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Quotes of the Day:
“Every SF group at full strength possesses capabilities to establish a special forces operating base (SFOB) and two or more satellites, called forward operating bases (FOB), assisted by company and battalion headquarters, known as B and C detachments. Cross-trained experts in each 12- man A detachment (54 per group at full strength) excel at five fundamental pursuits: light weapons, demolitions, field communications, combat intelligence, and paramedical support. Personnel consequently are proficient at raids, ambushes, and sabotage, but employing Green Berets for such purposes when suitable alternatives are available wastes their special talent, which is to develop, organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous military and paramilitary forces in unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID). UW assists selected insurgents and resistance movements, with particular attention to subversion, other underground/auxiliary activities, and guerrilla tactics. FID assists friends with counterinsurgency efforts, including military assistance and civic action. Unique reconnaissance and intelligence skills are essential in both instances. So is escape and evasion.
‘Force multiplication’ rather than direct force application, in short, is the special forces forte. Units can perform such functions as an adjunct to nuclear, chemical, and conventional operations during mid¬– and high– intensity combat, but their primary purpose is low intensity conflict of types just described.”
-John M. Collins, United States and Soviet Special Operations, p.24 (1987)
"Remote area operations are operations undertaken in insurgent-controlled or contested areas to establish islands of popular support for the HN government and deny support to the insurgents. They differ from consolidation operations in that they are not designed to establish permanent HN government control over the area. Remote areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups. They may be in the interior of the HN or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally involve the use of specially trained paramilitary or irregular forces. SF teams support remote area operations to interdict insurgent activity, destroy insurgent base areas in the remote area, and demonstrate that the HN government has not conceded control to the insurgents. They also collect and report information concerning insurgent intentions in more populated areas. In this case, SF teams advise and assist irregular HN forces operating in a manner similar to the insurgents themselves, but with access to superior combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources"
(From FM 3-05.202 Foreign Internal Defense 2007.) (NOTE: No longer in current FID Doctrine)
"It's no surprise that hackers working for North Korea, Iran's mullahs, Vladimir V. Putin in Russia, and the People's Liberation Army of China have all learned that the great advantage of cyberweapons is that they are the opposite of a nuke: hard to detect, easy to deny, and increasingly finely targeted."
- David E. Sanger
1. N. Korea fires 1 SRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military
2. N. Korea's 'SA-5 missile' fired across NLL similar to Russia's missile used in Ukraine war: S. Korean military
3. S. Korean, U.S., Japanese nuclear envoys condemn N.K.'s missile launch
4. Prosecution takes into custody head of NGO over allegations of smuggling currency into N. Korea
5. Analysis: North Korea's missile launches show no scarcity of weapons funding, materials despite sanctions
6. South Korea to announce Indo-Pacific strategy at the ASEAN Summit
7. Opinion | As war rages in Ukraine, the world is realigning. Exhibit A: North Korea.
8. Sloppiness Persists in the Military
9. State-run arms developer to build new missile testing facility amid NK threats
10. S. Korea to hold memorial event in Busan for UN war veterans
11. US reissues sanctions on Tornado Cash, tying it to North Korea's nuclear weapons program
12. Yoon works hard on ROK-US alliance and Korea-Japan relations
13. N. Korea continues to earn foreign currency by exporting coal
14. North Korea, dangerous but broke
15. A realistic way to address the nuclear crisis
16. [INTERVIEW] North Korea emboldened by Russia's defense at UN Security Council: expert
17. N. Korea investigates reasons behind S. Pyongan Province’s poor grain yields
18. Korea falls in love with NATO
1. N. Korea fires 1 SRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military
I wonder about the north Korean "industrial base." How many missiles of each type do they have in stock? How many missiles of each type can they produce? What kind of production timeframe do they have? What kind of production level can they sustain?
Kim's continued missile test launches is going to make people grow weary of the north's actions, if they already don't have "north Korea fatigue." The international community may now be "inoculated" against SRBMs and MRBMs since there have been so many of them. Can we use that to our advantage?
(3rd LD) N. Korea fires 1 SRBM toward East Sea: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with more info in paras 5-9)
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- North Korea launched one short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) toward the East Sea on Wednesday, South Korea's military said.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said it detected the launch from an area in or around Sukchon, South Pyongan Province, at around 3:31 p.m.
The North's latest provocation came as ballots are being counted in the U.S. mid-term elections. The South's military has been staging computer-simulated Taegeuk drills since Monday.
Pyongyang launched 35 missiles into the East and Yellow Seas between last Wednesday and Saturday in protest against an massive combined air exercise of the U.S. and South Korea, called Vigilant Storm.
The JCS said the latest missile flew 290 km at apogee of 30 km at top speed of Mach 6 and struck an uninhabited island in waters off the coast of the North's South Hamgyong Province.
The missile is assumed to be one of Pyongyang's new SRBMs, such as KN-23 or KN-24, according to defense authorities.
The JCS said it detected multiple North Korean warplanes flying around the missile's impact area and is analyzing whether the air drill was related to the missile launch.
"South Korea and the United States held a joint meeting and closely shared details of the situation after North Korea fired a ballistic missile and reaffirmed to strengthen the joint defense posture against North Korea's threats and provocations," the JCS said.
"A series of North Korean ballistic missile launches is a grave act of provocation that harms peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the international community, and a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions," the JCS added, calling on Pyongyang to stop such destabilizing acts.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
2. N. Korea's 'SA-5 missile' fired across NLL similar to Russia's missile used in Ukraine war: S. Korean military
SA-5 - note that is a surface to air missile. It is not a missile for "precision" strike against targets in the South. It is an air defense weapon to shoot down aircraft but as noted it can be used as a surface to surface weapon.
Excerpts:
The debris is around 3 meters long and 2 meters wide, and assessed to be that of an "SA-5" surface-to-air missile, given its appearance and feature, it said.
The retrieved remnant of the missile had Russian writing on it, suggesting the North assembled imported parts of the weapon developed in the Soviet Era. The SA-5 is known to have a maximum range of 260-300 kilometers, flying at an apogee of some 40 km.
"Whether this missile is Russian-made or not cannot be confirmed," a military official told reporters on background.
...
The SA-5 type, also known as the S-200, was developed by the Soviet Union in 1967 and uses a liquid-fuel main engine.
It can be used for a ground-to-ground strike purpose, and Russia recently used a similar missile in its war in Ukraine, the ministry added.
(2nd LD) N. Korea's 'SA-5 missile' fired across NLL similar to Russia's missile used in Ukraine war: S. Korean military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · November 9, 2022
(ATTN: UPDATES with more details throughout)
By Kim Soo-yeon and Chae Yun-hwan
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- The North Korean missile that flew across its de facto maritime border with South Korea last week has been found to be an "SA-5" type similar to that used by Russia in the Ukraine war, South Korea's military said Wednesday.
The defense ministry announced the results of an interagency analysis of the debris of a missile that North Korea fired southward on Nov. 2 past the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the East Sea.
The debris is around 3 meters long and 2 meters wide, and assessed to be that of an "SA-5" surface-to-air missile, given its appearance and feature, it said.
