culture also contacted defectors over the change who said Choe was known by defectors as a notorious womaniser and associate of Jang Song Thaek.

Jang supposedly confessed to plotting a coup against Kim, as well as distributing pornography and failing to clap enthusiastically enough.

Choe was supposedly known by defectors as a notorious womaniser and associate of Jang Song Thaek (pictured)

It is not an uncommon practice for the rogue nation who often delete records of dissenters. Pictured: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting nuclear warheads at an undisclosed location (undated)

'Apparently Choe was a promiscuous playboy in high political circles in Pyongyang,' Gabroussenko wrote.

'Jo may have even fathered other love children with the upper echelons of the Pyongyang elite, rumours suggest, and some defectors even say he leveraged these connections for unspecified financial schemes involving Workers' Party officials.'

This is not an uncommon practice for the rogue nation who often delete records of dissenters from its libraries, or destroy films featuring disgraced actors.

Gabroussenko concluded: ''The Taehongdang Party Secretary' series is likely just the tip of the spear of efforts to entirely realign North Korean films of old with the regime's values and priorities in 2023.'

Daily Mail · by Christian Oliver · April 7, 2023

14. Korean refugee raised among US troops comes full circle as professor on military base through global campus

Korean refugee raised among US troops comes full circle as professor on military base through global campus

Stars and Stripes · by Sabrina LeBoeuf · April 6, 2023

Choungja Lee, a professor with the University of Maryland Global Campus, teaches Korean to U.S. service members stationed in South Korea. (University of Maryland Global Campus/Facebook)

BALTIMORE, Md. (Tribune News Service) — Every Tuesday and Thursday, Cpt. Andrew Winters ends the long workday with a three-hour Korean-language class. On days when he debates skipping, he reminds himself who his teacher is.

Choungja Lee, a native of North Korea, grew up in a South Korean orphanage, where U.S. soldiers taught the children English. Today, she teaches Korean to the current generation of American soldiers stationed in South Korea.

“I have to go to class,” Winters said, citing Lee as his main motivation for continuing to learn Korean.

Lee, a professor through the University of Maryland Global Campus, commutes two hours each way for the evening class and offers free tutoring to her students on weekends. Her lively manner and eagerness to share about her upbringing make the class engaging, Winters said.

UMGC hosts the class at Camp Humphreys, the largest overseas U.S. Military installation in the world, located in western South Korea, according to the U.S. Army. Although Lee doesn’t have the opportunity to decorate the multipurpose classroom at the base’s education center, Winters said she adds her own flair, sometimes bringing in Korean ginseng candies to share with her students. Lee said this brings back memories of when U.S. soldiers shared snacks with her as a child.

Her pedagogical skills were honored last month when she was awarded the Stanley J. Drazek Teaching Excellence Award, UMGC’s highest honor. Lee, who has taught with UMGC since 1992, was one of nine faculty members worldwide to be awarded.

“It couldn’t be better,” she said of teaching at UMGC. “I like my job as a teacher. American soldiers — I am so happy that I can see them.”

Lee, 83, was born in Pyeonganbuk-do, a northwestern province of North Korea, and at a young age was taken to a South Korean orphanage with her younger brother. She remembers little except for the U.S. soldiers at Camp Page who helped provide her comfort.

For many years, Lee only had an elementary school education. After getting married, giving birth to her son and enrolling him in school, she grew tired of filling out forms asking for her highest level of education and writing the same answer.

“I made up my mind,” she said. “I will never, ever, never ever write my education background to be elementary school only.”

Lee completed her GED, commuting 75 miles daily to do so, on top of working several jobs. She then decided to attend university, for some years at the same time as her son. Lee earned her undergraduate degree in English language and literature and her masters degree in English education. She also conducted part of her education at Harvard University, all because she wanted to improve her English skills.

Having been a working student, Lee said she better understands where her students are coming from because the soldiers attend class after working.

She also teaches military spouses, like Shelsy Guerrero, who took the class in 2021. Guerrero moved to South Korea with her husband, a member of the Army, and was stationed there for two years. She remembers being nervous to take the class, then seeing how Lee creates a judgement-free classroom.

“She made it seem easy,” Guerrero said.

Winters said Lee does a great job of keeping the class engaging as the difficulty level increases and the class sizes decrease. He said in his current class of four students, Lee noticed the students needing a change of pace, so she moved them all to a table together and started up a conversation in Korean.

Lee also shows care for her students beyond their academic performance, students said.

Guerrero said she connected with Lee’s story because hers is similar: She moved to the U.S. from Mexico as a young child and knew the struggle of being brought to a new country. Guerrero said her Korean teacher inspired her to pursue her masters degree at New Haven University in Colorado, and the two still exchange emails.

