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Quotes of the Day:
"Happiness is not something readymade. It comes from your own actions."
–Dalai Lama
"Judge a man by his questions rather than his answers."
– Voltaire
"Repetition is the only form of permanence that nature can achieve."
–George Santayana
1. N. Korea says it conducted 'super-large warhead' test for strategic cruise missile
2. North Korea launched cruise and anti-aircraft missiles on Friday: State media
3. G7 FMs vow to counter N.K. sanctions evasion amid looming end of U.N. expert panel
4. ‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back at Work in Battle of Drones Over Iran
5. Was the US-South Korea-Japan drill just about North Korea? China might beg to differ
6. G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships
7. South Korean president facing 3 lame duck years?
8. It Is High Time to Engage North Korea
9. N. Korea installed facial recognition devices at major train stations during height of COVID
10. How general elections will affect South Korea's foreign policy
11. [Wang Son-taek] New direction of Korean diplomacy after election
12. Pres. Yoon to have first meeting with Lee Jae-myung
13. Kim Jong Un releases new song praising himself as North Korea's 'friendly father'
14. What the Revamp of the Japan-US Alliance Structure Means for South Korea
1. N. Korea says it conducted 'super-large warhead' test for strategic cruise missile
"Super large." Is that a description of a Big Mac meal?
(2nd LD) N. Korea says it conducted 'super-large warhead' test for strategic cruise missile | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 20, 2024
(ATTN: UPDATES with photo, details in paras 5, 8-11)
SEOUL, April 20 (Yonhap) -- North Korea conducted a "super-large warhead" power test for a strategic cruise missile and test-fired a new anti-aircraft missile this week, state media reported Saturday, further ratcheting up tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
The Missile Administration carried out the test of the warhead designed for the "Hwasal-1 Ra-3" strategic cruise missile, and test-launched its new anti-aircraft missile, the "Pyoljji-1-2," in the Yellow Sea on Friday, KCNA said, noting that a "certain goal" was achieved through the test launch.
It is the first time that Pyongyang has named a missile "Pyoljji," which means "meteor" in Korean.
"Both tests were part of the regular activities of the administration and its affiliated defence science institutes for the rapid development of technologies ... and had nothing to do with the surrounding situation," KCNA said in an English-language dispatch.
North Korea conducts a "super-large warhead" power test for a strategic cruise missile and a test-fire of a new anti-aircraft missile near the Yellow Sea on April 19, 2024, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
On Feb. 3, the North said it had conducted what it called a "cruise missile super-large warhead power test" and test-fired a new type of anti-aircraft missile in the Yellow Sea the previous day.
The North's Missile Administration had not specified the name of the weapons or the result of the test launches.
The South Korean military said it detected several rounds of cruise missiles and anti-craft missiles fired toward the Yellow Sea at around 3:30 p.m. Friday, and that it is now analyzing their detailed specifications.
"Our military has been closely monitoring signs of North Korea's provocations and military activities, while maintaining the robust combined defense posture," the Joint Chiefs of Staff said.
The latest announcement comes as North Korea has been ramping up weapons tests, including the launches of cruise missiles from sea and land and firing drills involving super-large multiple rocket launchers.
Friday's missile test marked North Korea's sixth cruise missile launch this year.
It also comes as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield traveled to South Korea and Japan this week in an apparent move to seek an alternative after the U.N. Security Council failed to extend the mandate of the panel of experts monitoring the enforcement of sanctions against the North's nuclear and missile programs.
During a visit to the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas on Tuesday, Thomas-Greenfield said the U.S. is looking at "out of the box" options with South Korea and others to continue the sanctions monitoring on North Korea.
North Korea conducts a "super-large warhead" power test for a strategic cruise missile and a test-fire of a new anti-aircraft missile near the Yellow Sea on April 19, 2024, in this photo released by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · April 20, 2024
2. North Korea launched cruise and anti-aircraft missiles on Friday: State media
North Korea launched cruise and anti-aircraft missiles on Friday: State media
First such tests since February come amid joint US-ROK air force drills, though leader Kim Jong Un not reported present
https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/north-korea-launched-cruise-and-anti-aircraft-missiles-on-friday-state-media/?utm
Colin Zwirko April 20, 2024
The Hwasal-1Ra-3 (Hwasal-1D-3) appears to have been launched from a runway, likely also Onchon Airbase | Image: KCNA (April 20, 2024)
North Korea conducted “regular” tests of new cruise missiles and anti-aircraft missiles on Friday, according to state media, the first such launches in over two months.
“The DPRK Missile Administration has conducted a power test of a super-large warhead designed for the ‘Hwasal-1Ra-3’ strategic cruise missile … in the West Sea of Korea in the afternoon of April 19” from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Saturday.
It also tested the “‘Pyoljji-1-2’ new-type anti-aircraft missile” from a mobile TEL. KCNA said unspecified “relevant goals were achieved” in both tests.
Pyongyang claimed last year that similar cruise missiles were capable of being fitted with “Hwasan-31” nuclear warheads, but further details of the “super-large warhead” have yet to be revealed.
This aerial photo of the Pyoljji-1-2 anti-aircraft missile test shows it was launched from a TEL on the runway of Onchon Airbase located on the west coast north of Nampho (coordinates: 38.91323° N, 125.23276° E), though the claimed date of the photo could not be verified | Image: KCNA (April 20, 2024)
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NK News analysis of satellite imagery and an aerial photo KCNA published of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) test suggests it took place at Onchon Airbase north of Nampho, near where artillery drills were conducted last month.
The cruise missile test likely took place from the same location, as a SAM TEL appears in the background of the single photo KCNA released of the launch.
The brief KCNA report did not mention the presence of leader Kim Jong Un at the tests. Saturday’s edition of the country’s main newspaper Rodong Sinmun also didn’t carry the report.
South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not announce any real-time detection of the reported launches on Friday. It’s unclear whether South Korean authorities were aware of the launch or opted not to publicly announce it, as JCS has claimed in the past.
State media had not previously mentioned the “Hwasal-1Ra-3” (or Hwasal-1D-3) and “Pyoljji-1-2,” but KCNA reported that new cruise and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles with similar descriptions were tested on Feb. 2, indicating they may be the same models. Hwasal is the Korean word for “arrow” and pyoljji means “meteorite.”
North Korea also tested the “Pulhwasal-3-31” cruise missile twice and “Hwasal-2” cruise missile once in January this year, and a new “Padasuri-6” anti-ship cruise missile on Feb. 14, the most recent known test of these capabilities.
Friday’s tests were “part of the regular activities of the administration and its affiliated defense science institutes for the rapid development of technologies in various aspects such as tactical and technical performance and operation of new-type weapon systems,” according to KCNA.
They “had nothing to do with the regional situation,” the report added, suggesting that, unlike some other missile tests reported in state media, the latest tests were not meant to send a message to the U.S. and South Korea.
However, the SAM test in particular could be interpreted as a response to joint U.S.-South Korea paratrooper exercises conducted on Thursday.
It also comes after Kim Jong Un was shown in state media last week reviewing military occupation plans and maps of Seoul and South Korean ports and airfields.
Edited by Arius Derr
3. G7 FMs vow to counter N.K. sanctions evasion amid looming end of U.N. expert panel
What kind of alternate enforcement process can be developed and implemented?
