Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"To be clear, DoD's main effort - integrated deterrence, is SOCOM's main effort. … Since 1942, your SOF have accumulated six decades of strategic competition experience. Now combined with over two decades of hard-earned combat experience in the Global War on Terror. These eight decades make your special operations tailor-made for this era."

– USSOCOM Commander Gen. Bryan Fenton in his 2024 opening remarks to the #HASC Intelligence and Special Operations subcommittee.

"Whatever you can do, or dream you can, begin it. Boldness has genius, power and magic in it."

– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

"Understanding a person does not mean condoning; it only means that one does not accuse him as if one were God or a judge placed above him."

– Erich Fromm

1. Improving SOF Ethics Education

2. Israel dismisses 2 officers over deadly drone strikes on aid workers in Gaza

3. Behind the Deadly Mistakes of Israel’s Military in Gaza

4. China Is Targeting U.S. Voters and Taiwan With AI-Powered Disinformation

5. Dwindling Ammunition Stocks Pose Grave Threat to Ukraine

6. Samsung to Fortify U.S. Chip Revival by Swelling Its Texas Investment to $44 Billion

7. Ukraine staged major attack on Russia's Morozovsk military air base, Kyiv source says

8. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 4, 2024

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 202410.. Israel braces for Tehran’s response after deadly Damascus strike

10. 11 ships are trapped behind the Key Bridge, including 4 considered key to national defense

12. Army’s top Pacific leader mum on ‘where or when’ new missiles will deploy

13. Pacific coalition tightens as China pressures the Philippines and Taiwan

14. How two brigades are leading the Army’s charge toward cutting-edge tech

15. Myanmar resistance group says its drones hit targets in the capital, but army says it shot them down

16. US Army officer’s book explores legitimacy of drone warfare

17. Confronting the Anti-Israel Narrative-Industrial Complex

18. ‘The machine did it coldly’: Israel used AI to identify 37,000 Hamas targets

19. The erratic results of deterrence against non-state armed groups

20. Michael Rühle, From Pacifism to Nuclear Deterrence: Norman Angell and the Founding of NATO

21. Why Natural Catastrophes Will Always Be Worse than Cyber Catastrophes

22. Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

23. War Books: Not Just What You Read, But How You Read

24. Marco Rubio: TikTok Parent Company Poses a National Security Threat

25. Gen Z is embracing dictatorships

26. Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces

1. Improving SOF Ethics Education

The 34 page report can be downloaded at this link: https://jsouapplicationstorage.blob.core.windows.net/press/479/Improving_SOF_Ethics_Education_Digital_Final_d.pdf

I hope everyone in the SOF community reads and internalizes this (others will benefit from this as well)

I was honored to serve with Mike Clark in 1st SFG and be a classmate of Dr. Thyne at Georgetown,

Improving SOF Ethics Education

https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/246?utm

Authored by:

Long, Joseph E.

Published on 4/3/2024

Digital Only

The realities of human nature combined with the realities of SOF culture and the SOF operational environment create frequent opportunities for SOF professionals to become numb to moral drift and the ethical dilemmas that follow from a culture where “if you ain’t cheatin’, you ain’t tryin’!” takes on an institution-wide leadership problem for SOF professionals across the joint force and across the operational spectrum. This reality requires SOF leaders who recognize the reality that the SOF profession offers its own peculiar professional and ethical challenges and leaders who are professionally ready to lead in such highly complex ethical decision-making environments.

Topics

Ethics

AORs

Global

2. Israel dismisses 2 officers over deadly drone strikes on aid workers in Gaza

Excerpts:

With pressure mounting on Israel to hold itself accountable, Hagari and other officials late Thursday shared with reporters the results of the military’s uncommonly speedy and detailed investigation.

It was unclear whether the punishments and the apology would calm an international outcry over the deaths of the World Central Kitchen workers or reassure international aid groups that it was safe to resume operations in Gaza, where nearly a third of the population is on the brink of starvation.

According to what spokespeople said were the Israeli army’s rules, targets must be visually identified as threats for multiple reasons before they can be hit. But the investigation determined that a colonel had authorized the series of deadly drone strikes on the convoy based on one major’s observation — from grainy drone-camera footage — that someone in the convoy was armed. That observation turned out to be untrue, military officials said.

...

The investigation found two major areas of wrongdoing.

It faulted officers for failing to read messages alerting troops that cars, not aid trucks, would carry workers from the charity away from the warehouse where aid was distributed. As a result, the cars that were targeted were misidentified as transporting militants.

The army also faulted a major who identified the strike target and a colonel who approved the strike for acting with insufficient information.

Israel dismisses 2 officers over deadly drone strikes on aid workers in Gaza

AP · by JULIA FRANKEL · April 5, 2024

JULIA FRANKEL

Frankel is an Associated Press reporter in Jerusalem.

twitter mailto

AP · by JULIA FRANKEL · April 5, 2024

3. Behind the Deadly Mistakes of Israel’s Military in Gaza

Excerpts:

The Israeli military often grants wide authority for commanders on the ground to call for airstrikes during wartime, said people familiar with the operations of Israeli forces. The rules are more like a broad set of procedures that depend on the situation, current and former Israeli military legal advisers said. They described two types of airstrikes.

The first are planned strikes on known targets. The second type of strikes are based on real-time information. They are usually carried out by drones against suspected combatants identified by soldiers on the ground. A commanding officer, located in a room with drone operators at an air force base, works with commanders at division, brigade or company level who can order strikes.

Both types of strike can require higher approval, depending on location and the potential for collateral damage, according to an Israeli military legal adviser.

A drone-operations room seen by The Wall Street Journal last year, under the command of a 27-year-old major, had three worn chairs in front of three video monitors showing the grainy black-and-white images from drones: One soldier pilots the aircraft while another manages its cameras. A red button fires the missile. The soldiers work in four-hour shifts.

Israeli soldiers don’t always see a clear distinction between civilians and militants. Reservists said in interviews that Hamas militants dress in civilian clothes and roam about unarmed, picking up weapons hidden in residential areas when they engage Israeli troops. Israel has said Hamas operates from hospitals and hides among civilians. Hamas denies using civilians as human shields and says Israel is responsible for killing civilians.

In Gaza, an urban area with a prewar population of 2.2 million people, the need for humanitarian organizations to coordinate with the Israeli forces is crucial.

The United Nations and other aid groups share the coordinates of their guesthouses, warehouses and other premises with the Israeli military, which adds them to a list of what should be protected sites that are shared with pilots and ground troops. Aid groups also share their movements with Israeli forces ahead of time. In particularly dangerous areas, such as northern Gaza, the Israeli military mostly denies aid missions on security grounds.

Behind the Deadly Mistakes of Israel’s Military in Gaza

A missile strike on a convoy of aid workers reveals the shortcomings of safety measures Israeli forces have in place to protect civilians

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/world-central-kitchen-israel-gaza-military-d08b3bde?mod=hp_lead_pos1

By Jared MalsinFollow

, Stephen KalinFollow

and Margherita StancatiFollow

April 5, 2024 12:01 am ET

A convoy of three vehicles ferried workers with aid group World Central Kitchen along the Gaza Strip’s coastal road on Monday night.

In the darkness above, an Israeli military drone scanned for enemy forces. The aircraft’s operators identified the convoy as a hostile target and opened fire. Missiles slammed into the vehicles, one after the other, killing seven people heading back from bringing food to the hungry.

The deaths have crystallized a broad international backlash against Israel’s war in Gaza. President Biden called for an immediate cease-fire during a phone conversation Thursday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Biden suggested that further U.S. support would depend on Israel taking steps to protect aid workers and civilians.

“This is not a stand-alone incident,” Biden said Wednesday about the deadly strike. “Israel has not done enough to protect aid workers trying to deliver desperately needed help to civilians.”

The Israeli military said the strike took place after its forces mistakenly identified the vehicles as enemy targets. The army launched an investigation.

For six months, Israeli forces, responding to the Oct. 7 attack that killed more than 1,200 men, women and children, have waged a broad campaign to destroy the Islamist militant group. More than 20,000 people who shouldn’t have been targets are believed to have been killed by the army—the majority of them Palestinian civilians, but also captive Israeli hostages, relief workers and journalists, according to Palestinian health officials, the U.N. and organizations tracking the war. Israel said it doesn’t target civilians.

Since the start of the war, nearly 200 aid workers have been killed, including 175 U.N. staff in Gaza, making it the U.N.’s deadliest, according to U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres.

Aid groups making efforts to alert the military about their plans and movements have been hobbled by miscommunication between Israel’s civilian and military branches. The World Central Kitchen convoy coordinated its trip ahead of time with the Israeli military. It passed through Israeli checkpoints, traveled a road used for aid deliveries and yet was struck anyway.

The scale of civilian deaths since Oct. 7 stems, in part, from the way Israel is going about the war, which is waged in a densely populated urban area where combatants mix with civilians. Israeli troops have wide latitude to carry out orders to destroy the enemy, and many are exhausted after six months of urban fighting.

“When you get nonspecific tasks from the national authority—destroy, annihilate Hamas, wipe them out—at some point, those kinds of things actually have to be translated into tasks on the ground for soldiers and units to actually orchestrate,” said Gen. Joseph Votel, a former chief of the U.S. Central Command during the U.S.-led war on Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

Remains of a car driven by a worker of World Central Kitchen after an Israeli strike on Monday. PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Workers of World Central Kitchen gathering at Al-Najjar Hospital in Rafah, Gaza, where the bodies of slain colleagues were taken. PHOTO: HAITHAM IMAD/SHUTTERSTOCK

With those imperatives, Votel said, humanitarian concerns get less attention.

The Israeli military often grants wide authority for commanders on the ground to call for airstrikes during wartime, said people familiar with the operations of Israeli forces. The rules are more like a broad set of procedures that depend on the situation, current and former Israeli military legal advisers said. They described two types of airstrikes.

The first are planned strikes on known targets. The second type of strikes are based on real-time information. They are usually carried out by drones against suspected combatants identified by soldiers on the ground. A commanding officer, located in a room with drone operators at an air force base, works with commanders at division, brigade or company level who can order strikes.

Both types of strike can require higher approval, depending on location and the potential for collateral damage, according to an Israeli military legal adviser.

A drone-operations room seen by The Wall Street Journal last year, under the command of a 27-year-old major, had three worn chairs in front of three video monitors showing the grainy black-and-white images from drones: One soldier pilots the aircraft while another manages its cameras. A red button fires the missile. The soldiers work in four-hour shifts.

Israeli soldiers don’t always see a clear distinction between civilians and militants. Reservists said in interviews that Hamas militants dress in civilian clothes and roam about unarmed, picking up weapons hidden in residential areas when they engage Israeli troops. Israel has said Hamas operates from hospitals and hides among civilians. Hamas denies using civilians as human shields and says Israel is responsible for killing civilians.

In Gaza, an urban area with a prewar population of 2.2 million people, the need for humanitarian organizations to coordinate with the Israeli forces is crucial.

The United Nations and other aid groups share the coordinates of their guesthouses, warehouses and other premises with the Israeli military, which adds them to a list of what should be protected sites that are shared with pilots and ground troops. Aid groups also share their movements with Israeli forces ahead of time. In particularly dangerous areas, such as northern Gaza, the Israeli military mostly denies aid missions on security grounds.

The aid workers killed in the Israeli strike were, top row, Damian Soból of Poland and Zomi Frankcom of Australia; middle row, John Chapman, Jim Henderson and James Kirby of the U.K.; and bottom row, Saifeddin Issam Ayad Abutaha, a Palestinian, and Jacob Flickinger, a dual U.S.-Canadian citizen.

WORLD CENTRAL KITCHEN/REUTERS (5), WORLD CENTRAL KITCHEN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES 2)

No solutions

The American Near East Refugee Aid paused its operations in Gaza after the strike on the World Central Kitchen convoy, said Sean Carroll, president of Anera. Its staff for the first time in the war no longer felt comfortable with the risks, he said. The U.S. relief organization has operated in the occupied Palestinian territories for more than five decades.

Carroll said he doesn’t know what safety measures to seek from the Israeli military. Giving advance notice of plans and movements, known as deconfliction, is already standard procedure. World Central Kitchen has employed security consultants and even some armored cars, he said: “That’s not going to help, so what is? The only thing you can think of is deconfliction, but that’s what we’ve done. So I don’t know what it is.”

Communication between humanitarian groups and the Israeli military passes through the military’s civil administration agency, called Cogat, before heading to Israeli forces on the ground. A senior U.N. humanitarian official said she saw problems with the process during the months she participated after Oct. 7. “We would have an agreement with Cogat, but it wasn’t necessarily conveyed by IDF to their soldiers at the checkpoint,” the official said.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said Tuesday that the Israeli military planned to set up direct coordination with international aid organizations. The war has taken an unprecedented toll on U.N. and other aid workers.

The majority of the dead were Palestinian employees of Unrwa, which is leading the humanitarian response on behalf of other U.N. agencies and aid groups. Unrwa workers supply food to an estimated 1.1 million people, as well as staff medical centers and run shelters for displaced Gazans. Unrwa said around 160 of its facilities have been damaged in the fighting.

Palestinians line up for a food Tuesday in Rafah, Gaza. PHOTO: FATIMA SHBAIR/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Volunteers of World Central Kitchen preparing food last month in Rafah, Gaza. PHOTO: HAITHAMI IMAD/SHUTTERSTOCK

In February, an Unrwa convoy carrying food was hit by the Israeli navy along a coastal road while it waited for permission from Israeli forces to cross into northern Gaza. The Israeli military said the convoy was struck by mistake. Unrwa suspended aid deliveries to the north.

The war has been the most lethal war for journalists: 95 killed since Oct. 7, according to the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists, which began collecting data in 1992.

Israeli fire also has killed some of the more than 200 Israeli hostages taken by Hamas, as well at least 20 of its own soldiers in friendly fire, among the more than 250 soldiers killed since Oct. 7.

In total, the war has claimed the lives of more than 33,000 Palestinians in Gaza, some 72% of them women and children, according to the territory’s health officials. The military campaign has obliterated schools, hospitals and cultural centers. Airstrikes have hit residential high-rise buildings and crowded refugee camps. The scale and speed of the killing of civilians in Gaza has surpassed other conflicts in recent history, according to many humanitarian groups.

Israel Takes Steps to Expand Aid into Gaza After Tense Call with U.S.

‘I am so scared’

A key principle of international law is that the level of civilian casualties resulting from any military strike should be proportional to the military value of the target.

Israel has chosen to take “a capacious definition of what constitutes necessity for military actions,” said Craig Jones, the author of a book on Israeli and U.S. military legal strategy and a lecturer in political geography at the U.K.’s Newcastle University.

The urban landscape of Gaza makes precision difficult. Hamas is a guerrilla force fighting in and among civilians, in an area about the size of Philadelphia. People are trapped in the coastal enclave by Israel on one side and Egypt on the other. Israeli population centers are in close range, increasing the urgency for intercepting threats.

“The whole purpose of targeting is to kill the ones that we are after, that is the Hamas terrorists, and to avoid unintended casualties among civilians, which is very hard to do in such a condensed place like Gaza,” said Maj. Gen. Tamir Heyman, a former head of intelligence for the Israeli military.

Residents searching for victims Thursday in the rubble of a house hit in an Israeli airstrike in Rafah, Gaza. PHOTO: HAITHAM IMAD/SHUTTERSTOCK

Israeli military personnel driving near the Israel-Gaza border on Wednesday. PHOTO: HANNAH MCKAY/REUTERS

The lack of clarity about Israel’s rules of engagement or explanations for strikes on noncombatants has led many civilians in Gaza to feel deliberately targeted. One journalist said her family, fearful of harm to her children, asked her to stay somewhere else.

Among the civilians killed in Gaza was 6-year-old Hind Rajab. On Jan. 29, she was caught in heavy fighting in Gaza City. The relatives she was with were killed, and the girl was able to reach emergency responders.

“I am so scared, please come. Please call someone to come and take me,” Hind told a phone operator of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, according to a recording of the call. The medical aid group dispatched an ambulance. It never returned. Hind’s body was found 12 days later near the charred remains of the ambulance.

“There was coordination for safe access with the Israeli military. We were given a map and a route to follow,” said Nebal Farsakh, a spokeswoman for the PRCS. “In the end it didn’t matter. Hind was killed, along with our two colleagues.”

U.S. officials urged Israeli authorities to investigate what happened to Hind. The Israeli military at the time told Israeli media that a preliminary investigation suggested its troops weren’t in the area. An Israeli military spokesman didn’t respond to a request for comment.

“We have to use this moment to say, ‘OK, not just World Central Kitchen,’” said Carroll, president of the aid organization Anera. “We want all of the incidents investigated.”

Dov Lieber, Omar Abdel-Baqui, Chao Deng, Anat Peled, Nancy A. Yousse and Fatima AbdulKarim contributed to this article.

Write to Jared Malsin at jared.malsin@wsj.com, Stephen Kalin at stephen.kalin@wsj.com and Margherita Stancati at margherita.stancati@wsj.com

4. China Is Targeting U.S. Voters and Taiwan With AI-Powered Disinformation

The same Americans who do not believe that Russia used social media and the internet to influence US elections in 2016 and 2020 might not believe these reports wither.

China Is Targeting U.S. Voters and Taiwan With AI-Powered Disinformation

Findings from Microsoft and others shed light on Beijing’s expanding covert influence operations

By Dustin Volz

April 5, 2024 12:00 am ET

In Taiwan’s January election, there was a surge in the use of more-sophisticated AI tools, Microsoft found. PHOTO: BILLY H.C. KWOK/BLOOMBERG NEWS

SAN FRANCISCO—Online actors linked to the Chinese government are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence to target voters in the U.S., Taiwan and elsewhere with disinformation, according to new cybersecurity research and U.S. officials.

The Chinese-linked campaigns laundered false information through fake accounts on social-media platforms, seeking to identify divisive domestic political issues and potentially influence elections. The tactics identified in a new cyber-threat report published Friday by

Microsoft are among the first uncovered that directly tie the use of generative AI tools to a covert state-sponsored online influence operation against foreign voters. They also demonstrate more-advanced methods than previously seen.Accounts on X—some of which were more than a decade old—began posting last year about topics including American drug use, immigration policies, and racial tensions, and in some cases asked followers to share opinions about presidential candidates, potentially to glean insights about U.S. voters’ political opinions. In some cases, these posts relied on relatively rudimentary generative AI for their imagery, Microsoft said.

Dwindling Ammunition Stocks Pose Grave Threat to Ukraine

What few munitions remain are often mismatched with battlefield needs as the country’s forces gird for an expected Russian offensive this summer.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/05/world/europe/ukraine-ammunition-shells-russia.html

Ukrainian soldiers firing a howitzer toward Russian forces in the Donetsk region of Ukraine last month.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

By Andrew E. Kramer

Reporting from Kurakhove, Ukraine

April 5, 2024, 5:02 a.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia and Ukraine? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

The crew at an artillery position in eastern Ukraine had 33 shells in its ammunition bunker, stacked neatly like firewood against a wall.

Then came an order to fire. Twenty minutes later, smoke wafted around a howitzer and 17 shells were gone — more than half the crew’s ammunition. The rapidly depleted stack was emblematic of Ukraine’s dwindling supply of artillery munitions, even as Russian attacks persist.

“Artillery decides battles,” said Capt. Vladyslav Slominsky, the artillery commander along this section of the front. “Who has more wins.”

For now, that is Russia, as Ukrainian soldiers are reaching for some of the last ammunition for some types of weapons after months of delays in the U.S. Congress over a fresh round of military and financial assistance. There are signs that the logjam may be breaking, as Speaker Mike Johnson this week laid out potential conditions for bringing the measure up for a vote that it is expected to pass despite opposition from many conservative Republicans.

The shortfall comes as Ukraine is on the defensive along the 600-mile front line in eastern Ukraine and is building additional fortifications, such as bunkers, trenches and minefields. Artillery ammunition is needed to hold the line until the defensive fortifications are completed and an expected Russian offensive gets underway this summer.

Russia has had an artillery advantage throughout the war, but that edge diminished for a time last year. Estimates vary, but analysts and Ukrainian officials say Russia is now firing at least five times as many artillery rounds as Ukraine.

“You cannot expect people to fight without ammunition,” Johan Norberg, a military analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, said in a telephone interview. “That’s a basic point.”

Image

A soldier preparing a shell for firing. Without additional aid from the United States, Ukraine will run out of vital 155-millimeter shells.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Ukraine’s largest single supplier of ammunition was the United States until the latest round of military assistance stalled in Congress. Representative Mike Turner of Ohio, a Republican who is the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, told CBS News over the weekend that American military and intelligence officials had made it clear Ukraine could not hold out much longer.

“We are at a critical juncture on the ground that is beginning to be able to impact not only the morale of the Ukrainians that are fighting but also their ability to fight,” Mr. Turner said.

On the front lines in Ukraine, they call it the “shell hunger,” a desperate shortage of munitions that is warping tactics and the types of weapons employed. It is not just the overall lack of ammunition that is so damaging but also an imbalance in the kinds on hand.

A year ago, for example, Ukraine lobbied the United States to supply cluster munitions, often criticized for scattering unexploded bomblets that pose a threat to civilians. As a result, it now has a relative abundance of cluster munitions that are effective against infantry but few of the high-explosive shells that could be more effective against advancing Russian tanks and other armored vehicles, military analysts and Ukrainian soldiers have said.

A shortage of mortar shells that cost about $1,000 each has forced commanders to turn to heavier artillery shells that are in short supply and, at $3,000, far more expensive. And Ukraine has more NATO-caliber shells than Soviet-caliber ones, even as it still fields more Soviet-legacy guns than newly provided Western models. And the heavy reliance on the Western howitzers has sent many back to the repair shop when they are badly needed on the front.

Image

While relatively plentiful, cluster bombs are not as effective as scarce heavy artillery shells in fending off advancing Russian armor, which is Ukraine’s most pressing need. Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

The Russian military, for its part, has developed relatively effective tactics for storming trench lines in the absence of heavy artillery from the Ukrainian side, pushing forward using large artillery bombardments of its own, human wave attacks with convicts and aviation bombs that can be released while planes are out of range of Ukrainian air defenses.

Ahead of the expected offensive, Russia has replenished its ranks with recruits and conscripts without resorting to a mass mobilization that might prove destabilizing, as was the case in the fall of 2022. And President Vladimir V. Putin has cast a stage-managed presidential vote as a popular endorsement of the war, while suggesting without evidence that Ukraine played a role in a terrorist attack on a concert hall in Moscow, stirring anger at Ukrainians.

By last week, Russian forces had advanced toward a key line of trenches and bunkers to the west of the town of Avdiivka, which Russia captured in February. Over the weekend, Russian forces staged one of their largest ground assaults in months on Ukrainian positions in that area, according to the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington group that closely tracks developments in the conflict.

Forced to cope with what they have, Ukrainian gun crews have to be fast and judicious in their expenditure of shells. When Russian soldiers break cover to attack, Ukrainian gunners have little time to lose.

One recent morning, around 5 a.m., a call came to a crew firing cluster munitions. Soldiers threw on body armor and helmets, raced to their howitzer and set about firing. Two soldiers ran between the ammunition bunker and the gun, hauling the shells.