After he learned Lee is Catholic, Winters asked if she wanted to attend his baptism, meaning she’d have to commute on a Saturday.

Winters said she agreed without hesitation.

“With everything that goes on in the world, it’s nice to have people who obviously care about other people,” Winters said. “The beautiful story about Ms. Lee is that genuine, caring soul that wants to make the world a better place, even though [there are] no obligations to do any of it.”

©2023 Baltimore Sun.

Visit baltimoresun.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Sabrina LeBoeuf · April 6, 2023

15. Canada Deploys Military Aircraft to Japan to Implement North Korea Sanctions

Canada Deploys Military Aircraft to Japan to Implement North Korea Sanctions

By U.S. News Staff U.S. News & World Report

April 6, 2023

View Original

Canada's Minister of National Defence Anita Anand speaks during Question Period in the House of Commons on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, March 22, 2022. REUTERS/Patrick DoyleReuters

By Kanishka Singh

(Reuters) - Canada on Thursday said it will deploy a military aircraft to Japan to support implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea.

Deployment of the Royal Canadian Air Force CP-140 Aurora Aircraft was announced by Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand.

For about six weeks, the CP-140 Aurora will monitor for suspected maritime sanctions evasion activities, in particular ship-to-ship transfers of fuel and other commodities banned by the Security Council, the Canadian government said.

North Korea has been under U.N. sanctions since 2006 over its ballistic missile and nuclear programs.

Late in March, North Korea tested a new nuclear-capable underwater attack drone, its state media reported, as leader Kim Jong Un warned joint military drills by South Korea and the U.S. should stop.

China and Russia have also blamed joint military drills by the United States and South Korea for provoking Pyongyang. Meanwhile, Washington has accused Beijing and Moscow of emboldening North Korea by shielding it from more sanctions.

For the past several years, the Security Council has been divided over how to deal with Pyongyang. Russia and China, veto powers along with the United States, Britain and France, have said more sanctions will not help and want such measures to be eased.

(Reporting by Kanishka Singh in Washington; Editing by David Gregorio)

Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.

Tags: South Korea, United Nations, Canada, North Korea, Russia, United States, international trade, Europe, Japan

​16. The daughter who fled North Korea to find her mother

The daughter who fled North Korea to find her mother

BBC · by Menu

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• 1 day ago

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Image source, BBC/ Hosu Lee

Image caption,

Songmi Park, now 21, is among the most recent North Korean escapees to make it to Seoul

By Jean Mackenzie

Seoul correspondent

Songmi Park dug her toes into the edge of the riverbank as she prepared to cross.

She knew she was supposed to be afraid. The river was deep, and the current looked strong. If she was caught she would certainly be punished, perhaps even shot. But she felt a pull far stronger than her fear. She was leaving North Korea to find her mother, who had left her behind as a child.

As Songmi waded through the icy water at dusk, she felt as if she was flying.

It was 31 May 2019. "How can I forget the best and worst day of my life?" she says.

Escaping North Korea is a dangerous and difficult feat. In recent years Kim Jong Un has clamped down harder on those trying to flee. Then, at the outset of the pandemic, he sealed the country's borders, making Songmi, then 17, one of the last known people to make it out.

This was the second time Songmi had crossed the Yalu River, which separates North Korea from China, providing escapees with their easiest route out.

The first time she left she was strapped to her mother's back as a child. Those memories are still as piercing as if they were yesterday .

She remembers hiding at a relative's pig farm in China, when the state police came looking for them. She remembers her mother and father pleading not to be sent back. "Send me instead," the relative had cried. The police beat him until his face bled.

Back in North Korea, she remembers her father with his hands cuffed behind his back. And she remembers standing on the train station platform, watching both her parents be transported to one of North Korea's infamous prison camps. She was four years old.

Songmi was sent to live with her father's parents on their farm in Musan, a North Korean town half-an-hour from the Chinese border. Going to school was not an option, they told her. Education is free in Communist North Korea, but families are often expected to bribe teachers, and Songmi's grandparents could not afford to.

Instead she spent her childhood roaming the countryside, hunting for clovers to feed the rabbits on the farm. She was often sick, even during summer. "I didn't eat much and so my immunity was low," she says. "But when I woke up from my sickness my grandmother would always have left me a snack on the windowsill."

Image source, Courtesy Songmi Park

Image caption,

Songmi with her mother as a toddler

One evening, five years after the train rolled out of the station bound for the prison camp, her father slipped softly into bed behind her, wrapping her in his arms. She buzzed with excitement. Life could begin again. But three days later, he died. His time in prison had chipped away at his health.