G7 FMs vow to counter N.K. sanctions evasion amid looming end of U.N. expert panel | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 20, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, April 19 (Yonhap) -- The top diplomats of the Group of Seven (G7) countries stressed their commitment to counter evasion of anti-North Korea sanctions Friday, as a U.N. expert panel monitoring sanctions enforcement faces its termination this month due to Russia's veto.
The officials from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Japan and Italy, as well as the high representative of the European Union issued a joint statement, presenting their unity against a series of global challenges, including from the North and China.
The mandate of the expert panel is set to end on April 30 as Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution for an annual extension of the mandate during a vote last month, where China abstained.
"Russia's veto of the UNSC resolution (UNSCR) to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the U.N. sanctions that Russia had previously voted for," they said in the statement.
"We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts," they added.
During her trip to South Korea this week, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said the U.S. is looking at "out of the box" options in cooperation with South Korea and other like-minded countries to continue the sanctions monitoring on North Korea.
In the statement, the G7 foreign ministers condemn "in the strongest possible terms" increasing military cooperation between the North and Russia.
"We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions," they said.
They reiterated their condemnation of the North's "escalatory" development of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs.
"We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UNSC resolutions," they said.
They restated that the North cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state.
"We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests ... We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programs, including malicious cyber activities," they said.
They took note of the North's progressive reopening of its borders, calling on the regime to take the opportunity to reengage with the international community.
"We are disappointed by North Korea's continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security," they said.
This undated file photo, released by AFP, shows a U.N. Security Council session under way at U.N. headquarters in New York. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · April 20, 2024
4. ‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back at Work in Battle of Drones Over Iran
‘Axis of Evil’ Is Back at Work in Battle of Drones Over Iran
Tehran’s relations with Pyongyang echo what President George W. Bush called the ‘axis of evil.’
DONALD KIRK
Friday, April 19, 2024
10:08:54 am
nysun.com
Iran may have deployed North Korean weapons Friday in defense of its air base and nuclear facilities at Isfahan, about 220 miles south of Tehran — offering the latest evidence of President George W. Bush’s dictum in 2002 that those two villains were bound in an “axis of evil.”
The targets reportedly were Israeli drones sent over Iran in retaliation for Iran’s assault on Israel on Saturday with 300 missiles and drones, most of which were shot down by Israeli, American, and Jordanian forces, but the scenario of strike and counter-strike was surely far from done.
Neither Saturday’s attack nor Israel’s response Friday caused much damage but provided a foretaste of worse to come. North Korea is shipping arms and ammunition, including missiles and drones, to Iran via Russia and China, according to South Korean intelligence sources. Neither Russia nor China are enforcing UN Sanctions against Iran.
“Iran has warned Israel it is likely to review its nuclear stance if its atomic facilities are threatened,” the Financial Times reported Friday. The paper said Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has warned “Tehran may ‘reconsider’ its nuclear policy” — now “on the threshold of becoming a weapons state.”
At the heart of the anti-Israel forces, the axis linking America’s two key foes in Asia and the Middle East, North Korea and Iran, is stronger than ever as war flares in both Gaza and Ukraine and tensions rise in Asia. The difference is that Iraq, which Mr. Bush included in the axis, is no longer a menace since the Americans drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 and in a subsequent invasion captured Saddam Hussein in 2003.
Now South Korea’s National Intelligence Service wants to confirm if the ballistic missiles fired by Iran against Israel were made in North Korea. The NIS, in a statement to the South Korean press, said it was “keeping tabs on whether the North Korean technology was included in Iran’s ballistic missiles launched against Israel, given the North and Iran’s missile cooperation in the past.”
Iran has acquired North Korean technology for its Scud missiles, according to a leading analyst on North Korea’s nuclear-and-missile program, Bruce Bechtol, and Iranian observers attend North Korean missile launches as observers. .
For starters, Mr. Bechtol, author of numerous books and studies of North Korean and Iranian military strength, told the Middle East Eye, “Iran still relies heavily on North Korea for conventional arms.” Beyond that level, he said “North Korea’s missile programs are far ahead of Iran’s..”
North Korean armaments, including missiles and drones, are assumed to have been designated for Iran before going by train or boat to Russian far eastern ports, according to NIS contacts.. The shipments are among 10,000 containers that the State Department says North Korea has sent to Russia since Kim Jong-un met President Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome on the Amur River in Siberia last September.
The North Koreans are presumably reluctant to risk shipping weapons by sea while American warships lurk in nearby international waters, but Mr. Kim counts on Russian cooperation to get arms through to Iran while also serving the voracious needs of Russian forces in Ukraine.
The ease with which North Korean weapons flow into and through Russia was guaranteed by Russia’s veto of a bid to renew a panel of experts that the UN Security Council had formed in 2009.
The purpose of the panel was to monitor UN sanctions, as the executive vice president of the Peterson Institute for International Studies, Marcus Noland, explains “China and Russia have sought to end sanctions on North Korea,” he writes, while the UN panel produced “authoritative evidence on North Korean sanctions evasion activities and member states’ implementation (or non-implementation).”
Iran may no longer be flooding Hamas with arms and ammunition as it was doing before the war in Gaza, but there’s no doubt it’s relaying them to its Hezbollah surrogate in Lebanon and to the Houthis in Yemen.
More importantly, many of the missiles and drones that Iran fired into Israel may have been North Korean. North Korean export of weapons to bad actors in the middle east goes back decades — and is believed to have increased exponentially in recent months.
nysun.com
5. Was the US-South Korea-Japan drill just about North Korea? China might beg to differ
Excerpts:
The three nations also carried out maritime interception training to block smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as search and rescue training.
Washington has been strengthening military ties with Seoul and Tokyo since the Camp David summit in August, where leaders pledged to “regularise defensive exercises that contribute to strengthening trilateral responses” against North Korean threats.
Last week’s drill followed naval exercises in January among the three countries, with a US aircraft carrier situated at a similar location south of Jeju in the East China Sea.
“The trilateral naval exercises are geared to respond to North Korea threats, but Beijing is certainly watching as the three allies strengthen military cooperation,” said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow and SK-Korea Foundation chair of Korea studies at Washington-based think tank the Brookings Institution.
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the waters – south of Jeju and north of Taiwan – had strategic significance for Beijing.
Was the US-South Korea-Japan drill just about North Korea? China might beg to differ
Seong Hyeon Choi
+ FOLLOWPublished: 3:00pm, 20 Apr 2024
Washington’s military cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo may be targeted mainly at North Korea but is also likely to unnerve China, adding impetus to the “transactional” relations between Beijing and Pyongyang, according to analysts.
Last week, South Korea’s navy said it had conducted joint naval drills with the United States and Japan in international waters south of Jeju Island to “improve joint operability against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats”.
The exercise involved six warships – the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, three Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers, and two Aegis destroyers from South Korea and Japan.T
“This training was conducted to implement a multi-year trilateral training plan jointly established by the defence authorities of [South] Korea, the United States and Japan in accordance with the Camp David Agreement last year,” the South Korean defence ministry said.
The South Korean navy said the forces focused on anti-submarine warfare training and on the ability to respond to North Korean underwater threats, such as submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The three nations also carried out maritime interception training to block smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as search and rescue training.
Washington has been strengthening military ties with Seoul and Tokyo since the Camp David summit in August, where leaders pledged to “regularise defensive exercises that contribute to strengthening trilateral responses” against North Korean threats.