“New target,” a commander’s voice crackled over the radio, rattling off coordinates. The soldiers twirled wheels on the howitzer to adjust the aim and then fired more rounds.

“Fire now!” the radio crackled at one point.

Image

On the front lines in Ukraine, the desperate shortage of munitions is called “shell hunger” and is warping tactics and the types of weapons employed.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Russian forces were assaulting a frontline position about five miles away. If another such assault had come, the gun crew would have been out of ammunition until new supplies arrived.

The crew commander, Sgt. Oleksandr Andriyenko, said he received 20 shells a day at his position, compared with 80 shells last summer, when Ukraine mounted a counteroffensive that failed even with relatively abundant supplies.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine told CBS News in an interview last month that his country was not prepared for a summer offensive by Russia and that the Russian military might reopen a northern front in the war with a ground attack into the Sumy region, which shares a border with Russia.

If the aid package clears Congress, however, the Ukrainian military can count on a fresh infusion of shells. Otherwise, its best hope for artillery ammunition is an initiative by the Czech government to buy shells on the global weapons market and donate them to Ukraine. European countries have little left to offer from their depleted stocks.

About 20 countries are contributing to a common fund for the purchases, the Czech president, Petr Pavel, said, adding that his government had found half a million 155-millimeter shells and 300,000 122-millimeter shells available for purchase outside of Europe.

The first deliveries are expected in June, but the program has already paid dividends, Czech officials say: Knowing that more ammunition is on the way, Ukrainian artillery forces are able to dip deeper into reserves, they said, adding that the same would be true if U.S. aid resumed.

At home, Ukraine is stepping up its own efforts to produce artillery shells under programs shrouded in secrecy, lest the locations become targets for Russian missiles. But production has not yet started, Ukrainian officials say.

Image

Forced to cope with what they have, Ukrainian gun crews have to be fast and judicious in their expenditure of shells.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Maria Varenikova contributed reporting from Kurakhove, Ukraine.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

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Our Coverage of the War in Ukraine

News and Analysis

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has signed into law three measures aimed at replenishing the ranks of his country’s depleted army, including lowering the draft age to 25.
With continued American aid to Ukraine stalled and against the looming prospect of a second Trump presidency, NATO officials are looking to take more control of directing military support from Ukraine’s allies — a role that the United States has played for the past two years.
Exploding drones hit an oil refinery and munitions factory far to the east of Moscow, in what Ukrainian media and military experts said was among the longest-range strikes with Ukrainian drones so far in the war.

Turning to Marketing: Ukraine’s troop-starved brigades have started their own recruitment campaigns to fill ranks depleted in the war with Russia.
Symbolism or Strategy?: Ukrainians say that defending places with little strategic value is worth the cost in casualties and weapons because the attacking Russians pay an even higher price. American officials aren’t so sure.
Elaborate Tales: As the war grinds on, the Kremlin has created increasingly complex fabrications online to discredit Zelensky and undermine Ukraine’s support in the West.

How We Verify Our Reporting

Our team of visual journalists analyzes satellite images, photographs, videos and radio transmissions to independently confirm troop movements and other details.
We monitor and authenticate reports on social media, corroborating these with eyewitness accounts and interviews. Read more about our reporting efforts.

6. Samsung to Fortify U.S. Chip Revival by Swelling Its Texas Investment to $44 Billion

Yet Samsung and other chip manufacturers who are investing in factories in the US cannot find enough qualified workers, South Korean request 30,000 work visas (not immigrant visas) over the next 5 years to bridge the gap and to provide trainers for American workers but the US has denied them.

Think about that. Companies are building big factories to build high tech equipment (chips) and we cannot find enough qualified American workers.

Samsung to Fortify U.S. Chip Revival by Swelling Its Texas Investment to $44 Billion

South Korean firm plans to add a second semiconductor factory and advanced-packaging facility at its new hub outside Austin

https://www.wsj.com/tech/samsung-to-fortify-u-s-chip-revival-by-swelling-its-texas-investment-to-44-billion-6d2d1799?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1

By Jiyoung Sohn

in Seoul and Asa Fitch

in New York

April 5, 2024 4:57 am ET

Samsung is capable of producing advanced semiconductors vital to artificial intelligence and national defense. PHOTO: MATTHIAS OESTERLE/ZUMA PRESS

Samsung 005930 -0.94%decrease; red down pointing triangle Electronics plans to more than double its total semiconductor investment in Texas to roughly $44 billion, according to people familiar with the matter, a significant breakthrough in the U.S.’s quest to make more of the world’s cutting-edge chips. The South Korean company’s new spending will be concentrated in Taylor, Texas, where Samsung is building a semiconductor hub and has other nearby existing operations, the people said. The additions include a new chip-making factory, and a facility for advanced packaging and research and development.

Samsung is one of just three firms, along with Intel and

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, capable of producing advanced logic semiconductors vital to artificial intelligence and national defense. These companies sit at the heart of the Biden administration’s push to strengthen the U.S.’s chip-making capabilities, as Washington simultaneously seeks to undercut Beijing’s tech advances. To help finance the broader Texas expansion, Samsung is expected to receive billions of dollars in subsidies from the U.S. Chips Act, the people said. Talks with the Commerce Department remain ongoing, though Samsung is expected to receive one of the largest payouts given to a single company.

An event to announce Samsung’s broadened investments is expected to be held on April 15 in Taylor, according to the people familiar with the matter. Samsung declined to comment. The Commerce Department declined to comment, saying that it is unable to discuss any specific company projects.

Samsung’s additional investments add to the $17 billion that the company had previously committed more than two years ago to Taylor, located just outside of Austin, for a cutting-edge chip-making plant.

The factory broke ground in 2022, with plans to start mass production as early as this year. The costs of building this first chip-making plant have increased due to inflation and other factors, requiring several billion dollars in extra investment, according to people familiar with the matter.

The second Taylor-based chip factory is expected to cost more than $20 billion, the people said. Samsung’s R&D efforts are expected to be warehoused inside those two plants. The size of the investments in these two factories could shift depending on market conditions.

The planned facility for advanced packaging—a key final step in the production of high-end AI chips like those made by

Nvidia—will have a price tag of roughly $4 billion, the people said.Earlier on Friday, Samsung said it expects a 10-fold increase in its first-quarter operating profit, to roughly $4.9 billion. This tops industry analysts’ estimates, as the chip industry awakens from a protracted downturn.

Samsung’s supersize chip investment in Texas adds fresh momentum to one of President Biden’s marquee domestic agendas as he seeks re-election in November. Many of the highest-profile projects have seen costs rise and face delays.

U.S. chip-making dominance has been a priority for Washington, which has earmarked tens of billions of dollars in subsidies to woo back local production that had migrated to Asia.

The Chips Act, which passed two years ago, set aside $53 billion in grants for projects like Samsung’s—and the money has only recently begun to flow.

Intel was awarded $8.5 billion for several chip plants planned in the U.S. last month, following a $1.5 billion grant to GlobalFoundries for projects in New York and Vermont in February. TSMC and Idaho-based Micron, a memory chip maker, are also expected to receive grants under the program.

The spree of projects aims to bolster domestic supplies of critical semiconductors. The U.S. share of chip-making declined to about 12% in 2020 from 37% in 1990, a fall that is increasingly seen as a national-security liability in an age when chips underpin advanced weapons, cyberwarfare and AI.

In a speech in February, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said that based on the level of industry interest in Chips Act funding, the U.S. was on track to produce roughly 20% of the world’s most advanced logic chips by the end of this decade.

Samsung’s big bet in Texas is comparable to those made by its chief rivals. TSMC is building two chip-making factories in Arizona, with a projected investment of $40 billion. Intel’s total investment in U.S. projects in the next five years is expected to exceed $100 billion.

Samsung began semiconductor operations in Austin in 1996, starting with memory chips. The site later transitioned into the contract chip-manufacturing business. The Taylor chip making plants are expected to be filled with equipment for producing the industry’s cutting-edge logic chips for customers.

Two years ago, Samsung floated the prospect in filings made to the Texas controller’s office of potentially investing upward of $200 billion toward building 11 new chip-making plants in Texas over the next two decades.

Samsung, the world’s largest memory maker by revenue, is also racing alongside South Korea’s

SK Hynix and Micron for leadership in high bandwidth memory, a critical component of artificial-intelligence computing.HBM can speed up computing times by stacking multiple DRAM memory—used commonly for helping devices or servers multitask—on top of each other and merging them as one.

HBM has become the go-to type of memory to work in tandem with graphic-unit processors made by the likes of Nvidia that power AI computing. To enable faster data-processing speeds, the two types of chips are currently bundled together using “2.5-D” packaging techniques. Major chip makers including TSMC, Samsung and Intel are investing in 2.5-D packaging as well as next-generation 3-D packaging.

Earlier this week, South Korea’s SK Hynix announced its plans for a $3.9 billion facility in West Lafayette, Indiana, for advanced chip-packaging, mainly for HBM. SK Hynix is the exclusive partner to Nvidia for the most-advanced HBM currently in the market.

Samsung’s planned advanced chip-packaging facility is expected to carry out packaging for HBM and provide 2.5-D and 3-D packaging technologies, according to people familiar with the matter.

At one of his company’s events last month for AI developers, Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang said his company was in the process of determining whether Samsung’s next-generation “HBM3E” product could be a viable option. He stopped by Samsung’s booth and autographed one of the chips. He wrote: “Jensen approved.”

Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Asa Fitch at asa.fitch@wsj.com

7. Ukraine staged major attack on Russia's Morozovsk military air base, Kyiv source says

Ukraine staged major attack on Russia's Morozovsk military air base, Kyiv source says

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-staged-major-attack-russias-morozovsk-military-air-base-kyiv-source-says-2024-04-05/?utm

By Reuters

April 5, 20244:56 AM EDTUpdated 2 hours ago

KYIV, April 5 (Reuters) - Ukraine attacked Russia's Morozovsk military air base in the Rostov region, destroying six Russian warplanes in a joint operation conducted by the SBU security service and military, a Kyiv intelligence source told Reuters on Friday.

Reuters could not independently verify the claim. The source did not say how the attack was conducted but that eight more warplanes had also been damaged.

Russia's RIA news agency cited the Russian defence ministry earlier as saying Russian air defences had downed 53 Ukrainian drones overnight, most of them over the Rostov region.

The source said the Morozovsk air base was used by Russian tactical bombers like the Sukhoi Su-24 and Su-24M that Moscow's air force uses to fire guided bombs at the Ukrainian military and frontline towns and cities.

The source described the operation as an important one.

Ukraine has significantly stepped up its drone attacks on targets in Russia in recent weeks, focusing on oil refineries in an effort to reduce Russian oil revenue.

A senior government official told Reuters earlier this year that Ukraine hoped to produce thousands of long-range drones in 2024, part of a priority defence programme in its war with Russia.

Unable to rapidly produce long-range missiles and with limited access to those made by Western allies, Kyiv has focused on developing long-range uncrewed vehicles to strike back at Russia, which has used a sprawling arsenal of missiles and drones to bomb Ukraine.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Tom Balmforth; Editing by Peter Graff and Nick Macfie

8. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, April 4, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-4-2024

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.
Jordan: PIJ military spokesperson “Abu Hamza” expressed support on April 4 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas rejected the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.
West Bank: The Shin Bet announced that it had detained and indicted eleven individuals, who had planned attacks against high-value targets in Israel.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed two drone attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets.
Yemen: A senior US military official stated that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes.

IRAN UPDATE, APRIL 4, 2024

Apr 4, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, April 4, 2024

Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Andie Parry, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Alexandra Braverman, Rachel Friedman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate with one another to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran on April 4.[1] Jaish al Adl conducted coordinated and simultaneous attacks targeting at least two Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) headquarters, a police station, and a naval facility in Chabahar and Rask in Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan Province.[2] Jaish al Adl claimed that it conducted attacks targeting six locations total across Sistan and Balochistan Province, although CTP-ISW cannot verify every attack.[3] At least 11 Iranian security personnel and 18 Jaish al Adl militants died during the attacks, which began around midnight on April 4 and lasted over 13 hours.[4]

IRGC-affiliated media reported that Jaish al Adl militants opened fire at the IRGC headquarters in Rask from the top of a nearby hospital, while other militants assaulted the headquarters with explosives.[5] Iranian military officials and state media also reported that the militants wore suicide vests, which could have been the explosives used in the attack.[6] Iranian state media claimed that the Jaish al Adl militants failed to breach the headquarters.[7] Jaish al Adl contrastingly claimed that it captured munitions warehouses within the IRGC headquarters and published videos showing Jaish al Adl fighters seizing unspecified military equipment at the warehouse.[8]

Jaish al Adl separately announced that it targeted Police Station 11 in Chabahar because the former police chief raped a young Baloch girl at this station in September 2022.[9] This incident fueled public outrage and large-scale protests in the nearby city of Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, in late September 2022. Iranian security forces violently suppressed the protests in Zahedan in an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[10] Jaish al Adl vowed in early October 2022 that it would retaliate against the Iranian regime for killing protesters and “enter the field with all its power.”[11] Jaish al Adl referencing the rape of the young Baloch girl in Chabahar is likely part of an effort to cultivate support among the local population.

Jaish al Adl separately cited Iranian cooperation with China, India, and Russia as a reason for its April 4 attacks.[12] The group specified that it seeks to disrupt the development of the Makran coast, a coastal strip that extends between southeastern Iran and southwestern Pakistan. Other Baloch militant groups, such as the Baloch Liberation Army, have previously targeted Chinese development projects in Pakistan’s Balochistan Province.[13]

The Jaish al Adl attacks demonstrate the group’s growing organization and ability to use relatively advanced tactics inside Iranian territory. Jaish al Adl claimed that it coordinated 168 fighters from two different battalions and an “intelligence and security unit” to conduct the attack.[14] Those same two Jaish al Adl battalions previously cooperated to raid an Iranian police station in Rask in December 2023.[15] One of the Jaish al Adl battalions involved in the April 4 attack separately organized a rare, battalion-sized training exercise in October 2022.[16] Most Jaish al Adl attacks involve targeted killings, IED attacks, and raids targeting Iranian security forces’ outposts.[17] A Jaish al Adl attack targeting a Zahedan police station in July 2023, for instance, used only four fighters equipped with suicide vests.[18]

The Jaish al Adl attacks risk straining the Iranian relationship with Pakistan, which Iran accuses of harboring Jaish al Adl militants.[19] Tehran has frequently called on the Pakistani government to crack down on Jaish al Adl and to secure its border with Iran.[20] The IRGC previously conducted drone and missile strikes targeting two Jaish al Adl “headquarters” in southwestern Pakistan in January 2024 in retaliation for an earlier Jaish al Adl attack on a police station.[21] The Pakistani armed forces responded to the IRGC strikes by conducting their own cross-border attacks targeting anti-Pakistan Baloch separatists in southeastern Iran.[22] Iranian and Pakistani officials quickly sought to deescalate tensions following the exchange of strikes, but the fundamental tension points remain.[23] The Pakistani Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned the April 4 Jaish al Adl attacks, possibly to try to preemptively address the risk of rising tensions with Iran.[24]

The Jaish al Adl attacks highlight the increasingly precarious state of the Iranian internal security environment. There has been a significant uptick in anti-regime militancy and terrorist activity throughout Iran in recent years. Jaish al Adl has conducted several significant attacks in this period, possibly because it has exploited the Bloody Friday incident to drive recruitment and support for itself.[25] The Afghanistan branch of the Islamic State, known as Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), has similarly conducted several major attacks inside Iran, including two attacks on a holy shrine in Shiraz in October 2022 and August 2023 and another attack on a funeral ceremony for Qassem Soleimani in January 2024.[26] These security challenges compound with the fact that there have been several major, anti-regime protest waves in Iran in recent years, imposing increased strain on the Iranian internal security apparatus, as it tries to violently impose social control.

Two unspecified Iranian officials told Reuters that Iran will respond seriously to Israel killing IRGC Quds Force Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahedi in Syria but that the retaliation would also be “limited and aimed at deterrence.”[27] The officials also indicated that Iran would continue trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel and the United States whilst continuing to support Iranian-backed attacks across the Middle East.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) military spokesperson “Abu Hamza” expressed support on April 4 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan.[28] Thousands of Jordanians have demonstrated in front of the Israeli embassy in Amman since March 24 to demand that the Jordanian government cut diplomatic ties with Israel, withdraw from the 1994 peace treaty, and cut off the trade route between the Persian Gulf and Israel that cuts through Jordanian territory.[29] Abu Hamza said that PIJ is following the protest movement closely and that the Jordanians’ voice ”is beginning to spread.”[30] The leaders of PIJ and Hamas previously praised the Jordanian protest movement on March 29.[31]

The Palestinian militias’ support for the Jordanian protests comes as Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance” have similarly expressed a desire to disrupt the ”land bridge” connecting Israel to the Persian Gulf.[32] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran and its Axis of Resistance may be shifting to a more confrontational strategy vis-a-vis Jordan as part of their effort to expand their capabilities and networks in the West Bank.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Iran: Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia, conducted unprecedentedly complex and sophisticated attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran.
Jordan: PIJ military spokesperson “Abu Hamza” expressed support on April 4 for the anti-Israel protest movement in Jordan.
Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations throughout the Gaza Strip. Hamas rejected the latest Israeli ceasefire proposal.
West Bank: The Shin Bet announced that it had detained and indicted eleven individuals, who had planned attacks against high-value targets in Israel.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
Iraq: The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed two drone attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets.
Yemen: A senior US military official stated that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) 7643rd Gefen Brigade (Gaza Division) and Netzah Yehuda Battalion (900th Kfir Brigade, 99th Reserve Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in Beit Hanoun on April 4.[34] The IDF reported that Israeli forces killed a Hamas company commander for the Beit Hanoun area during clashes with Hamas fighters. CTP-ISW assessed on March 25 that a small number of Palestinian fighters have likely infiltrated Beit Hanoun.[35]

Palestinian militias have continued to conduct attacks targeting Israeli forces in Gaza City since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3. Hamas mortared Israeli forces in Tuffah in eastern Gaza City on April 3.[36] PIJ and the National Resistance Brigades conducted a combined mortar attack on April 4 targeting Israeli forces west of Gaza City in Sheikh Ijlin.[37] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which is the self-proclaimed military wing of Fatah, also fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) at an Israeli bulldozer west of Gaza City on April 4.[38]

Israeli forces continued to engage Palestinian fighters in the central Gaza Strip on April 4. The IDF Nahal Brigade identified a group of nearby Palestinian fighters and directed an airstrike killing the fighters.[39] Hamas fighters fired an RPG at an Israeli Merkava tank east of Deir al Balah.[40]

Israeli forces continued to conduct clearing operations in Khan Younis on April 4. The 89th Commando Brigade (98th Division) killed Palestinian fighters and seized weapons in al Amal.[41] PIJ fighters mortared Israeli forces near al Amal Hospital and al Arishya neighborhood.[42] The IDF 7th Brigade (36th Division) continued to conduct clearing operations in eastern Khan Younis.[43] PIJ targeted Israeli forces operating in a building in an unspecified area of Khan Younis with an anti-bunker bomb.[44] PIJ also targeted an Israeli tank in the same location with a mine.[45]

The IDF said on April 4 that its independent investigative body completed an inquiry into the IDF strikes that mistakenly killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in the central Gaza Strip.[46] The General Staff Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism, which is ”an independent military body responsible for investigating unusual incidents amid the war,“ investigated the incident "thoroughly" and briefed the IDF chief of staff on its findings. The report will be released to the public in the coming days after the key stakeholders, including the World Central Kitchen and embassy personnel, review the findings. Israeli Army Radio reported on April 3 that the IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) was responsible for directing the airstrikes that killed the aid workers.[47]

US President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a call to discuss the Gaza Strip on April 4.[48] Biden called for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip ”to stabilize and improve the humanitarian situation and protect innocent civilians.” Biden said that the Israeli strikes on humanitarian workers and the overall humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip are ”unacceptable.” Biden added that US policy on the Gaza Strip depends on Israel’s immediate actions to ”implement a series of specific, concrete, and measurable steps to address civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and the safety of aid workers,” but that the United States will ”strongly support” Israel in the face of ”public Iranian threats against Israel.”

NBC reported new details of a virtual meeting between senior US and Israeli officials to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Secretary of State Antony Blinken met virtually with Israeli National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi and Israeli Minster for Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer on April 1.[49] Several unspecified US officials familiar with the meeting said that the plan that Israel presented to move 1.4 million civilians from Rafah to tents north of the city “did not include plans for addressing sanitation needs or an assessment of how much food or water would be required or where it would come from.”[50] The sources also reported that Israel has only considered sourcing “a fraction of the hundreds of thousands” of temporary shelters that will be needed under the plan.[51] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu purchased 40,000 tents to house displaced Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in preparation for Israel’s clearing operation into Rafah, according to Israeli media on March 28.[52]

Hamas rejected Israel’s latest ceasefire proposal on April 3. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on April 4 that Hamas had resubmitted its March 14 ceasefire proposal to Egyptian and Qatari mediators in response to Israel’s most recent proposal.[53] Hamdan stated that Hamas was “sticking to [its] position” but also claimed that the group had shown great “flexibility” in negotiations.[54] Hamas’ March 14 proposal includes implementing a ceasefire, calls for Israel to release Palestinian prisoners, an increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip, a return of displaced Palestinians, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip.[55] Israel sent an “updated” ceasefire proposal to the mediators and Hamas on April 2.[56] Israel’s updated proposal reportedly allowed for the gradual return of 60,000 displaced Palestinians to the northern Gaza Strip, representing a softening of Israel’s previous position.[57]

Palestinian militias conducted five indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on April 3.[58] This is the highest number of attacks launched from the Gaza Strip since February 8 and may be in anticipation of Iran’s annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day, on April 5.[59] Israeli air defenses intercepted two rockets fired by PIJ from the Gaza Strip over Netivot on April 4.[60] Palestinian militias have not targeted Netivot since January 16.[61] PIJ also fired mortars and rockets at three towns in southern Israel.[62] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), a secular leftist Palestinian group fighting alongside Hamas in the war, fired a rocket salvo at Kissufim.[63]

The IDF Air Force struck a PIJ launch site on April 3, shortly after fighters conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel.[64] The Israeli strikes destroyed several rocket launchers and militia infrastructure.[65]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3.[66]

The Shin Bet announced on April 4 that it had detained and indicted eleven individuals, who had planned attacks against high-value targets in Israel.[67] The cell included seven Arab Israelis and four Palestinians from the West Bank, who plotted attacks against targets, including the Israeli national security minister, Ben Gurion Airport, and an unspecified government complex in Jerusalem.[68] Four of the individuals in the cell were from Jenin and Tulkarm in the West Bank, where Israeli forces have repeatedly conducted operations targeting Palestinian fighters.[69] The individuals planned to rent land in Rahat, Israel, or in the West Bank to use for military training and weapons manufacturing.[70] At least one member of the cell was in contact with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which offered funding for attacks in Israel.[71] It is unclear when and where Shin Bet detained these individuals.