The retrieved remnant of the missile had Russian writing on it, suggesting the North assembled imported parts of the weapon developed in the Soviet Era. The SA-5 is known to have a maximum range of 260-300 kilometers, flying at an apogee of some 40 km.
"Whether this missile is Russian-made or not cannot be confirmed," a military official told reporters on background.
Another official said, "The missile's accuracy is relatively lower than that of the North's new SRBMs. Its trajectory is at a level where it can be intercepted by our military's interception system."
The Navy used a remotely-operated underwater vehicle to salvage the debris Sunday, which included the missile's four main wings, and parts of its liquid fuel tank, the engine and the nozzle.
The SA-5 type, also known as the S-200, was developed by the Soviet Union in 1967 and uses a liquid-fuel main engine.
It can be used for a ground-to-ground strike purpose, and Russia recently used a similar missile in its war in Ukraine, the ministry added.
The ministry "strongly" condemned the North's SA-5 missile firing as a violation of the inter-Korean military agreement signed on Sept. 19, 2018, to reduce border tensions.
"Our military will not tolerate any North Korean provocation that poses a threat to our nationals' lives and safety. We will sternly deal with it with overwhelming capabilities based on the Seoul-Washington alliance," the ministry said.
The military had initially assessed the missile at the time of its launch as an SRBM based on its trajectory, saying it marks the first time the North has sent a ballistic missile toward the South since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War. It flew 190 km at an apogee of over 100 km, it said.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · November 9, 2022
3. S. Korean, U.S., Japanese nuclear envoys condemn N.K.'s missile launch
Perhaps if north Korea keeps up their provocations it will drive trilateral cooperation toward a trilateral alliance - which neither north Korea nor CHina would like. Kim should beware of second and third order effects. (But I am probably being way too optimistic).
S. Korean, U.S., Japanese nuclear envoys condemn N.K.'s missile launch | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- The top South Korean, U.S. and Japanese nuclear envoys condemned North Korea's firing of a short-range ballistic missile toward the East Sea Wednesday during their phone talks, according to Seoul's foreign ministry.
Kim Gunn, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, had phone calls with his American counterpart, Sung Kim, and his Japanese counterpart, Takehiro Funakoshi, to discuss responses to the North's latest missile launch.
The envoys agreed North Korea's provocations violate United Nations Security Council Resolutions and cannot be justified. They promised to strengthen cooperation to respond to possible additional threats.
The North's latest provocation came as ballots are being counted in the U.S. mid-term elections and the South's military has been staging computer-simulated Taegeuk drills since Monday.
Pyongyang launched 35 missiles into the East and Yellow Seas between last Wednesday and Saturday in protest against a massive combined air exercise of the U.S. and South Korea, called Vigilant Storm.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
4. Prosecution takes into custody head of NGO over allegations of smuggling currency into N. Korea
What is not clear to me from this article (and this is the first report I have seen on this incident) is whether the money was intended to support the regime or was intended for Korean people in the north to help them. If the money was intended for the regime then I hope ht full force of Korean law will be applied. But if the money was to help Korean people (e.g., support to the underground for escapes, or provide funds for market activity, or to bribe local party officials to allow markets to flourish, etc). I would like to know the rest of the story. So...
I found this article (https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20221017000225) from last month and it looks like this "NGO" was making deals with the north Korean government (party). So was this for their "profit" or is the group a north Korean "sympathizer?"
Prosecution takes into custody head of NGO over allegations of smuggling currency into N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
SEOUL, Nov. 9 (Yonhap) -- Prosecution took into custody a man suspected of colluding with Ssangbangwool Group to smuggle huge sums of foreign currency into North Korea about three years ago, according to judicial sources.
The Suwon District Prosecutors Office apprehended the chief of the Asia Pacific Exchange Association, a Seoul-based nongovernmental organization, at an unidentified place in Seoul where he was hiding out, on charges of violating the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act.
Prosecutors have been investigating allegations that Ssangbangwool, South Korea's leading underwear company, secretly sent millions of U.S. dollars to China in 2019 and that the money was sent to North Korea.
They allege that dozens of Ssangbangwool executives and employees took part in the alleged currency smuggling by hiding dollars inside books on their trips to China to deliver them to North Korea.
Prosecutors suspect the man, only identified by his surname An, played a role in the crime.
Ssangbangwool and the NGO are suspected of handing US$1.5 million and US$500,000, respectively, to the North.
Prosecutors are also looking into possibility that support funds the NGO received from Gyeonggi Province were part of the money sent to the North.
The province surrounding Seoul provided about 2 billion won (US$1.46 million) to the NGO on two occasions between 2018-19 for an event where North Korean officials attended, and delivered flour and saplings to the North.
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 김나영 · November 9, 2022
5. Analysis: North Korea's missile launches show no scarcity of weapons funding, materials despite sanctions
This is because of north Korea's extensive global illicit activities network. We need to be taking aggressive action against this network around the world and help our friends, partners, and allies to take down this network (It takes a network to defeat a network as they say.)
And of course a key theme and message for the information and influence campaign is that the funds that go to missile tests could be used to feed the Korean people and ease their suffering. Kim deliberately denies the welfare of the people over support to his muscle (and nuclear) program.
Analysis: North Korea's missile launches show no scarcity of weapons funding, materials despite sanctions
Reuters · by Josh Smith
SEOUL, Nov 8 (Reuters) - North Korea's record year of missile launches has shown its willingness to pour resources into producing and deploying more weapons than ever, supported in part by overseas networks that provide funding and material, analysts say.
Last week the country fired more than 80 missiles, including its latest short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and a new variant of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), by far the North's most launches in such a short period.
Although North Korean weapon costs are not known, ICBMs in other countries can cost tens of millions of dollars, and SRBMs such as Russia's Iskander up to $3 million.
Analysts said Pyongyang's willingness to fire such expensive devices into the sea suggests the impoverished country's missile programme faces few hurdles despite being banned by United Nations Security Council resolutions.
North Korea must have either sufficient stocks of fuel and missiles, including complex machinery such as engines and guidance systems, the ability to produce new weapons quickly, or the ability to acquire what it needs from abroad, said Mason Richey of Seoul’s Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.
"Any way you look at it, it underscores how poorly sanctions have performed and are likely to perform in the future," he said.
Many of the missile launches in the past few weeks have been SRBMs unveiled in recent years, some of which appear to have been delivered to operational units. North Korean state media showed older SCUD-type missiles were also fired.
“The fireworks indicate that they have those missiles in numbers in stock,” said Markus Schiller, a Europe-based missile expert.
Even the latest SRBMs are several years old, which means that North Korea could have a stockpile, even if it could only build them at a slow rate, he said. He added that some, such as the KN-25 SRBM, are “definitely designed for production in higher numbers.”
FOREIGN NETWORKS
The scope of foreign assistance to North Korea's missile programme is hotly debated.
South Korea may uncover new clues as to how North Korean missiles are made when it analyses the debris it recovered from an SRBM that fell offshore last week.
When South Korea gathered remnants of North Korean Unha space launch rockets in 2012, it said it found components from Britain, Switzerland, the United States, China, and the former Soviet Union.
Analysts and sanctions experts say North Korea continues to rely on materials and other inputs from overseas.