Last week’s drill followed naval exercises in January among the three countries, with a US aircraft carrier situated at a similar location south of Jeju in the East China Sea.
“The trilateral naval exercises are geared to respond to North Korea threats, but Beijing is certainly watching as the three allies strengthen military cooperation,” said Andrew Yeo, a senior fellow and SK-Korea Foundation chair of Korea studies at Washington-based think tank the Brookings Institution.
Cho Han-bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said the waters – south of Jeju and north of Taiwan – had strategic significance for Beijing.
“As a result, China may be concerned that these Korea-US-Japan security maritime exercises could affect China, especially on the Taiwan Strait issue. It is also an area where there may be concerns about the expansion of security countermeasures against Taiwan,” Cho said.
“From the US perspective, the southern part of Jeju serves as a check on North Korea, but also, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is an area that can also serve as a certain check on China.”
South Korea’s participation in the US-Japan joint training is ultimately leading China to view the trilateral ties as targeting itself
Yang Uk, Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, said that while the exercises showed systemic cooperation between South Korea and the US in responding to North Korean threats, they would also be “inconvenient” for China.
“Basically, the response against China had been carried out through cooperation between the US and Japan,” Yang said.
“But now, South Korea’s participation in the US-Japan joint training is ultimately leading China to view the trilateral ties as targeting itself.”
Yang said the East China Sea area south of Jeju Island was a “strategic point” for China, because its navy must pass near the island and the Japanese archipelago to go towards the Pacific Ocean.
Kang Jun-young, a professor of Chinese studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, said there could be a “difference in perception” between Seoul and Beijing about the drills, resulting in more friction between the two countries.
“From China’s perspective, the North Korean nuclear issue is nothing new, and the fact that the three countries are training together means that they are trying to keep China in check,” Kang said.
The drill took place as China’s No 3 official Zhao Leji was on a three-day visit to Pyongyang to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on Saturday to mark 75 years of bilateral ties.
Zhao, the head of the national legislature, is the highest ranking Chinese official to visit North Korea since Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Pyongyang in 2019 and North Korea closed its border in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.
NEW PODCAST SERIES: About Asia - Is North Korea preparing for war?
At the same time, North Korea has been strengthening ties with Russia, with Kim and Russian President Vladimir Putin meeting in September. There are also suspicions that Pyongyang exchanged weapons with Moscow to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.
“[Zhao’s visit] has the double effect of further strengthening relations with North Korea, thereby keeping North Korea-Russia relations in check, and on the other hand, China is now showing a kind of warning about South Korea-US joint exercises or South Korea-US-Japan trilateral training,” Kang said.
Beijing “does not want to lose any influence over North Korea” to Russia, Kang added, while “China is leading relations with North Korea and Russia, and also leading the competition with the US”, which drives it to continue to provide support to North Korea.
However, Beijing’s strengthened ties with Pyongyang would continue to be “transactional”, according to Yeo.
Beijing has an incentive to support Pyongyang on the international stage as the US strengthens ties with its allies
Andrew Yeo, SK-Korea Foundation chair
“Beijing has an incentive to support Pyongyang on the international stage as the US strengthens ties with its allies,” Yeo said. “But China-North Korea relations will have greater constraints and look more transactional given North Korea’s pariah status and lack of transparency.”
Yang said Beijing’s attitude towards Pyongyang had been a “very clever approach”, focusing on political and diplomatic cooperation to contain Washington’s trilateral cooperation without risking any military consequences.
“Right now, China has nothing to gain by overtly engaging with North Korea militarily, and in particular, it could appear to be supporting North Korea’s nuclear development,” Yang said.
“But politically, of course, the relationship between the two sides has been long, and especially now, it can have some meaning in responding to trilateral cooperation between Korea, the US and Japan.”
CONVERSATIONS (14)
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Seong Hyeon Choi
Seong Hyeon joined the SCMP in 2022. He is from South Korea and graduated with a bachelor of journalism and master of international and public affairs from the University of Hong Kong. He worked as a research intern for Korea Chair at US foreign policy think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and as a news trainee for NK news.
6. G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships
A country by country and issue by issue rund down in 6 sections (plus the intro):
II. FOSTERING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICA
III. ADDRESSING IRREGULAR MIGRATION, FOSTERING HOPE AND OPPORTUNITY
IV. PROMOTING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC, MANAGING ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA
V. ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES
V1. TACKLING REGIONAL ISSUES
VII. COOPERATION WITH LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The north Korea section (my bias is showing). Heavy on nuclear weapons, missiles, threats, and sanctions. A paragraph on human rights but not surprisingly there is no mention of a free and unified Korea like at Camp David.
9. North Korea
We reiterate our strong condemnation of North Korea’s escalatory development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programmes. We further reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon all its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We urge North Korea to return to, and fully comply with, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We reiterate that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT. We urge North Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests. We urge all UN member states to implement all relevant UNSCRs fully and effectively and demand Security Council members to follow through on their commitments. We urge North Korea to cease activities that generate revenue for its unlawful ballistic missile and WMD programmes, including malicious cyber activities.
In this context, we condemn in the strongest possible terms the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea’s export and Russia’s procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia’s use of these missiles against Ukraine. We are also deeply concerned about the potential for any transfer of nuclear or ballistic missiles-related technology to North Korea, in violation of the relevant UNSC resolutions. Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution to renew the mandate of the UNSCR 1718 Committee Panel of Experts makes it easier for North Korea to evade the UN sanctions that Russia had previously voted for. We urge Russia and North Korea to immediately cease all such activities and abide by relevant UNSCRs. We reiterate our commitment to counter sanctions evasion and strengthen enforcement. We will increase efforts to maintain the Panel of Experts.
We strongly condemn North Korea’s systematic human rights violations and abuses and its choice to prioritize its unlawful weapons development programs over the welfare of the people in North Korea. We call upon North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately and to meaningfully engage with the UN human rights system. We take note of the progressive re-opening of North Korea’s borders and call upon North Korea to take this opportunity to re-engage with the international community including through the return of all diplomatic and humanitarian personnel to North Korea.
We are disappointed by North Korea’s continued rejection of dialogue and call on North Korea to accept repeated offers of dialogue, in order to enhance regional peace and security.
Read the entire statement here:https://www.state.gov/g7-italy-2024-foreign-ministers-statement-on-addressing-global-challenges-fostering-partnerships/
G7 Italy 2024 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Addressing Global Challenges, Fostering Partnerships
MEDIA NOTE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON
APRIL 19, 2024
The text of the following statement was released by the G7 foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the High Representative of the European Union.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the international community faces multiple crises we, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, renew our commitment to upholding the rule of law, humanitarian principles and international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to protecting human rights and dignity for all individuals.
We reiterate the need to take collective action to preserve peace and stability and to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution, biodiversity loss, global health, education, gender inequality, poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, violent extremism and terrorism, information integrity and a digital transition that respects, protects, and promotes human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We affirm our commitment to free societies and democratic principles, where all persons can freely exercise their rights and freedoms. Human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.
We reaffirm our commitment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) and to re-energize efforts towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as multidimensional crises, and particularly the pandemic and ongoing major conflicts, have set back progress towards their achievement.
We will continue to work in close cooperation with our partners and with relevant multilateral fora such as the G20. Global challenges require solidarity and a cohesive international response, looking for shared solutions for peace, stability, and development, leaving no one behind.