The indictments come amid several Palestinian attacks targeting Israeli civilians in recent months.[72] Palestinian militias have repeatedly praised these attacks and called for further attacks on Israeli civilians.[73]

Israeli forces detained three individuals on April 4 who had plotted attacks in Jerusalem.[74] The individuals are from east Jerusalem and planned small arms and IED attacks targeting a sports stadium and an unspecified police station. Israeli police and the Shin Bet said that the suspects were ISIS supporters but did not specify further on the nature of the relationship.[75] Israeli media reported that an ISIS affiliate had provided training to two of the suspects.[76]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least seven attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 3.[77]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed two drone attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on April 3. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed a drone attack targeting the IDF Ramat David airbase in northern Israel.[78] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq also claimed a drone attack targeting Ashdod, north of the Gaza Strip.[79] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify these claims.

US CENTCOM reported that it intercepted an anti-ship ballistic missile and two drones launched by the Houthis from Yemen toward the USS Gravely on April 3.[80] US CENTCOM separately reported that it destroyed a Houthi mobile surface-to-air missile system on April 3.[81]

US AFCENT Commander Lt. Gen. Alexus Grynkewich said on April 3 that the Houthis may be running low on their stockpiles of drones and anti-ship ballistic missiles due to persistent US airstrikes degrading Houthi munitions stockpiles.[82] Grynkewich further stated that US airstrikes have reduced the pace of Houthi operations but did not provide further details.

The IDF has taken several defensive measures, including expanding electronic warfare GPS-spoofing, canceling IDF soldier’s weekend leave, and ”strengthening” air defenses, on April 4 in anticipation of a possible Iranian attack on Israel in the coming days.[83] Israeli media reported that the Israeli security establishment is worried about an Iranian missile attack on Israel.[84] The Israeli defense minister held a "multi-front situational assessment" with top military and security officials on April 4.[85] The IDF spokesperson reassured Israeli citizens that there has been no change to the threat level in Israel, that the IDF is well prepared to defend against an attack, and that ”there is no need to buy generators, store food, and withdraw money from ATMs."[86]

The IRGC Navy held a naval parade in the northern Persian Gulf on April 4 as part of Iran’s annual, anti-Israel holiday, Quds Day. Iranian state media framed the parade as meant to show solidarity with the Palestinian people and demonstrate the naval capacity of the Axis of Resistance.[87] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Adm. Ali Reza Tangsiri suggested that other members of the Axis of Resistance participated in the parade, although not where and in what capacity.[88] Tangsiri reiterated the regime's intent for this year’s Quds Day on April 5 to be more widely celebrated globally than in previous years.[89]

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Adm. Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with the Russian National Security Council secretary and Chinese public security minister during the 19th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, on April 4.[90] The Russian secretary and Chinese minister expressed condolences to Iran for the IRGC officials killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria on April 1. Ahmadian thanked his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, for Russia’s support for a UNSC meeting on the strike. Ahmadian and Patrushev discussed Russo-Iranian efforts to combat terrorism and increase bilateral economic cooperation, including the construction of the North-South transit corridor.[91] Chinese Public Safety Minister Wang Ziaohong emphasized the need to strengthen bilateral coordination.

The United States Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one entity and 13 associated vessels for facilitating commodity shipments on behalf of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and the Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry (MODAFL).[92] These designations are part of broader US efforts to counter illegal Iranian military revenue generation and ability to finance its regional proxy and partner groups.

OFAC sanctioned the following entities:

UAE-based Oceanlink Maritime DMCC

OFAC sanctioned the following OceanLink Maritime DMCC-associated vessels:

Comoros-flagged Anthea
Comoros-flagged Boreas
Comoros-flagged Cape Gas
Comoros-flagged Glaucus
Comoros-flagged Oceanus Gas
Comoros-flagged Hebe
Comoros-flagged Hectate
Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Calypso Gas
Antigua and Barbuda-flagged Meraki
Belize-flagged Elsa
Belize-flagged Baxter
Panama-flagged Demeter
Cook Islands-flagged Ourea

OFAC updated the sanctions to account for the name change of the following vessel:

Saint Light, also known as Stellar Oracle, previously listed as Young Yong

9. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-4-2024

Key Takeaways:

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed that NATO and Russia are in “direct confrontation,” likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to intensify existing information operations meant to force the West into self-deterrence.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov appealed to Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) members to increase cooperation against perceived Western threats as part of the effort to posture against the West.
The Kremlin leveraged this overall information operation about escalation with NATO to target France specifically, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent calls for the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also promoted information operations feigning interest in negotiations, and Lavrov’s and Shoigu’s likely coordinated informational efforts may signal a new round of intensified Russian rhetoric about negotiations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to balance the Kremlin’s opposing efforts to set social expectations for a protracted Russian war effort and to assuage Russian society’s concerns about the economic consequences of the war and labor migration.
Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) on April 4 and advanced up to the eastern outskirts of the settlement.
Russian forces also recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
An unspecified senior NATO official reportedly told Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii that NATO intelligence agencies have not observed indications that Russia is preparing for a large-scale partial mobilization wave.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 4, 2024

Apr 4, 2024 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2024

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Riley Bailey, and Karolina Hird

April 4, 2024, 6:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on April 4 ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed that NATO and Russia are in “direct confrontation,” likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to intensify existing information operations meant to force the West into self-deterrence. Peskov claimed on April 4 that relations between Russia and NATO have “slipped to the level of direct confrontation” and that NATO is “already involved in the conflict surrounding Ukraine.”[1] Peskov accused NATO of moving towards Russia’s borders, likely referencing Finland and Sweden’s recent accessions to the alliance, and claimed that NATO is expanding its military infrastructure closer to Russia. Russian officials have long attempted to frame NATO and the West as an existential threat to Russia as part of the Kremlin’s justifications for its war in Ukraine.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on March 18 that a full-scale war between NATO and Russia is undesirable but possible.[3] Peskov’s repeated claims that NATO and Russia are already in “direct confrontation” represents an intensification of this ongoing narrative but is likely still part of Russia‘s reflexive control campaign that uses threatening language to delay and influence important decisions regarding Western support for Ukraine.[4] This Kremlin narrative is also likely an attempt to pose NATO’s defensive activity in response to Russia’s outright aggression as provocative.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been preparing for a potential conventional war with NATO, including through ongoing conventional military reforms and by recreating the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Moscow Military District (MMD) in western Russia.[6] Russian officials have accused NATO of giving Russia a reason to reconstitute the LMD directly on the border with Finland.[7]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov appealed to Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) members to increase cooperation against perceived Western threats as part of the effort to posture against the West. Gerasimov claimed on April 4 at a meeting of the chiefs of the general staffs of CIS member states that CIS countries are currently facing “increasingly real and diverse challenges, which requires [them] to have well-equipped and well-trained armed forces” as the West consistently destroys the “fundamental foundations of strategic stability and international security institutions.”[8] Gerasimov also reiterated false Russian accusations that the West sponsors international terrorism. Gerasimov called on the chiefs of general staff of CIS members to analyze the military-political situation developing in the world and on CIS members’ borders, develop integrated military systems, conduct combat training using member states’ combat experience, and increase multilateral military cooperation. Gerasimov is attempting to frame the West as a wider security threat to the CIS countries to portray Russia as the leader of an imagined coalition of countries that oppose the collective West. Russia has routinely attempted to posture against the West by casting Russia as the leader of the “world majority,“ a group of countries including post-Soviet and non-Western states that Russia intends to rally to oppose the West.[9] CIS countries’ governments apart from Belarus have not expressed open support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and have not recognized Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in September 2022, although Russia likely uses commerce through CIS countries to evade international sanctions.[10]

The Kremlin leveraged this overall information operation about escalation with NATO to target France specifically, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent calls for the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu held a phone conversation on April 4, reportedly their first contact since October 2022.[11] Shoigu threatened that the potential deployment of French troops to Ukraine would “create problems for France itself” in response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s March 16 statement that “perhaps at some point” it would be necessary for French troops to operate in Ukraine. Shoigu’s call with Lecornu is likely an attempt to directly influence recent French calls for Europe and the West to provide more military aid and other support to Ukraine. Shoigu likely attempted to single out France since Macron initiated the ongoing conversation about the West removing self-imposed constraints on its support for Ukraine. Shoigu is also likely attempting to deter future attempts from any Western states to increase military aid to Ukraine and intensify support for Ukraine by forcing Western leaders to self-deter out of fear of Russian retaliation. Shoigu had similar calls with senior US, UK, French, and Turkish officials in October 2022 in which he promoted Kremlin information operations threatening nuclear escalation in a likely attempt to deter the West from providing tanks to Ukraine.[12] Shoigu also claimed that he and Lecornu noted a “readiness for dialogue on Ukraine” that could resemble the Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations that occurred in Istanbul in April 2022, although a French government source told Reuters that “at no moment did [France] show any willingness to dialogue on Ukraine or negotiations.”[13] Shoigu’s attempts to threaten France and deter continued Western support for Ukraine while feigning interest in peace negotiations are part of a wider Russian information operation aimed at convincing Western countries to push Ukraine into unfavorable and unequal negotiations on Russia’s terms.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also promoted information operations feigning interest in negotiations, and Lavrov’s and Shoigu’s likely coordinated informational efforts may signal a new round of intensified Russian rhetoric about negotiations.[14] Lavrov used a meeting of dozens of foreign ambassadors from non-Western states to denounce Ukraine’s “peace formula” while claiming that Russia is ready to negotiate on terms favorable to the Kremlin. Lavrov spoke at a “round table” of more than 70 foreign ambassadors at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Diplomatic Academy on April 4 and reiterated several boilerplate narratives claiming that Ukraine was responsible for starting the war in 2014 and about Ukraine’s alleged involvement in the recent terrorist attack in Moscow. Lavrov also used the ambassadorial meeting to criticize Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “peace formula” and urge the countries present to not support it. Lavrov told journalists following the meeting that Russia thinks it is “not necessary to talk with Zelensky” but that Russia should negotiate instead with the West.[15] Lavrov claimed that the West, however, is not ready for negotiations. Lavrov also claimed that the current situation on the battlefield has created “new realities” and that Russia is ready for “honest talks based on these new realities and on Russia’s security interests.”[16] Russian officials have repeatedly falsely blamed Ukraine and the West for the lack of peace negotiations, despite numerous public Russian statements suggesting or explicitly stating that Russia is not interested in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s maximalist objectives – which are tantamount to full Ukrainian and Western surrender – remain unchanged and that any Russian statements suggesting that Russia is interested in peace negotiations are very likely efforts to force the West to make concessions on Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to balance the Kremlin’s opposing efforts to set social expectations for a protracted Russian war effort and to assuage Russian society’s concerns about the economic consequences of the war and labor migration. Putin stated during a speech at the 12th Congress of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia in Moscow on April 4 that Russia will experience a high demand for human capital and face labor shortages in the coming years.[19] Putin stated that Russia’s future labor shortage is “absolutely certain” and that it is “critically important” for Russia to increase labor productivity and modernize and automate various economic sectors, such as industrial production, service industries, and the agro-industrial sphere. Putin stated that Russia does not “have much of a choice: either [Russia] needs to import labor from abroad or [Russia] needs to increase labor productivity.” Putin appears to be telling Russia‘s xenophobic ultra-nationalist community that Russia must continue to rely on migration to address Russia’s labor shortages, likely to signal to Russian ultranationalist constituents to stop their calls for anti-migrant policies, especially in the wake of the March 22 Crocus City Hall terror attack.[20] ISW previously assessed that anti-migrant policies could worsen Russian labor shortages and degrade Russia’s crypto-mobilization efforts and that Russian authorities are unlikely to fully give into ultranationalist xenophobic demands to drastically reduce – if not eliminate – immigration to Russia at the expense of Russia’s war effort and economic needs.[21]

Putin also claimed that Russia has not transferred its economy to a wartime footing and that Russia’s economy is instead “quite balanced” and fulfilling all social guarantees.[22] Putin did note that the Russian government is concentrating its efforts and administrative and financial resources on developing Russia’s defense industry, however. Putin’s suggestions that the Russian economy either is or is not on a wartime footing depending on the constituency he is addressing is a false binary as Russia has been gradually but effectively mobilizing its defense industry to support its invasion of Ukraine over the past several years.[23] Russia is currently allocating roughly a third or more of its annual federal budget to defense spending, and Polish President Andrzej Duda warned on March 20, citing unspecified German research, that Putin is intensifying efforts to shift Russia to a war economy with the intention of being able to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027.[24] The Kremlin has not, and likely cannot, rapidly transition the Russian economy to total economic mobilization as the Soviet Union did during the Great Patriotic War (Second World War), although the Kremlin consistently appeals to the mythos of the Great Patriotic War to suggest that Russia is capable of such an effort.[25] Putin invoked the idea of a wider Russian social and economic mobilization reminiscent of that of the Soviet Union’s total mobilization during a speech to Russian workers on February 2 and may have been gauging domestic reactions to a wider economic or military mobilization.[26] Putin’s claim of a peacetime Russian economy is part of a wider pattern wherein the Kremlin oscillates between appeals to a wider economic mobilization to support its war effort on the one hand and appeals to domestic economic stability to cater to an increasingly apathetic domestic populace on the other hand. The Kremlin’s routine invocations of a wider economic mobilization likely aim to shore up domestic support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and create fear within the West of the Kremlin’s ability to bring to bear a significant amount of materiel in Ukraine.[27] The Kremlin’s efforts to reassure Russian citizens about Russia’s economic and social stability likely aim to avoid generating public discontent over the prospect of future economic disruptions.[28]

Key Takeaways:

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitri Peskov claimed that NATO and Russia are in “direct confrontation,” likely as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to intensify existing information operations meant to force the West into self-deterrence.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov appealed to Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) members to increase cooperation against perceived Western threats as part of the effort to posture against the West.
The Kremlin leveraged this overall information operation about escalation with NATO to target France specifically, following French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent calls for the West to expand the level and types of security assistance it sends to Ukraine.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also promoted information operations feigning interest in negotiations, and Lavrov’s and Shoigu’s likely coordinated informational efforts may signal a new round of intensified Russian rhetoric about negotiations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues attempts to balance the Kremlin’s opposing efforts to set social expectations for a protracted Russian war effort and to assuage Russian society’s concerns about the economic consequences of the war and labor migration.
Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) on April 4 and advanced up to the eastern outskirts of the settlement.
Russian forces also recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Donetsk City.
An unspecified senior NATO official reportedly told Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii that NATO intelligence agencies have not observed indications that Russia is preparing for a large-scale partial mobilization wave.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued west of Svatove near Andriivka; west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[29] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Terny and that fighting is ongoing on the settlement’s southeastern outskirts, but one of these Russian milbloggers later claimed that these claims are unreliable and that Russian forces have not yet reached the settlement.[30] A Russian source claimed that highly developed Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance capabilities are complicating Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[31]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces conducted a roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault towards Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut) on April 4 and advanced up to the eastern outskirts of the settlement. Geolocated footage published on April 4 shows Russian forces conducting a roughly reinforced company-sized mechanized assault against Chasiv Yar.[32] The footage indicates that the Russian mechanized column advanced along a section of the T-0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway to the eastern outskirts of the Kanal micro-district (the easternmost part of Chasiv Yar) before Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from making further advances into Chasiv Yar.[33] A Ukrainian soldier stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed 11 out of the 25 Russian armored vehicles that participated in the mechanized assault, although Ukrainian officials have yet to provide more details on the assault.[34] Russian forces are currently increasing the tempo and size of their mechanized assaults throughout eastern Ukraine and may be intensifying the overall tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine.[35] Russian forces conducted a battalion-sized mechanized assault near Tonenke (west of Avdiivka) around March 30 and a roughly reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Terny (west of Kreminna) around April 3, and the size of these recent mechanized assaults may indicate that the Russian military is currently prioritizing offensive operations in the order of the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, and Lyman directions[36]

Russian forces recently advanced elsewhere northeast and west of Bakhmut amid continued positional fighting in the area. Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Vesele (northeast of Bakhmut).[37] Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Berestove (northeast of Bakhmut) and also seized a large portion of southern Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces completely out of Ivanivske, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim and currently assesses that Russian forces do not yet control parts of southwestern and northwestern Ivanivske.[39] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamyanske, Vyimka, and Spirne; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Stupochky; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[40] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on Chasiv Yar’s eastern outskirts.[41]

Positional fighting continued west of Avdiivka on April 4. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 830 meters in depth southeast of Umanske (west of Avdiivka) and up to 600 meters in depth near Semenivka (west of Avdiivka).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control 20 to 25 percent of Semenivka, although ISW has only observed visual evidence of Russian forces maintaining a presence in southernmost Semenivka.[43] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces are partially withdrawing from Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka), Semenivka, and Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), although ISW has not observed any evidence of Ukrainian withdrawals from these areas.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted several mechanized counterattacks near Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), Umanske, Vodyane (southwest of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske on April 3 and 4.[45] Positional fighting also occurred west of Avdiivka near Yasnobrodivka and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske.[46] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Avdiivka direction stated that Russian forces are trying to advance in the area as long as weather conditions allow, likely referring to ground conditions that will become less conducive to mechanized maneuver as spring progresses and the ground becomes muddier.[47]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated on April 4 that Russian forces conducted mechanized assaults near Tonenke with up to 50 armored vehicles between March 29 and 31.[48] Voloshyn stated that the Russian mechanized assaults occurred over several days and that Russian forces conducted more than one assault.[49] Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault near Tonenke on March 30 and destroyed at least 12 Russian tanks and eight infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[50] Voloshyn’s reporting suggests that Russian forces conducted a larger mechanized tactical offensive effort in the area than initially reported but that the assaults did not all occur at once. A Russian Storm-Z instructor similarly claimed on April 1 that the mechanized assault occurred in multiple waves over several days.[51]

Russian forces recently advanced west of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on April 4. Geolocated footage published on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 3 that Russian forces have seized the majority of Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City), but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the western outskirts of the settlement.[53] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Pobieda, Novomykhailivka, Kostyantynivka, and Vodyane on April 4.[54] A Ukrainian officer stated that Russian forces continue to conduct assaults with small infantry groups west and southwest of Donetsk City.[55] Elements of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Pyatnashka” international volunteer brigade are reportedly operating in the Donetsk City area, elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka, and elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[56]

Positional fighting continued in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine on April 4.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 4, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced up to half a kilometer near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne), but ISW has not observed any confirmation of this claim.[58] Positional engagements continued near Robotyne and northwest of Verbove.[59] Elements of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Robotyne and Verbove, and elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[60]

Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on March 4, likely near Krynky where Ukrainian forces maintain positions.[61] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that a larger number of small Russian infantry groups are attacking Ukrainian positions on the left bank from different directions in an attempt to further spread out Ukrainian units in the area.[62] Humenyuk noted that Russian forces have significantly intensified assaults on Ukrainian positions in east bank Kherson Oblast in the past two days.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Ukrainian military sources reported on April 4 that Russian forces launched 20 Shahed-136/131 drones at Ukraine from Kursk Oblast on the night of April 3 to 4 and that Ukrainian mobile fire groups destroyed 11 of the Shahed drones.[63] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian drones damaged an energy facility in Kharkiv Oblast and a solar power plant in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[64] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones also struck civilian infrastructure and residential buildings in Kharkiv City.[65] Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov reported later on April 4 that Russian forces launched a total of 20 Shahed drones at Kharkiv City and that 15 of the drones struck residential and civilian infrastructure.[66] Synehubov reported that the Russian drone strikes killed Ukrainian emergency workers who were responding to the aftermath of earlier drone strikes, indicating that Russian forces likely launched a subsequent wave of drone strikes targeting Kharkiv City.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russia will likely continue its ongoing strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and is employing recent strike adaptations against such critical targets. The head of the Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, noted that Russian forces are increasingly using combined strike packages comprised of missiles and Shahed drones to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure and that Russia forces are using an increased number of drones in these combined strike packages.[67] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are launching up to 100 drone and missile strikes per day but are saving an unspecified number of missiles in Russia’s strategic reserves and that Ukrainian forces expect Russian strikes against critical infrastructure to continue.[68] Ukrainian military intelligence previously estimated that the Russian military is trying to maintain its missile stockpile at around 900 missiles and that Russian forces temporarily pause strikes in order to stockpile missiles to maintain the 900 missile mark.[69]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

An unspecified senior NATO official reportedly told Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii that NATO intelligence agencies have not observed indications that Russia is preparing for a large-scale partial mobilization wave.[70] Vazhnye Istorii reported on April 4 that the unspecified senior NATO official stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to postpone any large-scale mobilization because he wants to “demonstrate strength and confidence” after the March 2024 Russian presidential election and has “many” other domestic problems to solve. The unspecified NATO official stated that the Kremlin aims to conduct a normal conscription cycle without another wave of mobilization and assessed that Russia lacks the amount of ammunition and maneuver units needed to launch a ”successful major offensive.” ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities would likely intensify crypto-mobilization efforts before deciding to conduct another unpopular wave of mobilization.[71]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to claim that the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack has caused a significant increase in Russian contract service applicants amid reports that Russia is intensifying crypto-mobilization efforts. The Russian MoD claimed that there has been a significant increase in the past week and a half in Russian contract service applicants in Moscow Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Vladivostok, and St. Petersburg.[72] The Russian MoD claimed that over 800 Moscow Oblast residents have signed Russian military contracts in the past week and a half and that over 4,500 Moscow Oblast residents have signed contracts since the beginning of 2024, in comparison to the 14,000 Moscow Oblast residents whom Russian authorities claimed to have signed contracts in all of 2023. The Russian MoD similarly claimed that over 500 Vladivostok residents signed Russian military contracts in the past week and a half and that over 2,600 Vladivostok residents have signed contracts since the start of 2024, in comparison to the 9,000 Vladivostok residents who signed contracts in all of 2023. The Russian MoD additionally claimed that over 450 St. Petersburg residents have signed Russian military contracts in the past week and a half. These reports are consistent with recent polling showing that the Kremlin information operation baselessly blaming Ukraine for the March 22 Crocus City Hall terrorist attack may be increasing military recruitment.[73] The Russian MoD may alternatively be running a simultaneous information operation about alleged increased recruitment rates in response to the Crocus City Hall attack in order to encourage more contract recruitment.[74]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on April 4 that the Russian military launched a training program for strike drone operators in Belgorod Oblast.[75] A Russian drone instructor claimed that military personnel can learn to become drone operators after one month of training. The instructor claimed that the Russian military is constantly modernizing their drones and the methods of their operation and that instructors go to the frontline in Ukraine to learn how to improve the training programs.