"Russia and China are where most of the overseas North Korean ballistic missile procurement agents are based," said Hugh Griffiths, a former coordinator for a U.N. panel of experts that monitors sanctions on North Korea, and now an independent sanctions consultant.
On Tuesday the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned two North Koreans working for Air Koryo, the country's flag carrier.
They were accused of procuring and transporting military materials, including electronic parts, from China on behalf of North Korea's Ministry of Rocket Industry and its main intelligence agency, the Reconnaissance General Bureau.
A U.S. government advisory said that among the technology and materials most sought by North Korea were multi-axle heavy vehicles to transport and launch ballistic missiles; steel, aluminium, and speciality materials containing titanium; carbon fibre and filament winders for making lightweight rockets; and solid propellant, including aluminium powder and ammonium perchlorate.
"To obtain these components, North Korea uses an extensive overseas network of procurement agents, including officials who operate from North Korean diplomatic missions or trade offices, as well as third-country nationals and foreign companies," the advisory said.
North Korea wants to import some 100 tons of solid propellant by 2030, according to the advisory. Griffiths said other materials are small, nondescript and easy to smuggle.
"They could be shipped in some instances using fast parcel operators like DHL," he said.
This year the U.S. sanctioned what it called “a network of Russia-based individuals and entities complicit in helping the DPRK procure components for its unlawful ballistic missile systems," including a North Korean diplomat in Moscow.
It also named networks of North Koreans and companies based in Belarus and China.
In responses to the U.N., Russia said it did not have any information on allegations of illicit work. China said it had investigated the claims, and found no evidence.
Both countries have said they enforce the UNSC sanctions.
Reporting by Josh Smith. Editing by Gerry Doyle
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Reuters · by Josh Smith
6. South Korea to announce Indo-Pacific strategy at the ASEAN Summit
It will be interesting (and important) to compare the strategy with a Free and Open INDOPACIFIC.
South Korea to announce Indo-Pacific strategy at the ASEAN Summit
koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · November 9, 2022
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol will present the country’s Indo-Pacific strategy at the biannual Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit slated for later this week, the presidential office said on Wednesday.
In a press briefing, national security adviser Kim Sung-han said Yoon will participate in the summit with leaders of ASEAN countries on Friday in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. There, he will announce the country’s Indo-Pacific strategy and also the government’s new ASEAN policies.
“Yoon’s participation in the ASEAN Summit is meaningful, as he will be presenting South Korea’s specialized Indo-Pacific strategy,” Kim said.
“In the past six months (since inauguration), our diplomatic policy largely developed over the idea of alliance and multilateral diplomacy based on freedom and solidarity. Now we are finishing drafting the basic framework of Yoon’s diplomatic policies by completing the puzzle with regional diplomacy represented by our Indo-Pacific strategy.”
Yoon is also planning to attend the ASEAN Plus Three Summit and the East Asia Summit that will take place in the two days following the ASEAN Summit on Friday. However, the president specifically chose the ASEAN Summit to present South Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy, keeping the importance of the Southeast Asian region in mind, Kim explained.
“The reason why President Yoon will be presenting the Indo-Pacific strategy first to the ASEAN, along with the country’s Korea-ASEAN alliance plan, is that ASEAN carries that much weight (for South Korea),” Kim added.
Yoon will participate in the ASEAN Plus Three summit on Saturday, and the East Asia Summit on Sunday, before departing for Bali, Indonesia to attend the Group of 20 Summit set for Tuesday, Kim said.
Indo-Pacific strategies presented and implemented by the United States and Japan early on are widely perceived to present the countries’ policy directions aimed at containing China’s growing influence in the region.
Eyes are on whether South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy will include the values pursued by the United States and Japan, with whom South Korea cooperates to conduct trilateral military drills.
On Tuesday, Japanese media outlet Sankei News reported that the leaders of South Korea and Japan are considering discussing Korea's envisioned Indo-Pacific strategy, and confirm cooperation on the realization of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”
The daily said the two governments are coordinating the leaders' meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit, and that they will likely address the FOIP partnership.
Seoul's Foreign Ministry did not confirm Sankei News' report. But Yoon will likely share the "big picture" and vision of Korea's Indo-Pacific strategy at the summit, a Foreign Ministry official said.
The official also explained that the Foreign Ministry has been tasked to create a rough draft of the strategy, but it is the presidential office that makes the final decisions, the official said.
Sankei News said Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will share the FOIP as a common goal for Japan and South Korea in his envisioned meeting with Yoon, stressing the importance of setting an international order based on the rule of law with China in mind.
By Jo He-rim (herim@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Jo He-rim · November 9, 2022q
7. Opinion | As war rages in Ukraine, the world is realigning. Exhibit A: North Korea.
Conclusion:
Kim is indisputably right about one thing. Russia and China are seeking a new world system to replace the U.S.-led “rules-based order,” as Biden calls it. Ukraine is the main front where that battle is being waged, but it isn’t the only one.
Opinion | As war rages in Ukraine, the world is realigning. Exhibit A: North Korea.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · November 9, 2022
In the international battle for power and influence, North Korea is moving ever closer to Russia and China — and abandoning what was once a desire for engagement with the United States. Pyongyang’s hardening position is one more sign of a global realignment taking place in the wake of the war in Ukraine.
As conflict rages in the heart of Europe, the world is dividing more sharply into East and West. The United States’ partnerships are stronger but so is the intensity of the adversarial camp. North Korea and Iran are supplying weapons to an embattled Russia, according to the White House. Swing states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey are trying to hedge their bets between the battling superpowers.
North Korea has been a rogue state since the 1950s, but its recent behavior has been extreme, even by Pyongyang’s standards. It fired volleys of rockets and artillery in October, sent scores of jets aloft to menace South Korea this month, and adopted a new law in September promising a nuclear strike “automatically and immediately” if its leadership is attacked.
Such truculent behavior illustrates one hidden cost of the Ukraine war. With near-daily Russian threats to use nuclear weapons against Kyiv, smaller nations fear they need nuclear weapons for their survival — and know that if they have them, they should never consider giving them up, as Ukraine agreed to in 1994.
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“This war has unfortunately raised the perceived deterrent value of nuclear weapons,” wrote Mayumi Fukushima, a former senior Japanese diplomat and security expert, in an April article in War on the Rocks.
Since the Ukraine conflict began in February, North Korea has taken dramatic steps to toughen its nuclear doctrine, reject any denuclearization negotiations with the United States, and draw closer to the autocratic alliance between Russia and China. Kim Jong Un’s aspirations for a deal with Washington, evidenced by what President Donald Trump called “love letters” pursuing one, appear to have evaporated.
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“All the signs suggest that there has been a fundamental shift in North Korea’s thinking,” argued Robert Carlin, who was for many years the CIA’s leading analyst of North Korea, in a note to me this week. He contends that after the breakdown of Kim’s talks with Trump in Hanoi in 2019, “normal relations with the U.S. no longer seemed attainable … [or] worth the candle. If China was on the rise and the U.S. in decline in the Asia-Pacific, it made no sense for the North to put any eggs in the U.S. basket.”