Continue to read here: https://www.state.gov/g7-italy-2024-foreign-ministers-statement-on-addressing-global-challenges-fostering-partnerships/
7. South Korean president facing 3 lame duck years?
Again, due to the ROK Constitution, every president is a lame duck on the day he assumes office since they can have only a single 5 year term.
South Korean president facing 3 lame duck years? - Asia Times
Domestic and foreign policy challenges abound for Yoon Suk Yeol after party’s National Assembly election whipping
asiatimes.com · by Jong Eun Lee · April 19, 2024
South Korea’s parliamentary election of April 10, 2024, was widely seen as a referendum on President Yoon Suk Yeol’s first two years in office.
That being the case, the nation collectively expressed its strong disapproval.
With a relatively high turnout of 67%, voters handed Yoon’s conservative People’s Power Party a defeat, with its share of the 300-seat National Assembly dropping from 114 to 108.
The opposition Democratic Party retained its large majority in the National Assembly, winning 175 seats and maintaining control in the populous metropolitan areas of Seoul, Incheon and Gyeonggi provinces. Voters also delivered a disappointing outcome for most third-party candidates, the exceptions being the Rebuilding Korea Party, which campaigned as more combative opposition to the DP, and the New Reform Party, which broke away from the ruling PPP earlier this year.
As a political scientist with a focus on East Asia and international affairs, I believe the election results will have ramifications for Yoon’s foreign and domestic agenda during the remainder of his term.
Growing domestic pressure
Yoon had hoped the election would end the political gridlock that has stymied his first two years as president.
Throughout that time, the opposition has held a legislative majority. Subsequently, Yoon’s government has seen key parts of its agenda for education, labor and pension reforms blocked. Yoon has also vetoed multiple bills passed by the opposition-controlled legislature.
But the election saw the DP and other opposition parties amass 192 seats, just short of a veto-proof, two-thirds majority. As such, President Yoon again faces a divided government for the remainder of his term. In fact, he will be the only South Korean president whose party has failed to control the National Assembly at any time during the five-year presidential term.
A better parliamentary outcome for Yoon’s party would have bolstered the chances for the government’s legislative agenda on pressing domestic issues, such as addressing the country’s declining birthrate, high inflation and expanding medical student enrollment, as well as relaxing business regulations.
Instead, the Yoon government is more likely to be on the defensive after the election. Opposition parties have vowed to investigate alleged stock manipulation involving first lady Kim Keon Hee and probe former Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup over claims that he influenced an earlier report into the drowning death of a Korean marine.
Though Yoon retains veto power, there is now growing uncertainty over whether ruling PPP assembly members will continue defending the president’s actions if and when the two probes move forward.
Meanwhile, President Yoon’s prime minister, Han Duck-soo, announced his resignation after the assembly election. The National Assembly can vote against the president’s nominee to replace him, which may compel Yoon to pick a candidate acceptable to the opposition parties.
A trickier foreign policy climate
Under South Korea’s political system, the presidency has greater leeway in national security and foreign affairs than in domestic policy.
As such, the Yoon government will likely continue its foreign policy of expanding trilateral partnerships with the U.S. and Japan, building ties with NATO and striving to be a “global pivotal” state in the Asia-Pacific region.
During his first two years in power, Yoon has generally aligned South Korea closer to the West, though he has also been careful to avoid direct confrontation with China and Russia – both of which are geographic neighbors and trade partners.
While the opposition-controlled National Assembly has, to date, been generally supportive of the Yoon government’s attempts to strengthen ties with the US – a policy that remains popular among the South Korean public – the same cannot be said about its attempts to bolster relations with Japan.
In particular, the Democratic Party and the Rebuilding Korea Party have criticized the prospect of a closer partnership with Japan – whether through military exercises or through intelligence sharing – mainly due to Korea’s experiences under Japanese colonial rule.
And despite being generally welcoming of ties with the West, the two opposition parties are more cautious than the Yoon government when it comes to engaging in geopolitical rivalry. Specifically, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung warned during the recent election campaign that South Korea should not become involved in the Russia-Ukraine war or China-Taiwan tensions.
The opposition might not directly stop Yoon from pursuing his foreign policy, but they are likely to pressure the president to pay attention to domestic political issues.
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Moreover, opposition parties will be pushing the Yoon government to demonstrate what diplomatic “wins” the country has secured through its partnership with Japan and the United States. Notably, if the point of strategic partnership with the United States and Japan is to ensure security in East Asia, some voters may legitimately ask why it has failed to deter North Korea’s continued military provocations.
If the Yoon government cannot demonstrate diplomatic successes, opposition parties are likely to frame his foreign policy as one-sided “subservient diplomacy.”
Yoon has three years to show that his foreign policy has paid dividends; South Korea’s next presidential election is in the spring of 2027.
How successfully the president can navigate the domestic and international constraints exacerbated by the results of the parliamentary election could determine whether he exceeds the political expectations of a president facing a divided government or encounter, as some predict, an early “lame-duck presidency.”
Jong Eun Lee is an assistant professor at North Greenville University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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asiatimes.com · by Jong Eun Lee · April 19, 2024
8. It Is High Time to Engage North Korea
I object if we move to arms control negotiation or if we have to give concessions to Kim to come to the negotiation table. Kim has to come to negotiate on his own.
A step by step process of denuclearization is acceptable but arms control negotiation - e.g., strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and strategic arms reduction talks (START) using the example of the US-USSR is exactly what Kim wants because it implies keep his nnucelar weapons and in his mind puts him on the same level of the former USSR.
The alternative is a 3+2 strategy - Sanctions, information, deterrence and defense plus human rights upfront and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
Excerpts:
Instead, the United States needs to be patient and willing to go through a step-by-step gradual process of building mutual trust leading to arms reduction. Washington can work with allies including Seoul to offer Pyongyang economic incentives tied to the reaching of specific milestones in arms reduction. Such a pathway offers the only realistic chance for curbing (or at least slowing down) North Korea’s rapid arms build-up.
Some may object, saying all this is naïve and will gain no traction with the authorities in Seoul, Washington, and Pyongyang. But the alternative is to let relations deteriorate even further and just watch tensions rise even more as North Korea further builds up its nuclear and missile stockpile with each passing day. Efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang, even if they do not yield immediate results, can still lower tensions and, even for that reason alone, should be tried.
It Is High Time to Engage North Korea
thediplomat.com · by Jongsoo Lee
The alternative is to do nothing and drift into an even more serious crisis as North Korea further builds up its nuclear and missile capabilities.
By
April 19, 2024
In this photo provided by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaks at the Supreme People’s Assembly in Pyongyang, North Korea, on Jan. 15, 2024. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified.
Credit: Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP
The status quo in inter-Korean relations is a disaster in the making. Seoul and Washington must do what they can to improve relations with Pyongyang. The alternative is to do nothing and drift into an even more serious crisis as North Korea further builds up its nuclear and missile capabilities.
The current situation is that Kim Jong Un and Yoon Suk-yeol, the leaders of North Korea and South Korea, respectively, are locked in a cycle of dangerous, confrontational saber-rattling. Although it seems unlikely that Kim wants to start an all-out war, the risk is that he may engage in some form of military provocation against the South, and that such adventurism may lead to an unintended escalation into a much wider conflict.