Russia continues efforts to procure weapons and weapons components from Iran. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Alexander Fomin met with Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali to discuss bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.[76] Russia likely continues to rely on Iran for key technological components for weapons such as Shahed drones.[77]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Bashkortostan Republic Prime Minister Andrei Nazarov stated on April 4 that the interregional drone production group in Bashkortostan, which consists of 13 companies, will accelerate the production of anti-drone protection and electronic warfare (EW) systems to protect Russian industrial facilities from drone strikes.[78] Nazarov stated that the problem of possible Ukrainian drone strikes has become “particularly acute,” likely in response to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustam Minnikhanov’s call for Russian companies and local authorities to defend themselves against Ukrainian drone strikes following Ukrainian strikes on Russian military production and oil refinery infrastructure in Tatarstan on April 2.[79]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian milbloggers criticized multiple post-Soviet states for moving away from Russia’s sphere of influence. Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s policies distancing Armenia from Russia and claimed the Armenian government is destabilizing relations with Azerbaijan.[80] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger also accused Western organizations of trying to “oust Russia from its usual spheres of influence” in Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova.[81] Several Russian milbloggers criticized Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for increasing their cooperation with NATO and individual NATO member states, claiming this cooperation is tantamount to loss of sovereignty.[82] A Russian milblogger also criticized Kazakhstan for not appreciating its “shared history” with Russia.[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Major General Viktor Gulevich discussed the development of the Russian-Belarusian Unified Regional Air Defense System during a meeting of the chiefs of general staffs of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Moscow on April 4.[84]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

10. Israel braces for Tehran’s response after deadly Damascus strike

Israel braces for Tehran’s response after deadly Damascus strike

By Kareem Fahim, Susannah George, Shane Harris and Suzan Haidamous

April 4, 2024 at 4:18 p.m. EDT

The Washington Post · by Kareem Fahim · April 4, 2024

BEIRUT — Israel’s military was on high alert Thursday as the country braced for Iran’s promised revenge after an Israeli strike in Damascus this week killed senior Iranian commanders and stirred fears of widening war across a region on edge.

The strike — in broad daylight, on a diplomatic building adjacent to Iran’s embassy in Syria — was an escalation in Israel’s multi-front battles against Iranian-backed groups, which have intensified during its war in Gaza. The Israeli strike drew threats of retaliation from Tehran’s leaders and condemnation from their Arab neighbors. The European Union, which also condemned the strike, said in a statement that “further escalation in the region is in no one’s interest.”

“We will make them regret this crime and other similar ones with the help of God,” Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a statement Tuesday, the day after the attack.

For all of Iran’s muscular rhetoric, though, it would probably carefully calibrate any response, according to analysts, Western officials and people close to Iranian-backed militant groups. The country still hoped to avoid being goaded into a costly war, they said, while maintaining its ability to support proxy forces that have traded fire with Israel and attacked its main ally, the United States, throughout the Middle East.

The Iranians “believe the Israelis are intentionally dragging them into reacting, to spark a regional war or expand the current one,” said a person associated with Hezbollah, the Lebanese militant group and political party that is backed by Iran.

The Damascus strike was viewed as an attack on Iranian soil and, as a result, any retaliation would be likely to come from Iran itself, rather than its allies, said the person, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.

Israel will be “punished by the hands of our brave men,” Khamenei said, also suggesting retribution was a sovereign affair.

The Damascus attack was the most significant strike on Iranian interests since the start of the Gaza war, following the Oct. 7 attack on southern Israel by Hamas, another of Iran’s regional allies.

Among the dead Monday were two senior members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, along with five officers, according to a statement from the IRGC. One of the commanders, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, had been identified by the U.S. Treasury Department in 2010 as a conduit between Iran, Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence.

The targets and their location — in a diplomatic facility, traditionally exempted from hostilities — made the attack especially brazen. The United States was quick to deny involvement. “We had nothing to do with it,” John Kirby, the National Security spokesman, said at a press briefing Tuesday.

It came after months of regional instability reverberating from the Gaza war. In Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, confrontations have simmered between Iranian-backed groups and Israel or the United States — a pattern of violence just short of all-out war, which analysts and U.S. officials say Tehran has sought to avoid.

For months, though, there have been warnings that the region is one miscalculation away from calamity.

Events began to spiral in January, after an attack by fighters allied with Iran killed three U.S. service members at a base in Jordan. The United States retaliated with airstrikes against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Rather than escalating further, Tehran called for a halt to what had been regular assaults by the Iraqi militias on U.S. bases. The Pentagon acknowledged the apparent pause, a sign that the tacit rules of engagement had been restored.

But whatever understanding may have been reached was now threatened by Monday’s strike in Damascus, according to the person close to Hezbollah, saying it “sabotaged” previous understandings between Iran and the United States.

“Iran is seeking a price for what happened,” the person said.

The most recent annual report on global security threats from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, published in February, noted that Tehran remained “careful” to avoid head-to-head fighting with Israel and the United States, choosing instead to enable Hezbollah forces in Lebanon, Houthi fighters in Yemen, and a network of proxy militias in the region. U.S. officials said there was no indication that the Israeli strike Monday had changed that assessment.

But U.S. officials have become increasingly concerned that the daily exchange of fire between Hezbollah and Israel on the country’s northern border could escalate into a full-scale conflict.

The strike on the Quds Force officers, while provocative, didn’t rate as the kind of mass-casualty event that would trigger that broader conflict, four U.S., Israeli, and other Western officials said this week. One senior Israeli security official said he did not expect Iran to “overreact,” noting this was not the first attack Israel had carried out in Syria against Iran and its affiliates.

The officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence and security matters, expected Iran to respond with drone or missile attacks on Israeli targets, calibrated to avoid an even bigger response from Israel.

Still, in such a combustible environment, the potential for mistakes was high, they acknowledged.

Alon Pinkas, a veteran Israeli diplomat and former senior-level adviser who has been critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, called Israel’s decision to strike Iran directly “both warranted and justifiable,” given its “constant, broad and menacing” sponsorship of proxy militias.

“But for the same reason, it may also precipitate escalation because this type of attack may be impossible for Iran to contain,” he said.

Israel appeared to be preparing for retaliation. The Israeli military announced Thursday that it was suspending leave for reservists, a day after it ordered the reinforcement of air defense units. Later Thursday, to avoid panic, the Israel Defense Forces spokesman wrote in a message posted on X that “no generators need to be purchased, no food should be stored, no money should be withdrawn from ATMs.”

By striking the Iranian diplomatic compound, “Israel is prepared for the broader backlash that could lead to the regional war,” said Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at London’s Chatham House.

A broader war was “not the original motivation,” she said, but rather part of an Israeli strategy aimed at destabilizing the Iran’s “axis of resistance” through a campaign of assassinations, similar to those carried out in the past by Israel’s intelligence service, the Mossad.

“It’s not just about Hamas. It’s about everyone at once,” she said, adding that Israel was also keenly aware that its window for such operations was limited, as the death toll soared in Gaza and its military tactics came under greater scrutiny.

In Iran, the debates were over the virtues of a direct strike, or rather “taking time and exhausting Israel” with the kind of low-level warfare it was currently conducting, Vakil said. It was possible that Syria could serve as an arena for heightened hostilities between Israel and Iran, or that Tehran could “pivot and become confrontational in a different arena,” she said.

Afshon Ostovar, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, said that while the Damascus strike was serious, “I don’t think it is game-changing. I think it’s a very gradual escalation of the tit-for-tat conflict that has been going on between Israel and Iran over decades,” he said.

Even if the attack doesn’t bring Iran into direct conflict with Israel and the United States, it highlights growing tensions between Iran’s political and military ambitions.

Iran was “hamstrung because it is on the one hand succeeding politically ... but it can’t really push any harder militarily,” he said, referring to Tehran’s satisfaction at Israel’s increasing international isolation and the growing sympathy for Palestinians.

For Iran, escalating military operations risked “blowback” that wouldn’t benefit the leadership in Tehran.

“So long as Iran wants to succeed politically, it has to take some of this stuff on the chin,” he said. “For Iran, there’s no real reason to change the game and get into a shooting war.”

George reported from Dubai and Harris from Washington.

The Washington Post · by Kareem Fahim · April 4, 2024

11. 11 ships are trapped behind the Key Bridge, including 4 considered key to national defense

I have not noticed any other reporting on this. At least not this specific.

Six days to Europe? We need more of these ships.

Excerpts:

The four ships, the SS Antares, SS Denebola, Gary I. Gordon and Cape Washington, are part of the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, a fleet established in 1976 to quickly supply American troops around the world. Two of them — the Antares and the Denebola — are capable of sailing from the East Coast to Europe in six days, making them among the fastest cargo ships in the world, according to a 2020 Facebook post by the Maritime Administration.

The blocked ships worry some naval strategy experts.

11 ships are trapped behind the Key Bridge, including 4 considered key to national defense

stripes.com · by Angela Roberts · April 4, 2024

11 ships are trapped behind the Key Bridge, including 4 considered key to national defense | Stars and Stripes

U.S.

Angela Roberts

Baltimore Sun • April 4, 2024

The SS Antares, left, and SS Denebola are fast military sealift ships stationed at Pier 8 in Locust Point. The pair are among several large ships stuck in the port following the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge. (Jerry Jackson, Baltimore Sun/TNS)

BALTIMORE (Tribune News Service) — There are 11 cargo ships trapped in the Port of Baltimore behind the wreckage of the Francis Scott Key Bridge — including four that are supposed to be able to set sail at a moment’s notice to support the overseas deployment of U.S. military forces.

The four ships, the SS Antares, SS Denebola, Gary I. Gordon and Cape Washington, are part of the U.S. Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Force, a fleet established in 1976 to quickly supply American troops around the world. Two of them — the Antares and the Denebola — are capable of sailing from the East Coast to Europe in six days, making them among the fastest cargo ships in the world, according to a 2020 Facebook post by the Maritime Administration.

The blocked ships worry some naval strategy experts.

During the Gulf War’s Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the Ready Reserve Force was fully activated to transport people and supplies to the Persian Gulf Region, said Steven Wills of the Center for Maritime Strategy, a think tank affiliated with the Navy League of the United States and based in Arlington, Va.

“Right now, we do not have enough logistics vessels like these to do another Desert Shield or Desert Storm,” he said. “We would have to go out and ask for civilian companies to provide their ships in order to get enough.”

There are only 48 vessels in the Ready Reserve Force, according to the Maritime Administration, which is overseen by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The size of the fleet has declined in recent years, as ships are sold, get older and are repurposed, Wills said.

About 85% of all U.S. military cargo is currently housed in the country, said Capt. Douglas Harrington, who is responsible for the operations and management of the National Defense Reserve Fleet, which includes the Ready Reserve Force. While there are vessels in the fleet stationed around the country — including in Newport News, Va. — with four ships trapped in Baltimore, that leaves less capacity for the U.S. Transportation Command to use to transport supplies, Harrington said.

However, he added, two of the ships now penned up by the Key Bridge’s wreckage were out of service before last week’s disaster.

The Gary I. Gordon experienced an “engine casualty,” which is being repaired, said Harrington, the Maritime Administration’s deputy associate administrator for federal sealift and a licensed U.S. merchant mariner. The Cape Washington is also undergoing repair and regulatory work, he said.

The Antares and Denebola, like all vessels in the Ready Reserve Force, are maintained in a reduced readiness state but are supposed to be able to sail within five to 10 days in the event of a national emergency.

Harrington said they haven’t been activated much since Desert Storm, in part because they require a lot of manpower and money to operate.

“Even if that harbor clearance is completed,” Harrington said, “one or more of our ships may still be in a reduced state of readiness because of repairs or maintenance.”

Efforts are underway to clear the tangled mess of steel that is blocking the only channel into the Port of Baltimore, but stormy conditions have complicated the cleanup. Rescue divers weren’t able to resume their search Tuesday for four missing construction workers, who were bucked from the Key Bridge last week when the 984-foot container ship Dali collided with one of its main support structures.

The four men are presumed dead. Divers last week recovered the bodies of two other members of their crew, which was fixing potholes on the bridge when it collapsed just before 1:30 a.m. March 26.

Officials have been reluctant to say exactly how long cleanup efforts will take — just that they will take time. Temporary channels have been opened on the northeast and southwest sides of the wreckage, but at 11-feet and 14-feet deep, they are only suitable for smaller vessels and barges. For reference, the Antares requires a channel at least 30 feet deep to navigate out of the Patapsco River’s Northwest Harbor.

Retired Navy Adm. James Foggo hopes the Key Bridge collapse serves as a “wake-up call” for Americans and policymakers that further investment is needed in maritime infrastructure.

“It was a disaster of epic proportions,” said Foggo, dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. “I can’t believe how quickly that bridge went down.”

Besides the four Ready Reserve Fleet vessels trapped behind the wreckage, Foggo noted that the Coast Guard has its principal maintenance facility beyond the bridge in Curtis Bay. More redundancy is needed in the country’s sea infrastructure, he said. Plus, the nation’s shipyards have declined significantly in number over the years, he added.

The Maritime Administration is expanding its Ready Reserve Force, Harrington said. The Transportation Department is purchasing used ships, which are being updated, inspected and otherwise prepared. The Navy also will return some ships to the fleet soon. Once the new ships are incorporated, the Ready Reserve Force will include 53 vessels, Harrington said.

“We are doing everything we can to accelerate their suitability and readiness for being called into service,” he said.

Other vessels trapped behind the Key Bridge’s wreckage include:

Palanca Rio — an oil/chemical tanker sailing under the flag of the Marshall Islands.
Balsa 94 — a general cargo ship sailing under the flag of Panama.
Klara Oldendorff — a bulk carrier sailing under the flag of Madeira.
Saimaagracht — a general cargo ship sailing under the flag of the Netherlands.
Carmen — a vehicles carrier sailing under the flag of Sweden.
JY River — a bulk carrier sailing under the flag of the Liberia.
Phatra Naree — a bulk carrier sailing under the flag of Thailand.

Those vessels are berthed around the harbor from Dundalk Marine Terminal and the Canton industrial waterfront to a coal pier in Curtis Bay. There’s an adage in the shipping industry that ships that aren’t sailing aren’t making money. Every day they’re stuck with their crews behind the port’s closed main channel, their owners are losing money.

According to vessel tracking websites, another six bulk ships lie at anchorage south of the Bay Bridge, where they typically lay up before delivering bulk goods such as sugar or fertilizer or wait to pick up coal from one of the port’s two coal terminals.

Visit baltimoresun.com.

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

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stripes.com · by Angela Roberts · April 4, 2024

12. Army’s top Pacific leader mum on ‘where or when’ new missiles will deploy

But do we think China already knows? Once they are deployed will we be able to keep it a secret? (I think not, of course)

Army’s top Pacific leader mum on ‘where or when’ new missiles will deploy

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · April 5, 2024

U.S. Army Pacific commander Gen. Charles Flynn speaks to reporters during a media roundtable at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo on April 3, 2024. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

TOKYO — The U.S. Army will field newly developed missiles in the Indo-Pacific region this year with additional types in the pipeline, it’s Pacific-area commander told reporters on a recent visit to the Japanese capital.

“I’m not going to discuss what system and I’m not going to say where and when,” Gen. Charles Flynn said during a media roundtable Tuesday at the U.S. Embassy. “I’m just saying that there will be a long-range precision fires capability.”

The U.S. and allies Japan and the Philippines are gearing up for a potential fight with China, which boasts a formidable missile force, around Taiwan or in the South China Sea.

In November, Flynn told reporters at the Halifax International Security Forum in Canada that the Army would deploy a limited number of Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles to the region, according to a Nov. 19 report in Defense One.

Land-based Tomahawks, with a range of over 1,500 miles, were banned under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. But the U.S. pulled out of the treaty in 2019, due to Russian non-compliance, and the Marine Corps established its first Tomahawk unit in July 2023 at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

“I’m not going to say where or when we will deploy in 2024,” Flynn said in Japan. “There’s actually multiple systems in development.”

Flynn during the Tokyo roundtable mentioned the Typhoon launcher, which is designed to fire the SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. That system has a “hypersonic capability,” he said, referring to missiles that can travel faster than five times the speed of sound.

Flynn also spoke about the long-range, anti-ship Precision Strike Missile, which is set to reach initial operating capability this year.

“This new surface-to-surface weapon system will deliver enhanced capabilities to attack, neutralize, suppress and destroy targets using missile-delivered indirect fires out to 499+ kilometers (310+ miles),” manufacturer Lockheed Martin wrote on its website.

“We shoot HIMARS in a number of these countries today,” Flynn said in Halifax. “This is just a different missile to put into it. So, I don’t necessarily think we need to have an agreement (with other countries) ahead of time.”

Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

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Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · April 5, 2024

13. Pacific coalition tightens as China pressures the Philippines and Taiwan

As an aside, this statement went under the radar:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

– Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

Pacific coalition tightens as China pressures the Philippines and Taiwan - Washington Examiner

Washington Examiner · April 4, 2024

Our allies in the Pacific are working with us in preparation for war as China expands its aggression toward other nations.

Adm. John Aquilino, U.S. Navy commander and head of the Indo-Pacific forces, informed a House committee that if any direct action by China resulted in the death of a Filipino service member, then the Philippines could invoke our Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, thereby bringing us into war with China.

“That would put our policy decision-makers in a place that would require really tough choices,” Aquilino said.

This observation was brought up at the meeting because Chinese coastal guards have grown accustomed to harassing Filipino ships with high-powered water cannons. The most recent assaults have been on ships attempting to resupply forces at Ayungin Shoal. So far, this has resulted in the injuries of seven Filipino navy personnel.

Beijing has increased its aggression against the Philippines due to the threat the latter poses. Manila has been working with Vietnam to strengthen its maritime defenses. This could sever China’s vital connection to the global trade route passing through the Malacca Strait. To justify an attack, Beijing has already begun claiming that Ayungin Shoal is a Chinese territory.

In response, the United States has been working to strengthen coordination between American and Filipino forces. Japan, the other powerhouse and strongest American ally in the region, plans to join both later this month in their first trilateral joint training exercise together in the South China Sea.

China has not slowed down its aggression toward Taiwan, either. It knows that the island nation is necessary for American defense. Taiwan’s geographic location is the bridge between East and Southeast Asia, and conquering it divides the coalition in two and gives Beijing a direct path to American island territories in the Pacific. Its mountainous terrain means it would be incredibly difficult to push Chinese forces out if they succeeded in taking it.

In preparation for an invasion that Beijing assures the world is inevitable, the coalition has been improving Taiwanese capabilities. American special forces trainers have been sent to teach Taiwanese front-line troops. Japan plans to construct bomb shelters on islands between Taiwan and itself for their mutual protection.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

America should continue to stand strong as a rallying point for its Pacific friends, who are already trying to work together to check the rising power and aggression of China.

China needs to learn that it is not allowed to mess with American allies, or it will cost them dearly.

Parker Miller is a 2024 Washington Examiner Winter Fellow.

Washington Examiner · April 4, 2024

14. How two brigades are leading the Army’s charge toward cutting-edge tech

How two brigades are leading the Army’s charge toward cutting-edge tech

From Hawaii to Europe, Army units are running drone racing competitions and experimenting with predictive software for the battlefield.

BY SAM SKOVE

STAFF WRITER

APRIL 4, 2024 06:29 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

As the Army chief of staff pushes to put more experimental tech into the hands of average soldiers, two brigades at opposite ends of the globe are already pressing forward on everything from commercial drones to translation apps.

One—the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, or IBCT, of the Hawaii-based 25th Infantry Division—is putting commercial drones at the core of every operation, a program that got a boost in the Army’s recent budget submission.

The other—the Europe-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment—is experimenting with cutting-edge software and other tech, including virtual reality, that increases units’ ability to survive on a modern battlefield.

The 2nd Cav’s work has even become a template for the broader transformation that Gen. Randy George wants to see in the Army.

The regimental commander “understands the challenges of large-scale combat operations and is adapting in real time to be more mobile, low-signature, and lethal,” the chief of staff said in his October AUSA address.

Out in Hawaii, 2nd IBCT commander Col. Graham White has been seeding drones across his unit for the last year.

The division is “really baking [small drones] into our culture,” White said. “For all maneuver training we do in the 25th Infantry Division,” White said, “that all now includes [small drone] employment.”

He said soldiers from logistics to infantry are trained on the use of commercial drones by the brigade’s helicopter pilots in a two-day course. They get additional practice flying the drones on the units’ ranges. Finding the area to fly drones without violating airspace regulations has been a challenge for Army units.

To sharpen his soldiers’ skills, White has also worked small drones into existing competitions to hone flight and visual recognition abilities. For example, soldiers competing in events like a rope climb or a marksmanship challenge might have to use a drone to identify a sniper hiding in a fake village.

Soldiers particularly love drone races that require navigation or reading text placed in hard-to-access places. “That’s a popular one, because it requires skill with a joystick,”, White said.

The unit operates around 12 drones representing four models from the Defense Department Blue UAS list, White said. His soldiers have found that a wide variety of drones, including longer-range fixed-wing, shorter-range, quadcopters, and a mix of sensors is required.

White encourages use of the drones, even if that means they are accidentally damaged in training.

“We are not putting incredibly stringent measures in place as it pertains to soldiers’ employment on those platforms,” White said. “We do realize they're gonna break in, and we do realize that we'll buy more.”

White pays for the drones out of his operations budget, a fund of several hundred thousand dollars more typically used for training and other needs. White said that drone purchases had to be built into the budget: “I need to make it a priority for it to occur,” he said.

With drones off the Blue UAS list costing more than the average commercial, Chinese-made drone, White wishes that drone prices would come down, though. Drone purchases could run to a quarter of his budget he said, comprising his largest spending category for any singular item.

“We don’t have the amount we need right now,” he said.

At least some relief may be coming: in the Army’s unfunded priority list for the fiscal year 2025 budget is a request for $25 million in commercial drone spending. That money will go straight into operation and maintenance accounts, service officials said last week, which may make it easier for unit commanders to acquire drones.

In Europe

Thousands of miles away in Germany, the 2nd Cavalry regiment is also experimenting with adding in more commercial tech as well.

In one December exercise, 2nd Cavalry units had communications set up from the moment their vehicles rolled off transport planes thanks to commercial satellite services, said 2nd Cavalry Regiment commander Col. Robert McChrystal.

The unit also experimented with a virtual command post accessed via augmented reality goggles, from Palantir’s Immersive Command and Control, or IC2. Using the sets allowed units separated by hundreds of miles to look at the same screens as if they were in the same room, said McChrystal.

McChrystal’s unit has experimented with using other tech to make decision processes faster, including testing automatic translation software from Microsoft Azure. The software was used in an exercise with Poland and France and worked well, he said.

“We had a [French] battalion underneath us, and then we had a Polish division over the top of us,” he said.

That software was spread to other European units by loading the software onto Samsung phones held by liaison officers, said Maj. Jaime Holm, fire support officer for the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. “We could host a meeting where you speak into it in English and to the Polish user, it comes out in Polish.”

The unit will also test out battle simulation software that can help units in the field game out what areas to attack or where to defend.

The idea in principle is not new; armies have run table-top exercises since at least the 1800s to game out what an enemy might do in a given situation.

Unlike the wood-blocks and paper maps of yore, though, the software will provide answers in minutes and pull in live data, said Holm. “We can find ways to use predictive tools that help our current processes run faster,” said Holm.

As the two brigades move forward with their trials, Pentagon leaders and other offices in the Defense Department are watching and helping, according to the 2nd Cav leaders.