North Korea, for decades, wanted a U.S. counterweight to Russia and China, but apparently no more. Rachel Minyoung Lee, a Korea analyst with the Stimson Center, argued last week in 38 North that Pyongyang’s recent tilt “seems to spell the end of a strategic decision made 30 years ago by Kim Il Sung to normalize relations with Washington as a buffer against Beijing and Moscow.”
This strategic shift was partly a reaction to the “no limits” friendship pact signed in February by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. Their proclamation of a “new global order,” followed shortly by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, was an “inflection point” for Kim, argues Lee. She quotes Kim’s assessment in a September speech that “the change from a unipolar world advocated by the U.S. into a multipolar world is being accelerated significantly.”
Kim has been newly solicitous of Moscow and Beijing. He quickly endorsed independence for the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine. He backed China’s crackdown on Hong Kong and its menacing moves toward Taiwan. According to Carlin, North Korea’s defense ministry said in August that it would “closely wage strategic and tactical coordinated operations” with the Chinese military.
Kim has raced to bolster North Korea’s own nuclear deterrent. In April, he announced that he would augment his nuclear weapons capability “at the fastest possible speed.” In September came the law mandating a nuclear counterattack if he is ever threatened. Perhaps most important, Kim has rejected any possibility of giving up his nuclear weapons. “We have drawn the line of no retreat regarding our nuclear weapons so there will no longer be any bargaining over them,” he said in a September speech. “There will never be … denuclearization.”
The Biden administration has noted these worrying actions by Pyongyang. But a senior State Department official said on Tuesday that it is “too soon to tell if it’s a fundamental shift” in policy. The administration has signaled North Korea since President Biden took office that it is ready to talk anytime, anywhere, without preconditions. But North Korea hasn’t responded, other than with belligerent public rhetoric and launching more than 60 ballistic missiles this year.
Kim is indisputably right about one thing. Russia and China are seeking a new world system to replace the U.S.-led “rules-based order,” as Biden calls it. Ukraine is the main front where that battle is being waged, but it isn’t the only one.
The Washington Post · by David Ignatius · November 9, 2022
8. Sloppiness Persists in the Military (South Korea)
Conclusion:
Alarmed by the latest failures, the military canceled a second target shooting contest scheduled for Wednesday. It claims the cancelation was due to its need to remain vigilant amid repeated provocations by the North, but there are strong suspicions that top brass called off the event to avoid further embarrassment. Seoul recently signed a contract with the UAE to export W4 trillion worth of homegrown Cheongung-2 interceptor missiles (US$1=W1,385). The repeated failures can only have a negative impact on weapons exports. The Cheongung and Patriot missiles have rarely failed, so the cause of the problem could be the way the military manages and operates them. The whole system needs to be overhauled.
Sloppiness Persists in the Military
english.chosun.com
November 09, 2022 12:56
A series of South Korean missiles misfired when they were launched in response to recent North Korean provocations, leaving the military with egg on its face at a time when the country can ill afford it. After North Korea fired two ballistic missiles on Nov. 2 over the Northern Limit Line, the de-facto maritime border between the two Koreas, South Korea responded by firing five missiles from fighter jets that aimed north. But two of them misfired. One was a SPICE 2000 precision-guided missile launched from a KF-16 and the other a SLAM-ER long-range, air-to-surface missile fired from an F-15K in the same formation. The failures were apparently due to faulty mounting of the missiles under the aircraft. But the military announced only that its retaliatory move was a success.
When North Korea fired a mid-range ballistic missile last month, South Korea responded by launching a Hyunmu-2 missile that ended up veering in the opposite direction and crashing dangerously close to a military base in Gangwon Province. One of two Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles that were launched shortly afterwards got lost after the signal disappeared. But again the military announced that the missiles delivered precision attacks against an imaginary target.
When North Korea fired 25 missiles on Nov. 2, South Korea held a target shooting contest of guided missiles. The homegrown Cheongung-1 surface-to-air missile flew about 25 km and exploded in midair after the signal was lost. Out of six missiles that were fired, only two hit their intended targets, while the remaining four either misfired, got lost or exploded at the wrong time. If the two failed air-to-surface missile launches are included, six out of 11 missiles failed. That is a sorry 45 percent success rate and not much better than Russia's humiliating 40 percent success rate of missiles used against Ukraine. How can it hope to thwart North Korean missile attacks at this rate?
Alarmed by the latest failures, the military canceled a second target shooting contest scheduled for Wednesday. It claims the cancelation was due to its need to remain vigilant amid repeated provocations by the North, but there are strong suspicions that top brass called off the event to avoid further embarrassment. Seoul recently signed a contract with the UAE to export W4 trillion worth of homegrown Cheongung-2 interceptor missiles (US$1=W1,385). The repeated failures can only have a negative impact on weapons exports. The Cheongung and Patriot missiles have rarely failed, so the cause of the problem could be the way the military manages and operates them. The whole system needs to be overhauled.
Read this article in Korean
- Copyright © Chosunilbo & Chosun.com
english.chosun.com
9. State-run arms developer to build new missile testing facility amid NK threats
Excerpts:
South Korea's state-run defense research agency plans to construct a new testing facility for arms development as the country seeks to strengthen the "three-axis" deterrence system to counter North Korea's evolving threats, an informed source said Wednesday.
...
The three-pronged system consists of the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform; the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, a program to target an adversary's leadership in a contingency; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system.
State-run arms developer to build new missile testing facility amid NK threats
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 9, 2022
By Yonhap
Published : Nov 9, 2022 - 09:37 Updated : Nov 9, 2022 - 09:37
(Defense Acquisition Program Administration-Yonhap)
South Korea's state-run defense research agency plans to construct a new testing facility for arms development as the country seeks to strengthen the "three-axis" deterrence system to counter North Korea's evolving threats, an informed source said Wednesday.
The Agency for Defense Development is expected to build the facility at a location near its existing testing site in Taean, 109 kilometers south of Seoul, with an aim of completing the construction in 2026, according to the source.
The national defense committee of the National Assembly has recently approved a proposed budget of some 1.4 billion won ($1.02 million) to support the start of the construction next year. The project would cost a total of around 35 billion won.
The envisioned facility will be designed to test the country's strategic weapons and beef up the three-axis system in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.
The three-pronged system consists of the Kill Chain preemptive strike platform; the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation, a program to target an adversary's leadership in a contingency; and the Korea Air and Missile Defense system.
North Korea has launched a barrage of missiles in recent weeks, including last week's firing of a presumed failed intercontinental ballistic missile, amid growing speculation that it may conduct a nuclear test soon. (Yonhap)
10. S. Korea to hold memorial event in Busan for UN war veterans
Again, as I have written a number of times, I have a lot of respect for the Korean government and how it cares for allied/coalition veterans who helped defend Korea's freedom. I do not know of a country that expends so much effort to honor the veterans who fought to defend the freedom of "a country they never knew and a people they never met”.
S. Korea to hold memorial event in Busan for UN war veterans
koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 9, 2022
By Yonhap
Published : Nov 9, 2022 - 10:00 Updated : Nov 9, 2022 - 10:00
(Yonhap)
South Korea plans to host an annual ceremony this week to commemorate the sacrifices of fallen troops who fought under the UN flag during the 1950-53 Korean War, the veterans affairs ministry said Wednesday.