One reason Kim may feel emboldened to take such risk is the broader global geopolitical environment, which now features a Cold War-like standoff in the Korean Peninsula between South Korea, the United States, and Japan on the one hand, and North Korea, China, and Russia on the other. As Beijing and Moscow are now more closely aligned with Pyongyang, Kim may feel that he has more room for taking risks vis-à-vis Seoul and Washington.
Meanwhile, Yoon has declared that North Korean military provocations will be met with a retaliation multiple times more severe. The danger is that Kim’s adventurism and Yoon’s hardline response will lead to escalation, spelling a catastrophe for the region and for the world.
Given the stakes involved, what can Seoul and Washington do to lower tensions with Pyongyang?
South Korea can begin by offering a response to the claims made by Kim Jong Un in his recent statements. At the Workers’ Party Plenum on December 30, 2023, Kim declared that Pyongyang is not interested in reconciliation or reunification with South Korea because Seoul has proclaimed North Korea as its main enemy and is seeking to topple North Korea’s regime and reunify Korea by absorbing North Korea. Yoon can issue a statement reassuring Pyongyang that Seoul wants peace – not war – with North Korea. This can be done in a public statement he makes or can be conveyed to Pyongyang through diplomatic channels.
To show that South Korea is not seeking to topple Kim, Seoul can offer to refrain from activities aimed at undermining the North Korean regime, such as the loud speakers in the DMZ blaring anti-regime propaganda.
Importantly, Seoul can offer to refrain from sending balloons containing propagandistic leaflets into North Korea. This is important because, apparently, one major reason why inter-Korean relations quickly deteriorated after the whirlwind of summitry in 2018-2019 is that some South Korean NGOs continued to send such balloons into North Korea despite warming relations. Pyongyang’s rulers took offense at this, protesting to Seoul that this amounted to a devious attempt to topple the North Korean government while outwardly professing peace.
While it is true that South Korea’s democracy allows freedom of expression of its citizens and the government cannot – and should not – control the actions of NGOs, there are things that Seoul can do to work with NGOs and dissuade them from taking actions that raise inter-Korean tensions and threaten world peace.
Seoul can further demonstrate its desire for peace by offering economic incentives for Pyongyang to pursue peace instead of further militarization. Yoon offered glimpses of such incentives in his presidential inauguration speech in 2022, saying that South Korea can help North Korea economically if the latter pursues denuclearization. Yoon can issue a statement saying the offer is still on the table, this time offering more concrete details of such economic aid to Pyongyang.
This last point ties in with what the United States can do to reduce tensions with North Korea. Washington needs to engage Pyongyang in talks, and the way to induce Kim Jong Un to come to the negotiating table is by offering talks with no preconditions. The past approach of insisting on CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization) from the outset of negotiations is a non-starter for Pyongyang.
Instead, the United States needs to be patient and willing to go through a step-by-step gradual process of building mutual trust leading to arms reduction. Washington can work with allies including Seoul to offer Pyongyang economic incentives tied to the reaching of specific milestones in arms reduction. Such a pathway offers the only realistic chance for curbing (or at least slowing down) North Korea’s rapid arms build-up.
Some may object, saying all this is naïve and will gain no traction with the authorities in Seoul, Washington, and Pyongyang. But the alternative is to let relations deteriorate even further and just watch tensions rise even more as North Korea further builds up its nuclear and missile stockpile with each passing day. Efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang, even if they do not yield immediate results, can still lower tensions and, even for that reason alone, should be tried.
Authors
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Jongsoo Lee
James Jongsoo Lee is Senior Managing Director at Brock Securities and a Center Associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.
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thediplomat.com · by Jongsoo Lee
9. N. Korea installed facial recognition devices at major train stations during height of COVID
Another example of the "COVID paradox." The regime tried to defend against COVID but also used COVID defense as an opportunity to further oppress the people by implementing draconian population and resources control measures.
The regime is more afraid of the Korean people in the north than anything else.
N. Korea installed facial recognition devices at major train stations during height of COVID - Daily NK English
"Some were appalled that the state wasn't interested in how people were starving, but was spending money on technology to control people so they couldn't move an inch," a source inside the country told Daily NK
By Kim Jeong Yoon - April 19, 2024
dailynk.com · by Kim Jeong Yoon · April 19, 2024
Disease control officials testing drivers for COVID-19 symptoms in Pyongyang's Manggyongdae District. (Rodong Sinmun)
In 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the North Korean government sought technologies that could help it better track the movements of its people. One technology the government incorporated into its nationwide surveillance system was facial recognition devices at major train stations in Pyongyang and other major cities.
In response to an order from the central government, South Hamgyong Province first installed a facial recognition device at the ticket gate of a specific train station in April 2021. The device scanned the faces of people passing through the gate to board trains to confirm their identities.
The provincial branch of the Ministry of Social Security said the government “spent a fortune to install these special devices to stop enemy plots using the infectious disease as an excuse in South Hamgyong Province, a center of the chemical industry.”
The provincial authorities felt that installing the facial recognition software was an appropriate response that could minimize the risk of spreading COVID-19 while effectively managing public travel at a time when social distancing due to the virus was becoming more important.
Based on the successful trial of the facial recognition device, South Hamgyong Province decided to install the devices at the ticket gates of other local train stations. As a result, the facial recognition system was expanded to multiple gates at multiple stations, allowing authorities to more thoroughly control people’s movements.
The authorities were able to conduct inspections and confirmations much more quickly than before, when railway police made people wait in line while they visually checked their IDs, travel documents, and train tickets before letting them pass through the gate.
However, a resident of South Hamgyong Province, recalling those days, said that the installation of the latest technology at the train stations “showed the government’s efforts to strengthen the crackdown and control over the people by using advanced technology. In other words, the state’s goal was to crack down on public travel by installing facial recognition devices, ostensibly to stop the spread of COVID-19.”
“People at the time were shocked at how far the state’s technology had come,” the person said. “Some were appalled that the state wasn’t interested in how people were starving, but was spending money on technology to control people so they couldn’t move an inch.”
In other words, some people expressed despair and anger at the state for focusing solely on internal controls, including travel bans, while neglecting the people whose livelihoods were threatened by COVID-19’s impact on economic activity and who suffered from shortages of daily necessities and medicine.
According to several sources in North Korea, three facial recognition devices installed at a station in Pyongyang in 2021 are currently functioning normally, while those installed at several stations in South Hamgyong Province have malfunctioned and are no longer functioning.
At the stations in South Hamgyong Province, the railway police are still checking the IDs, travel documents and train tickets of each person boarding the train.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Daily NK works with a network of sources living in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous for security reasons. For more information about Daily NK’s network of reporting partners and information-gathering activities, please visit our FAQ page here.
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com · by Kim Jeong Yoon · April 19, 2024
10. How general elections will affect South Korea's foreign policy
Yes, enquiring minds want to know.
How general elections will affect South Korea's foreign policy
The Korea Times · April 20, 2024
President Yoon Suk Yeol and his wife Kim Keon Hee disembark from the presidential jet after arriving at Paris Orly Airport, Nov. 23, 2023. Korea Times photo by Seo Jae-hoon
Fundamental changes unlikely, as Yoon remains steadfast on diplomacy
By Nam Hyun-woo
The opposition bloc's landslide victory in the April 10 general elections is cornering President Yoon Suk Yeol toward changing his political philosophy and direction in managing state affairs.
However, despite the pressure, government officials and experts expect little change in Seoul's principle of aligning its diplomatic stance with the United States on major global issues and being more vocal about what Yoon calls "authoritarian forces."