“We are routinely asked by army senior leaders — how they can help, and what systems and procurement methods are working or not working,” White said. “The battlefield is changing quickly — we're going to risk irrelevance if we don't change with it.”

defenseone.com · by Sam Skove

15. Myanmar resistance group says its drones hit targets in the capital, but army says it shot them down

Myanmar resistance group says its drones hit targets in the capital, but army says it shot them down

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · April 4, 2024

FILE - A resident drives motorbike to Naypyitaw International Airport as security police stand guard, Thursday, Sept. 29, 2016, in Naypyitaw, Myanmar. Myanmar’s main pro-democracy resistance group said Thursday, April 4, 2024, its armed wing launched drone attacks on the airport and a military headquarters in the capital, Naypyitaw, but the country’s ruling military said it destroyed or seized more than a dozen drones used in the attacks. (AP Photo/Aung Shine Oo, File)

BANGKOK (AP) — Myanmar’s main pro-democracy resistance group said Thursday its armed wing launched drone attacks on the airport and a military headquarters in the capital, Naypyitaw, but the country’s ruling military said it destroyed or seized more than a dozen drones used in the attacks.

The opposition National Unity Government ‘s “Defense Ministry” said in a statement that special units of the People’s Defense Force used drones to attack the targets simultaneously. The group, known by the acronym NUG, calls itself the country’s legitimate government, while the People’s Defense Force is made up of many local resistance groups with a good deal of independence.

Although there was no immediate evidence of any damage caused by the attack, the military’s acknowledgement that it had taken place in one of the most heavily guarded locations in the country will be seen by many as the latest indication that it is losing the initiative to its determined opponents, a trend first evident late last year when it lost critical territory in the northeast and west.

The NUG said there were reports of casualties from the attacks, while the military said there weren’t any.

State-television MRTV in its evening news broadcast said that 13 drones crashed more or less intact and two others exploded in mid-air. Photos on the broadcast showed what looked like wooden fixed-wing drones with a wingspan of over a meter (yard). It added that they were searching for others. The military initially had announced they had shot down seven.

BBC’s Burmese-language service and Khit Thit, an online news service sympathetic to the resistance, said the airport was shut down for a while after the attacks.

It wasn’t possible to independently verify most details of the incident. People who live near the airport who were contacted by The Associated Press said they were unaware of any attack, and photos released by the government showed only what appeared to be crashed drones. There had been claims in September of an earlier attack on the airport in Naypyitaw, but it drew little attention.

Myanmar has been in turmoil since the military seized power from the elected civilian government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, triggering nationwide peaceful protests that were suppressed with deadly force by the security forces, leading to armed resistance that amounts to a civil war.

The airport compound, which includes both a military air base and a civilian airport, is about 25 kilometers (16 miles) southwest of the military headquarters that the resistance group said it attacked.

The resistance group that claimed responsibility for the attack, Kloud Team (Shar Htoo Waw ), specializes in drone warfare, which is frequently employed by People’s Defense Force units, which lack the army’s heavy firepower.

Kloud Team said it had targeted the house of Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, the head of the ruling military council, as well as the military headquarters and air base,

Despite its great advantage in armaments and manpower, the military has been unable to quell the resistance movement, and frequently carries out air strikes in disputed territory. Civilian targets are often hit, and about 2.4 million people have been displaced since the 2021 army takeover.

For the resistance forces, drones have become crucial weapons for fighting back. Initially, smaller drones with lighter payloads were used, but now the opposition groups are using more sophisticated systems to drop explosives on military targets. Resistance groups frequently post videos on social media of their drone attacks.

The People’s Defense Force and its local units have allied themselves with major ethnic guerrilla groups in border regions that have been carrying out armed struggles against the army for decades seeking greater autonomy.

Last October, a surprise offensive by an armed ethnic alliance captured towns and overran military bases and garrisons along the Chinese border. The operation by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, who named themselves the Three Brotherhood Alliance, was such a stunning success that it buoyed others in the resistance and represented a turning point, though victory for the opposition is still not in sight, experts said.

The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business. More than half the world’s population sees AP journalism every day.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · April 4, 2024

16. US Army officer’s book explores legitimacy of drone warfare

US Army officer’s book explores legitimacy of drone warfare

c4isrnet.com · by Christopher Hunter · April 4, 2024

The Legitimacy of Drone Warfare

By U.S. Army Lt. Col. Paul Lushenko and Shyam Raman

Routledge, 2024

Each day these days brings news of drone warfare by state and non-state combatants in various operational theaters.

Yet prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hamas’ invasion of Israel, and the Houthi’s maritime terrorism, most news of drone warfare consisted of asymmetric drone strikes by the United States targeting individual combatants in the global war on terrorism.

For example, just over four years ago the United States killed Qasem Soleimani by Hellfire missiles fired from an MQ-9 Reaper. The Reaper is a remotely-piloted drone that can carry a payload as well as be used solely for reconnaissance and related non-kinetic purposes. Soleimani had been commander of the Quds Force, the part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard with responsibility for international operations that resulted in attributable deaths of American service members. Soleimani also was aligned with Hezbollah, an international terrorist organization based in Lebanon.

Similarly, nearly two years ago the United States killed Ayman al-Zawahari also with Hellfire missiles fired from a Reaper into the house where Zawahari then was living in Kabul, Afghanistan. Zawahari had been a deputy to Osama bin Laden, helped plan the 9/11 attacks, and assumed leadership of al-Qaida after bin Laden was killed in May 2011. Zawahari had been on the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist List for years.

In both instances, the strikes were widely reported yet, once known, not necessarily widely supported.

In the short period of time between the Zawahari drone strike and today, drone warfare has, well, exploded. What used to be an emerging and limited method of delivering kinetic effects is rapidly becoming established and ubiquitous across conflict zones.

With many advances in technology, deployment and use sometimes can outpace broader societal deliberation and considered judgment about whether and how to deploy and use.

When it comes to technological advances in projecting military force, at least in the United States with its tradition of civilian authority for and control over the military, accounting for public support is critical to determining kinetic options. Political will as measured by public support for or opposition to action can create and limit those options. Plus, insofar as the United States continues to embrace its indispensable role shaping a rules-based global order (as it should), global governance of drone warfare is likely to be heavily influenced by U.S. and western allied public opinion.

That’s why a new book by U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Lushenko and economics professor Shyam Raman is so invaluable.

In The Legitimacy of Drone Warfare: Evaluating Public Perceptions, Lushenko and Raman break new ground in analyzing public attitudes about drone warfare, providing unique insights that should guide practitioners, policy-makers, researchers, and civil society in this most modern way of war.

Lushenko is an Assistant Professor and Director of Special Operations at the U.S. Army War College. Raman is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Williams College. They met at Cornell, where Lushenko earned a PhD, and their book is an outgrowth of that meeting.

Together, they bring to bear empirical methods to understand public attitudes about drone warfare in the United States, France, and comparatively more broadly.

How, for example, do Americans view drone strikes that cross territorial boundaries and deliver force inside another nation’s borders? Does multilateral support for such strikes matter or are there other factors that are more likely to determine domestic perceptions of legitimacy? What are differences in public perceptions among allied nations for conditions precedent to legitimate drone strikes? How might answers to these and other questions inform military decision-makers when developing concepts of operations, or civilian authorities when deciding whether to authorize such operations, or international governing bodies when called upon to develop standards in line with law of war principles?

It’s one thing to launch a Hellfire missile from a remotely-piloted drone at a Most Wanted terrorist combatant. It’s another to launch drone swarms, as Elliott Ackerman and retired Admiral James Stavridis envision, to achieve security objectives. Perceptions of legitimacy of the former will directly inform perceived legitimacy of the latter.

With warfare on the verge of a technological leap that will result in ever more uncrewed, semi-autonomous, and even fully autonomous weapons-capable drones in arsenals of ever more state and non-state combatants, understanding Lushenko’s and Raman’s legitimacy findings and how to apply them will become equally ever more important.

Christopher Hunter is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Tampa and a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida. He served in the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI.

17. Confronting the Anti-Israel Narrative-Industrial Complex

The other battlefield - the battlefield of information in the human domain.

Confronting the Anti-Israel Narrative-Industrial Complex

The growing demonization of Israel is not unstoppable.

The National Interest · by Lawrence J. Haas · April 4, 2024

“Israel has become so demonized” in human rights organizations, says Danielle Haas, former senior editor at Human Rights Watch (HRW), that there’s “no space to see Israelis as victims, or to absorb nuance or voices that challenge their orthodoxies. In a conceptual universe where Israel is an occupier-colonizer-apartheid state, it is a priori the aggressor, regardless of the brutal human-rights abuses it suffers.”

Haas (no relation to me) edited HRW’s annual review of human rights around the world from 2010 to 2023. In a blistering piece for the journal SAPIR, she writes that in human rights organizations, “Israel has become their watchword of outrage, the focus of disproportionate attention, and the note to sound for signaling fealty to a human-rights movement that is increasingly hijacked by politics and dominated by groupthink.”

That’s why, she writes, these organizations have been so anodyne in their response to Hamas’ brutality of October 7, so disinterested in the tunnels it has built “beneath children’s beds,” so skeptical of the proven ties between Hamas and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, so eager to parrot false claims of Israeli brutality in response to October 7, and so reluctant to correct the record later.

From their perch as self-appointed human rights arbiters, these groups play a huge role in shaping public views of the Jewish state. Their reports, tweets, and other utterances are echoed at the United Nations and other global bodies, in leading capitals, through media, on campuses, and in Hollywood—all of it contributing to what one might call a “narrative-industrial complex” that sets and reinforces a narrative about Israel that’s driven by ideology, biased in its conclusions, and disproportionate in its focus.

The silver lining in all this? Because the narrative is rooted less in facts than ideology, facts can chip away at that narrative, forcing its adherents to think anew. Polling proves it, and I’ve witnessed it up close.

Before we get to prescriptions, however, let’s dig deeper into the narrative-industrial complex and its impact on Israel.

In his “Allegory of the Cave,” Plato wrote about people chained to a wall who see nothing but shadows from nearby objects and, knowing nothing else, assume those shadows are reality. Only the person who leaves the cave and sees sunlight comes to recognize reality for what it truly is.

When it comes to Israel, much of the world is similarly chained to a wall, seeing only shadows—the shadows of a narrative about Israel as an “apartheid state,” a uniquely prominent human rights abuser now committing genocide in Gaza.

The problem does not begin and end with human rights organizations, nor do these organizations drive skewed views of Israel more than any other part of the narrative-industrial complex. The UN and its Human Rights Council focus inordinate attention on Israel while largely ignoring truly horrific human rights abuse elsewhere; Western newspapers often cover the Arab-Israeli conflict with a pronounced bias against Israel; Western leaders read that coverage and seek limits on Israel’s response to terror; and leftist professors nourish anti-Israeli bias on the campuses of all-too-many universities. It’s no wonder that support for Israel is dropping among college students and other young adults.

All is not lost, however. Ignorance about Israel—still the region’s only democracy, by the way—provides opportunity. In a recent survey of 250 college students from around the country, more than 85 percent of them supported the Palestinian chant “from the river to the sea.” Many, however, couldn’t identify that river or that sea, and many didn’t know basic facts about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“After learning a handful of basic facts about the Middle East,” the University of California at Berkeley professor who commissioned the survey wrote in December, “67.8% of students went from supporting ‘from the river to sea’ to rejecting the mantra.”

I’ve experienced something similar. Discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I’ve evoked blank stares when noting that Palestinian leaders have rejected multiple offers of statehood, that Palestinians overwhelmingly oppose a two-state solution and support Hamas’s brutality of October 7, that the Palestinian Authority continues to pay pensions to the families of terrorists who kill Jews, and that Israel arguably does more than any other nation to limit civilian casualties in wartime.

Nor do most people know that Palestinian leaders incite Jew-hating and Israel rejectionism at mosques, through schools, and on social media—lots of it documented by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) and other watchdog groups.

So, here’s an idea for those who want to level the playing field of discussion about the Jewish state: relay facts, offer history, and suggest reliable sources from outside the narrative-industrial complex.

And change the world—one blank stare at a time.

Lawrence J. Haas is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of, most recently, The Kennedys in the World: How Jack, Bobby, and Ted Remade America’s Empire (Potomac Books). Follow him on X: @larryhaasonline.

Image: Gal Rotem / Shutterstock.com.

The National Interest · by Lawrence J. Haas · April 4, 2024

18. ‘The machine did it coldly’: Israel used AI to identify 37,000 Hamas targets

Excerpts:

Israel’s use of powerful AI systems in its war on Hamas has entered uncharted territory for advanced warfare, raising a host of legal and moral questions, and transforming the relationship between military personnel and machines.

“This is unparalleled, in my memory,” said one intelligence officer who used Lavender, adding that they had more faith in a “statistical mechanism” than a grieving soldier. “Everyone there, including me, lost people on October 7. The machine did it coldly. And that made it easier.”

Another Lavender user questioned whether humans’ role in the selection process was meaningful. “I would invest 20 seconds for each target at this stage, and do dozens of them every day. I had zero added-value as a human, apart from being a stamp of approval. It saved a lot of time.”

...

Another intelligence officer said that more recently in the conflict, the rate of permitted collateral damage was brought down again. But at one stage earlier in the war they were authorised to kill up to “20 uninvolved civilians” for a single operative, regardless of their rank, military importance, or age.

“It’s not just that you can kill any person who is a Hamas soldier, which is clearly permitted and legitimate in terms of international law,” they said. “But they directly tell you: ‘You are allowed to kill them along with many civilians.’ … In practice, the proportionality criterion did not exist.”

The IDF statement said its procedures “require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and collateral damage expected … The IDF does not carry out strikes when the expected collateral damage from the strike is excessive in relation to the military advantage.” It added: “The IDF outright rejects the claim regarding any policy to kill tens of thousands of people in their homes.”

Experts in international humanitarian law who spoke to the Guardian expressed alarm at accounts of the IDF accepting and pre-authorising collateral damage ratios as high as 20 civilians, particularly for lower-ranking militants. They said militaries must assess proportionality for each individual strike.

‘The machine did it coldly’: Israel used AI to identify 37,000 Hamas targets

Israeli intelligence sources reveal use of ‘Lavender’ system in Gaza war and claim permission given to kill civilians in pursuit of low-ranking militants

Bethan McKernan in Jerusalem and Harry Davies

Wed 3 Apr 2024 09.53 EDT

The Guardian · by Bethan McKernan · April 3, 2024

The Israeli military’s bombing campaign in Gaza used a previously undisclosed AI-powered database that at one stage identified 37,000 potential targets based on their apparent links to Hamas, according to intelligence sources involved in the war.

In addition to talking about their use of the AI system, called Lavender, the intelligence sources claim that Israeli military officials permitted large numbers of Palestinian civilians to be killed, particularly during the early weeks and months of the conflict.

Their unusually candid testimony provides a rare glimpse into the first-hand experiences of Israeli intelligence officials who have been using machine-learning systems to help identify targets during the six-month war.

Israel’s use of powerful AI systems in its war on Hamas has entered uncharted territory for advanced warfare, raising a host of legal and moral questions, and transforming the relationship between military personnel and machines.

“This is unparalleled, in my memory,” said one intelligence officer who used Lavender, adding that they had more faith in a “statistical mechanism” than a grieving soldier. “Everyone there, including me, lost people on October 7. The machine did it coldly. And that made it easier.”

Another Lavender user questioned whether humans’ role in the selection process was meaningful. “I would invest 20 seconds for each target at this stage, and do dozens of them every day. I had zero added-value as a human, apart from being a stamp of approval. It saved a lot of time.”

Palestinian children salvage items amid the destruction caused by Israeli bombing in Bureij, central Gaza, on 14 March. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

The testimony from the six intelligence officers, all who have been involved in using AI systems to identify Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) targets in the war, was given to the journalist Yuval Abraham for a report published by the Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 Magazine and the Hebrew-language outlet Local Call.

Their accounts were shared exclusively with the Guardian in advance of publication. All six said that Lavender had played a central role in the war, processing masses of data to rapidly identify potential “junior” operatives to target. Four of the sources said that, at one stage early in the war, Lavender listed as many as 37,000 Palestinian men who had been linked by the AI system to Hamas or PIJ.

Lavender was developed by the Israel Defense Forces’ elite intelligence division, Unit 8200, which is comparable to the US’s National Security Agency or GCHQ in the UK.

Several of the sources described how, for certain categories of targets, the IDF applied pre-authorised allowances for the estimated number of civilians who could be killed before a strike was authorised.

Two sources said that during the early weeks of the war they were permitted to kill 15 or 20 civilians during airstrikes on low-ranking militants. Attacks on such targets were typically carried out using unguided munitions known as “dumb bombs”, the sources said, destroying entire homes and killing all their occupants.

story tips embed

“You don’t want to waste expensive bombs on unimportant people – it’s very expensive for the country and there’s a shortage [of those bombs],” one intelligence officer said. Another said the principal question they were faced with was whether the “collateral damage” to civilians allowed for an attack.

“Because we usually carried out the attacks with dumb bombs, and that meant literally dropping the whole house on its occupants. But even if an attack is averted, you don’t care – you immediately move on to the next target. Because of the system, the targets never end. You have another 36,000 waiting.”

According to conflict experts, if Israel has been using dumb bombs to flatten the homes of thousands of Palestinians who were linked, with the assistance of AI, to militant groups in Gaza, that could help explain the shockingly high death toll in the war.

The health ministry in the Hamas-run territory says 33,000 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict in the past six months. UN data shows that in the first month of the war alone, 1,340 families suffered multiple losses, with 312 families losing more than 10 members.

Israeli soldiers stand on the Israeli side of the Israel-Gaza border surveying the Palestinian territory on 30 March. Photograph: Amir Cohen/Reuters

Responding to the publication of the testimonies in +972 and Local Call, the IDF said in a statement that its operations were carried out in accordance with the rules of proportionality under international law. It said dumb bombs are “standard weaponry” that are used by IDF pilots in a manner that ensures “a high level of precision”.

The statement described Lavender as a database used “to cross-reference intelligence sources, in order to produce up-to-date layers of information on the military operatives of terrorist organisations. This is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack.

“The IDF does not use an artificial intelligence system that identifies terrorist operatives or tries to predict whether a person is a terrorist,” it added. “Information systems are merely tools for analysts in the target identification process.”

Lavender created a database of tens of thousands of individuals

In earlier military operations conducted by the IDF, producing human targets was often a more labour-intensive process. Multiple sources who described target development in previous wars to the Guardian, said the decision to “incriminate” an individual, or identify them as a legitimate target, would be discussed and then signed off by a legal adviser.

In the weeks and months after 7 October, this model for approving strikes on human targets was dramatically accelerated, according to the sources. As the IDF’s bombardment of Gaza intensified, they said, commanders demanded a continuous pipeline of targets.

“We were constantly being pressured: ‘Bring us more targets.’ They really shouted at us,” said one intelligence officer. “We were told: now we have to fuck up Hamas, no matter what the cost. Whatever you can, you bomb.”

To meet this demand, the IDF came to rely heavily on Lavender to generate a database of individuals judged to have the characteristics of a PIJ or Hamas militant.

Details about the specific kinds of data used to train Lavender’s algorithm, or how the programme reached its conclusions, are not included in the accounts published by +972 or Local Call. However, the sources said that during the first few weeks of the war, Unit 8200 refined Lavender’s algorithm and tweaked its search parameters.

After randomly sampling and cross-checking its predictions, the unit concluded Lavender had achieved a 90% accuracy rate, the sources said, leading the IDF to approve its sweeping use as a target recommendation tool.

Lavender created a database of tens of thousands of individuals who were marked as predominantly low-ranking members of Hamas’s military wing, they added. This was used alongside another AI-based decision support system, called the Gospel, which recommended buildings and structures as targets rather than individuals.

Two Israeli air force F15 fighter jets near the city of Gedera, southern Israel, on 27 March. Photograph: Abir Sultan/EPA

The accounts include first-hand testimony of how intelligence officers worked with Lavender and how the reach of its dragnet could be adjusted. “At its peak, the system managed to generate 37,000 people as potential human targets,” one of the sources said. “But the numbers changed all the time, because it depends on where you set the bar of what a Hamas operative is.”

They added: “There were times when a Hamas operative was defined more broadly, and then the machine started bringing us all kinds of civil defence personnel, police officers, on whom it would be a shame to waste bombs. They help the Hamas government, but they don’t really endanger soldiers.”

Before the war, US and Israeli estimated membership of Hamas’s military wing at approximately 25-30,000 people.

‘The Gospel’: how Israel uses AI to select bombing targets in Gaza

In the weeks after the Hamas-led 7 October assault on southern Israel, in which Palestinian militants killed nearly 1,200 Israelis and kidnapped about 240 people, the sources said there was a decision to treat Palestinian men linked to Hamas’s military wing as potential targets, regardless of their rank or importance.

The IDF’s targeting processes in the most intensive phase of the bombardment were also relaxed, they said. “There was a completely permissive policy regarding the casualties of [bombing] operations,” one source said. “A policy so permissive that in my opinion it had an element of revenge.”

Another source, who justified the use of Lavender to help identify low-ranking targets, said that “when it comes to a junior militant, you don’t want to invest manpower and time in it”. They said that in wartime there was insufficient time to carefully “incriminate every target”.

“So you’re willing to take the margin of error of using artificial intelligence, risking collateral damage and civilians dying, and risking attacking by mistake, and to live with it,” they added.

‘It’s much easier to bomb a family’s home’

The testimonies published by +972 and Local Call may explain how such a western military with such advanced capabilities, with weapons that can conduct highly surgical strikes, has conducted a war with such a vast human toll.

When it came to targeting low-ranking Hamas and PIJ suspects, they said, the preference was to attack when they were believed to be at home. “We were not interested in killing [Hamas] operatives only when they were in a military building or engaged in a military activity,” one said. “It’s much easier to bomb a family’s home. The system is built to look for them in these situations.”

Relatives outside the morgue of the al-Najjar hospital in Rafah mourn Palestinians killed in Israeli bombings on 1 February. Photograph: Mohammed Abed/AFP/Getty Images

Such a strategy risked higher numbers of civilian casualties, and the sources said the IDF imposed pre-authorised limits on the number of civilians it deemed acceptable to kill in a strike aimed at a single Hamas militant. The ratio was said to have changed over time, and varied according to the seniority of the target.

According to +972 and Local Call, the IDF judged it permissible to kill more than 100 civilians in attacks on a top-ranking Hamas officials. “We had a calculation for how many [civilians could be killed] for the brigade commander, how many [civilians] for a battalion commander, and so on,” one source said.

“There were regulations, but they were just very lenient,” another added. “We’ve killed people with collateral damage in the high double digits, if not low triple digits. These are things that haven’t happened before.” There appears to have been significant fluctuations in the figure that military commanders would tolerate at different stages of the war.

One source said that the limit on permitted civilian casualties “went up and down” over time, and at one point was as low as five. During the first week of the conflict, the source said, permission was given to kill 15 non-combatants to take out junior militants in Gaza. However, they said estimates of civilian casualties were imprecise, as it was not possible to know definitively how many people were in a building.

Another intelligence officer said that more recently in the conflict, the rate of permitted collateral damage was brought down again. But at one stage earlier in the war they were authorised to kill up to “20 uninvolved civilians” for a single operative, regardless of their rank, military importance, or age.