The Turn Toward Busan ceremony will take place at the UN Memorial Cemetery in the southeastern port city of Busan on Friday, with the attendance of 114 bereaved families and war veterans from 15 countries invited by the ministry.
Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, Veterans Affairs Minister Park Min-shik, United Nations Command Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Andrew Harrison and diplomatic delegates also plan to attend the memorial event first held in 2007.
The event is scheduled to start at 11 a.m. on the day with a minute of silence in remembrance and a 21-gun salute. It will also include an air show by the Black Eagles, the South Korean Air Force's acrobatic flight team.
A Mugunghwa Medal, the highest Order of Civil Merit in South Korea, will be presented to the family of the late Richard Whitcomb, a former US Army general who served in Busan during the war. The government posthumously awarded the state medal to Whitcomb in recognition of his philanthropic efforts in supporting war victims.
The remains of two late veterans from the Netherlands, Mathias Hubertus Hoogenboom and Eduard Julius Engberink, and one late British veteran, James Grundy, will be laid to rest at the cemetery.
The Busan ceremony was born out of a suggestion from Vincent Courtenay, a Canadian veteran of the Korean War. Some 1.95 million UN troops from 22 countries took part in the war, which ended in a truce, not a peace treaty. (Yonhap)
11. US reissues sanctions on Tornado Cash, tying it to North Korea's nuclear weapons program
We must do more.
US reissues sanctions on Tornado Cash, tying it to North Korea's nuclear weapons program
therecord.media · November 8, 2022
US reissues sanctions on Tornado Cash, tying it to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program
The U.S. Treasury Department reissued sanctions on the Tornado Cash cryptocurrency mixer service, accusing the platform of helping North Korean government hackers launder more than $455 million stolen in March 2022.
State Department spokesman Ned Price said the mixer had provided “material support” to the Lazarus Group — a hacking collective U.S. law enforcement agencies believe works on behalf of the North Korean government.
Price said the group’s hacks specifically support North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program.
“The use of Tornado Cash to launder stolen funds represents a larger trend by the DPRK regime to resort to illicit activities, including cyber-enabled heists from virtual currency exchanges and financial institutions, to generate revenue for its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs,” Price said. “The United States is committed to countering the regime’s attempts to raise funds through illicit activity and will continue to take actions against entities facilitating such activity.”
North Korea launched a barrage of missiles last week and threatened to test nuclear missiles after the U.S. and South Korea militaries held training exercises. The missile launches were in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Brian Nelson said the sanctions targets two key nodes of the DPRK’s weapons programs: its increasing reliance on illicit activities, including cybercrime, to generate revenue, and its ability to procure and transport goods in support of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
The U.S. also sanctioned two men – Sok Ri and Zhiyong Yan – for their role in violating sanctions by helping facilitate the sending of missile parts to North Korea.
Tornado Cash was previously sanctioned in August for its role in helping North Korea launcher stolen cryptocurrency from several hacks of decentralized finance platforms over the last year. A spokesperson for the company did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
U.S. Treasury openly accused North Korea of being involved in the $100 million hack of Harmony Bridge and in the theft of about $7.8 million from a cryptocurrency platform called Nomad. Tornado Cash was used to launder funds in both cases.
The U.S. has also previously accused North Korean hackers of being behind the headline-grabbing attack on Ronin Network, which saw almost $600 million in cryptocurrency stolen.
Jonathan has worked across the globe as a journalist since 2014. Before moving back to New York City, he worked for news outlets in South Africa, Jordan and Cambodia. He previously covered cybersecurity at ZDNet and TechRepublic.
therecord.media · November 8, 2022
12. Yoon works hard on ROK-US alliance and Korea-Japan relations
Unfortunately both these important issues do not translate to significant approval ratings from the Korean people living in the South.
Yoon works hard on ROK-US alliance and Korea-Japan relations
donga.com
Posted November. 09, 2022 08:11,
Updated November. 09, 2022 08:11
Yoon works hard on ROK-US alliance and Korea-Japan relations. November. 09, 2022 08:11. by Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com.
The most notable part of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's diplomatic and security moves is its efforts to normalize the ROK-US alliance and restore the Korea-Japan relations.
"The Korea-U.S. relationship has been strengthened into a comprehensive alliance that integrates security and economy," said an official from the presidential office. The leaders of the United States and South Korea held a summit meeting 11 days after the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in May, followed by the NATO summit in June and the United Nations General Assembly in September to agree on comprehensive economic cooperation. The level of security cooperation has also been significantly lifted, with the two countries agreeing to deploy U.S. strategic assets on time at the recent Korea-U.S. Annual Security Council Meeting (SCM).
Korea-Japan relations are also under recovery. The two nations are discussing the issue of forced labor victims during the Japanese occupation. Some observers predict that the two leaders will meet and begin consultations this month, such as at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit. However, some pessimists also project that it will be challenging to make progress practically due to the significant differences between the two countries over Japan's not being a contrite issue.
Yet, Korea-China relations are considered to be a stumbling block. Potential issues of contention highlighted include the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s sympathizing with the U.S. policy of containment against China by setting the “Ahn Mi Gyeong Se” (security for the United States, economy for the world) from “Ahn Mi Gyeong Joong” (security for the United States, economy for China). Gaps in positions over the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System) issue may also hinder bilateral relations.
The Yoon Suk-yeol administration tried to improve relations with North Korea by presenting the “Bold Initiative,” a roadmap for North Korea’s nuclear program. However, North Korea responded with concentrated provocations. The fact that there is no clear deterrence plan against North Korea is also a diplomatic and security issue that the current administration must resolve.
한국어
donga.com
13. N. Korea continues to earn foreign currency by exporting coal
N. Korea continues to earn foreign currency by exporting coal
Chinese traders are paying North Korea an average of USD 50 a ton for smuggled coal
By Seulkee Jang - 2022.11.09 10:00am
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: Lines of coal briquettes in North Korea. (Daily NK)
Despite international sanctions, North Korea is continuing to earn foreign currency by exporting coal. The country’s authorities have reportedly been pushing coal exports with greater enthusiasm as of late, even with North Korean coal fetching bare bottom prices due to the collapse of international coal prices.
According to a source in China on Friday, Chinese traders are paying North Korea an average of USD 50 a ton for smuggled coal.
Though North Korea was getting USD 100 a ton from China as recently as August, the price halved over the course of September.
Not only have world coal prices fallen, but with contraband exports of North Korean coal to China rising, prices of North Korean coal have fallen, too.
In fact, with North Korea trying to smuggle more and more coal to China, Chinese traders are sometimes even unilaterally lowering prices.
A source in North Pyongan Province said some companies are even selling coal to China for USD 40 a ton, depending on the circumstances.
Nevertheless, the source told Daily NK that because coal is North Korea’s biggest foreign currency earner – and because China is practically the only buyer – North Korea is trying to sell as much coal as possible to China at prices set by the Chinese side, even if those prices are low.
According to data from Bloomberg Terminal, relatively cheap Indonesian coal was selling for USD 331 a ton as of Oct. 31. Compared to this, North Korea is selling its coal to China at roughly one sixth the price. Moreover, North Korea is smuggling high-quality, NAR 6,000 kcal/kg coal.