Here are several reasons why Yoon will likely maintain his stance.
President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks during a Cabinet meeting at his office in Yongsan District, Seoul, Tuesday. Yonhap
During a Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, Yoon said he "humbly accepts" the public sentiment reflected in the general elections but mostly asserted he has been steering the country in the right direction, though the effect of his policies has not been sufficiently felt by the populace.
Regarding Yoon's remark, a senior official at the presidential office told The Korea Times that "there won't be a fundamental shift in the directions of the government's policies in a broader perspective, such as enhancing the alliance with the U.S. or strengthening coalitions with free democracy."
This stance was also seen in presidential chief of staff Lee Kwan-sup's remarks a day after the election. At the time, Lee said all senior secretaries of the presidential office have offered to resign, except for "those who are at the Office of National Security," which is in charge of security and foreign policies."
The election outcome weakens Yoon's influence on legislative initiatives which mostly affects domestic issues, but still can exert his power in terms of national security, despite facing strong protests from the National Assembly.
"I don't think there will be a shift in Yoon's foreign policies," Kim Joon-hyung, a lawmaker-elect from the minor liberal opposition Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), told The Korea Times. Kim is a former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy during the previous liberal Moon Jae-in administration.
"Most diplomatic experts would agree that Yoon will stick to his current diplomatic philosophy because national security is an area where the president can fully exercise his power."
Kim emphasized that the crucial question is whether Yoon's foreign policy will garner public support for the remainder of his presidency, because voters were sharply divided in assessing Yoon's diplomatic policies.
"While Yoon's opponents think his diplomacy was disastrous, his supporters say one of his best achievements is putting South Korea's diplomacy on the current course."
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida arrive for a press conference during a trilateral summit at Camp David in Maryland, Aug. 18. AFP-Yonhap
Since taking office in May 2022, Yoon has been making significant efforts to alter South Korea’s diplomatic strategy.
While his predecessor Moon focused on a balancing act in the rivalry between the U.S. and China and strived to tame North Korea’s nuclear ambition with discussions and talks, Yoon significantly improved South Korea’s strategic visibility that it is standing by the U.S. in most of the global issues, while maintaining an ever-hawkish stance on Pyongyang’s provocations.
In doing so, the Yoon administration introduced a concept it named “global pivotal state,” to symbolize Yoon’s diplomatic philosophy of improving Seoul’s diplomatic presence in the global diplomatic stage by raising its voices on international issues, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s assertive maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait.
The opposition, including Kim, has been calling for the president to be neutral in issues concerning the Taiwan Strait and Ukraine, worrying over possible diplomatic frays with neighboring superpowers, but Yoon’s diplomacy is oftentimes mentioned as the top reason for the support he receives in approval polls, though his overall ratings have remained below 45 percent throughout his presidency.
Due to this, Yoon said on May 9, 2023, when he was marking his first year in the office, that the biggest achievements in his presidency during the past year were “diplomacy and security.”
President Yoon Suk Yeol smiles during a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at his office in Yongsan District, Seoul, April 17. Courtesy of presidential office
Misery loves company
For a week after the election defeat, Yoon and the presidential office have been keeping a low profile to devise post-election strategies, with Yoon avoiding public engagements or media appearances.
Yoon resumed his public presence by holding a phone call with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on Wednesday.
According to the presidential office, the call was arranged to share the outcomes of Kishida's recent summit with U.S. President Joe Biden to keep their earlier promises to strengthen the three countries' security cooperation.
The call was interpreted as a strategic move considering each leader's domestic political situation.
Yoon and Kishida revitalized the two countries' frayed relations through seven summits last year. However, the process was not supported by the majority of Koreans, who saw that Yoon took a submissive position before Tokyo over the two country's historic disputes.
While Yoon is cornered with the ruling party's general election defeat, Kishida is also struggling with abysmal job approval ratings remaining below 30 percent. Without sufficient domestic support for their overall policies, doubts will continue to linger about the sustainability of their foreign policies.
Due to this, experts said Wednesday's call is viewed as their effort to showcase to the world that the two countries' diplomatic stances, despite the domestic doubts about their respective leadership, will stay as it is and promote further cooperation.
The South Korean presidential office said in a press release that "the leaders have agreed to continue fostering a strong relationship of trust and maintaining candid communication throughout this year to ensure the positive momentum in the bilateral relations can be sustained."
From left, then-President Moon Jae-in, then-Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hold a press conference after their summit in Chengdu, China, Dec. 24, 2019. Joint Press Corps
Seoul-Tokyo-Beijing trilateral summit
Against the backdrop, the envisaged trilateral summit between South Korea, Japan and China will be the first stage showcasing the Yoon administration’s post-election diplomatic stance.
The annual three-way talks have been suspended for four years since the last iteration held in China’s Chengdu in December 2019, in the wake of the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. Seoul is set to host the upcoming summit.
Seoul’s presidential office is yet to announce the exact date of the summit, but its government officials said the event is being arranged to take place at the end of May. Japanese newspapers also reported May 26 or 27 as possible dates.
“It is hard to expect a dramatic development (in Seoul-Beijing and Seoul-Tokyo-Beijing relations) after the summit,” the RKP’s Kim said.
“To change the current lopsided diplomatic landscape, a fundamental shift in Yoon’s diplomatic principle toward China, Russia and even North Korea is required… If Yoon adheres to such a stance, the summit may be worse than doing nothing. But at the same time, there is still hope that the general election victory (of the opposition) will affect Yoon’s diplomatic policies so that he can send signals for change.”
The Korea Times · April 20, 2024
11. [Wang Son-taek] New direction of Korean diplomacy after election
Some of us have a more positive view of President Yoon;s foreign and national security policy.
Conclusion:
President Yoon has three more years to go. If he changes his diplomatic strategy and tactics reflecting the demands from the general election, he might be applauded when he leaves office and can return to normal life. However, if he sticks to the current attitude, we cannot rule out the possibility of issuing a report card that says he ruined the foreign policy and security of the Republic of Korea.
[Wang Son-taek] New direction of Korean diplomacy after election
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · April 17, 2024
By Korea Herald
Published : April 19, 2024 - 05:30
The general election in South Korea on April 10 ended with the landslide victory of the opposition Democratic Party and the disastrous defeat of the ruling People Power Party.
The Democratic Party won 175 out of 300 seats in parliament. It is one of the most significant victories by an opposition party in the history of Korean politics. The party won 180 seats four years ago, but the meaning is different because it was the ruling party in 2020. Besides, just a couple of months after the formidable outbreak of COVID-19, there was a strong stream of opinion about helping the government overcome the global disaster.
The People Power Party gained five more seats than 103 four years ago. However, it is undoubtedly a catastrophic loss as it has become a ruling party from an opposition party.
In this election, the opposition parties emphasized a stern judgment on the government led by President Yoon Suk Yeol and the ruling party. They lashed out against the president as ignorant and incompetent, bringing up economic difficulties with high prices.
They also criticized him as ruthless and irresponsible, recalling the tragic incident in Itaewon in October 2022 and the death of a Marine last year.
The obvious backsliding of democracy in Korea was also a big issue with the government. The criticism also includes problems in foreign affairs and security. They have argued that the administration has aggravated the security situation because of the flawed national strategies, and Yoon incurred too many diplomatic humiliations.