“It’s not just that you can kill any person who is a Hamas soldier, which is clearly permitted and legitimate in terms of international law,” they said. “But they directly tell you: ‘You are allowed to kill them along with many civilians.’ … In practice, the proportionality criterion did not exist.”

The IDF statement said its procedures “require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and collateral damage expected … The IDF does not carry out strikes when the expected collateral damage from the strike is excessive in relation to the military advantage.” It added: “The IDF outright rejects the claim regarding any policy to kill tens of thousands of people in their homes.”

Experts in international humanitarian law who spoke to the Guardian expressed alarm at accounts of the IDF accepting and pre-authorising collateral damage ratios as high as 20 civilians, particularly for lower-ranking militants. They said militaries must assess proportionality for each individual strike.

Smoke rises over the Gaza Strip, as seen from from the Israeli side of the border on 21 January. Photograph: Amir Levy/Getty Images

An international law expert at the US state department said they had “never remotely heard of a one to 15 ratio being deemed acceptable, especially for lower-level combatants. There’s a lot of leeway, but that strikes me as extreme”.

Sarah Harrison, a former lawyer at the US Department of Defense, now an analyst at Crisis Group, said: “While there may be certain occasions where 15 collateral civilian deaths could be proportionate, there are other times where it definitely wouldn’t be. You can’t just set a tolerable number for a category of targets and say that it’ll be lawfully proportionate in each case.”

Whatever the legal or moral justification for Israel’s bombing strategy, some of its intelligence officers appear now to be questioning the approach set by their commanders. “No one thought about what to do afterward, when the war is over, or how it will be possible to live in Gaza,” one said.

Another said that after the 7 October attacks by Hamas, the atmosphere in the IDF was “painful and vindictive”. “There was a dissonance: on the one hand, people here were frustrated that we were not attacking enough. On the other hand, you see at the end of the day that another thousand Gazans have died, most of them civilians.”

Guardian Newsroom: The unfolding crisis in the Middle East

On Tuesday 30 April, 7-8.15pm GMT, join Devika Bhat, Peter Beaumont, Emma Graham-Harrison and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad as they discuss the fast-developing crisis in the Middle East. Book tickets here or at theguardian.live

The Guardian · by Bethan McKernan · April 3, 2024

19. The erratic results of deterrence against non-state armed groups

Can you really deter non-state armed groups (NSAG)

ONLINE ANALYSIS2nd April 2024

The erratic results of deterrence against non-state armed groups

The use of force against NSAGs can succeed tactically but delivers limited effects strategically.

https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/03/the-erratic-results-of-deterrence-against-non-state-armed-groups/?utm

The United States has led several rounds of retaliatory strikes against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the Middle East in early 2024. In January, it began launching strikes against the Houthis (Ansarullah) in response to their attacks on shipping vessels in the Red Sea, and in February, it carried out an air assault against groups in Syria and Iraq accused of killing US servicemen at its base in al-Tanf in Jordan. In both cases, the US response has exposed the difficulties, and perverse results, of using conventional deterrence against NSAGs.

Deterrence and the durability of NSAGs

The clearest metric for successful deterrence is the manifest reduction of the threat posed by an adversary. Less clear, but more valuable, is the degree to which the adversary drops its longer-term hostile intent. On the first metric, the US strikes on Houthi bases were initially a success: attacks on shipping in the Red Sea decreased. On the second, however, subsequent attacks in Iraq and Syria and in the Red Sea indicate that the strategic will of these groups has not altered. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq rescinded its suspension of attacks on US targets, and the Houthis have continued to mount attacks sufficient to deter international shipping.

The problem may not lie with US deterrence, which arguably worked well against Iran and Hizbullah when Washington sent two aircraft-carrier strike groups to the Eastern Mediterranean in late 2023. It may lie instead with the nature of NSAGs, for whom the grammar of deterrence, whereby both parties abide by a shared set of rules and understandings, is simply different. This risks rendering large-scale military interventions or shows of force ineffective or even counterproductive. Such interventions, however, may serve other purposes: they may satisfy domestic political pressure, seek to reassure markets or serve as a signal to other states and non-state entities. These were all considerations in the case of the US-led strikes. They can also degrade capability, which is a legitimate and reasonable defence objective, but they often come at a cost that nets out over time in favour of NSAGs.

NSAGs have advantages that offset their military inferiority. Most significantly, they possess a strategic resilience that comes from commanding a locality. They enjoy popular support, which translates into recruits, facilities and freedom to manoeuvre, and so evade. The Houthis have shown remarkable resilience over the past 20 years since the first insurgency they led in 2004. Hizbullah and other NSAGs in the Middle East have a similar pedigree: they have maintained an effective asymmetric force over decades and through multiple conflicts. Their ability to adapt their tactics, select effective partners and, through the provision of services, become the de facto source of government for a locality has contributed to their resilience. Most difficult of all for their state-level opponents, NSAGs are adept at leveraging external attacks to their advantage when crafting their local narrative. Efforts to deter such groups, therefore, may instead drive more recruits.

Difficulties of deterring NSAGs

The aftermath of the 85 attacks launched by the US in Iraq and Syria illustrates the difficulties of controlling the fall-out from deterrence operations against NSAGs. The groups targeted in Iraq (Kataib Hizbullah and Harikat Al Nujaba) qualified as ‘Iranian-backed’ in US terms, but they were not Iranians and were not located in Iran. This purported association with Iran, which was supposed to demonise the two groups, in fact misrepresented them and overlooked complexifying details. They were from Iraq (not a state hostile to the US), were paid by the Iraqi government and had recently been US allies in fighting against the Islamic State (ISIS). The collateral damage for the US has been an increase in anti-US and anti-Western sentiment. That sentiment may not be sufficiently articulated to result in concrete actions (e.g., terrorist operations), but it will help fashion the approach that Iraq, across the sectarian divide, takes towards its own security model and the role, if any, the US will play. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani has called for that security model to be entirely Iraqi, with neither the US nor Iran playing a determining role.

Efforts to combat NSAGs include the added problem that, while such groups may be deterred from mounting operations, they often continue to exist as alternate power bases to the state, which includes accumulating progressively more sophisticated and numerous weapon systems. Iran has played a key, although variable, role in improving the capabilities of the Houthis, Hizbullah and Hamas, which has been accompanied by a comparable effort on the part of the groups to build indigenous capability and improve military standards. None of these groups have been deterred or induced to change their strategic posture. On the contrary, all three have maintained a steady growth in strategic capability. Hamas’ large-scale attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the arsenal now at the disposal of the Houthis for use in the Red Sea in recent months, have shown how much their capabilities have developed. Fears that Hizbullah’s capabilities in Lebanon may have grown at a similar rate now haunt Israeli policy towards south Lebanon.

An alternative strategy

If deterring NSAGs through externally applied force does not work, what might? The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and the Houthis may both have a professed agenda of supporting Palestine against Israel, but their primary concerns are rooted in their respective local power struggles. Yemeni popular attachment to the Palestinian cause is deep and widespread, crossing sectarian and tribal boundaries. When the country was divided (into the Yemen Arab Republic in the north and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south) both states supported Palestinian groups. But, prior to 7 October, the peace process between the Houthis, the Saudis and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was progressing and that was the Houthi leadership’s focus. The 7 October attacks offered an opportunity for the Houthi leaders to demonstrate their military power, their connectedness to issues beyond their borders, their control of a strategic seaway and the importance, therefore, of their being taken seriously by the international community. Abdul Malik al-Houthi has been careful to exploit the raised profile that these attacks have given his movement by positioning himself as controlling a critical lever over Israel: he holds the Red Sea and the Suez Canal hostage to the recognition of a Palestinian state. Al-Houthi is undoubtedly sincere in his support for Palestine, but that support should be seen in the context of his strategic objective of a settlement agreement for the Houthis in Yemen. Focusing on this goal might change the Houthis’ calculation regarding their actions in the Red Sea. They may see advantages in trading international engagement for domestic gains.

NSAGs have flourished through the appeal of their militancy, their capacity to move decisively and their ability to offer a livelihood and purpose to young men who have limited economic opportunities, if any. They have both fed off and contributed to the weakness of central governments, disaggregating national resources and reinforcing ethno-sectarian divides. As they have grown, their potential to destabilise the region and, in the case of the Houthis, international markets has also increased. Before 7 October, they worked against the regional trends of conciliation and prioritising economic growth, which threatened to eclipse them. Now, they continue to control the regional security agenda and defy attempts to deter them strategically. It remains to be seen whether, out of the current kinetic stage of regional conflict, any opportunities will emerge for modulating to engagement, as they did in the early 1990s. Such a prospect may seem unconscionable, but the alternative is the continuation of a strategy that delivers the US and its allies more comfort than effect.

Author

20. Michael Rühle, From Pacifism to Nuclear Deterrence: Norman Angell and the Founding of NATO

The early Sir Norman Angell gave us the original Golden Arches Theory from Thomas Friedman - no two countries with McDonald's have ever gone to war. (Like Angell's original theory it has not panned out). But we so want his theory to be the case this time with China - we are so economically intertwined that it would make no sense for China in the US to go to war.

Excerpt:

In 1909, he self-published a pamphlet entitled “Europe’s Optical Illusion,” in which he argued that due to the ever-close economic interdependence of nations, modern war had become pointless: even for the victor the costs would exceed any conceivable benefit. Barely a year later, the expanded manuscript was published as a book and it became a bestseller. The Great Illusion was translated into 15 languages and sold two million copies.

Michael Rühle, From Pacifism to Nuclear Deterrence: Norman Angell and the Founding of NATO, No. 582, April 4, 2024 – Nipp

nipp.org

From Pacifism to Nuclear Deterrence: Norman Angell and the Founding of NATO

Michael Rühle

former Head of the Climate and Energy Security Section, NATO

On April 4, 1949, the foreign ministers of the United States, Canada and ten Western European countries met in Washington to sign a defense pact. Barely four years after the end of the Second World War, the United States committed itself to the military protection of Western Europe. While some observers on both sides of the Atlantic were deeply skeptical about this new arrangement, others felt that the Washington Treaty and all it symbolized were truly historic achievements. U.S. political commentator Walter Lippman put it best when he wrote that the new pact described a community of interests that was much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union and would therefore outlast it. Lippman was proven right. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that emerged from the Washington Treaty outlasted the Cold War and the Soviet Union and remains the world’s most tightly-knit security alliance.

Another enthusiastic supporter of this new pact was Sir Norman Angell (1872-1967), journalist, peace activist, politician, best-selling author and 1933 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. His support for a defense community of Western democracies against the Soviet threat marked the end of a lifelong search for a recipe to overcome war. Over the course of Angell’s political life, he went from being a pacifist and advocate of disarmament, to an advocate of collective security, the Atlantic Alliance and nuclear deterrence. This remarkable transformation can be viewed as a journey through the tragic first half of the 20th century. After witnessing how excessive nationalism and totalitarian ideologies had plunged Europe into two major wars, the world’s most famous peace activist had to realize that an alliance of likeminded Western democracies was the best model for securing peace in an imperfect world.

Ralph Norman Angell Lane was an urbane British journalist who had spent several years in the United States. and France. Always keen to attract public attention, the author of 40 books dropped his surname “Lane” early on and went by the euphonious name “Angell”. In 1909, he self-published a pamphlet entitled “Europe’s Optical Illusion,” in which he argued that due to the ever-close economic interdependence of nations, modern war had become pointless: even for the victor the costs would exceed any conceivable benefit. Barely a year later, the expanded manuscript was published as a book and it became a bestseller. The Great Illusion was translated into 15 languages and sold two million copies. At a time when the European powers were preparing for a major war and nationalism was running high, Angell’s rational arguments, with which he attempted to explain that the expected benefits of war were a great illusion, seemed like a long-awaited appeal to human reason. W.M. Hughes, Acting Premier of Australia, called The Great Illusion a “glorious book to read … pregnant with the brightest promise to the future of civilized man.” The German Kölnische Zeitung wrote that never before had the financial interdependencies of nations been laid out so well. And the Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung praised the book as proving convincingly that wars of conquest with the aim of achieving material gain had become impossible. In March 1912, Strickland, the cartoonist of the British Magazine “Vanity Fair,” referred to him as an “Angel of Peace.”

In Great Britain, Angell’s theses resonated tremendously. At Britain’s major universities, students founded associations of “Angellists” who would propagate the message about the futility of war. Although Angell had never claimed that wars had become impossible, the fear of an impending war in Europe had led many contemporary observers to over-interpret his theses. Many also believed that Angell’s views of the futility of war would be shared outside Britain – an assumption that others considered naïve. For example, in 1912, when Angell delivered a lecture before representatives of the British Banking Association, the audience argued that his theories would only lead to world peace if all nations shared his opinion on the unprofitability of war. Particularly with regard to the German Empire, doubts were justified.

However, many “Angellists” were convinced that warnings against German militarism were exaggerated. Lord Esher, President of the Imperial Defence Committee, opined that war was becoming “every day more difficult and improbable.” Lord Esher was also convinced that Germany was “as receptive as Great Britain to the doctrine of Norman Angell.” Angell himself held similar views, although his lecture tour in Germany in February 1913 should have taught him otherwise. In Göttingen, fraternities complained about the use of the English language at a German university, and in Berlin there were scuffles between Angell’s supporters and opponents. Angell had managed to garner much publicity in Germany, yet the good sales of his book obfuscated the fact that unlike in Britain, where pacifism had become a true movement, pacifism in Germany remained limited to a small section of the political elite. Angell himself later admitted that it would probably have taken several more years of intensive education to raise awareness in Germany of the futility of war between the European powers.

Predictably, Angell’s theses provoked considerable opposition. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the leading American thinker on naval strategy, accused Angell of arguing too materialistically and of conveniently ignoring non-quantifiable factors. He agreed that the cost-benefit ratio of wars was questionable, but insisted that wars did not arise merely from cold cost-benefit considerations: “Nations are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war in itself; but they recognize that different views of right and wrong in international transactions may provoke collision, against which the only safeguard is armament.” Mahan agreed with Angell that the disruption a war would cause to the international economic and financial system would also harm the victor. But merely acknowledging this fact did not mean the end of war. Nor could human behavior simply be reduced to mere self-interest: “Ambition, self-respect, resentment of injustice, sympathy with the oppressed, hatred of oppression” were factors that had to be considered as well. Because Angell excluded such factors, his “Great Illusion” was itself an illusion because it was based on a “profound misinterpretation of human action.” Numerous other critics also considered Angell’s almost exclusively economic argumentation to be too narrow. When listening to Angell, a German reviewer noted in 1911, “one might think that the whole controversy of mankind revolves around stock shares …”

Angell’s book was an attempt to counter the widespread fatalism in Great Britain regarding an “inevitable” war with Germany. He wanted to introduce rational arguments into a debate that he felt had become irrational. For example, when cabinet member Winston Churchill argued at a British university in 1913 that the best way to achieve security was to be stronger than one’s opponent, a visibly annoyed Norman Angell put him on the spot by asking him whether he would give the same advice to Germany. This episode was typical of the rather shy but rhetorically brilliant peace activist. However, the fact that he over-generalized his arguments, which were originally derived from his analysis of Anglo-German relations, lent his theses a degree of seemingly universal validity that the rather rambling collection of thoughts of The Great Illusion did not provide. Moreover, although Angell had never claimed that war was impossible, but only that the calculated use of military power had become counterproductive and unprofitable, the apparent plausibility of his reasoning and his tendency to exaggerate his arguments soon blinded him to reality. In October 1913, the American magazine Life quoted him as saying:

[T]he cessation of military conflict between powers like France and Germany, or Germany and England, or Russia and Germany .. . has come already … [I]t has been visible to all who have eyes to see during the last six months that far from these great nations being ready to fly at one another’s throats, nothing will induce them to take the immense risks of using their preposterous military instruments if they can possibly avoid it. … Armed Europe is at present engaged in spending most of its time and energy rehearsing a performance which all concerned know is never likely to come off.

The extent to which this naïve optimism had superseded rational considerations among British liberals was not evident only in Angell’s statements, the reflex to ignore the challenges ahead was also prevalent in parliamentary circles. When, during the July Crisis of 1914, a Liberal MP approached Foreign Secretary Edward Grey to demand that Britain stay neutral under any circumstances, Grey asked him what should be done in the event of a German violation of Belgium’s neutrality. “For a moment,” Grey wrote in his memoirs, “he paused, like one who, running at speed, is confronted with an obstacle, unexpected and unforeseen. Then he said with emphasis, ‘She won’t do it’. ‘l don’t say she will, but supposing she does.’ ‘She won’t do it’ he repeated confidently, and with that assurance he left me.” As much as the pacifists and internationalists tried to de-romanticize war, as much as they opposed a view of world politics as a Darwinian struggle for power and survival, they could not deny the fact that the European powers were on a collision course.

The outbreak of the First World War discredited naïve pacifism. Economic arguments and philosophical debates had not prevented the war. However, Angell’s popularity did not suffer. The immense destruction brought about by the “Great War” confirmed his thesis that the economic consequences of major wars would only produce losers. Angell remained a respected campaigner for international understanding and for a rational foreign policy. None of his subsequent books would achieve the popularity of The Great Illusion, but through his numerous essays Angell ensured his continuing visibility in the international debate. When he was knighted in 1931, one of his fellow campaigners felt that it was “the first knighthood for pacifism.” Angell, who had left school at the age of 14, had worked as a cowboy in California, and who, despite his eloquence, suffered throughout his life from a lack of academic honors, had made it to the top of British society. The “cowboy philosopher” – the title of a 1936 interview – had finally become a respected intellectual.

However, “Sir Great Illusion,” as some of his friends now called him with a mix of admiration and irony, had long since begun to question some of his pacifist arguments. In 1933, when Angell received the Nobel Peace Prize, he was a mature, middle-aged man who no longer believed in the war-preventing power of economic interdependence. Worried by the rise of totalitarian ideologies, he had become interested in the principle of collective security. As a leading member of the British League of Nations Union, he advocated the principle of international dispute settlement. In this context, Angell argued that the refusal of arbitration by a third party constituted an act of aggression that should be punished. However, Angell, like many of his contemporaries, shied away from arguing for military punishment. Given British war-weariness, his focus was on economic sanctions – a mistake, as he later admitted, because this meant that collective security was misunderstood as an alternative to military action.

The pacifist thus became sceptical of his own earlier positions. He had come to realize that his theses from The Great Illusion had not only become partially obsolete, but even counterproductive. All too often, his key statements were reduced to the simple formula that wars were no longer worthwhile. However, as Angell increasingly realized, this promoted the erroneous conclusion that peace could be secured simply by educating people about the irrationality of war. When Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, threatening a new era of wars of conquest, some of Angell’s earlier theories seemed hopelessly naïve. Angell also took issue with the perennial pacifist argument that war was a consequence of capitalism. The opponents of sanctions against Japan, he wrote in 1932, were primarily businessmen who feared for their lucrative trade with the Asian empire. From the mid-1930s, Angell consistently warned of the danger posed by Hitler’s Germany, and he came out in favor of British rearmament. He no longer repeated his view, expressed shortly after the First World War, that Germany should have been granted access to raw materials in order to avoid war. He now considered concessions to a potential aggressor, as still propagated by the classical pacifists, to be disastrous. In July 1914 he had hastily set up a “Neutrality League” to keep Britain out of the war. Now, at the beginning of the Second World War, he sided with his government’s policy.

Angell was aware that Britain owed its victory in the Second World War largely to the support of the United States. For the former Labour MP, the anti-Americanism that had started to spread among the British Left, was anathema. Angell, who held British and U.S. dual citizenship, was also concerned about the isolationism that was spreading in the United States. In 1917, at the urging of his fellow U.S. journalist Walter Lippmann, Angell had written an essay in which he called on the United States to enter the war. Now, after the Second World War, it was obvious to the convinced Atlanticist that the new political and military challenge posed by the Soviet Union could only be met by an alliance of like-minded democracies.

When negotiations on a transatlantic defense pact began in 1948, they met with Angell’s approval. Such a pact, he argued in February 1949, a few weeks before the signing of the Washington Treaty, should serve as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. He argued that if Germany had known what a high price it would have to pay for its aggression, the two world wars would probably never have happened. The same logic, he said, also applied to the Soviet Union. If Moscow was made aware of the resistance against its aggressive policies, the Third World War would not take place, either. This argument was a far cry from the pacifist ideas on which The Great Illusion was based. However, the repeatedly revised passages for the numerous new editions of this book had already indicated that his views were evolving. Pacifism, he suggested, may be based on morally noble convictions, but could lead to deeply immoral results.

For Angell, a system of collective security, as he had promoted after the First World War, still remained the best option. But just as Germany could not be integrated into such a system in the 1930s, it was equally impossible to integrate the Soviet Union into such an arrangement in the late 1940s. As much as Angell was pleased with the founding of the United Nations, he was also aware of the limits of this institution. Common security, he argued, could only be organized among like-minded nations. Hence, the new transatlantic defense community, which was enshrined in the Washington Treaty of April 1949, and which soon turned into NATO, came closer to his ideas of a system for maintaining peace than any other model. Unlike some of his pacifist admirers, Angell also understood the logic of nuclear deterrence as an instrument for preventing war. After all, the nuclear revolution meant that “the pleasures of belligerent nationalism” had become “suicidal.” Consequently, he harshly criticized the British “Campaign on Nuclear Disarmament” for instrumentalizing nuclear fears in order to pursue an unacceptable policy of “benevolent neutrality” towards the Soviet Union. The erstwhile pacifist was endorsing nuclear deterrence.

It is part of Norman Angell’s tragedy that, although he is now regarded as one of the first theorists of modern international relations, his name is still widely associated with a claim that he never made: that war had become “impossible” due to the economic interdependence of nations. Angell had instead argued that traditional wars of conquest had become economically ruinous and therefore pointless. But despite his fame and tremendous workload, he ultimately failed in his attempt to argue against what he saw as irrationality in politics and public opinion. Angell’s support for a defense community of Western democracies after the Second World War was an admission that ensuring peace and security required much more than an appeal to human reason.

See Michael Rühle, “NATO at 70: The Way Ahead, National Institute for Public Policy,” Information Series, No. 440 (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, April 18, 2019), available at https://nipp.org/information_series/ruhle-michael-nato-at-70-the-way-ahead-information-series-no-440/.

Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage, 3rd Edition (London: William Heinemann, 1911). The two most comprehensive studies on Angell and his thinking are Martin Ceadel, Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1872–1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), and J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind (London: Macmillan, 1986).

For more such praise see the further editions of “The Great Illusion.”

Strickland, Sir Norman Angell (‘Men of the Day. No. 1311, “an Angel of Peace”‘) available at (https://www.npg.org.uk/collections/search/portrait/mw260098/Sir-Norman-Angell-Men-of-the-Day-No-1311-an-Angel-of-Peace).

Quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962) p. 25.

See Philip D. Supina, “The Norman Angell Peace Campaign in Germany,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 1972), pp. 161-164.

A. T. Mahan, “The Great Illusion,” The North American Review, Vol. 195, No. 676 (March 1912), p. 322; for Angell’s reply see The North American Review, Vol. 195, No. 679 (June 1912), pp. 754-772.