RISING COAL PRICES INSIDE N. KOREA
Inside North Korea, coal prices are rising due to low supply, according to a source in North Pyongan Province. The source said that a ton of coal was selling for USD 40–50 in Sinuiju as of Oct. 25. The domestic price of coal has risen so much that it roughly equals the export price.
The domestic coal price is usually cheaper than the export price, but with little coal in domestic circulation and demand rising for the winter, the local price has risen to the export price.
The source said with domestic coal selling for more than USD 35 a ton at the point of production, the price climbs the further one goes from the mines.
If coal for export were diverted to domestic use, North Koreans would be able to purchase coal for slightly lower prices, but North Korea is having a tougher time earning foreign currency.
Now, with December approaching, North Korean trading companies must export as much coal as possible to China — and quickly — to meet their foreign currency quotas ahead of year-end reviews.
Another source in North Korea said in the past, you could buy coal for USD 10 a ton when prices were low, but now prices are USD 30 to 40 higher.
“It looks like preparing for winter will be tough, so I worry,” she said.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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14. North Korea, dangerous but broke
north Korea is desperate. We must not overreact. And north Korea has not won and will not win.
Conclusion:
The chain missile launches represent the desperation of Kim as he runs out of time. If he had been that confident of victory, he needed not provoke. The North’s economy is presumed to have gone back to 1995 levels at the beginning of the Arduous March. As it peaked between 1997 and 1998, two to three years from now is a critical period for Kim. He could be forced to choose between nuclear weapons and the economy.
We must not overreact to North Korea in a panicky manner. Its belligerence was expected. We just wasted a few years, naively believing that Kim Jong-un would easily give up nuclear weapons. We must raise our vigilance and our military deterrence while keeping cool. Creating a crisis-like ambience and fissures in the South Korea-U.S. alliance are what North Korea wants.
Thinking North Korea has won the game is not just misleading but dangerous. If such an argument gains ground, Kim would believe his tactics have succeeded and ratchet up the level of military provocations. We must not be awed by the fireworks he has demonstrated, but build an insightful strategy based on what he is hiding.
Wednesday
November 9, 2022
dictionary + A - A
North Korea, dangerous but broke
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/11/09/opinion/columns/north-korea-nuclear-weapons/20221109200054137.html
Kim Byung-yeon
The author is a professor of economics and head of the Institute for Future Strategy at Seoul National University.
Global efforts to denuclearize North Korea are in doubt. In a recent article titled “North Korea has already won,” the Financial Times quoted security experts who claimed that the U.S. and allies must admit to their defeat in the campaign to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. Some assert that South Korea must concentrate on avoiding a military clash with North Korea by accepting its status as a nuclear power. Since the working-level talks with the U.S. in Stockholm in October 2019, North Korea has not engaged in any dialogue. In September, it has legislated a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. The country recently fired a barrage of shells and missiles of all ranges.
If you only look at what the North wants to show to the rest of the world, North Korea policy fails. Instead, we must see through what its leader Kim Jong-un wants to hide. Pyongyang is moving strategically for the goal of winning international recognition as a nuclear weapons state. It is busy flaunting its muscle, or diverse types of nuclear weapons, while hiding its inner weaknesses, or economic failures, to pressure South Korea and the U.S. to give up denuclearization campaign and instead strike a nuclear arms reduction deal in return for removal of sanctions.
The opportunity cost of nuclear development on the economy would be over 1 trillion won ($724 million) annually. The North Korean economy is projected to have grown 2 to 3 percent annually through 2016, before international sanctions were imposed. From 2017, the economy is presumed to have contracted 3 to 4 percent a year. When assuming its gross national income at 20 trillion won in the mid-2010s, about 5 percent, or 1 trillion won, would have been lost by nuclear development. The future is bleaker. As long as the state is under sanctions, the economy cannot get out of the slump. Without surrendering nuclear weapons, sanctions won’t be lifted and no foreign country would wish to invest in the country.
No dictators triumphed over the economy. After taking power through the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Vladimir Lenin immediately put into action its extreme socialist theories. He did away with currencies and markets, nationalized industries, and centralized the economy. He withdrew his policies four years later when manufacturing output fell 70 percent. Lenin reintroduced the currency and market systems and allowed private ownership of land and small enterprises. He scrapped much of the centralized plans.
Mao Zedong had to surrender his chairmanship when his Great Leap Forward initiative to turn China from an agrarian country to an industrialized one led to massive starvation and deaths of more than 25 million.
The Korean Central News Agency, North Korea’s state mouthpiece, said Kim Jong-un guided a successful test-firing of an advanced ICBM on March 24. [YONHAP]
After ascending to the throne from the unexpected death of his father, Kim Jong-un cannot wield power as charismatic revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao. Kim would have been in a rush to show his capability through fast achievements to ensure his lengthy rule. For him, nuclear weapons are more like a debt than an asset.
His offensives are not deemed that menacing either. Some could think North Korea has triumphed with the advances in missiles and nuclear weapons. But military power is relative. Though North Korea has become stronger, South Korea’s conventional military power also has strengthened. The greater the North’s threat, the stronger the U.S. extended deterrence. War hinges on resources. North Korea’s economy is just 1 percent of South Korea’s. Expensive nuclear development would have widened the gap.
The chain missile launches represent the desperation of Kim as he runs out of time. If he had been that confident of victory, he needed not provoke. The North’s economy is presumed to have gone back to 1995 levels at the beginning of the Arduous March. As it peaked between 1997 and 1998, two to three years from now is a critical period for Kim. He could be forced to choose between nuclear weapons and the economy.
We must not overreact to North Korea in a panicky manner. Its belligerence was expected. We just wasted a few years, naively believing that Kim Jong-un would easily give up nuclear weapons. We must raise our vigilance and our military deterrence while keeping cool. Creating a crisis-like ambience and fissures in the South Korea-U.S. alliance are what North Korea wants.
Thinking North Korea has won the game is not just misleading but dangerous. If such an argument gains ground, Kim would believe his tactics have succeeded and ratchet up the level of military provocations. We must not be awed by the fireworks he has demonstrated, but build an insightful strategy based on what he is hiding.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
15. A realistic way to address the nuclear crisis
We must counter this dangerous thinking. Professor Lee is undermining extended deterrence.
Excerpt:
If we think peaceful coexistence is possible with a nuclear-armed North Korea, we can continue relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Otherwise, the government must find some realistic ways to address the crisis. The U.S. would not use nuclear weapons to defend its ally at the cost of a nuclear war.
Wednesday
November 9, 2022
dictionary + A - A
A realistic way to address the nuclear crisis
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/11/09/opinion/columns/nuclear-crisis-North-Korea/20221109195623964.html
Lee Chang-wee
The author is a professor of international law at the University of Seoul and president of the Korean headquarters of the International Law Association (ILA).