When Songmi's mother, Myung-hui, arrived home the following week to find her husband dead, she was distraught. She made an unthinkable decision. She would try to escape North Korea again. Alone.

On the morning her mother left, Songmi says she could sense something was different. Her mother had dressed strangely, in her grandmother's clothes. "I didn't know what she was planning but I knew that if she left, I wouldn't see her for a long time," she says. As her mother walked out of the house, Songmi curled under her bedsheet and cried.

The next 10 years were to be her toughest.

Within two years her grandfather had died. Now she was alone at the age of 10, caring for her bed-ridden grandmother, with no source of income: "One by one my family were disappearing. It was so scary."

In times of desperation, if you know what to look for, the dense mountains of North Korea can provide meagre sustenance. Every morning Songmi began the two-hour walk up into the mountains, hunting for plants to eat and sell. Certain herbs could be sold as medicine at her local market, but first they needed to be washed, trimmed, and dried by hand, meaning she worked late into the night.

"I couldn't work or plan for tomorrow. Every day I was trying not to starve, to survive the day."

Just 300 miles away, as the crow flies, Myung-hui had arrived in South Korea.

Having journeyed for a year through China and then into neighbouring Laos, then Thailand, she reached a South Korean embassy.

The South Korean government, which has an agreement to resettle North Korean escapees, flew her to Seoul. She settled in the industrial town of Ulsan on the south coast. Desperate to earn money that could pay for her daughter's escape, she cleaned the inside of ships at a ship-building factory every day without rest. Escaping from North Korea is expensive. It requires a middleman who can help to navigate the hurdles, and money to bribe anyone who gets in the way.

At night Myung-hui would sit alone in the dark and think about her daughter, about what she was doing, and what she looked like. Songmi's birthdays were the hardest. She would take a doll from the cupboard and talk to it, pretending it was her daughter, looking for some way to keep their connection alive.

As Songmi's mother recounts their time apart, from the safety of her kitchen table, she starts to cry. Her daughter strokes her arm. "Stop crying, all your pretty make-up is getting ruined," she says.

After paying a broker £17,000 ($20,400), Myung-hui was finally able to arrange her daughter's escape. Suddenly, Songmi's decade of waiting, with dwindling hope, was over.

After crossing the Yalu River into China, she kept herself hidden, stealthily moving between locations at night, afraid of being caught once more. She rode a bus over the mountains and into Laos, where she took shelter in a church, before making it to the South Korean embassy. She slept at the embassy for another three months, before being flown to South Korea. When she arrived, she spent months in a resettlement facility, which is typical for North Korean escapees. The whole journey took one year but, to Songmi, it felt like 10.

Finally reunited, she and her mother sit eating bowls of Myung-hui's homemade noodles in a spicy, cold broth.

The classic North Korean dish is Songmi's favourite. In contrast to her mother's guilt, Songmi radiates an infectious energy. She laughs and jokes as she comforts her mother, concealing any sign of her childhood trauma.

"The day before I was released from the resettlement centre, I was so nervous. I wasn't sure what I would say to my mother," she says. "I wanted to look pretty in front of her, but I'd gained so much weight during my defection and my hair was a mess."

"I was really nervous too," Myung-hui admits.

In fact Myung-hui didn't recognise her daughter, whom she had last seen when she was eight. Now she was meeting an 18-year-old.

Media caption,

'Why did you leave me behind?' Songmi asks her mother

"Here she was in front of me, so I just accepted this must be her," Myung-hui says. "There was so much I wanted to say, but the words wouldn't come out. I just hugged her and said, 'Well done, you've gone through so much to get here'".

Songmi says her mind went blank. "We just cried and hugged for 15 minutes. The whole process felt like a dream".

As Songmi and her mother work to build their relationship from scratch, there is one question Songmi has never mustered the courage to ask. It is a question she has asked herself every day since she was eight years old.

Now, as they slurp the remainders of their lunch, she cautiously allows the words to escape.

"Why did you leave me?"

Nervously, Myung-hui starts to explain. Their first escape had been her idea. How could she then return home from prison to live with her in-laws, reminding them every day that she had survived, when their son had died? She had no money, and could not see a way for her and Songmi to survive alone.

"I wanted to bring you, but the broker said no children," she says. "And, if we got caught again, we would both suffer. So I asked your grandmother to watch you for a year."

"I see," Songmi says, her eyes cast down. "Only one year became 10."

"Yes," her mother nods.

"That morning I left, my feet wouldn't move, but your grandfather hurried me along. He told me to get out. I want you to know, I didn't abandon you. I wanted to provide you with a better life. This seemed like the right choice."