Mahan, p. 332.

O. Umfrid, Der Kampf um den Boden, Die Friedens-Warte, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1911), p. 9.

C.E.M. Joad, Why War? (Harmondsworth/Middlesex: Penguin, 1939), pp. 71-72.

Life, October 2, 1913, quoted in Christopher Cerf and Victor Navasky, The Experts Speak: The Definitive Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation, 2nd edition (New York: Villard, 1998), p. 110.

Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916, Vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), pp. 327-328.

George Benson, quoted in Ceadel, op. cit., p. 282.

See “Pact Held a Bar to Soviet Inroads,” New York Times, February 22, 1949.

Norman Angell, The Steep Places. An Examination of Political Tendencies (London: Hamish Hamilton 1947), pp. 27-28.

Angell himself distinguished between the book’s critical success and its failure “to influence policies to any visible extent. It failed, moreover, in another sense: the case it tried to present not only came to be distorted in the public discussion; some of its basic ideas were turned completely upside down, and it was interpreted as advocating policies which were the exact contrary of what it did advocate.” Norman Angell, After All: The Autobiography of Norman Angell (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951), p. 150.

This Information Series is adapted from, Michael Rühle, “From Pacifism to Nuclear Deterrence: Norman Angell and the Founding of NATO,” Journal of Policy & Strategy, Vol 4, No. 1 (2024).

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

The views in this Information Series are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293- 9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit http://www.nipp.org/national-institutepress/informationseries/.

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21. Why Natural Catastrophes Will Always Be Worse than Cyber Catastrophes

Excerpts:

Cyber catastrophe risk tends to be treated as bigger than it is, the natural consequence of uncertainty over past experience. Improvements to scorekeeping show that the economic effects of cyber catastrophes are utterly manageable. Given how small they have been relative to natural disasters — the effects of which have been managed well — there is clearly precedent. The potential effects of cyber catastrophes that have been left either to guesswork or to extrapolation from thin sources ought to give way to a deeper understanding that more fully contemplates the rich history of cyber catastrophe economic loss data that has largely been ignored. While there may be a role for backstops and other means of support for economic security in the face of major cyber threats, such measures should reflect the realities of the risk.

The direct comparison to natural disasters goes a step further. We understand hurricanes and earthquakes — and lately wildfires and winter storms — as major economic events. There have been plenty of them for decades, and they have decent economic loss estimates assigned to them that have been largely accepted for as long as they’ve been published. The development of historical cyber loss estimates not only provides a reference point for cyber itself, but also allows for the natural comparison of two kinds of catastrophe. We’re starting to get to know cyber catastrophes the way we know natural disasters. It’ll take more time, but we should stop lamenting the perceived lack of data and experience and start putting what we now have to work. We may still be in the dark, but light is starting to shine through the cracks. Lewis identified an interesting and important point of comparison for cyber catastrophe, and the discussion above remains superficial compared to what is possible with further research. With more eyes on the problem, our understanding of cyber catastrophes as an economic security problem will only improve.

Why Natural Catastrophes Will Always Be Worse than Cyber Catastrophes - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Tom Johansmeyer · April 5, 2024

Cyber attacks have been characterized as “borderless” threats. The seeming lack of geographic constraint implies that one skilled hacker, presumably in a hoodie and Guy Fawkes mask, could take down the internet in its entirety. It even happened once, in 1988, with Robert Tappan Morris’ eponymous “Morris Worm.” But that was back when there wasn’t much internet to take down. A lot’s changed since then, but the fear persists — so much that the U.S. government is even contemplating a backstop mechanism for the economic effects of truly catastrophic cyber attacks. That might be a bit hasty, though. Despite the fact that cyber attacks are said to be on the rise, they’ve fallen short of the “mass effect, including casualties and destruction” described by James Lewis as a necessary feature of catastrophes. His claim that there hasn’t been a cyber catastrophe in 25 years is debatable because his definition is so strict, but its spirit is unimpeachable. Lewis’ high-level comparison of the damage from cyber events to those of natural catastrophes got my attention — in part because it’s correct and in part because nobody has taken a slightly deeper dive into the data. Having developed platforms and led teams focused on estimating the economic and insured loss consequences of both natural catastrophes and cyber attacks at the data and analytics firm Verisk, I’ve seen the differences in economic destructive power between them.

Although natural catastrophes are believed to be limited in their potential economic impact because they are confined by geography, the characteristics of such events make them much more impactful economically than their cyber counterparts. The reversibility of cyber attacks is an important part of the reason why. Damage from natural catastrophes is far more difficult to unwind. This article reflects some of my findings from recent research on how to better understand the economic damage from recent cyber catastrophes and what the size of those losses relative to the economic losses from natural disasters suggests about economic security threats via the cyber domain in general. The findings can inform discussions about a federal backstop for cyber catastrophes. Given that the effects of natural disasters have been so much more severe and pronounced than those from cyber, it is clear that the economic losses from cyber events should be relatively absorbable.

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By the Numbers

One of the reasons why cyber catastrophes and their economic effects are so often misunderstood is that the sector lacks a reliable scorekeeper. There’s no easy place to go to find out how much cyber catastrophes have cost over the years, which were the most expensive, and whether there have been pockets of unexpectedly high loss activity. For natural disasters, the situation is much different. We understand the effects of hurricanes and earthquakes, for example, because we have plenty of data from reliable. Munich Re NatCatSERVICE and Swiss Re sigma are robust databases covering both economic and insured losses for natural catastrophe events and offer half a century of history. The databases come from the two largest reinsurance companies in the world. They are not just resources for the insurance community, but also for broader research purposes, and they are well respected in both commercial and academic communities.

Munich Re NatCatSERVICE collects data from a wide range sources — to include “government agencies, scientific institutes, associations, the insurance industry, the media, and other publicly available sources” — and uses it to develop estimates of insurance industry and economic losses from natural disasters using the company’s in-house data and expertise. The methodology used by Swiss Re for sigma is largely similar, with economic loss estimates culled from publicly available sources, although some estimates are calculated using data the company collects through the normal course of its reinsurance business. The data from these sources has been accepted widely for both academic and research use, not to mention robust adoption by other stakeholders. For cyber events, it’s not so easy. There is no equivalent to Munich Re NatCatSERVICE or Swiss Re sigma. Overall, there has been little to consult for past events, which has fueled the belief that there is little in the past to consider.

I first started looking into the economic losses associated with cyber catastrophes in 2019, when I published an informal collection of historical losses, and I updated that list in an article published four years later on the principle of reversibilityin cyber attacks. For both pieces, the data set was incidental to their core purposes — a helpful resource, but not the result of a disciplined, rigorous research effort.

Since then, my conversations in policy, security, and insurance circles have increasingly made clear the need for a historical data set on the economic losses from cyber catastrophes. Not only would the reference point be useful, but it would also address the belief that there’s no relevant precedent for cyber catastrophes. The past exercises offer a decent starting point for formal and more rigorous data collection and analysis. The process I developed and implemented isn’t all that different from those used by Munich Re and Swiss Re, relying on publicly available data qualitative analysis of economic loss estimates to determine the best estimate for each historical event.

I found 21 cyber catastrophe events since 1998 with attendant economic losses adding up to a total of $310.4 billion. The reporting standard I’ve employed isn’t as severe as Lewis’ in that it doesn’t require mass injury or physical damage. It does, however, require mass impact. An attack on a single company, like Equifax, isn’t a catastrophe, even if the economic loss is comfortably above the threshold. In Property Claim Services (PCS) parlance, an event would have to affect a “significant number” of companies. Finally, the economic threshold for an event to qualify is $800 million, adjusted to 2023 for inflation at 3 percent per year.

Absent any context, these big numbers may seem meaningful. The total of $310 billion breaks down to $12.4 billion per year, with 2003 alone showing nearly $120 billion in aggregate economic loss from cyber catastrophes. At the time, some even felt the high estimates being publicized were unnecessarily alarmist. Interestingly, they likely were neither alarmist nor exaggerated. When compared to the economic impacts of natural disasters during the same period, the economic effects of cyber catastrophes don’t seem terribly catastrophic.

From 1998 to 2021, the last year for which data is available on the platform, sigma puts aggregate economic losses from natural disasters at approximately $4.3 trillion. That’s nearly 14 times the size of aggregate cyber catastrophe economic losses during the same period. The total cyber catastrophe loss is roughly the size of the economic loss from the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011. The economic losses from natural disasters in 2005, which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, reached $326.1 billion. The difference in scale makes natural disasters and cyber catastrophes almost literally incomparable.

This probably feels counterintuitive. Cyber attacks are borderless, right? WannaCry is believed to have infected computers in around 150 countries, yet it only caused economic losses of $4 billion. Meanwhile, Hurricane Ian was largely limited to Florida and the Carolinas, and it led to economic losses of around $100 billion. If it feels like something isn’t adding up, it’s because we’ve been looking at these two threats the wrong way. What matters most is reversibility — i.e., how easy it is to undo the damage from an event.

Damage Undone

When it comes to disaster, reach is far less important than physical impact. Lewis noted that mass physical damage from cyber events hasn’t been realized, and the contrary is observably true for natural disasters. Reversibility is an important and often overlooked aspect of physical impact, as it defines the longevity of damage. Small-arms damage, for example, is generally reversible, while nuclear attacks are not. Cyber attacks have been demonstrably reversible, given their transitory nature. U.S. institutions and communities have become quite adept at reversing the damage from natural disasters, but their widespread physical impact makes the process much slower and labor-intensive than remediation after cyber attacks. A comparison of two events makes this clear.

In 2015, a cyber attack on the power grid affected 230,000 people in Ukraine. Due to what has often been characterized as an act of cyber war (a questionable use of that expression at best), the lights were out for as long as six hours. This came as part of a wave of cyber attacks on the grid in 2015 and 2016, none of which had any further meaningful impact. The 2015 cyber attack-induced blackout tends to be seen as the “success story” for offensive cyber against power grids, even despite the lack of sustained impact. Natural catastrophes, on the other hand, have had no trouble depriving millions of people of access to electricity for days at a time. One of the most interesting cases for closer study, though, is Hurricane Ida.

Hurricane Ida challenges the belief that natural catastrophes, due to geographical constraint, are limited in their potential impacts. First, the storm was hardly limited by geography. It made landfall in Louisiana and ultimately affected more than a dozen states directly or indirectly before leaving the northeastern United States in its wake. The overall economic loss from the storm exceeded $65 billion, according to Munich Re NatCatSERVICE. Yet, you don’t need to view the storm as a whole to understand the challenges associated with reversibility.

Let’s go back to Louisiana, where 1.1 million people went without power for more than a week. Compared to the 2015 cyber attack in Ukraine, the depth and breadth of the outage is incredible. However, the week-long outage should be seen as brief, given the effort required to bring the lights back. Hurricane Ida “destroyed more than 22,000 power poles, 26,000 spans of wire and 5,261 transformers — that’s more poles damaged or destroyed than hurricanes Katrina, Zeta and Delta combined.” Cyber catastrophes could thus be seen as more geographically constrained than natural catastrophes, when viewed from the perspective of remediation efforts. The need to engage directly with what has been damaged is far more concentrated. The relative speed and ease with which cyber catastrophe damage can be reversed appears to have created an upper limit for economic effect, while the need to go out and fix broken equipment after a natural disaster necessarily takes more time, people, and expense.

Neither a Cyber Andrew nor a Cyber 9/11

Past results don’t matter, of course, when the “Big One” is right around the corner. Yet, such an event would have to be of seeming unimaginable magnitude, given not just the size of past losses but the fact that their economic effects have largely been forgotten. In the insurance industry, the ghost of Hurricane Andrew is often summoned. The society-changing cyber attack that many fear is often referred to as “Hurricane Andrew of cyber.” Hurricane Andrew was massive. If it happened today, the storm would cost the insurance industry approximately $100 billion, suggesting the economic loss would likely approach $300 billion. The event resulted in 11 insurer insolvencies and cost 44 people their lives.

More relevant to cyber catastrophe risk, Hurricane Andrew changed behavior. If it were to happen today, the financial impacts — to the insurance industry and society as a whole — would be more easily absorbed through increased risk management sophistication and deeper pools of capital. Hurricane Andrew also led to the mainstreaming of catastrophe models. The terror attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 had a similar effect. They changed how insurers and reinsurers view and analyze political violence risk and led to increased actuarial and modeling rigor. The most prominent development, though, was the development of a terror insurance backstop.

The Terrorist Risk Insurance Act provided support for an insurance industry reeling from a profoundly expensive loss event and filled an important economic security gap for society. Perhaps the best indicator of the success of the backstop is that insurance is widely available, suggesting that the backstop served its purpose by giving the industry breathing room to come back into the sector. The notion of a similar solution for the cyber insurance sector has been raised, but the situation is much different from the cases of Hurricane Andrew and the Sept. 11 terror attacks.

First, there has been no transformative cyber attack. If scale alone were sufficient, then one could argue the Andrew of cyber likely came in 2003 or 2004, whether as a single event or pocket of peak activity. Beyond scale, interest in improved cyber catastrophe models has come mostly from potential capital providers, not from a necessary sea change in threat or loss activity. There hasn’t been a loss large enough yet to rethink the risk. And it seems that such a loss is itself unlikely.

Speculation has filled the gap left by experience, with fantastical cyber catastrophe scenarios offered for contemplation. One recent example is the prospect of a $3.5 trillion scenario recently published by insurance marketplace Lloyd’s of London. Even with that economic impact spread across five years, the case strains credulity. It would require a single event more than 10 times larger than all cyber catastrophes of the past 25 years and more than 80 percent of the cost of 23 years of natural disaster losses. To hedge for such an unrealistic possibility is to divert resources and focus from where they could be more productive.

A Dose of Reality

Cyber catastrophe risk tends to be treated as bigger than it is, the natural consequence of uncertainty over past experience. Improvements to scorekeeping show that the economic effects of cyber catastrophes are utterly manageable. Given how small they have been relative to natural disasters — the effects of which have been managed well — there is clearly precedent. The potential effects of cyber catastrophes that have been left either to guesswork or to extrapolation from thin sources ought to give way to a deeper understanding that more fully contemplates the rich history of cyber catastrophe economic loss data that has largely been ignored. While there may be a role for backstops and other means of support for economic security in the face of major cyber threats, such measures should reflect the realities of the risk.

The direct comparison to natural disasters goes a step further. We understand hurricanes and earthquakes — and lately wildfires and winter storms — as major economic events. There have been plenty of them for decades, and they have decent economic loss estimates assigned to them that have been largely accepted for as long as they’ve been published. The development of historical cyber loss estimates not only provides a reference point for cyber itself, but also allows for the natural comparison of two kinds of catastrophe. We’re starting to get to know cyber catastrophes the way we know natural disasters. It’ll take more time, but we should stop lamenting the perceived lack of data and experience and start putting what we now have to work. We may still be in the dark, but light is starting to shine through the cracks. Lewis identified an interesting and important point of comparison for cyber catastrophe, and the discussion above remains superficial compared to what is possible with further research. With more eyes on the problem, our understanding of cyber catastrophes as an economic security problem will only improve.

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Tom Johansmeyer is a POLIR Ph.D. candidate at the University of Kent, Canterbury. Based in Bermuda, where he also works in the reinsurance industry, he was previously the head of Property Claim Services (PCS) at data/analytics firm Verisk, which provides data on industry-wide insured loss events for both natural and man-made disaster events. In this role, he developed the first such tools for global cyber risk. Tom proudly pushed paper in the U.S. Army in the late 1990s, and if you were in the 2nd Infantry Division in 1998, you might have bugged him for your reassignment orders.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Tom Johansmeyer · April 5, 2024

22. Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

Excerpts:

The PDI request for this year is $9.9 billion — more than $800 million over last year’s. But up until soon before the Pentagon released its FY25 budget request, it wasn’t, according to the first defense official and a congressional aide.

To show the Pentagon was focused on the threat from China, defense leaders tagged more items under the initiative at the last minute to raise its dollar figure, the first defense source and a congressional aide told Defense News. Among the late entries was the drone program Replicator.

At the recent March hearing, a member of Congress asked Ratner whether the $9.9 billion includes everything the Pentagon needs “for the PDI to be as effective as possible.”

“Congresswoman,” Ratner responded, “the PDI is simply an accounting mechanism.”

Pacific problems: Why the US disagrees on the cost of deterring China

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 3, 2024

In 2020, Mac Thornberry wanted to answer two questions: How much is the U.S. spending to prevent a war with China, and is it enough?

These were difficult, even for the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. And he wasn’t the only one asking. Thornberry often traveled to Asia, where U.S. allies had the same questions. Thornberry didn’t know what to tell them.

“What do we have to offer?” he said.

For two years, Congress had asked the Pentagon for a report on how much extra money it needed for the Pacific region, but never received one. So Congress demanded one.

“The attitude was, tell us what you need and we’ll try to help,” Thornberry said during a recent interview. “Well, if they’re not going to tell us, then we’re going to tell them.”

The defense policy bill for fiscal 2021 — named for Thornberry, who was retiring — created the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, a new section of the defense budget. PDI had two goals: to push the Pentagon to spend more on the region and to make that money easier to track.

Four years later, PDI has done only one of those two things, according to experts. It has certainly made China-focused defense spending more transparent, but it hasn’t driven much new spending on the Pacific. In fact, the part of America’s defense budget created to help deter a war with China has no actual money.

“Your priorities are always better reflected in your budget rather than in your rhetoric,” Thornberry said.

Whether those two areas match up may be the most important question in American defense policy right now. The last three administrations have decided China is America’s top threat, and a rising one at that. But it’s less clear how much money it will cost to address it and who gets to decide — Congress, the Pentagon or military leaders in the Pacific?

“I don’t think that we are somehow dangerously short of funding for the Indo-Pacific, whether it’s PDI or not,” Rep. Ed Case, D-Hawaii, who sits on the House Appropriations Committee’s defense panel, told Defense News in February.

“We’re going in the right direction, but the question is: Are we going there fast enough?”

A second opinion

This was the question that led to PDI.

In 2021, the head of Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Phil Davidson, was in Washington ahead of his planned retirement to testify before Congress. Davidson hadn’t appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee in two years due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Early on, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., presented a set of charts during a short call and response. Wicker read a list projecting the number of Chinese and American weapons in the region by 2025, asking Davidson to check his numbers.

Three Chinese aircraft carriers to America’s one. Six Chinese amphibious assault ships to America’s two. Fifty-four Chinese combat ships to America’s six.

The admiral confirmed each one.

“Our conventional deterrent is actually eroding in the region,” Davidson said.

What concerned him most was not that Beijing had a more powerful military overall; it was a problem of speed and distance. Taiwan — which the Chinese government considers a rogue province and has threatened to take back by force — is about 100 miles from the mainland. It’s more than 5,000 miles from Hawaii, the headquarters of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

It would take three weeks for the U.S. to rush ships to the area from the West Coast, and around 17 days to do so from Alaska, Davidson estimated. If China launched a rapid invasion, it might overwhelm Taiwan before the U.S. had a chance to arrive.

A soldier launches an American-made TOW 2A missile during a live-fire exercise in Pingtung County, Taiwan, on July 3, 2023. (Sam Yeh/AFP via Getty Images)

“The important factor here is time,” he said.

Davidson’s answer, and that of many committee members, was to push America’s forces closer to Taiwan — the military version of a full-court press. But the U.S. didn’t yet have the necessary infrastructure in place. It would need to construct bases, airfields, radars and other buildings along the Pacific islands that arc around Taiwan.

And this would cost money — lots of money.

PDI was, at first, meant to be the source of that money. To understand why, it’s important to understand how the Pentagon writes its budget.

The process depends mostly on the military services — in particular the Army, Navy and Air Force. These services hold about four-fifths of defense spending each year and direct where that money goes.

Their incentives are different from those of the seven geographic combatant commands, who carry out America’s military goals around the world. Given their roles, the commands often focus on shorter-term needs. Hence, the services often don’t fund everything the combatant commands want.

To lawmakers, the gap seemed especially wide in the Pacific, where China has spent the last two decades upgrading its military.

Noticing this problem, lawmakers as far back as Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., in 2017 wanted to fund Indo-Pacific Command’s goals with a separate account — something Thornberry also later supported.

It didn’t come together until three years later. In May 2020, the chair and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee announced plans for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative that would reassure U.S. allies and improve its forces.

It had five goals: to improve presence, logistics, exercises, infrastructure and the strength of partners in the Pacific. The bill also added a voice to the budgeting process. Indo-Pacific Command would now give Congress an annual second opinion on America’s military needs in the region.

There was, however, a structural problem. The lawmakers that created PDI didn’t actually get any money for it. The policy bill named for Thornberry gave the Pentagon about $2 billion in authority for the effort but not permission to spend it. That would’ve required a signoff from the defense appropriations committees, who control the nation’s purse.

Those committees balk at initiatives like PDI, according to multiple congressional aides, because passing them makes it harder to write a defense budget — the same reason it’s harder to write a recipe when someone else decides your shopping list.

U.S. Army soldiers and Indonesia airborne troops conduct a joint forcible entry operation at Baturaja Training Area on Aug. 4, 2021. (Staff Sgt. Thomas Calvert/U.S. Army)

“The hope was for the following year that the appropriations and the budget would match,” said Kimberly Lehn, a former aide on the House Armed Services Committee who helped write the PDI legislation.

That didn’t happen, and by the time Davidson testified before Congress a year later, the initiative had become an accounting drill.

Think about it like a home improvement fund. If you want an upgrade — say, a nicer kitchen — then you have two options: Earn more money or spend less money elsewhere. Instead, PDI was, and still is, implemented in reverse. Each year, the Pentagon builds its budget and then reviews it to see what contributes to deterrence in the Pacific. It then labels that as PDI and highlights the total number in its budget request.

“It reflects their decisions, it doesn’t drive their decisions,” said Dustin Walker, a former Senate Armed Services Committee aide who helped write the PDI legislation and now works at the drone-maker Anduril.

‘Free chicken’

This was not the model PDI’s authors had in mind.

“It started basically as a straight copycat of [the] European Deterrence Initiative,” Walker said, referring to an effort that stemmed from Russia’s 2014 seizure and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.

The Obama administration wanted to show commitment to NATO allies rattled by war on the continent. The government did so within months using what it originally dubbed the European Reassurance Initiative.

Russian soldiers patrol outside the naval headquarters in Simferopol on March 19, 2014. Russia's Constitutional Court unanimously backed President Vladimir Putin's move to make Crimea part of Russia. (Filippo Monteforte/AFP via Getty Images)

U.S. forces in Europe had declined for decades after the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s — down to about 62,000 personnel by 2016. The smaller size made sense in Europe given there were fewer needs for America’s military muscle. But Russia’s invasion showed how far readiness had fallen, said Tod Wolters, the former head of U.S. European Command.

With the European Deterrence Initiative, the administration wanted to bulk up.

“We knew that we could not go back to Cold War status, with the number of forces that were going to be in the theater. So the question became: How do we make sure that we can rapidly deploy combat power?” said Al Viana, who works in European Command’s force structure and requirements office.