A barrage of missile launches by North Korea pushes security on the Korean Peninsula into the zero-visibility territory. It fired a ballistic missile to the south of the Northern Limit Line for the first time followed by the launch of an ICBM into the East Sea. If North Korea conducts its seventh nuclear test, South Korea, the United States and Japan will certainly impose tougher sanctions on it. But if China and Russia vetoes an even tougher UN resolution on the North, its provocations won’t stop. The U.S. faces the challenge of easing security concerns from South Korea and Japan and preventing nuclear proliferation.
America’s North Korea policy has repeatedly failed over the past three decades, as seen in the uninterrupted collapses of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework during the Clinton administration, the six-party talks in the Bush administration, the “strategic patience” of the Obama administration, and the “madman strategy” of the Trump administration.
Trump and Kim Jong-un agreed to denuclearization of the North at a summit in Singapore in 2018. But it led to nothing. Their second summit in Hanoi in 2019 was botched. As Joe Biden’s administration apparently has no effective card to play in the nuclear conundrum, we are increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of achieving a complete denuclearization of North Korea.
What should we do now? In theory, South Korea can choose among three options: its own nuclear armaments, redeployment of U.S. tactical nukes, and NATO-style nuclear sharing. But developing nuclear weapons on our own is only possible when U.S. restrictions on South Korea’s use of atomic energy and the constraints from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) are lifted. Redeploying tactical weapons or sharing U.S. nukes is possible only when the ally agrees.
The United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1992, when the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation — also known as the basic agreement — was signed between the two Koreas. The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) had as many as 949 tactical nukes in 1967. It still possessed 150 at the time of the withdrawal of the nukes. Since the U.S. removed all nuclear packs, nuclear mines and nuclear shells from South Korea, it is difficult to redeploy them. The two governments also denied the possibility of redeploying tactical nukes in the South.
Nuclear-sharing refers to the provision of nuclear weapons management and maintenance to member countries of NATO. They can consult with the U.S. about related policies through the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) but Washington exercises final authority over the use of nuclear weapons. Currently, B-61 tactical nukes are deployed in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey. Using that system in Northeast Asia is not easy since no such multilateral alliance is established here. But if Seoul-Tokyo relations improve dramatically, that could change.
South Korea’s overreliance on U.S. extended deterrence for a long period of time seems to make the country reluctant to reinforce its own deterrence capability.
The remaining solution is South Korea’s own nuclear armaments. That depends on whether the South can convince the U.S. of the need for such armaments. The government must emphasize that while North Korea’s nuclear armaments are a hostile proliferation, South Korea’s own armaments constitute a friendly proliferation. If the U.S. allows its key ally nuclear armaments, South Korea can overcome opposition by the international community. Even if China and Russia insist on sanctions on South Korea in UN Security Council meetings, they cannot be implemented if the U.S. uses its veto.
Opponents of South Korea developing nuclear armaments point to the massive price the country would have to pay if it secedes from the NPT. But you must not forget that NPT is just an international agreement reached in the dynamics of international politics. As pointed out by Prof. Louis René Beres of Purdue University, a country can withdraw from — or terminate — international laws to ensure its survival. International law is not an accord for suicide. The NPT allows member countries to withdraw from it or suspend their compliance. If the government decides and persuades Uncle Sam, it could address such issues with NPT.
If we think peaceful coexistence is possible with a nuclear-armed North Korea, we can continue relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Otherwise, the government must find some realistic ways to address the crisis. The U.S. would not use nuclear weapons to defend its ally at the cost of a nuclear war.
Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.
16. [INTERVIEW] North Korea emboldened by Russia's defense at UN Security Council: expert
Sigh... we need a human rights upfront approach, a massive influence camping, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Conclusion:
All this suggests a major challenge for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, whose interest in the human rights of ordinary North Koreas will be limited by Russia and China. North Korea's next nuclear test, if conducted as widely expected, would provide the biggest test of the president's leadership, Hyun noted.
[INTERVIEW] North Korea emboldened by Russia's defense at UN Security Council: expert
The Korea Times · November 9, 2022
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, left, and Russian President Vladimir Putin smile during their meeting in Vladivostok, Russia, in this April 25, 2019, file photo. North Korea's next nuclear weapons test will likely be the first one to avoid a condemnation and additional sanctions from the United Nations Security Council because of Russia's right to veto them, according to an expert. Reuters-Yonhap
Pyongyang's next nuclear test will likely be first to avoid united condemnation, sanctions
By Jung Min-ho
Hyun Seung-soo, a research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification
North Korea's next nuclear weapons test will likely be the first one to avoid a condemnation and additional sanctions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) because of a likely veto by Russia, one of its five permanent members, according to an expert.
Intelligence reports of the United States and South Korea show that the North is on the brink of conducting its seventh nuclear test. The regime's decision to proceed would certainly draw international criticism. Yet, such voices will likely be less united this time than in the past, said Hyun Seung-soo, an expert on Russia at the Korea Institute for National Unification.
"I'm not sure about China (another permanent member). But Russia will very likely exercise its veto power against any UNSC attempt to pass a resolution condemning North Korea or to impose additional sanctions on it," Hyun told The Korea Times Tuesday. "Even before the war in Ukraine, there have been growing voices in Russia that the government's decision in the past to join the U.S.-led criticism and sanctions against the North was a grave mistake."
That does not mean that Moscow would welcome or condone Pyongyang's development of nuclear bombs, he said. Russia, one of just five official nuclear-weapon states and a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, simply known as the NPT, does not share the privileges attached to the special weapons with more countries. But after 20 years of cooperation with U.S.-led efforts to contain threats from North Korea, Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, realized that doing so did not offer ― and won't promise ― any benefits to his country, Hyun added.
North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date, once each in 2006, 2009, 2013 and 2017, as well as twice in 2016. All were immediately criticized and sanctioned by the united voice of the UNSC.
When Russia agreed to sign the resolutions, its leaders were not expecting that it ultimately would lead to more severe sanctions against North Korea, Hyun said. "In fact, Russia tried to relax the sanctions in return for joining the U.S. in condemning the North morally. However, the U.S. did not give Russia what it wanted, and Russia no longer has such expectations," he added.
Putin's change of stance appears to have emboldened the North, which has conducted weapons tests at an unprecedented pace this year, firing dozens of ballistic missiles. At UNSC meetings, however, Russia and China pointed the finger at the U.S. for inflating tensions in the region through combined military drills with South Korea, rejecting the approval of any additional resolutions or sanctions.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, center, visits Pyongyang International Airport to inspect the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, in this March 24 file photo. Yonhap
In the new Cold War climate, which Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's rising influence helped create, the North is expected to continue to get closer to the big powers as it needs a shield against the U.S. and its allies. The recent U.S. intelligence reports that North Korea has been secretly transferring weapons to Russia to help its war are only the latest signs of the climate where the three are strengthening relations.
North Korea's military repeatedly denied the reports, accusing the U.S. government of trying to tarnish its global image with rumors.
But many experts think the reports are credible, at least far more than North Korea's claims. Victor Cha, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the U.S., is among those who share Hyun's view that North Korea is using the Ukraine war to tighten its relations with Russia and taking advantage of the increasingly divisive world to protect its nuclear ambition.
All this suggests a major challenge for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, whose interest in the human rights of ordinary North Koreas will be limited by Russia and China. North Korea's next nuclear test, if conducted as widely expected, would provide the biggest test of the president's leadership, Hyun noted.