The ruling party's crushing defeat in the election made it inevitable for President Yoon Suk Yeol to make significant policy changes. Foreign and security policies should also be included in the policy changes. There are three major points Mr. Yoon should take to improve diplomatic performance: bipartisanship, an integrated approach and prudence.
Throughout his two-year governing since his inauguration in 2022, Yoon has kept denouncing the foreign policies of his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, as "fake peace" that relies only on the goodwill of the other party and has pushed for policies in the reverse direction.
Foreign policies can only be successful by using both "carrot and stick" in a well-tuned management. However, he declared that he would rely only on hard-line policies. Since Korea was divided into two nations, military tensions have constantly been a cause of instability. Therefore, it is an inevitable mission for South Korea to lower military tensions through dialogue with North Korea and to establish a reliable defense system. Nevertheless, defining dialogue and negotiations as fake peace, he ignores the basics of foreign and security policies, and the degree of security anxiety on the Korean peninsula has unnecessarily increased.
Second, we need an integrated approach. Reinforcing the Korea-US alliance and cooperation among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo is OK. However, that does not necessarily mean South Korea should declare the North, China, and Russia enemies. The Republic of Korea's greatest geopolitical feature is a superposition of nations belonging to continental and maritime forces, so Korea must work with both forces. Still, it seems that there are too many people inside the presidential office who believe that Korea should show some aggressive attitudes against China and Russia to achieve closer ties with the US and Japan. This is a shocking mistake. Relations with China and Russia can be positively managed.
Third, we need to find a sense of prudence again. President Yoon has made a lot of slip-ups, causing unnecessary diplomatic disasters and ripples. To maintain a prudent attitude in diplomacy, one should consider the sentiments of the other country's government and its people. Also, it is forbidden to unnecessarily mention another country in recognition that a third party, whether friendly or competitive, is watching the diplomatic moves.
The most symbolic example of this is his calling Iran an enemy in the UAE. His statement of solidarity with Ukraine with the courage not to fear death was also a severe slip of the tongue as it could sound like defining Russia as an enemy of Korea, given that Ukraine is at war with Russia. Korea is almost the only country in the world that has to suffer unnecessary losses if it formalizes its hostile relations with Russia due to its confrontation with North Korea. The other countries can denounce Russia as much as they want. However, the geopolitical situation in Korea requires us to use different language when we express support for Ukraine.
To achieve positive results in diplomacy, we must earn the people's support. Government leaders must actively communicate with the public, explain the goals and strategies of diplomacy, and ask for support. Naturally, cooperation with the media is crucial. Surprisingly, Yoon is notorious for not interviewing with Korean media and that is one of the big reasons that a lot of people have a negative appraisal of his diplomacy.
A prudent attitude also includes changing the obsession with state visits with a colorful protocol. State visits are expensive, but they are not very cost-effective. Anyway, protocol and guard procedures become complicated, which increases the possibility of miscommunications and mistakes. In modern liberal democracies that hate authoritarianism, state visits are an exceptional phenomenon. Yet, Yoon seems to favor state visits unduly. That is one of the critical causes of absurd diplomatic disasters. From now on, the foreign visits should be changed to focus on working-level visits.
President Yoon has three more years to go. If he changes his diplomatic strategy and tactics reflecting the demands from the general election, he might be applauded when he leaves office and can return to normal life. However, if he sticks to the current attitude, we cannot rule out the possibility of issuing a report card that says he ruined the foreign policy and security of the Republic of Korea.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed.
koreaherald.com · by Korea Herald · April 17, 2024
12. Pres. Yoon to have first meeting with Lee Jae-myung
Pres. Yoon to have first meeting with Lee Jae-myung
donga.com
Posted April. 20, 2024 08:14,
Updated April. 20, 2024 08:14
Pres. Yoon to have first meeting with Lee Jae-myung. April. 20, 2024 08:14. by Kwan-Seok Jang jks@donga.com.
South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol proposed a meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan-gu, Seoul next week over the phone conversation with the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, Lee Jae-myung, on Friday. This is the first action taken since the ruling party’s crushing defeat in the April 10 general elections, which led to an increased need for cooperation with the opposition party for managing state affairs. This is the second time the two who competed for the presidency in the 2022 presidential elections talked over the phone since August 2022, when Lee was elected as the leader of the opposition party.
“President Yoon talked to Lee for about five minutes over the phone around 3:30 p.m. on Friday. He congratulated Lee for the election of the Democratic Party members at the general elections, including Lee, and proposed a meeting next week,” said Lee Do-woon, the senior presidential secretary for public relations, during a briefing at 4 p.m. on Friday. President Yoon reportedly suggested more frequent communication to discuss state affairs. The president also asked to be excused for a delay in his phone call and a suggestion for a meeting due to the delayed appointment of a chief presidential secretary and a successor prime minister.
The senior secretary shared that Lee thanked the president for the invitation with an open heart. The opposition party leader expressed his willingness to cooperate for state affairs, adding that his party should help with the presidential work. The phone call was proposed by Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Kwan-seop to the Chief Secretary to the Democratic Party’s leader, Chun Joon-ho, around 1 p.m. on Friday. “A number of state matters are waiting to be resolved, and people’s lives are in a dire situation,” said Kang Sun-woo, the spokesperson of the Democratic Party. “Both the president and the party leader are expected to have a frank conversation, regardless of their parties.”
한국어
donga.com
13. Kim Jong Un releases new song praising himself as North Korea's 'friendly father'
It is all about making Kim Jong Un great.
Kim Jong Un releases new song praising himself as North Korea's 'friendly father'
The song all about the North Korean leader was sung at a ceremony which celebrating the opening of 10,000 new homes in the capital.
Thursday 18 April 2024 20:32, UK
Sky News
Kim Jong Un has released a song praising himself as the "friendly father" of North Korea.
The new song was played at a ceremony to celebrate the opening of a new development of 10,000 homes in a district in the capital, Pyongyang, on Tuesday.
Mr Kim was met with huge crowds as he arrived at the spectacular event in an armoured limousine that he was given as a gift by Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to news website NK News.
Later, while sitting on top of one of the new buildings ready to cut the ceremonial red ribbon, singers serenaded Mr Kim with the new song titled Friendly Father.
Image: Mr Kim sat on top of one of the new buildings while being serenaded. Pic: KCNA/Reuters
The upbeat tune involved singers repeating the North Korean leader's name, pumping their fists into the air and declaring a "brighter future" under his leadership, according to Korean Central Television (KCTV) coverage of the event.
The ceremony also involved fireworks and a flyover by the Korean People's Army Air Force, KCTV reported.
A music video for the new song was aired on the KCTV network on Wednesday.
It features scenes of Mr Kim interspersed with soldiers and citizens bouncing up and down, while all enthusiastically doing a thumbs-up sign, NK News reported.
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Image: Pic: KCNA/Reuters
The new homes in the Hwasong district are part of the Rimhung Street development, which began in 2022 with the building of 10,000 homes.
The projects are reportedly part of Mr Kim's promise in early 2021 to employ the military to build 50,000 new flats in the capital within five years.
In a visit to the Rimhung site earlier this month, Mr Kim confirmed next year's project will also be in the Hwasong area.
Sky News
14. What the Revamp of the Japan-US Alliance Structure Means for South Korea
USFK is not a warfighting HQ. It is a force provider to the ROK/US CFC.