This became the focus of EDI, whose name changed in 2018 when it became clear Russia’s military activities in the region weren’t coming to an end. From 2015 to 2023, the U.S. spent $35 billion on the effort to empower allies and ensure its own forces were more agile. The second goal required funding to run more exercises, rotate more troops, improve infrastructure and store important equipment on the continent.

By the end of fiscal 2014, European Command had dissolved two heavy combat brigades. However, EDI helped rebuild those forces — deferring cuts to Air Force personnel, supporting a combat aviation brigade and making sure the Army had an armored brigade combat team rotating through the theater. In FY16, the Army’s forces in Europe conducted 26 total exercises per year. By 2023, that number was around 50.

In 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. surged 20,000 extra personnel to Europe. That included an armored brigade combat team — including about 4,000 personnel, 90 tanks and more than 200 other vehicles — which arrived within a week from notification. Without those stocks already stored in the theater, it would’ve taken between four and six weeks, according to U.S. Army Europe and Africa.

“EDI is the place to go and see exactly what we’re doing,” Viana said.

The two initiatives’ different fates come almost entirely down to money. EDI was paid for through an account called overseas contingency operations, more commonly referred to as OCO (pronounced like “cocoa”). That fund started for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, supplementing the annual Pentagon budget.

“EDI was easy because you weren’t fighting with a service,” a senior defense official told Defense News, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the individual was not permitted to talk to the press. “It was free chicken.”

By the start of this decade, Congress had soured on OCO, partly because the Pentagon used it to dodge some budget cuts it faced in the 2010s. Lawmakers called it a slush fund.

This meant the Pacific Deterrence Initiative didn’t get any extra funding. The European counterpart transitioned away from supplemental money in fiscal 2022, and its funding amounts since then have steadily dropped.

Amphibious armored vehicles attached to a brigade of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps make their way to a beach during maritime amphibious assault training in China's Guangdong province on Aug. 17, 2019. (Yan Jialuo and Yao Guanchen/Chinese Defense Ministry)

The result is that many items Indo-Pacific Command lists in its annual report to Congress — the things the command says it needs to maintain its strength in the region — aren’t funded. So the command just resubmits those unfunded priorities on top of additional needs in the next year’s report. Hence, each year’s dollar amount snowballs.

When Davidson testified before Congress in 2021, his report listed $4.7 billion in requirements. This year, the number was $26.5 billion — $11 billion of which is unfunded. The bulk of that $11 billion would go to construction costs — much higher in the Pacific than on the U.S. homeland — and munitions.

“Our demand signal has been consistent,” George Ka’iliwai, the director of requirements and resources at the command, said in a March interview. “It is what it is because they are our requirements.”

The Pentagon has questioned some of Indo-Pacific Command’s priorities and whether they’re possible to carry out, even with funding. Infrastructure projects, for example, sometimes require negotiations with the host government as well as expensive labor and material costs. Only about a fifth of Indo-Pacific Command’s desired construction projects appear in the FY25 budget request, Ka’iliwai said.

Since its first report, the command has said the missile defense architecture of Guam — a U.S. territory crucial to the military’s Pacific posture — is its top goal. Others, such as infrastructure on Pacific islands or a secure network to communicate with allies, have also appeared each year.

PDI “doesn’t come close to scratching the itch,” the defense source said.

‘Trade-offs’

There are a few paths forward. One of them would see Congress give Indo-Pacific Command new money each year, like the account McCain sought in 2017.

There are lawmakers, such as Hawaii’s Case, who support that. But the appropriations committees don’t, and it’s unlikely that will change in the short term, according to multiple congressional aides.

Another option is in the Pentagon’s control. At the start of the budgeting process, department leaders could reserve money for the command’s priorities and build everything else around it. That would resemble how the deputy defense secretary is funding two signature initiatives: the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve, which helps accelerate prototyping; and Replicator, an effort to buy drones faster.

But these programs are loose change compared to what the command says it needs — hundreds of millions of dollars compared to more than $11 billion in unfunded priorities.

The way PDI works now is important, according to another senior defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic. The official argued that a different model for the initiative would make it more difficult for the Defense Department to plan and budget.

“The department has the best ability to find the right trade-offs,” the official said.

Points of view

Three years after Davidson testified, his successor stepped into a House hearing room this March.

“The risk is still high, and it is trending in the wrong direction,” Adm. John Aquilino noted in his opening statement, later adding that the Pacific is the most dangerous he’s ever seen it.

Sitting next to him, Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, was more hopeful, citing higher spending and the administration’s “historic momentum” with allies in the region.

The higher spending is easier to see with PDI, which has charted large increases in funding over the last four years. Whether the initiative is working depends on whether you look at the Pacific through the eyes of Ratner or Aquilino. Both agree war isn’t imminent, but they’re split on whether deterrence is getting better or worse.

If it’s eroding, as Davidson argued in 2021, then PDI’s current model may not be enough. If the region is more stable, then the initiative looks better too.

The biggest misconception about PDI, according to the second defense official, is that the Pentagon doesn’t take it seriously.

“This is not a gradual slope of increase,” the official said of Pacific funding. “This is a significant and dramatic increase in investment, and we are more committed than ever.”

The PDI request for this year is $9.9 billion — more than $800 million over last year’s. But up until soon before the Pentagon released its FY25 budget request, it wasn’t, according to the first defense official and a congressional aide.

To show the Pentagon was focused on the threat from China, defense leaders tagged more items under the initiative at the last minute to raise its dollar figure, the first defense source and a congressional aide told Defense News. Among the late entries was the drone program Replicator.

At the recent March hearing, a member of Congress asked Ratner whether the $9.9 billion includes everything the Pentagon needs “for the PDI to be as effective as possible.”

“Congresswoman,” Ratner responded, “the PDI is simply an accounting mechanism.”

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · April 3, 2024

23. War Books: Not Just What You Read, But How You Read

This is not your typical reading list. There are some good books and good advice in this essay.

How to think, write, and live.

War Books: Not Just What You Read, But How You Read - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jacob Olidort · April 5, 2024

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Editor’s note: Welcome to another installment of our weekly War Books series! The premise is simple and straightforward. We invite a participant to recommend five books and tell us what sets each one apart. War Books is a resource for MWI readers who want to learn more about important subjects related to modern war and are looking for books to add to their reading lists.

For this installment, a version of which was published previously in 2019, Jacob Olidort explains why professional reading isn’t just a matter of reading the right books. It’s also about reading them the right way.

Books on How to Think

One of my most humbling experiences came shortly after receiving my doctorate in Islamic intellectual history when I read a newly released 600-page book, with original translations from a dozen languages, and carrying the simple title of What is Islam? As I had studied with its author, Shahab Ahmed, I correctly expected the book to be, as one reviewer put it, “not merely field changing, but the boldest and best thing I have read in any field.” Like its author, the book embraces rather than ignores contradictions, and pushes readers to question deeply their assumptions and frameworks for analyzing—in this case, per the book’s subtitle, what it means to be “Islamic” and why that label is meaningful to adepts. For me personally and professionally, reading a book centered on such a seemingly basic question after just having finished a doctorate on the topic could not have been better timed. In particular, as I entered the fast-paced world of policymaking and media headlines and the marketplace of “experts,” the book was both a reminder to be, and a tool for being, humble about what I know and don’t know, challenging assumptions and correctly framing data to accurately reflect phenomena for an informed but inexpert community.

Besides being a landmark work in my field, the work therefore became part of my curriculum of books on how to think—specifically, how to critically analyze and synthesize information, how to bring different perspectives together for a correct understanding, and how to ask the right questions of situations and information you are given. The fields of national security and foreign policy require such thinking, and in short time, and few individuals do this effectively. Among works in this genre are Ernest May and Richard Neustadt’s Thinking in Time, Gregory Treverton’s Intelligence for an Age of Terror and and Jacob Shapiro’s

A subset of works on thinking are works on strategy—a favorite Washington word that is used to such an extent that, to paraphrase Lawrence Freedman (who literally wrote the history of strategy), can mean everything and therefore can mean nothing. For the purposes of my reading list, strategy is a way of thinking for decision-making. In addition to Freedman’s Strategy, I have benefitted from works by Thomas Schelling (The Strategy of Conflict and Arms and Influence) and Colin Gray.

Books on How to Write

Aside from mastery of substance and thinking, part of the job of being an expert (especially if one cares to be a useful, and therefore good, expert) is the ability to communicate. In particular, writing for decision-makers requires brevity, correct word choice, and an ability to anticipate what a decision-maker knows already so as to cut to the chase faster. A BLUF (bottom line up front) or executive summaries serves that function in the organization of a piece of writing. But assuming an important person is also a voracious reader (why else would she or he read your work in the first place?) and may decide to continue reading the entirety of what you wrote, you had better be sure what you wrote is what you meant to say and—if it is on a topic with policy relevance—that anything written is fair game to be taken as actionable policy guidance.

In his Stephen King emphasizes that there is no better or more effective way to learn how to write well than to read good writing. (Another added plus is that you can assume good writing is something senior decision-makers read and will give an additional insight into their frames of reference). Some authors and titles I would recommend in this genre (some of whom King recommends in the list of books that helped him write) include Blood Meridian and The Road by Cormac McCarthy, John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath and East of Eden, Jack Kerouac’s On the Road, John Updike’s Rabbit series, Vladimir Nabokov’s Paul Auster’s Leon Wieseltier’s Kaddish, Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler . . ., Philip Roth’s American Pastoral and Goodbye Columbus, and Cynthia Ozick’s

Books on How to Live

This section heading may be misleading, so a word of clarification. Far from how-to self-help guides, what I mean by “how to live” works are books written by individuals who have lived big (not necessarily long) lives and who have lessons to impart. A big life does not necessarily mean one of fame (although some have achieved this too) but rather one that includes a range of experiences, often difficult ones. There tend to be few books in this genre since there have been comparatively few truly big moments in history (whether tragic or great), few who have survived to describe them, and still fewer who have described them well. This rare coincidence means that books on how to live are both those on how to think and how to write, but are also much more. It is also this category of books that are the ones worth rereading.

At the top of my list would be the Memoirs and Selected Letters of Ulysses S. Grant (and, as a compendium volume, I would recommend Ronald White’s biography, American Ulysses). It is difficult to read his memoirs and think that this was a work written from a place of deep desperation and in a short period of time. The hero of the Appomattox and former president of the United States found himself penniless and racing against time as he battled throat cancer at the end of his life. And yet Grant was able to reach far into the details of his early travels and his campaign plans to reveal an individual who cared deeply for the human condition and making correct decisions in difficult situations. One favorite example is his vivid description of the first bullfight he witnessed while serving in the Mexican War, and his impression of the “sickening” sight, writing, “I could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions.”

Other works in this category I would recommend are Winston Churchill’s The Second World War and his River War, Seneca’s Letters from a Stoic, Primo Levi’s Periodic Table and If This is a Man, Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, David McCullough’s The Wright Brothers, and Wislawa Szymborska’s

Dr. Jacob Olidort is the director of research at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy. A former nonresident fellow at the Modern War Institute, he previously taught at American University and George Washington University and has served in a variety of national security roles across the US government.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Christa Lohman

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jacob Olidort · April 5, 2024

24. Marco Rubio: TikTok Parent Company Poses a National Security Threat

Marco Rubio: TikTok Parent Company Poses a National Security Threat

Newsweek · by Marco Rubio · April 3, 2024

Recently, a constituent emailed my office about TikTok. "I have not as yet seen evidence that the app poses security risks," he wrote. I hear this a lot from Americans skeptical of Congress' bill to require TikTok to cut ties with its Chinese parent company, ByteDance.

Lawmakers have a responsibility to respond directly to this and other concerns, because forcing a company to divest has serious implications. My response is this: ByteDance isn't a normal company. The evidence is clear that the Chinese Communist Party uses it to manipulate and spy on Americans through TikTok.

For one, the Chinese Communist Party controls ByteDance by law. In 2017, China's legislature required "all organizations and citizens" to "support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts." This means Beijing can command ByteDance to turn over Americans' TikTok data or modify the algorithm TikTok uses to manipulate American public opinion.

The connections between ByteDance and the Chinese Communist Party don't end there, though. The tech giant is closely involved with China's security forces. In 2019, ByteDance and China's Ministry of Public Security agreed to a plan of strategic cooperation to spread propaganda and strengthen China's "national security matrix" through ByteDance's platforms.

ByteDance has also been working to build artificial intelligence for the Chinese Communist Party's armed wing. In 2018, the company created the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence, which collaborates with Chinese universities to amplify China's supercomputing capabilities. These efforts are affiliated with both the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology and the People's Liberation Army.

When you look at who runs ByteDance, the line between the company and the regime gets even blurrier. After China banned an early version of TikTok in 2018, ByteDance founder Zhang Yiming groveled to Beijing, promising to embrace and spread "socialist core values." Today, ByteDance's chief editor, deputy chief editor, and vice president of government relations are all members of the Chinese Communist Party and/or the United Front system. The Chinese government also owns a "golden share" of a key ByteDance subsidiary, allowing a former government official to control the entire board.

ByteDance's business partners, meanwhile, are some of the most notorious human-rights offenders and military-linked companies in China. In fact, the U.S. government blacklists iFLYTEK, Megvii, and SenseTime—all of which have partnered with ByteDance—for enabling Beijing's genocide against Uyghur Muslims and other ethnic and religious groups. Another ByteDance partner, Sugon, is blacklisted for "helping the Chinese military do nuclear weapons simulation testing and hypersonic glide vehicle testing."

This illustration photograph taken on October 30, 2023, shows the logo of TikTok, a short-form video hosting service owned by ByteDance, on a smartphone in Mulhouse, eastern France. This illustration photograph taken on October 30, 2023, shows the logo of TikTok, a short-form video hosting service owned by ByteDance, on a smartphone in Mulhouse, eastern France. SEBASTIEN BOZON / AFP/Getty Images

What does this all have to do with TikTok? It shows that TikTok's parent company, the company that controls TikTok's algorithm and accesses TikTok user data, is working hand in hand with an adversarial regime and its military-industrial complex. China's military doesn't exist to enrich or strengthen America, and neither do the companies it partners with.

There is also abundant evidence that TikTok and ByteDance have already spied on American journalists, stolen Americans' sensitive financial data, and interfered in America's political process. Meanwhile, the evidence keeps mounting that ByteDance manipulates TikTok's algorithm to influence what users see—and what they don't see.

Recent analysis shows there is a more than six-to-one ratio of pro-Israel content on Instagram versus TikTok, despite the apps' comparable user bases. If TikTok were truly a neutral platform for free speech, that ratio would surely be smaller. Things get even worse when you consider political topics that are more sensitive to Beijing. There is nearly 82 times more Tiananmen Square content on Instagram than there is on TikTok.

This perfectly matches what the Chinese Communist Party says it wants to do with the app. As the Jamestown Foundation reports, Party members have, at various times, called for TikTok's use to "precisely grasp the cognitive orientation of target users/audiences" in the United States in order to "fight the war of public opinion well" and "construct the Party's image" in a positive light.

Set aside what my colleagues and I were told during a classified briefing. This publicly available information tells a damning story about ByteDance's ownership of American social media. It's no surprise China has declared TikTok's algorithm a "protected technology," blocking foreign scrutiny, while TikTok itself has prevented researchers from analyzing its material systematically.

To all those who asked me about this, here's the bottom line: ByteDance should not be allowed to curate your video feeds. Our laws prohibit foreign nations from controlling television and radio stations, so we shouldn't tolerate our greatest adversary pulling the strings on TikTok, from which a third of Americans under 30 reportedly get their news.

Marco Rubio, a Republican, is a United States Senator from Florida.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Uncommon Knowledge

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

Newsweek · by Marco Rubio · April 3, 2024

25. Gen Z is embracing dictatorships

Gen Z is embracing dictatorships

Newsweek · by James Bickerton · April 5, 2024

Generation Z Americans, aged from 18-25, are substantially more likely than older generations to support a "strong leader" who rules without regard for Congress or courts, according to a survey conducted exclusively for Newsweek.

The poll also found younger Americans are the most prepared to give up "some democratic powers" if it results in more effective government and are less likely to think military rule would be bad for the country.

It comes amid growing concern about the health of American democracy following the contested 2020 presidential election, with one prominent political scientist telling Newsweek the country is "at a crossroads between democracy and autocracy."

Over the past few months both Joe Biden and Donald Trump, the presumptive Democratic and Republican candidates respectively for the 2024 presidential election, have suggested the other represents a threat to democracy. Biden in January claimed the 2024 presidential election is "all about" whether American democracy survives while last month Trump said "I don't think you're going to have another election in this country" unless he wins in November.

Generation Z Americans are substantially more likely than older generations to support a "strong leader" who rules without regard for Congress or courts according to a new survey conducted exclusively for Newsweek. Generation Z Americans are substantially more likely than older generations to support a "strong leader" who rules without regard for Congress or courts according to a new survey conducted exclusively for Newsweek. Photo-illustration by Newsweek/Getty

Redfield & Wilton Strategies polled 1,500 eligible voters across the U.S. for Newsweek on February 10. In total 40 percent of Gen Z Americans agreed that "rule by a strong leader, where a strong leader can make decisions without interference from the legislature or from the courts" would be a good system of government for the U.S., versus 27 percent who thought it would be bad.

Among millennials, aged 27-42, 35 percent endorsed this type of government against 31 percent who were opposed. Notably a majority of Generation X, aged 43-58, and those from the boomer and silent generations, aged 59 and over, were opposed to such authoritarian leadership.

In total 30 percent of Gen X Americans said "rule by a strong leader" who can ignore Congress and the courts would be good for the country, against 43 percent who thought it would be bad. Among the boomer and silent generations just 18 percent thought this would be good, against 60 percent for bad.

Separately, 51 percent of Gen Z agreed with the statement that they would be "willing to give up some democratic powers if it made government function more effectively" against just 17 percent who were opposed. The statement was also backed by millennials, with 42 percent agreeing and 24 percent disagreeing.

However, the statement was opposed by 34 percent of Gen Z and 53 percent of boomers/silent generation, against 29 percent and 20 percent, respectively, who supported it.

Speaking to Newsweek Joel Westheimer, an expert in democratic ideals at the University of Ottawa, said youth discontent with American democracy is likely a response to increased partisanship and deadlock in Congress and the threat from climate change.

He said: "When we tally what an allegedly democratic system of governance has delivered for young people, it may seem unsurprising that their commitments to the system that previous generations took for granted are shaky.

"While many youth and young adults were coming of age as observers of the political scene, democratic governance did not seem to be working very well: In 2013 and 2018, an increasingly partisan and dysfunctional U.S. Congress, unable to compromise or pass legislation, led to government shutdowns of 16 and 35 days, respectively; climate change threatens to make the planet virtually uninhabitable, and, globally, government actions to mitigate the threat have been mostly dysfunctional."

Westheimer added: "The decline of commitments to democracy, especially among young people, keeps me up at night. It is not hyperbole to suggest that we are at a crossroads between democracy and autocracy for both America and many once-stable democracies around the globe."

Cynthia Arnson, a distinguished fellow at the Wilson Center think tank, said the new poll supports what other surveys have shown about youth support for democracy in the Americas.

She said: "The U.S. polling tracks with results from throughout the Americas, where support for democracy is especially low among young people and those with lower levels of education. In Latin America especially, young people born after the transition from dictatorship to democracy have no direct memory of the abuses of authoritarian regimes.

"In the United States, to be honest, the current levels of political dysfunction give young people little reason to be enthusiastic about a democratic system. What they see is gridlock, political theater, name-calling, brinksmanship. This is the opposite of getting things done and producing results that people care about.

"The catch, however, is that young people might not realize how difficult it is to restore rights once they've been relinquished."

The Redfield & Wilton Strategies poll also found significantly higher opposition to the idea of military rule among older generations.

When asked whether they thought "rule by the military" would be a "good or bad system of government for the United States," 26 percent of Gen Z answered "good" against 39 percent for "bad." Among millennials 27 percent replied "good" versus 44 percent for "bad."

Older age groups were noticeably more hostile to military rule, with 15 percent of Gen X saying military rule would be good, while 63 percent thought it would be bad. For boomers/silent generation just 9 percent said it would be good, against 73 percent for bad.

Speaking to Newsweek Professor Barbara Wejnert, a sociologist and expert in global democracy at the University at Buffalo, suggested Gen Z is more hostile towards what it views as dysfunctional government rather than democracy itself.

She said: "Seeing the polarization and stalemate in our House of Representatives, almost not passed budget and shut down government, not passed bi-partisan immigration reform that favored Republican requests, the question is more likely referring to dysfunctional government not so much autocracy. In my opinion, it does not reflect democracy (unless the younger generation does not understand its meaning, which again shows that we, educators, are failing), but it asks about a dysfunctional, polarized government.

"I truly think that Gen Z is referring not to authoritarianism but to the stalemate at the Congress or Senate or both."

Trump is continuing to insist the 2020 presidential election was rigged against him despite this claim being repeatedly rejected in the courts and by independent election experts.

On January 6, 2021, hundreds of his supporters stormed Congress in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent Biden's election win being officially certified. Trump has been criminally charged over allegations he broke the law attempting to overturn the 2020 presidential election both nationwide and in the state of Georgia specifically. He has pleaded not guilty to all counts and claims the allegations against him are politically motivated.

Uncommon Knowledge

Newsweek is committed to challenging conventional wisdom and finding connections in the search for common ground.

Newsweek · by James Bickerton · April 5, 2024

26. Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces

A 51 minute podcast covering some critical SOF issues is at his link: https://irregularwarfare.org/podcasts/strategic-disruption-by-special-operations-forces/

Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Ben Jebb · April 5, 2024

Episode 102 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast examines how special operations forces can disrupt the strategic designs of Washington’s adversaries.

Our guests begin with an in-depth discussion on civil-military relations, examining the relationship between SOL/IC and SOCOM. They then discuss the unique capabilities that special operations forces bring to the table, both during peacetime competition and large scale combat operations. Finally, they address the complexities of interagency cooperation, and how irregular warfare units can leverage their skills to deter adversaries, impose outsized costs, and create relative positions of advantage.

Christopher P. Maier is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Previously, he has served in numerous positions in government to include leading the DOD’s Defeat-ISIS Task Force and serving on the National Security Council Staff as a director for counterterrorism. Mr. Maier holds degrees from the University of California, Berkley, and from the Fletcher School at Tufts University.

Eric Robinson is an acting associate director of the International Security and Defense Policy Program at RAND. Mr. Robinson’s research focuses on special operations, irregular warfare, and gray zone challenges, and he holds advanced degrees from the College of William & Mary. In 2023, he co-authored a report entitled, “Strategic Disruption by Special Operations Forces,” which serves as the anchor for episode 102.

Ben Jebb and Nathan Kaczynski are the hosts for this episode. Please reach out to Ben and Nathan with any questions about this episode or the Irregular Warfare Podcast.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is a production of the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). We are a team of volunteers dedicated to bridging the gap between scholars and practitioners in the field of irregular warfare. IWI generates written and audio content, coordinates events for the IW community, and hosts critical thinkers in the field of irregular warfare as IWI fellows. You can follow and engage with us on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, or LinkedIn.

Subscribe to our monthly newsletter for access to our written content, upcoming community events, and other resources.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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