This choice might seem unthinkable to anyone living outside North Korea. But these are the gut-wrenching decisions and risks people must take in order to escape - and it is getting tougher. The government, under the leadership of Kim Jong Un, has increased security along the border and imposed harsher punishments on those who are caught trying to escape.

Before 2020 more than 1,000 North Koreans would make it to South Korea every year. In 2020, the year Songmi arrived, the number had fallen to 229.

When the pandemic broke out early that year, North Korea sealed its borders and banned people from travelling around the country. Soldiers along the border were ordered to shoot and kill anyone they spotted trying to escape. Last year just 67 North Koreans arrived in the South, most of whom had left the North before the pandemic.

Songmi was one of the last to make it out before the borders closed. Her memories are therefore valuable, as they offer a recent and an increasingly rare insight into life inside the world's most secretive state.

She recalls how the summers were getting hotter. By 2017, the crops started to dry out and die, leaving nothing to eat between autumn and spring. But farmers were still expected to hand over the same crop yield to the government each year, which meant being left with less, sometimes nothing, to eat. They began to forage in the mountains for food. Some eventually chose to give up farming.

Those who worked in the mine, the other main source of employment in her hometown of Musan, fared worse, she says. The international sanctions imposed on North Korea in 2017, after it tested nuclear weapons, meant no-one could buy the mine's iron ore. The mine almost ceased to operate, and workers stopped receiving their wages. They would sneak into the mine at night, she says, to steal parts, which they could flog. They didn't know how to find food in the wild, like those working the land did.

Image source, Getty Images

Image caption,

Songmi spent much of her life in North Korea in Musan

But by 2019, the biggest fear, other than finding enough food to survive was being caught watching foreign films and TV programmes. These have long been smuggled into the North, and provide citizens with a glimpse of the enticing world that exists beyond their borders. Images of glamourous modern-day South Korea, portrayed in K-dramas, pose the biggest threat to the government.

"Watching a South Korean film would have got you a fine or perhaps sent to a regular prison for two or three years, but by 2019 watching the same movie would get you sent to a political prison camp," Songmi says.

She was found with an Indian film on a USB stick, but managed to convince the security officer that she hadn't known the film was on there, and escaped with a fine. Her friend was not so fortunate. One day, in June 2022, after arriving in South Korea, Songmi received a call from her friend's mother.

"She told me my friend had been caught with a copy of Squid Game, and because she was the one who had been distributing it, she had been executed," Songmi says.

Songmi's account tallies with recent reports from North Korea of people being executed for distributing foreign shows.

"It seems the situation is even scarier than when I was there. People are being shot or sent to camps for having South Korean media, regardless of their age," she says.

Adjusting to life in capitalist, free-wheeling South Korea is often a struggle for North Koreans. It is alienatingly different to anything they have experienced. But Songmi is taking it remarkably in her stride.

She misses her friends, who she could not tell she was leaving. She misses dancing with them, and the games they used to play with rocks in the dirt.

"When you meet friends in South Korea you just go shopping or drink coffee," she says, a little disparagingly.

What has helped Songmi to integrate is her steadfast belief that she is no different to her South Korean peers.

"After travelling for months through China and Laos, I felt as though I was an orphan, being sent off to live in a foreign country," she says. But when she landed at the airport in Seoul the ground staff greeted her with a familiar "an-nyeong-ha-say-yo".

Image source, Courtesy Songmi

The word for hello, used in both North and South Korea, blew her away: "I realised we are the same people in the same land. I hadn't come to a different country. I had just travelled south."

She sat in the airport and cried for 10 minutes.

Songmi says she has now found her purpose - to advocate for the two Koreas to be reunited. This is the future that South Koreans are told to dream of, but many do not buy into the dream. The more time passes since the country was divided, the fewer people, particularly the young, see the need for it to come back together.

Songmi visits schools to teach students about the North. She asks who among them has thought about reunification, and typically only a few hands go up. But when she asks them to draw a map of Korea, most sketch the outline of the entire peninsula, including the North and South. This gives her hope.

As Songmi settles into her relationship with her mother, there are only small glimpses of strain. The pair frequently laugh and hug, and Songmi dries her mother's tears as they explore the painful details of each other's past.

Her mother's choice was the right one, Songmi says, because they are both now living happily in South Korea.

Myung-hui may not have been able to recognise her daughter initially, but the pair look strikingly alike. Now she can see her 19-year-old self in her daughter.

Their relationship is more like a friendship or one of sisters. Songmi enjoys telling Myung-hui all the details of her dates.

It is only when they argue that it hits her.

"Then I'm like, wow, I really am living with my mother," she says, laughing.

Additional reporting, filming and editing by Hosu Lee.

BBC · by Menu

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com