Some of the young Captain's assertions do not seem to make sense. The INDOPACOM commander remains the Combatant Commander and he will retain combatant command (COCOM) over USFJ and USFK as he currently does.
Excerpt:
Assigning a four-star general would lay the groundwork for the USFJ to assume not only an independent OPCON to shorten the crisis response time by not having to wait for the INDOPACOM, but also smooth the asset transfer between two same-ranked U.S. commanders.
...
The current USFK-USFJ relations, chain of command, and operation plans do not reflect a scenario of two four-star generals with independent OPCONs, possibly sharing limited U.S. assets in the region. That might seem arbitrary, even previously unthinkable, from South Korea’s standpoint, since U.S. assets in Korea have always been considered immovable. Moreover, under the new set-up, any such transfer would be decided based on consultations between the USFJ commander and the USFK commander, not orders from the INDOPACOM or the CFC-K as it stands now.
What the Revamp of the Japan-US Alliance Structure Means for South Korea
thediplomat.com
New security and military arrangements will have knock-on effects for both Japan and South Korea, their respective U.S. forces, and the regional security architecture.
By James JB Park
April 17, 2024
Fighter aircraft from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea conducted a trilateral escort flight of a U.S. B-52H Stratofortress Bomber operating in the Indo-Pacific, Oct. 22, 2023. U.S. F-16s from the 80th Fighter Squadron, 8th Fighter Wing flew alongside Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) F-2s from the 8th Air Wing, and Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) F-15Ks from the 11th Wing.
Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Karrla Parra
Not many realize that the United States had a Far East Command (FECOM) in the 1950s due to the Korean War and its ramifications. The gigantic battle command was then split into two subunified U.S. Commands in both South Korea and Japan, in the form of the United States Forces-Korea (USFK) and the United States Forces-Japan (USFJ). Each carries out their respective roles as parts of the U.S. “hub and spokes” alliance system.
The USFK, composed of approximately 30,000 servicemembers and ground-combat related assets, serves not only to protect the Korean Peninsula from possible North Korean attacks, but also to maintain stability in Northeast Asia as the first responder to any ground conflicts. The USFK has its own autonomous operational control (OPCON), and the commander of the USFK is a triple-hatted four-star general, simultaneously assuming the roles of the commander of the United Nations Command and the commander of the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC-K).
The story is a little different for the USFJ. Currently led by a three-star U.S. general, the USFJ, despite its 55,000 servicemembers and rich aerial and naval assets, has functioned as a “policy headquarter,” answering both bureaucratic and combat orders from the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), without any autonomous OPCON.
However, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s state visit to the United States in April is certain to cause new challenges for the U.S. hub and spokes alliance system assisted by the two subunified U.S. Commands. Priorities between the two “spokes,” South Korea and Japan, might overlap and in some cases conflict, necessitating adroit handling by the U.S. government.
Kishida’s visit had three aims: to ensure Japan’s new status as a “global” security partner, enhance the United States Forces-Japan’s class and eminence by improving the two nations’ combined Command and Control (C2) abilities against China, and bring in a U.S. four-star general to head the USFJ. The current three-star USFJ commander has not wielded the same influence as the USFK commander, who, if necessary, can even request a meeting with the Korean president. Moreover, the USFK commander can operationally control United Nation-led troops in case of another Korean War, and lead both Korean and U.S. troops under the CFC-K. It is no surprise that the USFK commander is regarded as an integral member of the senior U.S. military leadership.
So why the upgrade to the USFJ commander?
Against the backdrop of possible (even probable) Chinese assertiveness in the region, the U.S. government expects the USFJ to serve as a nimble aerial and naval power projection entity, while the USFK is hamstrung by 1.2 million North Korean soldiers just 30 miles away from Seoul. By equalizing the capacity and capabilities of both commands, U.S. Forces will have streamlined access to different regional combat assets – currently separated, generally speaking, between ground troops and guns in South Korea (along with some aerial and naval assets, of course) and strong aerial and naval assets in Japan – to create room for flexible, agile joint and combined operations, as the volatile situation demands. Assigning a four-star general would lay the groundwork for the USFJ to assume not only an independent OPCON to shorten the crisis response time by not having to wait for the INDOPACOM, but also smooth the asset transfer between two same-ranked U.S. commanders.
However, it is vital to remember this new, fluid strategy conflicts with the already-orchestrated Korea-U.S. CFC-K structure. Encompassing both the USFK and the Korean Armed Forces, the CFC-K operates based on the orders of the Korean and U.S. presidents, the commanders-in-chief, as well as on the established agreements of the Pentagon and its Korean counterpart. This allows the execution of the defense of Korea via seamless, patterned operation plan against possible North Korean invasion scenarios. While the U.S. and Japan still need to hash out the exact ramifications of Kishida’s aims, adding the USFJ to the established defense equation of South Korea would require relevant stakeholders’ immediate attention and deliberations. Subtleties can be costly in situations requiring split-second decisions.
The current USFK-USFJ relations, chain of command, and operation plans do not reflect a scenario of two four-star generals with independent OPCONs, possibly sharing limited U.S. assets in the region. That might seem arbitrary, even previously unthinkable, from South Korea’s standpoint, since U.S. assets in Korea have always been considered immovable. Moreover, under the new set-up, any such transfer would be decided based on consultations between the USFJ commander and the USFK commander, not orders from the INDOPACOM or the CFC-K as it stands now.
For instance, an aerial and naval reinforcement request from the USFK to the USFJ to defend the Korean Peninsula might not be met promptly if the USFJ commander’s combat priority is defending a besieged Taiwan, not South Korea. In this case, South Korea’s purview cannot dictate how to rotate U.S. assets, which is, lawfully, between two U.S. commanders.
Of course, one option would be the USFK commander putting on his “CFC-K commander hat,” to assume more bureaucratic priority than the USFJ commander, but that requires trilateral consultations and formal agreements. This underscores the need for deft handling. The CFC-K commander, though the same person as the USFK commander, speaks partially for the Korean military, and in that sense the issue of asset and personnel transfers is no longer confined within the U.S. Forces, but involving three governments: South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Naturally too, Japan and the USFJ would also want a clear blueprint of when the CFC-K commander’s orders would assume more priority over the USFJ commander’s.
Also, while denied at this point, the possibility of the USFJ activating a Combined Forces Command-Japan with the Japanese Self-Defense Force is yet another variable. In that case, there would be two Combined Forces commanders in the region, each considering the opinions of their respective deputy commanders, who, in turn, answer the orders of their commander-in-chiefs, one in Seoul and the other Tokyo.
This multivariable equation, more than ever, necessitates the trilateral alliance to devise a clear, well-thought out, and flexible deconflict plan concerning the two battle commands, the USFK and the USFJ, while also heeding each state’s national sentiments and the vox populi. This is not an easy task, but it would be tremendously worthwhile to investigate smart ways to do so for regional peace and the normative and inclusive international order.
This renewal of order and chain of command is only a beginning, and this South Korea-Japan case would be an invaluable precedent for future deconflict efforts involving other U.S. allies.
Authors
Guest Author
James JB Park
James JB Park, a Captain (R) of the Republic of Korea Army, is a 2024 Non-resident James A. Kelly Korea Studies Fellow. He is a Young Leader of the Pacific Forum and a NextGen member of the Royal United Service Institute. From 2017 to 2019, Captain Park served as a staffer in Korea’s Presidential Blue House and its Office of National Security. The views expressed here are the author’s alone.
thediplomat.com
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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