The Korea Times · November 9, 2022
17. N. Korea investigates reasons behind S. Pyongan Province’s poor grain yields
Find the blame. Identify scapegoats. The sad truth is the poor harvests and the suffering of the Korean people in the north is the result of Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions. But these "investigations" will balme anything and anyone except for Kim.
N. Korea investigates reasons behind S. Pyongan Province’s poor grain yields
So far, the inspection has been taking issue with the alleged failure to ensure sufficient acreage for wheat and barley in accordance with agriculture guidelines
dailynk.com
Farmland in Chongsan-ri, between Nampo and Pyongyang. (Flickr, Creative Commons)
North Korea’s Cabinet is inspecting the agricultural management committee of South Pyongan Province over the province’s poor wheat and barley yields, Daily NK has learned.
A source in South Pyongan Province told Daily NK last Thursday that the Cabinet’s Agricultural Commission is conducting the investigation because South Pyongan Province “could not push forward this year’s wheat and barley production as planned, and was a mess compared to other provinces.”
According to the source, the Agricultural Commission sent a document with the inspection details ahead of time to the province’s agricultural management committee.
In the document, the Cabinet commission said the inspection would “review” how the province carried out this year’s wheat and barley plans, take firm supervision of the situation, and press farms to prepare for next year’s wheat and barley crops.
The Agricultural Commission then sent inspectors to South Pyongan Province, where they began their inspection on Oct. 25. The inspectors have been conducting talks with farm management committees in accordance with the previously sent document.
The inspectors are reportedly focusing on whether the provincial agricultural management committee allotted acreage for wheat and barley in accordance with agricultural guidelines, whether farms planted, raised and harvested wheat and barley at the proper times, and whether ultimate yields were accurately determined.
Moreover, the inspectors are confirming the acreage on farms for wheat and barley in 2022 and 2023, and analyzing this year’s shortfall by comparing the wheat and barley harvest with the targets presented by the state.
The source said so far, the inspection has been taking issue with the alleged failure to ensure sufficient acreage for wheat and barley in accordance with agriculture guidelines.
“It seems the Agricultural Commission will compile the phenomena that appear [in the inspection] and evaluate findings that didn’t comply with the state’s agricultural guidelines as ideological problems,” he said.
The source further explained that it appeared the inspection will directly press lower-level farm management committee heads and officials who just nodded at agricultural policy and went through the motions, accusing them of ideological failings.
The Agricultural Commission is also supervising next year’s wheat and barley farming.
In fact, the commission is demanding that farms expand acreage for wheat and barley exactly in accordance with government plans, and calling on farms to resolve shortcomings by predicting seed-related problems ahead of time.
The source also told Daily NK that the Agricultural Committee is looking for ways to generalize the experience and lessons from this inspection to other provinces, believing the situation in other provinces might not differ much from South Pyongan Province.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
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18. Korea falls in love with NATO
Korea falls in love with NATO
By Ramon Pacheco Pardo flip.it4 min
View Original
Korea’s recent opening of a mission to NATO is a clear sign that the Asian country is here to stay, as the defence alliance becomes an important component of Seoul’s future security strategy, writes Ramon Pacheco Pardo.
Ramon Pacheco Pardo is the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance and Professor of International Relations at King’s College London.
From government officials to think tankers, Koreans want to know why NATO sees their country as a partner and what can Korea offer in return.
Even more interestingly for those seating in NATO’s Leopold III headquarters, Korea’s love affair with NATO is not a summer fling. It’s part of a long-lasting and well-calibrated courtship.
Korea’s recent opening of a mission to NATO is none other than the clearest sign that the Asian country is here to stay.
Certainly, there are immediate reasons why the Korean government sees the need to deepen ties with NATO. Above all, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looms large in Seoul. Not only is the invasion against international law, but it could set a dangerous precedent as tensions between China and Taiwan rise.
Thus, Korea has become the only Asian country to condemn Russia’s actions, impose sanctions on Moscow and also send offensive weapons to Ukraine—via third parties.
In private, Korean policy-makers don’t deny that Korean military equipment can be used by Ukrainian forces, even if Moscow has warned Seoul not to sell weapons to NATO members that can then transfer them to Ukraine.
There is a reason why Russian leader Vladimir Putin recently warned South Korea not to (directly) transfer weapons to Ukraine. But it is already too late.
Yet, South Korea’s rapprochement towards NATO has more enduring, longer-term reasons behind it.
To start with, the Korea-US alliance is now global in nature. This is a process that started at the end of the Cold War, and that has become very clear over the past fifteen years.
Since the US continues to be the most important NATO ally and is pressing for the organisation to engage with its four core Asia-Pacific partners, it is only natural for Korea to deepen ties with it. Yoon Suk-yeol, South Korea’s president, had no doubts about whether to attend the Madrid NATO summit upon taking office last May.
But US president Joe Biden reminded him about the importance of his attendance for good measure.
Furthermore, and at least as relevant, Korea has been increasing security ties with NATO members such as Canada, Estonia, France, Norway, Poland and the UK in recent years.
These growing ties are partly linked to Korea looking for reliable partners to better manage US-China competition and partly linked to Korea seeking like-minded partners to address the growing threats coming from North Korea and China. In fact, the latter is becoming ever more important for Seoul.
As a case in point, the previous Korean government led by Moon Jae-in joined NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre to help guard against cyber attacks from these two countries. The Yoon government wants to double down on this policy.
It should be noted that from the current government’s perspective, there is no contradiction in strengthening ties with NATO, individual European and NATO countries and the EU at the same time.
This is not a zero-sum game.
Therefore, from a Korean perspective boosting security ties with NATO has the added advantage of deepening links with individual European countries plus the EU.
Another long-term driver behind Korea’s rapprochement towards NATO is values, and being able to work with like-minded countries. Yoon has constantly emphasised their importance in Korea’s foreign policy.
In recent weeks, Seoul has voted in favour of an investigation of China’s actions in Xinjiang at the UN Human Rights Committee; co-sponsored a North Korea human rights resolution at the UN General Assembly for the first time since 2018; and voted to condemn Russia’s attempt to annex Ukrainian territories, again at the General Assembly.
The new Korean government has also appointed a North Korea human rights envoy, a position that had been vacant since 2018. From Yoon’s perspective, paying more attention to values as part of Korean foreign policy calls for deeper ties with NATO.
After all, Seoul feels that Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow are three sides of the same coin, so to speak.
Dating back to China’s decision to impose sanctions on Korea after the latter agreed to the deployment of Washington’s THAAD anti-missile system, Korea has been under no illusion that its neighbour won’t flex its muscle when it sees fit.
Incursions in Korea’s ADIZ and even airspace by combined Sino-Russian forces has brought home the growing military cooperation between the two. And North Korea’s UN votes in support of Russia and criticism of NATO following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine make the Kim Jong-un regime one of the very few governments openly siding with Putin.
NATO may not be the key for Korea to address this trilateral cooperation. But it is part of the answer that the Yoon government seeks.
All in all, Korea believes that NATO will become an important component of its future security strategy. Its love affair with the organisation is here to stay.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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